



Lockpick Eichholtz

Story the German war economy
1939-1945 _

tape I: 1939-1941 _

tape II/1 and 2: 1941-1943 _

tape III/1 and 2: 1943-1945 _

Lockpick Eichholtz

Story
the German War economy
1939-1945 _

Volume
III 1943-
1945

With cooperation from
Hagen Fleischer, Manfred Oertel,
Bertholdt Puchert and Charles Heinz Roth

Part 1

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Preface

The present volume includes three-volume work, its completion extended over an unusually long period of time. There were delays until 1988/89 everything mine cooperation long-term, officially higher at the time classified plans in the following years the during the Resolution of the Institutes the Academy of Sciences the GDR professional turbulence and existential problems. The scientist integration program in the university renewal program and most recently my work in the extremely collegial and cooperative atmosphere at the Technical niches university Berlin made possible it me, the Work concentrated to End to lead.

My friends and the Most of my colleagues thought so myself for necessary, the until 1985 to complete the work, which was published in two volumes. your criticism, also the Criticism of those who came after the "Turn" assumed that with the "real existing Socialism" Marx's social theory and Lenin's theory of imperialism had become obsolete was useful for the work. It The volume has long-standing reflections on the analytical method Depiction which resulted, above all, in opening up a view that was too narrowly focused on the economic forces at work. The criticism of such "economism" was widespread so closer and was like that more necessary than in the last period of the war Influence of course of war at the fronts on the Economy is extremely large and the interventions of political institutions - from the "Führer" and from Himmler's offices to the Gauleiters - in the economic processes were of considerable importance. Furthermore, won in the Late phase of the war the socio-psychological state of affairs of those in power Elites, especially the economic elite, a stronger weight in their political sphere Orientation and in the formulation or Acceptance of economic policy Decisions, as I her earlier to approve would have been ready. So is the specific grids, the one investigation of the War economy must be underpinned, freed from unnecessary coarseness. The conceptual instruments is from a scientific jargon that was canonical at the **time** , which will have made it difficult for some readers to understand, been relieved. It seems to me that the scientific and theoretical substance of the work has only increased as a result.

The Period, from the the tape acts, is until now from no one others author full processed been. It would be desirable that he, similar to the first volumes, suggestions for further, at many points more ins individual and into the depth ongoing research conveyed. Here become for the Time from End 1943 until spring 1945 the height points, the decline and the agony the war economy examined. The tape receives

alongside basic chapters on the war economy Structure and organization, about Production results and Air war damage as well as above decay and End the Economic activities in Germany Longitudinal chapter on German foreign trade in war and beyond the War financing. Three further chapters contain special studies on the situation of German and foreign workers and on the final phase of German occupation and to the economic Post-war planning in Nazi Germany . The mentioned subject areas are predominantly used first times examined, including detailed production development, the connections between air warfare and production relocations, the Crises of "work assignment" and his Organization, German foreign trade.*

As far as the newly developed sources and the density of the material are concerned, so it holds Volume stands up to comparison with the previous ones and goes beyond their level in that additional archive holdings, especially from some large company archives, are opened up and the Figures of the United States Strategy Bombing Survey wide include those evaluated as previously could become.

The main concern of the work remains the investigation of the material basis for the German warfare and beyond that entirety of those economic powers and interests, the dem imperialist urge of regime reaction and Violence, after exploitation, expansion, conquest and war underlying. This is intended to be a contribution to Definition of the to the forces driving war and those interested in war and their criminal methods.

Without the generous support of numerous archives, especially the Federal Archives (Koblenz and Potsdam). the coping and processing one so It would not have been possible to use the extensive source pool that is now available for the topic. Thankful am I the Co-authors of band, the in own chapters and Studies special Research objects deal, and everyone friends and Colleagues in the In- and abroad the Work as We provided encouraging and helpful support throughout many years .

I would like to thank my colleagues Martina Dietrich, whose help in producing the printed manuscript was invaluable and whose professional advice was valuable to me, Helma Kaden and Almuth Püschel.

I would like to thank the Hamburg Foundation for the Advancement of Science for their generous financial support during printing and culture.

January 1996

Dietrich Eichholtz

* Pre-publications of the author in this volume an essay in "Europe and the 'Reich Operation'" (1991), in "Brandenburg in the Nazi era" (1993) and in "Occupation and Collaboration" (1994) (see bibliography).

List of abbreviations

A4	Aggregate 4 (code name for Rocket V 2)
AA	Foreign Office
AA	Employment
Dept.	exchange department
ACDP	Archive for Christian Democratic Politics of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, St. Augustin
AD	Archives Diplomatiques, Paris
ADAP;AdaP	files to German Foreign Policy
ADR	Academy for German Law Employment
AEI	Engineer(s)
Affid.	Affidavit (declaration under oath) stock
AG	corporation; Allied Processes Working Group
Alles. Proc.	File note Arado Army
TO	High Command order
AO	Archives National Paris
AOK	Loosening-evacuation-paralysis-destruction
Ar	Institute of Industrial Science (the DAF)
Arch. Nat.	company archive
ARLZ	Federal Archives-Military Archives,
AWI	Freiburg Federal Archives Koblenz
BA	Federal Archives, Departments
BA/MA	Potsdam Battalion
BAK	Commander of the Reserve Army
BAP	Commander of the Security Police
Batl.	Representative for special tasks,
BdE	representative for the four-year plan
BdS	Bank for International settlements Basel head of the
BfS	security police
BfV	boss the Civil administration
BIZ	boss the Army Armament/Commander of replacement army
CdS	
CdZ	
boss HRüst/BdE	

CO	Comites d'Organisation German
DAF	Labor Front Dividend Tax
DAV	Ordinance Archives of Daimler-
DBAG archive	Benz AG
Degriges	German-Greek Warenausgleichsgesellschaft mbH
DfAO	implementing order
DHK	German Chamber of Commerce
Vari	Division
ous	German Institute for Dornier economic
DIW	research
Do	Displaced Persons
DP;DP	Drachma(s) Implementing
Dr.	Regulation
DVO	Germany in the second World War (see bibliography)
DZW	Ethniko Apelevtherotiko Metopo (National Liberation Front,
EAM	Greece)
	regulation to implementation and Addition of the Family
EFU-DV	Maintenance Act
	Deployment Family Support Act
EFUG	Decree
Erl.	iron and Steel community iron
Esge	producing industry
EsI	Deployment Wehrmacht Catering
EWVerpfleg.V. EEC	Regulations Deployment Wehrmacht Fee
Fagru	Act Specialist Group
FB	Guide meeting(s) (see list of sources) Franklin D.
FDRL	Roosevelt Library (see. Source list) French francs
for	Field howitzer
FH	Fieseler anti-aircraft
Fi	gun Freiherr
Flak	Foreign Relations of the United States (see bibliography) telex;
Fr.	Film collection Family Support Ordinance
FRUS	Focke-Wulf Field Economics
FS	Office, Gauarbeitsamt, Profit
FUV	Transfer Ordinance
FW	General representative for the employment of general
FWiAmt	representative General representative for the regulation of the
GAA	construction industry for Special questions the chemical
GAV	production
GBA	
GBConstruction	
GB Chem.; GB	
Chemistry	

GBM	General representative for metal ore mining,
GB Arm	general representative for armaments tasks (in the four-year plan)
Bldg. Gen.	Mountain gun(s) Major
Maj.	General Quartermaster
Gen.Qu.; GQu	General Army Staff Secret
Gen.Stab H	State Police Field Marshal
Gestapo	General Secret Field Police
GFM	General Government
GFP	Gutehoffnungshütte AG
GG	Inspector General
GHHAG	Inspector General for Water and Energy
GI	Commissioner General
GIWE	secret command matter, air
GK	force master general,
gKdos	lieutenant general Grenade
GL	launcher Gau economic
Glnt.	advisor Gau economic
Gr.W.	chamber main committee; -
GWib	committees main department
GWik;GWK	Trade policy Department (des Foreigners Office) main service manager
HA	
Have.	Army service regulations
HaPol.	Heinkel General Manager
GET	Army Group
HDV	Hermann Göring-Werke
Hey	Helpful trade politician
HGF	Committee handwritten
Hgr.	Hamburg Foundation for Social history of the 20th Century
HGW	Higher SS and Police Leader
Hiwi	Army Research Institute
HPA	Army Ordinance Bulletin
hs.	Army Weapons Office
HSG	Infantry Gun Historical
HSSPF	archive Crete
HVA	Inspector of the Security Police
HVBI.	Institute for contemporary history,
HWA	Munich
IG; Inf. G.	Paint Industry Interest Group AG Chambers
IAC	of Industry and Commerce(s)
IdS	
IfZ	
IG Colors	
IHK	

IMG	More international Nuremberg Military Tribunal (trial material)
IMI;Imi(s)	Italian military internee
Inf.	infantry
IRK	International Red Cross Industrial
ISV	Self-Responsibility Yearbook for
JfG	History
JtW	Junkers yearbook for economic
Ju	history
Jumo	Junkers engines
K	carbine; Cannon
KdF	power through joy
KdS	Commander of the Security police
Kdt.	commander
KK	District Command District
KKI	Command Heraklion
KL	Concentration Camp Criminal
Kripo	Police War Property Damage
KSSchV	Ordinance War Diary
KTB	Kaiser Wilhelm Institute Battle Car
KWI	Cannon War Economy Ordinance
CHP; CHP	Concentration Camps
KWVO	light
concentrati	Liquidity bonds trucks
on camp	legation council
l.(e)	Guidelines for the Price determination due to the Cost of goods
Li bonds	sold for services for public clients
Truck	Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg AG
LR	Member of the Supervisory Board Military
LSÖ	Commander
MAN	Ministerial Director
MAR	Messerschmitt
MBH;Mbfh.	Metallurgical Research Society GmbH memorandum
M.D	Machine gun military history
Me	Announcements military commander
Mefo	machine cannon
Memo	motorized submachine gun
MG	Ministerial Council
MGM	typescript; manuscript
Mil.Comman	
d.	
MK	
mot.	
MP;MPi	
MR	
MS;Ms.	

Mun.	ammunition
MV	Member of the Board of Directors; Central
MWT	European military administration Business
NA	Day National Archives, Washington Non-
NE (metals) NI	ferrous metals
NL	Nomarchy
NOC	Heraklion estate
NRe	Nederlandse Oostcompagnie
NS	Nomarchie Rethymnon National
NSB	Socialist(e,er,es)
NSDAP	National Socialist Bewegung (Netherlands) National
OB	Socialist German Workers' Party Commander in
OBH	Chief
ObdL	Commander in Chief of the army; Oberberghauptmann
ObdM	Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force
Obstlt.	Commander in Chief the Navy Lieutenant
OCPPI	Colonel
OKdo.	Office central de Repartition of the Produits Industriels High
OKH	Command
OKL	High Command of the Army High
OKM	Command of the Air Force High
OKW	Command the Kriegsmarine High
OQu	Command of the Wehrmacht Chief
ORR	Quartermaster Senior Government
OSS	Councilor
OT	US Office of strategy Services
PAAA	Organization Todt
Pak	Political archive of Foreign Office, Bonn anti-tank gun
pers.	personal party
Pg.	comrade Heraklion
PI car	Prefecture Passenger
PIAmt	Car Planning Office
PrAmt	Prefectural Production
PRe	Office Rethymnon
PRO	Public Record office, London
PSVR (production)	Powder, Explosives, intermediate products, rocket fuel (production)
Ptas.	Pesetas
PuS	powder and Explosives (operations)
(companies)	tanks
Pz.	Back side of the
R	Reich Labor
WHEEL	Service

RAF	Royal Air Force Reich
R.A.M.	Foreign Minister Reich
RArbBl.	Worksheet Reich Labor
RArbM	Minister Reich Railway
RBD	Directorate Speaker
Ref.	Circular
RErl.	Reich Office for Foreign Trade
RFA	Reichsführer SS Reich Law
RFSS	Gazette Reichsgruppe Handel
RGBI.	Reichsgruppe Industrie
RGH	Reichskreditgesellschaft
RGI	Reichskornmissar(iat) Ukraine
RKG	Reich Aviation Minister(ium)
RKU	Reichsmark
RLM	Reichsminister(ium) of the
RM	Interior, Reich Minister(ium) of
RMdl	Justice
RMdJ	Reich minister(ium) for nutrition and Agriculture
RMEL; RMfEuL	Reichsminister(ium) for the occupied eastern territories
RMfbO	Reichsminister(ium) for armaments and ammunition
RMBuM	Reichsminister(ium) for Armaments and war production
RMRuK	Reichsminister(ium)
RMin	Commodity Office Commodity
RoAmt	Trading Company mbH
Roges	Reichspostminister(ium) Circular
RPostM	Reich Security Main Office Reich
Rs.	Governor
RSAH	arms inspection(s); Armament Inspector(s) Armament
RSt; Rs.	Command(s)
Rüin	Armaments Commission Reich
RüKdo	Association(s) Reich
Rükomm	Association Iron Circular
RV;RV	Order(s) Reich Association Coal
RVE	Reich Transport Minister(ium)
RVfg(g)	Reich Office for Economic
RVK	Development Reich Chamber of
RVM	Commerce Reich Minister of Economics
RWA;RWiA	Rhenish-Westphalian Coal syndicate
RWiK;RWK	heavy(s)
RWiM;RWM	storm Division (the NSDAP); Special Committee
RWKS	SA standard leader
S.	
SAT	
SA staff	

S-	Barrier or protection
companies	operations Speedboats
S-boats	Security service Special
SO	confiscation campaign Self-
SE	propelled guns Swiss
campaign	franc security police
SFL; Sfl.	Swiss Naval War
sFr.	Management Credit
Sipo	Institution Swedish Crowns
SKA	Southeastern Europe Society
SKL	Schutzstaffel (the NSDAP)
sKr	Main camp for Prisoners of War
SOEG	State Police Tax Change Ordinance
SS	Assault Gun(s)
Stalag	Secretary of State
Stapo	regulation about taxation and the employment law treatment of
STAV	the Workforce out of the occupied eastern territories tank
StG; Stu.-Gesch.	(Focke-Wulf)
Sts.; StS	Table diary
StVA East	telegram
	entertainment(s)- and Extension(s)(- required)
Ta	Submarine
Tab.	essential
TB	US Army Air Force non-interest
Tel.	bearing Treasury notes
U- and E(-need)	United States Strategy bombing Survey
submarine	Undersecretary of State
UK;UK	Chairman of the supervisory board of
USAAF	the state-owned company, quarterly
U-	magazines for contemporary history,
Treasures	people's court
USSBS	Lecturing Legation Councilor
VAT	Vlaamsch National Verbond
VAR	Ordinance Liaison Officer
VEB	Economic department (the IG Farben) Chairman of
VfZ	the Board of Directors
VGH	Union People's own Operations of retaliatory
VLR	weapons
VNV	regulation above Merchandise procurement credit
from	Wojew6dzkie Archiwum pafistwowe w Katowicach, Katowice
VOffz.	
Vowi	
VV	
VVB	
V-	
Weapons	
VWBG	
WAP	

WE	Military training camp
warehouse	Military tax law
WehrStG	Military economic staff
Wewistab	Wehrmacht command staff (in the
WFSt	OKW)
WHW	Winter relief organization
WiAbt.	Economics Department
Wifo	Economic Forschungsgesellschaft mbH
Wigrü	economic group
Wipo	Economic policy department (the IG Farben)
WiRüAmt	military economics and Armament Office (of
Wistab	OKW)
East WT	Economic Staff East
WVHA	Wehrmacht part(s)
WWi	Economic Administration
ZAmt	Main Office (the SS)
ZAV	military economics
ZfG	Central Office
ZPE	Additional Export Procedure
ZPP	Journal of historical science (see list of sources)
ZSg	(see list of sources)
	Contemporary history Collections (in the BAK)

Chapter I

The Year of crisis 1944. Climax and Decline of the war economy organization

1. War prospects and economic situation

It was military and political the War for the German aggressor end 1943/beginning of 1944 had long been completely hopeless. The Red Army had broken through the German defense line in the east, the so-called Ostwall, which had been prepared for a long time but had hardly been completed in any section, almost everywhere from Latvia to the Sea of Azov, had Kiev, Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye 'e freed and moved on on the rise. In Western Europe seemed like what the German intelligence services about the conference in Tehran (November 28-December 1, 1943) were able to find out Danger of opening the Second front is imminent and with it an extensive two-front war against an opposing coalition that is materially superior threaten, the The regime had previously been spared this dimension. British and American forces were already stationed in the country of the defected Italian ally; They had conquered southern Italy and landed in the immediate vicinity in January 1944 Near Rome.

From a war economic perspective, the final loss of the Donets Basin in the fall of 1943, followed by that of Krivoj Rog and Nikopol in February 1944, represented the most serious loss for the Germans. In the occupied countries, resistance to economic exploitation and deportation became stiffer of workers. The Anglo-American air raids have been directed since Summer 1943 increasing damage in German production apparatus. The economy had to make up for the enormous losses in war material, but at the same time it had to use around 30 percent of its supply of skilled workers from the UK alone to Replenishment of the army. ¹ The "dilemma of the lack of people" ² threatened to become insoluble.

According to their own assessment, the German military was in a crisis in its warfare and was definitely "taking it into account." the Possibility of further "serious crises"³. The political situation in the German sphere of influence was, after all, quite euphoric Judgment of Security service from the end of 1943/beginning of 1944, not yet from a "general crisis of trust" marked; well, but be the Danger not be ruled out, that the enemy with his political and economic Post-war ideas (last in the

1 Please refer DZW, Vol. 5, p. 30.

2 IMG, Vol. 37, S. 662, Doc. L-172, Lecture from Colonel General Alfred Jodl before the Reich and Gau leaders on "The strategic situation at the beginning of the 5th year of the war", November 7, 1943.

3 Ibid, S. 666.

Statements from the Muscovites and the Tehran Conference) is trying to "gain a spiritual foothold in Europe" and "into the emerging crisis of trust".⁴

The fact that the German rulers at the beginning of 1944 did not yet see the inevitable defeat in sight or even thought of surrender was, apart from their chauvinistic hubris and ideological obstinacy, also due to objective factors that influenced their conviction after offered the chance, the fortune of war to turn again.

First and foremost was the fact that the German-Soviet front ran far from the German borders and that German occupation regime in the West, north and southeast Europe essentially remained intact was. Those in the east are still 500 to 1,000 km deeply occupied territories should "as main strategic size The occupied areas around Germany were "spatial capital," explained Colonel General Alfred Jodl, chief of the Wehrmacht command staff, on November 7, 1943, "from which we draw today"; even in the East there was "no ^{success} of the enemy...immediately fatal, unless the shutdown of the Romanian oil area".⁶ Even in the south, as Hitler said on May 27, 1944, a week before the evacuation of Rome, with the strong German defense "im seen big... completely irrelevant whether we a little further south in Italy would stand or not".⁷ In relation on the war economy resources had the "Space factor" also big Weight.

Under these circumstances, the German strategists considered Danger of Invasion of Western Europe as the largest. But they stopped there itself - in typical underestimation of opponent - for being sufficiently prepared and able to decisive landing battle" to beat victoriously and "take the enemy into the "To throw back the sea".⁸ Because of that, like that If they believed, the invaders would be deterred in the future, "Fortress Europe" (Jodl) would be maintained and new opportunities for offensive strikes in the East would be obtained.⁹

Furthermore, the ruling circles relied on the proven efficiency of the German war economy. Protected against resistance by the working population through terror, effectively regulated by the state in a monopoly manner and supported by the resources of half of Europe, war production has made significant quantitative and qualitative progress since 1942 made. The front's losses could so far in essential balanced,

4 Special report of the SD on "Basic questions of the mood and attitude of the German people", from around December 1943/January 1944. Quoted from Herbst, Ludolf, Total War and the Order of the Economy. The war economy in the area of tension between politics, ideology and propaganda 1939 - 1945, Stuttgart 1982, p. 299 f.

5 Groehler, Olaf/Schumann, Wolfgang, From the War for the Postwar. problems military strategy and politics ... In: JfG, Vol. 26, 1982, p. 278.

6 **IMG**, Vol. 37, S. 639; S. 661 (How Note 2).

7 IMG, Vol. 33, S. 77, Doc. PS-3780, interview Hitler's with ambassador Hiroshi Oshima, May 27, 1944.

8 Hitler's instructions for waging war 1939-1945. Documents from the Wehrmacht High Command. Ed. v. Walther Hubatsch, Munich 1965 (dtv, 278/79), S. 270 ff., Doc. 51, Instruction No. 51.

9 This was precisely what seemed morally and politically important to Goebbels: "A victory (in the East - DE), and our entire situation will be fundamentally transformed." (BAP, FS, Film 10809, Goebbels Diary, November 12, 1943).

the new installations will be equipped with modern equipment. A new generation of war technology had emerged and some have already been produced in series.

The threats mentioned - Air damage, labor shortages - affected the German economy considerably. Industrial damage (Essen, Schweinfurt, Berlin, etc.) has so far only been peripheral. In contrast, the German occupation of northern and central Italy provided those responsible for armaments with a welcome increase in military capacity of workers, the she now without consideration of Italian needs for their own purposes.

At a working conference of the Reich Industry Group at the beginning of December 1943, pithy speeches were made in praise of those who were used to victory "dynamic self-responsibility" of industry and invoked the "maintenance of the highest possible industrial effectiveness"; this depends "on the strongest concentration of the areas of work and from the limitation to the tasks that are important to the war effort".¹⁰

But the shadow of the strategic crisis also loomed over the economy. The immediate future raised serious questions, such as the prospect of an air war against the German armament in view of the imminent invasion, after the personnel overload of the economy and the front and after the vastly superior economic potential the enemy coalition, which had to have a completely different effect with the invasion than before.

In fact, the first half of 1944 put the German war economy to its toughest test yet. Difficult changeover processes affected the economic effectiveness and created social unrest, especially the relocation of significant parts of the armaments industry from cities and regions threatened by air warfare to less endangered areas, the relocation of particularly important companies and parts of companies to underground production facilities, the closure of many other companies civil sector, the extension of working hours in key armaments areas and the widespread introduction of home work for women.

Still stayed the general course the economy still proportionate stable. In almost all areas, arms production reached peak levels until June/July. The high investments in armaments the previous years became productive. The German "armament miracle", at that time also in the repeatedly invoked by the public, showed perseverance and helped spread the certainty of victory. Still worked the organizational mechanism of the defense industry; the concentration the regulatory power and the rationalization powers of the industrial leaders at the top of the committees, rings and commissions of Reich Ministry for Armaments and war production even continued to increase significantly.

This stability was also a result of the front location. The Western powers played on the until June European Theater of war one subordinate role. She prepared the invasion

10 BAP, Siemens AG, No. 5863, hectograph. Press information, "The BI."(?), December 8, 1943. - Albert Vögler took the production success figures as proof of "the unbroken power of the German economy" and suggested to the participants in the general board meeting of the United Steelworks Group "another "An enviably good picture of the German armament situation" (Archive Thyssen AG, VSt/4127, closing statement Albert Vögler, December 21, 1943).

by paralyzing significant parts of railway traffic in Western Europe from the air since April, with strong support from the Belgian and French resistance movements. The concentrated air raids against the German aircraft and fuel industry since May seriously impaired the war economic situation. Furthermore, the military and potential deployment of the Western Allies in Europe was low until June 6th. Only in Italy did they tie down stronger German forces.

On the other hand, let the Red Army the Not the Wehrmacht in the east hoped-for breathing space. From January to April/May she conducted significant offensive operations without interruption near Leningrad and in the south almost 4 500 km long front up to 600 km was pushed back to the west. The Leningrad region, almost that entire Ukraine and the Crimeans were liberated. The Wehrmacht's extremely costly retreat only occurred in the south the Romanian one Northern border before I i and to a standstill not far from the Polish border.

The bill, the the OKW in November 1943 in the Instruction No. 51 had opened, pointed so already in Spring 1944 serious errors. In first line worried them German leadership the threat to their southeastern flank and thus to "war-decisive" economic resources. Iodine! had already on November 7, 1943 pointed out this point: "Control of the Balkans as part of Fortress Europe (is). operational, military-political and economic reasons decisive for the war." ¹¹ In the Balkans, for example, 100 percent of the total European production of chrome ore and 50 percent of crude oil are mined.

It was not until the summer and fall of 1944 that the German defense began to collapse West and Eastern Front, in the Balkans and in Italy the war economy finally valid on the downhill track. The defeats that befell the Wehrmacht from June to October were not only military, but also economic irreparable.

The German frontline losses in the summer/autumn of 1944 were higher than in any comparable period before and ultimately caused all attempts to recruit the Wehrmacht to fail and bring it materially, quantitatively and qualitatively back to its previous level. In the West they were from June to September over 400 000 man, two thirds of whom were prisoners. At the They served on the Eastern Front from June to October on over one Million man. Huge quantities of weapons, equipment, vehicles and other material were lost. ¹²

The Ruhr area and Upper Silesia - two centers of German armor - were in immediate danger of being attacked by the enemy. French and Belgian deliveries stopped, as did important agricultural and raw material supplies from Eastern and Southeastern Europe. The oil wells in Romania, western Ukraine and Estonia and the nickel deposits in Petsamo were lost. Now neutral states also largely stopped their foreign trade relations with Germany.

Air raids of the Allies against the German armaments hit fuel plants and refineries in series. Aviation fuel production finally fell to a few percent in September the generation from the April away, so that the German air force "largely non-action

11 IMG, Vol. 37, S. 652 (How Note 2). See. the Pay at spear (II, S. 370 f.). 12 See DZW, Vol. 5, S. 672; Vol. 6, p.78 f.

capable" became¹³. In the fall of 1944 the Allied bombers and low-flying aircraft were large Parts of the German transport network came to a standstill, which increasingly paralyzed the war economy and ultimately caused it to break apart into individual parts. The restoration of the fuel plants, the armaments factories and the transport network became a futile race against time, requiring enormous economic effort cost.

Until June/July, the vast majority of Germany's ruling elite was still in agreement with the regime's military and political strategy. Even if skeptical about one victorious end of the war, so These circles saw the fact that the continent from the Atlantic to the Dnepr was in German hands, a reassuring pledge for an outcome of war with good result and Profit. The defeats of Summer and autumn changed them Position thorough. With The "Third Reich" came to an end.

But in this extreme situation it extreme differences of opinion in the Question how War to one bearable end to be brought. Only one disappearing small minority of officers and politicians wrestled itself to the by consistent anti-fascists championed conviction that the regime must be violently overthrown and the war must be ended immediately on all fronts. The majority expected a breakup of the anti-Hitler coalition and a compromise with the Western powers at the expense of the USSR, with the war continuing in the East. The greatest possible maintenance of the military and Armament power therefore appeared urgent required: on the one hand in the to hold out east and to stabilize the front, on the other hand, to become a partner to the Western powers recommend; The aim was to give them a corresponding signal through strength, not weakness. Steering this course, Hitler never tired of the "necessity" to talk about "fighting for every square meter and therefore to gain time every week".¹⁴

Prominent representatives of the old elites certainly supported this murderous course. Ambassador a. D. Herbert v. Dirksen, a politically experienced observer of international conditions, wrote to his cousin Georg v. during the Battle of the Bulge. Schnitzler, board member of the IG Farben Group, alluding to the growing ones Differences between the Allies in the Balkans: "The longer the war lasts, the more political opportunities it presents for us."¹⁵

The war economic apparatus under the direction of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production remained until late in the fall of 1944 largely intact and proven - despite all the hustle and bustle and increasing overall economic conditions Disorganization - effectiveness and flexibility; Those responsible for armaments managed to start production of weapons and military equipment at an astonishing level to hold and the Fronts even under catastrophic ones Conditions to provide the bare necessities.

The closer the defeat came, the more more serious stood up the German economic elite the question of all questions: the question of their own continued existence - this time met with unequal criticism circumstances than 1918. One of their main concerns consisted of the material substrate

13 Ibid, Vol. 6, S. 162.

14 ItZ, ED 115, NL Alfred Iodine!, Vol. 3, BI. 75, TB entry July 3, 1944.

15 BAP, Estate v. Dirksen, No. 14, BI. 529, v. Dirksen at v. Schnitzler, December 23, 1944.

of their Might, in first line the Production potential the Industry, before the destruction - also through heroic ones Actions of Nazi politicians and military personnel - to rescue. Capital was threatened with devastating consequences and possibly the final loss of its rule through internal unrest and revolutionary overthrow; particularly suspicious, even panicked. In this context, the ruling circles were fearful of the advance of the Soviet armed forces.

Given this gloomy perspective, representative capital circles, especially the Reich Industry Group, very deliberately developed counter-ideas which, when expanded into comprehensive plans in the second half of 1944, constituted a kind of double strategy - Substance conservation and anti-revolution strategy - for the transition from the war to the post-war period. The planning also included extensive economic problems with a high degree of uncertainty, such as the German ones Post-war opportunities in the global economy and seemingly secondary Questions such as the stability of the market currency.

This gave the criteria according to which those circles decided the military strategy and the outside-like domestic political activity of regimes judged. In the last months of the war there seemed to be only one thing: merging with the Western powers or one separate surrender one more or less acceptable peace settlement to promise and it before everything to enable the To keep the Red Army away from the interior of Germany. From this resulted itself a fundamental agreement with parts of the military and Nazi leadership.

In the domestic political sphere, the majority of the ruling class's fortunes remained unchanged, even still tighter as so far with the regime. The domestic political stability of the Reich seemed to her to be the most important prerequisite for preventing social unrest and fighting towards the end of the war. In this area was the cooperation of business leaders, Nazi leadership and the fascist repressive apparatus particularly close and intensive. This concerned the preventive mass arrests and executions of communists and other anti-fascists since the summer of 1944, the creation of a repressive apparatus specifically aimed at combating possible unrest among foreign forced laborers, and the murder of many thousands CONCENTRATION CAMP- and prison inmates in the last Weeks of war and -months by shooting and on "death marches" last but not least also social policy measures that should firmly bind workers, returning soldiers and civilian refugees to the companies and the social system as a whole.

2. Armament planning and Armament organization at the Turn of the year 1943/44

a) Starting positions

The turn of the year 1943/44 was a time of uncertainty and of illusions. There was still no sign of the Wehrmacht and economy this time instead of the expected winter break. Because of the continued Soviet offensives on the Eastern Front, they would not be able to take advantage of a longer period of calm. The air raids were aimed at German cities and production facilities significant Damage at. But they were still not full, concentrated and

persistently aimed at economic goals, and the damage were generally still through the locally available forces remediable, often in shorter deadline, as first assumed.

The armament plans, the to this Time in the German leadership circles forged were therefore to a large extent intact, efficient economy calculated, the in the Arms race for a long time keep up with the view and in front of yourself would prove to be superior to everything in terms of quality.

New, large-scale programs emerged in all areas of armaments, often with new technical specifications and requirements. The development and demonstration of armored cars were frequent and assault guns subject of Armaments meetings with Hitler, who on these occasions repeatedly emphasized "the incredible importance of the production of assault guns and tank destroyers", "Their value time is far greater than that of the corresponding armored cars" ¹⁶. In December 1943, Ferdinand Porsche (Volkswa genwerk) was replaced as head of the tank commission at the Ministry of Armaments Gerd (Gerhard) Stieler v. comes to the Henschel Group. Heydekampf commissioned. ¹⁷ This meant that the designer Porsche was replaced by an expert in mass production. The Special Committee Armored car was out the Armored Vehicles Main Committee and Tractors removed and to one independent main committee. His Management took over in December 1943 Serious Blaicher from the Mill construction and Industrie AG Braunschweig (MIAG), a company managed by MAN.

XXI (600 t) and Type XXIII (250 t) electric V-boats , which were designed for long underwater travel and high speed, were in November 1943 put into series production after a risky short construction period. In the summer of 1944, the plan was to have 60 a month of these boats are built - a completely illusory number. The new types, the first of which were launched in the spring of 1944, suffered from technical defects until the end of the war. ¹⁸ At the end of 1943, with Hitler's approval, the ministry ordered "that all V-boat production transports, including their supplies, may be referred to as 'tanks'." ¹⁹

Informed on January 2, 1944 Friedrich Lüschen and Karl Küpfmüller Hitler "about (the) state of electrical research and production, especially the location problem, with a demonstration one Exhibition in the Special car". ²⁰ Given the devastating Submarine- _

16 FB, November 13-15, 1943, point 16; Saur, November 13, 1943. See also FB and Saur, passim (Dec. 1943/Jan. 1944).

17 sour, December 21, 1943. - Stieler from Heydekampf was temporarily Board member the Adam Opel AG,

"an excellent production man" then took over the **truck factory** in Brandenburg and was finally appointed (June 1942) by the Minister of Ammunition as director at Henschel (see IfZ, ZS 1186 (Carl Luer), Vemehmg. Luer, November 26, 1947). After the war was St., among other things, general director of the NSU works.

18 Please refer Cape. II in the preliminary vol.; further II, S. 311.

19 BAP, Siemens AG, No. 5624, Rs. HA Elektrotechn. Products, December 31, 1943; s. a. sour, December 4, 1943; FB, December 6/7, 1943, point 8.

20 Saur, January 2, 1944. - Lüschen was deputy chairman of the board, Küpfmüller was a board member of Siemens & Halske.

losses in the previous Year and the allies Air superiority had itself straight at the "location problem" (radar technology) shown that the technical superiority of weapons and equipment at an ever-increasing pace passed over to the Allies. „Dr. Lüschen and Professor Küpfmüller assure that it of German research, if it is possible them to be concentrated, in proportion must succeed in a short time, the English in terms of their lead in the field of to recover the location." ²¹ Hitler assessed the problem only superficially. Apparently he was only interested in German submarine warfare. The Armaments Minister, however, already had Lüschen in mid-December 1943 "for the Entire field of electrical engineering as more orderly and more summary Dictator". ²² He put him in charge of the Electrical Engineering Main Commission, which was founded on January 19, 1944. which should summarize all developments in this area. ²³ Speer had to withdraw Lüschen's appointment as head of the radio measurement commission because of resistance from the Luftwaffe, which insisted on its prerogatives and imposed Karl Rottgardt (Telefunken) as its man. ²⁴

At the turn of 1943/44, the Luftwaffe leadership did not yet have a clear concept for the coming war. Hitler still shared, unlike Hermann Göring, field marshal general Erhard Milch and one part of air force general, the Opinion of Air Force Chief of General Staff Günter Korten and others that the Air Force must remain an offensive weapon. His motto was: "Terror can only be broken through terror. You have to take counterattacks - Everything else is nonsense." In general, the Luftwaffe gradually became more defensive, but... it none existed uniform opinion as to whether... the fighter plane, the bomber plane or those in development developed rocket and jet aircraft the priority to be given". ²⁵ Hitler was disruptive the Change considerably through voluntaristic decisions. It had a particularly negative influence on development and Production start-up of two-jet jet fighter Me (Messerschmitt) 262

- which he otherwise supported and from which he expected miracles - by sticking to his order for months, "that she (the Me 262 - DE) may initially start production exclusively as a bomber. ²⁶ Speer made several capable engineering and management personnel available to the General Aircraft Master "to assist with the start-up of the Me 262" ²⁷ and for other key areas of air armament.

Around the At the same time, extensive production programs were also launched for artillery and for Infantry weapons decided. ²⁸ In total betrayed the Armament planning for 1944, that

21 FB, January 1-4, 1944, Point 6.

22 Timeline, December 18, 1943; s. a. December 21, 1943.

23 sour, January 19, 1944; see. 11, S. 130; DZW, Vol. 5, S. 351; BAP, Siemens AG, No. 5620, Bl. 171 ff.,

Protocol d. Discuss b. Lüschen, January 29, 1944.

24 BAK, R 3/1589, Lecture notes Lüschen for Speer, December 27, 1943.

25 Groehler, Olaf, story of the air war 1910 until 1970, Berlin 1975 (in following: Groehler, Air War), p. 389; p. 412.

26 FB, June 7, 1944, Point 6; s. a. FB, December 16/17, 1943, Point 6.

27 sour, November 1943.

28 sour, January 17, 1944; FB, January 25-28, 1944, Point 13 ff. - spear had itself End December on his trip to Lapland German-Soviet Front itself from the shortcomings of the infantry equipment.

the defeats of Summer and autumn 1943 on the German-Soviet front with their enormous material losses the German leadership still in fresher Memory was and she encourage them to do so everything else and under all circumstances to secure material equipment for the army.

The conditions for the planned armaments achievements were, of course, no longer as favorable and stable as they were in the previous years. As far as raw materials were concerned, so was It was clear that further withdrawals would seriously endanger the available potential. Speer had after the collapse the German front in the Ukraine and after the Capture of Kiev by the Red Army as a precautionary measure memoranda for Hitler over the central "significance of the Chrome to drive out the Balkans and the Türkiye", of nickels out Finland, des Manganese from Nikopol etc. for armaments in 1944/45.²⁹

The Energy balance was in the November December 1943, as itself the Power plant capacity "due to lack of running water, Enemy influence and ... repairs" had been reduced by 27 percent³⁰, so tense that the Quota the ordered power cuts and shutdowns, at seven to eight percent, was almost twice as high as in the same months last year.³¹ All electricity consumers with more than 5,000 kWh monthly consumption (in the previous year: more than 10 000 kWh) were subject to a ten percent restriction. Furthermore, according to a "shutdown plan" the central planning or of the planning office for large consumers from December onwards additional power cuts considerable height, including the production of aluminum, carbide, calcium cyanamide and cement, electrical steel and fuel (except aviation fuel). At the end of November there were also³² "cries of distress from the industry" about the lack of gas and the Cessation of "important production" to be heard. The air raids forced here before everything due to damage or failures the coking plants, to "larger shutdowns than before", especially in the Chemical industry, for the benefit of the iron producing industry, iron processing and supply industries.³³

The labor question emerged as the most explosive problem for future armaments. Mid-August 1943 was the OKW assumed with meager One million soldiers who were supposed to move to the front from October 1943 to March 1944 (April 1st) could increase the combat power of the The Wehrmacht should be maintained at approximately its current level.³⁴ In October

especially with light and rapid-fire weapons, which he has already been advised by the authorities Army equipment had been pointed out (see his "leader template 2" v. January 25, 1944; BAP, FS, film 3385). He then left an infantry weapons program hang up after By the end of (November) 1944, the highest increases in MG 42 and 43 (more than double), assault rifle 44 (up to 21 times), Fist cartridges (37 times) and mines (almost 2 1/2 times higher) were achieved (Speer, Albert, memories, Berlin 1971 (1st edition 1969), p. 332 and 564). Please refer also Cape. II in the prev. Vol.

29 Please refer II, S. 370 f.; Timeline, (8th.) u. November 29, 1943; FB, 13. -11/15/1943, Point 3; Spear, Memories, S. 328 f.

30 ZPE, 50. Meeting, November 22, 1943.

31 Please refer II, S. 391, Tab. 107.

32 ZPE, 50. Meeting, November 22, 1943.

33 Timeline, (End) November 1943; sat FB, December 6/7, 1943, Point 20 (electric energy), Point 21 (Gas).

34 DZW, Vol. 5, S. 28.

lay the suggestion, in each of the following three months 70 000 workforce the war economy - "best key employees" as Speer put it - to move in.³⁵ But already at the beginning of February 1944, after the losses and withdrawals of the last months in East, the front's need for new soldiers had risen to 1.62 million men; 840 had to be added 000 man as compensation for the in the Winter continues to close expected Losses and for the planned realignment of 34 divisions. The war economy must, demanded Colonel General Fritz Fromm, commander of the Replacement army, solely for the army 1,2 give up millions of UK employees; that was 25 to 30 Percent of the total skilled workers and specialists employed in the UK.³⁶

Everyone involved was nevertheless aware that such numbers and ideas were unreal if they were war economy, How intended, with full power continue working should. Actually became in six months (December 1943 to May 1944) a million new soldiers were added to the Wehrmacht, but around half of these were due to a reduction in the reserve army.³⁷

The strategy of the armaments minister and the company representatives advising him amounted to:

- the supply of soldiers for the front to a large extent through "combing out the Wehrmacht departments in home and Stage", all German authorities and to cover administrations, including those of the Nazi Party,
- the War economy by radicals Mobilization of the German population (including the "use of women" and the "restriction of the general "private needs") to supply all unemployed and unemployed workers,
- size Parts "of what is still necessary civil sector" the Production in the occupied territories, especially to Western Europe.³⁸

Ultimately, the easiest way to solve the dilemma regarding the labor question seemed to those in power to be to deport millions of foreigners to Germany for forced labor, albeit in certain arms circles Illusions in this Ask warned.³⁹ Conflicts ignited itself before everything between

35 Speer to Wilhelm Keitel, December 8, 1943, quoted in Boelcke, Willi A. (ed.), Germany's armament in the Second World War. Hitler's conferences with Albert Speer 1942-1945, Frankfurt a. M. 1969 (hereinafter: Germany Armor), p. 310. This withdrawal of skilled workers from armaments, Speer told Hitler (FB 14./15.10.1943, point 20), was "only possible if mining and the entire commercial war economy is included. In addition, a catastrophe reserve of 190 euros should be set up 000 were prepared primarily by trained men." This latter action ("calendar action") played a role later, in the spring of 1944 (FB, March 5, 1944, points 13 and 17).

36 DZW, Vol. 5, S. 30 (Elaboration d. BdE, February 2, 1944).

37 Ibid.; sat DZW, Vol. 6, p. 25.

38 BAP, Case XI (Wilhelmstrasse Trial), No. 724, BI. 148 ff., Doc. Pleiger-416; Affid. Walter Rohland, appendix v. April 16, 1948: "Content of my memorandum on the total war effort, "Autumn 1943".

39 Please refer ibid (Memorandum Rohlands).

spear and the general representative for the Work effort, Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel, about the so-called restricted operations in the occupied territories.⁴⁰

These differences were resolved less by Hitler supporting Speer's position than by the failure of all hopes of new large-scale forced labor recruitment the occupied territories. So over the next few months the situation in 1942/43 was sorted out successful concept of the GBA, whose position, being undermined in this way, ultimately lost all meaning.⁴¹

The reorganization of the war economy apparatus had reached a new stage since the summer/autumn of 1943. Originally limited to army armaments, production was regulated by the Ministry of Armaments and its industrial "self-responsibility apparatus". on the naval armor, on the production of basic and raw materials, on the production of consumer goods and largely also on development and Construction of weapons expanded been. The system of "self-responsibility of the industry" According to Speer, now consisted of "about 4-5 000 the best technicians and operations managers the industry".⁴² Of the decisions the Central planning, in particular of the The fate of the other sectors of the war economy also depended on the allocation of raw materials and labor decided there (air armament, transport, agriculture).

b) Speers "Guide templates"

The demands and burdens of armaments in 1944 required the Armaments Minister to be convinced one sharp concentration the Forces under the direction of "Self-responsible" apparatus of the defense industry. Speer clearly noticed this Opposition from a number of party leaders, especially Martin Bormann and Heinrich Himmler the omnipotence of the minister and those in arms, There were also centrifugal tendencies within his ministry, which mainly came from the heads of the department, Xaver Dorsch (Construction Office/OT) and Karl-Otto Saur (Technical Office), and which suited the opposition.⁴³

In the October November had he already leading Representative of the Arms companies as "industrial proxies" the Heads of office to the side placed.⁴⁴ With his "house decree" from the 13.

40 Please refer II, S. 159 ff.

41 See chap. III, Section 1 in the prev. Vol.

42 BAP, FS, movie 3385, "Leader template I" v. January 25, 1944. -At the May 13, 1943 the Chronicle puts this number at "about 3 000 heads the Industry" quantified; on June 9, 1944 Speer spoke in a public speech already by 6,000 such employees (News, No. 39, June 24, 1944; Speech to representatives of Rhenish-Westphalian industry on June 9, 1944). A compilation However, the ministry for the purpose of this speech gave much higher figures: 566 RMRuK civil servants in total (but apparently without GIWE, G.I Road creatures and OT); approximately LO 000 honorary and part-time work and 4 000 full-time employees of committees, rings, etc. (of which 6,000 voluntary and part-time Employees with ID card of RMRuK, the "direct this includes" (BAK, R 3/1627, AN for Speer, June 7, 1944).

43 Please refer Spear, Memories, S. 330, S. 341 u. passim.

44 Please refer II, S. 164.

he followed up on the "Reorganization of the Central Office of the Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production" ⁴⁵ the intention to make the Central Office a strong supervisory and control body over the entire armaments apparatus within and outside the Ministry. He appointed Nuremberg Mayor Willy Liebel, a long-time acquaintance and man he trusted, to head the office, which now consisted of five central departments instead of the previous three office groups. Liebel's deputy in office was Karl Maria Hettlage (Commerzbank), one of the minister's oldest employee; The previously independent General Department of Economics and Finance, which Hettlage headed, now formed part of the Central Office. Friedrich Scheid, board member and "operations manager" in the Kahla Group, which is closely linked to Deutsche Bank, also took on a key position. Scheid has previously been head of the Main Ring for Technical Glass and Ceramics, head of the Ceramic Industry Business Group, and head of the "Industrial Self-Responsibility" department " in the Armaments Supply Office and as such deputy to the head of the department, Walther Schieber. The latter group of offices was formed from the Armaments Supply Office outsourced; Scheid was henceforth in the Central Office as deputy Director the

"Central Department Right and industrial self-responsibility" responsible for

- „Organization the industrial self-responsibility" (committees, rings, Groups)
- Service supervision above the organs the industrial Self-responsibility
- Prosecution of misconduct employee of industrial self-responsibility (including "Law enforcement measures"). ⁴⁶

The integration of Scheid's office group into the central office was evaluated crucial role of the arms companies in the centralized German system Armaments organization possibly still on and solidified their organizational basis in the ministry. That was undoubtedly the main purpose of the revision, and certainly not without the input of such an important advisor of Ministers like Lüschen came about, from dem several connecting lines ran to Scheid. ⁴⁷

Two weeks later, Speer demanded several copies intended for Hitler Memorandums, the so-called Führer templates, gave his ministry new, extensive powers. He grasped it for a long time covered and for example already in his poser Speech on

⁴⁸ demands made before the Gauleiters on October 6, 1943 , without which, in his opinion, the armament goals for 1944 could not be achieved.

The four "leader templates" dictated on the sickbed ⁴⁹ from January 25, 1944 are in this Connection a for the Overall situation significant Document. The central

⁴⁵ BAP, RMRuK, No. 63, Bl. 91 f. Hereafter also the The following.

⁴⁶ Ibid, Bl. 91R, 92.

⁴⁷ Earlier (1942) had Separate the special electroceramic ring within the main electrotechnical ring Products (head: Lüschen). The Siemens and the Kahla Group had traditional, very close business connections. Regarding Scheid, see Eichholtz, Dietrich, The Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production and the Strasbourg meeting of August 10, 1944 (remarks on open questions). In: Bulletin of the working group "second World War", H. 3-4/1975, p. 5 ff.

⁴⁸ Please refer II, S. 174 ff.

⁴⁹ From the 18th January until 8th. May 1944 itself spear in sanatoriums outside Berlin, but carried out intensive official business most of the time (Chronicle; Speer, Memories, p. 339 ff.)

The question, Speer said in advance, was "the increase in production in all areas of armaments for the year 1944 and the methods and paths that must be taken to achieve this goal." (1) ⁵⁰ He turned sharply against "rumors" that are "in part of the higher army departments" were spread and according to them "the armament is failing at the present moment and the lack of the Weapons, tanks and ammunition are exclusively available at the front "This failure is caused". Hitler should In contrast, authorize a "success report" from the minister with which Speer will speak out against such transparent accusations. (II)

After taking over a large part of the powers and apparatus of the Reich Ministry of Economics, one is "in a sense on the verge of a new start" and can expect significant increases in the performance of armaments. To this end, the Ministry of Armaments must be given "unified command authority" and "counteracting competencies" must be eliminated . First and foremost, Speer mentioned the system of "self-responsibility of the industry" through which armaments are managed become; man It must "put it under a new slogan and increase the number of forces".

As he demanded the second one "Increased involvement of the Political party, especially the one Gauleiter as Reich Defense Commissioner, the German Labor Front and the General Plenipotentiary for Labor Deployment". It must be ensured that the Gauleiters in particular "use their active participation in armaments exclusively as an aid to increasing armaments and really mean it unconditionally in all questions relating to my department and my tasks comply with technical instructions." (1) Violent He criticized the NSDAP's district economic advisors, "who have nothing to do with armaments" and himself, quite unnecessarily "with the Erection of the corresponding organization in the middle instance, the shutdown became unimportant to the war effort Production, ongoing rationalization and security against "Casualties caused by the air war". (IV) The GBA should be called to order; it It is "important that he also sees himself as a helper for the armament tasks and does not set tasks and objectives for increasing performance and similar demands on his own initiative". (1)

Sauckel had Speer's particular offense was caused by his propaganda speeches in Thuringia to arms industrialists, in which he clearly attacked the "industry's self-responsibility" and declared that the Russian system of "self-evident compulsory" be but obviously the more powerful. ⁵¹ At the Reich press conference on December 5, 1943, he made a grand gesture about the war economy called upon to make a final effort. ⁵² The armaments minister protested: "After all, I have to reserve the time and also the form in which I to call upon the men of armor for their final mission in a Reich roll call." (IV)

Indirect handle he even Goebbels at: The Reich press chief have "for that to care for, that

1. all Article and announcements, the itself with armament or war production employ

⁵⁰ In the following after BAP, FS, Movie 3385; the Pay in brackets describe the number the quoted "leader template".

⁵¹ Thuringian Main State Archives Weimar, RSt, No. 190, Bl. 5 ff. (Bl. 7), speech Sauckels on the "War conference the Thuringian defense industry", December 4, 1943.

⁵² Ibid, speech Sauckels on the 4th Reich Press Conference, December 5, 1943.

gen, go through my office for approval and any necessary revision, 2. It is up to me to decide when and how often such announcements and articles are made." (IV)

Hitler, the minister suggested, should have a similar one Send a letter to the Reich Defense Commissioners/Gauleiter, a "decree on cooperation with the Plenipotentiary General for announce the "work assignment" and let him, Speer, speak in front of the Gauleiters. (1)

The rather harsh tone of the "leader templates" and the ultimate impression they make their recipient had to make, indicated the urgency and weight of the decisions to be made. At the same time, they revealed the contours and severity of the power struggle that was actually taking place. Whether it there was a "winner" in this fight and whether Speer, after months, could feel like such ⁵³, remains doubtful. Rather, it was the war events that took away the sharpness of the old contrasts and created new, more comprehensive ones Put problems on the agenda and the opponent a to impose a more or less uniform course.

3. "Hunter's staff" and „Rod Geilenberg"

Between February 20 and 25, 1944, the British-American air fleets flew a concentrated wave of attacks against the German aircraft industry, against aircraft repair and against other companies important for air armament. The main targets of the 26 serious attacks with a total of over 9,800 aircraft sorties were production facilities for the Me 109 and Me 110, the FW 190, the Ju 88 and Ju 188, including aircraft factories in Leipzig, Braunschweig, Oschersleben, Augsburg, Regensburg, Gotha and Rostock; They were also hit hard Ball bearing factories in Schweinfurt, Cannstatt and Steyr. In the February became For the first time, more German fighter planes were shot down over Germany and Western Europe than on the German-Soviet front. Only from that point on could you speak of the establishment of a "second air front". ⁵⁴

The slump in aircraft production that resulted from the "Big Week" weighed in difficult; he would have, like Speer later testified that it could be even more threatening if the Attacks were not primarily aimed at the cell factories, but at the engine factories. ⁵⁵

What happened next did not come as a complete surprise to the Nazi leadership. Goebbels, for example, had relevant news material at his disposal at the end of December 1943, the itself on the preparation of Invasion related: „As first The task is floating English warfare meant the destruction of the Germans Luftwaffe before." ⁵⁶

Since Summer/autumn 1943 stuck air force and Air armament in the crisis. The previous Air armament concept had itself given the allies Bombing offensive against

⁵³ Spear, Memories, S. 353.

⁵⁴ Groehler, Air War, p. 404 f.; the same, bombing war against Germany, Berlin 1990 (hereinafter : bombing war), S. 213 ff. Please refer also Sour.

⁵⁵ BAP, FS, Movie 3568, hearing Spear, May 18, 1945.

⁵⁶ BAK, NL 118, TB Goebbels, Vol. 56, December 30, 1943.

Germany proved to be a wrong decision and drove the aircraft industry into a dead end of type fragmentation and a lack of coordination and production control. Air armament, with its cumbersome command structures, was decoupled from army and naval armament and required comprehensive rationalization and elastic program changes and incapable of sharp concentration on just a few aircraft types. Complaints from the aircraft industry (Messerschmitt) achieved Hitler, and this found no other way as Minister of Armaments to ask Spear “To the Reichsmarschall and at Field Marshal Milch personally ensures that significantly fewer types of aircraft should be manufactured.”⁵⁷

The aircraft industry controlled by the RLM/ObdL was traditionally good in terms of production capacity, raw materials and labor equipped and presented with it objectively one Competition for the army and naval armament represented by Speer. The influence of the Ministry of Armaments on the Air armament was limited to supplies, such as metal sheets, ball bearings and on-board weapons.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, the Luftwaffe was sensitive to the fact that the supplies "practically control the programs" and that, as the Minister of Armaments later described it, "by having this in my hands, [I] had practically acquired a key position."⁵⁹

On this basis there was limited cooperation. But since the summer of 1943, the armaments' air raids began the nerve started to go off and on the air armament crisis is a crisis of the threatened to become a complete armament, it gradually became clear that that this crisis required a fundamental solution. On August 31, 1943 - in the meantime The US Air Force carried out heavy attacks, for example on the Romanian oil field of Ploie ti (1.8.), to the ball bearing works in Schweinfurt and the Messerschmitt works in Regensburg (17.8.) and on the Daimler-Benz engine factory in Berlin-Marienfelde (23.8.) flown - he gave General Aircraft Master, Field Marshal Milk, at the "Night Hunting Session" in the Reich Aviation Ministry the participants to clearly understand: “Whether we now a couple Submarines or release a few tanks more or less is ridiculous. But if I bring out more fighters, destroyers, night fighters and the equipment that goes with them, then it will work something. It's all about this.... All other questions are secondary. Unfortunately he didn't know that.”⁶⁰

Beginning around September, Speer began attending weekly meetings with his close associates of this type with the General Aircraft Master.⁶¹ One of the personalities who pushed for such forms of closer cooperation was **Willy** Messerschmitt, whose company was the most important producer of fighter aircraft and was responsible for development and production Me 262 with great difficulties had to fight and under the constant **criticism** Göring's was standing. Messerschmitt was it, the spear regular meetings "above the development and Manufacturing issues the Air force, above the New introduction from

57 FB, September 11/12, 1943, Point 16.

58 See **BAP**, FS, Film 1730, RErl. **RMRuK**, August 27, 1943, regarding the “manufacture of aircraft weapons”: “This must be increased to an unheard of extent.” See Saur, 5.8. and October 14, 1943; Chronicle , August 25th and October 13, 1943.

59 BAP, FS, Movie 3568, Vemehmg. Spear, May 18, 1945.

60 BAK, R 3/1564, Protocol the GL night hunting meeting, August 31, 1943.

61 BAP, FS, Movie 3568, Vemehmg. Spear, May 18, 1945.

Types and variants" together with the "production processors" the industry suggested⁶² and him around Help asked for the "immediate start of this" ordered by Hitler type (Me 262 - DE) in large series".⁶³

In November the Minister of Armaments gave one of his employees (Krome) to the General Luftzeugmeister Special Representative for the Production of the Me 262. Another specialist (Otto Lange) was "deployed at Milch's request ... to provide assistance after the first serious aircraft damage at Messerschmitt-Regensburg."⁶⁴ Despite this, they did Air armament as a whole and this in particular constantly invoked "great No significant progress in the fighter program. "Doesn't see the submarine side or the tank side," so Milch complained on the 19th. January 1944 Speer's head of office Saur, "that they are in four or eight Not for months a tank and a Submarine more out of one German body find out?"⁶⁵

a) The Education of "Hunter Staff"

The "Big Week" ruthlessly exposed the cardinal weaknesses of the German air warfare strategy and the air armaments organization. Already on the first day of his multi-day tour to the attacked aircraft factories („Company Hamburg"), Milch explained, completely under the impression of the destruction, at a joint meeting with the heads of the Ministry of Armaments, the The air armament program had failed: "Today I have to explain to the Reichsmarschall and the Führer: The armament is according to the program, How we presented it, not even close more to fulfill. At the moment when you, leader, believe that we have two thousand hunters, we can be happy if there are 600."⁶⁶ On the 26th. In February, Milch declared the "bankruptcy" of the air armament: "Milch turns to Speer for ^{immediate} , comprehensive assistance from the entire ministry for the totally collapsed cell factories. He believes that, given the state of things, in the month of March there will not be more than 450-600 fighters (February: 1,350). Speer promises immediate help. Suggestion of milk to form a hunter staff."⁶⁸ Milch initially imagined this staff as an improvised reconstruction staff with significant involvement from his office; but during that meeting, according to Speer's testimony, both were already clear that „that this hunter's staff is the first step towards merging the armaments of the last part of the Wehrmacht with my ministry."⁶⁹

62 FB, September 11/12, 1943, Point 17.

63 BAK, R 3/1590, Messerschmitt at Spear, November 17, 1943.

64 sour, November 1943.

65 GL meeting, quoted in Janssen, Gregor, The Speer Ministry. Germany Armament in war, Berlin/Frankfurt a. M./Vienna 1968, p. 186.

66 GL meeting v. February 23, 1944, quote at Janssen, p. 186 f.

67 BAP, FS, film 3568, hearing Spear, May 18, 1945.

68 Saur, February 26, 1944; see IfZ, ZS 565 (Karl-Otto Saur), consultation. v. November 13, 1946. The date varies in Speer (Memories, p. 343 f.: February 23; in one later Speech [2.6.44]: 28.2.) and at Janssen (p. 187: 28.2.); There may have been several visits or telephone calls from Milch.

69 Spear, Memories, S. 344.

On March 1, 1944, by Speer's decree, with the approval of Hitler, the "Jägerstab" was formed, which, endowed with extraordinary powers, was supposed to be solely responsible for directing the production of fighter, night fighter and destroyer aircraft and also in the other areas of the Air armament could intervene. The heads of the hunter staff were Speer and Milch; they had actual leadership Sour than chief of staff inside. Had his seat the Jäger staff in the Reich Aviation Ministry. "Orders from the Jägerstab are equivalent to orders from State Secretary Milch and Reich Minister Speer." ⁷⁰

Table 1
composition of hunter staff, was standing 1. March 1944

Management:	Reich Minister Albert spear Secretary of State Field Marshal Erhard Milch Joint Deputy and Chief of Staff: Chief Service Officer Dipl.-Ing. Karl Otto Saur	
Members:	<i>Responsible for</i> construction matters: special construction orders: Production planning: Labor deployment: Seizure of relocation objects: Transport matters: Energy supply (electricity, Gas, Water):	Dipl.-Ing. Walter Schlempp SS group leader Dr. Hans Kammler (WVHA) Dipl.-Ing. Heinz Wegener Dr. Fritz Schmelter Building officer Huber (instead in 2nd version: MR Speh) Will Nagel, NSKK group leader and boss the Transport units of RMRuK General Director Dr. Richard Fischer
<i>additionally (after 2. Version):</i>	Program (Me) 262: all Machine questions: additional Social care:	Captain Dr. Krome Ing. Otto Lange ORR (or. MR) Dr. Carl Birch wood
<i>later named:</i>	Affairs the Reichsbahn: Affairs of the Reichspost: Repairs: Raw materials: Health issues:	Reichsbahn President Pimple (Essen) Senior Postrat Zerbel (RPostM) Ernst Nobel Heinrich Fabric rain Poschmann

Source: DZW, Vol. 5, S. 354; 2. version (v. same Date): **BAK, R 13 V/100.**

spear claimed in his "Arrangement above the Construction of "Jaeger Staff" from the 1. March for the task assigned to the staff "to carry out the repair of damaged works or their relocation through direct issuing of orders without bureaucratic inhibitions", the highest urgency, excepted "only the ball bearing production, the concrete runways for day and night hunting, the utilities (gas, water, electricity) and the transport facilities in the bomb-damaged cities." ⁷¹ The Minister of Armaments reinforced this urgency several times. ⁷²

Göring resisted this Delivery of large parts of air armament to that Ministry of Armaments, what but had no effect on Hitler and the others involved. He repeatedly refused to sign the decree, which Speer then signed himself. ⁷³ He only confirmed post festum the Education of the hunter staff. His decree of 4. However, March treated exclusively one in Speer's orders did not explicitly mention the special task of the Jägerstab, namely Göring and Hitler's favorite idea, "the creation of bomb-proof production facilities in larger caves or new tunnels", and named the SS (Himmler, Pohl, Kammler) as being primarily responsible for the construction and for the procurement of workers (concentration camp prisoners). ⁷⁴

While the Jägerstab was, in the narrower sense, a ministerial commission with fewer than 20 members that supported the main committees, corporations and companies of the aircraft industry with comprehensive means, the entire regulatory apparatus subordinate to the Jägerstab, including the main committees, the factory representatives, etc., ultimately comprised 1 500 to 1 700 men. Originally by Milch and Wilhelm Schaaf ⁷⁵ based on the model of the Ruhrstabe only as Reconstruction- and repair staff planned, it became an instrument more effective Concentration of power and coordination the Production planning and

-regulation a specific area of Armor. He was valid as a role model for the "Stab Geilenberg" created a quarter of a year later and for similar institutions of the following period. In terms of its structure and personnel composition, it was actually similar to a miniaturized "image of the Speer Ministry", a "miniature ministry" ⁷⁶, created by the Unification of partial powers and partial functions of the RLM and of Ministry of Armaments. At the same time was the Hunter's staff but a more improvised Crises

stab, he undermined the regulatory power of both ministries mentioned, albeit to very different degrees, and was thus a harbinger of disruption and dissolution in the war economy. Special rods like the Jägerstab introduced one of the Central planning had a largely independent existence and overrode its decisions as well as numerous other previously made regulatory decisions and measures wherever it seemed necessary. This put plans and programs in other areas of war production at risk and war economic proportions were disrupted.

71 BAP, **RWiM**, No. 20308, Bl. 110 (complete Facsimile print in DZW, Vol. 5, S. 354).

72 Ibid, Bl. 113, REL. RMRuK, March 4, 1944; B.A Sachsenwerk, No. 55 I, Rs. RMRuK, March 31, 1944.

73 See. BAP, FS, Movie 3568, Vemehmg. Speer, May 18, 1945.

74 BAP, **RWiM**, No.20308, Sheet 112, Erl. Göring's v. March 4, 1944; sat FB, March 5, 1944, Point 1 ff.

75 Schaaf's significant involvement this suggestion (February 23, 1944) according to Irving, David, The Tragedy that the German Air Force, Frankfurt a. M./Berlin/Vienna 1970 (hereinafter: Tragedy), p. 347.

76 Milward, Alan S., The German War economy 1939-1945, Stuttgart 1966, S. 125 f.

In the seven months from Low point in February to for the climax in By September 1944, total production managed by the fighter staff had increased from 1,323 to 3,538 aircraft (267 percent), including 944 day fighter aircraft on 2 388 (253 percent) and those of night fighters from 46 to 490 (1 065 Percent). ⁷⁷ These successes are only possible This is partly due to the fact that the Allies no longer concentrated their air raids on the aircraft industry in the spring and summer, but instead focused on other areas (fuel plants; Invasion of Western Europe). Several factors gave the organization of the hunter staff a unique impact:

a) Priority over all other production programs and powers over all other authorities and institutions of the war economy;

b) sharp and effective concentration of the central state regulatory power in connection with a comprehensive rationalization organized under “self-responsibility” of the industry on a sharply limited basis manufacturing sector;

c) ruthless procurement and exploitation of labor (with 72-hour working weeks) using "stick and carrot" and the "scrapping" of many tens of thousands of concentration camp prisoners;

d) Profit incentives for the industry, especially through fixed prices that have now been introduced. ⁷⁸ On various occasions, the Jägerstab also intervened in personnel issues in corporations and companies. ⁷⁹

The constituent one meeting of The Jägerstab took place in the Reich Aviation Ministry. Saur presided. “The basic composition and working methods were clarified (works representatives, daily 10 a.m. meetings, protocols with ordering characteristics, determination of the relocation and decentralization policies, no more than 100 Hunter, 75 destroyer or 50 Bomber units on an unprotected one production site and away from airfields).” ⁸⁰

"The first measure we take on January 1st March," said spear out after the end of the war, “The measure was to get the technicians from all the main committees and the best production planners from the army armaments department to invest in the air force industry” and the To put air armament “on a new basis” so that, just like at the Army Weapons Office, we can prepare the officials for this Page pushed and brought in the industry”. ⁸¹ Saur employed such experts everyone important Production facilities as Director from Field offices of hunter staff (factory

⁷⁷ II, S. 664 ff. Please refer also Cape. II in the prev. Vol.

⁷⁸ According to Saur's statement, in the aircraft industry until March 1944 90 Percent of all orders based from prices issued according to LSÖ (Trials of Was Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Nuremberg, Oct. 1946 - April 1949, Vol. 9, Washington 1950, case X [Krupp trial], p. 788, cross-examination Saur, June 8, 1948). See also II, p. 513 ff.

⁷⁹ So Speer ordered the replacement of the operations manager in July 1944 of the Heinkel plant in Vienna-Schwechat, which Heinkel and Frydag had just set up (BAK, R 3/1773, Speer's order note for Saur, July 5, 1944).

⁸⁰ Saur, March 1, 1944. Speer took part for the first time after his illness on May 26th. took part in a hunter staff meeting (see chronicle).

⁸¹ BAP, FS, film 3568, hearing Spear, May 19, 1945.

commissioned) that is there for rationalization and increased production or for the restart of production the outsourcing of sub-areas to alternative locations, for the allocation of workers and for the relocation of particularly important partial production into underground and bunkered factories had to worry about.

The members of the hunter staff and their employees had free access to all works. They each had a representative or liaison can be reached at all times in the central office of the hunter staff. Saur held a daily standing meeting there when he was not on one of his extensive sightseeing trips. Each week the heads of the main airframe and engine committees (Karl Frydag, William Werner) gave detailed accounts in front of the hunter's staff.⁸²

The Hunter's staff sat an extensive concentration on two types of fighter aircraft (Me 109 and FW 190), the along with the bombers of the Sample Ju 88 (including Ju 188 and Ju 388) accounted for a total of 74 percent of all aircraft produced in 1944.⁸³ of a total of 45 aircraft types and -patterns that Built at the beginning of the year, 20 remained in July and eleven in September.⁸⁴

Already in the first half of March Technical Office the Air Force Simplifications of the Air Force program were decided upon, some of which probably had a negligible impact, while others had already been under discussion for some time.

Table 2

stipulations of General Aircraft Master/Office C (Technical Government office) about "Simplification of the Air Force Program", March 1944

(1) Ju 52	Manufacturing is in Germany deposed; for that will start up in Hungary increased and overall production together with France 50 (pcs.)/month(nat) brought to the forefront.
(2) Yu 88 P 4, H 2, S 5	becomes painted. becomes full on Yu 88 G 2 converted.
(3) Yu 88 S 3, S 4	remains How until now in the program intended.
(4) Yu 388	Output in proportion 50 Percent bomber: 50 Percent Kehl and LT [air transport?]
(5) Hey 177	(hs. addition: "overhauled; 70%: 30%") Complete series only as a night hunter.
(6) Bf 110	Complete series only as Day destroyer (hs. Addition: "and
(7) Me 1 LO	reconnaissance officers") will be removed from the program. Removal
(8) Me 323	from DFS 230, however, only if the capacity occupied for this purpose
Go 242	Hunter manufacturing can be used.
DFS 230	

82 **BAK, R 3/1756**, "Quick Reports" ex. the meetings of Jägerstabs v. 2. and March 3, 1944.

83 USSBS, Aircraft Division Industry Report (hereinafter: Aircraft Report), (Washington) 1945, 1947, Exh. III-B to III-E. - It sounded radical when the central planning department decided to "stop the production of spare parts for old (aircraft) types" and no longer provide sheet metal material for them; "a corresponding large-scale operation to scrap old ones types is (ZPE, 55th meeting, March 11, 1944). However, it remains uncertain with what consistency such decisions were implemented.

84 Groehler, air war, S. 416.

Table 2 (Continuation)

(9) Fi 156	the Manufacturing in the Protectorate is for Hunter manufacturing released. For this purpose, two production facilities will be built in France for a total of 60/month. furnished. (A work in Paris is already running for 30/mo.).
(10) BV 246	omitted.
(11)	Helicopter manufacturing becomes set.
(12)	Type cleanup for Fighter aircraft will with Gen(eral)st(ab) 6. Dept. still clarified in detail.

Source: BAK, R 3/1759, "Daily note No. 13 from the March 11, 1944" (GUC - B2).

In mid-April, Hitler himself dealt with questions of German air defense and the fighter staff in several meetings; "The decisive meeting on the Obersalzberg, in which for the first time and too later the Führer, together with Göring, determined that the hunters actually came before everything else" ⁸⁵, apparently took place on April 17th. ⁸⁶ Despite further major fluctuations and arbitrary counter-orders from Hitler and Göring, the air force program was radically cut, primarily to the detriment of the Bomber production, as inevitable and prevailed, especially after the armaments minister took over all air armaments in the summer had. ⁸⁷

Air force general circles turned against the course taken by the Jägerstab - late - Understanding that it was "equivalent to the end of offensive air warfare" and meant "almost the death of the combat aircraft weapon." ⁸⁸ The leading representatives of the arms industry, however, stood behind the fighter staff and the policy advocated by the Ministry of Armaments. Not only did they appreciate the effectiveness of the organization and its effectiveness, from which they derived considerable advantages, but had more or less clear realized that it with the offensive air warfare was over, and were above all in protecting their works and facilities as well as the transport - and thus to a large extent intact German war economic potential - before the immediate Aerial threat is of interest.

The fighter staff intervened directly in production and organized for the aircraft factories the exchange of materials and workers, managed So-called bottleneck materials and supplier parts were also brought in from the rest of the industry, even tank factories ordered parts to deliver and sat - sometimes even on dem airways - Couriers for the smooth one Transport certain urgently needed materials and Installation parts. Construction and equipment the individual Aircraft types became thoroughly rationalized. ⁸⁹ The Hunter's staff created flow

85 BAP, FS, film 3568, hearing Spear, May 18, 1945.

86 Irving, Tragedy, S. 354; s. a. FB, 6th/7th and April 14, 1944; sour, 6. and April 19, 1944.

87 Irving, Tragedy, p. 367, quoted in this regard. Orders from Hitler and Göring from the end of June 1944. Production from bomber planes from August 1944 was drastic restricted; see chap. II in the preliminary vol.

88 Groehler, air war, p.417 (quote Memorandum out of RLM/ObdL v. May 5, 1944); Irving, Tragedy, p.357 ff.

89 After the war, Messerschmitt claimed that the fighter staff had "cleared out" aircraft types be so far gone, that "the machinery not more ready for use were"; (currently, ZS 1217 (Willy Messerschmitt), consultation. v. October 7, 1946).

repair brigades and task forces to repair bomb damage to aircraft factories and also called in columns of workers, skilled workers, engineers, equipment and rooms from the army armaments. He drove the further relocation of the large aircraft factories - usually in much smaller production units - to rural towns and more remote areas. In addition, large underground relocation projects have now been started. "All construction of above-ground factories was stopped and underground factories were built instead." According to Saur's information, at the beginning of March 1944, the Central Planning Department paid the Jägerstab 550 million marks 90 for such above-ground and underground decentralization measures

But this was also where there were major "difficulties" the work of the hunter staff, which Speer named: "1) air raids, 2) fragmentation the entire aviation industry on partial works, 3) The switchover that is already beginning to underground (underground) relocation, which had to leave a certain number of machine tools temporarily unused." ⁹¹

The priority of the hunter program, however often and apparently irrefutably invoked, was last At the end but but from the changing military and armament situation and of the Main effects of the dependent on Allied air raids and in the Practice cannot be strictly enforced. For example, the highest urgency existed at the end of February in the in the arrangement from the 1. March mentioned exceptions still for the "Quick action I(infantry)-M(unitions) machines". ⁹² At the end of April, after a devastating attack on the Tank engines and -gearbox production in Friedrichshafen (Maybach; Zahnradfabrik Friedrichshafen), Hitler ordered "engine and transmission production as well as assault guns" to be given the same urgency like the hunter program to be classified. ⁹³ Since the end of May, the Reconstruction of the destroyed fuel plants absolute priority. Despite that, she kept it Hunter production was a high priority, and the authority and activity of the hunter staff contributed significantly to its stabilization and increase.

The 72-hour weekly working time prescribed by the hunter staff ⁹⁴, This often included shifts on Sundays and public holidays, which caused unrest and dissatisfaction among the population. Even in the governing ones There was uncertainty in circles and skepticism on this issue. ⁹⁵ On March 5, Saur obtained Hitler's consent "to the additional one proposed by the Jägerstab social Care the at the Hunter program involved Forces regarding He-

90 ItZ, ZS 565 (Karl-Otto Saur), Vemehmg. v. November 13, 1946 (quote) and oath!. Explain v. December 9, 1946 (550 million RM).

91 BAP, FS, Movie 3568, Vemehmg. Spear, May 18, 1945.

92 B.A of VEB Sachsenwerk Dresden, No. 55 I, Rs. RMRuK, February 26, 1944.

93 sour, April 30, 1944.

94 From the beginning, the Jägerstab adopted the 72-hour working week from other special programs (tank program etc.); the However, the official decree about it is dated only from March 25, 1944. The usual working time in the defense industry was 60 hours.

95 For details see reports from the Reich 1938-1945. Edited by Heinz Boberach, H_errsching 1984, Vol. 17, p. 6582 ff., SO report to Domestic issues v. June 8, 1944 (economy). - Sauckel complained to Hans-Heinrich Lammers that he was "neither heard nor questioned"; the 72-hour week meant "a premature ruin of the workforce" (BAP, FS, film 3353, Sauckel to Lammers, June 18, 1944). See also DZW, Vol. 5, p. 373.

nutrition and Clothing" ⁹⁶ a. At the Hunter's staff constituted itself a special presentation "social care", which, building on previous experiences, for example from the time of the Adolf Hitler tank program, introduced a complete system of disciplining and stimulating the workforce. This system was extremely typical of the fascist regime and came into being, so to speak under greenhouse conditions, favored by both his sharp limited sphere of influence as also due to the fact that in the war economy - different from later, towards the end of the year - there were no chaotic conditions yet.

The prerequisite for "social care" by the hunter staff was "a weekly working time of 72 hours for men and 66 hours for women and young people, including work breaks". ⁹⁷ "Social care" extended to

"1) Nutritional issues

2) allocation from luxury foods

3) Allocation of tobacco products and Spirits (one the most excellent Medium for performance improvement)

4) Clothing, especially sweaters, warm underwear and stockings, mainly to workers, who work outdoors must. No point submission! Free of charge! A special recognition from Mr Reichsminister Speer and Field Marshal Milch!

5) sutler goods as bonus for excellent Services. If the Manufacturing for the Month of March is brought out to the highest possible level, will be one exceptional bonus will be given!

6) Health security campaign as nutritional support."

Also important was the "special allocation for factory kitchen catering" approved by the Ministry of Food. ⁹⁸ "Constant control of the factory kitchen and camp kitchen is essential," it said it in the Decree of Hunter staff from the 18th March. "Cooks and cooks can be requested from me for necessary, immediate use."

The ever-present threat of draconian punishments for "loiterers" connected with particularly close "constant monitoring" of the state of health the worker. The basic decree quoted stated laconically: "Use of the medical examiner's service increased disease state - reinforcement of the Company doctors - Eliminate free choice of doctor if possible." At the same time, the company doctor should take "every possible preventative measure"; Under certain circumstances, the factory representative of the hunter staff could provide "strengthening agents" for three to four weeks for workers at risk. (organic malt; vitamin tablets) ("health assurance campaign").

⁹⁶ FB, March 5, 1944, Point 10; s. a. FB, May 22/23/25, 1944, Point 2.

⁹⁷ BAK, R 13 V/100, RErL. RMRuK, March 18, 1944. Hereafter also the following. The total daily break time for men was expressly set at half an hour (ibid., RErL. RMRuK, March 30, 1944).

⁹⁸ It was 30 g of meat, 15 g of fat and 150 g of bread or the corresponding amount of flour instead Typically, 50g of canned legumes and 25g of foodstuffs are provided per person per day. "Prisoners of war, Eastern workers, Poles, etc. were excluded from this exchange (ibid., statement from March 30; quoted statement from RMEuL, March 24, 1944).

The effect that the military leaders wanted to achieve with this type of "performance incentive and recognition" has apparently been achieved in many cases. Despite the widespread opinion in business circles that "given the current state of health of the worker, working 72 hours a day is irresponsible" and that if used for a longer period of time, such coercion would result in the "physical deterioration" of the workers affected, according to the report the matter certainly not beautifully colored. According to the findings of the SD, "many workers clearly recognize the current need for tension all Forces out of free will to one such increase the working hours ready"

- although the "special food allocation... "played a not insignificant role" .⁹⁹

b) problems the Industrial relocation

The relocation of large parts of armaments production above and below ground was a significant economic effort. Born out of necessity, she was a total sensitive deduction from war economy potential - Production and means of transport, materials and workforce, otherwise directly the front or in the armor could have been used. But in some of the most important branches of the defense industry she in the last a year and a half of war in the first place one more or less secure, reasonably continuous production from air raids. Yes, it also allowed them to expand by acquiring additional buildings and premises, usable machines and workers from closed consumer goods and other companies, as well as many Tens of thousands of new workers figures of concentration camp prisoners in external concentration camps were included. The scale and urgency ranked far ahead Shifting the aircraft, aircraft engines and aircraft accessories industry, behind the the The hunting staff's powers and executive authority were in place.

In the course of of The year was 1943 became clear that the industrial cities and centers and The well-known large factories of the German armaments industry could no longer be protected from bombs anywhere, even in the east and southeast of the Reich. The most common and effective form of relocation was the outsourcing of production centers and armaments plants to many small, medium-sized and larger production facilities above ground in the surrounding area. The Ministry of Armaments has drawn up extensive regulations and guidelines worked out, after which the industrialists Cost of the Relocation and, to a large extent, risk and loss of profit were reduced. The industry itself had now realized that it had become impossible under the hail of bombs

⁹⁹ As note 95 (Reports from the Reich, pp. 6583 f. and 6588). - Far from everyone who worked 72 hours received special food allotments. The preference given to certain armament programs in this regard increased the dissatisfaction of many and reduced their enthusiasm for work. However, the Minister of Armaments did not think about the "additional social benefits". he it called, "on the to the entire armaments sector" (FB, May 22/23/25, 1944, point 2).

to continue producing as before and was extremely interested in keeping their machinery and other valuable furnishings as safe as possible .

The Above ground relocation brought except the economic faux frais of course productivity and loss of effectiveness for the affected companies with them, which must be offset against their operational and war economic advantages. The integrated production process of the great works was broken into many pieces, their reassembly caused considerable loss of time and logistical problems everything the Means of transport burdened. The Production failed in largest Dependency from the regional and national transport conditions. The complex of production of Messerschmitt fighters, which is controlled from Augsburg/Regensburg, expanded through relocation into a huge network of supply relationships throughout Germany, Austria, the Protectorate and Hungary.¹⁰⁰

The relocation required more technical supervisory staff, as well as foremen, foremen, setters and toolmakers. Those were almost exclusively qualified German workers, which the works had long been suffering from a severe shortage and whose numbers were increasing due to increasingly ruthless confiscations continued to coalesce into a troop.

The technological The process became considerably more cumbersome. Implementing technical and program changes meant a much greater loss of productivity and effectiveness as already before. Overall lost relocated production Productivity, already because the scale of concentrated mass production was lost and continuous production lines and assembly lines could only rarely be set up again.

Table 3

Industrial relocation above and below ground (arms final production only; according to main committees), 1943/44

Main Committee	Operating area (1000 m')	Share of the total relocation of industry (percent)
Airframes	3 103	18.44
engines	2956	17.46
ammunition	926	5.55
weapons	844	5.01
Aircraft equipment	830	4.92
Motor vehicles	739	4.44
shipbuilding	401	2.39
Rail vehicles	385	2.28
Armored car	329	1.96
<i>Together</i>	10 513	62.45

Source: Groehler, bombing war, S. 287; there without Source reference.

100 Aircraft Report, Fig. II-7; s. a. for the The following ibid, S. 25 f.

Since the spring of 1943, Hitler had been discussing the most sensitive options with Speer, Göring and others Manufacturing" below the to move earth into Mines, bunker systems (Magenot Line), tunnels, caves, valleys and gorges to be covered. The The first large underground production facility was opened in the fall of 1943 in the Kohnstein tunnels nearby from Nordhausen/Harz for the "miracle weapon" V 2 furnished.¹⁰¹ Under the Jägerstab, underground planning took on new dimensions. Göring's decree of 4. In the opinion of their authors, March¹⁰² and Hitler's orders of March 5, 1944 marked the "start of a generous and final Relocation of all German industrial plants the Earth ..., because only on this path in a long way view the conditions for the Preservation of manufacturing facilities created for a war can be."¹⁰³

At the beginning of April 1944, the Jägerstab's planning had progressed so far that " the most of the Shifts is scheduled and as first Level the decentralization above the earth until completed around August can be and the second Level in a total Securing the most sensitive work underground will be completed by the end of the year."¹⁰⁴

The most important concern of Hitler and Goering, downright one fixed idea, which Saur and Dorsch eagerly took up was the construction of so-called fighter factories, in which fighter aircraft were not actually manufactured Earth, but more precisely under concrete, in huge, approximately 30 m high, multi-story bunker works produced become should.¹⁰⁵

101 Please refer II, S. 154 ff.

102 Göring's decree contained the serious statement: "The Reichsführer SS provides sufficient protection for prisoners Dimensions as auxiliary staff for construction and manufacturing." (BAP, **RWiM**, No. 20308, Bl. 112).

103 FB, March 5, 1944, Point 9 ("Leader's demand").

104 FB, April 6/7, 1944, Point 16.

105 Projected as about 25 m high dome-shaped buildings with three to four floors, with six all around until nine meter thick concrete reinforced (Aircraft Report, S. 32); Declarations at Groehler, bombing war, p. 291: over 30 m high, 300-500 m long, and 90-200 m broad; at Hitler was on March 5, 1944 from six to eight floors the speech (FB, Point 4). The sources about the "Jäger Factories". inconsistent and imprecise. First, on March 5th In 1944, Hitler appears to have completed the construction of two Factories with 600,000 each up to 800,000 m² - Operating area ordered to have, from those the eiqe then few later dem Plan one extension of the Mittelwerk (as "middle structure") in the tunnel system under the Kohnstein near Nordhausen/Harz for productions from Junkers and for the Me 262 wich (FB, April 6/7, 1944, Point 17). At the April 15th (after Saur a week later: April 22nd) gave Hitler special authority for the Bunker construction by decree Xavier Dorsch. Speer is talking about six to eight bunker works with 100,000 (60,000 to 100,000) m' each Operating area, "the built above ground become should, similar like the V-boat bunkers" (ItZ, ED 99, NL Speer, vol. 7, hearing Speer, May 18, 1945; sa spear, memories, p. 348; the same, The slave state. Mine Conflicts with the SS, Frankfurt a. M./Berlin/Vienna 1984 (1st edition 1981), p. 320 f.). Possibly had cod and Saur Hitler and Göring divided the original project into six or eight individual factories suggested. According to Speer there should be cod her completion until for the 1. November 1944 promised have; but became until the end of the war none either only "remotely" finished (IfZ, ED 99, NL Speer, Vol. 9, "Appendix I to the memorandum to AH from April 19, 1944 on the reorganization of Building", August 28, 1945).

The Minister of Armaments opposed this Plan. On April 19th he wrote about being nem Sick camp out of at Hitler, the Underground relocation in of their planned new dimension, particularly but the Building of the large bunker works in the current situation illusory; because “only with Effort” could “the most primitive Requirements on accommodation of the German working population, the foreign workers and the Restoration of our armaments factories complied with at the same time become. I I am no longer faced with the choice of building on a large scale view... but I have to constantly work under construction Armaments factories shut down, around the most necessary Requirements for maintenance German arms production over the next few months.”¹⁰⁶ After his return to office, preparations for the underground relocation were nevertheless ongoing in full swing. But the minister influenced the planning of the buildings and their urgency, ordered e.g. B. assume that the preparation of caves for ball bearing production Building the hunter factories to proceed would have. Hitler confirmed him that cave space “just like that rated become (have to) like above days in concrete erected works ke If the Preparation of caves more quickly take place could as the Building of concrete ken, then it is left to me (Speer - DE) to weigh up and determine the urgency .”¹⁰⁷

The underground relocation, including the bunker construction, became the most complex sector of construction activity in Germany. She claimed a long time, probably until the last months of the war, a disproportionate one large part of the construction capacity and the workforce employed in construction work. According to very rough estimates, the underground relocation at the end of 1944 took up two thirds of the construction work (construction volume) used or provided for buildings in the armaments industry (with supply industry), 69 percent of Cement, 75 percent of structural steel and 60 percent of the workforce. Underground construction probably consumed the entire German construction volume too low Estimates 20 Percent.¹⁰⁸ Of the large bunker works however, until At the end of the war not a single one was finished. Two systems, both for the Messerschmitt aircraft works, at Kaufe ring and at Mühlendorf/Inn the figure was 50 percent in May 1945.¹⁰⁹

The relocation underground was associated with one of the darkest chapters of German armament: mass and ruthless exploitation “Scrapping” of concentration camp prisoners and Jews.¹¹⁰ Since February 14, 1944, there were fixed agreements between the Luftwaffe leadership and the SS leadership about it, from to get the SS workers, ie prisoners, to build the planned underground facilities. Fritz Schmelter, member of hunter staff, testified one Art Division of labor in the hunter's staff, after the SS brigade leader

After Groehler, bombing war, S. 291, took Sour in the June 1944 even ten Bunker works in prospect.

106 Quote at Spear, Memories, S. 348.

107 FB, 13.5.1944, Point 8th.

108 Do effects, S. 232, app. Tab. 42; Pay for December 1944.

109 Groehler, bombing war, S. 291.

110 Under The more recent publications on this are particularly impressive: Perz, Bertrand, Project Quartz. Steyr-Daimler-Puch and that concentration camp Melk, Vienna 1991; Friend, Florian, cement labor camp. The Ebensee concentration camp and the rocket armament, Vienna 1989.

Hans Kammler, in charge since autumn 1943 for the underground buildings (A 4), had concentration camp prisoners work, Walter Schlempp, on the other hand, as representative of the Construction/OT Office of the Armaments Ministry, was responsible for the other buildings, other forced laborers and, from June 1944 onwards, Jews deported from Hungary for his construction sites "requested".¹¹¹ Kammler, a special favorite of Himmler, former employee of the Reich Aviation Ministry, was head of Office Group C (Buildings) in the SS Economic Administration Main Office and was responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of prisoners.

The underground production, carried out with barbaric means and great human sacrifice, had ultimately, apart from the V-weapons, the Aircraft and aircraft engine production and some armament accessories such as precision instruments, optical equipment, tubes and ball bearings in the relationship to Effort modest result, that no comparison to withstood above-ground displacement. In November 1944, according to uncertain figures, compared to the planned figures for underground operating area (7.87 **million** m²) estimates an estimated 1.5 million (19 percent) completed. Of this, around 778,000 m² (52 percent) was accounted for Aircraft industry (cells, engines, accessories) and 107,000 m² (seven percent) on V-weapons production. In an approximately the same way Magnitude The electrical industry and industries for certain machine and armament accessories (**ball** bearings and the like) ranked.

112

What is striking, in contrast, is the much lower level of the numbers handed down by Speer and Kammler. In January 1945, Kammler calculated "the production areas completed in 1944 bombproof underground Manufacturing facilities for the Armaments Staff on behalf of the Reich Minister for armaments and war production". According to him, by January 1st January 1945 the SS gave it a total of 425,000 m² of operational space in underground or bunker construction built. Until 1. In June 1945 he wanted to increase it to 1,025,000 m² have. According to Speer, the overall planning amounted to three million m².

113

The figures from the planning office already quoted, separately for the Armaments Staff and the Armaments Supply Office calculated, amounted solely to the armament staff was doubled in each case (overall planning around six million, completed in November 1944 one million m²).¹¹⁴ The differences cannot be fully explained even under the assumption that Kammler ignored the buildings completed in 1943 (Mittelwerk) and that a large part of the buildings were built by the OT outside of collaboration with the SS.

Out of one Balance sheet of year 1944 surrendered following breakdown of the underground construction volume on the "needers":

Armament final production - 35 percent petroleum security
program - 32 percent fortifications for the Wehrmacht - 19
percent

111 ItZ, ZS 1432 (Fritz Schmelter), Oath!. Explanation Schmelter, December 9, 1946.

112 Do Effects, S. 233, ext. Tab. 43; according to statist. sources the planning office of **RMRuK**. The chemical industry and the "mineral oil security program" are not taken into account. See also chapter. II i. preliminary vol.

113 Kammler at Rudolf Brandt (Personal. Rod RFSS), January 11, 1945; quote after Speer, The slave state,

S. 333 f.

114 Please refer Note 112.

Transportation - 8th percent

Water- and energy industry 3 percent mining -

1.5 percent

Civilian sector and Air raid shelters - 1.5 Percent.¹¹⁵

In many cases, the armaments plants had unpleasant experiences during underground relocation. Even the access to the underground rooms, be it through vertical shafts and elevators, be it through horizontal tunnels, created major problems, especially for the transport of extensive machinery and the numerous workers. Ceiling collapses and water intrusions were common. What was particularly dangerous was the high humidity that was almost always present, which caused problems for people and severely damaged machines, especially precision machines and measuring devices. In "Goldfisch", an outsourcing facility for Daimler-Benz's large Genshagen aircraft engine factory (near Berlin), set up in a gypsum mine near Obrigheim/Neckar near Heidelberg, unheated air was used for ventilation, often simply drafts by leaving the tunnel entrances open; The result was a drastic increase in sickness among the workforce.¹¹⁶ The lack of sufficient electrical and heating energy was one of the main problems almost everywhere.

c) The indispensable minister

The Minister of Armaments was in the first months of year 1944 above a Quarterly (January 18 - May 8th) not in Berlin due to illness. He avoided having himself represented; on the contrary, he tried to keep the reins in his hands and constantly received official visitors; Field Marshal Milk testified three to four times to have been with him weekly.¹¹⁷ Speer kept it that way the control over the entire organization of the Ministry of Armaments and its huge industrial apparatus.

But he had also reason, his Position challenged to see. In the Nazi hierarchy In addition to allies like Goebbels and Robert Ley, he also had competitors and opponents, especially Himmler, Sauckel and Bormann. Hitler's favor swayed to that one Time. The

115 Groehler, Bombe War, p. 293. The share of the mineral oil security program appears to be too high (at the expense of final armaments production), since only started in August 1944. The share of the supply industry (ball bearings, electrical and optical device etc.) is not shown separately.

116 Aircraft Report, p. 29. - Detailed documentation on "Goldfish" in Das Daimler-Benz book. Ed. vd hamburger Foundation for Social History of the 20th Century, Nördlingen 1987, p. 392 ff.; Roth, Karl Heinz/Schmidt, Michael (with the collaboration of Rainer Fröbe), Daimler-Benz AG 1916-1948. Key documents on the company's history. Published by vd Hamburg Foundation for Social History of the 20th Century, Nördlingen 1987, p. 333 ff.

117 BAP, Case XI, No. 215, BI. 10 ff., consultation. Milk, October 13, 1948. - Such meetings became more frequent (according to the chronicle) until the first week of February, from End of February until March 24th (March 17th/18th, move from Hohenlychen to Hitler's guest house, Schloß Klessheim near Salzburg; March 24th, move to Meran) and since April 2nd.

"The Führer" took a liking to the frivolous promises and unconditional zeal for service People like Karl-Otto Saur and Xaver Dorsch, the spear at represented at the meetings at the Führer's headquarters. But other impressions were stronger in the long run; not so much the letters and petitions with which Speer bombarded him, but rather the ongoing production successes in armaments. For over two years now, Speer had drawn his attention often enough to the fact that the progress and speed of armaments was thanks to the efficiency of industrial "self-responsibility." had been achieved and that this Organization only through the close relationship of trust exists and functions, which prevails between his person and his relevant representatives. The experiences that Hitler had in dozens of armaments meetings, especially in the so-called Führer meetings, with the industry experts called in by Speer were without a doubt extremely conclusive of this.

However, Speer took the causes and background for the resistance to his politics very seriously in the spring and, as became clear later in the summer, even if they were probably not entirely transparent, even for himself were. A latent pre-crisis mood had made itself felt in a complicated way and had a variety of manifestations that were not easily reconstructed.

Critical voices increased in the arms industry circles controlled by the ministry. They were under the impression of the destruction from the air and the rapidly deteriorating prospects of the war. What they found to be immediately disturbing, however, was that new forms of state regulation undermined the previously accepted self-management of the defense industry ("self-responsibility") through bureaucratic requirements and regulations, for example in the area of the hunter staff. Such commands easily went beyond interests and needs of the company, including profit interests and the interest in longer-term production planning, which had to become important not least for the post-war period.

In a certain way went the Aspirations of the new management of the Reich Economics Ministry with such sentiments and currents compliant, if she wanted to expand this ministry as a counterweight to the all-powerful Speer Ministry, forged reorganization plans for the post-war economy and propaganda against excessive concentration of production and profit in large companies drove.¹¹⁸ From the perspective of the SS and by no means insignificant business circles, their objectives were - How it would also look like - quite plausible.

118 See II, p. 164 ff. - In addition to Franz Hayler (State Secretary) and Otto Ohlendorf (Head of Main Department II), Hans Illgner, Head of Main Department I, also had a high SS rank (Senior Leader in the RFSS Staff); see Boelcke, Willi A., *The German Economy 1930-1945. Internal Affairs of the Reich Ministry of Economics*, Düsseldorf 1983, p. 305. The new head of the important Department III (foreign trade; occupied territories), Franz Kirchfeld, was a board member of Ferrostaal AG, Essen; his connections to the SS have not yet been investigated. On the occasion of his appointment, the news circulated within Deutsche Bank that "there will be further similar new appointments to official positions with prominent representatives of the private sector in the near future" (BAP, Deutsche Bank, No. 22905, AN (EW Schmidt), January 18, 1944).

Things had been difficult since the fall of 1943 the relationship between the Ministry of Armaments and the General Plenipotentiary for Labor Deployment, Fritz Sauckel.¹¹⁹ Many Gauleiters/Reich Defense Commissioners also observed Speer's policies more suspiciously than before and offered resistance, particularly when it came to the closure of companies.

The Fronde, the finally within the Ministry itself, fundamentally opposed Speer's policy in the construction sector and had a longer history. The minister's goal since the fall of 1943 had been the construction industry within Germany, the facing extremely difficult and extensive problems - military construction, underground production facilities, elimination of the air war damage, Construction of barracks and temporary accommodation - stood, one independent of the OT, which operates predominantly in the occupied territories, and responsible only to him, Speer, as a "self-responsibility" organization admit. It emerged the construction office in the ministry and the main committee Construction (July 1943), each among representatives of large construction companies (Office of Construction: Carl Stobbe-Dethleffsen, personal partner of the company Wiemer & Trachte (Dortmund); HA Construction: Bruno W. Gärtner, board member of Wayss & Freytag AG and (since October 1942) head of the economic group construction industry).¹²⁰ At the same time raised Speer allegations against the OT because of declining performance, because of the "increasing signs of decline in the OT"¹²¹, because of self-importance and convenience in the occupied territories and because of the incompetence of the "leather officials" who remained in the Reich.¹²² To Ministerial Director Xaver Dorsch, head of the OT center, he has the trust lost; Cod be "as a leader the OT center no longer portable".¹²³

Cod thwarted this concept while Speer's illness. He let itself center April

1944 by Hitler and Göring with all powers for the construction of the underground or bunkered hunter factories¹²⁴ and for other similar tasks (underground headquarters for Hitler, the **OKW**, the general staff from the army and air force and the naval command in Lower Silesia; so-called hunter bunkers Protection of the aircraft at German airfields). and promised to close the aircraft works by November 1944 (!) to complete.

How the ambition is far from Cod went, is not more precise to reconstruct. Maybe he didn't want to succeed Speer,¹²⁵ so but at least that one Position of an unum limited "Building dictator". Goering and Himmler reinforced him in this, calculated apparently already with the resignation of the minister and in mid-April we got Hitler to ensure that Dorsch gave priority to the necessary projects over all other projects received building powers.¹²⁶

119 Please refer II, S. 159 ff.; S. 241 f. Further Cape. III in the prev. Vol.

120 Please refer BAP, FS, Film 3383, various Decrees **RMRuK**, 2. half 1943.

121 BAP, FS, Movie 5884, spear at Cod, January 27, 1944.

122 Ibid, Movie 1733, spear at Hitler, April 19, 1944.

123 Ibid, Movie 3385, Speer's "Leader template 5", January 29, 1944 (not sent). Please refer also Janssen,

S. 159 f.

124 Please refer Note 105.

125 After one notice out of dem General Staff of army had cod there spread, „that Speer was terminally ill and would therefore not come back." (BAP, FS, Film 3385, AN **RMRuK**, May 17, 1944).

126 Spear, Memories, S. 349 ff.

Speer reacted with uncertainty and vacillated several times within two weeks between demanding that his overall responsibility be restored and partial or complete surrender of Construction sector to Dorsch and its own offers of resignation. After Speer's memories were primarily of milk, sour and "the industry" (especially in the form of Walter raw land), the him with urgent ideas about his intention to resign On April 25th he decided to take the bull by the horns and reported himself to Hitler, who had been worked on in the same direction immediately before. Hitler confirmed Speer in all of his functions and powers, de facto withdrew Dorsch's aforementioned appointment and gave the minister a free hand in all related questions.¹²⁷

After this turn of events, Speer made a compromise with Dorsch in the field of construction, which completely disarmed his opponents. He appointed him after the dismissal of Stobbe-Dethleffsen as head of the Office building, at the same time as its representative GB construction and confirmed it as his representative in all matters the Organization Todt.¹²⁸ Ultimately, all powers were once again in the hands of the Minister of Armaments. The phase of a serious Weak leadership was finished. The bombing offensive against the fuel plants and the further course of the war soon set new priorities.¹²⁹

d) The Beginning from the End: The allies Fuel offensive and the „Rod Geilenberg“

“The news arrived this afternoon,” said GB Chemie, Carl Krauch, the Minister of Armaments on May 12, 1944, “that serious attacks had taken place on the central German hydrogenation plants: Leuna, Lützkendorf, Zeitz, Böhlen and Brück were attacked been. From everywhere are until now heavy Damage reported.”¹³⁰ At the attacks at the 12. May were 935 heavy bomber involved.¹³¹ With it had began, What spear and other-

127 Ibid. - Dates are sometimes missing in Speer's memories, or information and dates do not match those in the sources. See also Janssen, p. 161 f.

128 BAP, FS, film 5884, spear at cod and at Goering, April 29, 1944.

129 The discussion Speer's "Peripetie" and its dating (e.g. Ludwig, Karl-Heinz, Technology and Engineers in the Third Reich, Düsseldorf 1974, p. 470 f.) seems to me to be of little use. Such a decisive, even tragic turn, a fall or a relegation The Minister of Armaments left power in October In 1943 (after the Gauleiter speech). in the spring of 1944 or early 1945 given (at the beginning of 1945 it however, the Agony of war and the war economy, which caused the Nazi system as a whole and with it the position of the armaments minister to falter and fall). An overvaluation and such an interpretation of the constant diadochi battles and internal conflicts about partial interests and competencies prepares the ground for the apology of people and institutions, for the Speer, his ministry and his armaments organization are certainly unsuitable objects. See also section 6.

130 BAK, R 25/64.

131 FB, May 22/23, 1944, point 14 (Hitler). Speer testified in Nuremberg that on May 12th “the dream of fear from me since a or two years” come true. He believed to remember that he at

We had seen with horror what was coming, namely the systematic and sustained destruction of the "particularly sensitive point(s)" ¹³² of the war economy and warfare. The US strategy of major attacks on the fuel plants in Germany had been part of the plan since the beginning of March. The Allied objective was to gain air supremacy and prepare for the invasion of Western Europe, but it only took hold after a series of successful flights in April against the Romanian oil refineries of Ploieti.

The reports from the 22nd/23rd. May. The crisis meeting called by Hitler in Berchtesgaden reflected the confusion and lack of conception of the approximately 30 people present. ¹³³ Göring tried to blame Krauch for the lack of protection of the works; but as head of the Luftwaffe he was in an extremely weak position. ¹³⁴ Hitler saw salvation in "a significantly increased extent of the fogging of these endangered works" (i.e. the fuel, buna and nitrogen works), demanded more flak and promised to release 2,500 chemical industry specialists from the Wehrmacht for reconstruction. It was also decided that deductions (of workers, especially of construction workers - DE) for the hunter staff made of mineral oil, buna and nitrogen should not take place" - which led to weeks of heated arguments around this question is her sudden end found. ¹³⁵ Speer rather helplessly directed the discussion towards the "Importance" of the "attacks against the Moscow, Upper Volga power supply" and the "reconnaissance of the Ural region" by German long-distance aviation forces that he, Göring and industrialists such as Albert Vögler, Krauch and Hermann Röchling had planned since Stalingrad. ¹³⁶

flew to Pölitz the same day and "in the night still on Obersalzberg (was) to give me a whole there special Power of attorney to provide" (ItZ, ED 99, NL Spear, Vol. 7, consultation. v. I May 9, 1945). A year later in the trial itself he this dating not verified (IMG, Vol. 16, p. 521, hearing Speer, June 19, 1946; see Birkenfeld, Fuel, p. 185).

132 Birkenfeld, Wolfgang, The synthetic fuel 1937-1945. A contribution to National Socialist economic and armaments policy, Göttingen/Berlin/Frankfurt a. M. 1964 (hereinafter: fuel), p. 183 f.; Groehler, bombing war, p. 220 ff.; Mierzejewski, Alfred C., Tue Collapse of the German War Economy 1944-1945. Allied Air Power and the German National Railway, Chapel Hili/London 1988, p. 61 ff. (also p. 80 ff.).

133 The following according to FB, May 22/23, 1944; also Birkenfeld, Fuel, p. 186 f. Among the oil and hydrogenation experts present were three leading IG Farben representatives: Krauch, Heinrich Bütelfisch and Ernst Rudolf Fischer.

134 Anyway saw Krauch itself caused, against Göring's accusations - Goering in the case of Leuna on May 14th. even with the initiation of a court-martial threatened - a "mineral oil white paper" to have the corresponding data and information drawn up (BAK, R 25/127, letter from Göring to Krauch; and R 25/156, White Paper; dated August 31, 1944).

135 BAK, R 25/127, AT GB Chemistry, May 23, 1944 (re: Result the Discuss at Hitler).

136 According to Speer, it was developed in 1942 an "economic committee consisting of Krauch, Vögler and others." a." Documents for the air raids on the Soviet power plants in the Moscow area - Rybinsk - Gorky and in the Urals, a plan that was revived "in a more private industrial action" in the winter of 1944/45. At that time, Speer claimed after the war, there would have been around 18 as well as jetic Large power plants in the mentioned rooms destroyed, then "would be the war with Russia

First he judged GB Chemie a “reconstruction staff” under Heinrich Bütefisch based in Leuna a; spear sat a Rod under cod with the designation “OT special operation hydrogenation plants” a.¹³⁷ But on the 28. and 29. May This was followed by new attacks of even greater force against the hydrogenation plants, including those that were currently being rebuilt. Now the Minister of Armaments reacted, who seemed to have gotten over the initial shock, in the usual way. On May 30th he telegraphed the text of an extraordinary power of attorney to Obersalzberg for a “general commissioner” for the restart the fuel works.¹³⁸ On the same day in the evening there was a discussion with Hitler about this, after which he signed the text. To the “General Commissioner As suggested by Speer, he appointed Edmund Geilenberg (Hermann Göring Group), the previous head of the main committee, for the immediate measures taken by the Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production Ammunition. Geilenberg's task was broadly defined with the "quick elimination of aircraft damage in crucial productions". For this purpose, he was given the most rigorous powers over all other departments and institutions. His work enjoyed "unlimited priority over all other measures"; he could “override all existing urgency classifications in favor of his orders” and even had command authority about the for Wehrmacht formations used for the same purpose .

Geilenberg had the Possibility, “everyone within the widest possible radius.” workforce, the he needed, also from the most important to get out of arms factories. He could e.g. For example, he could take pipe welders, who represented a bottleneck, out of locomotive construction, he could take people out of tank production, etc. He practically had sub-authority as a 'minister' until his needs were met.”¹³⁹

Geilenberg's staff worked under the technical guidance of the operational staff that had now been formed at GB Chemistry under Gerhard Ritter, with whom there was constant contact; The third part of the overall organization was the “Reconstruction Staff” based in Leuna. The Geilenberg Staff included the offices of the GBA and the Labor Deployment Office (Schmelter) in the Armaments Office of the Speer Ministry (in relation to labor procurement), the Construction Office (Dorsch) of the Ministry (in relation to the construction sector), the Chemical Industry Economic Group (Richard Eugen Dörr, VV Phrix AG) and the Armament Supply Office/Air Damage Staff under Director Henke (in relation to on procurement and assembly of machines and equipment).¹⁴⁰

some time afterwards completed been" (IfZ, ED 99, NL spear, Vol. 7, Vemehmg. Spear, 19.5. 1945). He reported to Hitler the formation of such a working committee “with Pleiger, Schieber, Rohland and Dr. Carl (at the same time as managing director)" only in June 1943 (FB, June 28th, point 6). More Sources and dating (1943/44) s. Boelcke, Germany Armor, S. 273, S. 319. Further BAP, case VI, Movie 413, ADB 18, Doc. NI-5821, Vemehmg. Spear, March 12, 1947.

137 BAK, R 25/127, “Overview of the measures currently underway Aircraft damage repair at the hydrogenation works", June 2, 1944 (GB Chemie).

138 How the The following after BAK, R 43 II/1157a; birch field, Fuel, S. 189 f.

139 IfZ, ED 99, NL spear, Vol. 7, Vemehmg. Spear, May 19, 1945.

140 See. BAK, R 25/3, various pieces.

Table 4

composition of "Working staff Geilenberg", was standing 8th. June 1944

Overall management	Edmund Geilenberg
<i>Responsible for:</i>	
construction matters, work,	Dipl.-Ing. Flos (OT)
telecommunications,	Fritz Schmelter
catering	Senior Postrat Zerbel (RPostM)
Social care healthcare	MR Willfort (RMEL)
Preliminary and	MR Carl Birch wood
subcontracting of machines	Dr. Gutermuth (i. A from Prof. Brandt)
and apparatus used from	Dipl.-Ing. Henke
prisoners and prisoners	Dr. Sour (Construction staff I, Leuna)
transport matters motor	
vehicle use	SS-Standartenführer Gerhard Bricklayer (WVHA)
VO OKH/Chief HRüst-	RR Hartman (RVM)
BdE	Want nail (Boss Transport units Speer)
	Gen.-Maj. Kennes

Source: **BAK**, R 3/1768, Erl. **RMRuK**, June 8, 1944.

De facto was how so often in similar cases, indistinguishable at all, if Geilenberg was Hitler's state reconstruction commissioner or the armaments minister or the special representative of the GB Chemistry Department. "Krauch was also responsible for long-term chemical planning, new construction, final decommissioning of plants... Geilenberg was the person responsible for the restoration and also for the implementation of new systems, as far as Krauch uses them recognized as necessary." ¹⁴¹ Krauch, the officially described himself as Geilenberg's "technical advisor" and provided him with his technical staff and representatives available, without the his Work was unthinkable, and let his official business is increasingly carried out through the Reich Office for Economic Development. ¹⁴²

On the 8th In June 1944, US General Carl A. Spaatz described the attacks on the German fuel industry and the Romanian oil industry as "first-rate strategic Goal of 8th. and 15. US Air Force. From the 12th June also took part Royal Air Force on the offensive against the fuel plants, especially in the Ruhr area. ¹⁴³ In his first "Hydrier memorandum" for Hitler dated June 30, Speer spoke of the "tragic consequences" that the continued attacks for the German war effort from September onwards. The production of aviation fuel was until the 22nd. June to 11 percent and in June average on 30 percent gone down (opposite March). ¹⁴⁴ The Low point of year 1944 lay

141 BAP, FS, Movie 3568, Vemehmg. Spear, May 19, 1945.

142 Please refer birch field, Fuel, p. 195.

143 Ibid, S. 191 f.

144 Imprint the memorandum at birch field, Fuel, S. 238 ff. (p. 241). - At the May 30, 1944 appreciated

actually in September, when there were only 10,000 tonnes of aviation fuel (5.5 percent of March production) and petroleum products a total of 266 000 tons (36.8 percent) were produced.¹⁴⁵

Table 5

Main Attacks on the Hydrogenation plants and her Effect on the Aviation fuel production, March-June 1944 (daily production in t)

March	(daily average)	5 839
April	(daily average)	5 833
May	(daily average)	5 032
June	(daily average)	1 733
1st-11th May	(daily average)	5 645
12. May		4 821
(Attacks on Leuna and Brux)		
29. May		2 775
(Failure Pölitiz 100 %)		
13. June		1 078
(Failure Gelsenberg 100 %; Welheim Disturbance)		632
22. June		
(Failure Scholven 20 %; Wesseling 40 %)		1 268
24. June		
(Leuna again in operation)		

Source: Birkenfeld, Fuel, p. 238f. (= **Speer's first** hydrogenation memorial, June 30, 1944); Male and June averages according to **BAP**, FS, Film 10746, "The production development in the most important areas of chemical production. Status: March 1, 1945" (GB Chemie).

The Damage and Destructions in The hydrogenation plants also suffered direct and indirect losses in the production of synthetic nitrogen and rubber and many others basic products. From the 12th May in particular went through to autumn Nitrogen production as a result of the attacks on Leuna: by exactly half from April to August. Buna production fell with some interruptions from May onwards, less due to the bombing of the Buna works themselves than due to the failure of exhaust gas supplies (hydrogen). the hydrogenation plants. Production also halved from April to August.¹⁴⁶

The German experts put the loss for June at 56 percent of aviation fuel and around 20 percent of total production of mineral oil products (BAK, R 25/129, AN GB Chemie, May 30, 1944).

145 BAP, FS, Film 10746, "Production development in the most important areas of chemical production. Status: March 1, 1945" (RWA draft). See also chap. II in the preliminary vol.

146 Ibid (diagrams).

Area of application and area of responsibility the Geilenberg Organization expanded in accordance with the extent of bomb damage in the fuel, rubber and nitrogen industries, and later extended primarily to “the Repair and elimination of damage in energy production and supply systems”.¹⁴⁷ End June she decreed already over 350,000 workers, and soon thereafter also over concentration camp prisoners.¹⁴⁸

With a certain automaticity, the course of the war, especially the bombing campaign, had now, since May 1944, linked the fate of air force armament and chemical armament with each other and with the armaments organization of the **RMRuK**. This automaticity and the pace of development were largely brought about, even forced, by the events of the war, much more so than before. Those involved carried out this development more or less involuntarily. The pressure from government agencies and staffs on the economy increased. bureaucratic decisions, behind which was the threat of dictatorial execution, increasingly impaired the flexibility of war production. The effects of the air raids alone led to inevitable collisions between the demands and demands of the various authorities and staffs for construction capacities, workers and transport space, especially between those of the Geilenberg staff and of Jägerstabs. They were in the west invasion, in East new Soviet offensives imminent.

The result was finally, in shape of armor staff, the centralization the All regulatory power in the war economy rests with the Minister of Armaments. The ambiguous function of the armor staff was, however, obvious.

4. Balance sheet before the Catastrophe. The "staff of armor"

The The summer months of 1944 were unprecedented in their military and political drama. On June 6, British and American troops landed in Normandy, opening the long-awaited Second Front. On June 23, the Red Army entered Belarus biggest offensive at that time. On July 20, the assassination attempt on Hitler failed; On July 25, the Führer appointed Propaganda Minister Goebbels as “Reich Plenipotentiary for "the total deployment of war". End July, after six weeks Advancing, the Soviet Army was on the middle and upper Vistula and directly in front of the East Prussian border. A month later was hers Major offensive in the Balkans in full swing; The Western Allies had liberated Paris (August 25th) and took Metz (September 5th), Liège (September 8th) and Luxembourg (September 10th). In the There was an uprising in Slovakia and in the Polish capital. Meanwhile, the bombing campaign against Germany continued, particularly against fuel plants and large cities. undiminished his Continuing, though a big one for a long time Part the British and American air forces was bound in France and central Italy.

147 BAK, R 4311/1157a, Decree RMRuK, November 8, 1944.

148 BAP, Case VI, Film 414, ADB 37, Doc. NI-3767, Speer to Hitler, June 30, 1944. Concerning concentration camp prisoners sz B. BAK, R 25/179, two FS from Geilenberg to SS-Standardartenführer Gerhard Maurer (WVHA), July 10, 1944.

There was unprecedented activity within the Germans throughout the summer Armaments organization to observe. A lot of it was improvisation, some of it was already idle; but these months were everything. In everything, a period of greatest activity and tension, before the functional mechanism and regulatory apparatus of the war economy were affected by unmistakable signs of dissolution. The approaching catastrophe on the fronts once again released significant economic and organizational forces, which, however, were increasingly exhausted by the losses suffered due to the air raids and the loss of resources to compensate for damages.

The Minister of Armaments, who reported after the war that he was familiar with industrial companies such as Walter Rohland early and urgently on the possibility of one attention was drawn to the German defeat ¹⁴⁹, was nevertheless the spiritus rector of these efforts with which the ailing production repeatedly stabilized and the War was undoubtedly prolonged.

a) agreement with Hitler. More bureaucratic expansion the Armament organization

At the beginning of June he took In the course of several meetings with Hitler, he immediately set course for the management of the entire war economy, ie the concentration of even the last areas of armaments -powers of attorney in his Hand (air armament) and on decisions in his favor where his powers were unclear or controversial (SS companies; general representative for labor deployment).

With the Jägerstab he already held a key position in the Luftwaffe armament. Now stopped he Hitler the Success numbers the Aircraft production and explained, "that milk and I together the are convinced that the Air force armament should be integrated into the ministry, now that bomber production was also assigned to the fighter staff The Leader emphasized with extraordinary sharpness, that the Air force armor in the jet

He would have to be integrated into the ministry at a moment's notice and that he would discuss his opinion with the Reich Marshal." ¹⁵⁰ Göring signed a corresponding decree on **June 20th**, according to which "the armament of the German Air Force according to the from Commander in Chief the air force to be set up tactical requirements and technical

¹⁴⁹ spear (memories, P. 350) dates here Rohland's decisive visit to Meran, which he describes as "first of all still vague and shadowy Responsibility" for the "preservation of the "Substance" had it recorded, precisely on the afternoon of the 20th. April (Hitler's birthday). Rohland, on the other hand, spoke in Nuremberg of "around mid-March 1944" (IMG, Vol. 41, p. 493, Doc. Speer-42, hearing raw land, May 20, 1946) and repeated in his memoirs, that the first discussion on the topic with Speer took place in March in Hohenlychen, which was then continued in Meran (Rohland, Walter, Bewegte Zeiten. Memoirs of an ironworks man, Stuttgart 1978, p. 99 f.). Allegedly Speer had doubts about German victory since February-March 1943 (Stalingrad), and at the latest since May 12, 1944 (beginning of the major offensive on the hydrogenation plants) (ItZ, ED 99, NL Speer, vol. 12, Consultation Speer, 3.7 .1945); Critically, Schmidt, Matthias, Albert Speer: The End of a Myth, Bern/Munich 1982, p. 127 f., p.140.

¹⁵⁰ FB, 3rd-5th6.1944, Point 19.

see Determinations responsible by the Reich Minister for Armaments and war production carried out will".¹⁵¹ The decree did not formally come into force until August 1st.

The Armaments Minister further urged Hitler to influence Himmler; "His (Himmler's - DE) Production facilities would have to be subject to the same controls as those for other armaments and war production. I couldn't allow one part of the military force to go the way of independence, while I had put a lot of effort into the armament of the three other parts of the armed forces over two years of work."¹⁵² Furthermore, Himmler had these at his disposal 30 000 until 40 000 foreign Workers and prisoners of war who were recaptured by his police every month as "escapees" and "then used as concentration camp prisoners in the SS's projects." "I couldn't sustain a loss of 500,000 workers a year," says Speer, "especially since the majority of them are laboriously semi-skilled workers."¹⁵³

Last discussed the minister with Hitler the between dem GBA and him floating "controversial fundamental questions" which, unless clarified otherwise, he would submit to him, Hitler, "for a final decision."¹⁵⁴

It was hardly any month since Speer's return to office has passed, and already was clear, that his support and ability to assert himself with Hitler were once again at a considerable level.¹⁵⁵ After he had the most important for the central management of the war economy After clarifying questions directly with Hitler, he initiated a series of further economic policy and organizational discussions. Signed on June 19, 1944 Hitler issued the "Führer's Decree on the Concentration of Armaments and War Production."¹⁵⁶ In it, the Armaments Minister had all powers for the technical construction and rationalization of weapons and military equipment transferred to him, from development to series production. According to the wording of the decree, this happened This, above all, "those weapons and devices of the German armament that Through revolutionary new characteristics, we are able to bring us significant advantages over the development of the enemy, to be able to promote them in a concentrated manner and to continue to provide the necessary changes for those types whose development is considered to be complete can apply to stop".¹⁵⁷

The significance of this decree varies depending on how historians judge it. What is striking is that he initially was staged with aplomb. According to Speer's protocol, Hitler demanded that he "with everyone Sharpness carried out consistently must be".¹⁵⁸ It followed him directly five executive orders, later still two more. Milk,

151 News, No. 40, July 21, 1944.

152 FB, June 3-5, 1944, Point 21.

153 Ibid, period 22.

154 Ibid, Point 23. Please refer also Cape. III in the prev. Vol.

155 Milch remembered after the war: "Speer was close to Hitler [in] May and June and the relationship [was] again good like before." (Records v. [Sept.] 1945, quoted in Schmidt, S. 117).

156 News, No. 41 v. August 3, 1944; see FB, June 19-22, 1944, point 1. - The Armaments Minister's draft decree was issued on June 16th. sent to the Reich Chancellery (BAK; R 43 11/607, RMRuK boss of Reich Chancellery, June 16, 1944).

157 Ibid (News).

158 Ibid (FB).

at the 21. June to Deputy appointed by the Minister, in this capacity "the "To carry out a strict summary implementation of the decree - together with the heads of offices involved".¹⁵⁹ But first in the August was Decree with The five orders were published in the ministerial gazette.

¹⁶⁰ After the war, Speer himself was critical of the effect of the decree: it "no longer had any effect."¹⁶¹

Everything suggests that the Minister of Armaments used the decree to provide himself with a passe-partout for all eventualities. It was primarily about the development and construction of weapons and military equipment so completely from Ministry should be controlled that the decision on design changes, on discontinuation or continuation of developments completely in his competence lay. He rationalized production flow should of changes no longer disturbed and interrupted, the The development of new weapons is probably encouraged when the war situation improves, but is restricted or reduced in his favor when the war situation worsens. be set. But it will Speer, now that's it Taking over the Luftwaffe armament as was certainly imminent, as current and urgent, not least the overabundance of aircraft types and in contrast the "shattering new properties" the Me 262 and other aircraft with jet engines, as well as the V-weapons.¹⁶²

Important creatures of decree were below with Decree from 24. June formed "Commission for Standardization and Typing" under Hanns Benkert (Siemens) and the Main Aircraft Development Commission (September 15), which centrally directed and controlled the development work of the Air Force and the aircraft companies.¹⁶³ The head of the aircraft commission became the senior director of Messerschmitt Group, General Staff Engineer Roluf Lucht; Karl Frydag (Henschel/Heinkel Group), head of the Aircraft Main Committee, was appointed as his deputy.

At the end of June, Speer finally transferred the new results of the concentration of power in his ministry to the level the Middle instance (Gau or Armament commissions and arms inspections).¹⁶⁴ The "decree regarding the middle instance" from 22. June seemed at first

159 Ibid.

160 Ibid (News), 1. until 5. AO v. 20. until June 22, 1944 (2. until 4th AO here only reported).

161 IfZ, ED 99, NL Speer, Vol. 12, hearing Speer, August 31, 1945.

162 To a certain extent, Speer could certainly interpret the decree in such a way that the problem of expansion investments in industry was solved in his opinion. As he later testified, he tried "first in the fall of 1943 and then again in the middle of 1944." Hitler to impose his opinion, that "the further expansion of our industry to a greater extent view being stopped had to" (IfZ, ED99, NL speer, Vol. 7, hearing Speer, May 19, 1945). At the 18. August 1944 Hitler gave the formal consent to "that the expansion of the entire industry, unless it is completed in the short term, will be stopped for nine months" (FB, August 18-20, 1944, point 2). See also chronicle.

163 News, No. 40, July 21, 1944, "Decree regarding the control of standardization and typing", June 24, 1944; *ibid.*, No. 41, August 3, 1944, "Commission for Standardization and typing"; see a. II, S. 302 f.; *ibid.*, No. 47, October 18, 1944, "Formation of the Main Airplane Development Commission", September 15, 1944.

164 News, No. 40, July 21, 1944, "Decree regarding the middle instance", June 22, 1944. Hereafter also the following .

Compared to the line pursued since September/October 1942, ¹⁶⁵ does not contain much that is new. But he already caused a stir and was for spear in front all because of that of great importance because he a three quarters of a year later the scandal of his last speech the Gauleiters (October 6, 1943) ¹⁶⁶ officially made his position vis-à-vis the Gauleiters clear again in a very specific manner, albeit in a conciliatory form. ¹⁶⁷ The central demand of the chairmen of the armaments commissions the the minister “fully responsible for the maximum output of armaments and war production” were to be “even more than before those who are primarily responsible for the armament process in their area,” emphatically set the priorities. All other - now quite numerous - representatives and representatives of the Ministry of Armaments were given the task of coordinating everything with the chairmen of the armaments commissions.

The right to give instructions was now also secured the chairman of the armaments commissions versus the presidents of the district employment offices. This had been the subject of Speer and Sauckel's agreement of the same day ^{in 168}, which stipulated that in the future “joint guidelines of the Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production and the GBA published” would.

The relationship to the Gauleiters was the most critical **point**. The Decree again only contained the usual interpretable recommendations and declarations of intent. The chairmen of the armaments commissions were required to “keep them informed of the most important matters to inform” and with them “in all questions relating to their tasks (as Reich Defense Commissioners). - DE) concern, close agreement to produce”.

A supplementary decree from the Minister of Armaments dated 14. July 1944 ¹⁶⁹ on the “organization of armaments departments” of the middle instance finally reorganized the situation in the armaments inspections and armaments commands. These organs with military status, which had been subordinate to the armaments office of the ministry since 1942, ¹⁷⁰ and were previously divided into three adjacent ones “Army”, “Air Force” and “Navy” groups worked, were now uniformly integrated into the “Supply” groups and “finishing” structured. The armaments factories were therefore completely under the influence of the Wehrmacht units withdrawn and responsible for their entire production exclusively to the Ministry of Armaments or its committees, rings, etc.

165 See. II, S. 94 ff.

166 Please refer II, S. 174 f.

167 Immediately after his return to office Speer insisted on Hitler to stabilize his relationship with the Gauleiters again, whose opposition is undoubtedly an important root for was the anti-Speer Fronde that had emerged since the fall of 1943. He therefore suggested to Hitler that “a Gauleiter conference should take place as soon as possible that would be entirely focused on armaments.” (FB, May 13, 1944, point 1; s. a. FB, May 22/23, point 1). Such a conference, at which the Minister of Armaments gave a speech, took place on 3/4. August 1944 (see BAK, R 3/1553, Speer's speech on August 3, 1944). See Speer, *Memories*, p. 402 f.; critical Schmidt, p. 129 f.

168 News, No. 40, July 21, 1944, “Joint work of the GBA and the Reich Minister for RuK”, joint decree of June 22, 1944. See Chapter III, Sect. 1 in the previous volume.

169 News, No. 40, July 21, 1944.

170 See II, p. 69 ff.; Thomas, Georg, history of the German defense and armaments industry (1918-1943/45). Ed. Wolfgang Birkenfeld, Boppard 1966, S. 309 ff.

b) Armament conferences in Essen and Linz

The events described initiated a new, final major wave of concentration of power at the Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production, which reached its final climax soon afterwards, on August 1st, with the establishment of the Armaments Staff. Speer's activities were aimed at ensuring the functioning of the war economy machinery under the increasing strain of retreats and losses on land and destruction from the air by means of the most concentrated regulation of production and distribution.

At the same time, however, he and those around him were engaged in a comprehensive campaign to raise the issue War morale preoccupied; more soberly said, so that so far more or less uniformly behind the ministry bloc of representatives of economic power and their coalition with the political hold the leadership of the regime together. After the war, Speer asserted that he had no longer believed in victory since Stalingrad or at least had foreseen defeat since the concentrated air raids on the hydrogenation plants in May 1944.¹⁷¹ But the sources show something different for the summer of 1944, actually a strategy from the minister, through success reports and advocating perseverance propaganda to create a mood for the continuation of the war: primarily among the powerful in the economy and the employees of the "self-responsibility" of industry, but also among armaments workers and soldiers, and not most recently among those who are militarily and politically influential Circling.¹⁷²

The most serious problems that concerned the Armaments Minister and his audience were discussed right from the start, at the two most important events of this kind. On June 9th a remarkable event took place in the Ruhr area Conference held by the Ruhr staff had been organized. Speer, who experienced the day the invasion began at the Berghof with the "Führer". had and from there on the 8th. June direct drove to the Ruhrstab was, stopped on June 9th in the Essen Saalbau one already prepared for a long time Speech that he considered important enough to include - albeit in an edited form - to be published in its official gazette.¹⁷³ After the speech he presented himself at the "Haus Flick" in Kettwig Representatives of the Nazi business press for an internal "discussion".

The minister had scheduled the conference primarily to meet with his closest industrial colleagues and confidants (Vögler, Rohland, Röchling and others). above the problems the war and Armament situation to pronounce. Signs from Doubt

¹⁷¹ Please refer Note 149.

¹⁷² Preparations and texts for Speer's larger speeches can be found for the period from **May** to December 1944 in almost three times the number (42 speeches) compared to the entire previous period since spring 1942 (cf. BAK, R 3/1546-1557). See also Schmidt, p. 135 ff. Hans Frank claimed in Nuremberg, „with his pompous Talk" have spear helped, him, How many others, "to suggest confidence in victory" (Gilbert, GM, Nuremberg Diary, .Frankfurt a. M. 1962, p. 395 [June 21, 1946]).

¹⁷³ News, No. 39, June 24, 1944; the speech was on June 24th distributed to all participants at the armaments conference in Linz (see below). For the dating see Chronicle, June 4th to 9th, 1944. The Essen conference is not mentioned in Speer's and Kehrl's memoirs.

and dissatisfaction were evident also among the Rhenish-Westphalian industrialists to sense, the he otherwise to the firmest Support of Ministry and of systems the “Industrial self-responsibility” could count. After all, it was the situation after the targeted air strikes began against the German war economy and after the obviously successful - have been expecting and fearing for a long time - Landing in the West was so hopeless that even the most steadfast supporters of the regime, especially among the economically powerful, had doubts about the happy end of the war and thus about the meaning of their continued involvement.

The main one Purpose of Speer's appearance was not easy the defense of the existing war economy regulation system against adversaries from outside, especially the Gauleiters.¹⁷⁴ This was not his most important concern in Essen, especially since the Gauleiter of the Rhenish-Westphalian district (Friedrich Karl Florian, Albert Hoffmann, Alfred Meyer) rather to the followers of that system too count goods. The minister primarily addressed the industrialists and spoke about their problems out of his presentation and out the ministerial one Preparatory work for this can be clearly reconstructed .

Important materials¹⁷⁵ to preparation of speech came from the heads of office Sour and Kehrl, by Walter Rohland and - particularly insightful - from department head Friedrich Scheid.¹⁷⁶ Rohland's material contained a comparison of the armament potential in the German sphere of influence with that of the opposing coalition based on steel and iron dem he For Germany, this was a much better relationship compared to the First World War from 1 : 2.5 calculated (First World War 1:3.5). Saur described the production successes and the "huge reserves in the defense industry", for the he cited the thoroughly rationalized construction of submarines as an example.¹⁷⁷

Hans Kehrl and Scheid dealt with the “Fundamentals of German Economic Governance” (Kehrl) and “Problematic questions the industrial self-government” (Scheid). Kehrl went from there “European economic governance” out of, the would fall to Germany in the future. This and the competition from the other continents will "not allow a return to the so-called free economy," which is already "a wasteful" one and, as it is tied to interests, "also politically to be rejected under all circumstances." summarized his "world view" in three points: "Free economy is impossible. Bolshevik controlled economy is out of the question. Now after the war we need a planned economy." The general management and objectives of this controlled economy would have to be taken over by hand-picked "personalities" from the state leadership; the "implementation and steering" should, however, be left to the "self-responsibility of the entrepreneurs".

174 So argued Janssen, S. 169 ff.

175 In the following quote after **BAK, R 3/1550**; so far dated, dated June 5, 1944.

176 In the hands von Scheid (Kahla Group/German Bank) had been lying since the end In 1942 in the ministry as a "special task" the "supervision of the industrial self-responsibility of the entire armaments industry (committees and rings)" within the armaments supply office. First head of the “Industrial Self-Responsibility” department, he served as deputy head of the “Central Legal and Industrial Self-Responsibility Department” since the beginning of 1944. in the central office.

177 See. II, S. 311. To Rohlands analysis s. in more detail Cape. II, Section 2 in the prev. Vol.

Scheid defended also - in the Difference to Kehrl in quite more pragmatic Way - the "Industry's self-responsibility" (**ISV**), but above all addressed the "problematic questions" to: "Industry generally has a positive attitude towards the principles of the **ISV**, although it the individual entrepreneurs hasn't become easy, on the earlier applicable rights of free competition - especially the one free contract advertising - to renounce. A small part defends itself against those under a) to d) ¹⁷⁸ listed measures of the **ISV organization**. As a result, an opposition has formed here and there in the district. Wrong conclusion, to attribute selfish motives to the ring leader's orders if these Measures in not be ordered in his own company. Only purely technical aspects are decisive for this with the ultimate goal of generally increasing performance in the war economy."

In Speer's speech ¹⁷⁹ found each other these problems again; but he graded she so low in importance as possible and assigned them to his concept under, which aims to spread confidence in victory, consciousness of success and indispensability. The figures and diagrams shown, as usual, were intended to illustrate the "miracle of armor" under his Line accomplished been be. The "Armor Miracle" set itself straight now continued: "That these increases continued until May of this year, and that "The fact that the bomb terror brought us no losses here is, in my opinion, the most astonishing and wonderful achievement of our armaments and war production."

The minister obviously suppressed awareness of the actual situation and the shock that the air strikes had on the people Fuel economy had triggered in him just a few weeks ago. On the contrary, he did everything he could to uplift the morale of his audience. So he brought It was ready to answer the journalists who were specially invited in the afternoon when they asked about the prospects of the "material battle in the West", about the "distance in the final production of the Armor... between us and the most important foreign states", according to a saving "new idea of rationalization" for the armor or for the "miracle weapons". or to give less reassuring answers. Anyway, it was .the press response over the next few days was extremely positive; Of course There was nothing to be read about the minister's statement, "that the war... could last another five years." After the war, Speer explained it as one in the Surroundings of Hitler - but but probably not only there - widespread "special type of "Sensory disorder" which, in the speeches of the time, led him to "convince serious men of the idea that still one extreme effort can bring success." ¹⁸⁰

The "self-responsibility of industry" cannot be shaken. It is necessary for the war effort, an "unconditional demand of the leadership of the Reich". There have been "only very isolated setbacks". He will counter all attacks from inside and outside against this organization. In the press conference, the minister also expressly defended it, with the Note that it, aggravated while the Time his Illness, „on everyone

178 What was meant was a) type restrictions, b) specialization (including closure of companies and parts of the company), c) rationalization, d) "Unconditional exchange of experiences without regard to intellectual property rights".

179 After dem Imprint in News, No. 39, June 24, 1944. Hereafter also the The following.

180 speer, memories, S. 368. The Quote relates itself on Speers speech from the 24. June in Linz.

pages something Resistance against the industry's "self-responsibility". also in the industry itself, which “doesn't really like the control, which is partly woken from its slumber by people who approach it in a very sharp manner, the Things from them demand, the she even not make want, and [that is]

not because such a change would undermine their ability to build peace .” ¹⁸¹

However, Speer said in his speech that bureaucratization should not be allowed to break into the organization of self-responsibility. He will have any abuse of the regulatory power “punished in the strictest possible terms.” The power of disposal and responsibility the Managers would have to be protected; they are an essential part of the organization. “He (the operator) D E.) is and remains the boss of his company. I lean it "Therefore, it is also necessary to send inspectors to the companies in the long term."

Remained much more vague spear in his Answer to that "often discussed question, how the state control of peace production will be designed later, whether the current form of organization should be retained or if a completely free economy will emerge again." There was obviously by no means agreement on this even among his heads of office. He left it the question anymore or less open, but conceded changes for his attentive listeners the post war period; “The current form of the The industry's self-responsibility is purely war-related. But now is not the time to discuss this problem. After all, it had spear the question as explosively recognized. In the meantime, industrialists were even more busy the nearer she the end of the war and with it the saw the huge problems of the transition and post-war economy coming and the more intensively other authorities, especially the Reich Ministry of Economics, became involved in the discussion about the “order” of the Germans Peace economy turned on. Autumn leads the way he she calls it a “strange change.” Speer's economic policy stance in June 1944 is due to the influence of industry, especially Walter Rohland. ¹⁸²

The Armaments Minister considered the Essen conference a complete success, and the press coverage of the following days confirmed him. This encouraged him in his plan to organize the armaments conference in Linz two weeks later on a large scale and to give it the proper consecration with an appearance by Hitler.

On June 24th and 25th, 1944, the cream of the German armaments industry and armaments organization, almost 350 people, who had arrived in special trains, gathered in Linz. ¹⁸³ She met in the Linz Audorf barracks under military precautionary and control measures. The Minister of Armaments, his heads of office and other closest employees, as well as Fritz Sauckel and Hans-Joachim Riecke as representative of the State Secretary Herbert Backe and Gauleiter

181 BAK, R 3/1550, “Discussion in the Flick House, Kettwig, Friday afternoon. [hs.:] in front of representatives of the business press following the speech about the Self-responsibility the industry in Essen.”

182 Autumn, p. 327 ff. (p. 333 f.); sat p. 318 f. - Walter Rohland, VV of the United Steelworks AG and Vöglers right-hand man in both the group and the Ruhrstab, was due to his official functions in the RMRuK most influential industry representatives also within the ministerial apparatus.

183 After Timeline, June 23-26, 1944; see. Janssen, S. 171; Spear, Memories, S. 368 ff; Sweep!, S. 393 ff. (at the most detailed).

August Eigruber as host gave lectures on the achieved and future successes of the German "armament miracle". Albert Vögler, the gray eminence of the German armaments industry, also took part a speech at the event.¹⁸⁴ However, the real war situation was getting closer Conference including its solid evening program against the wishes of their organizers in the ghostly light of the threatening Defeat.

Speer praised three For hours, his armaments organization and the eventual success of his efforts, "the entire armaments and war production" to unite within it by taking over air armament.¹⁸⁵ He put tediously detailed figures on top of the Armor and spread in "neurotic euphoria"¹⁸⁶ about "reserves" at Effectiveness and workforce potential.¹⁸⁷ Not a word was said about the situation at the fronts. Speer only mentioned the catastrophe in the fuel industry in passing.¹⁸⁸

Evocative the minister spoke out against sentiments of "resignation," the he was just felt in his armaments organization¹⁸⁹: "We mustn't let a mood of crisis arise." More cynical than His advice always sounded encouraging, even under difficult conditions "[to] preserve a certain sporting behavior". Against this, he had The end of his speech had a dark undertone: "We continue to do our duty ... so that our German people remain with us."

Table 6

document (key points) for the speech of the Minister of Armaments in Linz at the 24. June 1944 re: „Concentration of armaments at the Reich Minister"

March 1942	Subordination of Army Weapons Office - Main committees and Commissions - Ban on constructing four-year plan Headquarters Planning to take over the armaments office
April 1942	
May 1942	- Armament inspections (become RMBuM departments) takeover the Iron quota from the RWiM HA Rail vehicles takes over Locomotive construction from the RVM Marine armor from the OKM
June 1943	

184 Birder spoke for the festive conclusion the Event (June 25); returns, p.395; Chronicle, June 25, 1944. BAK, R 3/1551. Hereafter also the following.

185 returns, S. 404 (sa Note 180).

186 Head of office Kurt Waeger had in his Documents for the speech straight in this one Point a dusky-res image drawn (v. June 19th; BAK, R 3/1551).

187 Returns claimed later, at the second Day significant more open spoken to have, for what he from Speer reprimanded been be (Returns, S. 394).

189 At the end of May, Speer was obviously particularly negatively impressed by the attitude of the "chemical people" after the attacks on the hydrogenation plants, which were "a blow in themselves", "in no way activists" and "not up to the task" of catastrophes (BAK, R 3/ 1551, speech at the RMRuK construction conference [Magdeburger Börde] on June 2, 1944). See also BAP, FS, film 1732, speech on December 1st. 1944 in Rechlin.

continuation Table 6

2. September 1943	affiliation the war production from RWM
13. September 1943	Power of attorney for Armament exploitation Italy
February 1944	takeover Hunter program - Burglary in Air force armor Air force armor from
June 1944	the RLM

Source: BAK, R 3/1551, BI. 50.

On the third day, the 26th June, spoke Hitler in the “Platterhof”, a guesthouse in near his residence on Obersalzberg, in front of the inner circle of the ministry's armaments organization, around 150 people. For his speech - the last one he gave to a larger audience - He had a concept from Speer in front of him in ¹⁹⁰, one of the most revealing in our context Documents. It contained four focal points and gave Speer's impression of the state of the armaments organization and the mood prevailing in industry is just as precise as his ideas about the industrialists being partly stimulate, sometimes under have to put pressure on them to so to speak, corset bars to move in and make them “top performance” to encourage. So far has as only Ludolf Herbst Speer's concept for Hitler's speech was examined. According to him, “it can be assumed that Rohland inspired Speer's keywords.” ¹⁹¹

Hitler should at first Place over the “Recognition and Strengthening the “Industry's self-responsibility” and its employees assure them, “that they can expect that from them difficult times of crisis”. The announcement of such heavy times In turn, it was not allowed to foster defeatism: “No reason for resignation.” The second focus was under the motto “If the war were lost!”. Hitler was supposed to generate power through fear by - as a necessary consequence of a German defeat - painted the specter of the “merciless extermination of industry”, the “destruction of German industry” on the wall. ¹⁹²

Of outstanding Hitler should be in charge, third, about “The free economy after the war and the additional ones “Tasks of the industry” speak. That Speer gives him the most detailed provided a template, leaves on one pretty harsh **criticism** industrialists the increasing commissary economy and paternalism by the ministry and internally Discussions about the character of the expected Post-war economy close. Promised should be given to those present “Fundamental rejection of nationalization the Industry”, one tremendous Post-war economy “on everyone areas” and one „Guarantee for the Exploitation the industrial capacities also on furthest View”.

190 **BAK, R 3/1550**, two versions v. 21. and June 22, 1944; hereafter (June 22) also the following. - On the first version, Speer noted: “Back strengthening of the people of the SV (“self-responsibility” - D E.), with it she also in Crises stand and Self-consciousness show.” Ibid, BI. 200R and 201R.

191 Autumn, S. 333 ff. (p. 336).

192 In his memories Speer says, surprised that Hitler is in his Actually talk to the industrialists with such prospects “to be frightened tried” (Speer, Memories, p. 370 f.).

The last According to Speer's instructions, part of Hitler's speech was intended for ensure an optimistic conclusion. Hitler should expressly commit himself to the "men of industrial self-responsibility" and at the same time demand "maximum performance" and even "temporarily necessary extreme work performance (72-hour week) to increase the most important armaments programs". With that and with that the "revolutionary innovations of the future (jet bombers, etc.)", according to the concept, the "guarantee of the final victory" is given.

Hitler, the under dem fresh impression of the since three days above the Wehrmacht the incoming major Soviet offensive in Belarus and the progress of the invading armies West and in South stood, offered those present "the sight of one People in the most severe state of exhaustion and temporary absent-mindedness".¹⁹³ At least he stuck closely to the given concept. At times his thoughts became lost, as he regularly did more demanding audience, in an ideological and philosophical way Shallowness. Only the German victory made "further development possible of humanity through funding the private initiative, in the I alone the see prerequisite for any real one Higher development". Multiple repeated he one the him specified Main arguments:

"If this war with our victory is decided, Then it will be the Private initiative the "The German economy will experience its greatest era!" He gave his word, "that after this war the German economy will perhaps experience its greatest prosperity of all time."¹⁹⁴

Table 7

Military events to Time the Linzer Armaments conference

June 1944

18th -	Four German divisions on the Cotentin Peninsula cut off and destroyed at the beginning of the Belorussian Red Army operation. Major action Belarussian partisans against the rear connections of Army Group Center
30th	
22nd/23rd	
23rd -	Parts the German 3. Tank army near Vitebsk and main forces the 9th Army surrounded and destroyed near Bobruisk
29th	major attack British 2nd army on Caen US troops occupy Cherbourg
25.	
26.	

193 Sweep!, p. 396. - Spear and especially sweep! describe Hitler's condition in dramatic colors in their memoirs. Sweep! On June 26th, he claims to have gotten the impression that Hitler was "seriously ill and therefore to guide unable" was (sweep), S. 397). spear want observed have, that the

"Industrial leaders" were "stunned" rather than "re-inspired" by Hitler's appearance and speech (Memoirs, p. 370 f.). But there are also judgments like Rohland's, which gave the minister unprompted and unreserved support for "congratulated the armaments conference that was going really fabulously (BAP, FS, film 5884, telegram dated June 28, 1944). Also the armaments inspector in the GG, Gltn. Max Schindler, mentioned in a report on the Linz conference that "the leader ... a pleasantly fresh impression might" (BAP, FS, Film 3386, minutes of the meeting of the Armaments Commission in the GG, July 5, 1944).

194 "The Führer speaks". 7 exemplary ones Hitler speeches. Ed. and explains. from Hildegard v. Kotze and Helmut Krausnick contributed. by F. A. Krumrnacher, Gütersloh 1966, S. 239 ff. (Quotes p. 343, p. 352, p. 367).

c) memoranda for the “Long shots War”. The Education of Armor staff

After the armaments conferences in Essen and Linz The influence and reputation of the Ministry of Armaments was once again significantly consolidated. Of course, this was to a lesser extent the policy and tactics of the minister and his restored close relationship with Hitler, but to a large extent due to the peculiar situation in which the military disaster was inexorably unfolding with the production of weapons and military equipment still at its peak in many areas one largely functional armaments organization. This also makes the otherwise psychologically incomprehensible euphoria of the minister, who was at least well informed about the military situation, understandable. Speer apparently only considered the threat from the air to fuel production to be really threatening.

He saw the “totalization” and reorganization of the world as the two most pressing problems in the near future Labor procurement and distribution and the final and complete summary of the regulatory power in armaments and war production to his ministry. He certainly had successes in both areas; But the development of the war soon made any such success obsolete.

In mid-1944, Sauckel had to admit his fiasco: Of the almost 2.2 million foreign workers he had promised to recruit for the German war economy in the first half of the year, were only less more as one half million came to Germany.¹⁹⁵ Just at this time it became clear that in the onslaught of Red Army on Army Group Center at the On the Eastern Front, dozens of divisions perished along with their weapons and equipment. Under these circumstances, the leading forces in the Armaments Ministry, who had long been committed to a more "total" labor mobilization in Germany, renewed their advances. July gave Speer to Hitler understand, that in relation to the workers for the armor and soldiers for the Front “more Possibilities still in the home and were unexploited in the Wehrmacht. However, he believed that “a significantly more stringent approach was necessary.” - the adapted to the current situation - opinion about the total use of the "Hei mat" and suggested a discussion about it in a small circle with Hitler.¹⁹⁶

As a basis for this discussion, which took place on July 22nd, two days after the assassination attempt on the "Führer", without him under the direction of Lammers, he wrote two memorials for Hitler dated July 12th and 20th¹⁹⁷, in which he demanded with imploring urgency and with reference to the judgment of Röchling, Paul Pleiger, Krauch and Vögler that “the last reserves should now be mobilized” and that “every internal German measure should now be ruthlessly and with the utmost severity”. take action that is suitable for strengthening German armaments and at the same time providing German soldiers for the to clear the front”. To the desired For the sake of uniformity in the control of human potential in the German sphere of power, “extraordinary powers ..., the yourself about all Ministries and on the the entire economy.”

195 Please refer Cape. III in the prev. Vol.

196 FB, July 6-8, 1944, Point 2.

197 Printed by Bleyer, Wolfgang, plans of the fascist leadership for total war in the summer of 1944. In: ZfG, H. 10/1969, p. 1312 ff.

those "personalities" be given, "the the courage have, through her taking risks when making decisions, and that At the same time, have the nerve not to act rashly even in the most serious crises." ¹⁹⁸

The appointment of Goebbels as "Reich Plenipotentiary for Total War Operations" by Hitler's decree of 25. July, as well as Himmler's appointment as commander of the reserve army on July 20th, had already been prepared and demanded for a long time by the Armaments Minister and his advisors, even if they were directly caused by the failed assassination attempt. If Speer suggested Goebbels as an authorized representative and was also involved in appointing Himmler ¹⁹⁹, so he voted so that for the two most active advocates of a ruthless escalation of "total war" from the fascist leadership, with whom he worked closely.

However, weeks and months later, both appointments proved to be double-edged for the interests that the armaments minister represented. Himmler allowed himself to be Chief of Army Armaments represented by SS Obergruppenführer Hans Jüttner, under whom the Army Weapons Office endeavored to achieve this at the expense of the Armaments Ministry and "self-responsibility". the industry to regain more influence and decision-making authority. "Therefore," Speer reported later Jüttner said laconically fall and Buhle his take place. This was achieved through a sharp attack by Saur on Adolf Hitler against Jüttner; which did not please Heinrich Himmler." ²⁰⁰

For the negotiations between the Wehrmacht and armaments the confiscations From now on, instead of the OKW (Keitel), the new Reich plenipotentiary Goebbels was responsible for the economic development of the Wehrmacht, who appointed the Gauleiter as his representatives. This meant that the Ministry of Armaments and its armaments authorities, as the **Ministry** recognized early on, "faced a much stronger partner." ²⁰¹

The immediate history of armor staff, the unified command center of the German war economy in its final and in a certain sense most developed form, dated June 20th. Göring was aiming for a delay when, as he believes, under Hitler's pressure that day he gave the powers to the Minister of Armaments and the responsibility in the transferred air armament; they shouldn't be until 1. August finally pass to him. Meanwhile, Speer used the time. As early as June 21, he appointed Field Marshal Milch as his "representative as Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production and Plenipotentiary General for Armaments Tasks." in the four-year plan". ²⁰² The integration of air armaments made rapid progress in this way.

198 Just that. 1317; S. 1319 (memorial v. July 12, 1944).

199 After Janssen, S. 271 ff. With Goebbels had spear for example whose size Memorandum from the 18.7. for Hitler Voted (BAK, NL 118, Goebbels, Vol. 107, Memorandum v. July 18, 1944).

200 HZ, ED 99, NL spear, Vol. 11, hearing Speer, July 2, 1945. See Saur, January 5, 1945: "Order AH (Adolf Hitler - DE) that Buhle, as chief of the army staff, takes over the weapons office and a Wehrmacht weapons office prepared." Likewise FB, January 3-5, 1945, Point 24; Spear, Memories, P. 427. Himmler complained to Speer, "that - not entirely without the influence of your ministry - me as BdE the Chief HRüst taken away became" (BAK, R 3/1768, Himmler Speer, January 12, 1945).

201 timeline (approximately August 7/8, 1944).

202 Please refer Faks. in DZW, Vol. 6, S. 358.

On July 11th, Speer discussed with the head of the department, Walther Schieber, and with Otto Merker, the head of the main committee Shipbuilding, for the first time the idea of naval armament, with which he is dissatisfied was, "to be taken to the Jägerstab and to use this opportunity to expand the Jägerstab under the new company 'Armour Staff' to all important programs".²⁰³ In a circular to the armaments factories from 14. July he pointed this idea too; "A uniform organization of armaments and war production has now become possible."²⁰⁴ He discussed his plan with Saur 17. July. One must "consider whether we should not convert the Jägerstaff into a kind of 'working staff for the most important final productions' at the beginning of August, without dissolving it, since yes assault guns, Tanks, infantry program, submarines, etc. in must be processed in a similar way and one Delegation of responsible employees individual offices [hs.: to you] is necessary for quick processing and [can] only bring advantages to final production".²⁰⁵

At the founding meeting of the Armaments Staff on August 1, 1944, in addition to the members of the All the main committee heads were invited to join the Jaeger Staff, the newly appointed members of the Armaments Staff and the heads of the Armaments Ministry. In his speech, Speer announced that the Jägerstab had been dissolved and that the Armaments Staff was taking its place.²⁰⁶ "Through the Jägerstab, we succeeded in achieving our ultimate goal of having a unified ministry for armaments and war production".

His beings after one "Continuation and Extension" of hunter staff (1. version of "Quick Report") The Armaments Staff worked according to the same "basic form" on the foundation of "self-responsibility" of the industry. "This armor staff is similar to the hunter's staff, but now for all most important programs of the overall armor, to ensure that achievements in all important areas are achieved without bureaucracy in the old form of improvisation as quickly as possible further increased become The Armor Staff has the same full power

like the hunter staff before and can therefore make decisions on the entire area of the ministry on my behalf."

As named programs to be supervised by the Armaments Staff Speer the air force program, the navy program, the infantry program, as included in it are the motor vehicle and assault gun program, the tank program, the locomotive program, the anti-aircraft program, the artillery program, the V-weapons program and the repair program. Twelve members were eliminated dem Hunter staff taken over. There were also thirteen new members, including Hans Heyne/AEG (responsible for "equipment of the programs"), Roluf Lucht/Messerschmitt ("immediate measures"), Georg Purucker/Spreewerk GmbH-Flick (weapons program), Krömer (tank program), Kunze (locomotive and V-weapons program) and Senior Mining Captain Oscar Fork („Affairs the Mining administration"). William

203 Timeline, 11.7.1944.

204 News, No. 40, July 21, 1944, Erl. re: „Organization the armament departments", July 14, 1944.

205 BAP, FS, Movie 5884, spear to Saur, July 17, 1944.

206 **BAK, R 3/1757**, "New version of the rapid report from August 1, 1944", v. August 8, 1944 (hereafter also the following); Deviations in the first (short) version dated 1.8., *ibid*; see **BAK, R 3/1553**, "Decree on the formation of the Armaments Staff", dated August 1, 1944. - The "Quick Reports" of the armor staff had, like already those of Hunter staff, order character and were considered immediate "Orders" Speer.

Werner/Auto-Union-Junkers became a member (for production planning) in his capacity as Director of the new main committee Engines. Heyne's jurisdiction became on the entire area of the "general "Device" expanded.²⁰⁷

The head of the Armaments Staff was formally Speer. Saur carried out the practical work as his deputy and as chief of staff. He appointed factory representatives for the most important companies; They in turn provided him with selected representatives as company representatives. Saur retained the daily "standing convention" from the time of the hunter staff; the members' liaisons had to be present, and they themselves "only upon request". An important working method Saur's remained lightning trips with the Special train of the hunter and armament staff²⁰⁸ to the armaments factories.

The Armaments Staff with its great powers and Saur's operational methods undoubtedly contributed to the fact that the German war economy's output of aircraft, submarines, tanks, weapons and ammunition was largely maintained until the end of 1944. Of course, contemporaries' opinions about Saur's personal role varied widely. Apparently he liked to be called "the living whip of the armaments industry."²⁰⁹ Milch claimed many years later that he be "the bad one." Spirit" of the ministry, "Hitler too was too dirty"²¹⁰ - probably not without resentment, considering that that Saur on him the Air armament since March 1944 rigorous out of the Hand taken men and milk friends in the Not industry had spared. At the industrial base The verdicts also varied widely. Willy Messerschmitt testified that Saur would have given the industry "everything Have courage again made"²¹¹ ; at the same time some complained Entrepreneurs are upset with him, outraged by his dictatorial work style and rude tone. Colonel Friedrich Geist, Head of the development department Technical Office, probably knew him best; Saur was a driver, not a leader, he said after the war.²¹²

207 Ibid („Decree above the Education ... ": 25 "Personal members"); Janssen, S. 399 f., Note 14.

208 The special train had the code name "Hubertus": "The train is a rolling office with meeting rooms, telephone exchange, dining and sleeping accommodation for 60 to 80 men." (Timeline, 15.8. 1944).

209 spear in one Vemehmg. at the July 13, 1945 (BAK, Movie FC 1819 N).

210 IfZ, ZS 1230 (Erhard Milch), folder 2, Prot. from Helmut Heiber over a interview with milk on April 8, 1957. However, according to Speer, Saur had July high-ranking officers of the HWA denounced Hitler to Speer's intervention were released again (Speer, Memories, p. 403; see Chronicle, mid-August [17th] and 20th September 1944).

211 IfZ, ZS 1217 (Willy Messerschmitt), Vemehmg. Messerschmitt on October 7, 1946. Compare, on the other hand, Saur's boastful and sharp tone, especially towards the aircraft industrialists (Wey res-v. Levetzow, Hans-Joachim, The German armaments industry from 1942 to the end of the war, Rer. pol. Diss., Munich 1975, p. 162).

212 BAK, Movie FC 1819 N („a pusher, not a leader").

5. decline

At the end of July/beginning of August 1944, the Goebbels triumvirate seemed - spear - Himmler guarantees a coordinated, consistent totalization of the German war effort on an economic level How in the political and military fields. "This time, total war will not become a basis for discussion, but a fact," Speer announced to the senior staff of his ministry.²¹³

But the law of action was since for a long time the Allies passed over. The facts, the on the fronts and in Air war created were, continued the successes of the The last major mobilization of forces not only imposed extremely narrow limits, but also caused insoluble conflicts to break out due to the growing lack of forces and resources, the military and economic overload and the increasing internal economic chaos and led to bitter power struggles among the protagonists of the total war. In the phase of the sharpest concentration of domestic political and war economic power he seized Decline unstoppable and in increasing pace also war production, which had just reached its peak performance during the war .

a) The “Minimal economic area”

Quite can be precisely determined the Period, in dem the military disasters This resulted in irreparable slumps in production and the demise of the previously functioning regulatory mechanism for the arms industry. It began with the events of the second half of August on the Western and Eastern Fronts, which meant that the final battle on German soil could be expected within a predictably short period of time.

Table 8th
Military events center August until Beginning September 1944

August	
15.	Allies land in South France (at Cannes)
18.	Red Army takes Sandomierz a (140 km northeast of Krakow) Uprising in
19th -	Paris. German occupation surrenders.
25th	invasion the Allies in the City
	Red army begins Offensive to Liberation of Romania
20.	Uprising in Bucharest. Overthrow of the Ion Antonescu
23.	government. Romania's exit from the war
	18 German divisions lași - Ki inev trapped and destroyed Red Army enters
25th -	Bucharest
29th	
31.	
End August/beginning of September	
	German main forces in Normandy smashed. Allies reach in east the East
	Prussian border, in West the Westwall (near Aachen)

213 BAP, FS, Movie 42214, speech before the heads of office, Office group heads and Department heads of the RMRuK, July 24, 1944.

The Allies' air raids on economic targets, especially on the large-scale chemical plants for the synthesis of gasoline, rubber and nitrogen, restricted the supply of raw materials and fuel to the most sensitive points and already limited the mobility of the motorized army units, as well as radius of action and training intensity the Air force. Scheduled Offensive operations at the Fronts would, so reported

Speer Hitler on August 30th, as the attacks continued from October Lack of fuel can no longer take place.²¹⁴

At the end of August, further important sources of raw materials in the previously occupied areas had been lost or were in the immediate process of being lost. The chronicle about of Ministry of Armaments summarized in this Phase: The Romanian oil and the French bauxite were no more in German hands; the copper extraction in boron (Yugoslavia) was extremely vulnerable to partisan actions, Allied air raids and not least by the advancing Red Army; something similar affected the Macedonian chrome ore, especially there Soviet Troops were close to the Bulgarian border (Bulgaria left on September 7th on the side of the Allies above); Turkey had the chrome deliveries -

like relations with Germany in general - broken off at the beginning of August; In Albania, chrome ore could only be mined and loaded at night.²¹⁵

So in the first days of September the "Chronicle" recorded laconically: "The production statistics begins to reflect the military events, albeit with a delay."²¹⁶

Under the impression of uninterrupted Hitler and Hitler discussed withdrawals Spear, like for a long time a "minimal economic area" could continue to wage war, "that will continue there to Disposal stands and whose approximate Boundaries from the Leader set become".²¹⁷

Of which was for the first time on 18. (or 19.) August the Speech: "The leader lays a 'minimal economic area' fixed, for whom in detail noted become should, how long with the

Existing supplies and the production therein carried out increased armament can be."²¹⁸ Der minister presented until for the 5. September in one Memorandum

the desired documents together. It had the innocuous name "Memorial on Metals".²¹⁹ It was to investigate, was called it there, „which Production possibilities in the Rich still exist if the Deliveries out dem Balkans, out Norway, from Finn land and out Sweden fails and that Production area then about occupies the following space :

for Italy - southern edge of the Alps, possession of area east of Trieste; in Croatia - the Save line; in Hungary - the Tisza Line".

214 3. Speer's hydrogenation memorial for Hitler, August 30, 1944; Reprinted in Birkenfeld, Fuel, p. 250 ff. (p. 253).

215 See the - very incomplete - Remarks For this in chronicle, End August/beginning September .

216 Ibid, Beginning Sept. 1944.

217 Ibid, August 20, 1944.

218 FB, August 18th - 20th 1944, point 4.

219 **BAK, R 3/1525**, Memorandum "metals", September 5, 1944. Hereafter that too The following. Please refer also Chr **nik**, passim; sour, September 5, 1944.

The quoted Hitler's instructions and the Speer's memorandum are interesting in many ways. Hitler's strategic considerations are particularly informative and, at least because of their early date, are somewhat surprising for researchers. A month later, when the fate of the Wehrmacht in the Balkans was decided, there would hardly have been anything surprising about them. But until August 20, the Red Army was still at the Romanian one Border; and yet Hitler was already seriously considering the possibility or the Need, the all over the Balkans, northern Italy and half to reveal Hungary. It was obviously clear to him that this would touch the nerve of the war economy, namely its raw material and fuel base. went. Hitler's world of thought in the for him - apart from the winter of 1941/42 - However, the most critical upheaval phase of the war (summer/late summer of 1944) has been little investigated and cannot be discussed in more detail here.²²⁰

Further is it from big Interest, at the Example the Memorandum the attitude Speers for the war and his opinion about the War prospects to determine. The Minister of Armaments as an important official representative of the non-opposition or pro-fascist German elites now basically hid not more that he considered the war hopeless lost held; the numbers in his memorandum clearly reflected this.²²¹ Not after Stalingrad, as the minister claimed after the war, but only in the course of 1944 did his confidence in victory decline more or less quickly, and it was only from August/September 1944 that he left the actual ministerial business to his employees and became increasingly involved mostly with plans and measures for the end of the war and the post-war period. Hitler's resigned idea of a "minimal economic area" has, like this one can assume this change of heart very accelerated.²²²

Finally is it insightful, How closely In the weeks and months that followed, the war economic problems were combined with the military and strategic ones. Any further loss of territory would now inevitably have an impact on the armament at ever shorter notice. The Zeal, with the Hitler and spear the Raw material situation and the They tried to coordinate their strategy with each other So understandable, nonetheless but absurd in view of the military like economic balance of power.

In the second September half they both came on the The topic returned, and Hitler determined, certainly at Speer's suggestion, that the Wehrmacht command offices involved should be continually reported on the effects of the war, preferably with a copy sent directly to the leader individual measures, especially with regard to in the course of Settling movements entering difficulties in in reference to Eliminated from raw material source

220 After the war, Speer explained the idea of abandoning the areas described in the north, south and southeast of Europe "in order to simultaneously create geographically favorable defensive positions by reducing the occupied areas ... "to obtain" and to release numerous divisions came from Jod! and was only hesitantly taken up by Hitler (Speer, *Memories*, p. 413).

221 Over the Results the Memorandum s. Cape. IV in the preliminary vol.

222 Sweep! (p. 410 f.) reports, he on August 21, 1944 for the first time "plain text with spear" about the need to "expand considerations". above beyond the end of the war" and, to his astonishment, "very quickly and completely agreed" with him. on fundamental questions of preparation for the post-war period (see Chapters VI and VII in the previous volume).

len and production facilities." Hitler responded to Speer's accusations "in this regard the still existing greatest threat to the production basis in the Slovakia, Moravia and in Hungary... for accelerated implementation of the Securing ordered and initiated (military) EN) Measures".²²³

However, this information system did not work and could not work given the stormy Soviet advance in the southeast. There was talk of this one last time at the beginning of November, when the Red Army had already reached the "Tisza Line": "The map of the southeast area was presented to the Führer and at the same time he pointed out how crucially important the bauxite deposits at Lake Balaton were for our aluminum production are. The Führer emphasizes again that it is urgently necessary to include both the Colonel General in written and oral reports Jodl as also Colonel General Heinz Guderian about the Manufacturing and To teach basic material production that could be lost to us in the course of operations. I pointed out to the guide that it was just is often difficult to provide this information Both the Wehrmacht command staff and the Army General Staff can only be made aware of the importance of production when these offices tell us which rooms are available for operations may come into question under certain circumstances." ²²⁴

The Ministry of Armaments' work focus and style changed in the autumn months strong. A precise work according to long-term, summary programs largely stopped. However, Speer's statements after the war are contradictory and misleading: "In 1944 - after the big air raids - we don't have any programs more on long view, i.e. given for one or half a year, rather have us content with that, for the next one to two months to report the approximate possible emissions." Although "long-term planning with the exact figures has been drawn up," it was only for internal use; the results were "so uncertain, that I am neither Adolf Hitler nor anyone else this Plans announced have". ²²⁵ In fact the minister continued on 3. August the Gauleiters in Poznań presents a partially quite detailed armament program for infantry weapons and artillery, ammunition, tanks, aircraft and submarines that is valid until the end of the year²⁶, the at that time as "You were programmed" was apostrophized. ²²⁷

Apparently, ad hoc decisions in the smallest circles, agreed upon, now predominated for example between Hitler and Speer or Saur, between Speer and Saur or, as far as it the raw material planning concerned, between Kehrl and his closest employees. In this way, central planning lost its function, especially the main one: "The iron distribution of [Quarter] IV/44 becomes in discussed in close circles. The Central planning should not be concerned with this." ²²⁸

223 FB, September 21-23, 1944, Point 17.

224 FB, I. .11.1944, period I.

225 IfZ, ED 99, NL Speer, Vol. 12, Vemehmg. Speer, July 13, 1945.

226 BAK, R 3/1553, speech Speers before the Gauleiters, August 3, 1944.

227 See wagon guide, Rolf, The German Industry in the wars 1939-1945, Berlin 1963 (2. Edition), p. 83 f. Detailed see chap. II in the preliminary vol.

228 Timeline, August 29, 1944. For the mentioned Circle belonged Sweep!, be Representative Hans Fischböck (at the same time

In reality, the circumstances forced improvisation to an extreme extent, which Speer had often previously praised as an important element of economic management. The delegation of special powers, with Hitler's or Speer's signature, to representatives for special technical or territorially limited tasks which already had its forerunners in the Ruhrstab, the Jägerstab and the Geilenberg staff, became a typical feature of the war economy regulation mechanism. The formation of the Armament Staff was de in fact another attempt to system in the to bring about increasing systemlessness. But to the special staff and commissioners, "who could work as 'ministers' across all of them" ²²⁹, There were numerous other special, often illusory, special and "violent actions" which were mostly ordered directly by Hitler and were caused by the extreme lack of certain defensive weapons (anti-aircraft guns, "high-performance" aircraft, Panzer Faust). The powers and allocations of workers, materials and transport space via which the Staffs, commissioners and commissioners ruled, competed with one another and constantly overlapped.

Speer reflected on these conditions after the war by admitting that the transfer of more and more regulatory functions to special staffs and commissioners had "leadership" his system. get into a "dead end". ²³⁰

The Armaments Minister decided in the autumn months to do so, only in his eyes most important Tasks himself to perceive. In addition counted in first line the „Fight for the "UK-posed" ²³¹ in the Armor and that immediate supply of the West front with weapons and equipment.

At the beginning of August there was still agreement with Goebbels about the convocations from business. ²³² But already in the course of the same month, contradictions arose between the labor requirements the war economy and confiscations Wehrmacht vehemently appeared. Between spear and Goebbels made their way increasing conflicts. The Gauleiters, who were now more or less willing accomplices of the "Reich Plenipotentiary for Total War Operations," also found themselves under the contradictory orders and appeals by Speer, Goebbels and Bormann. In addition, the district administrations, other organizations and regional authorities, especially in the "areas close to the enemy", moved in the short or long term Workforce from the companies out and divided them into fortification, Schanz and other special work a. So he complained Head of the Main Weapons Committee said that "Gauleiter or SA leader or other party officials were suddenly in the establishments intervene without Consultation with the Operations, namely with core and Key workers to name, the the next morning already on the Tracks can be set and special tasks can be carried out have."

²³³

Reich Prize Commissioner) and Willy Schlieker, head of the iron and steel department in the RMRuK. - In the second half of 1944, Central Planning only held three meetings.

²²⁹ ItZ, ED 99, NL Spear, Vol. 8th, Vemehmg. Spear, May 20, 1945.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Timeline, Beginning Sept. 1944.

²³² Timeline, August 2, 1944. Please refer also Cape. III in the prev. Vol.

²³³ Timeline, August 10, 1944, Explanations from Arthur Tix on the meeting of HA Weapons; s. a. Spear, Memories, S. 405.

To one Time so, as GBA Fritz Sauckel made significant concessions at made the Minister of Armaments and essentially withdrew to the role of an executive body in relation to the requirements of the departments of the Ministry of Armaments hard-won success has already become obsolete. Goebbels' prerogatives and his strong party base in the districts proved to be "stronger than the managers and the armaments departments ." ²³⁴

The Quarrels pulled itself there. ²³⁵ complaints out of the Armament industry piled up itself.

"A large Part the Armaments officers holds the Submission of UK employees out of the Armor deemed unwearable. They find it much more difficult that the involvement of the party results in a double command was created for the operators. They regret the loss of prestige suffered by the armaments departments." ²³⁶

In the October November made spear Hitler multiple emphatically on it attentive, "that, if there are any further collections the armaments, responsibility for the consequences could no longer be assumed." ²³⁷ Hitler, as Speer later wrote, also stood "between Goebbels' demands for more soldiers and mine were looking for increased armaments" ²³⁸ and no longer saw themselves in a position to clear to decide. First in the course of Winter 1944/45, below other conditions, the Minister of Armaments should finally show himself inclined to give preference to holding the front rather than maintaining production figures.

b) The Shadow the "burnt ones". Earth"

Indicative of Speer's changed understanding of the situation, which he shared with many of his officials, industrialists and military men in the fall of 1944, and for his The divided internal constitution was the repeated trips to the front from the September to December 1944 were the focus of his activities.

The trips were immediate Purpose to explore and to organize how to get the troops with weapons and equipment as quickly as possible, on the shortest route, from the nearest locations armaments sites, before everything dem Saar and Ruhr area. Hermann Röchling had already had the German units fighting in Lorraine supplied with improvised weapons and ammunition from the Saar region. He "on his own initiative, together with the ... Chairman of the Armaments Commission Kelchner, set up a supply service for the Troop organized. Röchling visits every day Generals of the divisions to inquire about their wishes." So he "caused through his relationships, a Ammunition train up To drive up to Metz, from the loading in Darmstadt to the timetable and for discharge everything was taken over by the arms industry

²³⁴ Timeline, Beginning August 1944 (later added Passage).

²³⁵ Detailed Janssen, S. 274 ff.

²³⁶ Timeline, August 31, 1944.

²³⁷ FB, November 1-4, 1944, Point 45; s. a. Point 46; FB, October 12, 1944, Points 15 u. 26; FB, November 28, 1944, Points 1 and 2.

²³⁸ Spear, Memories, S. 407.

He did the same thing with the benzene from his coking plants, which the fighting divisions used to fuel their divisions. ²³⁹

Speer already used Röchling's experiences for his "arms order" from 9. September 1944, according to which finished weapons should be delivered directly from the factory to the troops if necessary. ²⁴⁰ In the report from his first Front trip from the 10. until 14. September 1944 was called it:

"The Rhenish-Westphalian Industrial area and the rear areas of the rest of the western front (Baden district, Saarpfalz and Moselland) are by me to areas for the industrial supply of troops." ²⁴¹ Speer and Mayor West, Field Marshal Gerd v. Rund Stedt, made a special agreement "that in order to resolve real emergencies as quickly as possible, the combat troops can be supplied directly from the production facility in the combat zone." ²⁴² The OB West was a special staff set up, the this direct supply steered. Hitler confirmed it to the minister is extremely important, „that In the Ruhr area, the raw product is as closed as possible the Delivery up to the end product" is created. ²⁴³

spear studied on his trips to the front needs and demands of the Troop at the armament, noted technical deficiencies in their equipment, was addressed also with Questions of tactical and operational use of weapons and processed his observations in reports and memoranda for Hitler and in instructions to Saur.

Table 9
Front travel of Reich Minister for armor and war production, September - December 1944

10.-14. Sept.	Western Front
26. Sept.-! . Oct.	Western Front
19th-25th Oct.	Army Group southwest (Italy)
15th-23rd	Rhine-Ruhr area
November	Western Front; Ruhr area (Ruhrstab)
7th-10th Dec.	Western Front
15th-31st Dec.	

Source: Travel reports Speers in **BAK, R 3/1539** ff.

The minister also had another purpose with the trips, namely the application of the tactics the "Scorched Earth" to prevent on German soil. In the fall of 1944, this effort did not yet gain much practical significance, but it should later, in spring 1945, his fruit carry. ²⁴⁴ The Conflicts and Discussions

239 anatomy of the war, p. 460, Doc. 259, report Speers about the travel v. September 10-14, 1944 to the western areas.
240 Mierzejewski, S. 96 f.
241 **BAK, R 3/1539**, report Speers v. September 15, 1944 about the travel from the September 10-14, 1944 to the western areas.
242 BAP, FS, Film 4640, decree RMRuK v. September 22, 1944. authorized representative of the RMRuK in this matter was Gltn. Schindler, previously Rül in the General Government.
243 FB, October 12, 1944, Point 25.
244 Please refer Cape. VII in the prev. Vol.

about this in broader leadership circles of the Reich, between Nazi leaders, military officers, industrialists and officials, at least shed a telling light on the growing loss of meaning the Armor and on the highly differentiated attitude of the Participants about the war and the possible outcome of the war.

This phase of the Armaments Minister's activities was hyped up during the Nuremberg Trials and later on various occasions, not least by himself, as the beginning of resistance against the Nazi regime. However, unlike in the spring of 1945, the idea of a threat to Germany's continued economic existence after a defeat was not yet the dominant one and certainly not linked to the idea of a complete military and political catastrophe. At that time, the majority of those involved still clung to some kind of belief in miracles in a persistent delusion and, to the extent that an argument for the "preservation of substance" was at all accessible, that of spear used argument accepted, after a - soon - reconquest lost German soil you are not allowed to one of terrain denuded of all production possibilities.

However, Speer and his colleagues and confidants knew too well about the hopelessness the misunderstanding the situation. Nevertheless, most of them have regardless their intellectual insight that the end of the war is near, obviously wavered back and forth between the Nazi delusion of superiority, the stubborn arms fetishism that leads to... Example spear at the Western Front had everything done to prolong the war, and those looking ahead Concern about economic substance, which was understandably most pronounced among the armaments minister's industrial mentors.²⁴⁵

According to later, not very precise information from those involved, the first discussions between industry representatives and the Minister of Armaments about the "maintenance of the substance" took place in March/April 1944²⁴⁶ and in July after the armaments conference in Linz.²⁴⁷ Witnesses for the defense testified at the Nuremberg trial It looks like Speer has the production facilities in half of Europe, ie of the occupied territories the Destruction by those repulsed Germans rescued.²⁴⁸ Of these, the only thing that is probably true is what has been more precisely documented in terms of time and fact approximately the instruction to the OT in August 1944, the ore mines operated in the Balkans (presumably before everything Chrome ore mines in Macedonia) should not be destroyed when threatened by the attacking enemy, but if necessary only "paralyzed".²⁴⁹ Hitler expressly approved such a tactic at this point.²⁵⁰

245 Post-war insights and considerations Naturally, this clouds the picture presented in the memoirs (Speer, *Memoirs*, p. 409 ff.; Kehr!, p. 408 ff., p. 412 ff.).

246 Please refer Note 149.

247 IMG, Vol. 41, S. 493, Doc. spear-42, Vemehmg. Walter raw land, May 20, 1946.

248 Like Speers military Companion (from the Army's GenSt.), Obstlt. Manfred v. Poser (IMG, vol. 41, p. 522 f., Doc. Speer-47, statement by Poser on questions of Speer's defense in Nuremberg, June 14, 1946).

249 Ibid, S. 501, Vemehmg. Annemarie Kempf, Private secretary Speers, May 2, 1946.

250 FB, August 18-20, 1944, point 7. See also Boelcke, Willi A., Hitler's orders to destroy or paralyze the German industrial potential 1944/45. In: *Tradition*. H. 6/1968, S. 301 ff. (p. 303 f.).

In mid-September 1944, when the Americans and British were already on German soil in several places, the fight to preserve German industrial and supply facilities against a clique in the party and the Wehrmacht that was obsessed with extermination began. Speer was on his first trip to the West first a material compiled that the fundamental considerations and arguments against the destruction and, with exceptions, also against the "paralysis" ²⁵¹ of the endangered Rhenish-Westphalian industrial area. Without this area, "it would be a continuation of war not possible", it was said in this. ²⁵² "The **work** must continue," should be a slogan, the to spend anywhere was. A major role played that Fear of unrest under the German "Followship" at Shutdowns or destruction. In any case, the foreign workers should be "removed in good time".

„The West“

Without the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial area is one Continuation of the war is not possible. Also the Further processing in Central Germany and beyond is up to 50 % and more dependent on the pre-delivery of the district.

Under this setting, all measures that occur in whole or in part Occupation of the factory facilities are to be taken into consideration. The district must be fully operational again immediately after reoccupation.

In principle, no systems at all should be destroyed. In the case of the so-called paralysis of companies, all production facilities that are of no interest to the enemy for direct warfare should also be excluded, such as: blast furnaces, steelworks and rolling mills.

When it comes to refinements, a distinction must be made between the level of completion achieved in the district. Armored casing e.g. B., the here are produced on a large scale in the district, are without the to the associated engines in central and southern Germany made, unusable. It So there is no point in paralyzing such systems.

At the devices will also only then one Paralysis in place be if the Finishing the device is in the area.

Under no circumstances may the mine shafts in the coal mines be destroyed or paralyzed. The coal is for the warfare of the Allies, at least as far as that German space comes into question, is not of decisive importance. Something else is it with the fuel systems (benzene factories). A paralysis of the benzene factories would e.g. B. may be required.

251 Speer defined the term, which has been in use since the withdrawal from the USSR in 1943 Paralysis (in the system of so-called ARLZ measures: loosening - Eviction - paralysis - destruction) in such a way that the companies were "only at the last moment ... rendered unusable for a long period of time [become]. This Paralysis generally consists of that important electrical units are removed and transported away with precise names." (IMG, Vol. 41, p. 419, Doc. Speer-18, Telephone Speer to Bormann or to eight Gauleiters, September 15, 1944).

252 BAK, R 3/1539, BI. 4 f., AT "The West", n.d. (Appendix for the Travel report Speers v. September 15, 1944 above the Trip in the Western areas from the 10. until 9/14 1944). Hereafter also the The following.

- Apparently this is the result of Speer's discussions with the heads of the Rhine-Ruhr district and the Ruhr staff during the travel.

When concentrating the companies in the district, which are more or less all part of a joint economy, the principle must be established: 'The work must continue'. Evacuations of people, like she carried out in the Aachen area may have been unnecessary there, impracticable here in the area and probably not justifiable from a military point of view .

The principle must be established that all leading men remain at work. The only works, if the Works in operation or ready for operation remain. At the disused or destroyed work is addressed the Following against the management, the the caused destruction, one A fact that cannot be taken seriously enough.

Urgently required one uniform, clear instructions to the entire district. This can only be done from the most authoritative authority out of done so that it doesn't the Measures that with that in mind What has been said before will be misinterpreted by the leading gentlemen.

In summary is to say:

- 1.) The command output must be for the whole area uniform both politically and military-technically and economic side.
- 2.) The establishments become maintained and only so far paralyzed, How this in the military interest lies.
- 3.) The Line the factories remains under everyone circumstances on theirs Post.
- 4.) One Evacuation of the Population is out of the question until on companies or departments, the closed (raw materials and machines).
- 5.) The foreign workers must come with you the progression of the Crew out the district be removed in a timely manner. Appropriate recording options are to be prepared. Staying here Foreigner would the formation of Terrorist gangs to have consequences, the before everything itself would have an impact in the rear area."

Source: How Note 252.

Precaution was necessary. The most important and acute question was Hitler's corresponding powers to receive. While Speer was away, on 13. or 14. September, Bormann had, following a corresponding press campaign ²⁵³, the highest imperial authorities "The Führer's Announcement" communicated, according to the German soil only to the enemy as "scorched earth" was to be left behind. ²⁵⁴ The Armaments Minister intervened immediately and succeeded in getting Hitler and... - about Bormann - the To bring Gauleiter to his line for the time being he with the Slogan "Highest performance until "to the last day" ²⁵⁵ paraphrased. ²⁵⁶ center In October he tried all competencies regarding the ARLZ measures ²⁵⁷ in the West at its armaments departments to focus: „The Operations manager (in West Germany - D E.)

253 Please refer DZW, Vol. 6, S. 108.

254 Speer, Memories, p. 411; Boelcke, The German Economy 1930-1945, p. 339 f., quoted from the diary of ORR Wolfgang Schneider (**RWiM**): "Reference (Hitler's - DE) on Gneisenau. You should read there. All departments agree that the line is impossible... It won't be practical either the Find people to command to carry out. No farmer destroys his farm and his livestock, no worker destroys his business." (September 24, 1944).

255 Timeline, October 17, 1944.

256 In more detail s. Boelcke, Hitler's Orders, p. 301 ff.; Janssen, S. 303 ff.

257 Please refer Note 251.

receive everyone instructions dem area of Eviction, paralysis or destruction in The area of armaments and war production exclusively by or through the chairmen of the armaments commissions." ²⁵⁸

The Reich Ministry of Economics ²⁵⁹ and the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture ²⁶⁰ were also involved in the clashes in September/October 1944 with instructions involved in the "maintenance of the substance".

It was only six months later that the question of "preservation of substance" would acquire a fateful significance for entire economic regions of Germany; but in September 1944 the fronts were already beginning to emerge, on both sides the fanatics and bureaucrats of the Death and the destruction and, counteracting them, those forces stood, their interest in saving the Basics economic existence coincided with that of the working population.

For now it held up but the front in the West for months, essentially until At the beginning of February 1945, on the German border; Only around Aachen did the Allies occupy a larger piece of German territory since the second half of October.

c) The second "Battle around the Ruhr". The Ruhrstab under Birder

To new ones Way had a destructive effect in the Autumn 1944 meanwhile the Air raids on economic targets in Germany. The systematic bombing campaign against the transport system in the West began in the second half of September. In three waves of attacks, the Allied air fleets paralyzed the most important inland waterways for weeks (September 22nd/23rd: Dortmund-Ems Canal; October 14th: Rhine (through the destruction of the Cologne-Mülheim Bridge); October 26th: Mittelland Canal near Minden). , on which the Ruhr coal was transported to the south and east. Series of attacks hit the large transshipment ports, especially Duisburg, and almost all important marshalling yards and railway junctions from Münster and Hamm down to Stuttgart. ²⁶¹

The damage caused by the bombs was obvious. But only a few, including the closest circle around the armaments minister, understood its full consequences. Herewith The literal collapse of the German war economy began. The complicated geographical and economic division of labor was torn apart, right from the start at one crucial point: the role of the Ruhr area of the main Energy suppliers for central and southern Germany has been rapidly disappearing since the main transport arteries for coal and coke were hit again and again. The production of iron, steel and weapons also fell in the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial area itself, while deliveries from the rest of the Reich for the Western Front got into trouble Stuck, and the complicated network of Supplies from and to the Weaponsmithing tore at many Place. With it started also the

258 **BAK, R 3/474**, RAvailable **RMRuK** _ the Operations manager (West Germany), October 17, 1944; likewise, to the Gauleiter of the West Gaue.

259 Boelcke, *The German Business 1930-1945*, S. 340.

260 Boelcke, *Hitler's commands*, p. 311.

261 Please refer also for the The following Mierzejewski, p. 103 ff.

organizational apparatus of the war economy physically, but above all to fail in terms of its function.

at the beginning of November the western allies that German transport was ranked second in terms of target priorities after the petroleum industry and divided Germany into nine transport zones, the order of which indicated their importance as bomb targets. For the first time, "a detailed plan to paralyze the railway system in West Germany"²⁶² was available, which also included the waterway network.

Table 10

Series the to bombarding Traffic zones (transportation zones) in the allies Planning, 7. November 1944

-
1. Northeastern entrances of the Ruhr area
 2. Frankfurt - Mannheim
 3. Cologne - Koblenz
 4. kassel
 5. Karlsruhe - Stuttgart
 6. Magdeburg - Leipzig
 7. Upper Silesia
 8. Vienna
 9. Bavaria
-

Source: plan for Attack on German Transportation System, 7.11.1944; here after Mierzejewski, S. 123; s. a. Groehler, bombing war, S. 365.

With the air raids in autumn 1944 on the German transport began to be depleted and the irreversible decline of the German war economy began, which was completed by the conquest of the Upper Silesian region by the Red Army in the second half of January 1945.²⁶³

As early as October 12th, the Minister of Armaments signaled "traffic difficulties in the Ruhr area". In response to his suggestion, Hitler stipulated that "that the restoration of the transport facilities in all cases the entrenchment work has to go on, there maintaining traffic for operational measures and also for maintaining armaments from more crucial Meaning is."²⁶⁴ Beginning November repeated spear his

²⁶² The effects, S. 6.

²⁶³ The drop in production in iron and steel production was calculated for the Gutehoffnungshütte Oberhausen Board member George Bull: The air raids in the 4th quarter 1944 would have had a completely different dimension of damage, casualties and loss of work than that during the air offensive in the 2nd Quarter 1943. „The As a result, downtimes were on a completely different scale

... The reduction in production the air raids That's why it was in 1943 relatively low and only temporarily reached 50 percent, while in 1944 it rose to over 85 percent." (Haniel archive, No. 4001016/2, bull to Willy H. Schlieker, April 12, 1946). For 1945 see chap. VII in the preliminary vol.

²⁶⁴ FB, October 12, 1944, Points 21 u. 22. Highlight in the Original.

Warnings before the "Consequences the Enemy influence in the Ruhr area" ²⁶⁵ and laid Hitler vicinity,

"a general commissioner for the West". He Gauleiter Albert Hoffmann (Dortmund) was recommended for this position because of his efficiency and his understanding of the armor and war production". The "Führer" refused "for personnel reasons" to appoint one of the Ruhr Gauleiters over the others. ²⁶⁶

The "traffic closure of the Ruhrgebiet" ²⁶⁷ made such Concerns quickly become obsolete. The Experiences taught the minister that the Due to the chaotic traffic conditions in the Ruhr area, it was no longer possible to control them from the headquarters, both because of the severe disruptions to the telephone, telegraph and telex network and because of the increasing reluctance of the industry, especially the **RWKS**, in this catastrophic situation from outside and from various sources Pages (armament departments, traffic control centers, party offices, etc.) to accept contradictory, inappropriate and often late orders . ²⁶⁸

In his Ruhr memorial of November 11th, Speer, under the impression of the almost daily fresh catastrophe damage, clearly named the impending deadly danger to further warfare, just as clearly as he did it to Hitler had only done once so far, namely in the (third) hydrogenation memorandum of August 30, ²⁶⁹ : "It is based on the entire economic structure of the Reich, it goes without saying that a loss of the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial area would be intolerable in the long term for the entire German economy and the successful continuation of the war. In fact, the Ruhr area is currently falling to production still made in internal traffic for the German economy completely out..." ²⁷⁰

On November 23rd, of a nine day Trip in returned to the West, let he Hitler no longer has a choice. The industrial area was cut off in terms of traffic and news, reported he the "leader": "But also out of other reasons it necessary that in Ruhr area a personality on my behalf all the makes decisions, the have been able to be met directly by me or my representatives. It is therefore called Great of the already existing Ruhrstab, which so far a loose summary the one in individual departments working in the Ruhr area Ministry represented a Armaments representative of the Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production, who has all powers in times of emergency, makes the necessary decisions on my behalf to meet. To this one Armaments representative I will expected Mr Dr.

265 FB, 1.-4.11.1944, point 17.

266 Ibid, period 2.

267 BAP, FS, Movie 1732, Ruhr memorandum Speers, November 11, 1944.

268 At the Central Planning meeting on November 8, 1944 was indeed fixed to provide the "Battle for the Ruhr" with all possible help "from the Reich". "In the use of the control means," was how it was paraphrased further, „however, must, around the given elasticity and initiative of the Business to maintain, restriction practiced become." (BAK, R 3/1690, BI. 126 f., "Results of the 61st meeting of the Central Planning on January 8, 1944"). On the position of the RWKS and industry see Mierzejewski, p. 136 f., p. 144 and passim.

269 birch field, Fuel, p. 254.

270 How Note 267.

Birders determine the has agreed to this office to take over. Dr. Vogeller has also at the other large plants in the Ruhr area size Authority. He has in at the same time an extraordinarily good name for the followers." ²⁷¹

Hitler explained itself at the 28. November with the commissioning Vöglers agreed. ²⁷² At the

On December 6th, Speer appointed the chairman of the supervisory board of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke group Gray Eminence of German capital, as "General Plenipotentiary of the Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production for the Rhine-Ruhr Area (Armaments Plenipotentiary Rhine-Ruhr)" and assigned him his function as Chief of the Ruhr Staff. ²⁷³

Vögler was given authority to make "all decisions in the area that he deemed necessary the armor and war production of Rhine-Ruhr area in my (Speers - D E.) Names to meet... The Plenipotentiary Within the scope of my business area, in particular the urgent matters for restoring and maintaining production in the Rhine-Ruhr area without regard to special powers to regulate on their own responsibility and to ensure the necessary workers and materials. He can handle all offices under my authority in the Rhine-Ruhr area, including OT and transport corps with Instructions provided and followed use at his discretion. His decisions are also binding on these departments in personnel matters ."

Vögler's extraordinarily extensive Authorization and his power of disposal about by far the most important German armaments center characterizes quite vividly the role that the big capitalist mentors and backers of the Ministry of Armaments played as dominant personalities and organizers of the German war economy, especially in this late phase of the war. At the same time, Vögler's authorization was an emergency measure, a symptom of the breakup of the war economy's unified, centrally managed organizational mechanism. His appointment to the ser for the Ruhr area's decisive phase of the war ultimately testified not least to the effort to save the crucial economic positions and command positions of the German armaments companies as the war neared its end.

d) Beginning dissolution of Reich Ministry for Armament and war production

The headquarters of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and war production was in the fall of 1944 by the Air raids on Berlin and on the Transport and communication network in the West of Germany paralyzed. The ministerial Offices in Berlin had none spatial together

271 BAK, R 3/1542, report Speers v. November 23, 1944 about the trip to the Rhine-Ruhr area from November 15 - 23, 1944.

272 FB, November 28, 1944, Point 10.

273 BAK, R 121/9, decree RMRuK, December 6, 1944 (in Rs. RGI, January 12, 1945). Hereafter also the following. - In the news became the decree first printed a quarter of a year later (No. 55, March 15, 1945). See also Janssen, p. 285 f.

people stopped and moved from emergency accommodation to emergency accommodation. Due to the attacks on the transport connections, the Ruhr area was at times completely cut off from the headquarters; something similar was true in southwest Germany. Coal, gas and electricity were used in various regions of the Reich dangerously scarce. The of spear so often as Action maxim The vaunted improvisation by means of various staffs and commissioners reached a level that made the complicated ministerial management system obsolete and superfluous.

The Minister moved it since September 1944, on extensive Travel yourself to ensure the connection between industry and front troops on the western and southwestern periphery, if possible without any bureaucratic detours. Meanwhile, district leaders and local Nazi leaders expanded their economics Sphere of influence and impact due to the objective situation (repair, entrenchments; supply policy) .

Under these circumstances Speer dissolved the Armaments Supply Office, one of the largest of his eight ministerial offices, in mid-November.²⁷⁴ All those departments that concerned "the needs of the moment for the Wehrmacht" were transferred to the Technical Office (Saur).²⁷⁵ Powder, explosives and poison gas, however, went to the Raw Materials Office, in accordance with an agreement with Kehrl, the with spear approximately already on the 21st. August and in individually on October 27, 1944 on the most important questions of the preparation for the post-war period.²⁷⁶

In According to his decree of November 15th, Speer resigned also the resignation of Kurt Waeger and Willy Liebe), the Ladders of the Armaments and of Central Office, their offices initially on behalf of Theodor Hupfauer should be led.²⁷⁷ After It was said that he intended a transitional period it continues, "the armaments office to merge with the Central Office and HDL Dr. Hupfauer to be appointed head of this office". In the middle court, The minister assured that "there will also be opportunities for savings and simplification ".

One Row further Decree²⁷⁸ led to concentration nearly all ongoing ministerial work in two offices (technical and central office), on the armor staff and on the main Main committees. The Technical Government office performed finally substantial, one

274 News, No. 49 (November 20, 1944), Speer's decree regarding "Simplification of the organization of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production through dissolution and merger von Ämtern", November 15, 1944. Hereafter also the following. On this see Janssen, p. 283 ff.

275 Ibid. (News), Decree regarding "Transfer of the tasks of the Armaments Supply Office", November 12, 1944. - It was not even considered worth while to reconcile the date of this decree with that of the one mentioned in note 274. Quote from Kehrl, p. 413.

276 After the Depiction at Sweep!, S. 408 ff. Please refer also Timeline, August 21, 1944.

277 Hupfauer, who originally held a high position in the DAF, had long been Speer's close colleague on "work regulations" issues (Armaments Office; Ruhrstab).

278 News, No. 51 (January 10, 1945), Decree regarding "Reorganization of the Technical Office" dated December 22, 1944; *ibid.*, "Reorganization and reorganization in the main committees and main rings",

December 18 and 22, 1944; *ibid.*, no. 52 (January 17, 1945), "Position and tasks of the Works Representative of the Armaments Staff", January 6, 1945; *ibid.*, No. 53 (January 31, 1945), "Simplification the organization of the **RMfRuK** (merger of the Armament Office with the Central Office and reorganization of the Central Office)", January 17, 1945.

proper work only thanks to the factory representative of Armament staff and the office's supply officer Supplies and device for completion the Weapons had to be brought in despite air damage and traffic chaos. That reorganized The Central Office took over the "labor deployment" department from the Armaments Office as a special, new central department.

The progressive dissolution of the ministry also had motives other than objective ones. The willingness to "conserve" energy Since the new edition of the "Total War" in July 1944, the radical business and personnel restrictions demanded must be assessed against the background of the fierce competition and struggle for survival among the authorities and Nazi departments. Those who were "exempt" and were fit for military service, the threatened finally too the personal risk, even towards the end of the war at the Having to fight and die on the front.

As mentioned, in August 1944 the war economy regulation suddenly went from the peak of its effectiveness to its phase of decline. But for weeks and months beforehand, voices had been raised within the ministry and from outside against the over-centralization of the ministry and its rampant bureaucracy. The Ministry of Armaments, for its part, submitted a proposal in the middle of this year Year's radical "proposals for a simplification of the war economy organization", ²⁷⁹ apparently as a template for the minister's new push towards "total war". According to them, the Reich Ministry of Economics should be suspended "for the duration of the war", as should the Reich Chamber of Commerce and the Reich Industry Group; the Competencies of the GBA, des GB chemistry etc. should go to the Reich Ministry for Skip armaments and war production. The decree on the intermediate court of June 22, 1944 was based on a series of very radical proposals. ²⁸⁰

At the same time, party and SS groups raised the mood against the bureaucratic apparatus of the Ministry of Armaments, which had grown to enormous proportions. Verses even found their way into the files of Himmler's personal staff: "The 'old' take up rifles, the 'young' gather around Spear!" ²⁸¹ Also ideological accusations against the "non-party" industrial apparatus of the ministry had become loud after the attack on July 20th. Hitler, on the other hand, expressly supported the minister and the "self-responsibility of industry", especially in his address to the Gauleiter on the 4th August and in one - designed by Speer - Call to the "operators" the arms industry from 23. September 1944. ²⁸²

One Row more influential party and SS leader (Gauleiter like Albert Hoffmann and Karl Hanke, further Fritz crane foot, Sauckel and Bormann) complained itself since longer above

279 **BAK, R 3/157**, Bl. 1 ff., O. D (with Security out of dem planning office).

280 *Ibid.*, Bl. 16 ff., various Pieces, n.d. See p. 40 f. - The planning office's proposals, probably more of a kind of forward defense, are described by Herbst (p. 344) as unprecedented "political short-sightedness." interpreted.

281 BAP, FS, Film 3353, Anonymous letter to Himmler (in his capacity as BdE), November 13, 1944 (postmark).

282 Please refer Spear, Memories, S. 402 f.; S. 407; call from the 23.9. in News, No. 46 (29.9. 1944). Please refer also Section 6.

Walther Schieber, the head of the Armaments Supply Office, who had been compromised by his two "criminal" brothers. The accusations ranged from "character deficiencies" to "treason."²⁸³ Schieber was warned by Speer in October 1944: "The Pressure from individual Gauleiters Reichsleiter Bormann has become so strong that I can no longer hold you." Although that of Ernst Kaltenbrunner and Himmler himself conducted investigations - slider was SS brigade leader - Schieber's "innocence" result had, must he, Spear, him "despite it fall let ..., all the more more as the Reichsführer SS has not yet been able to carry out his promise to guide the Führer."²⁸⁴

In response to Speer's protests, Himmler finally told Hitler that "none of the allegations against Dr.²⁸⁵ Speer even applied to Hitler for "an appropriate donation" as compensation and achieved that Hitler awarded Schieber the highest civil order, the Knight's Cross of the War Merit Cross.²⁸⁶ After his release he continued to use it for "implementation of special tasks", especially in Italy.

If he Schieber's resignation as an occasion for an extensive, multiple offices comprehensive reorganization of the ministry took, so on the one hand around outward not to give the impression of being fired under pressure, but partly out of his own interest in simplifying the process ministerial apparatus, the also issued as a reduction could be. The The minister's long-term tactics clearly failed his decree of November 15th, in dem not just him the The arms supply office was dissolved, but in detail of his future intentions spoke, two further offices (armaments and central office) to be merged and also in the middle instance strong "to save" - here, as put it preventatively, "but in view of the current situation, only one step at a time and depending on the local conditions Necessities and possibilities and only after careful consideration and weighing up of the advantages and disadvantages in agreement with the departments involved in my ministry and the organs of the Self-responsibility of industry".²⁸⁷ The size and centralized power of the ministerial bureaucracy had become a nuisance not only for the political competitors and zealots of "total war", but also increasingly for business circles economically and politically towards the end of the war and the post-war period oriented.

The well-informed Berlin resident of the Gutehoffnungshütte Group reported on the departure three Heads of office of Ministry (slider, Waeger and Liebel) already at the November 14th, when only Schieber resigned for the time being. Extraordinarily interesting, but not certain, is additional information: "There is an intention in the ministry now also the Post one Secretary of State to set up, for the, How I confidential from

283 BAP, FS, Movie 3570, Hanke at Bormann, March 7, 1944.

284 Ibid, Berger at Himmler, October 31, 1944 (gives Testify slider again).

285 Ibid, Himmler to spear, November 8, 1944.

286 Ibid, Speer to Himmler, November 10, 1944; Speer, *The Slave State*, P. 100 (heavy dramatization here rendering representation); see FB, November 28, 1944, point 20.

287 How Note 274.

Dr. K. hear, perhaps the group leader Ohlendorf is planned." ²⁸⁸ Speer later testified that Ohlendorf had suggested to him at the beginning of November a merger of the armaments, **economics**, labor and food ministries, under Speer's leadership, but probably with him the target the "relocation of all Power up Ohlendorf". ²⁸⁹ Apparently it has the armaments minister want to pre-empt this, as he still in In the same month Hermann Neubacher suggested joining his ministry as State Secretary. ²⁹⁰

We can assume with certainty that the Armaments Minister had coordinated his actions with his industrial friends, especially with Vögler and Rohland, especially since Rohland was also in the ministry industrial Deputy from the head of office Armaments Office, General Waeger. ²⁹¹ The overall concept of the minister and his industrial mentors obviously went far beyond the measures to be taken at the Berlin headquarters. It was designed with the near end of the war and the post-war period in mind, in which, as was more or less clear to everyone involved, there would be a period of governmentlessness or at least extreme government weakness under enemy occupation. The Powerlessness of the armaments headquarters of the empire should be compensated for by regional centralization of regulatory power. The minister made use of his most tried and tested and influential employees from the industrial "self-responsibility" sector and, as his "arms representatives", endowed them with the full range of his own powers. He started in November/December 1944 in the Ruhr area with the appointment of Vögler as head of the Ruhr staff or "arms plenipotentiary for the Rhine Ruhr" and with the "reorganization of the armaments organization in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia" ²⁹².

288 Haniel archive, 400101301/15, Vygen to Hermann Kellermann, November 14, 1944. - The source mentioned could be ORR Dr. Arnold Köster (Planning Office), a close colleague of Kehrl, may have been.

289 Speer, *The Slave State*, p. 118 f. Less dramatized depiction of Speer's interrogation in Nuremberg (ItZ, ED 99, **NL** Speer, Vol. 11, consultation. v. July 2, 1945). -In The final phase of the war offered Sts. Hayler - now obviously without ambitions - the head of the **RMRuK production office**, sea builder, at, the Specialist equipment of **RMRuK** and of to merge **RWiM**, "The Reich Ministry of Economics has even declared its willingness to do so to practically subordinate their own apparatus (specialist speakers, Reich offices, specialist groups) to Mr. Seebauer, who would then simultaneously act under the authority of the Reich Minister of Economic Affairs and the Minister of Armaments for both areas could." (Ehrn. WFA of VVB Kali Staßfurt, A II, Sa, 1a, AV, No. 104, AN RGI about. Discuss Haylers with pliers, Rudolf Stahl, Karl Guth (all RGI) and Erdmann (RWiK), February 21, 1945).

290 Neubacher, Hermann, special assignment Southeast 1940-1945. Report of a flying diplomat, Göttingen/Berlin/Frankfurt a. M. 1956, p. 191.

291 On November 11, 1944, Speer handed over his Ruhr memorial to Hitler (BAP, FS, film 1732), which was of course based on previous agreements with the Ruhr rulers.

292 BAP, **RWiM**, No. 10097, RMRuK-"Decree on the reorganization of the Armament organization in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia", November 14, 1944. Afterwards, "the head of the economics and labor department in the German State Ministry took over for Bohemia and Moravia and Minister for Economy and Labor in the Government of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia", Walter Bertsch, the chairmanship of the Armaments Commission and at the same time the powers of the Prague Armaments Inspection the three armament commandos, the all dissolved became. spear (*The Slave State*, p. 153 ff.)

In February/March 1945, the entire Reich was finally divided into economic districts that were largely isolated from one another, in which the minister's armament representatives had a free hand in their decisions, as far as external, particularly military, circumstances permitted.²⁹³ They now had to make such decisions in two very contradictory ways. They maintained arms production and thus the German war machine in progress, as long as it was at all possible, and at the same time took measures for the transition from war to peace, for "saving the substance", for preventing and averting unrest among the German population and foreign workers.

6. arms organization, SS and NSDAP

The actual, although not unchallenged, leadership of the German war economy lay As long as the economy remained functional and manageable, it was with the Reich Ministry for armor and war production. „In the armaments economics Affairs ...everything listens to my command" ²⁹⁴, Speer could rightly say this right into the winter of 1944/45. In 1944, the ministry's apparatus was very swollen and complicated, but it functioned down to the individual level. The minister could certainly **have** been replaced in the event of a failure; but the well-rehearsed huge mechanism of the economic steering could not be replaced by another apparatus, such as that of the Reich Ministry of Economics. Especially no thought that one of the political Apparatus, such as the SS, could take its place.

Hitler understood this too, and just as Speer was shamefully uncritically loyal to him that he had protected him from the beginning and ultimately made him a minister, Hitler was more forceful on the minister and his armaments organization in the last years of the war reliant than to any other civilian organization or agency, including Himmler's SS, Goebbels' propaganda machine and the entire party apparatus.

The mutual dependency and trust between the two created a secure relationship Restraint of power of the minister in the political leadership and remained unshakable even in crises such as in the spring of 1944 and after July 20th. Apart from the military, only Speer had the opportunity to regularly give detailed lectures to Hitler until the end. These "leader conferences" were regular working meetings and resulted in countless, immediate ones "Leader decisions" served the minister as one of his most important means of power.

Since the publication of Speer's memory books ²⁹⁵, science has had a hard time fighting back the Legend formation to address, the from these to Hundreds of thousands of specimens

indicates this unifying as weakening of the **RMRuK** and its industrial defense organization .

293 Please refer Cape. VII in the prev. Vol.

294 BAK, R 3/1593, spear at OKL, October 29, 1944.

295 Spear, Memories (First edition Sept. 1969); the same, The slave state (DVA 1981; Ullstein 1984); also the same, Spandau diaries, Frankfurt a. M./Vienna/Berlin 1975. With the help

spread works arise. Without that we in detail on that of Schmidt ²⁹⁶ raised complicated problems Self-justification, repression, masking, falsification and apologetics can be included in those books, the conditions inside the fascist power apparatus should be examined insofar as they affect the war economy Development and its regulation by the authorities and the industrial apparatus of the Ministry of Armaments.

Well it had to be the case rather to contradictions and disputes in the Nazi power apparatus come ready, the more powers on economic policy and - directly or indirectly - also in the social policy area of the armaments minister. Substantial conflicts of interest were hidden behind the general bureaucratic and power competition and the ideological argumentation that was often associated with it.

The SS had a significant workforce in the concentration camps and was at the same time more favored Interested in equipping their Waffen-SS and Totenkopf formations with weapons and equipment. After their plan to found their own large-scale economic and armaments company in the concentration camps based on prisoner labor, as early as 1942 had essentially failed ⁹⁷, were found in the Other solutions to this problem will follow. The SS received a certain amount of additional weapons from the Armaments Minister in return for this made prisoners fit for work available to the armaments industry. The industrialists, the these prisoners until October 1944 herself from the **WVHA**, then through the Ministry of Armaments, also supplied her with ²⁹⁸ weapons "also irregularly".

The governing bodies of the NSDAP, especially the district leadership, were linked to armaments and the war economy in a different way. As top political and ideological regional leaders instance they felt yourself responsible for the Effects of armor on the Population. The Gauleiters, as Reich Defense Commissioners and as Reich Governors at the same time the highest political and official authority in the region, watched with suspicion over their competencies in general economic, in work and socio-political and in supply issues. They had extensive powers in case of defense (Air Defense; Border Defense).

Ullstein-Verlag also published two compilations by and about Speer, which followed the "Erinnerungen" and the "Spandau Diaries". and the period of time until the appearance of the "slave state" bridged (Reif, Adelbert (ed.), Albert Speer. Controversies around a German phenomenon, Munich 1978; *ibid.* (ed.), Albert Speer. Technology and Power, Esslingen 1979; Berlin/Vienna 1981).

296 Schmidt, Matthias, Albert Speer: The end of a myth. Speer's true role in the Third Reich, Bern/Munich 1982. Please refer further Hepp, Michael, Fake and Truth: Albert Speer and "The Slave State". In: Documentation center on Nazi social policy. Communications (Hamburg), H. 3, May 1985, pp. 1--69.

297 II, p. 223 f.; Speer, The Slave State, p. 31 ff. - The strength of the Waffen-SS in September 1944 was 600,000 men, that of the General SS 200,000 (BAP, FS, Film 3609, strength report of the SS Inspector for Statistics (Korherr), September 19, 1944.

298 Ohlendorf at least testified to this for industrial members of the "Himmler Circle of Friends" (BAP, case VI, film 420, ADB 91, Doc. NI-12456, Affid. Ohlendorf, November 17, 1947). Regarding

d. weapons shipments above the **RMRuK** s. FB, September 20-22, 1942, Point 36.

At this constellation were various conflicts of interest and Conflicts in the war economy are inevitable. But it was not such conflicts that determined the picture, but rather the agreement of all those involved in the military and political goals the Uniting efforts for the armor. was important here, that Hitler the spear Course confirmed again and again. That was important obvious Success of the armament. Ultimately, however, the decisive factor was the necessity of the war situation the Organization of the Ministry of Armaments unassailable made.

For spear however, was it to Time the His memoirs are already being written Became an obsession, subsequently his work as Fight with the dark forces of the SS and to define the party.²⁹⁹ His problem, more psychological than scientific, was that ei:, one myself at the time the highest-ranking pillars of the regime, supported by Hitler and courted by Himmler, albeit with resentment³⁰⁰, with even this past „settle up" wanted.

The conflicts mentioned acquired a certain significance in certain phases of the last year and a half of the war. Her Character, you course and its Effects are more precise only when the respective ones are taken into account to determine political and war circumstances.

Since the minister's first major success show, which was widely exploited for propaganda purposes, at the Sports Palace event at the June 5, 1943 was it with his reputation in the The public has gone uphill steeply. In September/October he recorded an extraordinary increase in power by taking over the powers of the Reich Ministry of Economics “in the area of raw materials and production in industry and crafts”.³⁰¹ A comprehensive decommissioning and “implementation” concept should now be tackled in the economy.

299 This is how it was created as his last - most questionable - plant instead of one originally planned Book about the German armament of the Second World War - a whole volume about the "most difficult chapter" this topic, his “disputes with the SS” (Speer, *The Slave State*, p. 13). His own experience in the war was good here 35 Overlaid by impressions for years he had won during the Nuremberg Trials and when subsequently studying Nazi files. Schmidt (p. 20 f.) reports that when the "Memories" were printed, the then head of the Ullstein publishing house, Wolf Jobst Siedler, and Joachim C. Firmly Speer advised and probably him too, „at least partially", the pen guided have. Similar like "The slave state" emerged be; here becomes advice already when choosing a topic used have. Not clear remains in Schmidt (p. 19 f.), whether and to what extent Speer and his advisors have come to terms with Walther Hubatsch and his doctoral student Gregor Janssen, whose richly sourced book and dissertation manuscript Speer had in Spandau prison as early as 1964 Working through can. Janssen's book he seemed a year Before "Memories" Speers in Settlers Ullstein publishing house and already put a good number of the later popular spear legends into circulation.

300 Sweep! had always “the impression that he (Himmler - D E.) for example Speer had respect bordering on fear and he was certainly not an opponent to be feared for Speer.” (Kehr!, p. 361). Himmler carried Speer received the rare highest SS rank (Oberstgruppenführer) in 1942. (Speer, *Memories*, p. 379).

301 RGBI. 1943 I, p. 529 f., "Decree of the Führer on the concentration of the war economy", September 2, 1943; see also II, p. 146 ff.

The Path to success of Minister's offer enough fuel for the complicated internal disputes, the to this time put in. Himmler, as new in August 1943 The appointed Interior Minister, who had just been given additional power, showed an active interest in filling the remaining positions of the Reich Economics Minister into his sphere of influence. The internal efforts of the SS batches involved, in the long term the Ministry of **Economic** Affairs as Counterweight to the overpowering Ministry of Armaments, with the aim of "weakening the Position spear"³⁰² to stabilize and yourself for In order to preserve a basis for their outlandish economic policy ideas saturated with Nazi ideology in the post-war period, they remained limited to academic discussions and propaganda efforts and never had an impact on the reality of the war economy.³⁰³

At the same time offered himself Himmler with success with Hitler, the Underground-relocation of the Rocket production (V 2) in own Direction to take over and realize it with concentration camp prisoners.³⁰⁴ Later, in the spring of 1944, the SS construction staff under Hans Kammler also built numerous large underground structures for the Hunter staff through.³⁰⁵ Client were and always remained organs of the Ministry of Armaments (Special Committee A 4; Jägerstab). The SS functioned like a contracting company, although in a prominent position, but not unlike the many other construction companies that worked within the framework of the OT at home and abroad. The Responsibilities were, of course, complicated, since Kammler was primarily and directly responsible for Himmler, as well as his head of office, Oswald Pohl, with regard to armaments construction the Minister of Armaments and de jure even Göring was also subordinate to him. "That had to happen but too lead to collisions," said the In front of the seated one jury in the Dora concentration camp trial in Essen (1 968); ",... or to Cooperation," he replied witness Speer was dry at the time. „One has tried everything to one to come to close cooperation." ³⁰⁶

Only at the V-2 rocket took over SS in the underground central works except The expansion of the production facility also included "production" insofar as it provided and guarded concentration camp prisoners as workers. The control of production was the responsibility of Special Committee A 4, her Management of the Directorate of the Ministry of Armaments founded Mittelwerk GmbH.³⁰⁷

302 BAK, R 58/377, AT SD lead section Berlin (f. Ohlendorf), October 12, 1944.

303 Autumn, S. 255 ff.; Spear, The slave state, S. 113 ff., S. 122 ff; II, S. 164 ff.

304 FB, August 19-22, 1943, point 24; see Speer, Memories, p. 378 ff.; the same, The Slave State, p. 288 ff.

305 After Statement Pohls were for the "Special Order Kammler" finally 110,000 prisoners employed.

306 Hitler's Minister of Armaments Albert Speer as witness before dem jury at the district Court Eat ... documentation and stenographic record of the interrogation of October 30, 1968. Zs. provided by Friedrich Karl Kaul et al., Berlin, Ms-Druck, p. 20.

307 See Bartel!, Walter, report on the role and significance of the Mittelwerk including the Dora-Mittelbau concentration camp and the function of the SS in the A-4 production (1968). Series of papers from the Presidium of the Association of those Persecuted by the Nazi Regime, H. 13/1970, Frankfurt a. M. Detailed and rich in material Dieckmann. Götz, conditions of existence and resistance in the Dora-Mittelbau concentration camp from the perspective of functional inclusion the SS into the system the fascist war economy, Phil. Diss. Berlin 1968.

With Himmler's offer, that To build and operate the underground V-2 factory with prisoners, the questions of the additional manpower required and the desired absolute secrecy were solved for the Armaments Minister. Speer cannot provide any conclusive proof of this in his later observations state that him the Commissioning Himmler and Kammler, How he claims, displeased have, where the Decision Hitler's him but „basically only (could have been) welcome." ³⁰⁸ He dramatizes the process on the sem Armaments sector, which was insignificant at the time and is still largely overestimated today, in anticipation of events that first in occurred in the last weeks of the war. ³⁰⁹ Eventually his memory disappears all late criticism of the "scandalous and also production-inhibiting conditions" ³ w in the Mittelwerk, which he visited on December 10, 1943, his enthusiastic praise for Kammler's "really unique act", "the underground facilities in Nie(dersachswerfen) "To transform the raw state into a factory in an almost impossibly short time of two months, which has no equal in Europe and is, moreover, unsurpassed even by American standards." ³¹¹

On the overall problem of underground relocation and the demarcation of responsibilities between the armaments ministry (Hunter's staff, armor staff) and SS recently Perz, Project Quartz, S. 135 ff.

308 Speer, *The Slave State*, p. 289; P. 297. Speer actually had it during the Nuremberg interrogations sounded completely different: "The production of the A 4 - taken over by Kammler - was still quite pleasant for me because it meant a capacity that had to be completely rebuilt. I no longer had reserves of manpower, and so the fact that Kammler was taking care of this was quite pleasant to me." (IfZ, ED 99, NL Speer, Vol. 11, consultation. v. July 2, 1945). - The negotiations with Hitler on August 20, 1943 with Himmler about the rocket program obviously only revolved around Hitler's "excessive demands" after 5 000 rockets per month Speer considered it unfulfillable (Speer, *The Slave State*, p. 295).

309 "In the did Himmler succeeded decisive blow against my bis then undisputed Authority via the indirect route of acquiring the development and production of the new rockets." (ibid., S. 298). This in everyone in terms of misunderstanding claim is in the literature corrected long ago been (approximately at Janssen, S. 197 ff.). The Minister of Armaments kept the control of V-weapon development and -Production over his Special Committees and The Dornberger working staff was in charge until January/February 1945, but left responsibility for the difficulties and failures in production and operation in particular to the Rocket A 4 Himmler and Kammler. First in the phase of collapse the War economy became Kammler development and production of the rockets (see Chapter II, Section 3 in the previous volume) and finally also the production powers regarding the Me 262 transmitted: appointment K.'s through Goering for the

"Special representative to carry out the requirement regarding development, procurement and industrial testing on dem Area the ordnance with rocket propulsion", 22nd I. 1945; crossing "all Powers that were previously within the scope of the Reich Minister for armaments and war production for 262 were issued", by "Führer's order" on K. as "General Representative of the Führer for jet aircraft", March 27, 1945 (BAP, FS, film 2961, Kammler to Frank/Messer Schmitt, April 16, 1945). See also Section 3 in the previous chapter; also Chapter VII.

310 Ibid, S. 299.

311 BAK, R3/1585, SpeeranKammler, December 17, 1943.

As Minister of the Interior, Himmler was the immediate superior of the Gauleiter in their state function. He became Reich Defense Commissioner. In this Speer tried to make him his ally in the fall of 1943 in order to use his help to implement the planned radical economic measures. Measures of the "Total War" in the Gauge through clogging. The Armaments Minister "hoped for Himmler's power," as he later put it, to "stop the progressive organizational disintegration of the unified Imperial administration against Bormann".³¹²

On October 6th In 1943 he made the attack in his speech in Poznań the Gauleiters suddenly at and accused them of not sufficiently supporting his policy of "total war" and even of sabotaging it. With reference to his appointments with Himmler ("Iron Pact" Himmler - spear) and with dem SD he threatened them with Himmler's executive power.³¹³ But Himmler's support failed to materialize, and Speer's frontal attack was unsuccessful. The resistance the Gauleiter seems to be temporarily stiffened and even had an effect on Hitler brought about to have.

In the following months, especially during Speer's absence from office (February-April 1944), it became clear how solid and how indispensable the minister's armaments organization was for the German war effort. Although they attack from various Pages, out of the Nazi leadership and out of dem Ministry himself, to ward off had and spear later even - without sufficient Proof - claimed that Himmler had him during his Want to kill illness³¹⁴, survived she this critical Not only time, but it also laid the foundation for extraordinary production successes, of which the achievements of the Jägerstaff were only the most spectacular. Also in the districts both the tough work of the armaments inspections, armaments commissions, etc. and - as a resounding argument - the catastrophic effects of the Allied air raids on this, that in the Gau lines the insight in the Necessities of "Total war" increasingly Place handle.

The summer 1944, one A time of severe defeats on land and devastating attacks from the air, it was also the culmination of the armaments minister's power. Arms production reached its peak during the war. The restored one Close contact with Hitler proved to be the pivotal point from which the armaments minister asserted his position confidently.³¹⁵ During this time he maneuvered Göring in the air armament out of, urged Sauckel in one subordinate position away, helped Goebbels as new "Reich Plenipotentiary for the total war effort" into the saddle and largely neutralized Himmler and Bormann, who had it after the 20th century. July failed the To discredit the ministry and its industrial organization and to draw friends and mentors of the **minister**, such as Vögler and Hermann Bücher, into the maelstrom of suspicion and persecution after dem attack to pull. Hitler gave spear the Opportunity two weeks after 20. July before the Gauleiters above the successes and Perspectives the armor to speak-

312 Spear, Memories, S. 325.

313 Ibid, p. 325 ff.; II, S. 173 ff.

314 Spear, Memories, S. 339 ff.; the same, The slave state, S. 316 ff.

315 Important data in this context are the "leaders' meeting" from June 3rd to 5th and the Armaments conference in Linz (incl. the speech Hitler's in the Platterhofb. Berchtesgaden); s. Section 4.

chen ³¹⁶, and increased his prestige in an unusual way by emphasizing Speer's achievements and the importance of his work in front of the same group at his headquarters the following day (August 4th). ³¹⁷

Once again, at the end of September 1944, in an "appeal" to the armaments factories, Hitler officially donated to von Speer "from industry organically created "self-responsibility" Recognition and praise ³¹⁸, after the Minister joins him in detail against political suspicions of his industrial employees by Goebbels and Bormann and against the Gauleiter's uncontrolled interventions in armaments. ³¹⁹

The more important part of Speer's memorandum of September 20th, however, was the attempt to create "clear lines of command" in view of the increasingly chaotic responsibilities, especially in the districts near the border. It was necessary to authorize the Minister of Armaments in all questions of the Armament and war production "to the Gauleiter directly necessary instructions to grant"; before Above all, "they" would have to Gau economic consultant... For the duration of the war, I would be working together with the regional department heads for technology." The party and the DAF should not have direct influence on the companies, but rather must itself "exclusively the me subordinate organs serve The Operations manager must assume full responsibility for production in his company . " ³²⁰

As described, Hitler reacted evasively because Bormann protested. After all, the problem concerned the district authorities for a while. ³²¹

316 To the speech on August 3, 1944 in Posen see chap. II in Preliminary vol. ("Victory program"). Original was a day-long armaments conference at a military training area planned (FB, May 13, 1944, point 1; FB, July 6-8, 1944, point 6). Himmler also spoke in Posen about the situation after July 20th.

317 Spear, *Memories*, S. 402 f.

318 News, No. 46, September 29, 1944, Hitler's appeal "To the Operations manager the German armaments and war production", September 23, 1944.

319 IMG, Vol. 41, S. 394 ff., Doc. spear-1, Memorandum spear f. Hitler, September 20, 1944. Excerpts quote

b. Janssen, p. 172 f.; sa spear, *Memories*, p. 406. Here in claimed Spear, his The task is "a non-political one" (IMG, p. 395); Naasner rightly contradicts this: "By using the means of rational production control to underpin the regime's irrational final victory perspective, the **RMBM/RMRK** took... one in the highest extent political function true." (Naasner, Walter, *New centers of power in the German war economy 1942-1945. The economic organization of the SS*, Boppard 1994, p. 471).

320 Ibid (IMG, S. 398 ff.).

321 An official from the planning department reported about the different ones Reactions from some of the Gauleiters he had visited: "At first Speer rejected the Gauleiters' participation and wanted to work without them. Now suddenly one is trying to attribute to them a share of responsibility, where previously there were no rights at all or only very few." (Konrad Henlein/Sudeten gau). August Eigruher (Upper Donau), in turn, "contrary to Bormann's opinion, took the position that Gauleiter takes responsibility under all circumstances would have to take over the armaments in their districts. This is a political matter of course at this time and is already de facto the case, at least for him." (BAK, R 3/170, BI. 66 ff., report ORR Arnold Köster about trip to Reichenberg, Prague and Linz v. October 25-30, 1944, November 4, 1944).

In the following months, when the Allied air raids largely paralyzed German transport, the Battle of the Bulge failed and finally <read When the Upper Silesian industrial area was occupied by the Red Army, the internal divergences and conflicts between armaments, SS and party departments disappeared - although often continued in a ghostly manner and carried out with varying success - their meaning.

The regulatory mechanism of the German war economy collapsed at the beginning of 1945. Parts of this mechanism remained in operation under the so-called armaments representatives of the ministry until they ran dry or were overrun by the enemy due to traffic breakdowns and a lack of raw materials, supplies and fuel. The Minister of Armaments, whose personal safety in the turbulence of the crumbling Reich was now ensured by "some reliable front-line officers" from the army ³²², saw become unemployed until In the last weeks of the war he energized one for the German economy's final important task, the "rescue of the Substance" before Hitler's extermination orders, took over. ³²³

322 Spear, Memories, S. 470.

323 Please refer Cape. VII in the prev. Vol.

Chapter II

war production. Pay and Analyzes

1. Peak performance and Final crisis

The production curve in 1944 was complicated and, especially in the second half of the year, went in opposite directions movements on. She achieved results in almost all areas Armament peak values, sometimes still towards the end of the year, and has been controlling since the summer in an unstoppable crisis. Early 1945 was standing the general economic Disaster imminent.

It was at that crisis is not about an even one and simultaneous decline in production after a clearly definable turning point, but rather a gradual, fractional, sometimes delayed collapse of war production, for which several factors are responsible were. Under these factors was the Allied aerial bombardment demented against them German industry and transport are the dominant ones; Since August/September, the loss of occupied areas that were important for military purposes has been increasingly effective.

"Theoretically, if not actually in the real world of war, German production output had not yet reached its ultimate limit when it began to falter." ¹ The ambivalent course of production development itself encouraged those responsible for the war economy to consider what was "theoretically" possible as what was possible, even when the realities of the war had long since thwarted their programs and their efforts doomed to failure.

a) factors the Peak performance

In July 1944, according to calculations by the planning office, German armaments production reached its highest value at 322 percent of the base period chosen Average for January and February 1942. ² However, according to the same calculation, the absolute highest value for weapons (408 percent), tanks (598) and shipbuilding (233) was only in December, which is the difficulty and uncertainty of the calculation.

Military disasters occurred on the Eastern Front in July and on the Western Front in August, and the Air offensive against the German fuel plants, a Menetekel also

1 Milward, The Second World War, S. 110.

2 Wagenühr, S. 178 ff. Hereafter also the following. For the history of the "index numbers of armaments production" see Kehr!, p. 319 ff.

Table 11

Index numbers the Armament final production 1943, January 1944-February/March 1945 (January February 1942 = 100)

	In total	Weapon s group					Group of tanks	including : Tank- battle- dare	Storm- sh., Assault tank, tank hunter	group flight witness (armame nt weight)	group ship building aircraft	Group Muni tion	
			including : Lightwei ght Inf. weapons	Heaviness Artillery. Inf.- weapons	total	Flak total							
Monthly average 1943	222	234	199	391	264	266	330	220	656	216	345	182(181)	247
Monthly average 1944 1944	277	348	269	506	520	363	536	330	1 752	277	787	157(166)	306
January	241	274	231	420	416	282	438	324	884	232	551	140	281
February	231	284	228	449	403	293	460	304	1 021	186	351	170	303
March	270	301	238	467	471	302	498	338	1 171	262	566	153	314
April	274	320	245	465	486	330	527	359	1 329	285	684	127	302
May	285	337	245	507	536	344	567	381	1 472	295	798	152	301
June	297	361	261	535	570	373	580	397	1 779	321	866	107	?
July	322	384	283	569	589	410	589	402	1 849	367	982	139	319
August	297	382	284	479	496	426	558	363	1 708	308	1 105	141	323
September	301	377	274	517	522	400	527	305	1 991	310	1 130	184	335
October	273	372	290	543	535	372	516	258	2 287	255	957	217	321
November	268	375	321	534	609	370	571	268	2 666	274	1 096	124	307
December 1945	263	408	331	582	602	451	598	263	2 866	224	363	233	263
January	227	284	295	284	264	364	557	210	2 813	231	930	164	226
February	175	216	234	250	235	247	285	163	1 856	168	654	143	191
March	145	208	270	162	approx. 195	227*	221(273)	?	?	136	?	109(99)	157(154)

*) Only heavy Flak.

Source: car driver, S. 114 ff., S. 178 ff.; The effects, S. 175, Tab. 100 (numbers in Brackets= Deviations opposite Wagenfüh); s. a. BAP, FS, Movie 1732, index numbers of the German armaments production. As of February 1945.

for the rest of the war economy, had already been underway for several weeks. Apparently, during this critical time, those responsible for armaments clung to the production successes that the armaments minister had achieved with the help of himself and Goebbels. the concept of a second wave of "total war". promised. Speer, who claimed "that we, for example, have half a month's production the total losses Army Group Center suffered as a result of its rapid retreat. 3, spoke several times about a new, huge armaments program that would run until the end of the year. He already mentioned it on July 20, the day of the assassination attempt on Hitler, when he appeared at the Reich Propaganda Ministry at the invitation of Goebbels. Detailed He presented it to the Gauleiters of the NSDAP on August 3rd.

It seems to be that "victory program" to have acted in March 1944 (or soon after March) must have been drawn up in the Technical Office and the Planning Office of the Ministry of Armaments. 4 An expert involved in the planning office confirmed after the war that it be even in Spring 1944 not very likely been, the desired increase rate of 58 percent in the Total armor to be achieved within nine months (March-December 1944). "But it was obviously supposed to be a matter of extreme effort the it was valid, also the last industrial capacity to mobilize. Because, so strange it

sounds- the appointed experts believed they had a decisive lead to achieve abroad." 5

After the war, the armaments minister claimed that there were no longer any long-term armament plans in 1944. 6 But despite his illness and absence from Berlin for several months, he must have been informed about that program and recapitulated it in the mentioned Speech of the 3rd August the program numbers for December 1944 exactly, without making any compromises in view of the setbacks that have now occurred in the land and air war.

After the war he commented on that speech and the December program several times. The target figures resulted from Hitler's demands and "were intended to show the party leaders that my device and I currently at were irreplaceable in these months." He said The Gauleiters also called them "inflated numbers" in order to increase the effect. 7 According to the sources, this only applies to the planned numbers for tanks (3 200 pcs.), heavy Pak (1 500) and 3.7 cm Aak (1 800) to.

3 BAK, R 3/1552, Speer's speech in Sonthofen at the "War Home Work Conference", July 28, 1944. - Speer explained his and those around him's euphoria about armaments after the war, which was difficult to understand, with a "sensory disorder" (Speer, *Memories*, p. 368). See also Sweep!, p. 355 ff.; p. 402 ff.

4 Wagenühr, p. 83 f.; The term "victory program" is found nowhere except here, neither in the sources nor in the post-war literature. The infantry program from mid-January 1944 was an essential part of the "Victory Program"; see Section 3.

5 Ibid, p. 84.

6 speer gave in recorded during his interrogation on May 17, 1945: "For the There was army equipment it 1944 in general no on long deadline specified programs more, probably but short term (in the) submitted in advance 'Program outlines'." (BAP, FS, Movie 3568). Similar Interrogation v. July 13, 1945 (IfZ, ED 99, NL Speer, Vol. 12); sat Sweep!, S. 354.

7 BAK, Ms. Albert Speer,,To 'Germany Armament in World War II (ed. and deposited v. Willi A. Boelcke)", December 1969, p. 23.

Table 12

Planned figures of "Victory Program" for December 1944 and Production figures from March, July and December 1944

Device or type of ammunition	Plan Dec. '44	Is March '44	Is July '44	Is Dec. '44	Plan req.(%)
<i>ammunition (1000 Shot or 1000 Piece)</i>					
MP44	400000	12000	47000	103 000	26
Inf.- Mun.(a- final MP44)	800000	388 000	410000	446000	56
8th cm Size W.3,4	4000	2300	3 300	2 800	70
12 cm Size W.3,4	600	279	322	300	50
1.1.G.	2000	865	922	834	42
slG	400	206	166	189	47
IFH	5 000	3400	3 500	2400	68
sFH	1 200	649	635	399	33
stem and eggs					
Hand grenades	5000	4 100	4 100	3 400	68
Total Mun. army (Gen.-Qu- tons)	360000	81 000	294 000	221 600	62
<i>weapons (pcs.)</i>					
MP44	100000	7000	20510	49800	50
K43	100 000	18 594	33 010	36415	36
MG	30000	18 618	24 141	31 339	104
s. IG	160	86	145	200	125
s. Pak	1300	1 138	1 180	1 238	95
1. FH	1095	797	920(?)	1 082	99
sFH	380	198	273	301	79
3.7 cm Flak	1 563	416	865	1 004	64
s.Flak	1 208	680	690	895	74
Guns (Tube) from 7.5 cm	8th 200	4 150	5 605	5,737 _	70
s. Headlight (200cm)	525	184	240	214	41
<i>tank (pcs.)</i>					
Stu.- Store,					
Tank destroyer	2 165	545	818	1 259	58
tiger u. Panthers	570	388	527	355	62
tank all					
Types (pcs.)	2 800	1 520	1 680	1 840	66
tank all Types (combat weight)	75 900	48 617	53 118	50 528	67
<i>Traction vehicle (pcs.)</i>	2270	1 612	1 570	1 074	47

Table 12 (Continuation)

Device or. Ammunition type	plan Dec. '44	Is March '44	Is July '44	Is Dec. '44	Plan- req.(%)
<i>Trucks</i>					
(pcs.)	13 948	9 897	8th 522	3203	23
VI	9000		3 000	2600	29
<i>Airplanes (pcs.)</i>					
Airplanes Total	6032	2 661	4075	3 105	51
(excluding repairs)					
hunter staff					
production	5 134	1 830	3 115	2 733	53
bomber	898*	383	386	35	
<i>Warships</i>					
(pcs.)					
Submari	44	20	17	38	86
nes					
Speedboats	17	5	6	3	18

*) In this Number are educational, Transport- and training aircraft included

Source: BAK, R 3/1552, BI. 87-90, „Collection of Documents to elaboration of draft to speak from the July 20, 1944”. This Number statements carry the Date from the 20.7. and from the October 18, 1944 and regarding the “Required Increase in production Dec. 1944 opposite **June** 1944” and the “Required Increase in production Dec. 1944 opposite Sept. 1944” (October 18th). Cf. BAK, R 3/1553, speech Speers before the Gauleiters at the August 3, 1944 u. more Documents in addition. - The Actual numbers sometimes differ with the - also not fully matching - Declarations the "Emission overview", the

"Production figures" and the "Quick Reports/Final Armament Production" (see II, p. 327 f.; S. 646 ff.). The actual numbers for March, July (supplementary) and December 1944 mainly come from the "Emission overview" (II, S. 646 ff.). Partial overviews for the "Victory Program" with partially deviating numbers at car driver, S. 83; Boelcke, Germany Armor, S. 398 f.; BAK, Ms. Albert spear v. Dec. 1969

„To 'Germany armor in the Second World War' (ed. and deposited v. Willy A. Boelcke)", S. 24 f.

“Armament miracle” and “victory program” were terms behind which stood the real numerical successes in war production. The production of weapons and equipment was far away. The primary industry, on the other hand, had long since reached the limits of its capacity. But it remained at a remarkable level until the third quarter. The decline in the fourth quarter was offset by the loss of areas around Germany to be supplied (Money). While however in the previous years rather still some surplus of raw materials above what was present the As the production of weapons and equipment required, the high output of weapons in 1944 meant that the supply of raw materials became scarcer. “At the beginning of 1944 the raw material situation had changed from a fairly generous (comfortable) supply to increasing difficulties, to meet the armaments requirements.”⁸

By April/May, production of synthetic fuel and rubber and important basic chemical products also increased. Since the end of May, the Allied bomber offensive against the hydrogenation works thoroughly destroyed their base in four months, so that it never recovered.

The Rüstungsminister illuminated the war economy successes of Year 1944, but also the hardly measurable losses on the fronts, as he wrote in his annual report from 27. January 1945 stated, that alone for the army the Armament performance that year "(would have been) enough to completely re-equip 225 infantry divisions and re-establish 45 armored divisions." ⁹

The peak performance of armaments in 1944 can be explained by various, often interrelated, causes that go back to the years 1943 and 1942. The concentration of regulatory power over the war economy in the Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production and in his industrial apparatus since 1942 had made great progress in 1943. ¹⁰ Hitler's decree of December 6, 1943 ultimately gave the minister all the powers "to ensure the priority of the supplier industry." For this purpose he was able to "rely on the entire remaining war production, including the most important armaments production." ¹¹ This was an important sector of industry - including those of the occupied territories - with hundreds of products and dozens of product groups from mechanical engineering, the metalworking industry, the electrical industry, the precision mechanical and optical industry and most other branches of industry were made fully available for armaments. With the formation of the Jägerstab (March 1, 1944) it was de facto already the transition of the entire air armament in the Steering authority of Armaments minister pre-programmed.

In the Years 1944 came the Main part of the extensive Investments out of 1942 and 1943 ¹² to carry. Expansion capacities and new large-scale plants, for example for tanks and assault guns, went into production or reached their full performance. Rationalization and especially type restrictions for weapons and equipment led to significant increases in production. The increased concentration on certain areas had a particular rationalization effect in 1944 sectors of the Armor, in first line on fighter planes the air armament, on tanks and assault guns in the army armament and on submarines in the naval armament. Airplanes and tanks significantly increased their share of final armaments production in terms of value.

Compared to 1943, the volume of tank production in terms of value increased in the first half of 1944 155 percent, aircraft production to 122 percent and weapons production to 138 percent.¹³

Finally, operational reorganizations within the industry since the fall of 1943 ¹⁴ increased the share the armament on Cost the civil Production. The production from weapons and Ge-

⁹ Bleyer, The secret report ... from the 27. January 1945, S. 366.

¹⁰ Please refer II, Cape. III.

¹¹ BAP, FS, Movie 10604, Hitler decree v. December 6, 1943; in addition Decree Speers v. January 14, 1944.

¹² Please refer II, S. 381 ff.

¹³ car driver, S. 67.

¹⁴ Please refer II, S. 150 ff.

advises made around 40 in 1944 percent of industrial production, compared to 31 percent in the previous year.¹⁵ The share that the supply industry and the raw materials industry had to contribute to this increased accordingly.

Table 13

Share of groups in final armaments production, 1943-1944 (as a percentage of the total value in constant prices)

	center 1943	End 1943	center 1944
weapons	8.0	9.7	9.4
tank	6.4	7.9	8.3
Motor vehicles	4.8	3.5	3.0
Traction vehicle	1.8	2.0	1.7
Airplanes	41.9	35.7	45.9
Warships	9.7	6.6	5.6
ammunition	24.6	31.5	25.4
powder	2.8	3.1	2.5

Source: Wagenführ, S. 69. At Ploetz, 2, S. 22, figures for 1944 without giving reasons "easy changed".

Table 14

Portion the Arms production (Weapons and Device) at the industrial production, 1941-1944 (in Percent)

1941	1942	1943	1944
16	22.5	31,1	39.8

Source: car driver, S. 67; 1941: Ploetz, 2, p. 22.

b) factors the crisis

The air bombardment of the Allies against German residential towns and war economic goals not the war decided. It was military and economic lost long before the Allied air fleets won air supremacy over Germany at the beginning of 1944 and the German war economy systematically since the summer of 1944 to paralyze and to destroy began.

Was purely military the Bombing war undoubtedly of little importance compared to what was happening at the Fronts in the East, Southeast, west and south and hit here only indi-

15 See table. 4. - The statistics prepared by the RGI of those "employed for the Wehrmacht" in industry were apparently only available up to 1943 (May 31) led and pointed for 61 percent for this point in time the Wehrmacht producers; In 1944 the percentage was probably 65 to 70 percent (The Effects, p. 213, table 11).

directly due to the need for soldiers and weapons for air defense in Germany. The effect expected by leading Allied air warfare strategists at the time on German war morale, which is still controversial today, should also not be overestimated. The defeat of Stalingrad probably showed just as great a political and moral impact on the German people as the air raids, which have occurred since the second half of the year 1943 probably also caused increasing political apathy and war aversion. On the other hand, the Nazis' hate propaganda against "air terror" and their appeal to the "steadfastness of the home front" certainly mobilized a broader section of the population. The Menetekel the near defeat, that tags the contrails of the bomber fleets and wrote their luminous markers in the sky at night, only a few read and only a few wanted to read. Recently, the highly dubious argument that the German population has resurfaced only Retaliation was demanded, and the Nazi leadership and those responsible for armaments were under this pressure "the biggest mistake in the Armor during War": They would have increased the production of V-weapons and thus wasted industrial capacity that could otherwise have been used to produce around 24,000 more fighter aircraft in 1944/45.¹⁶

Things were different in the war economy than in the military and moral-political spheres. When in 1944/45 the economy fell from peak performance into crisis and inevitable catastrophe, the Allied air raids on industry and transport were actually the cause primary factor. Her effect itself in the individual with a fairly high degree of accuracy. The large body of statistics used and published by the USSBS provides invaluable services in this regard.¹⁷ The overarching, quite speculative questions the Overall effect of the Bombing raids will of course remain open; in our context So above all the question of how long they shortened the war and the question of the possible economic and war consequences a renunciation of strategic bombing or its failure or else a more effective air war strategy would have resulted.

After the decision of the Western Allies in Casablanca (January 1943) to launch the air war against Germany and the The US Air Force and, over time, also the British Bomber Command began to coordinate the German war economy and plan it together Strategy through that on the Destruction of the defense industry key objectives. Repression has long been considered a prerequisite for the elimination of such targets as the submarine shipyards, the transport system and the petroleum industry the opposing ones Air force, particularly the Air defense. Since June 1943 ranked the

16 Murray, Williamson, Reflections on the Combined bomber Offensive. In: **MGM**, 51 (1992), H.1 , p. 81; P. 89 f. (quote p. 89). Speer contributed to the emergence of this illusionary idea in Nuremberg when he explained that five to eight fighters could have been built instead of one V-2 rocket (BAP, FS, Film 3568, Vemehmg. Speer, May 21, 1945). Recently, Schabe!, Ralf, has been fundamentally critical of this. The illusion of Miracle weapons. The role the Jet aircraft and Anti-aircraft missiles in the armaments policy of the Third Reich, Munich 1994, p. 193 ff. and passim.

17 For the European Theater of war 208 reports alone, (Washington) 1945 ff. The 31 most important reports were in the 70s reissued years ago (in ten volumes: "Garland Series", New York/London).

Offensive on German fighter production is at the top of the US priority list. Until the invasion, almost a year, the Americans stuck to this priority, strengthened by the painful, high losses by Germans Hunter, the their and the British bombers suffered over Germany in 1943.¹⁸

Table 15

Major attacks ally bomber on economic goals, 1943 (Selection)

March-	(RAF)	„Battle around the dysentery“
July	(USAAF)	North and Central Germany (including submarine
March-		shipyards and aircraft factories)
July	(RAF)	Möhnetal and Edertal dam
	(USAAF)	Bunawerk Hüls/Marl ball bearing
16. and 17th of	(USAAF)	works Schweinfurt Messerschmitt
May	(USAAF)	Works regensburg
22. June	(RAF)	Army Research Institute Peenemünde (v 2) Air
17. August	(USAAF)	armament works
17. August	(USAAF)	Ball bearing works Schweinfurt
17th/18th		
August 8th -		
14th October		
14. October		

Sources: As note 18.

Until End of 1943 But the Allies only flew seven major attacks on fighter aircraft production sites (cells). Nonetheless were particularly the attacks Regensburg and Wiener Neustadt (Messerschmitt) in August and on Marienburg (Focke-Wulf) in October.¹⁹ Production reached a low point in December, but this was due to an acute shortage of aluminum and probably also to the outsourcing of the Messerschmitt and Heinkel plants. The Series of heavy attacks end February 1944 ("Big Week") and the bombings that continued until May, although destructive, did not achieve that either strategic goal, the to deal a devastating blow to German aircraft and especially fighter production. But they had through success in a tactical sense, in that hundreds of aircraft were destroyed or not produced that could otherwise have fought on the front (invasion front) or in the German air defense. In the spring of 1944, the Allied strategic air forces shifted the focus of their attacks to France and Belgium and carried there by systematically shutting down important transport facilities, contributed significantly to the preparation of the invasion.

In terms of war economic consequences and losses, in the period from spring 1943 to April/May 1944 it was less the direct damage and destruction caused by the bombs than the forced effort of the Relocation of significant parts the arms industry, first above ground, then also underground. The shift has been in the for a long time leadership circles of regimes discussed, started in big style in the Autumn 1943 (above

¹⁸ See DZW, Vol. 3, p. 156 ff.; Vol. 4, p. 128 ff.; Groehler, bombing war, p. 92 ff., p. 121 ff. and pas sim; Groehler, Air War, p. 379 ff.

¹⁹ The effects, S. 3; S. 155; s. a. USSBS, Aircraft division Industry Report, January 1947.

Table 16

Bomb load dropped over the European Theater (USAAF and RAF), 1943-April 1945 (in t)

quarter	In total thrown off	including: on Airplane- factories	on driving fabric works and- bearing	on traffic Investments	on area chen goals
1/1943	27 920	4		1 199	15,039 _
11/1943	46 377	1392		1 291	36213
111/1943	60018	1 880		1 916	39200
IV/1943	52 734	969		6138	28964
1/1944	103 745	7 189	177	17,763 _	40792
11/1944	302 595	7 530	21240	97 257	53 329
111/1944	366 327	6 983	53 271	64095	103 965
IV/1944	317 341	1635	55 760	104 946	96716
1/1945	335 373	1 745	59944	138 770	69 823
April 1945	101 116	869	5 852	38 101	17 655

Source: The effects, S. 3 ff., Tab. 2-4; short tons converted in metric tons.

days) or in the spring of 1944 (underground) and continued until the end of the war. She brought, apart from the effort of the relocation yourself, especially that Underground mining brings with it major but difficult to quantify economic and business disadvantages: decentralization of production, complicating uniform management, multiplication and over-expansion of transport connections, not to mention the social problems or the specific technical problems of underground production.²⁰ In contrast However, it remains to be noted that the aircraft industry, as the most heavily relocated industry, achieved top performance under the Jägerstab until September 1944 and produced more than ever before.

The real turning point in the bombing war against the German war economy began with the air offensive against the hydrogenation plants. In May/June 1944, what had long been feared by insiders in the German arms industry and in the general staff occurred. A good dozen of them fuel plants, six of them, in them almost the all aviation fuel was produced, plus refineries, benzene plants, oil depots, etc. were closed for months - comparatively easy to hit - goal of Allied bombs. After the successful invasion, the German fuel industry became the target of the strategic bomber offensive highest priority.²¹ To the first Have operated on US and Royal Air Force in full of

20 Please refer Cape. I, Sect. 3; further II, S. 153 ff.

21 The effects, S. 4 f.: "On the 8th June ... determined a new one Directive, 'the The primary strategic goal of the United States Air Force's strategy is now to "deprive the enemy Wehrmacht of fuel" (to deny oil)."

Coordination and cooperation in day and night precision bombing. By March 1945, 183,000 tons of bombs had been dropped in 555 separate attacks on 135 different fuel targets, "with every synthesis plant and major refinery, if evidently in operation, was successfully attacked. During the In the summer they were "Most attacks were flown on sight, later mostly without visibility, and the RAF used the new techniques of precision airdrops at night in a remarkable series of attacks in January 1945." ²²

The Battle for the It was impossible for the German side to gain fuel works because air supremacy over Germany increasingly belonged to the Allies and the systems, which had been repaired with extreme effort, were repeatedly attacked and put out of operation were set. Still in Summer 1944 that came about Plan, comprehensive capacities for the production of to build fuel underground - a desperate plan that was doomed to failure from the start.

The consequences of the fuel offensive were devastating. By September, synthetic production fell to 7.5 percent overall, and that of aviation fuel to 5.7 percent compared to April 1944; In the fourth quarter it remained intact despite unspeakable reconstruction efforts monthly average below 20 percent, measured from the first quarter. 1 0 000 Metric tons aviation fuel in September, at the time of the highest aircraft production - the was only a fifth of what the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Karl Koller, had demanded for the aircraft crew training program alone. ²³ Increasing gasoline shortages in the army even drastically limited the tactical operational options of the armored troops. The German tanks were undersupplied with fuel during the Battle of the Bulge, and at the beginning of 1945 there were 1,200 to 1,500 tanks ready to defend Upper Silesia without having enough fuel for the mission. ²⁴

With the Fuel production collapsed over the course of a few months Production of basic chemicals, which as products of the hydrogenation works were indispensable for the production of buna, powder and explosives. This involved hydrogen and heating gas (for the Buna works), significant amounts of nitrogen, methanol and other precursors for powder and explosives. Explosives production was halved within three to four months.

The air offensive against transportation began in September 1944 and was "the single most important cause of Germany's final economic Collapse." ²⁵ Now - only now - were the Allied experiences out of the time before the Invasion was implemented when the French transport system was permanently paralyzed by air raids within weeks. The attacks in September/October on the West German industrial four met with greater concentration and force railway main lines, important train station

22 Ibid., p. 5. - In-depth study of the production development of aircraft, fuel, etc. in the following section. Numbers up in short tons.

23 Ibid, S. 77.

24 Ibid., p. 81.- The The last cited information is inaccurate in terms of time and place and differs from others, approximately in the Final report the Oil division of USSBS; she support itself on Statements from Speer, Göring, Jodl, v. Rundstedt including after the war. See also section 3.

25 Ibid, S. 13.

fe, bridges, large freight handling centers (marshalling yards) and waterways. After this first climax of the attacks, the traffic chaos spread step by step to southern and central Germany.

Until end of The permeability decreased every year the marshalling yards to 40 and occasionally to 20 percent.²⁶ The unfinished business Trains were backed up; In December there were up to 2,000. The Reichsbahn's freight wagon supply, one of the most important transport indicators, fell to 60 percent from mid-August to the end of December, and to 23 percent by the beginning of March 1945, with fluctuations.

One of the most serious consequences was the lack of coal. From August to December 1944, coal transport by rail and water fell from 7.4 to 2.7 million tons. Speer reported to Hitler on November 11th that "at the beginning of the worst coal supply crisis since Beginning of war" stand, with bad Follow for rail transport, Shipping, electricity and gas supply.²⁷ In southern and central Germany, hospitals and military hospitals were already suffering from a lack of coal or coke. Until Upper Silesia was lost in January 1945, coal could be transported from there to Braunschweig and beyond as a temporary measure. After that, collapse was inevitable.

Things looked even worse when it came to supplying the defense industry with certain other raw materials, semi-finished products, components, assemblies and special ones Supplies out of, the continuously and on time approached become had to.

"A large number of important arms companies are reported to be on the verge of coming to a standstill (e.g. Deutsche Waffen- und Munitions-AG, Lübeck; Phönix, Harburg; Miag, Braunschweig)." ²⁸ The iron and steel industry itself suffered from "systematic attacks Elimination the German one Steel base" ²⁹, under Ore- and Lack of scrap, furthermore among the major damage to the gas and electricity network.

Bombs fell on railway facilities in the area of 23 attacked Reichsbahn directorates (from in total 31) in the September, October and November respectively between 12 000 and 18 000 Metric tons, in the December approximately 60 000, in the January 1945 meager 40 000, in the

February and March each approximately 50 000 Metric tons.³⁰

After the bombings of September/October, German efforts appeared in mid-November about recovery and stabilization of transport to have a certain degree of success. But the destruction were too large and the German forces and resources were already too weak and fragmented. The In many cases, producers of weapons and equipment continued to use their resources Storage reserves. At the end of December 1944/beginning of January 1945, new waves of attacks began, completing the chaos and ushering in the collapse of the war economy.

26 USSBS, The Effects of strategy Bombing on German Transportation, New York/London 1976 ("Garland Series", Vol. 6), P. 2. Hereafter also the following. See also Mierzejewski, p. 103 ff.

27 BAP, FS, film 1732, Memorandum spear f. Hitler ex. d. „Location in the Ruhr area", November 11, 1944.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 As note 26 (USSBS), p. 2/3, card "Railway Bomb Tonnage vs. Car Loadings by Reichsbahndirektionen" (short tons).

Table 17

losses through bomb and Low-flying attacks on the German Reichsbahn, 1943-1944 _

	Heaviness damage, Loss or. Injuries from locomoti ves	Freight wagons	Passenger wagons	staff	Train backlog (daily average)
1943	444	6644	4370	590	
1944	6086	21293	12450	6 713	
January	12	398	367	29	455
February	43	304	137	90	664
March	76	639	683	156	483
April	417	1 137	654	395	337
May	556	2034	563	592	312
June	117	1392	594	114	275
July	252	846	985	384	330
August	379	2458	2130	500	421
September	1 171	4442	1907	1 198	851
October	1 164	1 570	1 752	1 307	1 052
November	1 023	4 775	1461	1024	1 103
December	876	1 298	1 217	924	1 658

Source: USSBS, *The Effects of Strategy Bombing on German Transportation* (1945), New York/London 1976 (Garland), p. 57, exh. 52.

Surprisingly, the Allied staff did not understand in which way until January/February 1945 Measure them the nervous system of the had hit the German economy.³¹ As her Bombers and low-flying aircraft each other in the February/March 1945 once on that German transport systems collapsed There are quite a few in Upper Silesia Time in Soviet hands; the Red Army was at the Or at Küstrin and near Breslau, and the Western Allies crossed the Rhine. So these attacks, although the most severe and comprehensive, had essentially only an accompanying effect. The German war economy had been on the brink of catastrophe since the end of 1944 .

From May 1944 to February/March 1945, one can say with great justification, it was phased Decline of the Germans Economy from the rhythm of the attack waves strategic bomber forces Allies intended. Nevertheless, they also had Other events, especially those on the land fronts, had no small influence on this, namely the loss of occupied areas, the collapse of the foreign trade, and finally the Withdrawal from German territory.

The most important turning point was the course of the war in Western and Southeastern Europe in August/September 1944. Around heard this time the Deliveries from Iron ore as well as out of dem Minettere

31 Detailed above the consistent “stubborn bureaucratic opposition” against one greater concentration of attacks on transport Mierzejewski, p. 162 ff.; p. 179 ff.

four as well Sweden ³² on. In August the occupied Red Army Romania, like this that now always scarcer oil supplies from there quite failed to materialize. France delivered to no more bauxite; 1943 had the French bauxite 24 percent, of January to July 1944 over 40 percent the German Bauxite imports identified. ³³ In the heard in September in the Balkans the extraction of raw materials for the Germans stops; As far as means of transport could be used, reserves of ore, especially chrome ore, transported away. ³⁴ End September began Soviet offensive towards Hungary, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia; Hungary, the only remaining major bauxite supplier, only failed completely at the end of December. ³⁵

In contrast to the destruction the Air he hit However, the loss of raw material resources only occurs with a long delay except for production through, particularly in weapons and equipment. Ores and metals in particular - apart from various savings and exchange options - were in most cases significant supplies available; in addition the usual lead time came from the raw material to the finished product. Speer calculated in September 1944 the deadline for the German arms production in case of loss nearly all occupied and other supplying countries for another one to one and a half years. ³⁶

There was a labor shortage that was acutely threatening to the functioning of the economy it wasn't in 1944/45. In the However, the analysis reveals a complex one Picture, the changed greatly depending on time phases and production areas. Until the summer of 1944, there was still a growing shortage of workers, exacerbated by great demands on forces for clean-up, reconstruction and repair work after air raids and for Surface and underground relocations. On the other hand, there were considerable reserves that were far from fully mobilized (combing out, women's work, home work, extension of working hours, especially in "priority programs" Increase in labor productivity). They were old sources for foreign forced laborers largely dried up, This is what the Wehrmacht, Nazi authorities and the arms industry did on (Italian "military internees", Hungarian Jews). ³⁷

32 According to Jäger, Jörg-Johannes, The economic dependence of the Third Reich on foreign countries, shown using the example of steel industry, Berlin 1969, p. 191 ff., fell since At the end of August, 50 to 60 percent of Swedish deliveries were out; Since the end of September, only small quantities of Swedish ore have reached Germany from Narvik on German ships. For the following, see also Chap. IV and V in the previous vol.

33 USSBS, Aircraft Division, Light Metals Industry of Germany, Exh. b (41 percent).

34 Please refer Cape. IV, Section 2.

35 The USSBS Light Metals Report (see note 33) suggests that Hungarian deliveries are still pending were continued at the end of the year (p. 23). The actual import of bauxite was in June and July 1944 still had 110 each 000 t, after "failure from France, Italy, Croatia and part of the Hungarian Supply" in September 40 000 t and in October 28 000 t (BAK, R 3/1960, report RMRuK/RoAmt, November 27, 1944). In the last decade of December it closed the Red Army the ring around Budapest and occupied the largest mines of the Hungarian aluminum ore company northeast of Szekesfehervar with a capacity of 65-70,000 t of bauxite per month (Europe_ under the swastika, Vol. 6 (Seckendorf, Martin, et al. (ed.), The occupation policy ...), Berlin/Heidelberg 1992, p. 391, Doc. 353, report d. German WWi officer in Hungary for November and December 1944, January 9, 1945).

36 BAK, R 3/1525, Memorandum "Metals", September 5, 1944.

37 In more detail s. Cape. III in the prev. Vol.

The most critical time was the third quarter of 1944, both what the Tension in the workforce situation as well as the change in the overall situation that was now occurring. So far, the arms industry had survived the military conscription relatively unscathed. What her was a priority no problem Quantity, but the quality of the workforce. The German skilled workers, foremen and foremen were the backbone of the Production, not only in the with regard to theirs their own professional work, but above all with regard to the work of the thousands upon thousands of foreign workers and concentration camp prisoners whom they instructed and supervised and over whom they had extensive disciplinary control had violence. The According to the Minister of Armaments, the minimum number of such specialists was ³⁸. from the end of July onwards due to renewed, extensive conscriptions into the Wehrmacht.

As early as mid-July, work began in East Prussia on fortifications, anti-tank ditches, etc. on German soil ³⁹. soon also in the "Warthegau", in Silesia and in the east of Brandenburg, a little later in West Germany, to which the NSDAP regional leadership mobilized the male and female population independently and arbitrarily. Since October, the "Volkssturm" has been drafting every able-bodied German man into its exercises. The Volkssturm men came largely from the armaments factories. ⁴⁰

In the third quarter of 1944, the workload for repair, reconstruction and relocation work took on new dimensions. About the "Geilenberg program" and the clean-up work in the hard-hit cities came with the "mineral oil security plan" and the emergency programs of the Reichsbahn.

The loss of productive work as a result Air raids were in The third quarter of 1944 was very high and since then it has become a serious obstacle to production. According to the USSBS calculations at that time, The total number of civilian and military personnel deployed to repel the air attacks and eliminate their effects was 4.3 to 5.45 million people. ⁴¹ The most important This included the "non-manufacturing" employees in industry (1.5 to 2 million), the Construction workers (750 000 until 1.2 million) with those mentioned Work was busy and the workforce was out of civil production would otherwise have been "implemented" or confiscated, so but were continued to be employed in order to the bombed out population with household goods and others necessary goods the Consumer goods industry to equip (1 to 1.2 Millions) - overall then 3.25 until 4.4 Millions of people. This information is supported by calculations from the planning office at that time. After that, within one year, from September 1943 to September 1944, the percentage of those employed "outside manufacturing" was in the so-called A companies from 18.9 to 34.7, ie from around 850,000 to 2.1 million employees. Converted to the entire industry, the difference was "largely an expression of the impairment the production

38 **BAK, R 3/1576**, spear at Donitz, October 3, 1944.

39 DZW, Vol. 6, S. 236 f.; S. 374 f.

40 Ibid, S. 237 ff.

41 Do effects, S. 39 ff.

(might be) due to aircraft damage" ⁴², around 2.5 million workers, significantly more than calculated by the USSBS.

In the late summer of 1944, unemployment appeared for the first time, completely opposite to the previous labor problem. That was a special kind of unemployment, a clear sign of the disruption of the national economy caused by the air raids. It occurred on a business and regional basis. First there was major and persistent damage to operational facilities, the workforce made unemployed until the need for strength was completed after the repairs were completed often became extremely urgent from one day to the next. Then, during the air offensive on the German transport system, it was the disruption of the production context, ie the lack of supply and the prevented removal of raw, semi-finished and finished products, which paralyzed production in larger areas. Only some of the unemployed workers were assigned to clean-up and repair work or to the entrenchment. On this occasion, a certain number of specialists who had previously been guarded - temporary unemployment - also drafted into the Wehrmacht.

c) The Expression the "Final Crisis"

The crisis in the war economy that came with the Allied fuel offensive at the end of May 1944 began and developed in In contrast to many other earlier economic crises, the crisis that fully developed in late summer and autumn was of a partial or temporary nature ⁴³ unrecoverable and captured in destructive Way that overall material security of warfare. There were no internal, system-related causes, no dysfunction, irregularity or even irrationality of the Nazi system or the "NS economy" that led to this crisis, but rather external, military ones, namely the superiority of the Allies in the air and on land their offensive actions, which are irreversible created facts. One What was special about this crisis was that that she yourself in one time spread, in the arms production Peak performance reached. Here So bumped in dramatically, how in a large field battle, offensive and counter-offensive on each other, and only in Course from about four months - End of May to September October - the crisis finally gained the upper hand.

It has been spreading since mid-May 1944 initially from the fuel sector through the area of basic chemicals and reached production sectors that are crucial for warfare, such as aviation fuel, Buna, powder and explosives. She concerned with the in September beginning crisis of German transportation first Money and ore and

42 **BAK, R 3/1841**, weekly report d. Have. Plan statistics v. 6.11. until November 11, 1944 (Abstract).

43 These include so different phenomena such as certain critical ones appearances the the initial conversion of the economy to the war, the general, ongoing decline of branches of the consumer goods industry and the dysfunction of the war economy control apparatus at the end of 1941/beginning of 1942, which in naval armament lasted until the summer of 1943, and in air armament until spring 1944 continued, with the resulting setbacks in the programming, in the production changeover and in the production itself.

reached out to others raw materials, semi-finished products, Supplies for weapons and device etc. about. It appeared at the same time in the territorial losses in the west, east and southeast, where raw material resources and industrial capacities were important for the war effort were lost.

In February, or at the latest in March 1945, they had Effects of the described Events reverberated everywhere. The crisis was total, the war economy collapsed. The end of every regular and controllable economic activity was there.

2. Production comparisons and Self-deception

The memory of the oppressive military and material superiority of the Franco-British-American coalition in the First World War was certainly present to the German elite two decades later. The conclusion to the war that Germany was heading for since 1933 was that of a large hostile alliance through diplomatic means Avoid maneuvers, at least a war against one to risk such a coalition first, if a for that more sufficient "major economic area" or. the accordingly

"Greater defense economy" were secured. The second option should be implemented using the means of the blitzkrieg strategy.⁴⁴

Both Variants were one after the other and tried side by side. Significant disputes over the always latent risk of a multi-front war against a superior coalition culminated in the pre-war years.⁴⁵ Munich Agreement and Hitler Stalin Pact rails temporarily the success of the first Ensure variant. The successes of the Blitzkrieg strategy from 1939/1940 - Half control Europe - encouraged them German rulers to crazy overextend their own strategic plan and finally abandon it by attacking the USSR and entering the war of the USA provoked.

That was it for the The worst case scenario for German warfare occurred. There was a coalition on several fronts of opponents to fight, their superiority of potential and material quickly developed. "The abandonment of the Blitzkrieg strategy marked the beginning of a hopeless battle for Germany against an economic superiority."⁴⁶ - where the term the disclosure here both a forced one Condition as well as, with a certain justification, the arbitrariness of the German side that arises from hubris.

The German experts - Economists, military officers, authorities - Since 1942, but especially in 1943/44, they have frequently and extensively dealt with calculations of the potential comparison and the economic balance of power between Germany and his opponents or between the fighting Coalitions. Her expertise and her Experience were to

44 Please refer Ranger, Gerhard, Total War and Blitzkrieg, Berlin 1967, S. 77 ff.; bsd. S. 94 ff., where, however, the military economy (including foreign policy) preparation for war is neglected.

45 See Eichholtz, Dietrich, The expansion program of German finance capital the evening before of second world war. In: The Away in the war. Ed. by Dietrich Eichholtz and Kurt Pätzold, Berlin 1989, p. 1 ff.

46 Milward, The Second World War, S. 80.

big, as if they had not recognized the true facts. There were enough sober calculations and estimates that only too clearly the one demonstrated the absolute material and economic inferiority of the fascist coalition. On the other hand, it remains a problem to be clarified that neither in these secret documents nor apparently in any other written form the political and military consequences of the calculated inferiority were discussed. Hereon will have to come back.

It gave also previous calculations. However, they had a completely different character than those that emerged since 1943 and 1944. In 1938/39 the authors - led by the Reich Agency for Economic Development, which was staffed by experts from the IG Farben Group - to develop an economic policy strategy that corresponded to the eventuality and risk of a major war, including a blockade war; Precisely in order to create such a "large-scale defense economy"⁴⁷, partly with peaceful and partly with military means, which, if necessary, "close to the effort." the whole rest of the world grown"⁴⁸ should be. In 1941/42, sometimes as early as the second half of 1940, memoranda and calculations were created about Germany's supply of raw materials and the increase in armaments potential, which now seemed guaranteed after the conquests in Europe and North Africa.⁴⁹

The earliest elaboration known to me. On the other hand, in sober numbers that include the superiority of the Allies (still without USSR) was recorded at the beginning of 1942 in the Statistical Reich Office.⁵⁰

47 See Eichholtz, Dietrich, The "large-scale defense economy" for the great war. In: Bulletin of the working group "Second World War", No. 1-4/1986, p. 70 ff.; Volkrmann, Hans-Erich, The Nazi economy in preparation for war. In: The German Reich and the Second World War, Vol. 1 (= causes and requirements of the German war policy), p. 339 ff.; p. 353 ff.

48 Quote from Carl Krauch, April 1939, in: Eichholtz, Dietrich, On the share of the IG Farben Group in the preparation of the Second World War. In: JfW, 1969, Part II, p. 104.

49 For example, elaborations from the Reich Office for Economic Development: "Europe's supply of raw materials with full utilization of the extraction opportunities in Europe and Africa (according to figures from 1938)", probably 1940/41 (BAP, FS, film 10614; there only a map, no V., no D.); , "Europe's raw material supply compared to the supply possibilities of the Anglo-Saxon world" (maps), 1941, in BAP, FS, film 10629; the associated memorandum (including v. Japan) in **BAK, R 25/57** (Nov. 1941); "Europe's supply of raw materials with full utilization of the Opportunities for extraction from the Indo-Pacific region", and the same with the addition "and European Russia", both dated June 30, 1942 (**BAK, R 25/42**, diagrams/diagrams); "The future possibilities in Ukraine and in the areas between the Don and the Caucasus" (elaboration with diagrams/diagrams) with diagram: "Ukraine Comprehensive Plan", October 26, 1942 (**BAK, R 25/42**); see. a. BAP, FS, Film 10613, numerous. Elaborations of Reich Office for Soil Research, 1940-1942; s. also various raw material balances in the Stock **BAK, R 25 u.** in BAP, FS, Movie 10629 and 10630.

50 BAP, FS, Film 10609, "Production capacities in the Anglo-Saxon and European Economic Areas", Statist. Reichsamt (Department VIII), February 1942. The "European Economic Area" included Germany, Poland, the "Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia", France, Belgium and the Netherlands, the "Anglo-Saxon Economic Area" the USA, Canada and Great Britain. Here also the following.

Table 18

Annual production capacity of "European" and of "Anglo-Saxon" economic area, As of mid-1941

	Mengen- einheit	Europäischer Wirtschafts- raum	Angelsächsi- scher Wirt- schaftsraum	Europäischer Wirtschaftsraum im Verhältnis zum angelsächsischen Wirtschaftsraum
Money	mill. t	500	824	1 : 1.6
oil	mill. t	10* (43)**	233	1 : 23 (1 : 5.4)
pig iron	MY. t	33	58	1 : 1.8
Crude steel	mill. t	41	92	1 : 2.2
copper (refined production)	1 000t	500	2 100	1 : 4.2
Lead (hut production)	1 000t	590	1 800	1 : 3.0
zinc (hut production)	1 000t	1000	1 100	1 : 1.1
tin (hut production)	1 000t	45	200	1 : 4.4
bauxite	1 000t	2400	2660	1 : 1.1
aluminum (hut production)	1 000t	400	490	1 : 1.2
magnesium (hut production)	1 000 t	29	19	1 : 0.7
rubber	1 000t	60	1400	1 : 23

*) Without European USSR. **) Incl. European USSR.

Source: BAP, FS, film 10609 (How Note 50).

The figures in the original table above are largely correct, apart from the fact that for the "Anglo-Saxon" countries they are obviously different from the current ones production figures, but for the "European" countries peace figures from the time before the occupation of France etc. were assumed, which could subsequently neither be achieved nor fully utilized by the German war economy. In the longer term, Soviet oil was listed as a separate resource. The authors of the draft acknowledged that "the significant expansion plans" the opponents, especially the USA and Canada, were not taken into account, so that "in the most important areas of raw material processing, the Anglo-Saxon preponderance will become more pronounced in the near future, but no later than mid-1942" have to calculate. They are against that not yet fully overlooked "acquisitions made in the Russian region".

Later surveys of such a comprehensive nature that include these "acquisitions" have not yet been found. However, proportional calculations in the more recent literature, which are based on the production actually achieved on the German and Allied sides, confirm how far more pressing that allied overweight since 1942 was, yourself the loss of important industrial areas in the west of the USSR.

Table 19

Relationship the German to allies production at Reason- and raw materials, 1942--1945 and 1944

	1942-1945	1944
Money	1 : 2.6	1 : 2.1
Iron ore	1 : 3.7	1 : 3.8
Crude steel	1 : 5.1	1 : 4.3
aluminum	1 : 3.5	1 : 2.6
mineral oil	1 : 47.0	1 : 41.7

Source: Ellis, John, *Brute Force. Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World* was, London 1990, S. 347 ff. (tables); absolutely: *Ibid*, S. 554 ff., Tab. 46 ff.

After Stalingrad, two problems particularly concerned those in the know, namely the "apparent inexhaustibility of the Russian masses of people"⁵¹ and the economic performance of the USA, which would be fully weighed in the event of the expected invasion.

The inspector for statistics of the Reichsführer-SS was able to demonstrate the superiority of the Soviet human potential (220 million "Russians" compared to 100 Millions of "Reichsbetölkemng" including Protectorate) can only be explained with a "miracle" that "the young, fresh born of primitive Russian fertility" despite Bolshevism, despite all "bloodletting" since the First World War; after all, it also showed a general decline in mortality firmly.⁵²

In a more comprehensive way and not just from the perspective of "Wehrkraft" was concerned the Reich Statistical Office, Foreign Research Department, with the "human potential of the power groups". The first version of the draft from July 1943⁵³ was a model case of sound calculation. Almost all of Europe, including the occupied Soviet territories, all of Japan, went to the "Axis powers". dominated "East Asian Prosperity Sphere" and Nanking China into the calculation. With the help of these and other dubious and erroneous procedures, the superiority of the "enemy powers" could be reduced to a ratio of 1.5 to 1 (1 271 against 857 million total population), for the working population it can be reduced to 1.4 to 1 and for the "industrially employable population" (employees in industry and crafts) even to almost 1 to 1. However, it should be "taken quite seriously", so was called it in the Summary of the document, that the output per worker in American industry 131 percent⁵⁴ of Germans amount and is far higher, especially in industries that are crucial for the defense industry.

51 BAP, FS, Movie 3575, memo RFSS/Inspector for Statistics, „The Russian military strength", April 29, 1943.

52 *Ibid*.

53 BAP, FS, Film 5273, Statistical Reichsamt, "The human potential of the power groups", July 1943. Hereafter also the following.

54 In the Re-editing from the March 1944 corrected to 189 Percent; according to the German Institute for Economic Research even 226 percent (*ibid.*).

Table 20

Labor productivity ever Industrial workers in chosen branches the US industry opposite of the German (percent; based on the industrial surveys of 1937 [USA] and 1936 [Germany])

Hard coal pig iron	(in terms of	209
Agriculture machinery and Tractors	quantity) (in	284
machine tools	terms of	219 (314)*
Motor vehicles of	quantity) (in	165 (236)*
which: passenger	terms of value)	264 (378)*
cars, trucks	(in terms of	
	value) (in terms	868
	of value)	578
	(quantitatively)	
	(quantitatively)	

*) On Reason one more real dollar exchange rate corrected Pay from the 2. Editing the memorandum of March 1944 (see note 55).

Source: BAP, FS, Movie 5273 (How Note 53).

A rework the memorandum, dated March 1944 and this time carried out by Department IV (Population Statistics) of the Reich Office ⁵⁵, fell over the first version, albeit between the lines, a harsh sentence and exposed her Point for Point as a frivolous compilation of uncertain figures, under the pretext that what has now occurred Territorial losses (in Italy and the USSR) and human sacrifice in the war to be taken into account. The reader was thus prepared for the "not inconsiderable shift to the disadvantage of the Axis powers" with which he was confronted became.

According to the new calculations, the enemy powers were superior in terms of population in a ratio of 1.86: 1 and in terms of the number of people able to work (in the first version: employed) in a ratio of 1.84: 1. A calculation of the third general comparative figure (industrial and craft workers) was omitted and was limited to the main industrial countries on both sides; Here the superiority based on the total population was 1.27: 1 and based on those of working age 1.31: 1. However, the productivity difference between the German one would remain and the US industry "is indeed worrying".

But, it was said as a consolation, if the Axis human potential was "completely made effective" and labor productivity was significantly increased, "an overcompensation of quantity by quality appears in principle possible". There is also no need to be afraid of the direct military deployment of numerically superior numbers of people "since the military talent and virtue of the Germans and Japanese as well as other continental European peoples in this area are most likely to enable quantity to be overcome by quality" - both internally and in public until the final phase of the war constantly strained arguments.

The American engineering industry was from the beginning of the war German competitors "in view of of their Key position for the American Armor" ⁵⁶ out-

55 Ibid., "Second Edit," March 1944. Hereafter also the The following.

56 BAK, R 41/142, Karl Lange, head of the HA Machinery, to Speer, April 30, 1943. Hereafter also the following.

been spied on. The head of the main committee Mechanical engineering, Karl Lange, grasped it Results of an expert report prepared for this purpose from the spring of 1943 ⁵⁷ in a letter to the Minister of Armaments together. The German industry is thanks to the economy went to war in the 1930s with greater machine tool production than the USA and England and France taken together. However, the USA alone would have caught up in two years and thanks to the utmost urgency and government subsidies in the year 1942 towards Germany and the occupied territories already the Doubles created; The USA's production of machine tools reached a value of 2,100 million DM in 1942 compared to the German production of 1 074 **million RM**.

The German machine tool industry, on the other hand, is expected to increase production "beyond the level of 1941" (1 100 **Mill. RM**) is no longer possible, since since the raw materials - Iron, non-ferrous metals - not would be adequately allocated, so that 'One now Row that for capacity expansion measures taken and one A large number of machine tool factories have been "shut down" from new production. Otherwise, if only enough materials, workers and supervisory staff "One would definitely be made available similar production levels How America... hold ".

Around this time, "Anglo-Saxon propaganda" seemed to increasingly focus on the economic superiority of the Allies appointed and the ghost of to have invoked German depletion in 1918. The In any case, OKW planned a propaganda publication to spread abroad dem counteract should. ⁵⁸ The Economic Group The iron-making industry then thought it was particularly worth mentioning and could be used favorably for propaganda purposes. that Germany or the "Tripartite Powers" 1942/43 one had twice and three times as much iron and steel production as Germany/Austria-Hungary in 1918. Should the enemy side "parade" with its superior production figures, the author of the answer promised himself the OKW effect also from a comparison between 1918 and 1943. At that time (1918) there was an Allied superiority in pig iron from 3.8: 1 and in Crude steel from 3.5: 1, in years 1943 (according to estimates production figures) one such "only" from 2.2 : 1 or. 2.3 : 1.

A later, more precise, internal list of the economic group - only for crude steel - produced a similar, slightly less favorable picture. ⁵⁹ In fact, in both world wars the balance of power in steel was initially almost equal, but in 1918 and 1943, after the USA entered the war, it was hopeless for the Axis and the Tripartite Pact.

57 BAP, FS, Film 3384, HA Maschinen, "The development of the machine tool industry in the USA 1939-1942", March 1943.

58 This can be seen from BAK, R 13 1/1138, Wigrü Esl (JW Reichert) to WiRüAmt/Wewistab (?), April 19, 1943. Hereafter also the following. - The OKW probably backed away from its plan .

59 BAK, R 131/1144, Wigrü Esl, "War potential in Crude steel", April 25, 1944. - The the following Walter Rohland prepared the calculation as material for the Armaments Minister's speech in Essen (see Chapter I, Section 4).

Table 21

"War potential in crude steel" according to calculations by the iron industry group Industry, 1914, 1917, 1939 and 1943 (in 1,000 t)

balance of power 1914 = 1.2: 1

"Enemy countries"		"Central Powers"	
Great Britain	9,210	German Customs Union	
France	3 073	(incl. Luxembourg)	15 076
Belgium	1466	Austria- Hungary	2,191 _
Russia	4,817 _		
Italy	1 025		
Japan (estimated)	400		
Canada, Australia			
u. Brit.- India	893		
<i>Total</i>	20884		17 267
(1913)	24154		21 830)

balance of power 1917 = 3.5 : 1

USA	47 689	German Customs Union	16689
Great Britain	10 951	Austria- Hungary	2 921
France	2,187 _		
Belgium	34		
Russia	3 100		
Italy	1 332		
Japan	796		
Canada, Australia			
u. British- India	2018		
<i>Total</i>	68107		19 610

balance of power 1939 = 1 : 1

"Enemy countries"		"Axis Powers"	
Great Britain	13 500	German Rich incl.	
France	7 920	Ostmark	23 733
Belgium	3 111	protectorate	
Luxembourg	1 762	Bohemia u. Moravia	1600
Netherlands	110	Italy	2 700
Poland	1 177		
<i>Altogether</i>	27,580 _		28033

balance of power 1943 = 2.5 : 1

"Enemy countries" (estimates)		"Tripartite Powers"	
USA	81000	"Great German	
Great Britain	13 000	"sphere of power"	35 120
Russia	12 000-15 000	Italy	1600
Canada	2900	Hungary	785
British India	1 300-1500	Romania	350

Table 21 (Continuation)

Australia	1 300-1 500	Japan sphere of power	7 000-10000 _
South Africa	500		
Medium- u. South America			
u. Chungking China	500		
Together	112 500-115,900		44 855--47 855

Source: How Note 59 (April 25, 1944). After the Pay the Crude steel production.

Light metals were 1943 Object of elaborations of the Prague Association for chemical and metallurgical production and the IG Farben group.⁶⁰ The more precisely specified information from the IG Farben group, which extends to 1942/43, which we rely on here proves that the fascist powers until 1940 both mined more bauxite as well as produced more aluminum than the Opposite side, but from 1941 onwards the tide quickly turned. It was similar with magnesium from 1942/43 onwards. The authors included the USA, Canada, Great Britain and the USSR from the beginning (1938). opposing side, Japan and all European countries became the "Axis area".

Table 22

World production from Bauxite, aluminum and Magnesium, 1938-1943 (in 1 000 t)

Year	Total production	of that in the Area the Axis powers	around Allies	Relationship between allies: Axis powers
<i>bauxite</i>				
1938	3 896.9	2 542.2	1 354.7	: 1.9
1939	4024.7	2 585.9	1,438.8 _	: 1.8
1940	4 421.6	2 350.6	2 071.0	1 : 1, 1
1941	6005.0	2 631.7	3 373.3	1.3 : 1
1942	7 125.0	2 785.0	4 340.0	1.6: 1
<i>aluminum</i>				
1938	578.8	315.6	263.2	: 1.2
1939	666.4	373.0	293.4	: 1.3
1940	811 , 1	424.0	387.1	1 : 1, 1
1941	1 025.9	495.9	530.0	1.1 : 1
1942	1 574.9	652.4	922.5	1.4: 1
1943 (Planning)	2 353.1	748.1	1 605.0	2.1 : 1

60 BAP, FS, Film 10614, "The Bauxite and Aluminum Industry of the World", June 1943, approx. 350 BI.(!) (Prague Association); ibid, Film 3365, "World Promotion of Bauxite, Aluminum, Magnesium", 20.7. 1943, with annotation. v. August 25, 1943 (IG Farben to **RWiM**).

Table 22 (Continuation)

<i>magnesium</i>				
1938	24.7	17.8	6.9	: 2.6
1939	31.0	22.0	9.0	: 2.4
1940	40.4	26.7	13.7	: 1.9
1941	64.9	34.1	30.8	: 1.1
1942	114.6	63.0	51.6*	1 : 1.2
1943 (Planning)	344.2	70.2	274.0*	3.9: 1

*) According to different information for USA and Canada are for 1942 and 1943 Significantly higher numbers are likely (105.4 and 536.0, respectively).

Source: How Note 60 (Movie 3365; IG Colors). For the Part Estimates.

In 1944, the authorities, the Wehrmacht and the economy began to coordinate comparative studies of war potential and production levels and to intensify. A primary interest was now the production of weapons and military equipment.

The surveys that can be found mostly come from the planning office of the Armaments Ministry or the Rüst GB, which awarded regular contracts to economic groups, Reich offices, the Reich Office for Economic Development and other bodies. It worked closely with the **OKW Field Economics Office**, a remnant of the former military economics and armaments office, which also carried out independent surveys.

Kehrl, head of the planning office, had set up a "scientific advisory center" specifically for the purpose of comparative production and potential surveys.⁶¹ Over the course of 1944, this office reached a level that offered the German leadership the opportunity to "a comprehensive one Comparison of forces between the own potential and that the In just a few pages, she was able to find out about German armaments production and its frightening gap to the Allies, she was able to compare the supply of raw materials and food or the production of explosives, in short, she was able to get a picture of the military economy Basics of Warfare in 1945."⁶² The most important reports went, after Herbst, "to Hitler, Bormann, Keitel, Himmler, Goebbels and in some cases also Göring", further at the four **With-**

61 See Autumn, p. 439ff.; Kehrl, p.323 ff.-The "Scientific Advice Center", since Under construction in March/April 1944 and fully operational since June, it was the "code name" for "an exchange of experiences between all departments" (so sweep! to party office, November 8, 1944; likewise. Speer to Himmler, November 10, 1944; to Göring, January 19, 1945; How the following according to BAK, R 3/1954; here BI. 98). A list of their employees included around 35 names and institutions, including, in addition to senior officials from the planning office, representatives of the OKW (FWiAmt; Defense), the WT (bsd. Luftwaffe), the AA, the RSHA, the extra. Reich Office, the RWiM (OBH), scientific institutions and industry representatives (e.g. Reichert/Wigru Esl; Friedrich Dom/Konti oil; Adolf v. Carlowitz/HGW).

62 Autumn, p. 441 f.

members of central planning. ⁶³ Hitler is said to have finally banned the distribution of these "green booklets". ⁶⁴

In the spring of 1944 the field economics office produced statistics about the Soviet production of tanks and guns. ⁶⁵ The Planning Office's large comparative list from September 1944 was ultimately based on these and similar figures. ⁶⁶ The Central Office of the Armaments Ministry presented a study on the reserves and prospects of American armaments production in August 1944. ⁶⁷

The highlight of these activities was undoubtedly the mentioned statistical statement on "final production of armaments. German Reich and Enemy Powers" from September 1944, which was published by the Planning Office and was created under the leadership of the Field Economics Office. The detailed survey spanned three years (1942-1944). The production for the year 1944 was based on the figures for the extrapolated for the first seven months been; has the result for So no immediate real value this year, yes because in the fall and winter months In 1944 production overall, but especially ammunition, powder and Explosives, sank. Still, it acts around a An astonishing document in which, based on sober figures and without any diminishing or euphemistic comments, a generally threefold, sometimes five to tenfold superiority of the enemy was established.

Table 23

"Final production of armaments. German Reich and enemy powers", 1942-1944 (Selection; in 1 000 pieces)

1942	Germany	Allied	Relationship Germany : Allies
eyewitness total	15.0	83.3	1: 5.55
<i>including:</i>			
destroyer u. Fighter aircraft	4.5	25.7	1: 5.7
Battle- and Attack aircraft	6.8	27.3	1: 4

⁶³ Ibid, S. 441, Note 386.

⁶⁴ Sweep!, S. 324. Actually but confirmed still in January 1945 Hitler, Bormann, Keitel, Donitz u. a. the Reception from "green stapling" (BAK, R 3/1954, various docs).

⁶⁵ BAP, FS, Film 4605, "Overview of the probable development of tank and assault gun production in the SU", O. D.; *ibid.*, "Soviet production of guns, Pak and KwK, summarized according to loot findings (As of April 1944)", May 15, 1944; *ibid.*, "The development of tank production in the SU while of the year 1943", May 5, 1944; *ibid.*, "Production of the T 34 in 1943", undated.

⁶⁶ BAK, R 3/1959, Planning Office/Science. advice center, "Final production of armaments. German Reich and Enemy Powers", September 1944 (lead: Field Economics Office).

⁶⁷ BAP, FS, Film 1729, RMRuK/Zentralamt, "Is the maximum of US military production already achieved?" (= Information service abroad, No. 653, special service), August 22, 1944. - The Authors the study summarized, „that from one full utilization of the There is still no question of American arms potential."

Table 23 (Continuation)

1942	Germany	Allies	Relationship Germany : Allies	
Panzerkampfwagen	5.6	41.5	1 :	7.4
Armored scout car	0.6	16.7	1 :	27.8
Armored Off-road vehicles	6.4	21.3*	1 :	3.3
Tractors	12.1	49.5**	1 :	4.1
Other Motor vehicles total	121.2	1 033.0	1 :	8.5
guns, Carabiner	1 378.9	2 115.0	1 :	1.5
MG	80.0	556.5	1 :	7.0
MP	153.8	815.0	1 :	5.3
Grenade launcher	19.8	46.7	1 :	2.4
Lightweight Field guns	2.9	22.0	1 :	7.6
Moderate, severe and heaviest Field guns	1.5	8.8	1 :	5.9
Pak	9.3	34.4	1 :	3.7
Lightweight Flak	12.0	28.2	1 :	2.4
Heaviness and Heaviest anti-aircraft gun	3.3	7.0	1 :	2.1
Infantry ammunition (million shots) 1,336.4		LO 215.0	1 :	7.6
Anti-aircraft ammunition (Million Shots) 93.2		230.9	1 :	2.5
Artillery ammunition (Million Shots)	28.8	90.2	1 :	3.1
Drop ammunition (1 000 t)	244.3	680.0	1 :	2.8
Powder	148.0	265.0*	1 :	1.8
Explosives	279	360.0*	1 :	1.3
1943	Germany	Allies	Japan	Relationship Germany : Allies
Airplanes total	26.6	157.9	13.2	1 : 5.9
<i>including:</i>				
destroyer u. Fighter aircraft	10.7	44.3	4.0	1 : 4.1
combat and Attack aircraft	9.6	59.2	4.7	1 : 6.2
Panzerkampfwagen	6.2	62.2	2.1	1 : LO
Armored scout car	0.6	18.0	0.4	1 : 30
Armored Off-road vehicles	7.2	41.0		1 : 5.7
Tractors	24.3	154.0		1 : 6.3
Other Motor vehicles total	156.9	1 781.0		1 : 11.4
guns, Carabiner	2 063.1	5 185.0	300.0	1 : 2.5
MG	165.5	1 186.0	10.2	1 : 7.2
MP	234.0	1 617.0		1 : 6.9
Grenade launcher	29.6	64.8	10.5	1 : 2.2

Table 23 (Continuation)

1943	Germany	Allies	Japan	Relationship Germany : Allies
Lightweight Field guns	6.9	35.9	2.5	1: 5.2
Moderate, severe				
u. heaviest Field guns	2.3	9.6	1.0	1: 4.2
Pak	21.1	42.6	0.6	1 : 2
Light AA	15.4	45.8	9.6	1 : 3
Heaviness and				
heaviest Flak	6.9	10.5	2.8	1 : 1.5
Infantry ammunition				
(Million shots)	3 102.4	19 720.0	2 520.0	1: 6.4
Anti-aircraft ammunition				
(mill. shot)	49.1	196.3		1: 4
Artillery ammunition				
(mill. shot)	51.7	94.9		1 : 1.8
Drop ammunition				
(1000t)	approx. 150.0	1 116.0	150.0	1: 7.4
Powder	209.2	595.5		1: 2.8
Explosives	233.7	822.0	12.0	1 : 3.5
1944	Germany	Allies		Relationship Germany : Allies
Airplanes total	36.5	200.5		1 : 5.5
<i>including:</i>				
destroyer u.				
Fighter aircraft	21.1	57.8		1: 2.7
combat and Attack aircraft	9.1	68.2		1: 7.5
Panzerkampfwagen	9.0	52.2		1 : 5.8
Armored scout car		18.7		
Armored				
off-road vehicles		56.6		
Tractors	26.6	106.7		1: 4
Other Motor vehicles total	162.8	1 569.0		1: 9.6
guns, Carabiner	2 639.2	4880.0		1 : 1.8
MG	234.5	1 208.0		1: 5.2
MP	291.4	1 535.0		1 ; 5.3
Grenade launcher	25.0	67.0		1: 2.7
Lightweight Field guns	13.1	38.3		1: 2.9
Medium, heavy u.				
heaviest Field guns	4.2	14.0		1 : 3.3

Table 23 (Continuation)

1944

	Germany	Allied	Relationship Germany : Allies
Pak	13.5	45.0	1: 3.3
Lightweight Flak	28.4	59.6	1: 2.1
Heaviness and the heaviest flak	7.9	14.3	1: 1.8
Infantry ammunition (mill. Shot)	4 383.6	14030.0°	1: 3.2
Anti-aircraft ammunition (mill. Shot)	174.4	160.2°	1: 0.9
Artillery ammunition (mill. Shot)	69.5	73.7°	1: 1.1
Drop ammunition (1000 t)		1 053, above sea level	
powder	276.0	665.0	1: 2.4
Explosives	574.0	1 323.6	1: 2.3

*) USA and UK only. **) Only Great Britain (with Canada, Australia, India and South Africa) and USSR. °, US and UK only (with Canada etc.)

Source: BAK, R 3/1959, BI. 63-69. Allies= USA, USSR and Great Britain (with Canada, Australia, India and South Africa). The ratios are calculated by me.

Ellis' latest calculations show for the German production (1944) a slightly more favorable result for armored cars (including assault guns) and machine guns, due to the actually higher German and the already slightly falling Allied production; On the other hand, it was obviously less favorable for artillery, where the Field Economics Office estimated the USSR's production far too low.

Table 24

production of weapons and Equipment of war in proportions, 1942-1945, 1944 (German : allied production)

	1942-1945	1944	
Armored car and assault			
guns	1: 5.0	1: 2.7	
artillery	1: 5.6	?	
MG	1: 7.0	1: 4.7	
warplanes	1: 5.4	?	
including:			
Frontline aircraft	?	1: 3.6	
Transport aircraft	?	1: 37	
TRUCK	1: 12.7	1: 10.4	

Source: Ellis, S. 347 f. (Tabel); S. 556 ff., Tab. 51 ff.

Table 25

Airplane- and aircraft engine production the powers, 1942-1945 (in pcs.)

Airplanes	1942	1943	1944	1945*
Germany	15 409	24807	39 807	7 540
Japan	8th 861	16 693	28 180	11066
Italy	2400	1 600		
<i>Together</i>	26670	43 100	67 987	18 606
USA	47 836	85 898	96 318	49 761
USSR	25 436	34900	40300	20900
Great Britain with Commonwealth	28247	30963	31 036	14 145
<i>Together</i>	101 519	151 761	167 654	84806
Relationship Germany/ Japan/Italy: Allies (after pcs.)	1: 3.8	1: 3.5	1: 2.5	1: 4.6
Relationship German! : Allies (after pcs.)	1: 6.6	1: 6.1	1: 4.2	1: 11.2
Relationship German! : Allies (after Ge- weight, without USSR)	1 : 3.4	1: 5.2	1 : 5.8	?
aircraft engines				
Germany	37000	50700	54600	?
Japan	16 999	28 541	46526	12 380
<i>Together</i>	53 999	79 241	101 126	?
USA	138 089	227 116	256 912	106,350 _
USSR	38000	49000	52000	?
Great Britain	53 916	57 985	56 931	22 821
<i>Together</i>	230005	334 101	365 843	?
Relationship German! : Allies	1: 6.2	1: 6.6	1: 6.7	?
Relationship Germany/ Japan : Allies	1: 4.3	1: 4.2	1: 3.6	?

*) Germany: January-April; Japan: January-August; UNITED STATES: January -December; USSR: January-June; Great Britain: January-August.

Source: Overy, R.J. , The Air War 1938-1945, London 1980, p. 150, table 12. - Ratios calculated by me.

Overly charged for the air armament more detailed Pay. According to them, the Planning Office/Field Economics Office underestimated German production in 1944 and overestimated American and British production Generation and calculated therefore a for the Allies too favorable quotients. The opposite development of the weight quotient reflects the sharp decline in the German weight ratio Bomber - in favor of fighter production in the second half of 1944 which was not taken into account in the July/August estimate.

Between August 1944 and February 1945 gave the Planning office another one whole Series of others Memoranda and statistics out, for the other Ask that Material prepared had ten.⁶⁸ In the work on the "phosphorus supply to the belligerent powers" from August 1944 the ratio became in the Production of phosphorus between "Enemy Bund" (main producer USA and USSR) and "Freundbund" (main producer Germany) for mid-1944 with 5.3: 1, or probably even with 7.2: 1 stated (1 16 000 or 158,000 tons opposite 22 000 t).⁶⁹

For explosives, the capacity comparison was 2:1 for the "Enemy League" (for mid-1944), and for high-grade explosives it was even 2.1:1. 1, with powder at the same level.⁷⁰ The capacities of the Allies, especially the USA, would, however was called it, only at 60 up to 75 percent utilized. The German expansion planning at that time, however, continued until mid-1945 one Production increases of 78 percent for explosives and 52 percent for powder, a total of 69 percent. In reality, the production of explosives fell sharply in August, and that of powder in October; both continued to sink afterwards.⁷¹

A comprehensive analysis of the "Non-ferrous metal supply. German Empire and Enemy Powers" brought that Planning Office out in October.⁷² Meanwhile, Finland, Serbia and Bulgaria in the east, France and Belgium in the west had moved out of the German sphere of influence into those of the Passed over to Allies. This The authors took this fact into account when they compared non-ferrous metal production in 1944 with that in 1943. However, they did that cautiously and with reservations; so related them size Quantities of remelted copper and remelted lead in the German balance sheet and eliminated from the Allied zinc deliveries from the French and Belgian smelters for "transport reasons". Nevertheless, the figures illuminated the bleak German situation vividly enough.

68 For dating the last For elaborations (December 1944 to February 1945) see **BAK, R 3/1954** (only the cover letters there).

69 **BAK, R 3/3004**, Planning Sarnt/Wigru Chemical Industry, "Phosphor Supply the warring powers", 1st report, August 1944.

70 BAP, FS, Film 10613, Planning Department; Lead Wigru Chemical industry; involved FWiAmt, Air Force Command, Reich Office for Economic Development, Wigru Chem. Ltd.: "The supply of explosives to the belligerents powers", 1. Report, mid-August 1944. Hereafter also the following.

71 See section. 3.

72 BAP, FS, Film 10613, Planning Department; Head of the Reich Office for Iron and Metals: "NF metal supply. German Empire and Enemy Powers", October 1944. Hereafter also the following. Similar figures *ibid*, film 10614, "Comparison of Axis area of power - Enemy sphere of influence" (for copper and for aluminum production, 1939-1942), n.d. n.d.

Table 26

Non-ferrous metal production (hut production) in the German-Japanese and in the Allied sphere of power, 1943 and 1944 (in 1,000 t)

	copper	zinc	Lead	tin
<i>1943</i>				
German				
sphere of power	264	417	243	1.2
Japanese				
sphere of power	160	45	60	45
ally				
sphere of power	2 748	1 554	1 362	90.5
Relationship				
German:				
ally sphere of power	1: 10.4	1: 3.7	1: 5.6	1: 75.4
<i>1944</i>				
German sphere of				
influence	214	308	175	1.1
Japanese				
sphere of power	160	47	65	40
ally				
sphere of power	2648	1 529	1 336	91.5
Relationship				
German:				
ally sphere of power	1: 12.4	1: 5	1: 7.6	1: 83.2

Source: How Note 72. ally Sphere of power= UNITED STATES, USSR, Brit. Empire, "Anglo-American. Area". German production with significant proportions of copper and lead from 2. Melting (used and remelted material).

The rather dense tradition outlined here leaves no doubt that in 1943/44 a considerable number of central state, military and economic institutions with a number of experts and insiders had a clear understanding of the real economic balance of power between the two fighting groups of powers. Below counted ahead everything the Reich Ministry for Armament and war production, particularly the planning office, and the leadership corps of its industrial "self-responsibility" (shots, rings, etc.), the OKW and the general staffs of the Wehrmacht parts, the Reich Statistical Office, the Reich Office for economic expansion, the management of the most important economic groups and imperial offices. At least from Summer 1944 From now on, the work on potential and armament comparisons seems to have taken on a controlled and systematic character .

But despite the black on white proven hair-raising Inferiority Germany or the German Japanese The mostly reliable calculations and analyzes led by the coalition came to an abrupt end dem point where its military and political consequences should at least have been hinted at.

The cannot simply be explained by the fact that it is life-threatening was, open to express that the war cannot be won. People like Hjalmar Schacht and Fritz Thyssen, the earlier before that who had warned against taking on the USA were now without influence or were already in the "Celebrity Concentration Camp".⁷³ Other There were more skeptics or less inconspicuously withdrawn, approximately Ernst Poensgen, Hermann Bücher or Paul Reusch. A number of other older industrialists with experience from the First World War were in the first years of the war deceased, like that Carl Friedrich von Siemens, Carl Bosch and Robert Bosch.

The Those mentioned belonged like this or so no longer to the core the economic Elite, were no longer actively involved in the organization of the war economy and arms production and could moreover - so far at the live and in Freedom - from the take little notice of the detailed calculations in question here.

The mass of the active defense contractor, -manager and -bureaucrats, the with some clarity about the situation was in a complicated psychological and social situation. At the beginning of the war, the economic balance of power was still equal in many cases, for example in iron and steel; the German lead at the time in aluminum and magnesium production, in equipment with modern machine tools and in wide areas of the actual Armament, especially in the army and air force, was well known. The Victories the Wehrmacht during the The first three years of the war had brought half of Europe and with it enormous, seemingly inexhaustible economic potential that could cope with all eventualities under German rule. At that time, the German **economic** elite had fallen into an uninhibited frenzy of "expansion" and "reorganization".

From this In the course of 1943 they tore apart the military Events on the fronts, and their firm belief in German "final victory" began to waver. Since then they have been representatives the economy in a strange one dilemma between the growing insight into the ever deeper military crisis and the superiority of the Allies on the one hand, the undeniable successes of the Armor and the growing effectiveness of the armaments organization under Speer on the other hand.

Mentally, they probably processed such highly contradictory experiences and memories in different ways. In any case, stereotypes are explained on this background opinions of the higher quality of German soldiers and the German weapons or from the possibilities, the quantitative superiority of the opponent with German quality weapons (new designs of tanks and weapons; long-range bombers and jet fighters; electric and Walter V boats; "miracle weapons" of all kinds).

When Hitler himself pushed for "technical equality" with his opponent⁷⁴ and always again size hopes on novel weapons sat, so gave he only the far spread

73 Thyssen since the end of 1940; Shaft since July 23, 1944. Schacht explained in Nuremberg opposite the American one forensic psychologists, not the attack on Russia Hitler's "main mistake" was "the declaration of war was to America the most catastrophic madness that a statesman only could commit. I warned him about America's manufacturing potential." (Gilbert, G. M., Nuremberg diary, Frankfurt a. M. 1962, p. 190 (March 12, 1946).

74 BAK, ZSg 115/8, collection Nadler, report from Helmut Sinner man (deputy Reich press chief)

expressed reluctance to take serious note of the real and irreversible balance of power. Speer, the it better as all others should have known, even seems to have suppressed the existence of the analyzes described. He responded to one shortly after the end of the war corresponding question, Hitler had himself always violently against high ones - d. H. real le - Economic reviews forces and resources Facing opposite side. "That was also the reason why you rarely found comparisons with the enemy's armament potential. They practically didn't exist." ⁷⁵

Speer himself reacted almost schizophrenically to the contradictory situation. The astonishing enthusiasm for armaments that he still displayed during the summer of 1944 certainly reflected this his beliefs How the mood of catastrophe, in the he in the May, in view of the Allied bombing raids on the hydrogenation works, which was already clearly expressed in the "Hydriermemo" for Hitler on June 30th. ⁷⁶

At the same time, at the end of June, the Armaments Minister in Linz, assisted by Hitler, staged a triumphant display of the performance of the German war economy and its industrial organization and suggested to his audience his own "irrepressible will." ⁷⁷ He encouraged Hitler himself on 12. July in his belief that "with the new, technically superior weapons, aircraft, submarines, with the use of the A 4 and with that increase in Production of tanks and assault guns in 3-4 months, we could have overcome the peak of the crisis that we are still facing and ... that 3-4 months of production would be enough, around our Target strengths almost fully to achieved if only normal losses and no catastrophic losses occur during the same period." ⁷⁸

As described, Speer was still peddling the "victory program" in August. In the memorandum "Metalle" of September 5th, he set a production deadline of one to one and a half years for German armaments in terms of raw materials after a withdrawal from the Balkans⁷⁹. without, where it would have been appropriate, the hopeless inferiority of the German war economy in all raw material matters to point out. Nowhere, like that can be observed, he dealt with the results and consequences of the potential and production comparisons made in his own planning office.

The minister only spoke several times about the enemy's aircraft production, but showed himself each time miserably informed and spread an almost absurd euphoria, at the same time-

before Journalists ex. "Core Ideas" out of Hitler's speech on June 25, 1944 the armaments industrialists (as part of the Linz armaments conference), June 27, 1944. - Speer's remark in his speech to the Gauleiters, "perhaps is the program to produce new and better weapons as well as the question of whether we can produce more," aimed in the same direction (BAP, FS, film 1732, speech of August 3, 1944).

75 IfZ, ED 99, NL Speer, Vol. 12, consultation. Speer, July 3, 1945. - Own wishful thinking has the very doubtful one Attempt by the planning office influenced the "combat power ratio in Europe for 1943" in one Express the total number. After It came like a car Government office to a ratio of 1 to 1.7, while in fact it is probably twice as unfavorable was (Wagenühr, p. 85 ff.).

76 birch field, Fuel, S. 238 ff.

77 Please refer Cape. I in the prev. Vol.

78 Speer's memorandum for Hitler regarding total war, July 12, 1944, in: Bleyer, Wolfgang, plans of the fascist leadership for total war in the summer of 1944. In: ZfG, H. 10/1969, p. 1317.

79 Please refer Cape. IV.

valid whether before Hitler, the Gauleiters, the DAF or the main committees and armaments commissions of his own ministry.⁸⁰ At the beginning of 1945 he wanted to make Hitler believe - apparently with Success -, that man the superiority of the Allies in the Aluminum production

"under consideration of extraordinary increased aluminum requirements one "Bombers make up for (that of) a fighter". could, "since one bomber shot down with a fighter is already enough to establish parity, whereas a hunter more than three hostile ones Hunters have to shoot down in the long run to maintain an equal relationship." ⁸¹ At the turn of the year 1944/45, however, it was almost impossible to distinguish between What at such and similar performances of Ministers - approximately before high military officials in December 1944, when he also feel "optimistic" Regarding the arms comparison with America, there were ⁸² - Devotion, what Tactics and what mimicry was. But the logic of Following the path to destruction, he made sure how He is skeptical the situation with your own and with the eyes also seen by his big industrial friends have like, with his means - Combating disaster damage, Maintenance arms production, care the Fronts with weapons, fuel etc. - for the Continuation of war

total

Any comparative Analysis of the war potential and arms production of the powers necessarily leads to the conclusion that, „after America and Russia had been drawn into the war and after both had repelled the enemy's first furious attack, there was absolutely no chance that the Axis powers could even have negotiated a negotiated peace (salvage)." ⁸³ All attempts thus prove to be superfluous and misleading, mistakes, wrong or late decisions in the German Armor, so debatable them whatever it may be, for to blame for the defeat. Among the numerous wrong decisions, the in In this sense, things that are repeatedly rumored count

- the to late and imperfect Conversion on the "Total War",
- the numerous defects and Mistakes in the Air armament, especially at the Development and production of jet engine fighters,
- the underestimation the opposing ones V-boat defense and that missing the German air reconnaissance for submarine warfare,
- the waste of production capacities for the A 4 (V 2) rocket instead of being used for production of more fighter planes; or, looking at it from a different perspective, the inadequate Urgency for the construction the A 4 and other "miracle weapons"
- the Treading on the spot in the Atomic research and at the Development the Atomic bomb.

80 Boelcke, Germany Armor, S. 417 f. (to: FB, October 12, 1944, Point 1); s. a. Section 3.

81 FB, January 3-5, 1945, point 25. - spear probably followed this time a particular Tactics that also came to fruition when Hitler made a long overdue decision: "Taking this fact into account, the Führer immediately gave his consent to my suggestion, the Me 262 as To use fighters directly against four-engine bombers." (ibid.).

82 BAP, FS, film 1732, speech Speers in Rechlin, December 3, 1944.

83 Ellis, S. 538.

3. War economy in Pay

The most important industrial raw materials German war economy were coal, Steel (including iron ore and alloy metals), mineral oil, nitrogen, rubber, light metals and electrical energy. The planning office calculated in its index the Basic material production also includes carbide, sulfuric acid and methanol, artificial silk and rayon wool.

Table 27
index the raw material production, /943 and /94'4 (/942 = /00)

	1943	1944
January	109	III
February	105	108
March	117	113
April	109	108
May	109	105
June	107	104
July	109	97
August	105	90
September	105	76
October	108	73
November	108	64
December	109	55

Source: Wagenühr, p. 167, Table 4. The reporting years are incorrect in the source marked 1942 and 1943 .

The high level of foreign dependence in iron ore, bauxite, and some alloys and non-ferrous metals was up to Summer 1944, various even longer, through the exploitation of the occupied territories and through imports from friendly, dependent and neutral countries. ⁸⁴ All in all, supply options and production were "completely sufficient for the essential armaments programs" ⁸⁵ , d. H., Basic materials were overall always pretty close, but the production was, apart from mineral oil and of electrical energy, from 1941 to 1944 still exceeded the requirements for the production of finished weapons and equipment. In the first Half year 1944 was the Position more tense, especially at Coal, energy and quality steel. It became general more difficult to cover the needs of armaments and the Wehrmacht . ⁸⁶

In the second half year 1944 sank the raw material production, first relatively slow, then off September faster to about half of the values_ from mid-year. In January and February 1945, it roughly fell by half again.

⁸⁴ See Wagenühr, p. 52 ff.; more precise information for iron ore and ferroalloy metals from Jäger;

Milward, Alan S., *The New Order and the French Economy*, Oxford 1970 (bauxite; iron ore, etc.).

⁸⁵ The effects, S. 71.

⁸⁶ Ibid, S. 71 ff.

Table 28

Production figures from raw materials, 1943 - February March 1945

	Hard coal (mill. t)	coke (mill. t)	Brown coal (mill. t)	cement (1000 t)	Mineral oil products in total (1000 t)	Airplane- petrol (1000 t)
monthly average cut 1943	23.2	4.7	23.9	942	625	148
monthly average cut 1944	20.7	4.2	21.7	908	459	87
<i>1944</i>						
July	22.6	4.7	22.3	1 134	344	35
August	22.6	4.7	22.0	1094	318	17
September	18.7	3.9	20.0	970	265	10
October	16.2	3.5	19.4	810	279	20
November	14.2	2.9	18.3	643	290	49
December	14.3	2.6	17.5	506	272	25
<i>1945</i>						
January	11.8	2.3	17.5	312	200	II
February	7.0	1.7	13.8		150	1
March						

	Pig iron (1000 t)	Crude steel (1000 t)	of which: Thomas steel	Siemens Martin steel	electrical steel	rolling mill generate nisse (1000 t)
monthly average cut 1943	2020	2 550	1046	1 216	232	1 777
monthly average cut 1944	1589	2,154	768	1089	238	1 428
<i>1944</i>						
July	1950	2 564	1012	1 222	268	1697
August	1500	2144	670	1 161	246	1460
September	1 382	1999	603	1082	250	1 313
October	1 142	1 695	433	970	235	1 109
November	792	1246	288	746	171	855
December	622	991	181	629	148	628
<i>1945</i>						
January	542	819	220	445	127	500
February	414	581	150	308	98	35

Table 28 (Continuation)

	Metall c aluminum (1000 t)	copper (metallu rgical prod. 1000 t Cu)	Chrome metal (t Cr)	Tungsten (t W)	embroider y Fabric (1000 t N)	Hoko acid (nitrous acid 1000tHNOJ)
monthly average cut in 1943	20.8	15.6	2 278	128	76.7	67.6
monthly average cut 1944	20.4	13.4	2 623	92	55.7	66.4
1944						
July	24.5	14.9	2 787	76	56.8	70.4
August	25.2	13.8	2 759	87	43.5	62.8
September	21.0	15.3	2030	81	40.2	59.7
October	19.1	13.8	2 245	76	36.6	59.1
November	16.4	7.8	2 372	51	23.9	46.0*
December	15.7	7.5	1 618	96	21.1	50.0*
1945						
January	9.9	5.0	1 356	110	11.2	25.9
February	5.7	3.5	895	85	8.0	11.0
March			471(!)			

*) without
protectorate

	Methanol (1000 t pure)	Sulfur- acid (1000 t SOJ)	carbide (1000 t)	BunaNitro (1000 t) (1000 t)	cellulose
monthly average cut in 1943	20.4	173	127	9.6	13.5
monthly average cut 1944	14.8	150	120	8.4	14.3
1944					
July	13.0	160	138	10.0	14.0
August	9.6	150	128	6.2	14.2
September	5.2	133	119	4.9	13.6
October	10.1	123	110	5.7	12.3
November	11.2	103	87	5.6	11.3
December	4.6	90	75	1.8	11.6
1945					
January	4.0	87	49	4.7	9.1
February	2.3	73	43	3.5	5.4

Table 28 (Continuation)

	Powder (1000 t)	explosive Fabric (1000 t)	of which: noble explosives	Ray on wool (1000 t)	Artificial silk (1000 t)	Airplane wooden panels (cbm)
monthly average cut in 1943	19.8	34.2	20.2	26.2	8.0	678
monthly average cut in 1944	21.5	41.3	21.4	23.1	7.2	
1944						
July	21.1	49.3	24.5	24.7	8.0	1 111
August	22.4	33.6	20.3	23.1	7.8	1230
September	22.1	32.3	15.6	21.8	6.6	1 393
October	20.6	35.9	15.3	21.9	6.3	1 555
November	17.3	35.2	15.5	18.9	5.1	1 792
December	16.6	31.3	15.5	14.1	4.2	
1945						
January	16.2	24.9	11.9	10.3	3.5	
February	11.0	17.6	8.6	5.1	2.2	
	gas out of Coking plants (million cbm)	electrical energy (million kWh)	Performance failures Electrical energy*) (Megawatt)	restrictions the Electricity deliveries**) (Megawatt)		
monthly average cut in 1943	1 869	3 941				
monthly average cut 1944	1 749					
1944						
July	1 863	3 895	770			
August	1950	4169	890			110
September	1690	4093	1040			150
October	1560	4230	1 360			550
November	1 170	3980	1670			1400
December	1130	3 802	2040			1 740
1945						
January	1000		2550			2500
February	738		4050			2 510

*) Through Enemy influence and territorial losses; respectively 3. Thursday of month. **) weekly remedy,
3. Week of month.

Source: **BAP**, FS, Film 1732, rapid statistical reports on war production. As of: February 1945. Area: "Greater Germany" with CdZ areas and protectorate. - Figures from November 1944 in generally "preliminary", "estimated" or "approximate".

a) *Mone*

y

Coal, often referred to as the “most important basic product” in central planning, held up the German war economy actually in a comprehensive sense in Function. The **The economy** suffered despite the heavy demands placed on coal production through the energy industry, metallurgy, large-scale chemicals, including domestic fire supply and export the supply of the occupied territories, as well as through highly energy-intensive industries How The aluminum industry did not experience a serious shortage of coal until the fall of 1944. The Allied air raids had little direct effect on coal production.

However, since 1943, critical points in the coal industry became noticeable, which made the planned increases in production obsolete and triggered endless discussions in the armaments bureaucracy. First and foremost was the labor problem. The number of miners overall rose sharply until the end of 1943 and fell only gradually in 1944 (by four percent by July). But the employment structure changed significantly. The number of German workers decreased as a result of conscription into the Wehrmacht. Those who remained had an increasing average age. Revision, Sunday and special shifts, restricted diet and the nerve-racking Life during the bombing campaign exhausted their health and performance.

“In addition, the - also numerically - inadequate replacement of the high-quality German skilled workers drafted into the Wehrmacht by prisoners of war from outside the mining industry and Eastern workers the performance-wise structure the workforce additionally worsened and the

since decline in performance observed over the years still accelerated. End March 1943 were from one Total workforce of coal mining from 919 960 Man 649 270 = around 70 vH

German. End March 1944 were the Germans only still with 588 158 = around 60 vH at the Total workforce of 986,779 involved. The performance of foreign ones Even after a long period of training, the number of workers is far below that of German miners.”⁸⁷ These were predominantly Soviet prisoners of war and, since the end of 1943, increasingly Italian military internees, who were forced to work under a regime of hunger and performance terror, often executed by beatings by German miners did hard work.

“In the Years In 1937/38 there were 188 million t Hard coal mined with one Workforce of 434,337 men, including only a small number of permanent foreign employees contain was. In 1943/44, 268.3 million tons of hard coal were mined with a workforce of 797,334 (man), among whom 324 269 were foreigners. The work effort increased by 84 percent, the funding only increased by 43 percent.”⁸⁸

There was also heavy wear and tear in high capacity utilization Dangerous operating systems in mining and coking plants are noticeable through increasing repairs and disruptions.

⁸⁷ BAK, R 7/88, report the RVK “Coal performance program 1944/45”.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

Table 29

employees in the Mining, 1941-1944 (in 1 000)

30. November 1941	773
30. November 1942	871
31. January 1943	911
31. May 1943	902
30. September 1943	948
30. November 1943	969
31. January 1944	948
31. March 1944	938
31. May 1944	930
31. July 1944	929

Source: The Effects, S. 210 f., Table 9. - Here Difference to quoted above RVK statistics, the u. a. includes Lorraine .

On the 22nd In April 1943 the Reich Coal Association reported in the Central planning for the past and the beginning of the coal industry year (April - March). Because of the confiscations ("special confiscation campaigns") and the absence of the Forced labor transport "around Germany" was the funding "since the 20th. February (1943) ... unfortunately declining fig" ⁸⁹, so that the targeted increase compared to the previous year was significantly lower. This "allocation list" was Accordingly, already "one "A very daring measure": "Any shortfall is at the expense of the house fire, which has already been greatly reduced, with all the political and psychological consequences, and the coke supply for the iron workers Industry!" ⁹⁰ Also the Export obligations tolerated no Disadvantages:

"We I'm dying of it Iron ore from not Sweden", said Kehrl, "if we who do not deliver coal." ⁹¹

The for the Year 1943/44 in the plan used delivery rate from 290 mill. t Hard coal - "This corresponds to full utilization of the funding capacity" ⁹² - had an "absolute prerequisite" the supply of 192,000 workers, including 70 000 as "immediate need" for the second and third quarters of 1943. "If the workforce "cannot be delivered," says Speer we declare our bankruptcy with the Reichsmarschall." ⁹³ In total should

89 ZPP, 36. Meeting, April 22, 1943. Hard coal mining of the Ruhr area fell from 425,000 from February to April 1943 400 000 tons daily and was the beginning May on the low point from 394,000 to 397,000 t. "On Easter Saturday, coal production only had 322,000 on Tuesday after Easter 329 000 tons per day be. This decrease... is also due to the fact that the usual holiday shifts take place in mid-April in the start mining again, the also under not exposed to any circumstances become can, already with regard to the state of health of the miners." (ZPP, 40th meeting, May 4, 1943; sweep!).

90 ZPE, 36. Meeting, April 22, 1943.

91 ZPP, 36th session.

92 ZPE, 36. Meeting.

93 ZPP, 36. Meeting.

A quarter of a million foreign workers, primarily Soviet prisoners of war, were to be recruited for the 1943/44 coal plan.

On the 23rd In June 1943, Central Planning discussed new options. Hitler should propose "To have the army group chiefs release 200,000 Russian prisoners of war from the stocks of the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS who are suitable for hard work, who are to be selected on the spot by miners' association doctors and then taken over by organs of the GBA." From " plenty of additional food ... based on the "performance" that Hitler had recently promised for Soviet prisoners of war in the mining industry ⁹⁴, was no longer here Speech, but only about bonuses for "special services", from additional payments in storage money, for which "certain amounts of food (e.g. new sunflower seeds, etc.), beer, tobacco, tobacco products, small consumer goods, etc. should be provided . ⁹⁵

In fact, in July 1943, far-reaching orders were issued by Hitler, Keitel and Himmler about the transfer of prisoners of war, suspected and sympathizers of "gangs" to Germany as workers. Hitler's main calculation in his order of July 7, 1943 with dem "New attack from Soviet prisoners of war" and with in the "Gang fights" prisoners taken in the east and southeast who were sent to Germany as prisoners of war for forced labor have to be transported. ⁹⁶

The hope for prisoners of war largely fell apart when the German offensive at Kursk, the last major German offensive operation in the east, which took place on *January 5th*. July had started within one week with one heavy defeat ended, and as in the following months one general Soviet offensive in the middle and in the South of the Front set in. During the large-scale German operations against the partisans in the spring and summer of 1943, the SS and Wehrmacht abducted tens and even hundreds of thousands of civilians from the embattled areas areas. Still more should on the withdrawals of second half-yearly 1943 "evacuated" have been . ⁹⁷

Ultimately, a total of around 250,000 Soviet citizens came to Germany as forced laborers. But among them, according to the complaints from the employment offices and the armaments factories, there were only a very small number of men suitable for mining.

In fact, the entire mining industry employed an estimated 80,000 foreign workers between May 31 and November 30, 1943 been. ⁹⁸

On May 25, 1944, Pleiger presented the Central Planning Department with a comprehensive report from the Reich Coal Association on the 1943/44 coal business year and the "1944/45 coal performance program". ⁹⁹ Basically, this "coal meeting" the same scenario away as a Year previously: The in the meantime on 275.6 mill. t hard coal degraded

⁹⁴ FB, May 30, 1943, Point 19.

⁹⁵ ZPE, 42. Meeting, June 23, 1943.

⁹⁶ Case 5. Prosecution plea, selected documents, verdict of the Flick trial. Edited by Karl-Heinz Thieleke; deposited v. Klaus Drobisch, Berlin 1965, p. 187, Doc. NI-2840, Erl. ChefOKW, July 8, 1943 (contains "Führer's order" v. July 7, 1943); FB, July 8, 1943, point 17. See also II, p. 239 f.

⁹⁷ Please refer DZW, Vol. 4, S. 171 ff.

⁹⁸ Do effects, S. 211, Tab. 9; S. 212, Tab. 10 (recoveries).

⁹⁹ ZPP, 58th session, May 25, 1944. More detailed documentation of "performance program" in BAK, R 7/88, R 7/480, R 7/1014.

Funding commitments had not been fully met (268.3 million t). The new target for 1944/45 was identical to the ideal figure for exploitable capacity (290 million t of hard coal; 309 million. t lignite), with the fulfillment of which Central planning in reality didn't count.

Table 30

Coal funding program for 1944/45 (April - March; in mill. t)

<i>Hard coal</i>			
Dysentery	137.7		
Upper Silesia	107.0		
Saar (Westmark)	25.14		
Aachen	7,622		
Lower Silesia	5.52		
Zwickau	3,804		
(Central Germany) Lower			
Saxony	2,438		
<i>Together</i>	289,224		
Protectorate brown	10.0		
coal areas (stone and	1.937		
pitch coal)			
<i>Brown coal</i>			
	Soft brown	Hard	briquettes
	coal	brown coal	
Central Germany	197.0	31.74	50.0
Lower Rhine	70.7		15.98
Southern Germany	1.33		0.03
Ostmark		6.6	0.36
<i>Together</i>	269.03	38.34	66.37
protectorate	0.912		

Source: **BAK**, R 7/1014, Attachment "War task for 1945" to **Rs. RWiM**, May 10, 1944.

This time, however, the transport situation became a serious obstacle to the removal of the coal Language. The Allied air raids on the Railway networks in France, Belgium and the neighboring German industrial areas, which began to emerge massively in the second half of May, immediately before the invasion, significantly disrupted the coal industry.¹⁰⁰ Since the coal supply for the railways, the Wehrmacht, the economy and the population in France and Belgium collapsed, German coal, wagons and workers had to help out become. A certain "relief" of the coal supply, so Speer, would bring the right now Failures in the Chemical production after the attacks

100 For this Mierzejewski, S. 84 ff.; sat S. 59 f.

on the hydrogenation works on May 12th. He didn't seem to have any idea that this was the beginning of the German fuel industry; however, he held it with regard to the invasion preparations for "quite secure, that the June as well as in the Ruhr area. How it was also extremely critical and catastrophic in the surrounding marshalling yards. Month by month will".¹⁰¹ The Headquarters planning saw itself because of the "Traffic difficulty" not in the location, for the coming time a coal distribution plan to set up.

According to Pleiger, the exhaustion and poor nutrition of the miners had now become a cardinal problem. He particularly mentioned the "nutritional difficulties among the foreigners and prisoners of war who were fed in the camp" and the mass appearance of tuberculosis and scabies among the "Russians"; but the performance of the Germans has also dropped alarmingly. "The weight loss among the buddies is enormous." On the Ruhr, the output per underground worker was their climax in the year 1941 (2.1 t) on 1.3 t in the year 1944 sunk.¹⁰²

Regardless of this, central planning saw the way out entirely in the supply of new forced laborers: 165,000 for what had begun coal year, of which 35,000 were "immediate requirements": Speer noted for the next "leader's meeting":

- "a) Combing out the Army groups in the east on Workforce (Waeger),
- b) Carrying out one SE action the Russian prisoners of war for the benefit of mining (Waeger),
- c) Return from refugees, primarily in mining, in particular agriculture (Kehrl/Pohl),
- d) Compilation of the reasons for the fluctuation (KehrVRVK)."¹⁰³

However, the German coal production in the spring of 1944 reached a point from which no further improvement was possible. "The coal situation of 1944 was the clearest indication that the German primary industry had practically reached its limits as a support for the war economy in the spring of this year."¹⁰⁴ Production has decreased gradually since the summer and rapidly since September.

The RVK reports pointed to bomb damage to the production facilities and a lack of labor as the main reasons for it. Actually, it was but the paralyzing of the transport system that was the most critical point. The German transport system was the target that received by far the largest bomb load in the last quarter of 1944 (33 percent compared to 17 percent in the third quarter); it took in this relationship from now on at the first place. Of this, around 40 percent (41,565 of 104,946 t) fell in December, although for tactical reasons during the Ardennes offensive the majority fell on the Cologne-Koblenz region.¹⁰⁵ Already since end September led the attacks but those constrictions of

101 ZPP, 58th meeting, May 25, 1944. Hereafter also the following. - Since leaving Italy from the war was the German carbon balance also relieved of larger export quantities (see The Effects, p. 96, table 58).

102 USSBS, The Effects of Strategy Bombing on German Transportation, S. 80.

103 ZPE, 58. Meeting, May 25, 1944.

104 The effects, S. 96.

105 Pay after the effects, p. 5 f.; Mierzejewski, P. 126. - For the second quarter 1944 pointed the USSBS statistics at 32 percent also takes first place. Here but numbers relate on

Rhenish-Westphalian industrial area, which despite the most energetic, even desperate countermeasures and the disaster deployment of tens of thousands of workers - from foreign forced laborers, OT units, summoned miners and other industrial workers, also Wehrmacht units - could not be eliminated again.

Coal was what expanded the transportation options for large quantities routes, the most crisis-prone German product of all. The large coalfields were on the periphery, both in the west (Ruhr, Saar) as also in East (Upper Silesia). "The coal supply is critically dependent on maintaining transport capacity, especially in the Ruhr area." ¹⁰⁶ As a result of the massive air raids on transport connections in the Ruhr area and on the Access routes out of dem or. for the Territory spread itself a

"Deadly hunger for coal" ¹⁰⁷ in the areas of southern and central Germany dependent on the Ruhr. Three heavy waves of attacks against the west-east canal system laid from the end September on the Transport of coal and iron ore eastward the Mittelland Canal is lame. In October, concentrated attacks hit the Reichsbahn main lines and depots from Cologne and Duisburg to Hamm and Münster. "Since the beginning of October, the Ruhr has been basically (virtually) cut off from the rest of Germany." ¹⁰⁸

Table 31

failure from hard coal transport, August 1944 -January 1945 (in mill. t; estimated)

	Failure (Reichsbahn)	Failure (inland shipping)	Total (cumulative)
<i>1944</i>			
August	1.7		1.7
September	4.8	0.25	6.8
October	5.7	0.89	13.3
November	5.9	0.96	20.3
December	5.6	0.73	26.6
<i>1945</i>			
January	8.7	1.20	36.5

Source: Mierzejewski, p. 194, Table A 6. After comparison with the values for the coal industry year 1943/44.

The wagon supply for hard coal in the RBD Essen area fell in October by 54 percent below the previous year's level, and the coal and coke stocks in the dumps and on the coke ovens soared on the Six- up to sevenfold in the Height. The Coal mining

"Axis Europe"; in this quarter the majority of the bombs fell on French and Belgian transport facilities, in connection with the invasion and its preparation (The Effects, p. 4 f.; Mierzejewski, p. 86).

¹⁰⁶ ZPE, 61st meeting, November 8th 1944. - 39 percent of all rail transport Coal transport (USSBS, Tue Effects of Strategy Bombing on German Transportation, p. 79).

¹⁰⁷ Mierzejewski, S. 103; the The following after S. 103 ff.

¹⁰⁸ Do effects, S. 99; s. a. Section 1 of prev. Cape.

had to around a One-third, the Coke production around a Quarter restricted become. The **coke** gas deliveries sank around the half.

In Upper Silesia, the situation was also tense despite much less damage to the transport network. "Still closed beginning of this year they were Pits of the The local district was only able to meet the funding demands placed on it by exerting all its strength. For this reason, work was carried out almost regularly on three Sundays a month... Towards the middle of the year, however, this situation gradually underwent a change, which was reflected in the reached such an extent in the last few weeks that almost all mines in the district had to work shifts after Sunday funding had already been discontinued earlier. The reason, as we hear, is a sharp decline in the number of from the Reichsbahn daily provided wagons. While before every day for about a year still 24,000 cars were provided, the number is currently around 14 000. As a result of this poor wagon positioning, significant stockpiles have accumulated in almost all companies... The loss of funding is currently being addressed about 20 percent estimated (260 000 t funding daily against 320 000 t funding daily earlier)." ¹⁰⁹

Table 32

Coal mining and coke production, 1942/43, 1943/44, January 1944 - February 1945 (in mill. t)

	Total hard coal	of which: dysentery	Brown coal	coke
1942/43 (Coals fiscal year)	264.5	131.2	248.9	
1943/44 (Coals fiscal year)	268.9	125.4	252.5	
<i>1944</i>				
January - March (monthly average)	23.7	10.7	24,1	4.8
April-June (monthly average)	23,1	10.4	23.0	4.8
July	22.6	10,1	22.3	4.7
August	22.6	10.4	22.0	4.7
September	18.7	9.4	20.0	3.9
October	16.2	7.2	19.4	3.5
November	14.2	5.2	18.3	2.9
December	14.3	5.4	17.5	2.6

109 WAP Katowice, Dresden Bank, branch Katowice, No. 121, Report at the Headquarters in Berlin, 3.11.1944.

Table 32 (Continuation)

	Hard coal in total	of that: Dysentery	Brown coal	coke
<i>1945</i>				
January	11.8	5.5	17.5	2.3
February	7.0	4.7	13.8	1.7
March („expected“)	(6.5)	2.8*	(12.8)	?

*) Estimated.

Source: Tue Effects, p. 92, table 55; p. 93, table 56; P. 98, table 60. March estimates: BAP, FS, Film 3385, "Development of the coal situation", Reich and Protectorate, undated; Ruhr, Jan. - March 1945: USSBS, The Effects of Strategy Bombing on German Transportation, p. 80, Exh. 78. See also partially different Mierzejewski, p. 189, Tab.A1 (hard coal); P. 190, Table A 2 (lignite).

The coal reserves at the Reichsbahn, electricity and steel works fell dangerously. At the end of November, at Speer's suggestion, Hitler had so-called fortress battalions put together from Ruhr miners and given military training, "which were then placed in the immediate vicinity of the area in which they had previously worked were to be used". That would be Immediate "repatriation" is made easier if necessary, "if the stockpiles are reduced due to more favorable traffic conditions and the workforce available in the mining industry is no longer sufficient to extract additional coal".¹¹⁰

Table 33

Bombing raids on Transportation facilities in West Germany, November 1944 (Selection)

Date	target
<i>November 1944</i>	
2.	marshalling yard Düsseldorf-Derendorf Dortmund-
4.	Ems Canal (near Ladbergen) marshalling yards and
7.	other railway facilities from Hamm, Muenster,
	Bochum, Osnabrück, Cologne, Eat
20. and 23.	blocking of Rhine-Herne Canal through destroyed bridges on
21.	the Dortmund-Ems Canal (near Ladbergen)
21.	Mittelland Canal (at Gravenhorst)
26.	Railway facilities from Hamm, Bielefeld, Osnabrück, Hanover, Gütersloh
26. u. 29.	Paderborn (Altenbeken Viaduct)
29.	Düsseldorf- Derendorf

Source: Mierzejewski, S. 128 ff.

¹¹⁰ FB, November 28, 1944, Point 11.

The removal of coal by the Rhenish-Westphalian coal syndicate fell by 52 percent in December 1944 compared to September, of which shipping fell by 68 percent and rail departures fell by 47 percent.¹¹¹

This happened at the end of January 1945 Upper Silesian Lost territory. Speer expected a remaining capacity of 12.1 million t of hard coal for January - The districts in Lorraine, on the Saar, near Aachen, in Upper Silesia, Large capacities on the Ruhr were paralyzed - only with one actually deductible, ie transportable quantity of 5.5 to 6 million. t, that was barely a quarter of the Promoting January 1944 (23.4 mill. t). That was it steel production and with her the entire armor The end is near. „**With** one production With 300,000 to 400,000 tons of crude steel per month, armaments are doomed to a rapid collapse." ¹¹²

In March/April 1945, the German coal supply ended in "complete disaster."¹¹³

b) iron and steel

Production and distribution of iron and Steel had already been regulated since 1937 by state central offices and representatives (Four-Year Plan; Reich Ministry of Economics) and by industrial associations with official powers (Economic Group for Iron-Producing Industries). Since 1942, under central planning, the distribution of iron and steel (quota) to the lever of a central, fairly comprehensive overall control of the war economy. The main activity of central planning was to distribute a total quota every quarter to the individual "requirements" on the basis of production commitments from the RVE and the main iron production ring. to allocate.

Generation commitments and quota weights initially referred essentially to crude steel production (blocks), with percentages Deductions related to processing to rolling mill and Forged products and with the addition of iron and cast steel; Since the beginning of 1943, the calculation system has been based on the sum of rolled mill products, semi-finished products pre-rolled for forgings and castings.¹¹⁴

In central planning, a contingent list was drawn up and decided on a quarterly basis, the left-hand side of which represented the declared or approved needs of the military contingent holders (Wehrmacht parts) and the direct producers of weapons and equipment, ie the relevant main committees, and the right-hand side of which represented the needs of the "civilian" quota holder, the so-called indirect armament needs, including of U-

111 Mierzejewski, S. 138.

112 **BAK**, R 3/1965, BI. 224 ff., elaboration Speers "Effects - Loss Upper Silesia", January 30, 1945 (this is apparently a draft for the Memorandum "On the Rüstl,mgslage" handed over to Hitler February March 1945", v. January 30, 1945, in BAP, FS, Movie 1732; s. Cape. VII in the prev. Vol.); s. a. The effects, S. 99.

113 The effects, S. 99.

114 **BAK**, R 13 1/1138, J. W. Reichert at Serious Poensgen, November 3, 1943. Please refer also II, S. 362 ff.

and e-needs (entertainment and expansion). Despite increasing production there was there is always too little steel all requirements To do enough. So was "distributed" in the Finally, central planning the Rule "the monthly amount that at fulfillment of all "The conditions could be achieved in the best case scenario".¹¹⁵

In 1942/43 there was order in the allocation of quotas and the inflation of the allocated quotas (control numbers, later iron checks) was rigorously contained and reduced been so that the delivery times from nine up to ten months decreased to an average of 2.8 months¹¹⁶; But the allocations began as early as the first half of 1943 production again, and in the third quarter they were already ten percent above that.¹¹⁷ In November it turned out that the Armament priority programs once they have all reached their "program top" have achieved, "in their demand for all iron, [especially] but also [for] alloyed steel and sheet metal, far exceed the production and thus quota possibilities. A leadership decision must therefore be made as to which programs should be restricted and to what extent."¹¹⁸

Table 34
crude steel production, 1941-1945 (in 1 000 t)

	Production ("Greater Germany")	Loss of production*) due to air raids	production ("Greater Germany" and occupied areas)
<i>1941</i>	28 233		31 819
<i>1942</i>	28 744		32 126
<i>1943</i>	30603	2 279	34644
January	2 688	78	2 971
February	2 569	88	2 858
March	2 805	133	3 127
April	2 612	III	2926
May	2489	327	2 833
June	2431	317	2 795
July	2590	205	2 953
August	2455	214	2 802
September	2 507	155	2 868
October	2 548	203	2 913
November	2458	262	2 801
December	2451	186	2 797

115 ZPE, 40. Meeting, May 4, 1943.

116 ZPE, 38. Meeting, April 22, 1943.

117 How Note 114.

118 ZPE, 49. Meeting, November 19, 1943. - Alloys Steels were always a special Bottleneck; nonetheless gave

it some Possibilities the saving and of evasion on less highly refined ones Steel, even in tank production (see FB, June 19 - 22, 1944, point 27). For the situation regarding alloy metals see Jäger; also II, p. 366 ff. and chap. IV, Section 2 in the previous vol.

Table 34 (Continuation)

	Production ("Greater Germany")	Loss of production*) due to air raids	production ("Greater Germany" and occupied areas)
<i>1944</i>	25 853	4226	28 501
January	2558	166	3 040
February	2488	145	2981
March	2672	200	3 171
April	2494	189	2 912
May	2487	256	2 778
June	2506	256	2 731
July	2 568	185	2 766
August	2 139	180	2 155
September	2000	201	2007
October	1 696	562	1 703
November	1 253	834	1 259
December	992	1 052	998
<i>1945</i>			
January	825	1 155	(825)
February	597	937	(597)

*) Underproduction through (Alarm) downtime and through Damage and Destructions.

Source: Do effects, S. 252, tab. 72; S. 253, Table 73; S. 254, table 75; S. 257, tab. 77. For 1942 reject chend Hunter, S. 305, Tab. 47.

At least the system of iron quotas and central order control worked iron and Steel" ¹¹⁹ until Mid-1944, when the The Allies' strategic air offensive began to attack and destroy the German economy in core areas. The last of those meetings of the Central planning, the with the Iron quota concerned, took place on the 7th. June 1944 a point in time when the catastrophe would befall the fuel plants had begun and the invasion of Western Europe had been successful. In terms of figures, the balance to be drawn was very positive, especially for the first quarter. But back in March, given the impression of this result, they had foresight In the third quarter, the mark was set higher than ever, namely 2.7775 million t of quota weight per month, ¹²⁰ so you put them now - which had also never happened before - down to 2.44 million tonnes, "under a considerable uncertainty factor due to the unpredictable development of the actual situation". ¹²¹

119 Furnished at the February 1, 1943 in the Armament Supply Office of **RMRuK** under **Willy Schlieker**; Weyres v. Levetzow, S. 104.

120 ZPE, 55. Meeting, March 11, 1944.

121 ZPE, 59. Meeting, June 7, 1944.

Until June/July 1944, however, there was still talk of the "rapid iron plan", which, prepared for the main iron production ring and given a regulatory character by the Ministry of Armaments, was launched on the 18th. January 1944 in the first version, on the 20th. February in second version ¹²² and at the 10. or 11. June in third Version ¹²³ in Power set became. He should

- with regard to the exorbitant iron requirements for the priority programs, for the elimination the aircraft damage and for the incoming Industrial relocation on a large scale - the prerequisites for a production of 3.5 million t, later 3.3 million t (a quota weight of 2.8 and 2.75 million t respectively accordingly). These requirements concerned "different additions the Production facilities the iron

"creating industry", especially "for the production of quality steel, fine, medium and heavy sheets as well as tubes" ¹²⁴, additional ore imports from the Minette district, from Kri voj Rog and Nikopol (in February 1944 already given up by the Wehrmacht), from Norway and Southern France (Pyrenees) and out the Balkan region (manganese ore), the reckless use of the northern Italian smelter capacities and all tangible scrap reserves, Rationalization measures in the German plants and draconian measures to "increase performance" the worker.

Reality caught up with this plan by August/September 1944 at the latest; After all, Rohland claimed in December that he was "secure" in the first half of the year. ¹²⁵

Table 35

rolled mill products, 1941-1944 (in mill. t)

	"Greater Germany"	"Greater Germany" and occupied areas
1941	19.7	22.5
1942	19.2	21.8
1943	21.3	24.2

¹²² Weyres v. Levetzow, S. 127 f.

¹²³ Please refer Haniel archive, 400 IO1331/2, raw land at Hermann Kellerman (vv the GHH), June 12, 1944.

¹²⁴ BAP, RMRuK, No. 54, Bl. 58, Rel. (ZAmt) re: "Iron Quick Plan" May 25, 1944.

¹²⁵ Archive Thyssen AG, VSt/3025, speech by Walter Rohland (vv the United Steelworks AG; Head of the main ring iron production; deputy head of the RVE; etc.) on the Full board meeting United Steelworks AG, December 19, 1944. - Still on the 18th. In January 1945, Rohland complained about the "neglectful treatment" of the express iron plan and demanded that the rest of the plan be implemented: "It has only been in place for two years the situation It was necessary to draw up new building plans, and that was very late. This is how the rapid iron plan was created, which was supposed to bring major additions. At the beginning of 1943, plans were in place that would cost a total of 200 million RM to realize. After repeated cuts to 110 and deletions to 82 million, the figure was gradually reduced to 52 and finally to 33 Millions run down. He doesn't understand why this small sector has been treated so neglectfully.... After the renewed cuts man with in total 13,000 workers get along. Further be 12 000 t Construction iron and 38 000 t cement necessary. One more Limitation be not to justify." (BAK, R 7/2252, Rohland's speech at the Iron Conference in Berlin, January 18, 1945).

Table 35 (Continuation)

	"Greater Germany"	"Greater Germany" and occupied areas
<i>quarter</i>		
I	5.8	6.4
II.	5.3	6.0
III.	5.1	5.8
IV.	5.2	5.9
1944	17.2	19.2
<i>quarter</i>		
I	5.2	6.3
II.	4.9	5.6
III.	4.5	4.6
IV.	2.6	2.6

Source: Do effects, S. 249, Tab. 70; Sum error through rounding.

The armaments giants were able to remain quite satisfied with the production itself until well into the summer. The first Quarter 1944 concluded with just one minor Exceeding the plan. The highest production figure of the year, one of the highest ever during the war, was recorded in March. Until including July held the Production is quite a good level. It was not until August/September 1944 that the Allies' offensive took place West the Production capacities in France, Belgium and Luxembourg including the Minette district. The Lorraine huts were in early/mid-September, as far as she were not lost, immediately in Front area. At the 15. The Allies arrived in September troops the Trier line - Metz - Nancy. The Saar huts continued production for the time being, albeit to a very limited extent.¹²⁶

raw land calculated later the losses on (in Percent):

"Thomas[stole]	37
Siemens- Martin	9
Electric	8th
Garnet steel	20
heavy plates	17
wire	27
Workpiece	30

¹²⁶ See archive Thyssen AG, VSt/651, report on meetings in the Saar area, September 17, 1944: "In Völklingen the ore inventory from the blast furnace is sufficient for three to four weeks. Various rolling mills were shut down and workers were used for entrenching work. It is intended, the work and especially the Coking plant for benzene production so long as to keep it in operation as much as possible. In the event of an operational shutdown due to the military situation The factory facilities are to be staffed by an emergency workforce in strength of about 300 Man maintained."

In addition, the minette fails, which means that Saar area 50 percent loses and the north west 10 percent of Thomas steel production."¹²⁷

Table 36

Crude steel production after districts, 1943-1944 (in 1 000 t)

	"Large German- country"	of that: North west (dysenter y)	southwest (Saar, Lorraine, Luxembou rg)	Medium- German- country	Schle- sien	protectio n torat	Southea st (Easter rich)
1943	30603	13 444	7 478	4072	2 821	1 733	1 055
1944	25 853	11,745 _	4 527	4018	2 878	1 676	1 007
<i>quarter</i>							
I.	7 718	3 430	1 876	984	720	451	257
II.	7 487	3 334	1 684	1 058	718	425	268
July	2 568	1 170	569	351	248	140	88
August	2,139 _	1 160	182	340	235	136	86
September	2000	1 098	118	337	230	127	90
October	1 696	768	98	363	246	129	92
November	1 253	495		314	243	138	63
December	992	290		271	238	130	63

Source: Do effects, S. 253, Table 73.

In a secret speech on September 28, 1944, Rohland described these losses as "very remarkable" without comment. In the meantime, Sweden had also closed its ports, so that Ore freight only could still be obtained from Narvik. Rohland saw danger in „that the continued destruction Rhenish-Westphalian Train stations through the enemy planes would have led to a kind of blockade, so that the Ruhr area could not reach its full potential production nor can it receive its raw material requirements". Despite hope above all man, so lock he purposefully optimistic, „one Monthly production from 2 000 000 t up to 2,150 000 tons of steel until the middle of 1945."¹²⁸

At that time was it apparently already leading to drastic reorganizations and cuts everything whose came, What not directly dem most urgent Armament needs served. "All shipping," for example, reported the Gutehoffnungshütte on September 27, "is now carried out almost exclusively for special programs on military-stamped freight bills with keyword 'Tank', 'Geilenberg', 'Eilbau' etc."¹²⁹

¹²⁷ See note 125 (December 19, 1944). Percentages calculated on the average of first half of 1944.

¹²⁸ BAP, FS, Film 3654, AN (Reichert) about Rohland's speech "On the Situation" in front of district commissioners the RVE and the Wigru Esl, September 28, 1944; that. in BAK, R 7/2247.

¹²⁹ Haniel archive, 400003/3, AT for GHH supervisory board meeting at the September 28, 1944, September 27, 1944.

From October 1944 onwards, the basis of production collapsed. The transport network in West and northwest of Germany to far after Central Germany It was torn apart in many places by the air raids. The factories on the Ruhr themselves were also hit by a devastating hail of bombs.¹³⁰

The transport crisis affected iron and steel production far less in terms of the purchase of iron ore than in the deliveries of coal and coke. Considerable reserves of ore had been built up since mid-1943, which could be used. But the supply of coke from the Rhine and Ruhr to the steelworks, especially those in central Germany, fell sharply, which led to serious declines in production.¹³¹

The continued air raids on the industrial area and its access routes began On the 29th. September, that is the day after Rohland's quoted speech. By March 1945, over 20 serious attacks directly affected the steel sites in the Ruhr region, with a focus on the last quarter 1944 and in February 1945.¹³² "From anyone active Defense," said a letter dated November 3rd from Oberhausen, "there has been no talk of it for weeks, neither from fighters nor from flak." ¹³³

The contemporary reports and speeches gave because of the confidentiality "just the real situation again hinted at..., in particular there is no reference to the Production conditions in the months of November and December that seem downright monstrous." After the New Year's Eve attack, the smelting operations at the Gutehoffnungshütte initially came to a complete standstill, However, production slowly started up again in mid-January 1945. "The biggest difficulties lie in restoring the destroyed living space, and I know that with the best will in the world not like us get there should. The people live in almost unimaginable conditions despite cold, frost and snow." ¹³⁴

The arms industrialists were still encouraging themselves with strong assurances that they would fight the second "Battle of the dysentery" exist as well as the first year and a half ago. But this time they had lost from the start.

At the last general board meeting of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke on December 19, 1944, there was a strange mixture of awareness of success and brisk optimism and just bad more concealed End times mood, which many sources reflect from that time. Rohland gave the usual track record up to August/September 1944, then cited a wealth of data about the catastrophic event Condition of the district and the loss of production („Coal 60 percent failure; gas 75 percent; Current 50 percent, plus power

130 The USSBS agency determined after the war that the air raids had caused mostly damage to the power and gas pipeline network and the steel mills' internal transportation facilities, but "surprisingly little damage" to the blast furnaces, rolling mills, and other machinery (The Effects, S.108).

131 USSBS, The Effects of strategy Bombing on German Transportation, S. 87 ff.

132 Haniel archive, 4001016/11, report from Napp tin (GHH archive), O. D (Autumn 1945).

133 Haniel archive, 40010131/IOI, Kellerman at Otto Meyer (MAN), 3.1.1944.

134 Haniel archive, 400100/99, Kellerman at Julius Curtius, IO.II 945 and at Curt Berthold Haniel, 15. II 945. Raw land provided at the same time, "that in important In cities in the Ruhr area, up to 80 percent of workers' housing has been destroyed. As a result, many workers cannot be brought back The Missing digits are from 14 on 30 percent gone up." (18.1.1945; like note 125).

damage to equipment; Traffic, measured by coal cars, 60-75 Percent; Steel and Iron 85 percent standstill") ¹³⁵ and then spread illusions about how to achieve this Win the "Second Battle of the Ruhr" and thus decide the war become.

Table 37

Loss of crude steel production at the Gutehoffnungshütte due to air raid alarms and aircraft damage, 1940-1945 (in percent)

May 1940 - March 1943	4.3
April 1943-July 1943	26.3
August 1943 - September 1944	9.1
October 1944 - March 1945	74.8
<i>including:</i>	
January 1945 - March 1945	82.3

Source: Haniel archive, 4001016/2, elaboration of GHH archives (Napp-Zinn): "The influence of air war total on the Pig iron and crude steel production the Good Hope Hut during the Second World War 1939 - 1945"; completed July 1945.

Hans-Günther Sohl, deputy chairman of the board, explained about the raw material situation that "the existing stocks of Swedish ores and Minette like that stretch that we if possible "get through the next winter, that is, hold out until around the beginning of March 1945". With appropriate support from Domestic ores and others Temporary assistance, he assured, was, subject to the solution to the transport issue, "maintenance full raw material production until at least the summer of 1945 and in some cases considerably longer." Rohland spoke beforehand even "at least ten months" for the the "Stocks in P-poor ores and alloys "at full production" would be sufficient. ¹³⁶

On January 18th 1945, at a conference of the steel industrialists with the Rohland became more clear to Saur, officials at the Armaments Ministry. Under "normal conditions" especially in transportation and in the energy sector, the steel mills could Dysentery in Day-and Night work "in at latest six months repaired become". The But there are "prospects for the next few months". can only be assessed if one assumes a secure transport and raw material situation and that Upper Silesia and Austria will be "preserved for our war economy". ¹³⁷

135 Thyssen AG archive, VSt/3025, lecture notes by Rohland and Sohl, December 19, 1944 (full board meeting of the United Steelworks). Hereafter also the following.

136 At Hitler's request, Speer had already calculated how long at the end of August/beginning of September 1944 the German armor using iron ore and steel alloy metals had taken care of, if Western Europe, Scandinavia, the Balkans, the Slovakia and Hungary as Suppliers failed - which occurred in the autumn (with the exception of Norway, which... Slovakia and Hungary). In According to Speer's memorandum, who had the same sources as Rohland and Sohl, the supply was provided the remaining smelting works low in phosphorus ores to 1. June 1945, the with phosphorus-rich ores were considered secure until April 1, 1946 (BAK, R 3/1525, "Memorial for Metals", September 5, 1944). See also Jäger, p. 306 ff.; also in the previous volume, Chapter IV, Section 2.

137 BAK, R 7/2252, protocol the Iron conference in Berlin, January 18, 1945. Hereafter also the The following.

If that for the Neither did contemporaries cynical yet provocative may have sounded, so can the Present in of their The majority have not overlooked how such demands are unrealistic were.

What was significant about the energy and fuel situation was that all the smelters and factories outside the coal mining areas were in dire need. "Of 34,000 kilowatt hours at Böhler," reported Franz Leitner, "there are 20 000 in the morning and afternoon hours. At Schoeller is lying it similar, also in Donawitz. The Work in Lietzen [probably correct: Linz] stands all day and can only at night with one Oven drive We fall unfortunately in the production drops sharply, because we have extremely poor tension. We need it to melt the double time." For the Central Germans factories it's about the transport here of 420,000 t of coke per month. "60 percent of the delivery has been made at the Hermann Göring Works, 35 until 40 Percent at Lübeck, too 60 until 70 percent in the pure steel mills in the middle."

What is certain is that the rapid decline in production of steel and iron had no automatic impact on the production of weapons and equipment in the autumn of 1944, the beginning of 1945 and even afterwards; This was not the main reason for the collapse of this production sector.¹³⁸ The production of important weapons, some types of ammunition and various other military equipment continued at a considerable rate until January/February 1945 Keep paying. The manufacturing industry was able to focus on one Upholstery of "stock supplies" on not processed material in Height of approx. 5 mill. t and processed material of more than 10 Mill. t" support.¹³⁹ So the central planning and the armaments ministry ordered "that the production programs continue unchanged for the time being."¹⁴⁰

In the last months of the war, numerous measures also took effect the Expand steel production and direct its production to final armaments production as quickly as possible. As early as September 1944, all delivery orders for export (with the exception of export to Denmark, Hungary and Switzerland) and to... previously occupied Western Europe to the Xanten line - Krefeld - Pirmasens closed or canceled.¹⁴¹ Construction was stopped and shut down on a large scale, including investment buildings and most of the many complex underground and surface relocation structures. The current supply contracts for Steel were checked according to strict standards. In mid-December, a representative of the Ministry of Armaments (Schlieker), together with representatives of the companies and associations, determined that "Which orders are the represent the most urgent need and under all circumstances delivered become must. A compilation of the programs should be one each the authoritative owner of the works, who is responsible for ensuring that this compilation is kept secret and not made generally known. All other orders will be put on hold... They're basically put on hold."¹⁴²

138 Please refer The effects, S. 105 ff.

139 Haniel archive, 4000000/45, protocol the Esge board meeting, November 10, 1944.

140 Ibid.

141 Arrangements of Armament Supply Office from the 14. and September 22, 1944; quote in Haniel archive, 400003/3, AN for GHH supervisory board meeting on 28.9/1944, 9/27/1944.

142 Haniel archive, 4000000/54, protocol the Esge board meeting, December 15, 1944.

Finally they came Weapons production the Fruits of many years of materials research and rationalization benefit. Saur praised on the Iron session on the 18th January 1945 "the Introduction of the latest methodological means". Over the course of two years, they had managed to "make do with an unimaginable minimum amount of material." The weapons output, he claimed, was a gross exaggeration, increasing sevenfold for the same amount of raw steel. Despite savings or replacement, it was scarcer Alloy steels would have alloy metals much improved in quality. For six months armored steel plates have been made "without a kilo of nickel". "They used to have cannon barrels just about 500 We endured shots, but today we have 1,800 shots." ¹⁴³

Of course, the steel crisis at that time had the greatest impact where, by far, it was about 30 percent of steel produced was consumed: in the ammunition sector. On January 14, 1945, Speer reported to Hitler about catastrophic gaps in coverage due to a lack of steel; of ammunition for anti-tank and battle vehicle guns Only 31 percent of the ammunition required is produced light artillery only 47 percent and only 37 percent of Nebelwerfer modifications. ¹⁴⁴

At the beginning of February, transport, energy and fuel (coke) crises accumulated like this, that the Ministry of Armaments ordered on its own initiative that the iron and steel production, even in factories that are still capable of production, in favor of rolling mill output: "Before new ones Iron production stands the completion from rolled material existing stocks of raw blocks, pre-blocks and other semi-finished products. The allocated amount of energy and fuel is for this reason in first line to fulfillment this purpose to use First if this

possibility of realization the Stocks of semi-finished products full is exhausted, represent fuels and energy the production of new crude steel is available." ¹⁴⁵

c) mineral oil

Germany would have the modern one War of fast troops, tanks, planes and submarines cannot lead if the size fuel gap, the after the failure of overseas imports since 1939, not through synthetic production using the IG Farben hydrogenation process long Time sufficiently closed would have been. ¹⁴⁶ In the Years 1943 stood in total 11.3 mill. t mineral oil to Disposal; of that came from 51 percent the

- in all other belligerents countries except Japan insignificant or non-existent - synthetic production, 24 percent from the import of petroleum products and 17 percent from our own (mainly Austrian) oil production. ¹⁴⁷ aircraft fuel became like this almost exclusively in the hydrogenation plants produced, 94 percent by six of the twelve major plants alone. ¹⁴⁸

¹⁴³ How Note 137.

¹⁴⁴ Boelcke, Germany Armor, S. 460.

¹⁴⁵ AO quote in Haniel archive, 400101331/13, Rs. RVE, February 9, 1945.

¹⁴⁶ Please refer II, p. 353 ff.

¹⁴⁷ II, S. 354, Tab. 72.

¹⁴⁸ Pölit, Gelsenberg, Leuna, Brück, Scholven and Wesseling; according to the status of April 1944 (Birkenfeld, fuel, p. 228, table 17).

Table 38

capacity the Synthetic fuel plants against End of war (in yep Month)

Hydrogenation plants		Synthesis plants (Fischer- Tropsch)	
Leuna	50000	Ruhr chemistry	5 000
Bohlen	25000	Victor	3 330
Magdeburg	20000	Rhine Prussia	5 500
time	25000	Croup	5 500
Scholven	20000	Essener Hard coal	7080
Gelsenberg	35 000	Hoesch	4000
Welheim	12 500	Schwarzheide	14 170
Pölitz	50000	Schaffgotsch	3 333
Lützkendorf	4000	Lützkendorf	1 000
Wesseling	17 000	<i>Together</i>	48 913
Ludwigshafen- Oppau	4000		
Moss beer tree	7 500		
Brux	50000		
sheet metal hammer	13 750*		
Heydebreck	3 330*		
Auschwitz	2500		
<i>Together</i>	339 580		

*) Planned Capacity: sheet metal hammer 33 000 t; Heydebreck 7,500 t.

Source: USSBS, Oil Division, Final Report, p. 74/75; S. 88, Tab. 34.

The warring sides had long been aware of the special vulnerability of the German war economy at this point, but it remained controversial in the Anglo-American air war strategy until well after 1944.¹⁴⁹ When the Allied bombers, equipped with new homing devices, in the first months of 1943 Major attacks on industrial targets in northern Germany, in the Berlin area and in the Rhine-Main area were carried out and with the attack on Essen on 4/5. When the "Battle of the Ruhr" began in March 1943, the battle took place in the Central planning alarm. The GB Chemistry, Carl Krauch (IG Colors) already showed at that time urgent on the Air hazard the chemical Large industry there, on "The extraordinary need for protection" of the large works, "primarily Ludwigshafen, Oppau and Leuna". Field Marshal Milch's words had something prophetic about them: "The hydrogenation plants are the worst thing that can happen to us; This means that the possibility stands or falls the entire warfare. It stand Yes not only airplanes, rather also tank and U-

149 Since the end of the war in the literature debated about how many months earlier The Western Allies could have eliminated the German Air Force and the other motorized forces of the Wehrmacht with an air combat concept that was consistently directed against the oil industry. So about already in The Effects, p. 82 f. Still informative Birkenfeld, fuel, p. 183 ff. Recently Groehler, Luftkrieg, p. 397 ff., S. 426 ff.; the same, bombing war, p. 122 ff., p. 210 ff.; Mierzejewski, p. 61 ff.

boats quiet, if the Hydrogenation plants really hit should be." ¹⁵⁰ Since then, such fears have plagued the participants and guests of the Central Planning Department on several occasions. ¹⁵¹

It was clear to everyone involved at least since that time that thorough air protection measures were necessary. But the means of defense (flak and fighters, smokescreens, protective structures within the factories) were limited in number and capacity, and their effect was limited. Finally, the production facilities were set up and expanded always the Air raid protection measures were in place, which only had to put a strain on the iron contingent and construction capacity.

Table 39

Generation program of GB Chemistry for Mineral oil, aircraft fuel and high-performance fuel, 1943-1945 (in mill. t)

	Mineral oil	of which: aircraft fuel		including: high- performance fuel	
1942	6.3				
1943	7.6	1.6		0.56	
		normal	maximum	normal	maximum
1944		2.32	3.1	1.8	2.0
1945	9.9	2.58	3.39	2.46	2.72

Source: ZPE, 37. Meeting, April 22, 1943.

The planners set themselves high goals, especially at this time. The program of the GB Chemie envisaged a German production capacity of almost ten tons of mineral oil in 1945; The capacity for aviation fuel should increase to a maximum of more than double, for high-performance fuel (DHD gasoline) to five times. The "Mineral Oil Plan. was standing 5.12.1944" was still on a similar, now completely illusory scale (1945/46 = 9.2 million t of mineral oil). ¹⁵²

After the air offensive of the winter of 1943/44 and especially After the "Big Week" at the end of February 1944, ¹⁵³ the now obvious dangers were also discussed in the Air Force leadership. The Air Force General Staff made their case in a memorandum dated April 15, 1944 "the to now still completely unclear and opaque question" why the Opponent the I haven't broken up the hydrogenation plants yet, „for what reason he at his in last Time so highly developed Attack technique without additional in the Position were. **With** the destruction ours

¹⁵⁰ ZPP, 37. Meeting, April 22, 1943.

¹⁵¹ ZPP, 44. Meeting, July 29, 1943: "The larger output of fighters and destroyers the the only option, around to impede, that us everything smashed becomes then can man itself shoot." (William Werner); ZPP, 49. Meeting, November 19, 1943: "The (British) Secretary of State for Aviation has stated that preparations are being made to attack the nitrogen and fuel systems first." (Kehr).

¹⁵² BAP, FS, Movie 10764.

¹⁵³ Please refer Cape. I in the prev. Vol.

He could do so in a few large refineries and hydrogenation plants achieve a success that would actually call into question the possibility of a continuation of the war."¹⁵⁴

Table 40

generation and import from mineral oil products, 1943, I. quarter 1944, April 1944 (in 1 000 t)

	Quartalsdurchschnitt 1943	I. Quartal 1944	April 1944
Hydrierung		945	318
Fischer-Tropsch-Synthese		127	51
Kohlenteerdestillation	1437		
und Steinkohlenschwelung		225	75
Benzol		176	59
Alkohol (Kraftspiritus)		9	2
Erdölverarbeitung	471	512	155
Import von Mineralölprodukten	691	750	?
<i>Insgesamt</i>	2 599	2 744	662*

*) Without Import; with natural gas (0.6) and Waste oil (1.1).

Source: The Effects, p. 75, Tab. 37 (1943); S. 76, Table 38 (I/44); **BAK, R 25/128**, GB Chemistry: "Mineral oil security plan. 1st section. As of August 1, 1944" (April 1944). See also Birkenfeld, Fuel, p. 223, tables 8 and 9.

On April 21, Göring asked the GB Chemistry to immediately examine "how the most sensitive parts of the hydrogenation works and Buna works can be subsequently placed under 2 m of concrete."¹⁵⁵ Krauch replied on May 5 that only the actual parts would be covered Operating facilities - without pipe bridges, railway tracks, etc. - "The necessary expenses for the 14 most important fuel and four Buna plants amounted to around six billion RM. 1,200 000 Construction workers would have to work for a year for this largely bomb-proof air raid protection." Krauch gave further hair-raising figures for such a project: 11 million tons of cement, 70 million tons of gravel, 1.1 million tons of structural steel, 1.8 million tons. Cubic meters of wood. Intimidating The minimal variant calculated by Krauch was enough: Even at

154 Quoted from Groehler, Luftkrieg, p. 426 f., who also discusses the probability of the following assumption in the quote: "With the generous and long-term Given the English policy, it is quite conceivable that he (the opponent - DE) perhaps does not do so in order not to render Germany unable to continue the war against Russia, since it is in his interest to force the German and Russian forces against each other." - In a comprehensive travel report by two officers of the WFSt/OQu "Re. Mineral oil Romania and Hungary" from the second half of May, the demand already appeared under "declaration of a major emergency for all works of the Fuel production ... "To immediately initiate the relocation of at least some fuel production facilities, especially for aviation fuel, underground." (BAP, FS, Film 4564, report Dereser/Cartellieri about trip from May 9th to May 13th, 1944). The discussions in the OKW since around the beginning of 1944 see KTB of the OKW, Vol. IV/1, p. 942 ff.; p. 783 ff.

155 BAK, R 25/64, Goering at GB Chemistry, April 21, 1944.

A sharp selection of "only individual links in the connected chain of production" amounts to one billion RM in expenses and 200 000 construction worker - almost twice as many as worked for the entire "Chemical Production Plan" (107,000) - required for one year. On the contrary, 14,000 construction workers should be deducted from the GB Chemistry for the Jägerstab. This would jeopardize production schedules and the ongoing air raid protection program (limited to splinter and fire protection for the facilities and to the construction of air raid shelters for the workforce) would become "practically unfeasible".¹⁵⁶

A week later, the Allied fuel offensive began, which had a real impact on the war economy one turning point meant. On the 30th May were after the serious attacks on eight For the time being, 56 percent of aviation fuel capacity (half of it in Pölitz alone) and 20 percent of the remaining capacity in the mineral oil industry have failed, a total of 34 percent.¹⁵⁷

After the successful Allied attacks in May, the air warfare strategy practiced here became generally accepted. "At the same time, at that the Germans Ensuring their Fuel supply to the top of her The Allies did all the armaments their destruction became their most important strategic air war Goal. The central The hydrogenation works took a position within the intentions and measures on both sides."¹⁵⁸ Given the given balance of power in the air war, the fate of these works was sealed for the foreseeable future.

Controversial and is unsafe still the answer to that Question whether There were forces in the West Allies, especially in US business circles, who were not interested in the destruction of the German fuel plants and who may have had an influence on the late target orientation have taken. By Leuna director Heinrich Bütetfisch (MV IG Farben) it is said that after the first attack on the Leuna plant, he spoke out strongly against German nuclear researchers about the pending project to produce heavy water in Leuna. This project, he said, had provoked the attack, even though it was a "gentlemen's" project. s agreement" with the American industrialists about "that the hydrogenation plants, for which the Allies Countries so significant Investments accomplished had, not destroyed would."¹⁵⁹ However, it can be assumed that, at the end of 1942 at the latest, so-called target savings were abandoned for reasons of capital integration had been made".¹⁶⁰

The one on May 30th for the repair of the "Stab Geilenberg" set up¹⁶¹ to deal with damage to the hydrogenation plants was given all the powers, was disproportionately well equipped with materials and manpower and was able to act ruthlessly other companies, construction projects and warehouses intervene. Despite extraordinary efforts, he was unable to stop the petroleum industry's rapid decline until October. For those responsible in Germany, the blackest summer days were in the second half of June, in the second and fourth weeks of July and in the last week of August.

156 Ibid, GB Chemistry at Goering, May 5, 1944.

157 Measured on March results; BAK, R 25/129, AT GB Chemistry, May 30, 1944.

158 birch field, Fuel, S. 190.

159 Irving, David, The Dream of the German atomic bomb, Gütersloh 1967, p. 247 f.; s. a. S. 352.

160 Groehler, bombing war, p. 227.

161 Please refer Cape. I in the preliminary vol.

Table 41

On Fuel targets thrown off Bomb load (USAAF and RAF; European theater of war), January 1944 - April 1945 (in t)

	1944	1945
January	103	11 344
February	73	20534
March	0	28065
April	517	5 852
May	4668	
June	16054	
July	19 417	
August	23 877	
September	9976	
October	11 378	
November	31 772	
December	12610	

Source: Do effects, S. 78, Tab. 40; short tons converted in metric Metric tons.

After the 19th July succeeded No more, or even the daily production of aircraft fuel, for three months a only time over the 1 000 ton limit bring to. The The low point was reached in September, the very month in which German armaments produced the highest number of fighter aircraft during the entire war.

Table 42

Effect the Airstrikes on the and aviation fuel production, May-September 1944 (in tje Day)

May 1944

1.- 11.	5 645 t	(daily average)
12.	4 821	
13.	4,875 _	
14.	4842	
15.	4 775	
16.	4980	
17.	4 839	
18.	4920	
19.	5 010	
20.	4 975	
21.	5,025 _	
22.	5 075	
23.	5 051	
24.	5 073	
25.	5 487	Leuna comes with 20% in again Operation
26.	5 541	
27.	5 550	

Table 42 (Continuation)

28.	5 526	2. Attack on Leuna; failure 100%
29.	2 775	attack on Pölitz; failure 100%
30.	2 743	
31.	2 794	
<i>June 1944</i>		
1.	2476	
2.	2 535	
3.	2 580	
4.	2 555	
5.	2 511	
6.	2226	
7.	1 823	
8th.	3 718	
9.	2 756	
10.	2 873	
11.	3 052	
12.	2 120	
13.	1 078	Gelsenberg falls 100% out of; Welheim short Disturbance
14.	1587	
15.	1527	Scholven short Disturbance
16.	1275	
17.	1 214	
18.	1 323	Scholven anew attacked; low production loss
19.	1 278	
20.	1 392	Through attack on Pölitz Installation of work until August pushed out
21.	1 268	
22.	632	Scholven Loss of production 20%; Wesseling 40%
23.	868	
24.	1 268	Leuna comes with 20% again in operation
25.	1 223	
26.	1204	Moss beer tree Loss of production 100%
27.	1 252	
28.	1 241	
29.	1 237	
30.	1 218	
<i>July 1944</i>		
1.	1 043	
2.	1 086	
3.	954	
4.	1 065	attack Scholven
5.	1 393	attack Scholven
6.	1645	attack Scholven
7.	916	Attacks on Scholven, Leuna, Lützkendorf, Bohlen, Heydebreck
8th.	600	attack Scholven

Table 42 (Continuation)

9.	870	attack Scholven
10.	961	attack Scholven
11.	75- 1	attack Scholven
12.	1 133	start from Leuna
13.	1 278	
14.	1 271	
15.	1 714	increase in Leuna
16.	1 588	in Leuna Conversion on Special fuel
17.	2,307	increase _ in Leuna
18.	1 378	
19.	856	attacks Wesseling, Scholven
20.	970	attack Leuna
21.	120	attacks Welheim, Brux
22.	140	
23.	140	
24.	609	attempt from Leuna
25.	417	

August 1944

1st - 31st		approx. 400 tons (daily average)
		Attack on:
2.		Ludwigshafen sheet metal
6.		hammer; Heydebreck
14.		Ludwigshafen
16.		Magdeburg; Bohlen; Zeitz
18.		Ludwigshafen
20.		Auschwitz
22.		sheet metal hammer;
24.		Heydebreck Leuna; Brux
25.		Pölitz
26.		Scholven
27.		Ludwigshafen; sheet metal hammer; Heydebreck
28.		Moosbierbaum

September 1944

1.		
2.	80	
3.		
4.		
5.	720	attack Ludwigshafen- Oppau
6.	38	
7.	529	
8.	375	
9.	427	
10.	303	
11.	—	attack Bohlen, Gelsenberg attack
12.		Scholven

Table 42 (Continuation)

13.		
14.		
15.		
16.	360	Start-up Gelsenberg
17.		
18.		
19.		
20.	176	
21.	186	
22.	385	
23.	216	
24.		
25.	260	
26.		
27.	261	attack Welheim
28.		
29.	258	
30.	626	

Source: Albert Speer's hydrogenation memorials, printed in: Birkenfeld, Fuel, p. 238 ff. (May and June= 1. memorandum, June 30, 1944; July = 2. memorandum, July 28, 1944; September= 4. memorandum, October 5, 1944); BAP, FS, Movie 3384, Lineup GB Chemistry ex. "Air strikes on hydrogenation plants" f. d. Time v. 1.5.-18.10.1944, v. October 19, 1944 (August). Before the fuel offensive, according to the figures from March 1944, out of a total of 181,000 t, aircraft fuel was delivered: Pölitz 27.7 percent, Gelsenberg 17.4 percent, Brück 13.2 percent, Leuna 10.2 percent, Böhlen 4.4 percent (**BAK, R 25/64**, GB Chemistry at **RMRuK**, May 12 and 15, 1944).

Since the end of August 1944, Romania has also been completely unable to export oil to Germany or to supply the German troops with fuel.¹⁶² Also heating oil production for the German Navy in Estonia stopped. So When it came to imports and troop supplies, "the main emphasis was now on Hungarian production and the export opportunities there." But the Allied bombers also flew heavy attacks against Hungary.

In the October and November had for the Allied air fleets that German transport de facto has the same priority as the oil industry; Oil targets were only attacked when the weather was favorable.¹⁶³ November brought a visible success: the production curve for all types of fuel pointed up a little. But still in Serious attacks began in the same month. The unequal battle continued until, on January 13, 1945, a series of attacks on Pölitz, Leuna, Brück, Blechhammer and Zeitz was switched off for a longer period of time after the plants in the west had been down for a long time were.¹⁶⁴

162 BAP, FS, Movie 1775, FWiOffice/Dept. Mineral oil, „Contribution for the monthly report" (f. Sept. 1944),

13.10.1944. Hereafter also the following.

163 See Mierzejewski, p. 98 ff.

164 birch field, Fuel, S. 261, 5. Hydrogenation memorandum Speers v. January 19, 1945.

Those responsible for armaments had been blinded at least since the middle of 1944 close to the obvious decline. But they didn't give up to waste an immense material and manpower potential in a truly Sisyphean effort to delay the catastrophe. The extent to which they themselves still had hope of a resounding German success can probably only be clarified on a case-by-case basis. After all, all fronts collapsed in the summer/autumn of 1944. The resources of Eastern, Western and Southeastern Europe were lost, including oil shale production in Estonia (land connection cut off at the end of July), the aforementioned petroleum imports from Romania (August) and those from Albania (September).

At the end of June it was clear that reconstruction would begin the works had been "unsuccessful": ¹⁶⁵ Speer told Hitler on 30 June "tragic consequences" are predicted if hydrogenation plants and refineries do not improve in the future by fighter planes, Anti-aircraft and smokescreens protected everywhere, including at the Air Force, "strictest measures" for Fuel savings would be made. Illusions about the future warfare should be better be dismantled: „Included is determine how ahead of time "The war can be continued if only a portion of the current fuel quantities are available."

On the same day it was decided in the central planning that Only 42 percent of the fuel allocated in May was available for civil consumption, including business, in July. ¹⁶⁶ A "leader's decree" should be obtained "that "The decision regarding the use of road transport, trams, motor vehicles and trailer vehicles is to be transferred to the Reich Transport Minister with full responsibility for the duration of the war" and "that the Reich Transport Minister regulates the distribution of fuel and tires". ¹⁶⁷

The "rationalization" of fuel-dependent transport now looked like this: "We are already forced, Truck trains at the Trams to attach" (Ganzenmüller).

"They have to Empty runs are eliminated. The transport space must be fully utilized. Trailers must be used. It has to be driven in tow. The transport routes that are driven by **trucks must** be reduced, etc. (Kehrl). Not only the economy, too Wehrmacht should to largely convert motor vehicles to use wood gas generators. "The wood supply," said Speer in the cited memorandum of June 30, "is ensured through clear-cutting." ¹⁶⁸ The Chief of the Army General Staff, Colonel-General Heinz Guderian, threatened in an order dated August 11, 1944 that officers and soldiers who undertook "non-military" trips in motor vehicles would be "court-martialed as fuel saboteurs." to ask". ¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, S. 241, 1. Hydrogenation memorandum Speers v. June 30, 1944. Hereafter also the The following.

¹⁶⁶ ZPP, 60. Meeting, June 30, 1944.

¹⁶⁷ Initially, the Reich Economics Minister successfully claimed responsibility for this .

¹⁶⁸ Birkenfeld, Fuel, p. 241, 1. Hydrogenation memorandum Speers v. June 30, 1944. - "In August there were approx 100 000 vehicles with Gas generators and consumed around 4.34 **million** m³ – Wood and other fuels, e.g. B. Anthracite, with a heat value of 2.2 **million** m³ wood (calculated per year). About 500,000 tons of gasoline were saved in this way in 1944." (USSBS, Oil Division, Final Report, p. 27; cubic feet converted into cubic meters).

¹⁶⁹ BAP, FS, Movie 713.

At the end of June, GB Chemie, Carl Krauch, also began to prepare for the new situation in the long term. His office was since the pre-war years busy the War for German global dominance economically possible. He and his team as well the leadership circles of the IG Farben Group, whose Chairman of the Supervisory Board since 1940 belonged to those forces of the economic elite who were apparently not yet ready to one to face German defeat. The - absolutely unrealistic - Thoughts, "a really basic backup, at least for a part (the most important to provide fuel supply)" ¹⁷⁰, Krauch and his employees implemented the so-called mineral oil security plan of August 1, 1944 over the course of July. ¹⁷¹ According to his proposals, a "large number of small facilities" for the processing of petroleum and the extraction of shale oil should be built in the empire, most of them and the most important of them "in the mountain", that is, underground in caves and tunnels, or at least in camouflaged quarries become. The most ambitious parts of the project were a "bombproof Large refinery" for the production of lubricating oil from refinery residues from coarser processing stages (code name "Dachs"), "a truly bombproof plant" for high-pressure hydrogenation of jet fighter fuel (J2) ("Swallow") and one also underground hydrogenation plant (according to the DHD process = dehydrogenation) to produce knock-resistant aviation fuel ("cuckoo"). ¹⁷²

Table 43

resolution the Code names in the mineral oil backup plan, Stand 4. August 1944

1. Oven [planned 40 Investments]:

Small distillations in which crude oil is simply broken down by distillation. Car gasoline and diesel fuel are extracted and the residue is sent to other places for processing.

2. rust (5):

Reserve makeshift distillations at failure from "Oven" systems.

Steam boiler systems that are currently idle are being converted into distillations. The steam kettles themselves serve as stills.

3. Badger (3):

Through solvent treatment, the residues of petroleum distillation are processed into lubricating oil by separating paraffin and asphalts. Special qualities, such as aviation lubricating oils, are also produced at the same time. [The location for the 4th facility has not yet been determined.]

4. Dove(!):

Petroleum distillation residues can also be converted into lighter products, e.g. B. car gasoline, can be converted, but without producing lubricating oil.

¹⁷⁰ BAK, R 25/128, GB Chemistry at RMRuK (sweep!), June 29, 1944.

¹⁷¹ See *ibid.*, "Proposals for the continuation of the mineral oil program based on a discussion with the departments involved on July 11th." (Dr. Knight), July 12, 1944; "Minutes of the mineral oil meeting on July 11, 1944", July 13, 1944; report from Geilenberg to Speer, July 26, 1944; among other documents. Detailed presentation in Birkenfeld, Fuel, p. 198 ff.

¹⁷² *Ibid* (BAK), „Suggestions ...", July 12, 1944. Hereafter that too The following.

Table 43 (Continuation)

5. Desert (15):

In 3 m high hiking piles, moderate temperature treatment, whereby the shale oil itself provides the necessary heat through partial combustion, and the oil is smoldered from the oil shale; the Oil vapors come through in the miler protruding probes are sucked off and condensed. The residue remains in place. Locations: Next to the oil shale deposits in Württemberg.

6. cuckoo (1):

DHD = dehydration process. Heat treatment of gasoline at about 60 atm. Hydrogen pressure in Presence of contacts. This results in the enrichment of aromatic hydrocarbons in the Gasoline that produces a knock-resistant aviation fuel.

7. swallow (1):

Processing of lignite and hard coal tar in high-pressure hydrogenation plants (300 and 700 atm.) to aviation fuels for jet-powered aircraft. Other residues and asphalt can also be processed. Processing the resulting car gasoline into high-performance aviation gasoline (as in Cuckoo).

8. Tit:

Catalytic cracking. Direct conversion of petroleum middle oils at around 420° in the presence of catalysts into aviation fuel. [Originally planned for 10 small systems; planned in August as a "larger facility" together with "Kuckuck" for the Niedersachswerfen site (medium construction).]

Source: According to BAK, R 25/128; "Mineral oil security plan ...", August 1, 1944. See also (incomplete) situation map in DZW, Vol. 6, p. 371.

The 40 "oven" systems and "grates" were intended to ensure "a certain minimum supply of automobile gasoline (14 000 moto) and diesel fuel (40 000 moto) are secured" by "Dachs" monthly 38 000 t lubricating oil. Together with "Dove" These systems should be paid annually two millions t oil to around 240 000 t gasoline, 670,000 t of diesel fuel and process 670,000 tons of lubricating oil; In addition, "Wüste" in Württemberg was supposed to produce 240,000 t of shale oil (which can be used as tractor fuel).

The most critical product, however, aircraft fuel, had to be made from coal tar or naphtha high pressure synthetic, through hydrogenation or Dehydration. In the underground facilities "Cuckoo", "Swallow" and "Meise" - with a total of annually 768 000 t - "from one essentially as A raw material base that can be viewed as secure "a significant part of the supply of hunting weapons must be ensured".

Although still At the beginning of August, various positions were initially cut back considerably - downgrading of the originally estimated size and performance of systems; Cancellation of projects ("Schwalbe II"); relocation of the "furnace" systems no longer "for the most part." completely protected in caves" (12. July), but "as camouflaged as possible, e.g in quarries or on mountain slopes" (August 1) - the mineral oil security plan, which was created under the leadership of Krauch's closest colleague, Gerhard Ritter, remained a memorable document, also because it was completely illusory.

Table 44

„Scope of the measures of the mineral oil security plan 1. Securing the fuel supply created in this section (in tje Month)

	Secured End production	of it "in the mountain"	From existing provided fully operationa l	works ,
Shale oil (for hot bulb engines)	20 000			20000
Aviation fuels	97 000*	(97,000)*	179000**	276000**
of that:				
DHD ¹	43 000			
Aviation fuel	6000			
J2 fuel ²	48 000			
Car gasoline	24 000	(8th 000)	100000	124 000
diesel fuel	54 000		26 000	80000
heating oil	88,000	(24 000)	31,000	119000
Lubricating oils including aviation oils	54 000	(38 000)	8000	62 000
paraffin	18000	(9 000)	9000	27 000
<i>In total</i>	355 000	(180 000)	353 000	708 000

¹) DHD process (= dehydrogenation) produced high-performance fuel. ²) J2 = Fuel for jet engines. *) By deletion from "Schwalbe II" (discussed on August 3/4, 1944) reduced to 64,000 t.

**) "This capacity number decreases by about 30 000, because devices for the structure of the secured systems must be taken from the current ones."

Source: BAK, R 25/128, "Mineral oil security plan. 1st section. As of: August 1, 1944". - Through the Cancellation of "Schwalbe II" and "Dove II" on August 3/4, 1944 became obvious also the Planned figures for the other fuels and for lubricating oil reduced; in the one developed later, The "Schwalbe II-VI" projects were newly included in the second section of the mineral oil security plan, which had not yet been found and the corresponding numbers are increased in turn (see The Effects, p. 234, Table 44; cf. also Birkenfeld, Fuel, p. 232, table 23).

Krauch, Geilenberg as construction representative and their helpers expected the shortest construction deadlines. Your projects usually had the special level "Urgency above all others" for their purchases. According to plan, the "Oven", "Grate" and "Desert" systems should already be between end of August and be completed at the end of October 1944, "Badger" in February and "Dove" in April 1945. Even with the most optimistic specifications, the aircraft fuel systems took five to twelve months: "Cuckoo" until January 1945, "Meise" until March 1945 (both in the caves from "Mittelbau" Niedersachswerfen), "Schwalbe" to June/August 1945 (in two construction stages).

The numbers and dates of the second section of the mineral oil security plan, which was drawn up later, probably in the early autumn of 1944, are not known in more detail. However, the final report of the USSBS (Oil Division) suggests that they were accessible to him: "The whole program required 140 different production facilities of very different types and scope and should 1.4 billion RM cost. Building, equipment and Entertainment this

Plants would have required at least 200,000 workers for an entire year," that is, "more people than the entire U.S. oil processing industry in a year 1944 were busy".¹⁷³ Dem would the there information about the production, which - in relation to January production in 1944 - the plan was based on: 82 percent of Aviation fuel, 25 percent of car gasoline, 88 percent of the Diesel fuel and the Half of the lubricating oil.¹⁷⁴

The longer the deadlines went, the less likely it was to be adhered to. Only a few details about the implementation of the mineral oil security plan have been handed down. A series of "oven" and "grate" systems and three "desert" systems have been completed; it remains uncertain how many of which is actually in operation were taken. The earliest news available so far about the completion of alternative facilities by Geilenberg's construction and assembly departments states that "the first oil processing plants started in September."¹⁷⁵

But a little later it will also have been true for the mineral oil security plan that, as Speer reported to Hitler at the end of November, "due to the extraordinary transport difficulties, the lack of coal for cement and the decline in iron production, above all (but) through the required Use of closed assemblies with Device for "For the reconstruction in the Ruhr area, the scope of construction work had to be severely restricted in order to secure the armaments program."¹⁷⁶

The GB-Chemie report of March 13, 1945 (as of March 1) referred to "the construction of the systems in the second half of 1944 'Oven' and 'Grate', which now have a processing capacity of around 140 000 t per month, "so that with the help of existing systems, the entire production of German crude oil of around 160,000 moto could at least be processed through distillation. Due to the lack of post-processing facilities is it is necessary for now, very much to store large quantities of petroleum residues and a corresponding drop in lubricating oil production To take purchase." Under construction there would be "capacities of approx. 50 000 moto Aviation fuel, 45 000 moto car gasoline and 70 000 moto Diesel oil... The main increase These new installations are expected for automobile gasoline and diesel fuel at the beginning of April, while for aviation fuel it is not expected until the beginning of July 1945."¹⁷⁷

173 USSBS, Oil Division, Final Report, S. 31.

174 Ibid, S. 29.

175 As note 162. - The extensive documentation on the mineral oil security plan in the files of GB Chemie (**BAK, R 25**) contains lists and reports up to March 1945, the conclusion beyond that End of war always stronger bloated Planning (e.g alone until to five "Schwal be" and eight "Dachs" systems). the planned locations and the planned capacity of the system, but not about the expansion status achieved.

176 FB, November 28/29, 1944, Point 19.

177 **BAK, R 25/36**, Report GB Chemistry: "Production development in the most important areas of the chemical production. As of March 1, 1945, after the failure of industry in Upper S[chlesia] and the impact of the heavy air raids on production facilities and traffic" (March 13, 1945). According to The Effects, p. 81, March production amounted to mentioned facilities on 52 000 t, which is what Birkenfeld (Fuel, p. 204), who probably gave the number incorrectly only applies to "oven" systems, seems very high.

As mentioned, the total cost of the program was estimated at RM1.4 billion, of which RM868.5 million was for underground structures. Around 382 million RM were spent by the end of the war, of which 269 million RM were spent on underground buildings - 85 million for "Schwalbe I" (Oberrödinghausen near Menden/Westphalia), 70 million for "Kuckuck" and "Meise" (Niedersachswerfen) and 61.5 million for "Dachs I-III" (Porta Westfalica; Ebensee am Traunsee; Deutsch Brod in the "Protectorate." Bohemia and Moravia").¹⁷⁸

The total number of workers employed was a maximum of 53,000, including an average 33 000 on the underground construction sites. 56 percent of Total were foreign workers¹⁷⁹, probably much more underground. The number of concentration camp prisoners employed - for example in Niedersachswerfen, in Mauthausen ("Ofen") and in Ebensee - is not specifically stated anywhere.

The few hundred thousand tons of automobile gasoline and diesel fuel that the mineral oil security plan actually produced since late autumn 1944 were not so important in terms of war economics; rather were it the workforce potential and the material and financial resources, which he tied up from August 1944 onwards.

At the beginning of 1945 there were up to on Pölitz everyone large oil works quiet; at 13th. January Pölitz was also canceled. The conclusion was probably, it was said in the OKW, "that the army will be largely de-motorised, meaning that the Panzergrenadiers will be on foot or moved by wheel and only panzer brigades remain fully motorized."¹⁸⁰ The production of Aviation fuel in February he estimated Minister of Armaments on 9 000 t; the urgent Requirement fraud against it, loud OKW, 40,000 t. The OKW reserve believed to maximum 20,000 t. At the 11. February The head of the Wehrmacht command staff ordered "the ruthless limitation of all air force operations" to those "at the most crucial focal points and only where other means did not promise success."

of materials and labor had been spent over the 17 years since the construction of the first hydrogenation plant in Leuna . turned into a useless wreck. This meant that the economy and the Wehrmacht were largely paralyzed. Pilot training began as early as September 1944 the air force was radically restricted, training airfields were closed, air force soldiers were placed in infantry units. The fighter aircraft, which were still being produced in increasing numbers, could not be used effectively. Accidents and crashes became more frequent when flying in and during the transfer to the front. There was also a lack of flying experience in air combat itself bad consequences. In the last months of war The pilots flew after 40 to 45 hours of training in frontline operations - "Sitting ducks" for the well-trained Allied aircrews.¹⁸¹

178 The Effects, S. 234, Tab. 44; after later Testify Geilenbergs.

179 Do effects, p. 81.

180 KTB d. **OKW**, Vol. IV/2, p. 1317. Hereafter (ff.) also the following. - In February 1945, the OKW promoted a "new production process for liquid fuel" that made one cubic meter of wood in addition to 100 kg Generator coal 20 until 25 liters of motor vehicle gasoline should be obtained (1319 f.).

181 USSBS, Oil Division, Final Report, S. 2; S. 39.

Table 45

generation from mineral oil products, 1943, 1944/45 (in 1 000 t)

	Aircraft fuel	Other fuels*	Lubricating oil and other products	Together _	In total**
1943	1 788	4 008	1 824	7 620	11 000
1944	1 045	2 988	1 445	5 478	6 829
<i>1944</i>					
January	159	345	165	669	900
February	164	306	160	630	886
March	181	364	178	723	968
April	175	326	161	662	810
May	156	287	164	607	734
June	52	252	125	429	511
July	35	208	102	345	438
August	17	206	95	318	345
September	10	170	86	266	281
October	20	164	82	266	316
November	51	173	67	291	337
December	25	187	60	272	303
<i>1945</i>					
January	11	148°	37°	196°	?
February	2	166°	47°	215°	?

*) car gasoline, heating oil, diesel fuel, Propellant gas (Mixture out of propane and Butane; hydrogenation product).

**) Including import and production in occupied areas (not source congruent). ° Estimated.

Source: **BAK, R 25/36**, GB Chemistry: "The production development on the most important areas of chemical Generation. Was standing: 1st March 1945", Appendix (diagrams, v. **March 13, 1945**); The effects, p. 75, tab. 37; S. 79, Tab. 41 (Total numbers incl. import and production out of occupied countries).

On the Western Front there had been fuel cuts in the army since July 1944; away In September the allocations were reduced almost daily. Horses and men transported artillery and ammunition from position to position, as in ancient times, without the aid of motor vehicles. Towards the end of Armored cars were brought with them during the war oxen to the front pulled to fuel to save. For the 1,200 Tanks in early 1945 for a major attack When the Soviets had converged on the Soviet bridgehead at Baranów on the Vistula and were thus supposed to avert the danger from Upper Silesia, there was so little fuel available that they were effectively immobile stayed.¹⁸²

d) Buna. War important Chemicals. powder and explosive

¹⁸² Ibid.; after Testify Speers, v. Rundstedts, Göring's u. a. Please refer also The effects, S. 81 (1 200 until 1 500 Tank); further Speers Statement („approximately 1 500 Tank") in IfZ, ED 99, NL spear, Vol. 11,

Vemehmg. v. June 22, 1945.

The Allied air raids on the fuel plants ushered in catastrophe for chemical war production. The hydrogenation plants produced key raw materials and intermediate products for both synthetic rubber (hydrogen gas) and powder and explosives (nitrogen; methanol).

Since 1943 After losing all import opportunities, including the so-called blockade runner imports from Japan and Brazil, Germany depended entirely on synthetic production for its supply of rubber. Directly against that Buna Werke (Schkopau, Hüls, Ludwigshafen), which were extremely vulnerable from the air, were the only targets of the major attack on Hüls on June 22, 1943. On the other hand, they were entirely dependent on deliveries of hydrogen and heating gas from the neighboring hydrogenation plants: Schkopau from Leuna, Hüls von Scholven and Gelsenberg, Ludwigshafen from the hydrogenation plant there.

Table 46

Failures in the Buna generation through air strikes, May 1944 (in t)

plant	planning	generation	failure in percent	Remarks
Schkopau	5 810	3 829	34	failure from Hydrogen deliveries out of Leuna
Hüls	3 300	2947	11	A hit in the Contact system
Ludwigshafen	2500	1 732	31	Effect more constant Jamming attacks on L.
Leverkusen	440	374	15	failure from Butadiene supplies out of Hüls
<i>Together</i>	12050	8th 882	26	

Source: **BAK, R 25/149**, GB Chemistry at **RMRuK** and Reich representative for Rubber, June 6, 1944.

So supplied itself the estimated Production losses through direct Attacks only on 16 000 t Buna, those resulting from attacks on the hydrogenation works (since May 1944), on the other hand, to 75,000 t - not counting the failure of the planned capacity increase.¹⁸³ Serious raw material difficulties in the rubber processing industry only arose from September 1944 and soon led to significant production losses for tires for heavy commercial vehicles, airplanes and **cars**.¹⁸⁴

The collapse in PSVR production also dated from May 1944, esp from the attacks on Leuna. The plants in Leuna and Oppau produced by then half of Germany's nitrogen.¹⁸⁵ From July onwards, nitrogen production in Leuna stopped completely for several months. Since the beginning of August, all of the German synthetic material produced has arrived Nitrogen to the Wehrmacht. The Agriculture, which is still the case so far 50 000 to 60 000 t monthly, of that approximately 40 000 t out of German Production, in shape from embroidery

183 Do Effects, S. 84; USSBS, Oil Division, Final Report, S. 51 u. Fig. 52.

184 USSBS, Oil Division, finals Report, S. 52.

185 Tue Effects, S. 87. - PSVR = powder, explosives, preliminary products, rocket fuel; also PSVCR (C-substance = poison gas; also K-substance = warfare agent).

had received chemical fertilizer, increased to 8,000 t by the end of the year and to 1 by March 1945 500 t shortened.¹⁸⁶

Table 47

production from synthetic Rubber, 1943 - February 1945 (in t)

	In total	of which: Schkopau	Huls
Monthly average			
1943	9600	?	?
1944	8400	4096	3 248
<i>1944</i>			
January	11 000		
February	11 000	6 121	3 884
March	13000	(= Monthly average	
April	12000	January -April)	
May	8900	3 939	2944
June	11 000	5 240	3 278
July	10000	4931	3 149
August	6000	2 282	3 216
September	5 300	1427	3 585
October	5 700	2133	3 555
November	5 600	4486	2 251
December	1 800	226	1464
<i>1945</i>			
January	3000	1426	3 227
February	3,000 _	?	?

Source: BAK, R 25/36, "Production development in the most important areas of chemical production. Was standing: 1. March 1945 after failure ..." (How Note 177; total numbers); Do effects, S. 84, T. 48. - No accordance between the Sources for separate Months (November 1944; January 1945).

When the central planning department decided on a "nitrogen use plan" at the beginning of November, this proved to be the case its numbers are true, before the signatures dry were, as complete illusory; but the threatening one catastrophe in the supply of ammunition and the expected misery of agriculture were already clearly visible to the participants, so that spear and jaw with one Memorandum about it at Hitler imagine became.

"The indirect Wehrmacht needs (i.e. i. Consumption of the defense industry - D E.) is limited to the utmost, and the direct Wehrmacht requirement is also around 15 percent below that Explosive- (48 000 t) and Ammunition iron capacity (450 000 t). There the Wehrmacht

186 Ibid, p. 87 f., tab. 52 u. 53. See also BAP, FS, Movie 10763, „Overview on the PSVR plan. Status: 1.9.1944", dated October 6, 1944.

may be indispensable at the intended level, the main burden of the undersupply falls on agriculture; their needs are compared to the allocation in the last year of peace 790 000 tons only to 24 percent covered. There the Minimum requirements the Intense fruits (vegetables, oil, potatoes, sugar) alone 340 000 t, there is a risk that the reduced allocation will limit the area under cultivation." ¹⁸⁷

"Away Autumn set systematic attacks too on the other nitrogen plants - the cannot produce fuel at the same time - so that in February (1945) the nitrogen plant was temporarily no longer in operation." ¹⁸⁸

Methanol, another important raw material for powder and explosives production, was in the main thing too a product of Hydrogenation plants. The production in Leuna and Oppau fell away May 1944 away; the same thing happened in Heydebreck and Auschwitz, since in the In July/August these factories were also increasingly hit by air raids. In January 1945, both plants were completely closed due to the Soviet offensive.

Table 48

production from Nitrogen and methanol, 1943-February 1945 (in 1 000 t)

	Nitrogen (N)	of which: synthetic nitrogen	Methanol
Monthly average			
1943	75	55	23
1944	54	37	17
<i>1944</i>			
January	68	52	29
February	70	53	25
March	82	62	20
April	84	64	24
May	67	48	20
June	61	42	23
July	54	36	16
August	42	24	11
September	39	19	6
October	36	19	12
November	22.3	12.4	13
December	19.5	10.5	5.3

¹⁸⁷ ZPE, 61. Meeting, 8.1.1944. See. Do effects, S. 88. Dr alternative „Eat" (Milk) or shoot, the already happier one size role played (**ZPP**, 57. meeting, May 18, 1944), was can no longer be solved simply by redistributing nitrogen to the Wehrmacht's benefit. The Speer/Jaek memorandum for Hitler v. December 6, 1944 in BAK, R 3/1530.

¹⁸⁸ How Note 177 (Report GB Chemistry).

Table 48 (Continuation)

1945			
January	9*	2.8	3.2
February	6.5*	2.3	2.5

*) Estimated.

Source: BAK, R 25/36, "Production development... Status: 1. March 1945" (see note 177); for 1944 slightly higher numbers ("Greater Germany") in The Effects, S. 88, Tab. 53. - End of February 1945 Leuna and Oppau ran disused had, back on; so surrendered in March Nitrogen production "for the first time increased again compared to the previous month"; however, Oppau was "occupied by the enemy" on March 22nd (ibid., "Nitrogen production development. As of March 27, 1945").

At the beginning of October 1944, the Reich Office for Economic Development stated that the entire PSVR production had run "as planned until June 1944." "At the P- and There were no S-companies Direct, significant impacts caused by aircraft damage." But then a shortage of nitrogen and methanol set in. "These two raw materials are now the key to the entire powder and explosives production. Since July, the upper one has been Limits on powder and explosives production are drawn by the available quantities of technical nitrogen and methanol." ¹⁸⁹

Plants for the underground production of Buna, nitrogen, methanol and other chemicals have been planned many times since the fall of 1944, and construction has even begun on some of them. But all capacities were already covered by the Jäger program and the Geilenberg program and Petroleum backup plan so stressed that until End of war none Plant was completed.

At the beginning of 1945, an underground facility for buna and tire production was built near Mühlendorf/Inn the Planning started. In Mettenheim, not far away, was a complete acetaldehyde plant and an ethylbenzene plant installed; Both went out of production. ¹⁹⁰

Plans were also in place one large underground facility, the monthly 4th 000 t Nitrogen or 5,000 tons of methanol generate and should be ready for operation on July 1, 1945 ("Orion"). Nine smaller plants for nitrogen liquefaction with a total of 15 000 t and four methanol plants (above ground) with a total monthly capacity of 2,000 t were planned or under construction in 1944/45. ¹⁹¹

There should also be a lead tetraethyl plant for 200 t monthly production in a cave near Brixlegg/Tyrol ("Rabe") will be built. Similar plans also existed for other war-critical chemicals (acetone, cyanide, lignol). ¹⁹²

189 BAP, FS, film 10763, „Overview above the PSVR plan. Was standing: 1.9.1944", v. October 6, 1944.

190 USSBS, Oil Division, Final Report, S. 55 u. S. 116. Please refer e.g the Suggestion from Otto Ambros (IG Colors) for one Buna and two Kybol systems "im protected space and under Conditions of absolute air protection" (BAK, R 3/1854, BI. 116, Ambrose at Sweep!, December 16, 1944).

191 Ibid, S. 46 f.; s. a. The effects, S. 88.

192 USSBS, Oil Division, Final Report, S. 47.

Within a few months Almost the entire chemical industry was in decline. Of new investments and capacity expansions, the until now - since the times of the four-year plan - had played an outstanding role, there could no longer be any question. The current "Chemical Production Plan" of the Reich Office for Economic Development or the GB Chemistry had become a waste of paper since the summer. "Accordingly," was the summary of a plan analysis of the Reich Office from October 1944, "they had to in the summer of Restrictions on the entire chemical production plan that were still considered unacceptable this year systematically to be continued, like this that now practically only the minimum construction program (M) and part of the so-called additional program (Z) are being implemented." But even from there the workforce would always be returned Bomb damage repairs deducted. "Through the Airplane damage in major factories everyone has each other The ongoing expansion programs there will be completed by themselves, as all forces will be completely dedicated to clearing up air-raid damage and there can no longer be any talk of new buildings."¹⁹³

Table 49

production from powder and Explosive, 1943- February 1945 (in 1 000 t)

	powder	explosive (with extenders)	of that: Rock salt
Monthly average			
1943	19	34	
1944	21.5	41.2	
<i>1944</i>			
January	21.7	38.5	
February	21.6	43.6	
March	24.7	48.6	
April	22.5	46.0	
May	24.7	49.6	
June	22.5	51.0	
July	21.1	49.3	
August	22.4	33.6	
September	22.1	32.3	4.1
October	20.6	35.9	8.6
November	17.3	35.2	9.2
December	16.3	31.3	8.5
<i>1945</i>			
January	16.2	24.9	7.5
February	11.0	17.6	5.6

Source: Tue Effects, p. 89, table 54; Monthly averages for 1943: **BAK, R 25/36**, "Production development... as of March 1, 1945" (see note 177).

193 BAP, FS, Movie 10765, "Continuation of Chemical generation plan away IV/44. As of October 1, 1944".

The production of powder and explosive was exclusively Matter the Large-scale chemicals and employed large Parts this complicated industry. The most important preliminary products for this were highly concentrated nitric acid (hoko acid), Toluene, glycol, hexogen, glycerin or diethylene glycol dinitrates as a replacement for nitroglycerin, and stabilizers. By mid-1944, powder and explosive - Explosives except the time of the Summer offensives 1941-1943 - always produced well in excess of consumption, so that considerable supplies existed. That changed radically in the summer of 1944. The Wehrmacht Since the invasion in the west and the Soviet offensive in Belorussia, it has had to defend itself against major attacks in the west and east Defend sides, later also in Italy and in Southeast Europe. Consumption increased from one month to the next (May/June) to more than double (explosives) or two and a half times (Powder).¹⁹⁴ At the same time, the Allied air offensive began on the hydrogenation plants.

Table 50

consumption and Stocks at Explosive, 1940-1944/45 (in 1 000 t)

	Average monthly consumption	Stocks (in months) (each on 1. January)
1940	5.9	
1941	13.7	17
1942	21.4	12
1943	29.0	9
1944	52.0	7
1945		1.9

Source: USSBS, Oil Division, Final Report, S. 60, Tab. 29.

The powder and explosives factories themselves were only attacked from the air at the beginning of 1945, although they maximum sensitive targets represented and attacks on the The most important factories could have caused lasting damage: in seven of a total of 35 plants 70 percent of the TNT capacity and the entire stabilizer production were concentrated in two (Wolfen; Verdingen). On the 15th In February 1945, 87.7 percent of TNT capacity was still intact. The decline was not caused by bombing a, but due to a lack of raw materials and intermediate products, especially nitrogen and methanol; "The bombing of four large oil works (Leuna, Oppau, Linz¹⁹⁵ and Heydebreck) 1944 "The explosives industry virtually came to a standstill."

At the end of August, Armaments Minister Speer gave notice to the Führer for September due to a lack of methanol (Decline the production in the August on 26 percent the "target production")

"heavy Burglaries ... at the valuable explosives (Hexogenous and trinitrotoluene)" at;

194 USSBS, Oil Division, Final Report, Fig. 58 and 59. The following according to *ibid*, p. 60 ff. See also the "Ammunition" section in the previous chapter.

195 Is meant the Moosbierbaum plant in Austria (at St. Pölten).

the failure at Nitrogen could "first exclusively to loads the Agriculture (goes), which currently only receives around 45% of its previous year's allocation." ¹⁹⁶

Table 51

Operational capacities for production of chemicals (pre-products for powder and Explosives), as of February 15, 1945

	Total capacity (well month)	of it operational (Percent)
Nitrogen (Ammonia)	71 300	6.9
Oleum	93000	68
Hoconitric acid	62 500	81.5
chlorine	46600	82
Ammonium saltpeter	30000	46.8
Methanol	30575	15.5
Nitrocellulose	19000	74
formaldehyde	15 750	19.7
toluene	12 500	28
Ethylene oxide	7 100	64.8
Dinitrobenzene	3 450	66.4
Hexamethylenetetramine	4650	38.7
diglycol	3 850	51.8
Guanidine nitrate	1950	100
Stabilizers	1 120	51
Pentaerythritol	1 025	70.8
Myrole	1 010	1
Nitroguanidine	1 000	40
MAN salt	1 000	0
Dinitroanisole	350	100

Source: BAP, FS, Movie 3383, Table "chemicals", February 16, 1945.

Production remained high until July, and for powder even until September, but could no longer keep up with the consumption of the Wehrmacht. As a result, supplies, particularly of explosives, fell catastrophically. Savings (of nitrogen in agriculture; of explosives in mining) and temporary assistance (restriction of hexogen production in favor of TNT; use of extenders, especially rock salt, as well as various nitrogen-saving mixtures with sodium nitrate, aluminum powder and zinc dust, up to 70 percent of the amount of explosives, ie 70 percent extender on 30 percent TNT) only slowed down the descent and worsened the Quality. A drastic emergency measure, for example, was to switch production from 10.5 cm to 7.5 cm howitzers, "because the smaller guns fire twice as many projectiles with the same amount of explosives could". ¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁶ birch field, Fuel, S. 251, 3. Hydrogenation memorandum Speers v. August 30, 1944.

¹⁹⁷ USSBS, Oil Division, Final Report, S. 60.

Towards the end of the year, Hitler "repeatedly" ordered "that in order to expand the powder and explosive layer, lower quality powders must also be used for the flak, accepting the resulting increased wear and tear (of the flak pipes - DE)" and ordered on Speer's operation, "that a focus is formed on the areas the technical mobilization of all possibilities to save on powder and explosives." ¹⁹⁸

After the war, USSBS staff noted that the production of special chemicals that in the last year of the war were extremely important for the use of new ones German weapons had remained almost entirely unaffected by bombing raids, despite their production on very few, extremely was focused on vulnerable works. It acted itself about special fuel for rockets such as the A 4 (V 2) and the anti-aircraft missile C 2 ("waterfall") and for the turbine engines of aircraft and submarines.

With these substances and with Their mixtures continued to be experimented with until the end of the war. They ran under code names such as R-Stoff (various fuels for the rocket program), TL fabric (fuel for turbine drives), C3, B4, J2 substance (special aircraft fuels), etc. The two most important chemical groups for these substances were oxygen carriers (primarily hydrogen peroxide; also liquid oxygen mixed with methyl or ethyl alcohol), called T-substance, and fuels, some of which are quite simple in composition (primarily hydrazine hydrates; also crude oil, methanol and bertolin mixtures), called B-substance. ¹⁹⁹

Hydrazine hydrates came from the IG Farben plants in Leverkusen and Ludwigshafen, but above all from the large-scale plant in Gersthofen, Bavaria, which was still "satisfactory" in March 1945. ²⁰⁰ Hydrogen peroxide was produced similarly undisturbed, especially in Lauterberg/Harz, and also in Höllriegelskreuth/Bavaria, since "the core of the rocket fuel industry, the plants that produced 85 percent of the hydrogen peroxide, remained almost undamaged by bombs." ²⁰¹

The general, inexorable decline in chemical warfare production since May 1944 was obvious. Those responsible in the Reich Office for Economic Development were aware of this by autumn 1944 at the latest in the clear. And yet they wrote The crazy plan continued into 1945 and 1946. Among the numbers they targeted were monthly amounts of

- 27,300 t Trinitrotoluene (away End March 1945)
- 34 300 t Ammonium saltpeter (away end of year 1944)
- 21 700 t Nitrocellulose (away End March 1945)
- 92 500 t Hoconitric acid (away End September 1945)
- 34 575 t Methanol (away End March 1945)
- 20 600 t formaldehyde (from the end October 1945)
- 60 400 t chlorine (away End September 1945)
- 81 600 t Primary nitrogen (away End September 1945). ²⁰²

198 FB, November 28/29, 1944, Point 28; FB, December 5, 1944, Point 3.

199 USSBS, Oil Division, Final Report, p. 72 f.

200 How Note 177 (Report GB Chemistry).

201 USSBS, Oil Division, Final Report, p. 73; s. a. ibid, Fig. 76 u. 77.

202 How Note 189; sat Note 193.

The figures for T-substance (hydrogen peroxide) were four times higher at the end of 1945 than in 1946 on the Quintuple of status from the Turn of the year 1944/45 beyond, those for b Material (hydrazine hydrates) for End 1945 on the Triple.²⁰³

e) Electric energy

The increase in new generation capacities of electrical power was still about the same in 1944 as in previous years. Systems for 965,000 kW were brought online, including 877 000 kW from public producers; that meant in Public sector growth of almost seven percent in nominal output compared to 1943.²⁰⁴ The available power the public Power plants²⁰⁵ lay until spring In 1944 it was around 20 to 25 percent below the rated output^{of 206} and declined significantly thereafter.

Table 52

capacity and generation the public power plants, 1943-February 1945 (in 1 000 kW)

	Nominal performance	available Performance	peak burden	power generation (bn. kWh)
Monthly average				
1943	12 277	9725	8th 934	47.3 (Jan.- Dec.)
1944	13 017	9 800	8th 880	48.7 (Jan. - Dec.)*
<i>1944</i>				
January	12,700 _	10300	9770	
February	12,700 _	10 320	9460	4.2 (monthly)
March	12,700 _	10070	9030	
April	12,700 _	10 160	9 140	
May	12 800 _	9620	8th 710	4.0 (,,)
June	12,820 _	9600	8th 870	
July	13 300 _	9 820*	8th 820	
August	13 300	9950	9040	4.2 (,,)
September	13 300	9670	8th 780	
October	13 300	9540	8500	4.2
November	13 300	9560	8440	4.0
December	13 300	8990	7 990	3.8

203 USSBS, Oil Division, Final Report, Fig. 76 u. 77.

204 Tue Effects, p. 116; according to RMRuK reports. Other figures ibid, p. 117, table 85 and II, p. 390, table 106; see discussion in the cited source (Tue Effects, p. 116, note 43).

205 Only for this lay Declarations before.

206 The actual peak load (highest power delivered to the grid) was still below the available power, not every power plant always the full performance drove, be it out of (regiona lem) Lack of need, due to the need for capacity for Peak demand or as a reserve save, due to lack of coal (mainly because of the Destructions in the transportation) or off Running water shortage.

Table 52 (Continuation)

	Rated power	Available power	Peak load	Electricity generation (bn. kWh)
<i>1945</i>				
January	13 300	7 500	6 100	**))
February	13 300	7600	5 580	**))

*) From July 1944 to including Warthegau and Alsace. **) Public and private power plants created together In 1943 86 billion, in January 1945 4.3 and in February 3.8 billion kWh.

Source: The effects, S. 118, Tab. 71; S. 123, Tab. 76; S. 265, Tab. 85; S. 267, Tab. 88; car driver, S. 102. For the Part deviating Values in USSBS, German Electric Utilities Industry Report, Exh. R.

Targeted air strikes on the Electric power plants gave it not until the fall of 1944. This was later critically noted in the USSBS analyzes and other studies. Those responsible for German armaments spoke early on about the high threat to the electricity industry from the air. State Secretary Günter Schulze-Fielitz (GIWE) considered possible air strikes on the large power plants - "five to six power plants" - for just as serious like those on the hydrogenation works.²⁰⁷

"The large performance losses of the public energy supply companies became too common through area attacks (on cities) caused by attacks on industrial targets such as oil works and the collapse of the transport system, which disrupted coal deliveries."²⁰⁸ Of the 2 238 t bombs, the 1944 on electricity plants were thrown off, fell 1 989 t in the last four months of the year. The time span of targeted attacks pushed himself more or less in October 1944 and February/March 1945 on ever one to two weeks together.

Table 53

Allies Airstrikes on power plants, September 1944 -April 1945

Attack date	power plant	capacity (kW)	Respectively switched off capacity (percent)
<i>1944</i>			
September 28th	Future	123 700	100
15. Oct.	Rice wood	115 000	100
21. Oct.	Goldenberg	496 000	90
23rd/24th .Oct.	Eat Headquarters	45 000	100
28. Oct.	Goldenberg	496 000	100
28.0kt.	United Ville	60000	100
28.0kt.	Future	123 700	100
29. November	Fortuna	190 000	17
Dec 5th	Berrenrath	100 000	20

²⁰⁷ ZPP, 37. Meeting, April 22, 1943.

²⁰⁸ The effects, S. 121. Hereafter also the The following.

Table 53 (Continuation)

Attack date	power plant	capacity (kW)	Respectively switched off capacity (percent)
<i>1945</i>			
Jan 10	Fortuna	190 000	68
Jan 16	Thalheim	75 000	100
10. Feb.	Fortuna	190 000	90
20/21 Feb.	Rice wood	115 000	100
24. Feb.	Fortuna	190 000	90
24. Feb.	Frimmersdorf	55 000	95
11. March	Eat Headquarters	45 000	100
20. March	Hattingen	95000	30
20/21 March	Bohlen	319 000	95
23. March	Brainwork	128 000	25
7th/8th April	Aspen grove- Molbis	300 000	100

Source: VSSBS, German Electric Utilities Industry Report, Exh. M- 3.

Since October 1944 took the Bomb damage multiple scope the previous. However, the energy losses due to “unscheduled repairs” on the power plants, which were often older, had been increasing since 1942/43 and were close to the ten percent limit at the end of 1944. From then on, capacity was immediately reduced with the occupation of German territory lost the enemy; in January 1945, out of a total of 3.1 million kW of lost power, it was already 1.2 **million**, in February almost half (1.7 million kW).

The catastrophe in February was reflected in the number of coal consumption by power plants - in a sense a summarized index of the collapse of the coal supply and of transportation. He sank from 1.03 mill. t in the previous month to 494,000 t.²⁰⁹

The developed German high-voltage interconnection network generally offered the possibility of a severely affected region Electricity deliveries out of one others - before everything the Ruhr area through deliveries from central Germany - to relieve.²¹⁰ According to the Reich load distributor's later statement, his office's repair organization was usually able to quickly resolve malfunctions and failures until the end of 1944.²¹¹

209 BAP, FS, Film 3385, Ed. "Development of the coal region", Empire and Protectorate, n.d. (End of March 1945).

210 The interconnected network However, it was also attacked; the Allies used z. B. Interference balloons that caused damage to the 100 and 200 kilovolt lines (The Effects, p. 123).

211 Ibid. - The office of Reich load distributor was held by Richard Fischer from the staff of State Secretary Günter Schulze-Fielitz, Speer's permanent representative as GIWE (Inspector General for Water and Energy).

Table 54

Loss of performance (public power plants), June 1943-March 1945 (in 1 000 kW)

	In total, (absol.)	Rated capacity (%)	of that: "enemy" effect-		extra- scheduled moderate repairs (absolu te		mainten ance attitude (absolut e		coal mange!	running water mange!
			(absol ute	(%)	(absolu te	(%)	(absolut e	(%)		
<i>1943</i>										
June	2670	21.9	345	2.8	640	5.2	1 210	9.9		430* (May)
Dec.	2440	19.2	350	2.8	820	6.5	440	3.5		630 (September)
<i>1944</i>										
Jan.	2400	18.9	290	2.3	940	7.4	410	3.2		630
Feb.	2 380	18.7	270	2.1	1 070	8.4	420	3.3		
March	2630	20.7	230	1.8	1 000	7.9	490	3.9		
April	2540	20.0	220	1.7	970	7.6	860	6.8		
May	3 180	24.8	700	5.5	1 000	7.8	1 120	8.8	210	
June	3 200	25.0	630	4.9	920	7.2	1 190	9.3		
July	3 480	26.2	770	5.8	920	6.9	1 270	9.5		
Aug.	3 350	25.2	890	6.7	820	6.7	1 120	8.4		
Sept.	3 630	27.3	1 020	7.7	920	6.9	1 090	8.2	40	400
Oct.	3 760	28.3	1 360	10.2	1 000	7.5	840	6.3	200	
Novem ber	3 740	28.1	1 670	12.6	820	6.2	610	4.6	400	
Dec.	4 310	32.4	2040	15.3	1 050	7.9	490	3.7	450	
<i>1945</i>										
Jan.	5 800	43.6	3 110	23.4	1 200	9.0	400	3.0	800	600
Feb.	5 700	42.9	3 720	28.0	1 010	7.6	360	2.7	1 000	670 (1.2.)
March	6 280	47.2	4090	30.1	1 100	8.2	590	4.4	?	470 (1.3.)

*) Declarations only for the specified Months available.

Source: The effects, S. 117, Tab. 70; S. 123, Tab. 76; S. 265 ff., Tab. 85, 87, 89 u. 90; USSBS, German Electric Utilities Industry Report, Exh. R; car driver, S. 101 (1. March 1945).- Because of the Difference and incompleteness the Sources disagreements between Line items and Total .

Consumption restrictions for energy and power shutdowns ("power cuts") were a well-known phenomenon in the German war economy as well as among the population. But first in the fall of 1943 took the The gap between demand and available capacity became so large that the prescribed consumption cuts resulted in significant production losses, even in sectors that were important to the war effort such as the production of nitrogen and electrical steel. Of the general reduction in energy consumption by ten percent decided at the time, only the most urgent Wehrmacht production, the production of mineral oil, electrodes and some "bottleneck chemicals" excepted. Aside from that approved the Headquarters planning a "Shutdown plan for large consumers",

from that though Nitrogen and aviation fuel excluded, but Aluminum", carbide and lime nitrogen, electrical steel and even mineral oil were affected.²¹²

A Year later, on 8th. November 1944, immediately after the air raids on the E-Werke from the end October, was a expanded System of shutdowns decided that the peak demand ('unthrottled demand') in November and December 1944 by 14.2 and 17.7, respectively percent, fell by 29.1 percent in January 1945.²¹³ "For energy distribution, the ten percent general shutdown that took place from November 1, 1944 will be extended to the own power plants, as far as she at the Connected to the interconnected network, it was decided. In addition, the general shutdown plan presented (is not included in the protocol - D E.) from Central Planning as general instruction approved; are excluded from the General shutdown fuel, nitrogen and largely buna and methanol. Furthermore, the So-called hazard shutdown (daily shutdown of larger energy consumers at regular intervals) is approved. From the general Shutdown and the danger shutdown, the railway power plants are to be excluded."²¹⁴ The repair of the power plants and the restoration of their "operational performance" were now part of the Geilenberg program.²¹⁵

f) Airplanes

In 1944, the German aircraft industry had production figures of about a year previously not closed yet think was. There were high-flying programs it in the Air armament is enough; In particular, those of April and October 1943 had already set goals of 6,000 and 7,000 aircraft per month (to be produced from autumn 1944 and from the beginning of January 1945, respectively).²¹⁶ Until February But it was still 1944 not even reached the 1,500-piece limit. After February, at a time when the aircraft industry was a preferred target for Allied bombing, production rose to over 4,000 (July to September) and did not fall below 3,000 until January 1945.

However, it was the Production increase from 1944 since the summer of 1943 mentally and practically prepared by the aircraft industrialists and the RLM (General Aircraft Master). The utilization of the had capacities is improving. The The realization that more fighters had to be produced took hold, albeit slowly and against massive resistance in the air force leadership. through. Type restriction was discussed. Heinkel, Messerschmitt and other companies have already relocated important production phases. After February 1944, considerable material reserves, processed parts, etc. could be accessed immediately.²¹⁷

212 ZPE, 50. Meeting, November 22, 1943.

213 Do effects, S. 120, Table 73.

214 ZPE, 61. Meeting, November 8, 1944 (in: BAK, R 3/1690).

215 Ibid.; s. a. BAK, R 4311/1157, Decree RMRuK, November 8, 1944 (see Chapter 1).

216 USSBS, Aircraft Division Industry Report, 1945, 1947 (hereinafter Aircraft Industry Report), Exh. II.

217 Do Effects, S. 154 ff. Hereafter also the The following.

The "Big **Week**" itself did not cause a significant downturn in German aircraft production, although 90 percent of the fighter production plants were attacked and 75 percent of their buildings were damaged or destroyed. The damage on the mechanical facilities was much lower; often the damage to the building didn't even affect production. For the whole of February it suffered an 18 percent decline compared to January, and production of single-engine fighters fell by 23 percent. The production curve rose steeply again in March.

After February there was a lack of the Allied air raids on the aircraft factories on continuity and sustainability, as has been the fuel offensive since May distinguished. Allied and German experts were each other moreover. After the war, they agreed that the air force's effectiveness would have suffered far more if concentrated attacks had been carried out on the aircraft engine factories instead of on the cell factories.

Table 55

Aircraft production after 'Number and Weight, 1940-1944 /45

	Number of all aircraft produced	Weight (airframes) (t)	Average! Weight per aircraft (Cell)
1941-1942 _ (century average)	13 666	81460	5.96
1943	25 527	141 610	5.55
1944	39 807	174 938	4.39
<i>1944</i>			
January	2445	12,150 _	4.97
February	2015	10 128	5.03
March	2672	13 240	4.96
April	3,034 _	15 087	4.97
May	3 248	15 471	4.76
June	3 626	17 291	4.77
July	4 219	20008	4.74
August	4007	16 840	4.20
September	4103	14 811	3.61
October	3 586	14107	3.93
November	3 697	14 359	3.88
December	3 155	11 446	3.63
<i>1945</i>			
January	3 188		
February	2249		
March	1 930		

Source: The Effects, S. 276 f. Tab. 101 u. 102; Groehler, bombing war, p. 216 (1945)..

218 Please refer Cape. I in the prev. Vol. Doubtful assessment the Effect the Big week at Murray, S. 79:
„The air force recovered itself never again from dem heavy Attack."

By June/July 1944, no radical change had occurred in the relationship between offensive and defensive armament, or between the production of bombers and fighter aircraft. By July, the number of bomber aircraft produced had increased significantly, but no longer compared to that of the fighter planes, the had been higher since the beginning of 1943 and in the first half year 1944 approximately at the Triples lay. First End June lay Suggestions "higher place" d. H. of the Air Force Command, before, the sharp cuts in the bombers in favor of the fighter program, in accordance with "the clearly expressed will of the Führer that one must finally draw really decisive and hard consequences from the idea of establishing priorities." ²¹⁹

Since the "will of the Führer" was by no means always clear on this issue in particular, they took advantage those in charge of the hunter staff the favor the hour and drastically reduced types and numerical specifications in bomber production. At the beginning of July, Hitler confirmed a corresponding program to the Armaments Minister: "The Führer in the presence of the Mr Reichsmarschall this is due to the focus formation Aircraft program established by the Air Force in coordination of tactical requirements and technical capabilities submitted. In order to now have a secure production basis for the industry create, commands the leader, that this program in its basis for the year 1944/ 1945 not changed may be To be with all acceleration the focus of the

In order to be able to practically realize fighter production, the Führer orders, at the suggestion of the Reich Marshal, that they are about to expire certain patterns, even on the Due to the risk of having to scrap parts or using them for replacement purposes, production will be stopped with immediate effect and the managers, workers, machines, other capacities and means of transport for this purpose will be stopped the ramp-up of the current hunters and in particular the restart of the newly ordered patterns should be implemented." ²²⁰ According to the presentation Saur approved Hitler "on Suggestion Goering new Aircraft program with 7,400 machines at peak with the aim of the end of 1946 (program date July 15, 1944)" ²²¹

From August - now under the armaments staff - there was a "crass withdrawal of fighter aircraft and the most other patterns - so far she not hunters, destroyers and scouts are" ²²². It was literally hired by one month on the other the Production of a- and four-engine Bombers, at twin-engined greatly shortened, and All transport aircraft and cargo gliders were also canceled. ²²³ Immediately after the formation of the armaments staff, the head of the main committee, Karl Frydag, ordered 20 000 workers out of the Bomber- in the Hunter manufacturing to implement. ²²⁴ The production the Yu 88 and

219 **BAK, R 3/1756**, Quick report d. hunter staff, June 27, 1944, Points 2 u. 3. Please refer also Cockroach!, S. 236.

220 FB, July 6-8, 1944, Points 23 and 25.

221 sour, July 8, 1944.

222 **BAK, R 3/1749**, AT Gen.-Ing. Hertel, October 3, 1944.

223 Göring felt compelled to make a "statement" to the Gauleiters "The unrest that has already arisen within the Allegiances "was to be eliminated" (quote. *ibid*). The Armaments Minister shared the Gauleiters with,,, that due to the change in the aircraft scrapping program larger dimensions for the Part of almost finished old samples must be done and wrong complain for this reason must be rejected." (Saur, October 14, 1944).

224 Groehler, air war, p. 417.

of their further developed types, of flagship the German bomber fleet, became from radically cut in September. "The production of Ju 88 Combat, Ju 188 combat air torpedo and Yu 388 Battle and Aerial torpedo becomes with dem today days painted", decided the Armor Staff at the 7. September.²²⁵

Table 56

production from Hunt- and bomber planes, 1940-1944 (in pcs.)

	Hunt ers in total	% d. Total prod.	bomber s in particul ar total	Othe r _	hunt er on motorized	two-	Bomber single- engine	two-	three-
1940--42 _ (century - through- sec.)	4 017	30.8	4962	3 740	3 088	929	668	4 178	116
1943	11,738	46.0	8th 589	5 200	9626	2 112	1,844 _	6254	491
1944	28 926	72.7	6468	4413	25 860	3 066	909	5 041	518
<i>1944</i>									
Jan.	1 555	63.6	522	368	1 315	240	92	368	62
Feb.	1 104	54.8	567	344	1 016	88	158	354	55
March	1 638	61.3	605	429	1 377	261	140	389	76
April	2021	66.6	680	333	1 696	325	140	474	66
May	2212	68.1	648	388	1 907	305	129	448	71
June	2449	67.5	703	474	2 177	272	90	534	79
July	2954	70.0	767	498	2 627	327	90	598	79
Aug.	3020	75.4	548	439	2 779	241	49	469	30
Sep.	3 375	82.3	428	300	3 031	344	21	407	
Oct.	2973	82.9	326	287	2 735	238		326	
November	2 995	81.0	412	290	2 776	219		412	
Dec.	2630	83.4	262	263	2 424	206		262	

Source: The effects, S. 277, Tab. 102; Aircraft Industry Report, Exh. III A- D

Overall shifted the Weight ratio between hunters and Bombers up At the end of 1944, almost three quarters of the aircraft weight produced went to fighters and 25 percent to bombers were eliminated (Relationship in the January 42 : 45; in the July 48 : 43; in the December 72: 25).²²⁶

In the summer of 1944, the Luftwaffe's offensive strategy was finally buried. The corresponded dem acute interest the Industry and the Director the war economy, the

²²⁵ BAK, R 3/1749, Prot. d. Armaments discussion v. September 7, 1944 (R 3/1749). - Played in the background The impending shortage of aluminum undoubtedly also played a role in this turnaround in air armaments, since France, one of the two major bauxite suppliers (France and Hungary), had meanwhile failed.

²²⁶ The effects, S. 162; S. 276, Tab. 101.

hopeless of destruction at the mercy of the air and rapid decline and whose only chance was her had to see in it Air supremacy at least about to regain the imperial territory. Certainly some of them did the math those responsible, before Industrialists who were more clear-eyed at that time were already facing imminent defeat and saw effective air defense as the means of preserving the industrial substance beyond the end of the war.

The rapid production successes left those in charge of the hunter staff euphoric. Speer boasted to Hitler on October 12th that "after an inferiority that existed at the beginning of the year - our figures were less than half, in some cases only a third, of the production opponent - "In the month of September, for the first time, both in the area of single-seat fighters and in the area of the entire so-called aircraft groups supervised by the fighter staff, the production figures of England, America, Canada and Australia together were exceeded by German production." That was a completely unfounded claim . The German technical quality is also there

"new German "Aircraft types" with turbine engines are higher, so that "unconditional superiority" over the enemy can be secured. ²²⁷

A month later, in a bashful note from the Armaments Staff, one read the retraction of the figures presented to the "Führer". but this time probably did not come to Hitler's attention. ²²⁸

Two contradictory facts remain in need of explanation such as the large increase in production over eleven months (March 1944 to January 1945) and its desperately small effect on the course of the air war.

The strict central regulation of air armament by the Jägerstab was the most important prerequisite for the Production successes. It went Yes at the "Hunter Program" by no means only

- as with previous special programs, such as the Adolf Hitler tank program ²²⁹ - to concentrate existing production capacities, around the Rationalization and simplification of production or reduction of types in order to ensure the provision of workers and materials with the utmost urgency, but also to Creation of extensive additional capacities a in scope and effort so far one-off relocation program (additionally for the reconstruction more destroyed and more damaged operating parts) and

- since Summer 1944 - around one sharp reversal of the Production, which freed up capacities, materials and workers from bomber production for fighter production, which meant that the Theoretically, the total number of aircraft produced had to be more than doubled.

Without a doubt, the push for rationalization in air armaments was significant. State-of-the-art flow production gave it Of course only in a few new ones major works. impressively was the On the other hand, progress was made the Type rationalization. When forming the According to Speer's report, 47 aircraft types with 171 variants were "under construction or in preparation", as Speer reported. Eight months later, 15 types with 36 variants remained. ²³⁰ But also in companies walked Rationalization campaigns of hunter staff, approximately the "Special measures action

227 FB, October 12, 1944, Point I. Please refer also Boelcke, Germany Armor, S. 417 f.

228 BAK, R 3/1749, AT v. 14.11.1944. To the actual numerical ratios s. Section 2.

229 Please refer II, S. 121 ff.; S. 334 ff.

230 BAK, R 3/1615, spear at Bonnann, 3.1.1944.

Jot" for the "refinement" and "clearing out" of production. The Focke Wulf Group's guidelines for this campaign listed, for example: "a) reducing tolerances, b) saving on deburring, especially on the outside edges of sheet metal, c) Simplification of welded structures..."²³¹

Overall, the judgment of the USSBS experts is probably correct: the effectiveness of the fighter staff under the difficult conditions of 1944 proves the organizational deficiencies and the low rationalization and work pressure ("little pressure") as well as the excess capacity in the air armament previous years.²³²

Table 57

Prisoners and foreign civilian workers as workers works of the German aircraft industry, October 1944 (in percent of all workers)

Compa ny*	Foreign Civilian workers	prisoners (political prisoners, prisoners of war, Jews)	Together
Junkers	34	11	45
Messerschmitt			
- Augsburg	28	35	63
- regensburg	45	11	56
Arado	49	8th	57
Focke- Wulf	59	2	61
Dornier			
- Northern Germany (Wismar)	27	19	46
- Friedrichshafen	21		22
Wiener- Neustädter			
Aircraft factories	48	4	52
Heinkel			
- Rostock	26	29	55
- Oranienburg	10	53	63
- Wittenberg	16	41	57
Erla Machinery works (Leipzig)	40	23	63
Weser flight (Bremen)	38	3	41
Fieseler	52	12	64
Henschel	42	7	49
ago (Oschersleben)	57	8th	65
ATG (Leipzig)	39	8th	47
Märkischer Metal construction (Oranienburg)	67	3	70

*) After Number of employees orderly. **With** Supply contract companies.

Source: USSBS, Aircraft Industry Report, Exhibit IV.

231 BAK, R 3/3113, Guidelines v. April 5, 1944.

232 Do effects, S. 155; S. 158; S. 162.

Under the hunter's staff became Furthermore, the sophisticated and particularly brutal system of labor and exploitation was set up to which many hundreds of thousands of German and foreign workers were subjected and the through beating and Manslaughter, exhaustion, hunger and disease brought the death of tens of thousands of concentration camp prisoners, prisoners of war and other forced laborers.

In the area of the main engine committee, the amount of work per engine had fallen to 55 percent compared to the beginning of 1942. The proportion of foreign workers used to be 10.6 percent (January 1942), compared to March 1944 already at 41.4 Percent; at BMW in Munich-Allach was he even on 71 percent increased. The "Armament Miracle" was here "just through rationalizations been achieved, the "enabled the use of a modern slave army".²³³

After the "Big **Week**" in February 1944, armaments production began to shift since 1943 in came into gear was, new dimensions. Karl Otto Sour established a program in the fighter staff according to which the 27 most important aircraft factories were divided into 729 small operating units should be relocated. Until the end of the war, Production actually roughly 300 smaller Factories and buildings relocated. In the aircraft engine industry became between April and August 1944 51 factories, some of which are the result of previous relocations were, in 249 smaller Business premises outsourced.²³⁴ From the tool ma Engines in the aircraft engine industry were 21 percent in March 1944, 50 percent in September, according to USSBS data percent outsourced. According to the further plans, it should ultimately be 70 percent. The figure for September included 15 percent of machines relocated underground.²³⁵

The large underground bunker buildings required the greatest effort in terms of manpower and construction capacity, the in the Summer and Autumn 1944 the "Special construction staff Kammler" and the OT with well over 100 000 workers, predominantly concentration camp prisoners, constructed. In mid-May 1944, construction began on 200,000 m² The operating area is experimentally used for underground production. Between June and August this area increased fivefold.²³⁶

Against End of war developed finally one whole Row from so-called Forest factories controlled by the Minister of Armaments Given the Limitation of the Concrete and underground buildings as "usable Workaround" ²³⁷ designated and later in the Analyzes of USSBS as "one the most interesting and "most effective methods" of relocation were highlighted became.²³⁸ The Messerschmitt Group built more as a dozen such factories, not far from the Augsburg main factory. In the the forest built, with Camouflaged wooden buildings and barracks were located as close as possible to the highway, to which there were carefully camouflaged access roads led. Naturally not very extensive, the forest factories could be used for the assembly or partial assembly of fighter aircraft, especially the Me 262 become. In the Factory at Horgau for example became wing parts, bug and

233 Cockroach!, S. 207/209.

234 Aircraft Industry Report, S. 24 f.; s. a. Groehler, bombing war, S. 286 ff.

235 The effects, S. 50.

236 Groehler, air war, S. 415. Please refer also Cape. I in the prev. Vol.

237 FB, November 28-29, 1944, Point 19.

238 Aircraft Industry Report, S. 30 ff. Hereafter also the The following.

tail sections the Me 262 mounted; another such facility nearby provided final assembly. The highway served as a runway for experimental and ferry flights.

The construction time of the forest factories took around two months, only a fraction of that of an underground facility.

Allied reconnaissance did not discover a single forest factory. Airplanes were only photographed on the highway. The Allies then attacked Hunter next to the Half highway hidden Me 262s attacked and destroyed many of them.

Table 58

The most produced German warplanes, 1939-1944 (in pcs.)

	Me 109	FW 190	Ju 88	Hey 111	Me 110	Ju 87	Yu 52	Fi 156 stork
1939	1540	1	110	1399	315	557	593	227
1940	1,868	2	2184	827	1 231	611	401	216
1941	2 628	224	2619	930	786	476	451	430
1942	2664	1 878	3094	1 337	581	917	504	605
1943	6418	3 208	3 301	1408	1509	1844	900	884
1944	14 212	11 411	3 013	714	1 518	909	380	396
<i>Overall</i>	29 350*	16724	14 321	6615	5940	5 314	3 229	2 758

*) Faulty ones total

Source: Aircraft Industry Report, Exh. III-8 to III-E. - In comparison with the available USSBS statistics are the numbers Ploetz, Story of Second World War, 2. ed., Würzburg 1960, 2. Part, S. 128, often incorrect; however are she in Vol. II used been (11, S. 341, Tab. 62).

The production of aircraft doubled in just a few months in 1944, and that of fighter planes tripled. As late as February 1945, production did not fall below that of the beginning of 1944 and remained the same Hunters even at a much higher level. Nevertheless, the Allied air superiority grew unstoppably in terms of numbers and technology. The but alone does not explain why the 40 000 German aircraft produced in 1944 - including 30,000 fighter aircraft - such an extraordinarily small one had an effect in the air war over Germany and on the fronts. The USSBS authority found after the war that from January to September 1944 around 18,000 single-engine fighters were produced number of in operational air force units fighting hunters of this one types but only increased by 1,000 (one thousand) in the same time.²³⁹

During the Battle of the Bulge from December 16 to 26, 1944 flew it - attacking - German Luftwaffe 5,000 sorties; the Allied Air Forces However, 30 flew 000.²⁴⁰ 1945 deteriorated the ratio of actual combat missions is like this dramatic that finally 4 000 daily Attack launches the Allies (probably without USSR) only

²³⁹ The Effects, S. 159 (ff.). Hereafter also the The following.

²⁴⁰ DZW, Vol. 6, p. 133. In the days the invasion had the relationship even 46 more: 1 (Roach!, p. 180).

300 from the German side and the aircraft losses on both sides were like one in six or seven.

The reasons for this are complex and difficult in detail quantifiable. However, they can be summarized in three factors, namely the air supremacy and air superiority of the anti-Hitler coalition, the increasing German fuel shortage and the lack of sufficiently trained German pilots.

The air superiority of the Allies not only led to enormous attrition of Luftwaffe fighting machines on four fronts in the west, east, south and southeast of Europe and across Germany itself²⁴¹, rather also to enormous losses already on the ground, already at the factory airfields, then on the air bases, before and after the invasion, especially on those near the front field airports the Western Front. In one case, 1,000 completed aircraft that had just been accepted remained at a factory airfield after an air raid only 92 remain undestroyed. Major losses occurred during the transfer flights the entry or operational airports. She should be on a fifth, towards the end to a quarter of production and amounted to more. Here was but the cause is not just enemy influence, but often also inexperience and inexperience Pilots. The experienced pilots were in combat operations, so that just at An incredible number of planes were broken during ferry flights.

The Air Force's fuel consumption fell dramatically as aircraft production increased 195 000 metric tons in the May on 60 000 in the September 1944 and on 27 000 in the February 1945. Pilot training first suffered from the shortage, which had already been cut in 1943 to make gasoline save. Later we had to too the Combat operations will be restricted. "After September, the gasoline shortage made large-scale operations impossible."²⁴² Thousands of missions were canceled due to a lack of fuel almost without exception still in the currently being tested so-called High performance aircraft out of, locked in the Me 262. "Only 2 000 Machines of this type were completed, but more than a thousand of them stood unused at the operational ports around because they lacked fuel."²⁴³

The shortage of pilots resulted from both the heavy losses and the high output of new aircraft. end of March 1944 was considered in Jägerstab even whether the "staff the "higher staff" of the Air Force used become in order to meet the shortage of incoming planes."²⁴⁴

241 1,000 each Fighter planes went in February and in the March 1944 lost, almost of it the half at the Eastern Front (Groehler, *Luftkrieg*, p. 405). Larger air battles became the exception in 1944: "The rule was that the American and British bombers, fighters and fighter-bombers, without encountering great resistance, they could attack any target." (ibid., p. 439). For the following. IfZ, ED 99, NL Speer, Vol. 7, consultation. v. May 18, 1945.

242 Do effects, S. 161. - In pilot training sank the number of Total practice flight hours since July 1944 120 while she earlier (1939-1942) was double (July 1943 - June 1944 = 170 hours; July 1944 to the end of the war = 120). In contrast, those of the American and British pilots were between 300 and 400 (Schabel, p. 198).

243 Luser, Rudolf, *The German weapons and Secret weapons of Second World War and her development*, 2. ed., (Munich 1958), S. 67.

244 BAK, R 3/1755, Quick report d. hunter staff, March 27, 1944, Point 3.

Special difficulties did it the pilots, even experienced ones, to fly the new turbine-powered aircraft, which would have required long-term, reorganized pilot training. "They are all new models," it was said at the armaments staff meeting on September 11th, "that have not undergone the usual testing have, but straight into the series have gone".²⁴⁵ Design and operational defects made every flight a risk for a long time. The Junkers TL-004 engines for the Me 262 were only available in June 1944 ready for series production. Nevertheless, they remained vulnerable to disruption. Takeoff and landing were critical phases for this aircraft, which the enemy fighters often used to attack.²⁴⁶ The Armament Staff received horror reports, such as the Me 262 breaking its cabin roof at high speed flew away, or that in an Me 163, a rocket-powered one interceptor, "the man almost burned to death when he landed"²⁴⁷ "The main thing would be," complained sour, „that you really fly on the machines sets. If you are young Taking soldiers who have only flown once is not possible."²⁴⁸

In short, the attacks on the German aircraft industry in February 1944 marked the downfall of the Luftwaffe; but the effect of the fuel offensive - the lack of gasoline - was ultimately much more important. "The success of the attack on the Petroleum production," according to the USSBS experts' verdict - after all, not entirely free of exaggeration - "has made all further attacks on aircraft production superfluous."²⁴⁹

"High performance aircraft"

On October 12, 1944, Hitler issued an order calling for the "extreme acceleration of the ramp-up" of the so-called high-performance aircraft.²⁵⁰ The "start-up representatives" and special representative of the Ministry of Armaments/Armaments Staff (Degenkolb for the Me 262, Keßler for the He 162, Krome for the T-Stoff, etc.) were given all the powers to initiate series production of the relevant types to bring corresponding works to maximum performance.

The high-performance aircraft were the last hope of those in power to bring about a turnaround in the air war. So far A strategic concept behind this hope could be seen, with four to five types of fighter aircraft (Me 262, Me 163, Ta 152, Do 335, He 162). the rule of the Allied bombers was broken and with A few bomber types (especially the Ar 234) carried out a successful air attack against distant targets, such as large USSR power plants in the Moscow area and the Urals.

Technically speaking, the "high-performance aircraft" were a diverse mix bombers, long-range reconnaissance aircraft, fighter-bombers and Hunters, from airplanes Piston engine, jet (turbine) and rocket engine.²⁵¹

245 BAK, R 3/1749, protocol the Armament staff discussion, September 11, 1944.

246 Groehler, air war, S. 443 f.; Aircraft Industry Report, p. 102; DZW, Vol. 6, S. 159.

247 As note 245.

248 Ibid, protocol d. Armament staff discussion, November 6, 1944.

249 The effects, S. 162.

250 FB, October 12, 1944, Point 1.

251 For more details see Kens, Karlheinz/Nowarra, Heinz J., The German aircraft 1933-1945. Germany Aviation development until for the End of Second World War, 3. ed., Munich 1968 (most recently Nowarra, ..., 4 vols., Koblenz 1985-1988).

Table 59
"High performance aircraft" (also "pilot aircraft"), was standing September October 1944)

Eyewitnes	genus	engine	First flight	Total produced (1944/1945)
Me262	Hunter, fighter-bomber	Two Gas turbines Jumo004	July 18, 1942	1 280 (1 433)*
Me 163	Interceptor	rocket engine, alternatively Argus thrust tube (v 1)	Summer 1941	364
Hey 162	Micro hunter (single-seater)	BMW gas turbine 003	December 6, 1944 (Saur: 4.12.)	128
Ta 152	Hunter	Piston engine Jumo 213 or DB 603	Autumn 1943	67
Ar234	Femautklärer, bomber	Two (Variant: four) Gas turbines Jumo 004 or BMW003	June 15, 1943	214
Do335	multi-purpose fighter plane, Night bomber	Two Piston engines DB603	October 23, 1943	11
Do635	Long range-Long-range reconnaissance aircraft	Four Piston engines (Two hulls do 335)		

*) After Cockroach!, S. 284.
Source: Groehler, Air War, p. 442; Boelcke, Germany's Armament, p. 442 and passim. Illustrations in DZW, Vol. 6 (after p. 160).

For the three most built patterns lie more detailed Pay (Was standing 10. April 1945) before.

Table 60
production and losses from me 262, Hey 162 and Ar 234, was standing 10. April 1945

	Me262	He 162	Ar234
production			
Until December 31, 1944	564		150
January	167		35
February	296	82	15
March	295	34	14
1.-10. April	47	8th	
In total	1 369	124	214

Table 60 (Continuation)

	Me262	Hey 162	Ar234
<i>losses and Duration</i>			
From the air force accepted	1 039	56	219
losses through Enemy influence	186		38
Other losses	402		57
Duration	297	56	100
Of that on the enemy	181		44

Source: Cockroach!, S. 284. Some different production numbers at Boelcke, Germany's armament, p. 470 f., the one too last planned figures (from March 1945) for the three Types listed: 1 000 pcs. Me 262 (October 1945); 530 pieces He 162 (monthly from July 1945); 75 pcs. Ar 234 (beginning 1946).

In jet turbine and rocket engine technology German research and industry had a certain, but by no means decisive, lead over the Western Allies. A conversion of the Air Force on these technologies the The situation in the fall of 1944 was a desperate undertaking that encountered insoluble problems. Apart from the expected drop in production when the armaments plants were converted, it acted is primarily about the immaturity of the **BMW** and Junkers jet engines and the lack of capacity for them their production, fuel shortages and the lack of time and energy for a solid retraining program for pilots.²⁵²

The only the mentioned Machinery, the still in bigger Number for the Combat use and - under cheap Conditions²⁵³ - to Take place against hostile bomber came, was the Me 262. The first use of four examples of this type dates back to October 4, 1944. 564 machines were built by the end of 1944, and over 800 from January to April 1945.²⁵⁴

Because of its short flight duration, the Me 163 ("Komet") interceptor was only used to protect important objects, such as Leuna and Pölit. In November 1944, the armament staff was still complaining about the poor shooting Weapons (**MK 108**) of the hunter and above the bad Quality the Ammunition. However be it "much more decisive", so was called it, "That out of 37 machines only 14 were used at all due to a lack of fuel."²⁵⁵ They were produced first combat-capable machines since May/June 1944, until the end of 1944 a total of 327; in January 1945 another 30, in February/March a total of seven.²⁵⁶ The successes that this hunter is said to have achieved are doubtful.²⁵⁷

²⁵² Please refer also Groehler, air war, S. 440 f.

²⁵³ Over the susceptibility to failure and the tactical weaknesses the Me 262 s. ibid, S. 442 ff.

²⁵⁴ Basic to Me 262 Cockroach! (here's. 284). In total lower numbers for 1945 (716 pcs.) at Boelcke, Germany's armament. p. 470. - The Me, which is regularly greatly overestimated in older literature (e.g. Lusar, p. 65 ff.). 262 („Queen of the According to American research, the total amount was "air") 150 kills at 100 own losses (Schabel!, p. 245).

²⁵⁵ BAK, R 3/1749, Prot. d. Armament staff discussion, November 6, 1944.

²⁵⁶ Groehler, air war, S. 446; contradictory Declarations b. Boelcke, Germany Armor, S. 424 u. 442.

²⁵⁷ Groehler, Air War, p. 446; sour, January 5, 1945: "(Me) 163 is from AH deleted because with 217 aircraft so far there have only been five kills."

At the end of September 1944, the Heinkel design for the He 162 won the tender for a jet engine single-seater fighter, which was completed within three weeks and would only last until 2000 kg heavy (wooden construction), short-start capable and with One or two **MK 108s** should be armed. Hitler youths were supposed to be able to fly the “Volksjäger” (also “Salamander”) en masse.²⁵⁸ The He 162 became “from the first draft the immediate start of the Series production was released and ordered with a provisional quantity of 1,000 units per month.”²⁵⁹ After the first flight on December 6th, the second test flight on December 10th ended in a crash. In total there were around 130 Machines built. The aircraft was no longer used in combat.

The Ar (Arado) 234 According to Hitler and Göring, the “Final Solution” was supposed to be Represent jet turbine bombers.²⁶⁰ It was originally tested as a long-range reconnaissance aircraft. The Machine flew a number of missions before the end of the war. From her remained the Call, being the world's first combat jet bomber. 150 examples were built in 1944 and around 70 in 1945.

The Ta 152 (named after Kurt Tank, dem General Director and Chief designer von Focke-Wulf) emerged a version of the Fw 190, equipped with a Junkers in-line engine instead of with dem Radial engine from **BMW**, as. faster and more maneuverable Hunter (“Sturmjäger”). Also the Do (Dornier) 335 each one Piston engine in bow and stern wore as “quick ste Piston engine aircraft of Second World War”²⁶¹ the hopes the fighter plane Experten.

The real obsession But Hitler and most Luftwaffe strategists were up to it Finally, the wishful thought of being able to hit the enemy again with the offensive weapon, the heavy bombers, and retaliate. Except that do In 635, various other types of large aircraft, especially bombers, were on the drawing board during the war. On January 20, 1945, Hitler emphatically demanded "the development of a large, high-speed bomber with a long flight range and a large bomb load."²⁶²

g) tank

The production of tanks (armored fighting vehicles, assault guns/tank destroyers, self-propelled guns) reached **in** the the last period of the war Climax. Already in 1943 to double, in terms of weight Two and a half times grown, she rose 1944 around again 60 percent, by weight after by almost 70 percent. The three most successful months were around the turn of the year 1944/45 (November - January).

258 Kens/Nowarra, S. 283 f. Detailed Shabet, S. 248 ff.

259 FB, September 21-23, 1944, Point 1.

260 FB, June 19-22, 1944, Point 35.

261 Boelcke, Germany Armor, S. 378.

262 FB, January 20, 1945, point 3. - According to Speer (Reif (ed.), Albert Speer. Technology and Power, p. 23 f.), Messerschmitt then informed Hitler in March or April 1945 that “within a very short time Time in the location would be bomber to build, with whom you Cities in the USA could attack” - one of the many “examples of absolute denial of reality” especially in air armament (Schabet, p. 282).

Table 61

Tank production after types, 1940-1945 (in pcs.)

	Panzer I/II	Panzer III	Panzer IV	Panther	Tiger I	Tiger II („Königs- tiger“)	38(t) [=tsche- chisch]	StG. III/IV	Jagd- panzer IV	Jagd- panther	Jagd- tiger	Jagd- panzer 38 (t)	Selbst- fahrla- fetten	Panzer insgesamt
1940	9	895	280				275	184						1643
1941	233	1 845	480				698	550						3 806
1942	306	2 555	964		78		195	828					1 248	6 174
1943	77	349	3 073	1 850	647		87	3 319			2		2 557	11 961
1944	7		3 371	3 964	623	377	124	5 884	1 764	215	51	1 598	1 248	19 226
<i>1944</i>														
Jan.	7		300	279	93	3	41	331	50	5			175	1 284
Feb.			252	276	95	5	50	373	60	7	2		250	1 370
März			330	296	86	6	33	446	91	8			224	1 520
Apr.			319	320	104	6		485	118	10			180	1 542
Mai			317	360	100	15		556	93	10		66	198	1 715
Juni			334	390	75	32		585	160	6		70	45	1 697
Juli			331	400	64	45		562	155	15	3	83	22	1 680
Aug.			330	347	6	84		412	168	3	3	180	83	1 616
Sept.			204	355		73		541	171	21	8	158	35	1 566
Okt.			237	303		26		509	207	8	9	306	7	1 612
Nov.			210	330		26		543	208	55	6	387	5	1 770
Dez.			207	308		56		541	283	67	20	348	24	1 854
<i>1945</i>														
Jan.			175	232		40		508	235	72	10	434	60	1 766
Feb.			168	135		42		231	169	42	13	401	22	1 223
März			74	102		30		322	54	52	3	301	5	943

Source: VSSBS, tank Industry Report, 1945, 1947, Exh. A Largely agreed v. Senger and Etterlin, F M., The German Tanks 1926-1945, 3. ed. revised u. supplemented by F Kosar et al. W. J. Spielberger, Munich (1968?), p. 342 ff. (tables).

In 1943, the tank weapon was the special weapon in the plans of Hitler and the generals with which they wanted to regain the strategic initiative in the East. Now, in 1944, they hoped with her the Red Army, the most offensive and in the eyes of the political and economic leadership most dangerous Enemies to at least keep away from the German borders. Characteristic of the change in the situation and strategic orientation was the transition from armored combat vehicles, the fast offensive weapon, to assault-gunned vehicles as the preferred type of tank. Assault guns and the tank destroyers developed from them (with long-barreled guns) were also fast and agile, but also suitable for dealing with the attacks of the superior Soviets with their mostly rigidly installed guns from the position. later also the English-American - Encounter tank troops.²⁶³ In the second half of 1944 was even the production of the since 1942 always stronger forced heavy tanks in favor of Assault guns and light tank destroyers were taken back, which was in the Acceptance of the average Tank weight reflected.²⁶⁴

Table 62

Tank production after Weight, 1939--1945 (in t)

	Weight (monthly average)	Average weight per armored vehicle
1939 (Sept.- Dec.)	1 375	22.2
1940	2902	21.2
1941	6393	20.2
1942	10368	20,1
1943	27 115	27.0
1.half	21223	25.5
2nd half	33007	28,1
1944	45 715	28.9
1.half	43 345	29,1
2nd half	48085	28.6
1945(Jan.- March)	33 353	25.4

Source: Tue Effects, p. 278 ff., Table 104 and 105. There inaccurate calculation some Monthly averages.

263 To the tank types and theirs technical equipment. v. Senger and Etterlin; Spielberg, Walter J./Wiener, Friedrich, The German Panzerkampfwagen III and IV with their variants 1935 - 1945, Munich 1968. - Speer explained to the Japanese ambassador Oshima that they wanted to with the assault guns "replacing the current anti-tank guns, that is in a way only produce one moving Pak because they has too great a loss." (BAP, FS, film 1740, speech Speers v. August 8, 1944).

264 Here has apparently too the Steel shortage one role played. spear brought about an end September 1944 Hitler's approval to switch production from the StG III and IV, if with a short gun, to the 38 (t) tank destroyer, the only one an operating weight of 14.5 t had steel (versus 24 t); FB, September 21-23, 1944, point 10; Boelcke, Germany Armor, p. 412.

In 1943, nine tank companies had a production share of over 90 percent of fully assembled tanks: Alkett (Berlin-Borsigwalde), Miag (Braunschweig), the Austrian Nibelungenwerk of Steyr-Daimler-Puch (St. Valentin), Vomag (Plauen), Krupp-Gruson (Magdeburg), MNH (Machinery Factory Lower Saxony, Hanover), Henschel (Kassel), Daimler-Benz (Berlin-Marienfelde) and MAN (Nürnberg). ²⁶⁵ 1944 The Czech companies Skoda and BMM (Bohemian-Moravian Machinery Factory, Brno) joined as producers of the assault gun 38 (t) (Jagd-38) in the front positions. The largest tank engine factories were Maybach (Friedrichshafen) and Daimler-Benz (Berlin-Marienfelde). As a supplier Large parts of German industry, especially the steel industry and mechanical engineering, worked for the tank works (hulls, turrets, guns, chassis, equipment).

There were only a few relocations in the tank assembly plants, for example in the case of Vomag, where the production of small parts with 50 percent of the machine tools was relocated in the summer of 1944, or in the other case of Alkett (a subsidiary of Rheinmetall-Borsig). After bomb damage near Alkett in the fall of 1943, large alternative works were built in Falkensee (assembly) and in Berlin-Spandau (tubs).

Important suppliers relocated their production (motors, gearboxes, ball bearings) to a much greater extent. The Auto Union factory in Chemnitz-Siegmarsdorf was now producing increasing numbers of Maybach engines, so that the heavy attack on Friedrichshafen on the night of April 27th to 28th, 1944 was ^{not} dangerous Burglary entailed. Than Work in Siegmarsdorf on the 1. September 1944 difficult was attacked Friedrichshafen is back in full production. ²⁶⁷

Table 63

production from Maybach tank engines at Auto Union AG, plant Chemnitz-Siegmarsdorf, 1944/45 (in pcs.)

1944		1945	
January - April total	245	January	250
May	361	February	350
June	700		
July	800		
August	800		
September	198		
October	312		
November	210		
December	293		

Source: USSBS, ammunition Division, Auto Union AG, Chemnitz and Zwickau, 1945, 1947, S. 6.

²⁶⁵ USSBS, tank Industry Report, S. 11, Tab. 3; leading: Alkett (26.6 Percent), Miag (14.3), Nibelungenwerk (13.7).

²⁶⁶ Saur, 28., 29th and 30. 4. 1944: "Sister Attack on Friedrichshafen (Tank engines and -transmission and you] 335) Visit to Friedrichshafen. Comprehensive relief effort necessary. Therefore Wei flight to the Berghof. ... report to AH (Hitler - D E.) via Friedrichshafen. Any support required will be fully provided. Engine and transmission production as well as assault guns are given the same urgency like the hunter program."

²⁶⁷ Please refer USSBS, ammunition Division, Auto Union AG, Chemnitz u. Zwickau, 1945, 1947, S. 2 f.

It was not until August 1944 and in the following two months that most of the large tank factories and various engine factories were targeted and bombed with it until end of year, after Estimates of USSBS, 18 until 20 percent the Capacity, approximately the production of 2,000 tanks correspondingly, eliminated.²⁶⁸ Since January/February 1945, further attacks hit the factories.

The air strikes the Tank works were "in the none at all Success". The USSBS experts were particularly struck by how resistant the production was to building damage in many cases. Paralyzing the transport system would be more effective away October November 1944, the main reason for the drop in production at the beginning of 1945.²⁶⁹

The chaotic transport conditions ultimately made it more difficult the delivery of the tanks to the Fronts. The Fuel situation finally made the full one operational exploitation of tank stocks impossible, what during the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944²⁷⁰ and during the battle for Upper Silesia in the second half of January.

Table 64

Damage caused by air raids in three tank factories, August 1944 - March 1945 (in percent of the factory area made unusable)

	Henschel, Kassel ("Tiger")	MAN, Nuremberg ("Panther")	Krupp-Gruson, Magdeburg (Panzer IV)
<i>1944</i>			
August			42.2
September	48.0	23.6	7.5
October	45.3	37.0	10.9
November			
December	0.2		
<i>1945</i>			
January	34.4	14.7	4.6
Februar		2.6	6.6
y	9.0		
March			

Source: USSBS, Tank Industry Report, p. 16, Table 6. - The calculations were based only on the area used for tank production, at Krupp-Gruson e.g. B. 17 percent (USSBS, Munitions Division, Friedrich Krupp Grusonwerke Magdeburg, 1945, 1947).

If the production rose steadily until January 1945 or maintained its height, that was not the case last at of their regulation and rationalization through the Main Committee armored vehicle

268 USSBS, Tank Industry Report, S. 15; p. 19; The Effects, S. 170 (Here it is claimed that "all eleven assembly plants" attacked and were hit).

269 USSBS, tank Industry Report, S. 19.

270 DZW, Vol. 6, P. 127: "Instead of the five consumption rates for fuel that were considered necessary, there was an average of only 1.5 to 1.8 Consumption rates available, i.e. H., the The distance traveled by the tank units was limited to 70 to 90 kilometers." (According to a note (Gen.Qu.?) from December 15, 1944, the day before the offensive).

gen and the Technical Office of the Ministry of Armaments. They controlled the entire production including deliveries, material flow and Labor replenishment obviously very effective and elastic, though in the second half of the year 1944 no longer in the The highest level of urgency was what was happening in the January 1945, however, changed again in the "emergency program", at least for the most important tank types, such as the "Panther".²⁷¹ Successful was the work of the main committee and its subcommittees and commissions also in saving materials. For example, when the most important chromium and nickel imports stopped in the second half of 1944, the problem was how to replace these alloy metals already solved by others, especially manganese.

The fact that the planned figures specified by Hitler, especially for tanks, were particularly far higher than those actually achieved²⁷². It was hardly due to a lack of industrial efficiency, either far less in effects of war, but rather in the fact that in the meantime - against the background of the enormous strain on Germany's entire economic power in 1944 - the capacity of this branch of armament was largely exhausted and that, despite this, Hitler continued to extrapolate the success figures of the "Adolf Hitler tank program" from the first half of 1943.

The catastrophe for the German tank weapon Of course, it didn't have its final reason again recoverable losses the fronts and in the multiple superiority of the Allies. As early as 1943, the three Allied powers had produced 68,000 tanks, well more than five times the German production; The USSR alone produced more than twice as much (24,100).²⁷³ from June 1944 The Germans also had one Losses - although growing rapidly since Stalingrad - a new dimension. 10,000 tanks were lost in five months. The army inventory, previously at 14 000 grew and fell to 12,000 by November 1st - at a time when more tanks than ever would have been needed on four fronts.²⁷⁴

h) Warships

Capital ships have not been built or completed since 1942/43. Destroyers and torpedo boats also proved to be blunted weapons were. Their artillery armament was weak, and the opportunity to fire torpedoes was only a rare coincidence.²⁷⁵ Wherever they appeared, they were easy prey for the superior enemy air force and navy. Although decimated by high losses in previous years, only two destroyers and six torpedo boats were built in 1944.

In 1944, speedboats and mine clearing boats were still being built in increasing numbers Coastal protection boats and cargo ships (Prehme).²⁷⁶ The production from Fast-

271 USSBS, tank Industry Report, p. 18 f.

272 The effects, S. 168 f.

273 Ibid, S. 168.

274 Ibid, S. 169 f.

275 Please refer Breyer, Siegfried, The German Navy 1935-1945., Vol. 2, Friedberg/H. 1986, S. 8th.

276 For detailed statistics see II, appendix 1, S. 668 f. ("Emission overview 1940-1944. Weapons, equipment and ammunition", as of February 6, 1945).

he wanted to boot Armaments Minister from three pieces per month in previous years to 17 Piece in December 1944 increase and claimed that they would "undoubtedly turn 30 without further ado." until 40 units a month", of course only if the "extraordinarily difficult to manufacture, complicated engines" would be available in sufficient numbers.²⁷⁷ Actually rose the Production increased to six to eight boats between May and September 1944, but then suddenly fell back to three boats.

In the spring of 1944 went a series of rapidly developed so-called naval small combat weapons in Production. Here acted it itself around Micro-V boats („Seal", "Newt" "Beaver", "Pike") nine to twelve meters long and displacing a few tons of water and electric drive, the Torpedoes - on some types laterally attached - at should bring the enemy; also about one-man double torpedoes ("Marder", "Negro") and demolition boats ("Lense", "Wal"), the as concentrated load first from one driver, then after the jump Driver, from one Lead boat ins Goal were controlled.²⁷⁸ The first notable From deliveries from the Series production appears to have taken place in July: "In the area of small combat weapons, series production for 'Hecht' and 'Molch' has started. The following will be delivered: 7 Piece 'Pike' and 38 Piece 'Newt'... 'Lens' will be until the end 75 pieces were completed in the month." The same applies to "Biber": "19 pieces are delivered."²⁷⁹ In the last months of the war, primarily "Seal" was produced.

The focus of naval armament was submarine construction. The German leadership saw itself in 1943 forced, the Submarine weapon entirely based on new boat types (**XXI** and **XXIII**) with electric propulsion to convert, as the conventional ones Because of their frequent surfacing and their low underwater speed, dozens, even hundreds, of boats were sunk by Allied aircraft and ships using innovative tracking and defense technology.²⁸⁰

The Retrofitting the new submarine types had high Priority for the Ministry of Armaments, to which the naval armaments departments had largely been subordinate since June/July 1943. It was in June a final fleet building program of the Commander-in-Chief the Navy for It was announced five years ago that there were plenty of utopian goals contained, like this the construction of eight destroyers per year and 40 submarines per month.²⁸¹ In September 1943, Dönitz assigned the development and construction of the new submarines "with completely new underwater characteristics" to the Ministry of Armaments and its Main Committee Shipbuilding, which focused the specialists from the large shipyards and supply industries on this task. "As early as November [1943]," says Speer, "we had we despite the risk that on burdens us if this new submarines should have major changes [necessary] and with it the investment

277 BAK, R 3/1553, speech Speers before the Gauleiters the NSDAP, August 3, 1944.

278 Please refer Breyer, Siegfried/co-op, Gerhard, The German Navy 1935-1945, Vol. 3, Friedberg/H. 1987, p. 86 ff. For the use of these weapons see DZW, Vol. 6, p. 179 ff.

279 Timeline, July 11, 1944.

280 See DZW, Vol. 4, S. 105 ff.

281 Lakowski, Richard, Submarines. About history one Weapons category of the Naval Forces, 3rd edition, Berlin 1989, p. 259.

282 So Speer in his speech to the Gauleiters of the NSDAP, August 3, 1944 (see note 277). Hereafter too the following.

in this new production would have been free, I ordered series production based on the drawing "on my responsibility".

In December, Dönitz spoke highly to the Navy commanders from the "geniuses." Measures" Speers, "the production of Europe in its hand". The handover of the naval armament and the shipyard industry in the area of the Ministry of Armaments, including the privatization of the Navy's own shipyards, will be worthwhile: "We will be producing 60 submarines a month next summer. Speedboats... we will raise them to 17, 25, 30 per month".²⁸³

During the spring and summer of 1944, construction of all other types was stopped except for few experimental boats that one too of so-called Walter submarines, which were equipped with a new, additional hydrogen peroxide drive from the engineer Walter (XVII, XVIII and XXVI W). The accelerated submarine construction Shortages of certain raw materials and production capacities are worrying. As for lead for the accumulator batteries of the new submarines, that was the case Speer envisaged long-term "draconian measures", "mainly in the area of Book and newspaper printing, also for the Years 1945 and 1946"²⁸⁴; The lead set there was to be confiscated and melted down step by step.

As early as December 1943, the Minister of Armaments the production of electric locomotives (except industrial locomotives) should be stopped in order to concentrate the entire engine construction capacity on the production of the new submarine electric motors.²⁸⁵ The new submarines, he decided Ganzenmüller (Reich Ministry of Transport) in the Central planning, "the already in a short time ... in bigger Series are supposed to come, need pretty much to make the transition the entire capacity of the electrical engineering industry in the area." Main committee leader Lüschen (Siemens) explained it for "completely impossible" in 1944 to produce electric locomotives in addition to submarine production. Hitler himself, said Speer, would have to decide at the submarine meeting on January 2, 1944.²⁸⁶ This decision was also made when Hitler received Speer, Lüschen and a whole series of other experts on January 2nd.²⁸⁷

Another one Year later seem to be major problems technical equipment of the Boats appear to have been open. For example, "the question was whether the new Type 21 submarine would have a modern radio periscope in can be provided in a submerged state, is far from being solved". So, so According to the experts' judgment, the boat lags "far behind the modern state of the art".²⁸⁸

The production of electric motors and accumulators proved to be particularly sensitive to air attacks limbs of the otherwise with help the Technology of Section building in different prefabrication and Assembly sites pulled apart product

283 **IMG**, Vol. 35, Doc. D-443, S. 110; S. 113, speech Donitz' v. December 17, 1943.

284 BAK, R 3/1576, spear at Dönitz, July 26, 1944.

285 Ibid, spear at sword butt, December 15, 1943.

286 ZPP, 52. Meeting, December 21, 1943.

287 FB, I .-4.1.1944, period 5. The detailed discussion with Lüschen and other highest-ranking specialists also covered the problem of locating and anti-aircraft submarines (ibid., point 6). See also Saur, January 2, 1944.

288 BAK, R 3/1556, spear at Donitz, January 6, 1945.

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“Statistical Quick Reports” of **RMRuK** (armament final production) give for January and February 1945 27 or. 19 decreased Submarines (BAP, FS, film 1732). Naval Small Ordnance: Ibid. - Submarine series: Large boats = **IX, X, XIV** (old); XXI (new), 1,819 t (dipped); medium boats = VII (old) as standard front submarine, 745 tons; small boats = XXIII (new), 258 t.

chain of submarine construction. In mid-January 1945, for example, four of the five accumulator plants failed that the construction of the boat's hull was temporarily "well in advance".²⁸⁹

The losses of boats due to air raids were also high, especially since the end of March 1945. "Since March 30th. were in ports and shipyards a total of 24 U-boats sunk and 12 others damaged. Of the sunken submarines, 9 were Type **XXI**, 4 of which were scheduled to sail in April."²⁹⁰

The disproportionate one the great effort that went into building the new submarines in the last period of the war, and the advance laurels, what was given to them was wasted. The first boat ran on April 17th (**XXIII**) and on April 19th. April 1944 (**XXI**) from stack²⁹¹; However, the testing of the boats revealed so many defects that it was not until February 1945 that the first small boats were able to leave for use at the front; the first large boat did not follow until April 30th.²⁹² In the last weeks of the war since the 1st In April, around 60 boats of the new types left their home ports for the bases in Norway.²⁹³

The last surviving naval armament program, which showed monthly plan numbers for 1945, may have been dated to the end of January/beginning of February 1945. It corrected the numbers of the previously valid plan partly downwards and partly upwards and apparently represented the "emergency program" for naval armaments.

Table 66

"Emergency program" the Marine armor for 1945 (in pieces. ever Quarter)

	[Iron-] Con- tingent weight Per Unit (t)	quarters								year	
		I.		II.		III.		IV.		1945	
		plan old	new	plan old	new	plan old	new	plan old	new	plan old	new
destroyer	3 300									4	
Torpedo-											
boats	1 865	4	2.25	4	2.25	3	2.25	3	2.25	14	9
fast											
boats	120	75	51	75	51	75	51	75	51	300	204
R-Boats	95	25	36	25	36	25	36	25	36	100	144

289 Ibid, spear at Hanke, January 18, 1945.

290 KTB d. OKW, Vol. IV/2, p. 1626, „Minutes on the participation of the Lord Mayor of the Navy at the leadership positions", excerpt from April 10, 1945.

291 sour, 17. u. April 19, 1944.

292 With that fulfilled even those that have already been dampened hopes the Navy from October 1944 not: „Ob.dM hopes in the January 1945 with the first boats of type **XXIII**, in the February with around 40 Type **XXI** boats will be used." (Lectures by the Commander-in-Chief of the Kriegsmarine to Hitler in 1939 - 1945, Munich 1972, S. 604; Ndschr. about meeting in the Fuhrer's headquarters, October 13, 1944, v. October 16, 1944).

293 Please refer DZW, Vol. 6, S. 184.

Table 66 (Continuation)

	[iron] Con- tingent weight Per Unit (t)	quarters								Year	
		I.		II.		III.		IV.		1945	
		Plan old	New	plan old	new	plan old	new	plan old	new	plan old	new
M- Boats	572	27	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	111	112
Submarine											
s :	932	2	2	6	6	30	30	36	36	74	74
XXVIW											
XXI	1475	96	96	81	81	66	66	66	66	309	309
XXIII	206	Further construction									
discontinued		Other types are being phased									
out											

Source: BAK, R 3/1959, BI. 48 f., Tab. "Warship construction" 1945, no V. no D. (probably RMRuK/PIAmt, January/February 1945).

i) weapons

Weapons for the Wehrmacht (handguns, grenade launchers, guns, tank, aircraft and ship armament) rolled off production lines and assembly lines in uninterrupted flow and still growing numbers until the end of 1944. While the tank and vehicle industry in the Summer 1944 were systematically bombed for the first time, weapons and ammunition production was never possible the Goal Such attacks, albeit large armourers, such as Krupp, the Bochum Club, Rheinmetall-Borsig and the Dortmund-Hörder Hüttenverein were often affected in the air raids on the Ruhr area, Berlin and other industrial cities.

From 1942 onwards, the production curve for weapons increased sharply and with regularity. 1943 was an increase of 70 percent over the previous year, 1944 a figure of 50 percent was recorded. In 1944, a number of new companies began producing effective types of machines. The Front received newly developed automatic and semi-automatic handguns, heavier mortars and Guns, especially anti-tank guns, Flak and Guns in armored vehicles.²⁹⁴

Since However, Stalingrad and Tunis grew Losses of irreparable magnitude. Since the Wehrmacht now really began to feel the superiority of the Allied land, air and sea forces, all the production efforts of the German weapons producers could not make up for the Wehrmacht's inferiority and lost fighting power.

Weapons production in 1944 was sufficient to equip 250 to 256 divisions. Everything that had been produced was lost again: at the beginning of 1945 the stocks of weapons were about the same as at the beginning of 1944.²⁹⁵

²⁹⁴ Do effects, S. 183.

²⁹⁵ Do effects, S. 188.

Table 67

Weapons production and Weapons losses (Army), January- September and November 1944 (in pcs.)

Weapon type	monthly average January - September Manufacturing Army after army	losses	losses in% of production	November production for
Pistols	86000	87 000	101	89 256
MP48 u. 40	16 100	19 110	119	22 740
Assault rifle 44	14 550	2445	17	55 100
Guns	187 700	385 546	205	213 300
MG	20500	23 336	114	28 741
2 cm Flak 30 u. 38	460	478	104	402
2 cm Flak Quadruple	38	44	116	30
3.7 cm Flak 18, 36, 43	104	64	62	164
7.5 cm Pak on wheel. u. on Sf.	914	738	81	1 025
8.8 cm Pak on wheel. u. on Sf.	118	115	97	216
8cm size W.	1 840	2 110	115	2 380
12cm size w.	380	208	55	400
le. I G. 18	197	328	166	186
sIG33	115	135	117	201
Bldg. 36	37	22	59	32
Je. F H. 18 u. 18/40 on wheel. u. on Sf.	708	640	90	905
s. F H. on wheel. u. on Sf.	207	207	100	271
s. 10 centimeters K	?(53)	70	132	75

Source: BAP, FS, Movie 1732, „Production, allocation and losses from Weapons", O. V., December 18, 1944.

The huge amounts of weapons for the army could hardly replace the losses at the front. Far bigger than production was the losses of rifles and infantry guards. The Wehrmacht also lost the race in terms of quality, particularly in terms of air defense, but also serious ones in anti-tank defense Follow entailed.

At the beginning of 1944, the artillery equipment was rather weaker than at the beginning of the war against the USSR. There had been no significant technical development in this area. The number of guns over 7.5 cm had risen, mainly because anti-tank guns and tanks had been more heavily armed.

Despite a significant increase in production, 1944/45 was inadequate the number of serious ones Guns for armored Vehicles. With Gunners above 15 cm was the Wehrmacht - compared to the US armed forces - unusual poorly equipped. ²⁹⁶ 296 The effects,

Table 68

Weapons production 1940 1945

	carbine	Auto		grenade	Aviation light	Guns		Guns	
		Infantry		including: thrower	board	Flak	(Artillery)	from	
		7.5cm trie-		MP44			weapons	from 7.5	
		including:		upwards	heavy	Pak	ingepan weapons	(Storm	
			rifle)	anti-aircraft gun			certify	8.8cm	vehicles
Monthly average									
1940	112 642	14240		365	94	607	458	118	30
1941	113 212	27,071		352	889	1 016	591	198	86
1942	113 619	26 394		815	2 682	2 040	999	304	194
1943	179 105	36 282	2 601	1 913	7 903	2 965	2 242	495	65 741
1944	188 439	65 590	23 488	2 575	22,433	4,243	3 390	644	156 1 271
IV.Quarter	175 623	105 202	50300	3 657	28046	4772	3 775	706	214 1684
1945									
January	165 329	97 995	41 683	1 749	16 411	5 247	2 174	574	115 1 680
Feb.						2430	1 696	331	132 936

Source: BAP, FS, Movie 1732, "Production figures 1940-1945".

The infantry armament program for 1944, the figures for which, according to Saur, were "obtained from findings that Speer had made during his visits to the front [at the end of 1943]," was published in January 1944 with industrialists and military "discussed and initiated".²⁹⁷ Officially stated The minister only presented it to the "Führer" after his illness, in June, and received Hitler's signature.²⁹⁸ The program, which was considered essential component was included in the "victory program" of the spring/summer of 1944 until the end of the year most Positions more or less according to plan; but they stayed Numbers of the Flak program from August, which has the same urgency as the hunter program received, illusory.²⁹⁹

The military situation, which deteriorated radically from the end of June, changed the basis for the army programs, barely that Hitler's signature was dry. At the On July 6, the Quartermaster General gave the Führer a lecture "on the loss of material during the retreats in the East"³⁰⁰, and Hitler ordered a "shock operation" for infantry weapons, This means that "in addition to a general increase in production, there was already an increased output in the period between the 20th and 25th. July will be delivered".³⁰¹ From now on the curve of "leader demands" moved towards "special" and "violent actions" in unison with the mi-

297 sour, 17.I.1944; also Weyres-v.Levetzow,S. I37f.

298 FB, June 19-22, 1944, Point 25; s. a. FB, 3rd-5th6.1944, Point 17.

299 FB, August 18-20, 1944 (addendum), Point 10; FB, 19th-22nd6.1944, Point 29.

300 sour, July 6, 1944.

301 FB, 6th-8th7.1944, Point 14.

literary situation and moved away getting further and further away from the real possibilities of the Armor .

Table 69

Infantry- and Anti-aircraft weapons program for 1944 (Should and Is)

Device	Should for Dec. 1944	Is (Piece) June	July	Novemb er	Dec.
carbine	450000	246 294	268 080	229 919	218 406
MG	30000	20 803	24 148	28 741	31 339
Pak	1 500	1 192	1 180	1 251	1 238
1.FH	1 070	778	869	909	930
sF H.	360	265	273	315	301
2 cm Flak Quadruple	1 000	351	464	576	471
3.7 cm Flak Singleton	1 000	659*	865	744	1 004
3.7 cm Flak twin	500				
8.8 Flak 37	1 000 (March 45)	529	486	506	715
8.8 Flak 41	500 (Nov. 44)				
10.5 cm Flak	200	118	103	55	77
12.8 cm Flak Singleton	300	62*	67	44	94
12.8 cm flak twin	50				

*) Number the Pipes (at everyone actual information)

Source: Weyres v. Levetzow, S. 139; Flak actual numbers partially corrected after "Emission overview 1940-1944" (II, p. 656 ff.).

The air raids, especially the attacks on German transport, led to significant losses in production of weapons and ammunition since the end of 1944. Calculations are only available for all finished goods. Here these losses were around 10 percent in December 1944 and 22 percent in January 1945.³⁰²

The August anti-aircraft program came, according to Speer's description,³⁰³ In mid-August after arguments in the Führer's headquarters between himself, Lieutenant General Adolf Galland, the commander of the fighter pilots, and Hitler. Speer and Galland were unable to dissuade Hitler from his unreal program demands, which he was only just beginning to fulfill with Date from the 15th of July from him approved new Augzeug (Hunter) program (7,400 aircraft as a target for the end of 1946)³⁰⁴ were ordered to be cut in half. Hitler apparently reacted so violently to the pressure the increasing fuel shortage, but rather that the Aak since May 1944 higher kill numbers for the first time reported as the hunters who

302 The Effects of strategy Bombing on Gennan Transportation (Garland Series), p. 90.

303 spear, memories, S. 415 ff. Hereafter also the following. Please refer in addition also D. following Section (Ammunition).

304 sour, July 8, 1944.

had to struggle hard with the new, strong fighter protection of the Allied bomber units .³⁰⁵

The Armaments Minister later explained that it was "Hitler's first order." neither Saur nor I followed."³⁰⁶ In the "leader's meeting" he secured his place for the time being the Notice away, it lack at electrical Command- and radio measuring devices, the
 "For reasons of capacity, we cannot ramp up to the same extent or at the same pace ."³⁰⁷

According to the gun numbers, the anti-aircraft ammunition should be "under short-term Ramp up in seven months at the latest"³⁰⁸ be increased; here he said already closed this time noticeable lack of powder and explosives and whose preliminary products are the high-flying ones Plans have narrow limits.

The lack of anti-aircraft weapons and ammunition was only one aspect of the disaster. The flak made value In 1943/44 25 to 30 percent of the total weapons production came from³⁰⁹; but their effectiveness was Given the rapid numerical and technical development of the Allied air forces was shockingly low. Nevertheless, the German air defense could of course not do without flak felt the lack of everyone corners and ends. After "Big Week" At the end of February 1944, anti-aircraft units were withdrawn from large cities in order to better protect industrial areas and large companies.³¹⁰ On July 17, during the Red Army's Belorussian operation, the Minister of Armaments noted forebodingly: "The time will come when stationary anti-aircraft guns will be transferred from the cities to the East (as an anti-tank weapon - D E.) must be deducted."³¹¹ Finally, in November, during the traffic disaster, Speer suggested in his Ruhr memorial "by dispensing with anti-aircraft guns at the most important armaments plants." a thousand pipes to Protection of the to bring together transport hubs .³¹²

Hitler saw himself obliged twice more, in November and January, to order "an absolute focus on the production of anti-aircraft equipment and ammunition as well as the concentration of forces on further development in this area" and "above all other urgencies" to classify.³¹³

In the last months of the war, heavy anti-aircraft guns were often used in ground combat. 100 batteries took in the December 1944 at the Battle of the Bulge part, many times as regular

305 That's what it stood for enormous effort Anti-aircraft ammunition opposite. After Boog (Boog, Horst, Die German Air Force Command 1935-1945, Stuttgart 1982, S. 211) missed it 8.8 Flak 36 per aircraft shot down around 16 000 grenades, the more modern 8.8 Flak 41 always still 8th 500 Grenades. Please refer also Cockroach!, S. 260.

306 Spear, Memories, S. 417.

307 FB, August 18-20, 1944 (addendum), Point 10.

308 Ibid, period 21.

309 Do effects, S. 187.

310 Do effects, S. 185.

311 BAP, FS, Movie 5884, spear at sour, July 17, 1944.

312 BAP, FS, Movie 1732, Memorandum Speers for Hitler ex. „Location in the Ruhr area", November 11, 1944.

313 FB, November 1-4, 1944, point 32; FB, January 3-5, 1945, point 1. Dated November 4th, 1944 a corresponding decree from Hitler "on the immediate short-term increase in the anti-aircraft weapons and ammunition program" (BAP, FS, film 1772).

Table 70

...

generation from Ammunition, 1940-February 1945

	Insges. Heeres- munition (Gen.-Qu.- Tonnen; 1000 t)	Gewehr-, Pistolen- undMP- Munition (Mill. Schuß)	darunter für: Sturm- gewehr44	Sonstige Infanterie- waffenmun. (Granatwer- fermun., Minen, Hand- granaten, Panzerfaust, Panzer- schreck; IOOOSchuß)	darunter für: Panzer- faust u. Panzer- schreck	leichte Flak- u. Bord- waffenmun. (1 000 Schuß)	Munition ab 7,5 cm aufwärts (1 000 Schuß)	darunter für: Flak 8,8 cm
1940	865	2 953	-	29424	-	?	27000	3 100
1941	540	1 344	-	19 736	-	77 366	27 075	11 958
1942	1 270	1 340	5	40014	-	129 767	56 800	12 942
1943	2 558	3 175	23	118 444	523	196 332	92 950	12467
1944	3 350	5 375	580	180 900*	7 468	262 687	107 900	13 649
Monatsdurch- schnitt IV. Quartal								
1944	273	512	98	15 507	1 085	23 275	8 067	1 184
1945								
Jan.	162	?	110	9 247	1 320	?	?	1 325
Feb.	?	?	?	8 394	1 292	?	?	1 425

*) total corrected after Monthly numbers.

Source: BAP, FS, Movie 1732, "Production figures 1940-1945", O. D.; Assault rifle 44: II, S. 646 f.

Field artillery. 300 batteries fought on the Eastern Front in January/February 1945, primarily against the attacking Soviet ones Tank.³¹⁴

j) ammunition

The production of ammunition was second only to the Luftwaffe in terms of value for Wehrmacht equipment (December 1943: 653 **million RM**; July 1944: 719 **million RM**). Ver needed those Armament (weapons and military equipment) 52.8 percent of of steel produced (1943) went away 52.3 percent the Ammunition Sector (III. Quarter 1944), whereby the specific

Steel consumption went back. "From III. Quarter 1942 to III. Quarter 1944 rose the production from ammunition around 70 Percent, the Steel consumption therefor around fewer as 50 percent"³¹⁵,

partly because of the reuse of the cartridge cases for large calibers, partly because of the reduction in steel production waste.

The increase in Generation in the years 1943 and 1944 was significant, remained but behind that one from weapons back. While AA ammunition, particularly heavy, yes Although it was produced in considerable numbers in 1941, the campaign in the East, with its huge demand for army ammunition, drove the blitzkrieg speculation particularly drastically to the point of absurdity. The increases in production here were enormous until 1944.

In terms of supplies, the army's ammunition never reached the level it had reached in mid-1941. The army lived during the years of the Eastern campaign by hand in the mouth and was in 1945, when production fell rapidly and supplies, otherwise estimated at three to six months, were as good as used up, and ammunition was "hopelessly short in every respect".³¹⁶

Table 71

production and consumption at Army ammunition 1944 (in 1 000 Shot) and Stocks at the 1. January 1945

	production 1944	consumption 1944	Stocks on 1/1/45; in months
7.92mm Handgun ammunition	3 860000	4 760000	2.8*
8cm mortar	35 693	27 778	3.5
7.5 cm IG	10666	11 623	1.1
10.5cmF.H.	38056	40887	1.5
10.5 cannon	2 725	2 238	?
15 cm IG	2254	2430	1.8
15 cm FH	6746	7 722	1.2

*) without MP 44.

Source: Do effects, S. 188 f.

314 The Effects, p.187.

315 The Effects, p. 183. The remaining figures *ibid.*, p. 145 table 81; p. 139; USSBS, Muniti ons Division, Ordnance Industry Report, Exh. D

316 Do effects, S. 188.

Ammunition factories were frequent targets of Allied bombing raids in 1944. Among the very uncertain estimates of production losses, perhaps the most real is the 11 percent for handgun ammunition.³¹⁷ The lack of powder had far more effect and explosives since the summer and steel towards the end of the year. The loss of increasing amounts of powder and explosives due to the lack of nitrogen and methanol was at least made up for to some extent by extenders, from September 1944 onwards primarily rock salt.

Nevertheless, the German troops had been hopelessly in the rear since the summer of 1944. The opponent missed double and multiple times on all fronts of ammunition. From the bloody fighting in Normandy, in all of them hopes up the success German counterattacks were "crushed in the fire of Allied bombing carpets and naval guns"³¹⁸, they reported tank formations, that the Opponents with "unrestricted air supremacy" an artillery superiority "as in the largest material battles of the (first - EN) World War" have. The impacts lay in places, approximately on an area of ten hectares, "so dense that there was no more than a step and a half of space and distance between the individual shell craters."³¹⁹ This superiority continued to grow dramatically, especially since the supply of supplies "became the most painful" due to the enemy fighter-bomber attacks and the most burning problem of the struggle. The ratio of shells fired during attacks, not counting bombs, is "to our disadvantage... 1 : 15 to 1 : 20"; the Allied 35 cm guns and the Naval artillery be "also of caliber Superior to the otherwise excellent German artillery."³²⁰ In the last months of war broke the Ammunition supply more and more together. According to estimates, the actual consumption of army ammunition was in January 1945 only still 67 percent, 50 in February percent and in March 33 percent of Minimum requirements.³²¹ Jodl noted for February that at maximum 4,150 tons of supplies were fired every day in the east alone, 4,300 tons would.³²²

Figures from the Quartermaster General for Hitler said that in view of the announced steel allocation in the spring with "One not yet been there shortage situation "munition" can be expected; the decline compared to the autumn of 1944 - 31 percent for anti-tank and KwK ammunition, 47 percent for light artillery ammunition and 37 percent for smoke (rocket) launcher ammunition - "must lead to catastrophes."³²³ The The transport of ammunition caused damage to the transport network and a lack of fuel itself becoming an increasingly difficult undertaking.

The Navy was with weapons How with ammunition exceedingly plenty provided. End

317 The effects, S. 184.

318 DZW, Vol.5, p.641.

319 BAP, FS, Movie 10738, Situation report d. 9. SS Panzer Division "Hohenstaufen" July 2, 1944, ex. d. Time v. 29.6. until July 2, 1944.

320 Ibid., report Lutz Koch (war correspondent for HGr B) about. "The situation in the West" (not-published), August 2, 1944.

321 The effects, S. 189.

322 ItZ, ED 115/3, TB Jodl, February 12, 1945.

323 BAK, R 3/1531, Leader's lecture GenSDH/GenQu, „Assessment the ammunition situation", January 14, 1945.

1944 covered for example the supply of Torpedoes measured at Annual consumption in 1944, 18 months left. The Luftwaffe also apparently did not suffer a drastic shortage of on-board weapons ammunition and bombs, although production here actually increased in value from 1943 to 1944 declined, regardless of huge Increase in newly produced aircraft. This decline was due to bomb production, which had been severely reduced since mid-1944. It stood out in the fourth quarter around 30 percent compared to the first quarter 1944, in first quarter of 1945 to less than 10 Percent.³²⁴ That with one increase in production of fighter aircraft to almost two and a half times 1944 The fact that only a third more aircraft ammunition was produced compared to 1943 only leads to the conclusion that the aircraft produced in 1944 played a relatively minor role in combat. The “growing inability to fight” the German fighter aircraft³²⁵ showed up yes just at that time when the hunter staff reported its high output figures. It fits into this picture that in the last months of... This year the use of ammunition for acceptance, zeroing and practice shooting was drastically restricted.

Anti-aircraft weapons and ammunition made up a considerable part of the total weapons and ammunition production in 1943/44: anti-aircraft weapons between 25 and 30 percent, anti-aircraft ammunition between 15 and 20 percent (in terms of value).³²⁶

Table 72

production of Weapons and ammunition, January 1943, September 1944, December 1944 (in Mill. RM; in constant prices)

	Weapons January 1943	December 1944	increase (Percent)	Ammuni- tion January 1943	September 1944	increase (Percent)
army	64	180	181	356	560	57
Flak	39	87	123	82	142	73
war	20	22	10	19	29	53
marine	(Ship's armament and torpedoes)					
air force	9	30	233	76	69	- 9
	(onboard weapons)			(Board weapon ammunition u. bombs)		
<i>In total</i>	132	319	141	533	800	50

Source: The effects, S. 181; S. 183.

Light flak had no effect against the flow of bombers, which generally flew at high altitudes, but was an indispensable weapon, especially in the last year of the war, against the enemy's attack aircraft and bombers at the front or at sea. The creation of lighter Anti-aircraft ammunition increased hesitantly in 1942, in the Years 1943 around 70 percent and one more

³²⁴ The effects, S. 286, app. Tab. 115.

³²⁵ Groehler, air war, S. 439.

³²⁶ The effects, S. 187.

times by 35 percent in 1944.³²⁷ She stayed already in 1942/43, then in 1944 even further behind Anti-aircraft weapons production returned.

The majority of heavy anti-aircraft ammunition (1943: 88 percent; 1944: 83 percent) consisted of 8.8 cm ammunition. It was already in 1941 8.8 cm anti-aircraft ammunition increased to almost four times where the, possibly due to the strategic Consideration, make sure to keep your back against the British Air Force during the war against the USSR, the man 1940 not had wrestle down can, rather in the Opposite began to learn to fear. In the following years, production hardly increased, although it did increase from 8.8 cm anti-aircraft guns in moved upwards in a steep curve. The led in 1944 There was a severe shortage of this type of ammunition and can only be explained by the fact that those responsible first used the large stocks as a reassurance for a long time and then, when an acute shortage occurred, the army's ammunition capacities were fully utilized and the need for anti-aircraft ammunition of a heavier caliber (10.5 and 12.8 cm) growing capacities band. Over the course of a few months, Hitler ordered himself several times "acts of violence" and

"Immediate actions" in this area and set up increasingly illusory production programs .

"Leader" data re: generation from Flak (Weapons and Ammunition), 1944/45

"The Führer considers the output of [ammunition for] sFH, HG and sIG and, above all, [for] 8.8 anti-aircraft guns to be completely inadequate and expects drastic measures to be taken immediately in order to achieve significant increases." (FB, 7.6. 1944, point 3)

"AH demands that flak be urgent the hunter program equated will." (Saur, June 20, 1944)

„UH calls for violent action to increase in heavy flak for the hydrogenation plants." (Saur, July 5, 1944)

"AH's demand that old [aircraft] models, since they are worthless, should be radically canceled in favor of increasing flak." (Saur, August 11, 1944)

"New increased Flak program ordered Further Financial support on increase one Row from types of ammunition, before everyone things; matters Anti-aircraft ammunition." (Saur, August 18, 1944)

"The anti-aircraft ammunition is to be increased with the shortest possible ramp-up in seven months at the latest" [follow target figures]. "At the Immediate action by the Ammunition increase is in the next two months the largest concentration on The increase the 8.8 cm/37 to be laid, the output of which must be ensured in the transition with at least 1.5 or 2 million [shots per month]." (FB, August 18-20, 1944, points 10 and 21)

"Due to the special war situation and taking into account the increasing reports of extraordinary disruption the enemy air activity by flak commands the Leader, a absolute main emphasis for the Manufacturing from Anti-aircraft gun and

-ammunition as well to concentration of the Forces on the more To ensure that development in this area is accelerated as a matter of priority. He signs a power of attorney submitted by me [di Speer] in this regard and expects all forces to be concentrated under the toughest conditions on the immediate fulfillment of the set goal." (FB, November 1st - 4th, 1944, point 32)

327 See table. 70. Hereafter also the The following.

"Leader's authority to increase flak. Serious accusations by AH due to the lack of an increase in anti-aircraft and anti-aircraft ammunition..." (Saur, November 4, 1944)

"The Führer agrees that an increase in the anti-aircraft ammunition carried out in the Ruhr area becomes, this to the additional Shot handed over could be made under the condition that there is no decrease in the other calibers." (FB, November 28, 1944, point 22)

"In the implementation of the authority given by the Fuehrer on November 4, 1944 for the flak, the following immediate measures are to be taken by the Fuehrer above all other emergencies to combat enemy incursions 5. ds. M. again in Individuals have been ordered: A) one Increase in all types of anti-aircraft ammunition... B) an increase in all anti-aircraft guns... D) ... In order to ensure effective aircraft combat using the Flak 8.8/37 and the 10.5/39 even at higher altitudes, in addition to the normal sufficient supply of ammunition, an additional provision for these guns with sabot ammunition 8, 8/7.0 or 10.5/8.8 with a combined time and impact fuze." (FB, January 3-5, 1945, point 1)

In 1945, production of a few types of ammunition continued at full speed until March. Among them was the anti-aircraft ammunition (3.7 and 8.8 cm) by far the most important.³²⁸

k) "Miracle Weapons"

"miracle weapons" was a term of great arbitrariness, which the Nazi propaganda, although they used it specifically since Stalingrad, never precisely defined and which is precisely why it affects everyone Layers of German population its despair-dampening, euphoric - ultimately prolonging the war - Effect exercised. Also the leading circles of Regimes widely shared the Illusions about weapons that break the Allied air supremacy and Germany went on the offensive again should help in warfare.

Propaganda and targeted rumormongering were primarily intended to mobilize feelings of revenge and hatred. The longer, the more greater was the intentionally manipulated inclination of large parts of the population with the hope of "miracle weapons" that of a turnaround in the entire course of the war. As early as October 1943, an SD report stated that "retribution" for the national comrades means more than the word suggests, namely the decisive chance of victory, without which one can often no longer imagine a good outcome to the war. "³²⁹

Only the Ministry of Armaments, At best, the OKW still had an overview of all the "special weapons", Only a small number of them were used, but the majority were still in the design stage or being tested at the end of the war. Appeared such a weapon in the theater of war and showed it itself, Although no miracle happened, new "miracle weapons" soon appeared in the fog of rumors and speculation this term came up above all the "weapons of retaliation" (V-weapons) that the Allies

328 Wagenühr, S. 115; USSBS, Ordnance Industry Report, S. 18; Tue Effects, S. 285, ext. Tab. 114; with differences between the sources.

329 Messages out of dem Reich, Vol. 15, S. 5886 f., report v. October 18, 1943.

"Air terror" was supposed to break with counter-terror, the various anti-aircraft missiles (flakets) and other remotely guided projectiles, glide bombs, etc. In a broader sense, in different ways weighting, the "High performance aircraft" to this, especially those with jet turbine and rocket propulsion, as well as such diverse weapon systems as poison gas and the atomic bomb, the new submarines and the small combat weapons of the Navy.

The beginnings of the technical development of most of the "miracle weapons" went back to the 1930s and even further. The German war successes first time, achieved with temporarily superior but conventional weapons technology, let them initially fade into the background. Only the devastating air raids on German cities since 1942, the Stalingrad catastrophe and the extensive destruction of the German submarine armada in 1943 brought about development and production new types of weapons boom.

The more revolutionary and complex the new weapon systems, the more extensive. The more time-consuming the development work was the testing and the more complex the production. None of those involved had any experience with these weapons and their use, least of all those who decided on them. The confusion that Hitler himself, the commanders of the Wehrmacht units, the SS leadership, and even the armaments minister with their frequent interventions in this time in that project, was increased by the fierce competition between the many different projects and the military authorities that supported them. Authorities among themselves around "Urgency" and favoritism, that is, an adequate supply of manufacturing facilities, materials and workers.

It there weren't any either technical coordination of research and development. Due to the high level of secrecy, the numerous operational and military-official research and engineering groups knew about it so next to nothing from each other, so that hundreds of highly qualified staff without the possibility of The exchange of experiences and scientific-technical feedback were blocked itself also blocked each other, did double work and just did so often end up in scientific and technical dead ends.

The dramatic events surrounding production and use of "miracle weapons" The events that took place in the last year and a half of the war are still grossly overrated today in terms of their military significance and impact on the war.³³⁰ Apart from the fact that the use of V-weapons had a purely terrorist character and most of the other "miracle weapons" (jet fighters, anti-aircraft missiles) of defense against the Allied air raids were supposed to happen the at most a reflected strategy - To force Britain to a ceasefire, the potential of the USA exhaust and with the entire war power to overthrow the USSR - supported by illusionism that was hardly imaginable at the time. However, very practical consequences with regard to Germany's potential resulted from the requirements for materials and for special and other workers for the new weapons. What aluminum, steel, sophisticated electricians, fuels including liquid oxygen, pure alcohol, etc. are pumped into the programs and engineers and qualified workers complained became - for the rocket A 4 alone 200 000

330 See the detailed ones. Discussions with the relevant problems in Schabe's new works! and Hölsken (Hölsken, Heinz Dieter, The V-Weapons. Origin - Propaganda - War effort, Stuttgart 1984).

Total workforce for production and use - this was missing from the production of new fighter planes and other weapons; The electrical system in particular was generally a bottleneck that became so... This became more noticeable in the production of submarines, anti-aircraft equipment (radar) and aircraft. Ultimately, the military benefit of using V-weapons was meager and disproportionate to the effort involved. "With every major Allied bombing raid became more Explosives dropped than at the the entire V-weapons offensive against England was missed was." ³³¹

Nevertheless, it was - in addition to pronounced undesirable developments and technical dead ends - about a new generation of weapons in statu nascendi, about outstanding inventions, designs and engineering achievements that were in some cases unique in the world at the time world were. How in First World War with the use of tanks, aircraft and poison gas announced such a threatening new generation of tools of destruction for future wars were them this time first jet aircraft, Missile weapons and nuclear weapons are the harbingers of incomparably increased destructive power. As far as the significant German contribution to the development of these weapons is concerned, the tragedy was not that they came "too late" but that they became criminal tools that prolonged a criminal, long-lost war, and that the dew sending sacrifices that their production and application were completely pointless.

The V-weapons

The term "weapons of retaliation" only appeared in German propaganda on June 17, 1944, when the jet-powered flying bomb Fi (Fieseler) 103 had already flown towards London for a few days in not very large numbers. A little later this weapon was officially called " V 1", which was intended to awaken the population's hope for further "war-decisive" weapons. Other suggestive and code names for the Fi 103 were "Kirschkern", "Maikäfer" and FZG (anti-aircraft gun) 76. ³³²

The winged bomb 7.23 m long, with 690 liters fuel 2 152 kg difficult, flew with 830 kg of explosives at a maximum speed of 644 km/h for a maximum distance of 230 to 240 km. ³³³ The Project was since spring 1942 in fierce competition to the army project A 4 (V2) of the Air Force supported and tested. At the development and The companies Fieseler-Werke GmbH (design; series production) and Argus Motoren GmbH (Argus As 014 Pulso thrust engine), as well as Askania AG (self-control), were significantly involved in production. Hellmuth Walter KG, Kiel (launch catapult), that Rheinmetall-Borsig plant in Wroclaw

331 Cockroach!, p. 176.

332 Illustrations the v 1 and another "miracle weapons" in DZW, Vol. 6, S. 160/161 u. S. 176/177.

333 The information refers to the mainly fired type Fi 103 A-1. More, even faster ones Types or test series (8th until H) were with enlarged fuel tank for size re Ranges, with wooden components, with Poison gas container etc. fitted; s. Hölsken, S. 216 u. pas sim; the same, The flying bomb Fi 103 ("V 1"). In: Benecke, Theodor/Hedwig, Karl-Heinz/Hermann, Joachim, missiles and guided rockets. The history of their development of German guided missiles from the beginning of this century to today, Koblenz 1987, p. 86 ff. Hereafter also the following.

(igniter). The Series production took place from autumn 1943 at the Fallersleben Volkswagen plant, and later at the Mittelwerk near Nordhausen, and in companies the Fieseler Group (Kassel; Cham near Regensburg); around 50 other companies supplied parts. The Series production started after one Testing time with many failures and one Error rate of just under 40 percent, which remained very high later. Production had to end at the end of November 1943 in Fallersleben even temporarily adjusted and wings and centerpieces for 2 000 Devices because of mistakes in the design and production are scrapped. The The large-scale production of the device cost around 5,000 RM.

The first operation on the night of the 12th. for the 13th June 1944, after months The postponements were a failure: in 54 operational firing positions in the north-west of France, between Calais and Rouen, only ten devices were ready to fire; four of them reached the British island, five fell shortly after leaving the Catapults off. Already over was June but the shot of the thousandth flying bomb recorded. Until the 22nd July was 5 000 missed.

The German withdrawal from the Seine and Somme began in mid-August 1944. Started on September 1st the last of 8 617 Flying bombs launched from France into England; After that, the British island was no longer accessible for the V1. Only in March 1945 flew from Holland another 275 Devices, this time with an enlarged tank, against London. In the meantime Belgian cities were the target of the V 1. Served in December she in the Mission against Antwerp and Liège directly Support the Ardennes offensive, "as a stopgap for the failure of the German air force and the lack of the heaviest artillery".³³⁴

In total became 32,600 to 32,800 flying bombs produced, of that but only 22,384 at the Front shot (68 Percent). Goals of Missiles were London (10 332) and other British cities (160), Antwerp (8th 696), Liège (3 141) and Brussels (55). Of the devices fired, only barely hit 60 percent (13 180) in the target area, the rest failed or were shot down by anti-aircraft guns and fighter pilots (6,140 losses from shootings alone).³³⁵

Table 73
production from v 1, End September 1943 -March 1945

1943 (since end of September)	2 300-2 500
1944	23 784
1945 (Jan. - March)	6 509
<i>1944</i>	
March	400
April	1 700
May	2 500
June	2000

³³⁴ Hölsken, The V-weapons, p. 155.

³³⁵ Just that. 219; P. 163. About 1,600 Devices V 1 were used by bomber planes (He 111) shot out.

Table 73 (Continuation)

July	3 000
August	2 771
September	3 419
October	3 387
November	1 895
December	2600
<i>1945</i>	
January	2000
February	2482
March	2027
<i>in total</i>	32 600 -32 800

Source: Hölsken, S. 80. March until June 1944 = approximated Pay; 1943 including scrapped Parts.

The V 2, developed as Aggregate 4 (A 4) by officers and civil servants of the Army Weapons Office, had been in use since the mid-1930s large liquid rocket for was designed for the war effort. The army research institute (HVA) in Peenemünde was founded in the following years thanks to this project by the Lord Mayor of the Army, Colonel General v. Brauchitsch, personally promoted. Originally (1 936) 80 men strong, pointed the HVA In 1943 we finally had 15,000 personnel.

The missile was a highly complex ballistic weapon system. She was 14.02 m long, weighed 13 metric tons and consumed nine metric tons fuel from - in the contrast to v 1 - higher Quality (liquid oxygen and pure alcohol; for the company the injection pump concentrated hydrogen peroxide and potassium/sodium pennganate). Its top speed was 5,472 km/h, several times the speed of sound, and its summit height was 97 km, the maximum range at 374 km. Their cost averaged 120 000 to 130 000 RM each, i.e. 20 to 25 times the cost of the flying bomb.³³⁶

Despite the enormous amount of intelligence and material that went into the rocket, they were only 976 kg of explosives, So not much more than the V 1 that brought them to the finish - this however at three times the speed of sound, so that their approach reaches up to after inaudible after impact stayed and one Defense with the resources at that time was not possible for the Allies.

Hitler himself vehemently promoted the project since August 1941 and at the same time made completely unreal demands after one Annual production of "hundreds of thousands" later (1942) from 50 000 Piece. On December 22, 1942, he signed the order for serial production of the device, for their state-industrial Speer contributed to management and coordination his ministry the "special committee A 4" under Degenkolb (Demag) and the "Development Commission for Long-Distance Shooting" was formed under Waldemar Petersen (AEG).³³⁷ To that one However, time came up a successful test start - the first at 3. October 1942 - still a dozen failed attempts.

³³⁶ Hölsken, The V-weapons, S. 219; S. 79 f.; S. 139.

³³⁷ Please refer II, S. 154 ff.

In addition to the test series plant in Peenemünde, production was to start at Luftschiffbau Zeppelin GmbH in Friedrichshafen and in the Rax works in Wiener-Neustadt (Henschel Group). Later, in July 1943, the Demag vehicle works in Falkensee were added. The automatic course control came from Siemens; Lorenz, Telefunken and other companies were involved.

Still was but with the Series production never started anywhere, except the Air raid on 17/18. August 1943 struck Peenemünde, which caused those responsible to panic, although the material damage compared to the number of fatalities - 732 people, five sixths of whom were Soviet and Polish forced laborers - was relatively low.³³⁸ The Zeppelin works had already been badly hit on June 22nd and the Rax works on August 13th.

Directly after the attack on Peenemünde they judged SS and the Special Committee A 4, in consultation with Hitler and Speer, built the future main assembly plant for the V 2 in the underground tunnels of the Kohnstein near Nordhausen a. Himmler presented this on August 28th first Concentration camp prisoners from Buchenwald. End September 1943 that worked later ones

“Mittelwerk” with 3,000, and finally with almost 14 in November 1944 000 prisoners from the “Dora-Mittelbau” concentration camp subcamp.

Chief designer Wernher v. Braun declared Hitler already on the 9th. September 1943, the development of the rocket was practically complete. But all lofty plans for a monthly production of 900 devices in the spring of 1944 and their early use fell apart when hundreds of errors in the weapon were discovered and 46 percent of the test launches during the winter months ended with so-called air separators. The first series device was delivered on January 1, 1944.

After two false starts on 6. September 1944 was on September 7th. September the first A-4 rocket the Fired at Paris near Malmedy; On the same day, another task force fired two devices from The Hague towards London. Two weeks later, rockets were fired from positions in the Westerwald onto military targets in France and Belgium. Only about 120 rockets were fired in September.

On October 12, 1944, v. Rundstedt gave the order to direct the fire of the V-2 batteries exclusively at London and Antwerp. With this, Hitler once again relied on the pure terrorist concept of V-weapons, probably also in the knowledge that the military effect of the few tons of explosives fired at several area targets was minimal. In February 1945 the rocket offensive reached against London with an average of ten shots per day reached its peak.

In total were 6,500 to 6,600 Devices produced, of which 48 percent (3 170) were shot at the front. Under Fire Antwerp was taken (1 610 Kills), London (1 359), other cities in England (44) and Belgium (54), French cities (73) and Meuse Tricht (1 9); eleven were brought to the Remagen Bridge without hitting anyone shot after it was captured by the Allies. Overall, almost 77 percent of them hit (2 438) in the target area.³³⁹ They fell on March 27, 1945 last A-4 rockets on London and Antwerp .

³³⁸ Hölsken, The V-weapons, S. 50.

³³⁹ Ibid, S. 219; S. 163. In the more precise analysis the Production figures (p. 79; see below

Table 74

production from v 2, 1942-1945

<i>1944</i>	
January	50
February	86
March	170
April	261
May	437
June	132
July	86
August	374
September	629
October	628
November	662
December	613
<i>1945</i>	
January	690
February	617
March	app 700
	rox
	.
generation of experimental series plant Peenemünde, 1942-1944, at least	314
<i>Together</i>	abou 449
	t 6

Source: Hölsken, S. 79. Summation at H. faulty.

The long-range gun V 3 ("high-pressure pump" (HDP); "England gun"; "Busy Lieschen"; "Cenipede") was developed in the Röchling Group in 1942/43 based on an older French model. The impressive but ultimately unsuitable construction consisted of a 32-section sloping tube with a total length of 130 m (!) with a caliber of 15 cm. It should be three meters long wing-stabilized grenades of 140 kg with a 25 kg explosive charge 160 km away.³⁴⁰ The projectile was to achieve its high acceleration through powder propellant charges, which were ignited in a corresponding number of side nozzles as the grenade passed through.

Hitler promoted this weapon his friend Röchling against the advice the professionals, approximately

Werner Osenberg, head of the planning office of the Reich Research Council. He demanded start 1944, that not, How until now in Outlook placed, 2 500 grenades, rather "short term ... 10 000 shot per Month" would be manufactured.³⁴¹ Deep launch bunkers of gigantic proportions have been since Summer 1943 at the channel coast built, the, before one at all sharp shot fired was, End August 1944 from the Allies taken became. The elaborate

Table) undermines H. a Summation error (6 559 instead of 6 449); therefore are the above Numbers probably need to be corrected slightly. See also the rather rough estimate in USSBS, Aircraft Industry Report, p. 120a (Rickhey estimate); it is 6,915.

340 Hölsken, The V-weapons, S. 43 u. passim.

341 FB, January 25-28, 1944, period 7.

Firing tests revealed fundamental design defects in the gun and ammunition; 20 000 finished grenades had to be scrapped become.

It was not until the end of 1944 that tests with new grenades showed positive results. Two guns, now with a significantly shortened barrel (40 m), reduced shell weight (90 kg) and a shorter range (60 km) ³⁴², opened on the 30th. December 1944 or. on 2. January 1945 from the banks of the Ruwer, south of Trier, the fire on Luxembourg. Until the 22nd February there were 183 Grenades fired. Shortly beforehand, Kammler had stopped production completely.

The four-stage powder rocket V 4 ("Rheinbote"; Rh.Z.61) was developed in 1941 after lengthy preparatory work at Rheinmetall-Borsig. Within the **HWA**, the "Rheinbote" enjoyed a certain Promotion as competition to A-4 rocket of the HVA. Hitler has apparently never from the v 4 experience. She was 11.70 m long and weighed with around 600 kg Powder propellant charge 1 650 kg, including the warhead 40kg with 25kg of explosives (originally The device was designed to hold 200 kg of explosives). The rocket flew a maximum of 78 km. Their range varied greatly from barely 50 and over 230 km. The Top speed was 5 860 km/h. ³⁴³ This made it even faster than the A4. It was unsteered and had to be aimed at the target on a launch vehicle become. Three stages of the rocket separated within 22 Seconds after each other from the fourth, which flew towards the target with the warhead.

The first Order of **HW A** on 200 Devices took place in the April 1944; first now received the "Rheinbote" has a certain level of urgency. Rheinmetall-Borsig produced the device in the **factory** in Berlin-Marienfelde and in the Dombrowa bank factory. They were in August worst childhood illnesses - before all air exploders - eliminated. The first series devices were completed at the beginning of October 1944, a total of 115 by December 12, 1944 Piece.

The use of the weapon since December 24th against Antwerp continued to suffer from errors, large differences in distance and target deviations. A total of at most 50 rockets appear to have been fired. On February 6, 1945, Kammler drew the conclusions the situation - probably especially from the disproportion between the high powder consumption and the minimal effect of the weapon - and had all work on the "Rheinboten" stopped.

Anti- aircraft missiles

Carl Krauch as boss the chemical armor could itself - in this respect one Exception - as an industrialist and at the same time as an expert technician and chemists made a comparative assessment of the "wonder weapons" in June 1943. In Peenemünde and in Kiel (German Aviation Research Institute) he was given the A 4 and the Fi 103 ("Attack weapons"), the C 2 anti-aircraft missile "Waterfall" and the Me 163 interceptor rocket fighter ("anti-defense weapons") were introduced and well received also shown in the film. Walther slider, Chief of Armaments Supply Office, internal after How before with dem IG Farben Group tied together, had him

342 Hölksen, The V-Weapons, p. 218 and passim; e.g. T. different Values in DZW, Vol. 6, pp. 160/161 (image section).

343 After Hölksen, The V-weapons, S. 154 u. passim.

primarily around one calculation the on longer view required Types of fuel and -amounts for this weapons requested.

Krauch not only presented a balance sheet that the significant gaps in rocket fuels named and contained corresponding investment demands (e.g. for a large Visol plant in Auschwitz), but he at the same time sharply criticized the strategic preference for offensive weapons, particularly the A-4 missile, this one "extremely complicated and expensive mechanism".³⁴⁴ The "driving forward attack missile development" be like that pointless for a long time, how the German cities and the for those Weapons production facilities were "left almost defenseless" to enemy bombers.

"These considerations" This is how Krauch summarized his analysis in a tactically clever way, "speak for a further strong push of the entire rocket development, in particular and first of all the air defense device, the device C 2 'Waterfall'. Its use must be carried out suddenly and in large numbers; the effect must be so devastating and paralyzing that even the concentrated attacks on the rocket weapon production facilities (which, incidentally, have to be set up in the East and deployed very heavily) no longer prevent the use of this weapon of war can significantly affect. This goal of the mission the rocket weapon is achieved when the Opponent through our superior air defense to renounce air terror against our population and armaments industrial centers and to attack on land be forced where we the have certain superiority. This will ours at the same time Confidence of victory decisively raised and ours Armament potential is maintained to its current extent. Further (becomes) the energy and time-consuming industry was relocated and the population evacuation with all its negative consequences was avoided."

Krauch's argument reflected quite accurately the main concerns of the German business elite at the time. His field of vision remained limited to the current state of Anglo-American air warfare, which by no means ensured Allied air supremacy over Germany. He also called the bombing of cities "currently the only effective means of war used by the enemy."

Furthermore, Krauch underestimated dem impression of his visit the The "Waterfall" rocket was ready for development, and he was convinced of its "absolute accuracy" and "absolute superiority over everything that had come before"; in any case, he was correct in seeing that The HVA in Peenemünde concentrated all its forces not on "Waterfall" but on the A 4. Above all, he obviously overlooked how hopeless electrical engineering research and development was and the German electrical industry as whole of the Production of one functioning radio remote control or even Radar self-steering system alone for LO 000 "Waterfall" rockets per month were overwhelmed. The same thing happened for the problem of automatic standoff fuses for the anti-aircraft missiles to.

The overall problem of German air defense was insoluble and would have remained insoluble if also if, after Krauchs Suggestion, a Special Representative for "one tighten and a-

344 BAK, R 25/156, three documents from the GB Chemistry v. June 29, 1943: AN "To secure raw materials of the R program"; AN "Remarks on the R program" (regarding discussion with Schieber); "Proposal for the organizational development of the R program" (after consultation with Schieber). Here also the following.

holistic leadership of the entire R program in Objectives, development, industrial production of the Devices (and) Deployment the raw materials or propellant" would have been appointed, „with dem Goal, as soon as possible to one mass emission particularly at C 2 to come."

Krauch also describes "the tremendous fragmentation of German engineering and research potential"³⁴⁵ have become only vaguely conscious, and the actual type confusion was confused solely in the field of Anti-aircraft missiles stayed him obviously hidden. At the beginning of 1943 an inventory was taken by the general aircraft master and the "General of the anti-aircraft artillery at the RMdL and ObdL" a good half dozen projects from the corporations Air Force and the Army, including "Wasserfall" (HVA), "Rheintochter" (Rheinmetall-Bor sig), "Butterfly" (Henschel) and "Enzian" (Messerschmitt).

These were projects of single- and multi-stage powder and liquid rockets that worked according to various optical control and target search methods. Their takeoff mass varied from 430 kg ("butterfly") to almost four tons ("waterfall"). the payload of 40 kg ("butterfly") up to 500 kg ("Gentian"). The solid steel construction from "Rheintochter" contrasted with the lightweight and wooden construction of "Butterfly" and "Enzian".³⁴⁶ Only "Waterfall", the most complex development, was supposed to reach supersonic speed and be equipped with electronic beam control.

Another group in the RLM (Amt C) represented the concept instead the entire complex system of surface-to-air missiles to develop on-board missiles for fighter aircraft. Therefor In 1943/44 there were three Henschel projects and others ("X missiles") the German Aviation Research Institute.

On October 30, 1944, the Armaments Ministry decided after a rocket demonstration before Goering, all Projects to follow up: particularly urgent "Butterfly", "Gentian", Henschel Hs 298 and X-4 (Air-to-air missiles with radio remote control), further

"Daughter of the Rhine" and "Waterfall". Every month there should be 2,000 "gentian", 3,000 "butterfly" and 5 000 X-4 produced become. These numbers remained the same Paper, as well as the These plans included Hitler's anti-aircraft order of November 4, 1944. Only test devices were built; By January 1945, 40 to 50 of "Wasserfall", 100 of "Rheinbote", and about a dozen of "Schmetterling". (it was missing distance fuze), from "Enzian" 23, 123 of the X-4. None of the devices reached series production.

After Appointment of Kammler on 22 January 1945 by Göring as "special representative for the implementation of the requirements regarding development, procurement and industrial testing in the field of ordnance with rocket propulsion" - late realization of one SS variant of Krauch's proposal from June 1943 - one suddenly realized, "that the development controlled anti-aircraft missiles approximately the same power at the same time and was operated in parallel by many companies and departments. Distributed all over Germany, they were busy each a few people with sometimes completely inadequate Means with such tasks, and this with transport difficulties getting worse from day to day."³⁴⁷ Kammler decreed at the 6. February the Attitude all Work at the

345 cockroach), S. 264. Hereafter (p. 265 ff.) also the The following.

346 Hermann, Joachim, surface-to-air missiles. In: Benecke/Hedwig/Hennann, S. 130.

347 Domberger, Walter, Peenemünde. The Story the V-weapons, Esslingen 1981, S. 288; cockroach), S. 281.

most Anti-aircraft missiles. Anyway should the Development some types, underneath "Waterfall",
"Daughter of the Rhine" and **X-4**, keep running.

l) Poison gas

The German military experts and the poison gas producers, especially the IG Farben Group, were convinced of their superiority in a gas war and were already looking for pretexts at the beginning of the war for "devastating" and "war-decisive" gas offensives at the front and in the enemy's rear.³⁴⁸ The Rapid advances between 1939 and 1941 not only made the use of gas unnecessary, but would also have posed dangers to our own troops.

In 1942, Churchill's May warning had an effect - repeated in April 1943 - as a deterrent to the German poison gas strategists, if poison was used in the East, the Royal Air Force would attack the German cities, with whose large-scale bombing they would be successful had started to use gas too.

During the sinking of the 6. army at the Volga demanded Hitler a report about poison gas production.³⁴⁹ It was especially Göring who back then - probably under the impression of the disaster Air force in Stalingrad - an intervention with gas out of the Luft advocated, in "Concentration on narrow Space".³⁵⁰

On May 15, 1943, the gas experts gathered at Hitler's house. Otto Ambros (IG Farben), Head of the Special Committee C (Combat Substances), held in detail Lecture, praise the new Types of gas Tabun and sarin, the from never existing killing power, pointed out but point out that the potential of the opponents may be greater and taboo abroad too be known. The debate over the question of whether the IG Farben experts, as Ambros and Krauch claimed after the war, wanted to warn about the gas war or not, is pointless.³⁵¹ The current situation in the air war over Germany was threatening enough and had to happen one Gas warfare wreaked havoc the German population, about the economy, transport, etc.

Ambros' "way out" was the forced German upgrade in the area of new weapons so that they would have "a means of the very last decision" in hand.³⁵² In any case, the expansion of the large IG plants in Gendorf/Bavaria (Lost) and Dyhernfurth/Silesia (Tabun) and the construction of "Seewerk" near Falkenhagen/Brandenburg (Sarin) were subsequently carried out highest level of urgency moved. Hitler immediately ordered Dyhernfurth on the double A lot of taboo (2,000 tons per month) and Falkenhagen on

348 Groehler, Olaf, *The silent Death*, Berlin 1987, S. 119 ff. u. passim. Hereafter also the The following.

349 FB, January 3/4/5, 1943, Point 40.

350 KTB des OKW, Vol. III, p. 112, January 26, 1943.

351 See. Groehler, *The silent Death*, S. 254 f.

352 BAK, R 3/1894, BI. 27 ff., Otto Ambras/Special Committee C, "The situation in the area of combat materials. Excerpt from the lecture at the Führer's headquarters on May 15, 1943 with a comparison of the situation on March 1, 1944", March 20, 1944 (quote BI. 33).

600 instead of on 100 tons of sarin per month.³⁵³ Both orders remained on paper; Dyhernfurth did not even use its 1,000 t capacity during the war.

Table 75

production from warfare agents, October 1939-January 1945 (monthly average; in t)

	In total	of which: Lost	Taboo
1939 (October - December)	881	518	
1940	982	526	
1941	1 189	495	
1942			
I quarter	368	151	
II. quarter	421	120	
III. quarter	367	105	45
IV. quarter	308	34	179
1943			
I quarter	638	288	200
II. quarter	1 016	512	358
III. quarter	1 072	454	476
IV. quarter	860	230	484
1944			
I. quarter	965	179	627
II. quarter	1 107	189	724
III. Quarter	1 200	435	620
IV. quarter	?	?	518
1945			
January	?	?	118

Source: Groehler, *The silent Death*, S. 197 and passim.

Poison gas production rose from its low point in 1942 during the critical period after Stalingrad and again during 1944 to near levels reached in 1941 high mark, with the difference that the terrible Nerve gas Tabun (Triton T 38; also T 83). ever larger production share. Sarin (T 46), also a gas from the group of so-called trilone agents, had, according to Ambros, about six times the effect of tabun, but reached up to to a few tons (since the end of 1944) not for delivery. A third gas in this group, soman, three times more toxic than sarin, was discovered in the IG Farben group in 1944 and was still being tested in the laboratory in 1945.

In the Years 1944 14 weapons plants worked in Germany, including eight within the large IG Farben group plants or as new plants using the process and know-how of IG Farben; four works operated the Auer company (with participation the Theodore

³⁵³ FB, May 13-15, 1943, Point 36.

Goldschmidt AG, the Degussa and Kalichemie AG) and two the Riedel de Haen AG. The with Greatest works by far they were in Gendorf at Trostberg and in Dyhernfurth, as well as the factories under construction in Falkenhagen and Auschwitz (diphosgene) - all under IG Farben leadership. Since 1943 they have been part of the Army Weapons Office the power to decide on investments in the toxic gas sector and production control was developed and transferred to the Speer Ministry (Armaments Supply Office, since November 1944 Raw Materials Office) or the Special Committee C under Ambros.

The Total inventory at Poison gas in Germany towards the end of the war itself on 68 000 until 69 000 tons, including 31,650 Tons of lost items of all kinds and 12 815 tons of tabun. Total German production in the First World War, on the other hand, was little more than half (37,600 tonnes, of which 7,700 tonnes wasted).³⁵⁴

The stocks of ready-filled gas grenades and bombs also grew to enormous proportions. In June 1944, over 4.3 million ready-to-fire grenades of all types and calibers were counted. In the spring of 1944, the Luftwaffe had almost 660,000 combat bombs of various fillings and calibers, as well as over an indefinite number of simple drop containers and over 2 cm gas grenades that could be fired from onboard weapons.³⁵⁵

Table 76

Stocks at Combat ammunition (Selection), 1. September 1939-June 1944 (in pcs.)

	1.1.G. and IFH grenades	sFH- Grenades	Launche r grenade s
September 1, 1939	214 200	50900	30000
September 1, 1940	943 300	234 000	?
January 1, 1942	1690700	836,900	248 500
April 1943	1928 600	576 100	217000
December 1943	2029 000	605 400	263 000
June 1944	2683 100	674400	408 900

Source: Groehler, *The silent death*, S. 219; S. 260 f.

Because of these supplies and the willingness of a clique to commit all crimes that would prolong the war, they became more determined political, military and industrial leaders existed at all times, but especially since the summer of 1944, when the Red Army to the Vistula advanced, the danger that that clique would unleash gas warfare.

But the Allied air supremacy over Germany was all too obvious. Furthermore, there were civil gas protection precautions always neglected been, and the own population was accordingly defenseless.³⁵⁶ So could itself those Forces not push through.

³⁵⁴ Groehler, *The silent Death*, S. 301 f.; S. 73.

³⁵⁵ Just that. 261 f.

³⁵⁶ Just 1944 rose the Production of civil gas protection agents steep at, especially from "people's gas masks" and from "gas beds" and "jackets" for small children. In 1943, on average, monthly 441,000 "people's gas masks" produced; their number rose- especially erratic since

Since the fall of 1944, the Ministry of Armaments has gradually reduced the production of poison gas in favor of the most common types of ammunition. At the 11. October wrote Speer to Keitel that it was necessary to immediately "drastically limit" the production of Tabun and Lost, in particular to shut down Tabun from November 1st in order to use intermediate products such as ethylene, sodium cyanide and methanol for the benefit of the needy powder and explosives production.³⁵⁷ At the end of 1944, Kehrl ordered the dismantling of gas grenades via the main ammunition committee her Transferring to normal ammunition, with the same argument, namely the lack of ammunition (cases), powder and explosives and their preliminary products.³⁵⁸ In March 1945, poison gas production was completely stopped.

m) Consumer goods

The production of consumer goods had fallen by around 14 percent between 1938/39 and 1942³⁵⁹. On the other hand, the supply of these goods to the civilian population is much greater³⁶⁰, while the Wehrmacht's needs were met first and foremost, in plentiful quantities and more or less in the usual quality.

The consumer goods industry itself had undergone years of sharp rationalization. It had constantly lost capacity and workers since 1939, ultimately losing almost 40 percent of its workforce in five years, including a disproportionately high proportion in the clothing industry, the paper processing, the printing industry, the brewery and malting and the spirits industry. The push for rationalization was by no means fueled by investments and technical innovations, but rather largely by the increased exploitation of an aging German workforce and a large number of foreign workers. The concentration of the remaining production in large companies also played a role here, while large numbers of small and medium-sized companies were "combed out" and withdrawn from production were. As early as 1943, the range of goods had shrunk drastically. Instead of 25,000 different medicines, only 3,000 to 5,000 were produced; Instead of many thousands of types of agricultural machinery and equipment, industry only produced a few; instead of hundreds of thousands of shoe models became more or less just one more "Uniform shoe" fabricated.³⁶¹

September 1944 - to 2.1 million in January 1945 (BAP, FS, film 1732, Rapid statistical reports on war production. Status: February 1945).

357 BAK, R 3/1894, Bl. 55 (ff.), Speer to Keitel, October 11, 1944. According to Speer, Memoirs, p. 421, Hitler ordered "up "Under no circumstances should we reduce poison gas production"; but this is an order had already remained ineffective at that time.

358 Sweep!, S. 415 ff.

359 Please refer The effects, S. 130 Tab. 77; similar car driver, S. 173 Tab. 1.

360 The private consumption longer-lasting goods of so-called elastic demand 1943 (III quarter) for clothing fell to 25 percent, for furniture and household goods (wooden and glassware) to 9.5 percent compared to the quarterly average of 1938 (Boelcke, The German Economy, p. 309).

361 BAK, R 3/1836, Bl. 6, Speech "The German Industry at the threshold of fifth year of war", O. v. O. D (Autumn 1943?).

It saw 1943 after the proclamation of "Total War" in February and after the Takeover of the consumer goods industry in the regulatory area of the Ministry of Armaments in the September, exactly the same. It looks as if the downward trend in production will continue more strongly. The "combing out" and decommissioning campaigns of the armaments and labor authorities, as well as the beginning of the massive relocation of the armaments industry from the air-endangered industrial cities in capacities of the regional consumer goods industry pointed in this direction.

But the statistics, as imperfect as they are - for example when taking into account changes in prices, product ranges and quality -, shows for 1943 even an increase in consumer goods production a bit more as five percent, and also in 1944. According to this, the level of 1942 is hardly there undercut, although in the second half of the year the significant imports from most occupied and neutral countries and shortages of coal, energy, materials and increasing transport difficulties were already pushing the production curve considerably downwards.

It was the distress the millions through the Airstrikes around Apartment and Have come "bombed out" - since summer/autumn 1943 one unmistakable mass phenomenon - that it not only prohibited the regime from further increasing the proportion of the Wehrmacht to the detriment of the civilian population, but also made it appear politically questionable to deprive the consumer goods industry of capacities and workers to the planned extent for armaments. During the course of the war, air raids in Germany destroyed a total of around 490,000 residential buildings and severely damaged 415,000. It is estimated that there were at least 15 percent of all apartments in the Reich uninhabitable. 30 percent of destruction occurred in Years 1943 a, 40 percent in years 1944, and 26 percent in the last months of the war in 1945. So several million families lost Apartment, furniture, clothing and household appliances. Providing these people with the most basic necessities was a question of existence.

Of course, German industry could not remotely meet the urgent need for furniture for the bombed-out people - Bed frames, cupboards, tables and chairs - blankets. The Furniture industry limited due to the lack of materials and the forced to produce more cheaply, especially since the fall of 1943, to the simplest standard of execution and to greatly reduced quality.

Table 77
production from furniture, 1942-1944 _

	Wooden beds	wardrobes	tables	Chairs
<i>Monthly average</i>				
1942	29 200	14400	?	?
1943	73,900 _	28 700	35,500 _	340000
1944	126 000	16,100 _	?	?
<i>1944</i>				
January	84300	25 300	33 700	383 000
February	139 000	25 000	45 200	315000
March	197 000	20000	52 500	355 000

Table 77 (Continuation)

	Wooden beds	Wardrobes	tables	Chairs
April	187 000	17,300	?	?
May	165 000	13 800	?	?
June	166 000	11,400	?	?
July	140 000	12 600	?	?
August	123 000	12 900	?	?
September	109000	14000	?	?
October	81900	14600	?	?
November	59500	12 500	?	?
December	60200	13 900	?	?

Source: Do effects, S. 272 Tab. 96. Different (annual values 1943 u. 1944) car driver, S. 173 Table 3.

In mid- 1943 the situation also changed radically with regard to clothing. After the major attacks on Hamburg in July/August 1943 alone, the demand for so-called clothing units jumped (Provision of clothing and linen for two people) for bombed-out victims to 200,000 per month. At the end of 1943, according to official estimates, the clothing industry was only producing a third of the required Amount of 300 per month 000 clothing units. The centers of the German clothing industry were themselves ravaged by destruction; Berlin's most important industry, for example, was 80 percent destroyed at the beginning of 1944.³⁶² The very important ones Deliveries from Western Europe were canceled Summer 1944 all at once. Kehrl reported to leading representatives of the Reich Industry Group: "The supply situation for textile products has suffered a serious blow due to the loss of France, Belgium, Holland and a large part of Italy. 40 percent of our production was made in these countries. There is nothing left but that consumption the German one "Confine the civilian population further."³⁶³

Since August 1943 the "Reich Clothes Card" was closed to adults, that is, it required special urgency and a corresponding official certificate, if you, without being "airplane injured" to be, buy something on it wanted. In mid-1944, the new (fifth) clothing card was only issued for adolescents up to the age of 18.

Cotton virtually fell short of raw materials completely off; 1943 was the Imports only 776 tons per month compared to 15 419 tons in years 1939, so five percent.³⁶⁴ wool will have been more or less completely consumed by the Wehrmacht. German substitutes dominated, often of poor quality (rayon wool, artificial silk). Processing was radically simplified and standardized.

³⁶² The effects, S. 134.

³⁶³ BAK, R 13 I/630, Bl. 44, „The Raw material situation in the Autumn 1944“, Speech Kehrls on the RGI managing director meeting, 27.10.1944 .

³⁶⁴ BAK, R 3/1836, Bl. 25, Production figures u. -notes, O. v. O. D (approximately May 1944).

The consumption settled after a drastic Distribution canon: The Wehrmacht came first, the Wehrmacht came second the bomb victims, thirdly infants and young children; Fourth place was indispensable special consumption such as harvest binding twine. Finally, those responsible kept a "significant reserve for special war risks".³⁶⁵

In autumn, the production of textile raw materials fell by more within three months (September - December). as 40 Percent. Increasing shortage of raw materials, coal and Since then, electricity has brought the entire textile industry to the brink of collapse.

In 1943/44 (July - June) 270,000 tonnes available (including 40,000 tonnes of leather imports), of which 100,000 tonnes are in the form of artificial leather, synthetic sole rubber, etc. 55 Percent consumed the up to Wehrmacht was well supplied towards the end of the war, almost that all leather.³⁶⁶ The substitutes remained for the civilian needs.

The The shoe industry increasingly used wood as a material. Wear work shoes Wood or with a wooden sole (usually with a textile upper) were in 1943 2.6 mill. Pieces produced (compared to 234,000 piece in 1938). Bombs hit larger production sites, for example in Stuttgart, Pirmasens and Erfurt. From the end of 1944, leather and shoe production fell sharply.

The lack of shoes primarily affected the working population the growing youth. The SD registered countless complaints about this, particularly from agriculture. There are reports before, like this an SO report from January 1944, "that ... various farmers had approached the local group leaders and explained to them that it was not possible for them to do the farm work to the necessary extent with the old, completely torn footwear, there Workforce and health among them would suffer 'Many say, if I no Shoes get, then listen I on to work.'" Before

namely the farming population also complained about "that for the children aged 12 - It's been hard to get sturdy, durable footwear for 14 years. This would be necessary for the above-mentioned age groups in the country because the boys and girls would be heavily used by their parents for agricultural work." The working people's anger was caused by the unsuitable quality of the "work shoes with wooden soles, particularly for the winter months Textile top": "They would be special at the current cold and damp weather in the Agriculture is of little use, like that that on heavier floors, accidents and minor foot injuries are unavoidable due to the floor sticking to the shoes. Likewise, these shoes would also be rejected by fellow citizens would have to move heavy loads because wooden or possibly rubber soles do not provide sufficient anti-slip protection. Add to that the fact that these shoes because of the many Repairs and of their Short-livedness relatively expensive be en."³⁶⁷

365 Ibid, Bl. 26 f.

366 The effects, S. 135 Tab. 79. Hereafter also the The following.

367 Messages out of dem Rich, S. 6282 ff., SO report v. 24.1.1944.

Table 78

Leather- and shoe production, 1938, 1942-1944

	Leather (1 000 t)	shoes and Boots made of leather (million pairs)
1938	131.7	89.7
1942	93.8	75.6
1943	106.4	71.6
1944	70.9	56.6

Source: car driver, S. 173 Tab. 2.

There were lists of Reich offices until the fall of 1943 of longer-lasting consumer goods, the production of which was prohibited; after that came specific lists of the only goods approved for production. Countless items were excluded from production for civilian use, including radios, clocks, refrigerators, electric ovens, binoculars, leather handbags, Woolen goods, crystal goods.³⁶⁸ remained - apart from the already mentioned primitive furniture - those household appliances that were vital for the bombed-out population, i.e. kitchen accessories and eating utensils. Until mid-1944, these items were manufactured in increasing numbers, but in a primitive manner and of poor quality (cutlery made of aluminum, dishes made of cheap stone or sheet metal, pots and pans made of inferior steel or cast iron). Eventually more and more companies had to Cut production because there was a lack of coal, raw materials and supplier parts and the traffic breakdown made it impossible to transport the products.

Table 79

production from household appliance, 1943-January 1945 (in 1 000 pieces)

	Pan the frying bucke t	Cook-	Knife	Forks	soup	Plates pots spoons	Eating u. bowls	bowls cups u. Mug
<i>Monthly average</i>								
1943	96	863	1 690	1 232	2,138	3 658	4 208	2 658
1944	102	698	1 135	940	1 751	2 868	4 333	3 767
<i>1944</i>								
January	98	628	1 252	1 053	2,162	4 310		7 717
February	95	684	1 663	1 109	2 315	3 604		
March	198	1141	1 592	1 225	2 380	3 776		
April	123	788	1 331	1 198	1 860	2 892		
May	124	788	1 330	916	1 791	2901		
June	155	673	1242	974	2 021	2864		

³⁶⁸ The effects, S. 136.

Table 79 (Continuation)

	frying pans	Bucke t	Cook- pots	Knife	Forks	Soup spoon	Plate	food bowls u. bowls	cups u. Mug
July	97	827	1 036	909	1 703	2497			
August	68	639	714	1 127	1 705	2490			
September	70	523	904	864	1 740	3 071			
October	70	538	911	858	1532	2 730			
November	63	659	841	606	1034	1657			
December	57	488	804	443	770	1623			
1945									
January	85	398	524	310	582	1 709			

Source: The Effects, S. 271 Tab. 95; car driver, S. 173 Tab. 3 (Dishes).

The production of Aachglas - of utmost importance for repairing broken windows - rose by 26 in 1943 percent compared to 1942 and 1944 again by 3.3 percent.

Table 80

production from flat glass, 1942-1944 (1 000 m')

Monthly average

1942	4272
1943	5 388
1944	5 567
1944	
January	6 256
February	5,984
March	6 354
April	6012
May	5,965
June	5 732
July	5404
August	5 500
September	5 410
October	5 162
November	4475
December	4555
1945	
January	4 282

Source: The effects, S. 272 Table 97.

The more severe the shortage, the more comprehensive it was the rule of the bureaucracy that administered it. She was for the consumer in the last war period omnipresent alone

The overlapping responsibilities between the Ministry of Armaments, in which the Production Office, the Raw Materials Office and the Planning Office are responsible for planning, production and distribution, were complicated by the overwhelming variety of consumer categories, quotas, purchase vouchers, authorization cards and "purchasing cards for victims of war" that it created consumer goods and the necessary raw materials, and the Reich Ministry of Economics, which was responsible for the actual supply of the population via the state economic offices incumbent. The Reich offices, Economic groups and imperial associations were still subordinate the Service supervision of Reich Minister of Economics, but were responsible for their production area to the Ministry of Armaments.³⁶⁹

However, Speer stopped the "re-management" of most of the consumer goods industry's operations, probably to relieve himself of a large part of the responsibility to relieve this difficult area. On April 27, 1944, he ordered that all "textile, clothing and equipment, leather, footwear, wood processing, Paper processing, printing, glass (excluding technical glass), **ceramics** (excluding technical **ceramics**), tobacco processing plants" should not be transferred to the control of its regional armaments departments, but should be looked after by the state economic offices.³⁷⁰

Against the barter and black market economy that affects the everyday life of the German population and the foreign workers in last year of the war more and more shaped, The most severe threats of punishment no longer helped much.³⁷¹ As early as January 1944, the SD recognized three major areas of the shadow consumer economy: "The long duration of the war led to one general easing of the strict opinions about the reprehensibility the additional provision for the national comrades.... Essentially three forms of provision have emerged outside of the official allocations. Firstly, the exchange of legally entitled scarce goods for corresponding other goods among fellow citizens (e.g. smoker's card for bread tokens). On the other hand, it is that Barter of scarce or rationed goods within certain groups of business people (butchers and clothing store owners, liquor dealers and tobacconists). As Third it comes preferred Granting of benefits against Delivery of goods that are in short supply or with limited supply, especially in the relationship between craftsmen and private customers."³⁷² Furthermore, exchange relationships developed between townspeople and farmers, especially in the provinces.

Finally, some valves were officially opened. "The organized exchange of used and unused goods was permitted in the form of the ring exchange process and the goods exchange centers in larger cities."³⁷³ The Reich Commissioner for recycling scrap materials led one Art reward exchange, at dem for example a voucher for the purchase of a bar of curd soap by handing over five kilograms of bones or a letter folder with five sheets and envelopes could be bought by handing over five kilograms of waste paper.

369 Please refer Boelcke, The German Business, S. 313 ff.

370 Ibid, S. 307.

371 Please refer ibid, S. 343 ff.

372 Messages out of dem Rich, S. 6260 f., SO report v. January 20, 1944.

373 Boelcke, The German Business, S. 344.

End 1944 arose the University of Münster as “Secret Imperial Matter” a work on “exchange economic options for mobilizing stocks of old textiles in German households”.³⁷⁴ This analyzed how to do this “general tendency towards exchange acts” could exploit in order to the population to Handing out old textiles and rags move, their emergence despite “spin collections” and other “popular sacrifice” campaigns declined rapidly. The author of the Study considered "making the allocation of smoking cards dependent on the presentation of a used textile tax"; the distribution of alcoholic beverages would also "promise a great success, as there have been no allocations for a long time more took place and This is unlikely to happen in the future either is to calculate." He finally suggested an exchange list to “lure out” old textiles.

Table 81

Suggestions for barter goods against Old textiles and rags, December 1944

barter goods	To be delivered Old textiles or. Rags (kg)
Smoking card Men	2.0
Smoking card Women	1.0
1 liter Drinking brandy	5.0
1 Wiping cloth or Dishcloth	1.0
1 men's shirt	3.0
1 long Men's underpants	3.0
1 Pair of men's socks	3.0
1 women's shirt	2.0
1 women's panties	2.0
1 Pair of women's stockings	1.0
1 Children's trousers and - shirt	3.0
1 Couple Children's stockings	1.0
100 G Knitting yarn u. like.	1.0bis 2.0
Je a "Point" the “Reich clothing card”	0.250

Source: How Note 374.

In January/February 1945, when the flow of millions of refugees reached the interior of Germany, this failed System of the Nazi supply bureaucracy, and the until a little more then regulated care the Population broke within fewer weeks together.

n) "Total volume" 1943

At the end of the summer of 1944, the planning office prepared a kind of economic balance sheet for 1943, which is of great interest because of its uniqueness and exemplary character. Apparently such a balance sheet only exists for the year 1943, but that's it also for the typical year of developed German war economy, a year without serious losses and disruptions caused by air raids and loss of territory.

374 BAP, FS, Film 10611, Memorandum Dr. Wilhelm Elbers (research center for general and textile market economics at the University of Münster), “Barter economic possibilities ...”, December 1944. Hereafter also the following.

This was about an attempt to "total volume" consisting of national income and "foreign benefits" (increase in clearing debt, crew costs and other penalty payments), to compare the usage side, broken down into civilian, state and armed forces consumption and investments. From this, with the addition of a few interim calculations and estimates, we can arrive at the level of war consumption in the narrower sense, ie the share of armed forces power, armaments and the associated investments, getting closed. The lineup ³⁷⁵, Declared a "Secret Reich Matter", it was a comprehensive part of a series of numerical reports on questions of Germany's war and economic potential.

Table 82

"Total volume of goods and Services by product group. German Reich (including Bohemia and Moravia). Preliminary amounts in billion RM for 1943"

Product groups	Domestic services	Foreign benefits	Together
<i>consumption</i>			
<i>Market services</i>			
Nutrition	37.1		37.1
luxury foods	9.3		9.3
clothing	17.1		17.1
Apartment	11.6		11.6
Heating, Lighting, Water	3.5		3.5
Furniture and Household items	5.5		5.5
Culture- and Luxury needs (material requirements)	4.1		4.1
Traffic	5.6		5.6
Healing beings	1.4		1.4
cleaning	0.7		0.7
Services, Enjoyment, Sports	1.4		1.4
<i>Market services in total</i>	97.0*		97.0
<i>State benefits</i>			
Civilian consumption (School, healing)			
Administration of justice and police	0.5		0.5
Education	4.0		4.0
Apartment	0.5		0.5
Healing beings	2.0		2.0
Welfare	3.0		3.0
<i>Civilian consumption in total</i>	10.0		10.0

375 **BAK, R** 3/1964, Bl. 6, "Number overview IX. Total volume of goods and services by product group. German Empire (including Bohemia and Moravia). Preliminary amounts in billion RM for 1943", September 1, 1944.

Table 82 (Continuation)

Product groups	domestic Services	foreign Services	Together
<i>Wehrmacht consumption</i>			
Nutrition	5.8	2.0	7.8
luxury foods	1.4	0.4	1.8
clothing	3.0	0.6	3.6
Apartment	0.8	0.2	1.0
heating, lighting, Water	0.3	0.1	0.4
Furniture and Household items	0.3	0.1	0.4
Culture- and Luxury needs	0.3	0.1	0.4
Traffic	0.2	0.0	0.2
Healing beings	1.4	0.4	1.8
cleaning	0.3	0.1	0.4
Services, Enjoyment, Sports	0.2	0.0	0.2
<i>Wehrmacht consumption in total</i>	14.0	4.0	18.0
<i>State benefits in total</i>	24.0	4.0	28.0
<i>consumption in total</i>	121.0	4.0	125.0
<i>Investments</i>			
<i>Wehrmacht (without Buildings)</i>			
Equipment of war			
Airplanes	12.6	1.1	13.7
Ships	2.4	0.2	2.6
tank	2.4	0.2	2.6
Motor vehicles	1.6	0.1	1.7
weapons (incl. underwater weapons)	2.8	0.2	3.0
ammunition	6.7	0.7	7.4
powder and Explosives	0.6	0.0	0.6
Precision mechanics and optics	1.6	0.1	1.7
Electrical engineering	2.3	0.2	2.5
Miscellaneous	2.0	0.2	2.2
<i>Equipment of war in total</i>	35.0	3.0	38.0
<i>Other Deliveries and services</i>	7.0		7.0
<i>Other Investments</i>			
<i>buildings</i>			
Industry	1.9	0.7	2.6
energy	0.4	0.1	0.5
Traffic	0.5	0.2	0.7
craft, Agriculture, forestry	0.3	0.2	0.5
trade, tourism,			

Table 82 (Continuation)

Product groups	domestic Services	foreign Services	Together
banks, Insurance			
Administration	1.2	2.0	3.2
Housekeeping	0.9	0.2	1.1
<i>buildings in total</i>	5.2	3.4	8.6
<i>machinery</i>			
Industry	3.9	1.1	5.0
energy	0.1	0.0	0.1
Traffic	0.5	0.1	0.6
Crafts	0.0	0.0	0.0
Agriculture	0.4	0.2	0.6
forestry	0.0	0.0	0.0
Trade, Tourism,			
banks, Insurance	0.0	0.0	0.0
Administration	0.1	0.0	0.1
Housekeeping			
<i>machinery in total</i>	5.0	1.4	6.4
<i>Miscellaneous</i>			
Industry	0.9	0.6	1.5
energy	0.1	0.0	0.1
Traffic	0.2	0.1	0.3
Crafts	0.0	0.0	0.0
Agriculture	0.1	0.1	0.2
Trade, Tourism,			
banks, Insurance	0.0	0.0	0.0
Administration	0.4	0.3	0.7
Housekeeping	0.1	0.1	0.2
<i>Miscellaneous in total</i>	1.8	1.2	3.0
<i>Other investments in total</i>	12.0	6.0	18.0
<i>Total investments</i>	54.0	9.0	63.0
<i>In total</i>	175.0	13.0	188.0

*) Correctly summed up: 97.3

Source: How Note 375.

On the consumption side (125 billion RM), in addition to the military consumption (18 billion RM), a significant part of the "civilian" consumption used by the state must be added to the war consumption, namely a large part of the expenditure for the police, including the SS, SD and Sipo, the expenses for paramilitary organizations such as the RAD and the OT, for the concentration, extermination and labor camps and for the judiciary and law enforcement apparatus, so probably four to five billion RM.

The entire "military equipment" and "other supplies and services" for the Wehrmacht were included in the investment balance (RM 63 billion) - From an economic point of view, this classification is absurd, since these goods and services never became material prerequisites for future production or other economic activity, i.e. physical capital. Here we want try that only for Exclude investments made in war and armaments from the total.

The items listed so far amount to a total of 68 Billion RM must be attributed to significant parts of the machinery and construction investments. A detailed breakdown of these investments is available from August/September 1944.³⁷⁶ She referred on the "Greater German Empire without a protectorate" and pointed therefore around nearly 30 percent lower totals. The numbers of the Construction investment statistics have already been published³⁷⁷. However, the investment in machinery has so far remained unknown.³⁷⁸

Table 83

Machinery- and construction investments, 1943 („Greater German Reich without Protectorate"; in mill. RM)

economic sector	Investments: machines	
		Building
Industry	3 895	1,834 _
Energy industry	79	392
Traffic	502	525
Crafts	35	
Agriculture	433	343*
Forestry	I	
Trade, Tourism,		
banks, Insurance	30	
Administration	53	1 167**
Housekeeping***		856°
total	5 028	5 117

*) Of these, 241 **Mill. RM** for resettlement.***) Of which 1 027 RM million for Wehrmacht and national defense. ***) D i. Buildings including housing.⁰) Of that 532 **Mill. RM** for Resettlement and barracks campaign.

Source: How Note 376.

The big items, especially investments in industry, energy and transport How also in the Administration are quite mostly for the Armament industry or. for

376 **BAK, R** 3/1960, BI. 165, "Construction investments in 1943, broken down according to production in the overall expenditure plan. Greater German Empire without a protectorate (approximate values)", July 23, 1944; BI. 175,

"Machinery investments in 1943, broken down according to production in the overall expenditure plan of the German economy. Greater German Empire without a protectorate (approximate values). Improved result", September 15, 1944.

377 II, S. 380; The effects, S. 59 Table 32.

378 Percentages only: II, S. 376 (after Weyres v. Levetzow, S. 115).

the Wehrmacht was made. Industrial investment, in turn, came from another source - also out dem planning office - differentiated, so that the Magnitude of war consumption in this case **can be determined more precisely.**

Table 84

*industrial investments, 1943 („Greater German Reich without Protectorate“; in **mill. RM**)*

	Investments: Mechanical	engineering
I. Rüstungsendfertigung	1 174	699
davon:		
Panzer	119	118
Kraftfahrzeuge	42	3
Waffen	118	65
Unterwasserwaffen	6	26
Zellen		
Triebwerke	74 } 181 }	127
Ausrüstung	51	
Schiffe	27	21
Feinmechanisches und optisches Kriegsgerät	5	4
Elektrotechnisches Kriegsgerät	57	30
Munition	176	62
Pulver und Sprengstoff	6	
Sonst. Wehrmachtsgerät	35	27
Nicht aufteilbarer Rest	278	216
II. Übrige Fertigung (25 Wirtschaftsgruppen)	328	141
III. Grundstoffindustrie	2 191	991
davon:		
Bergbau	1 384	149
Eisen und Stahl	243	142
NE-Metalle	3	94
Kraftstoffe	243	302
Holzgewinnung	9	
Chemikalien	298	261
Steine und Erden	11	2
Rest		41
IV. Bauindustrie	131	3
Rest insgesamt (I.-IV.)	71	
<i>Zusammen</i>	3 895	1 834

Quelle: Wie Anm. 376.

From The listed industrial investments must, with the exception of those in the construction industry and the consumer goods industry - For the sake of simplicity, the high Wehrmacht share in their future production should be ignored here - and in certain border areas with a negligible share, all others are viewed as armaments investments, i.e. as war consumption will be, so probably over 95 percent.

This makes it clear for the war consumption to calculate:

- 18 billion RM Wehrmacht "consumption",
- 38 billion RM war equipment,
- seven billion RM "other Services and Services" for the Wehrmacht,
- four until five billion RM for the suppression and destruction apparatus,
- 5.5 billion RM industrial investments,
- over three billion RM in investments in the energy industry, transport, "administration" and for "resettlement".

The total amount of pure war expenditure for "consumption" and investment was estimated at 76 billion RM, along with the investments in the "Protectorate" (6 billion **RM**), which may have served exclusively for war and armament purposes, to 82 billion RM. Of the "total revenue" Of the national income and foreign payments amounting to 188 billion RM, the share that accrued only to the war and the armaments industry in 1943 was almost 44 percent.

Chapter III

Labor procurement. The situation of the workers (studies)

1. crisis of "work assignment"

For years they had German authorities and arms companies out of abroad everything the occupied territories of Poland, the USSR and France, like out of an inexhaustible one reservoir Workforce after Germany pumped in, quite mostly as those forcibly recruited or as prisoners of war. That these sources in the third quarter, more precisely: since August 1943 a tempo to dry up began, took she very probably true; it prevented her but not about it, for 1944 to prepare a massive new levy program .

Since September/October 1943, the Germans had the unexpected opportunity to smuggle several hundred thousand Italian "military internees" into the German arms industry. When Italy on 8. When he left the war in September, the former allied Italian soldiers became too German prisoners of war and found themselves caught up in the maelstrom of the German war economy as workers. As "military internees" - one from Hitler coined term, the the Germans the obligations of Geneva Convention of 1929 for prisoners of war - From then on they were an object "for inhumanity, contempt for humanity, humiliation, which a sadistic imagination drove to never-ending excesses, for mental and physical torment as well as merciless exploitation. " ^{1,600} 000 "Imis" - that was the largest, most important influx of workers for the German war economy in the last period of the war.

The Minister of Armaments had hastily secured Hitler's place to use all Italian prisoners in the armaments industry. In an official letter granted the Central planning dem GBA on the 16th September 1943 the appropriate Edition: "On the express instructions of the Leaders have to The resulting Italian prisoners of war are sent exclusively to the commercial war economy. For this purpose, central planning determines that 1.) all Italian prisoners of war suitable for mining, first of all for mining, 2.) forces suitable for heavy industry to cover the area there from me recognized needs to use are. 3.) It is necessary, that the Gaur

See this fundamental work by Schreiber, Gerhard, Die Italian military internees in the German sphere of influence in 1943 until 1945. Betrayed - Despised - Forgotten, Munich 1990 (here: S. 578); also Cajani, Luigi, The Italians Military internees in Nazi Germany. In: Europe and the "Reich deployment". Edited by Ulrich Herbert, Essen 1991, p. 295 ff.; Herbert, Ulrich, foreign workers. Politics and practice of "Foreign assignment" in the war economy of Third Reich, Berlin/Bonn 1985, p. 259 ff. See also sections 2 and 3 in the previous chapter.

In principle, the Italian prisoners of war are to be ordered first only to be used to cover the need for red slips and lists."²

The arms industry learned of this on September 18th through Speer's circular.³ "Bright spot: Italians. ... RMin Speer's express wish that the branch offices of the RVE at sighting of the to available Italians switch on."⁴ The arms companies now saw, after Italy had left as an ally, also opportunities to recruit workers more freely in Italy: "Bright spot: civilian Italians in Italy."⁵

In Upper Silesian mining circles, people were apparently not too enthusiastic about the prospect of taking Italian prisoners of war. It was argued in the Schaffgotsch group that "only a very low performance can probably be expected from the Italians." I'll probably have three Italians for one German miner have to take. „Dr. However, Verres does not think that These three Italians will not even come close to replacing a German miner in terms of performance."

⁶ Nevertheless, complaints arose in the weeks and months that followed out of dem Hard coal mining and from GB Chemistry that too few Italian military internees were being assigned to them.⁷

hopes on more "Eastern Workers" smashed itself quickly. Still Beginning October 1943 they calculated Ruhr companies with increased supply. „More There are bright spots This is due to the fact that civilian Russians are being repatriated in the course of the withdrawal movements of our armies in the East. The extent of these new forces cannot yet be overlooked."⁸ Mid November - The Red Army had meanwhile taken Kiev and pushed further west across the Dnepr - was the General disappointment: "It's from Russia contrary to expectations in connection with planned repatriations No workers came in during drop-off movements."⁹

2 BAK, R 3/1597, Bl. 12, Headquarters planning (Funk/Milk/Speer) at GBA, September 16, 1943.

3 BAP, Siemens AG, No. 5624, REL. **RMRuK**, "Concern. use of Italian", September 18, 1943. Red note and lists = respectively with agreed to by the GBA Workforce requirements for priority Armaments manufacturing.

4 **BAK, R13** _ I/592, Prot. d. Meeting of the narrower advisory board Northwest of the Economic group Iron industry on October 8, 1943.

5 Ibid, meeting at the November 17, 1943. - After Goebbels was the Italian Prey, particularly at workers , a "good business"; p. II, S. 242. Colonel General Alfred Jodl, boss of Wehrmacht command staff, saw a way out out of dem "Dilemma of lack of people": „Fortunately shows Italy's betrayal comes from here his good Page. The Influx of military internees and workers Italy will one significant relief this one Area bring." (IMG, Vol. 37, S. 662, doc. L-172, speech before the imperial and Gauleiters the NSDAP (Draft), November 7, 1943).

6 WAP Katowice, Upper Silesian Institute for economic research, No. 2, AT ex. Discuss with Dr. Verres/Schaffgotsch in Gliwice, November 9, 1943.

7 BAP, FS, Movie 8322, AT ex. Discuss GB Chemistry/HA Building, 8.12. 1943; Thyssen archive, VSt/619, AN United Steelworks ex. Discuss at GauAA Essen, January 6, 1944: "Although one much higher number Italian military internees was promised, just be 7 500 dem district to provided , the but to 90 percent the iron creating Industry assigned be."

8 Like note 4.

9 How Note 4; meeting at the November 17, 1943.

Table 85

Speer and Sauckel's distribution plan for Italian military prisoners, late September/early October 1943

Together („first“)	440000
<i>of that</i>	
Heavy industry	30000
Other commercial War economy	150000
Coal mining	115 000
Other Mining	5 000
food industry, Crop emergencies	60000
Be- and Unloading columns	11000
Reichsbahn	15 000
Reichspost	10000
Construction sector	25 000

Source: Demps, forced laborers 1943, S. 839; report of GBA v. October 5, 1943, „The Work use in the III. quarter 1943“.

a) The fiasco of GBA

In the first half of 1944, the position of General Plenipotentiary for the work deployment together, and other conditions and power structures emerged in the multi-layered organizational structure of the German and foreign “work deployment”. The collapse of the European “Human dictator” Sauckel into insignificance and the expansion of the powers of Speer, Himmler, Goebbels, the DAF and the Wehrmacht in this area can only be roughly summarized here be sketched. On December 20, 1943, Sauckel reported to the Führer about the drastic decline in worker recruitment, especially in Western Europe, in the first seven months of 1943 are still 391 000 French, 117 000 Belgian and 138 000 Dutch after Germany came; from

August until December were it only still 26 000 French people (6.8 Percent), 13 000 Belgian (11

Percent) and 20 800 Dutch (15 percent). ¹⁰

The GBA gave several “Reasons for the collapse of “Western Worker Deployment” to:

“1.) Strengthening the resistance of the local population. 2.) Inconsistent opinion...among the Germans Departments”. The military commanders in France and Belgium “fear, for example, that the resistance movement will strengthen, in particular, danger to the transport facilities”; the armaments departments “fear a decline in performance in the German armaments factories in the occupied territories and strikes.” In third place, Sauckel mentioned the “lack of ability to take action and lack of authority, as well as inadequate executive resources, but also a lack of determination on the part of the French Government.”

The Minister of Armaments held it for required that Hitler deal with the labor situation concerned and before everything one Decision to his Favor above the so-called blocking

companies met. Tensions between him and the GBA on this issue had increased since then. The Speer-Bichelonne Agreement from Mitte September 1943 initiated; but in the first months of 1944, the open dispute broke out over the so-called protection companies or restricted companies (S-companies) in France and other countries (Belgium, Netherlands)

- sometimes also as spear operations referred to - out of, in To whom the workers in front were protected before being transported to Germany.¹¹

Speer explained to Hitler in mid-December 1943 that "the main thing is to exploit France's industry more for Germany in order to approximately to accommodate an additional million workers. In contrast, Sauckel takes the position that primarily workers to Germany "It is also about the uniformity of German occupation policy, "otherwise a loss of Germany's prestige and disorder in the French labor force would be unavoidable."¹²

The topic was the subject of extensive discussions in central planning on December 21st. There was agreement that in France and other occupied countries for Germany produced become must, if only there is some German workforce for it in Germany would be free. "Speer: Us stand with Sauckel because of France in a difference because I am of the opinion in France have to be the French ones Workers are activated for production that is made for Germany, so that we in Germany can released workers in the Armor stuck. The German workers are in Germany worth much more. For example, I can train textile workers for other industries much faster than a French worker. Funk: The same is the case with the Italian production that Schieber promised us and which has already taken the workers away from us."¹³

spear announced that at 4. January 1944 the problems of the "labour deployment" Hitler should be presented and that a preliminary discussion was arranged between him, Sauckel, Himmler, Keitel and Lammers, "In which the question of an executive power in a Sauckel action in France, Holland and Belgium should be clarified".¹⁴

The Advice to Hitler, at the except the The so-called milk and cheek took part, externally without the drama that was inherent in their subject.¹⁵ The needs calculation, which was opened showed over four million new workers to be recruited:

"a) to Maintaining employment levels in the entire War economy including agriculture or to replace departures due to conscription into the armed forces, death, illness, expiry of the contract, etc.... 2,500,000...

11 Please refer II, p. 160 f.; S. 241 f.; Kehrl, p. 344 ff.; Herbert, foreign workers, S. 253 ff.

12 FB, December 16/17, 1943, Point 8th.

13 ZPP, 52. Meeting, December 21, 1943; partially also as Doc. Spear-9 in **IMG**, Vol. 41, S. 414 f.

14 How Note 13. Similar already in the Meeting with Hitler (see note 12). Differently see Speer, *Erinnerungen*, p. 333 (only Himmler and Keitel). According to Speer (*ibid.*, p. 564, note 21) it was said on January 4, 1944 Chronicle: "The minister hopes that With the help of Himmler and Keitel he managed the dangerous restart the Sauckel actions avoid could..." This passage cannot be found in the source (BAK, R 3/1739).

15 Here is DZW, Vol. 5, S. 370, to be corrected. Please refer also Homze, Edward L., *Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany*, Princeton, NY, 1967, p. 147 ff.

- b) for additional Armament tasks or. for special Guide programs ... 1 300 000 ...
 c) to Fulfillment of driver requirements regarding air raid shelters ... 250 000
 ... together 4 050,000." ¹⁶

The entire plan revealed one Euphoria, that could hardly have been shared by everyone present. Sauckel explained, he would "with make the attempt with fanatical will", to fulfill the order confirmed by Hitler. However, this time, unlike usual, he was "not in a position with the best will in the world to give a firm commitment." According to his ideas, one and a half million should come from Italy, one million from France, from the occupied Soviet territories and the General Government 600 000, from Belgium and the Netherlands each 250 000 workers to Germany be deported. Out of "Inner German Reserves" should be "at extreme effort" half a million, the rest (100 000) from other European countries (4.2 million in total).

The GBA was expressly obliged by Hitler to "protect the workers employed by Reich Minister Speer in the French armaments factories from withdrawal."

Under these circumstances, the Minister of Armaments raised no objections to the GBA program seemed completely behind the from Hitler to provide authorized numbers. In contrast, there were voices from his own ministry, such as the planning office, which supported the GBA program in his Height as "completely absurd" designated. Kehrl called it

"one Utopia and over and beyond one serious political danger for Germany" ¹⁷ . let but nevertheless a list of needs for more than 4.4 million workers by mid-February calculate, in which, however, also the Fluctuation due to job changes ("false fluctuation") with around one million workers.

At least Speer relayed it Ending the conference, still pending the Führer headquarters, the Armament inspection Paris the "Leader instructions" in the Shape, that the blocking companies

to be replenished "accelerated and preferentially" with workers and "the workers who are now working and who will flow in in the future through free advertising or through placement in the blocked companies in the occupied territories and to protect Italy from any withdrawal to Germany are." ¹⁸ His actual strategy formulated the minister few later in his "Leader template I" from the 25. January in shape the Financial support, straight also the GBA must

"really unconditionally" his professional Instructions are equivalent to and itself exclusively "as helper for the Tasks the Armor" . ¹⁹

16 IMG, Vol. 27, S. 108, Doc. PS-1292, Sauckel to Lammers, January 5, 1944. Hereafter (p. 107 ff.) the following; see *ibid.*, p. 104 ff., AN Lammers, January 4, 1944.

17 BAP, case XI, No. 188, Protocol, hearing Werner Bosch (P!Amt), September 20, 1948; s. a. Sweep!, S. 344;
 S. 346 ff.

18 IMG, Vol. 41, p. 415 f., Doc. Speer-10, Telephone Speer to General Studt, January 4, 1944. Apparently such letters were also sent to the armaments departments in Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy .

19 BAP, FS, Movie 3385. Please refer also Chapter I in the prev. Vol.

Table 86

Workforce program of Planning Office for 1944 (in 1 000)

	I quarter	II.-IV. Quart.	In total
Agriculture	70	70	140
forestry u. Timber industry	40 ¹		40
armor u. war production	544 ²	3000	3 544
Air damage	100	50	150 ³
Traffic distribution	85 ⁴	265	350
Public administration	62 ⁵		62
Wehrmacht administration	130		130
total	1 031	3 385	4416

¹) Of which 25,000 for the forestry industry and 15,000, including 8,000 women, for the timber industry, compared to a peace requirement of 150,000 male and 40,000 female. Seasonal workers with now significantly increased felling (1943: 70 million cubic meters; 1944: 80 million cubic meters) and particularly strong combing by convocation. ²) Along with dem GBA determined as Immediate need for February. ³) 150 000 are the minimum requirements; additionally to the until now used 70,000 OT, 100 000 GB Building and 118 000 craftsmen in local and regional operations and 42 000 centrally deployed forces. The movable ones Formations are to multiply and to be strengthened through local support, in particular through the through Aviation damage released. ⁴) Of that 75 000 Reichsbahn, 1 000 inland waterway vessel

drive, 7 000 motor traffic, 2 000 Local railroad. ⁵) Of that 27 000 Reichspost and 35 000 Red Cross.

Source: ZPE, 53. Meeting, February 16, 1944.

Sauckel didn't think about coming along to be content with such a role, and so on it came on the 1st March 1944 on a Central planning meeting led to heated arguments. In view of the clearly emerging fiasco of its program, the GBA left he by hook or by crook wanted, in the Offensive and attacked the S-companies frontally at. He said he saw "a serious danger in the exaggerated concept of protection in France for the Mission for Germany The S operation in France is nothing other as

a shield from Sauckel's access! ... If we are in Germany, where we have the companies in the Have a hand where we also one other Work discipline have and produce different work performance than in France itself, do without these people (from the S-companies - DE), then we forego the quality, and I can only do the inferior ones elements ... after Germany bring I am the Opinion, that at all the

"The introduction of the S-companies was a major mistake that damaged the interests of Germany as a whole." ²⁰ He had to control the S-companies, get the superfluous workers, especially skilled workers, and needed sufficient executive power for this above all the support from the occupying troops.

Milch, who chaired the meeting, later recalled that the opponents were "like vicious dogs." each other started. ²¹ spear was absent; despite it was standing the GBA open-

20 ZPP, 54. Meeting, March 1, 1944. Hereafter also the The following.

21 BAP, case XI, No. 215, hearing Milk, October 13, 1948.

visibly in a losing battle. The heads of the Ministry of Armaments (Kehr!, Schieber, Waeger) categorically rejected “a perforation of the principle of S-companies (as) completely out of the question.” and referred to Hitler's vote of April 4th. January.²²

Sweep! had another one done and itself immediately after the meeting at Hitler on his own the Occupation authorities in France, Belgium and the Netherlands agreed to forestall Sauckel's new actions and declare "everything that is not nailed down" as off-limits operations.²³ The bodies mentioned were in view of the growing crisis in the occupation regime and in anticipation of the invasion themselves urgently interested in conserving energy and keeping the population calm, and reacted promptly.²⁴

There were also major differences on the second central question of labor procurement, which concerned the available “internal German reserves,” particularly the obligation to serve non-working people German women. Sauckel denied the possibility that to bring the German population into armaments work on a much larger scale than before through compulsory work, implementation and “combing out”. His thesis, “that there is practically a German Work use male- and on the female side not more gives; he must as exhausted viewed will”²⁵. tried he through one On Bill of German against to support the British women's mission; According to this, almost 60 percent of all women in Germany were aged 14 to 65 "employed" for years (including self-employed people, family members helping out, Wehrmacht helpers, etc.) - according to his calculations, as many as in England. The central planning and the Ministry of Armaments complained On the other hand, for a long time now there has been “a complete failure of the mobilization of German women for work and armaments” and they had made other calculations (46 percent of employed German women).²⁶

22 ZPE, 54. Meeting, March 1, 1944.

23 Kehr!, p. 347 f. See also IMG, vol. 41, p. 415 f., Doc. Speer-10, Speer to General Studt, Paris, 4th I. 1944.

24 Please refer BAP, case XI, No. 374, Doc. NG-1838, Affid. Abetz, 30.5. 1947. - Iodine! noted on his

"Huge sightseeing trip West" on 13.1.1944: „General v. Cuffing nail.2) Danger the action Sauckel, you have to stall on a voluntary basis until the landing (of the Allies - DE)." (IfZ, ED 115, NL Jod!, TB Jod!, Vol. III).

25 ZPP, 54. Meeting, March 1, 1944. Hereafter also the The following.

26 ZPP, 53rd meeting, February 16, 1944. According to USSBS calculations, 45 percent of the female working population in Germany was in employment as of March 31, 1944, while only 35 percent was in non-agricultural employment Sector (The Effects, p. 38, Table 16). The success of the British women's mobilization stood in "significant contrast". One characteristic was the number of domestic helpers, which decreased only slightly in Germany towards 1939 (1939: 1.58 **million**; 1943: 1.44 **Mill.**; Sept. 1944: 1.3 **mill.**), in Great Britain on the other hand between 1939 and 1943 of 1.2 on 0.5 mill. sank. Strong grown and far beyond twice as was big also the German authorities. (Ibid., p. 34; p. 215, table 15). The housemaids were apparently a critical point, especially for the Nazi upstarts; This is how Sauckel argued at a meeting with Hitler on April 25, 1944: “If, for example, housemaids are now being drafted into Germany, many things will become absurd, for example that a responsible man the Have to clean boots yourself ” (**BAK, R 43 11/651**, transcript Bor manns, April 25, 1944).

At the time, the outcome of the battle still seemed uncertain to those involved, especially since Speer had been ill for a long time and his position was temporarily weakened. "They overlap," like this was the verdict in the Reich Chancellery, „two claims to totality, namely that one of GBA on the management of Europe's entire workforce in favor of the German war economy and that of the Armaments Minister to manage war production. The Only the leader can make the decision as to which claim takes precedence."²⁷

Meanwhile, the Minister of Armaments did not remain idle. He put Sauckel under pressure. The armament programs (new submarines, torpedoes, anti-tank weapons, airborne weapons, infantry guns and others) could not be fulfilled, he wrote him, if mid-March despite Despite the usual success reports from the GBA, not even the January red slips and the February slips were barely half supplied with workers.²⁸ If Eastern workers came, they would exist Transports to to half, various even more, from children under 14 years of age, the elderly, the sick and the wounded.²⁹ He would probably have to withdraw his promise "not to attribute the program delays in my lectures to the Führer caused by the lack of manpower in the individual arms branches to this actual cause."³⁰

Hitler behaved cautiously, probably because he was too dependent on the Armaments Minister and his well-established and successful armaments management apparatus. In mid-April he sent Sauckel home from an audience without having accomplished anything and did not consult until April 25th, when Speer was able to appear again in Berchtesgaden, with the participants in the presence of Lammers, Bormann, Ley, Fischböck, Abetz and Liebel (Zentral amt **RMRuK**). The most important point of discussion was the S-companies. Speer traded one for themselves very cheap armistice with dem GBA out of. He confessed him to, itself at

"Visits" of S-companies to participate. "It is agreed that the Commission, the French should visit companies, out of men of spear and Sauckel, chaired by Speer's men."³¹ From now on, new S-companies were to be set up with the participation of the GBA. Hitler confirmed this in front of everyone present as his last word, "that in case of doubt, the final decision from Reich Minister spear should be hit".³²

While the disputes between the Armaments Minister and the GBA in the first months of 1944 are quite well known³³, has hardly been examined as it is in the summer attached became. Her Exit can in two phases described become. The first

27 BAK, R 4311/651, AT f. Lammers, April 18, 1944. Please refer also vine table, S. 512 f.

28 BAP, FS, film 3857, Speer to Sauckel, March 22, 1944 (I. Version March 14, 1944). - "From 63 000 red notes in January and February were 20 000 was not covered, although according to Gauleiter Sauckel over 300,000 workers were sent to the war economy in the same period. Minister Speer personally took responsibility for clarifying this contradiction." (BAK, R 70 Poland/78, Ndschr. about the chairman of the armaments commission, March 16, 1944). See also IMG, vol. 41, P. 442 f., Doc. Speer-32, Speer to Sauckel, March 11, 1944.

29 BAK, R 3/1597, spear at Sauckel, January 25, 1944. Please refer II, p. 274.

30 As note 28.

31 BAK, R 4311/651, Transcript Bormanns, April 25, 1944.

32 Ibid, Transcript Lammers', 27.4.1944.

33 See Milward, war economy, S. 88 f.; Janssen, S. 125 ff.; Homze, S. 194 ff., S. 223 ff.; Herbert, Foreign Workers, p. 251 ff. Further Speer, Memories, p. 333 fu Kehr!, p. 341 ff.

covered the period until the middle of the year. During this time, military and political events in the West (Invasion) and in the East (Belorussian Operation) took place the reds Army) and to a large extent also in Italy the GBA provided the basis for its activities in the occupied territories. The second phase is characterized by the submission of the GBA to the decision-making power of the Minister of Armaments, by its gradual stripping of all essential central functions and, during the final phase of the war, by its retreat into relative insignificance Gauleiter position characterized. None the less he produced as GBA still until Recently, numerous “programs” and dubious reports.

In May 1944, Sauckel, with the help of the occupation authorities and the Foreign Office, concluded agreements with the French and Italian (Mussolini) governments the annual call for work in Germany came about.³⁴ But events passed over these plans and treaties. On June 28th Sauckel already signaled that the Results of the German-Italian agreement “extraordinary "left to be desired" let. “The calls so far whole Vintages are only to one quite A small fraction has been followed.”³⁵

At the same time, German arms companies also reported that their volunteer recruitment had de facto collapsed. The advertisers of a Zeiss company set up in France reported: “Under today's circumstances, recruiting workers for Germany is not only very difficult, but almost impossible. Everyone who wanted to leave voluntarily left. As far as I can see, workers can only be brought into the Reich with strong police means, but even here every alternative option is used. ... It is for example a gentleman (from Zeiss - DE) in Orleans managed to find 35 suitable workers by combing out smaller and Smallest businesses to be found, but they are at the train station Finally only three men were found, the rest had disappeared.”³⁶

Everyone stayed in Italy Efforts to recruit volunteers are also “pointless.” the for The advertiser responsible for the German aircraft industry reported to the head of the Focke-Wulf Group, “in particular after through the m. E completely inappropriate and confusing methods compulsory confiscation of the workers to German labor deployment and the Wehrmacht no longer voluntarily report for German labor deployment at all takes place.”³⁷

Under the pressure of events, Sauckel appears to have approached Speer. On June 21, 1944, shortly before the armaments conference, which was triumphant for the armaments minister in Linz, in whose Frame Hitler himself occurred, found in Berchtesgaden a “Forgiving-

34 BAK, R 43 II/651, Sauckel to Lammers, May 14, 1944; Lammers to Ribbentrop, May 14, 1944; “Agreement with the Italian government on the retirement of certain vintages for the use in the Reich” of May 20, 1944; Sauckel-Laval Agreement of May 12, 1944.

35 Ibid, Sauckel at Lammers, June 28, 1944.

36 Brazen. BA from VEB Pentacon Dresden, Ememann-France, No. 162, Ernemann-France to Zeiss Ikon, June 28, 1944.

37 BA/MA, FS, Film 3956, AN Franz Haberstolz (RMRuK staff in Italy) for Kurt Tank (Focke Wulf), July 6, 1944.

conversation" instead, the spear on the 24th. June in his speech in Linz: "I intend to three days with put together by Pg. Sauckel and over a period of several hours After a difficult battle with Sauckel, they communicated and reconciled, as the saying goes. However, I had to insist on my position." ³⁸ According to the "Berchtesgaden Agreement" of June 22, 1944, the "result of long, arduous discussions with and without the involvement of the Reich Chancellery" ³⁹. The chairmen of the armaments commissions were given very extensive powers with regard to the "deployment of work", in particular the right to give instructions the president of the regional employment offices. They had to use all the armaments and war production available workforce decide; the Presidents of the regional employment offices had to carry out these decisions "in all cases of needs assessment, recognition of needs and the implementation of workers without delay ." ⁴⁰

With his signature on this agreement, which was published on July 21st in the newsletter of the Ministry of Armaments, Sauckel apparently signaled his willingness to the question of S-companies are forced to crawl when this happens were not mentioned in it at all.

On July 2, 1944, Sauckel had to inform Hitler that the procurement of labor from Italy and Western Europe had "practically come to a standstill in the last few weeks" ⁴¹. In the last quarter (April - June) only 19,140 workers came from Italy and 19,160 from France. The now expired Presentation dates for two for the

"Empire deployment" Italian vintages offered would only be noticed by 1.8 percent of those called up been - a "complete failure" which the GBA attributed to the "failure of the Italian government". In France I have field marshal v. Rundstedt "suspended" the vintage call (1924) in view of the situation in the country. There are now, where there is short-time work everywhere, there are hundreds of thousands of available workers. But: "Only a tiny fraction of the French workforce fulfills their obligation to serve."

Hitler ordered at least, immediately one to convene a meeting of all departments involved. ⁴² Lammers scheduled a "chief meeting" in the Reich Chancellery for July 11, 1944. Four days earlier, Sauckel presented a half-yearly balance sheet, which he presented to those in the know the fiasco of "Reich operation" revealed. ⁴³ The bloated post of the German Workers (with part-time workers and home workers) and those deported from the USSR (with children, old people and other "repatriates") as well as the prisoners of war who did not fall under his authority accounted for 83 percent of the overall "success".

38 **BAK, R** 3/1550, speech in Linz, June 24, 1944.

39 Timeline, June 22, 1944.

40 **IMG**, Vol. 34, S. 44 f., Doc. PS-4006, agreement above "Community work of General representative for the work effort and of Reich Minister for armor and war producti<:m", June 22, 1944.

41 **BAK, R** 4311/651, Sauckel at Hitler, July 2, 1944. Hereafter also the The following.

42 Ibid, Personal adjutant of "leader" at Lammers, July 3, 1944.

43 BAP, FS, Film 3353, Report of GBA, "New workers made available to the economy from II to June 30, 1944", July 7, 1944. See also Homze, p. 150.

Table 87

Labor procurement in the first half year 1944 (in 1 000)

	plan of GBA for the first half of the year 1944	Reported fulfillment	In Percent of plan
German Workforce	250	848	339
Italian civilian Workforce	1 125	37	3
French Workforce	455	33	7
Belgian Workforce	125	16	13
Dutch Workforce	125	15	12
Workforce out of the occupied areas the USSR, dem General Government, dem protectorate and the remaining European countries	350	436	125
Prisoners of war		97	
<i>Together</i>	2430	1482	61

Source: BAP, FS, Film 3353, GBA report about. "New workers made available to the economy from June 1st to June 30, 1944", July 7, 1944 (fulfillment); **IMG**, Vol. 27, p. 109 f., Doc. PS-1292, Sauckel to Lammers, January 5, 1944 (Plan).

At the "chief meeting" On July 11th, the GBA initially tried to find the culprits. He spoke of a "scandal" and the "complete bankruptcy of the German authority in Italy and France."⁴⁴ He complained that "the necessary severity was not applied." The "cancer damage" is that his, Sauckel's, "extensive responsibilities and powers have been put up for discussion." He called for more military and police to support him and called for more pressure to be put on the country's own governments. It is necessary to finally "set an example," for example stubborn French authorities to shoot or "a large part of the to transport away the outstanding excellent Italian harvest in order to improve the rations of the German and foreign workers."

Only the Representative of **OKW**, general Walter Warlimont, told dem GBA more extensive support too. He promised to bring in the able-bodied residents during the forced evacuation of large cities and the clearing of areas close to the front, but above all to get workers out of the "gang areas". Kaltenbrunner complained about the Sipo's weakness in the occupied areas. Eggert Reeder (MV boss Belgium /Northern France) considered strengthening the field gendarmerie to a full 200 men.

The majority of speaker, except Speer and Funk especially those High-ranking representatives of the occupation authorities in France and Italy (Michel, Abetz, Rahn, Landfried) opposed Sauckel's line. Violent methods would only cause "complete disorder and disruption of production" (Rahn), including the shooting of French officials "the Population only around so rather into the maquis to drive" (Abetz). Rahn criticized in the-

44 **IMG**, Vol. 33, Doc. PS-3819, p. 186 ff., AN for Lammers üb. boss meeting on July 11, 1944 regarding. "Increased use of foreign workers", July 12, 1944. Hereafter also the following.

In this context, explicitly "the retaliatory action ordered by the Führer because of the strikes in Turin, through which ten percent of the workforce should have been identified as unwilling to work."⁴⁵

Funk summed up after the meeting: "It was clear that the measures envisaged in the executive meeting, especially in the resistance areas, none ins would produce results that would decrease in weight..."⁴⁶ Sauckel could not escape this impression either. It was probably the decisive impetus for him to meet with the Minister of Armaments finally closed arrange. Already on the 16th July spoke spear as Sauckels Guest at the Wartburg in front of the representatives the GBA offices. In Sauckel's "message" to Hitler was called it occasion Speers Participation: "It consists of all fundamental ones Questions with full agreement."⁴⁷

Announced at the Wartburg conference the GBA has a new "work deployment program" for the second half of the year in the form of 15 points, the second only one only concrete number was included (250 000 "to be combed out" German forces) and a single, still unclear, subordinate reference to the "increased mobilization of workers in the occupied territories and in the friendly states".⁴⁸ Insofar as the 15-point program did not limit itself to generalities, its two focal points were agreed with Speer; this concerned the more radical approach of the domestic German reserves and the performance increase the German and foreign workers certain concessions (wages and wage transfers, nutrition, clothing).

In the meantime, Speer and Goebbels had taken much more far-reaching measures "Total war" prepared Hitler was suggested and presented several times. These negotiations, in which Sauckel no longer had a part, ultimately resulted in Goebbels' appointment as "Reich Plenipotentiary for Total War Operations" on July 25, 1944.⁴⁹

b) Last Labor reserves

The events on the fronts and in the occupied territories meant that in the course of the summer months of 1944 the rulers in Germany were forced to develop completely different labor resources than before and that the procurement of labor for the German war economy was correspondingly completely different structure had. At the first Job moved the mobilization German, particularly

45 Rahn continued according to the minutes: "We have 4,000 for this purpose German forces were brought together. The result was that the resistance movement cut off food supplies to Turin and the interruption of the energy supply been, like that that 250 000 workers should have celebrated. This cannot be justified in view of the considerable war contribution of the Italian armaments industry." (ibid.).

46 BAK, R 7/3007, Wireless at Lammers, July 13, 1944.

47 BAK, R 4311/651, „Report" Sauckels at the "Leader", July 17, 1944.

48 BAK, R 41/237a. More GBA programs or. drafts from the July 1944 s. BAK, R 4311/651.

49 Please refer Cape. I in the prev. Vol.; DZW, Vol. 6, S. 222 ff. Sources v. a. in BAK, R 43 II/664a.

female workers. In the July and August were Hitler after much resistance Approval to increase the compulsory service age for women from 45 to 50 or to 55 years.⁵⁰ reserves, which were also not inconsiderable, opened up the economy to the “restriction of administrations and companies”. Of the free here- and “implemented” workforce (455 052) came from around 24 percent off the household sector, 23 percent from the area of the Reich Ministry for Science, education and public education (especially schools), 9.5 percent from the administration of the armaments industry, 8 percent from the Reich Chamber of Culture, 6 percent the inside and 5 percent out the postal ministry.⁵¹

Table 88

statistics to Labor procurement for the “total war effort”, Was standing: December 31, 1944

1. Second and third parties Mandatory Reporting Ordinance	
a) Received Messages	1 783 351
b) finally edited Messages	1 391 136
c) from b) are usable and usable persons	899 626
d) used persons	582 884
2. extraction from workers through the Limitation from administrations and Operated	
a) For important to the war effort Mission intended Forces	608 449
b) implemented Workforce	455 052

Remarks: GauAA East Prussia without Goldap, Gumbinnen, Insterburg, Memel, Scharfenwiese, Sudauen and Tilsit.- GauAA Cologne-Aachen (without AÄ Aachen, Düren, Erkelenz and Eupen) as of. 14.10.- GauAA Essen (for AÄ Duisburg, Essen, Kleve and Moers from October 23rd) Stand from. 25.1 l. - GauAA Düsseldorf stand v.28.10.-GauAA Baden stand v. 18.1 l. - GauAA Westphalia-South u. Moselland (for AÄ Gerolstein v. 9.9. and Koblenz v. 18.1 l.) Stand v. 25.1 l. - GauAA Westphalia-North (for AA Gelsen churches v. 10/28 and Bielefeld v. 2.12.) and Westmark (for AÄ Saarbrücken v. 31.10. and Saarlautern v. 15.II.) As of December 9th. - GauAA Kurhessen, Franconia and Salzburg Stand v. 12/16 - GauAA Rhein Main (for AÄ Gießen from 25.II. and Niederlahnstein from 2.12.) and Württemberg Stand from. 12/23 - GauAA Munich-Upper Bavaria for AÄ Munich and Traunstein v. 12/15

Source: BAK, R 4 I/290a, BI. 14.

Different other smaller and larger additions to labor flowed In 1944 from the German manpower reserves into armaments. Relatively significant, although not exact in extent capture, was the Home work. The Decrees of Minister of Armaments about the “relocation of home-based production from the armaments industry and commercial enterprises War economy into “war home work” took place over the course of the year 1944 a always more urgent Inflection at: „It must all suitable Work ver-

50 See operations in BAP, FS, film 19482; “Second VO about the Report of men and women for tasks of the Reich defense”, June 10, 1944, in: RGBI. 1944 I, p. 133 f.; “Third VO about the registration of men and women for tasks of the Reich defense”, July 28, 1944, in: RGBI. 1944 I, p. 168; see also DZW, vol. 6, p. 375.

51 BAK, R 4 I/290a, BI. 15. - The “registration” of housemaids was only regulated by a GBA decree of September 11, 1944 (von Gersdorff, Ursula, women in military service 1914-1945, Stuttgart 1969, p. 443 f.).

be stored." ⁵² Nevertheless, it worked Industry the initiative of Ministers only gave up reluctantly and hesitantly, as working from home involved a lot of additional work. However, in suitable industries, such as the electrical engineering, precision engineering and textile industries, additional workers could be included in the armaments by assigning home work, especially women who were covered by the registration requirement but not because of their children or family members in need of care could be used in companies.

A high percentage of female labor service was used in the armaments industry. Was low against that number of to mobilize for this purpose students, and the intention completely failed, students to work in to commit to armaments. To at the same time they were Protection provisions for working young people have largely been abolished. Reich Youth Leadership, Reich Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Armaments agreed on one 56-hour working week; For those over 16, it was said that 60 hours was acceptable. ⁵³

In April 1944, the Ministry of Armaments suggested "work treatment" for inmates of military hospitals and hospitals. They should do work in the armaments sector for pay, if necessary also as supervisory staff; in this way "a large number of additional working hours" could be gained. According to head of office Saur, "mildly ill cases" should also do such work in tuberculosis sanctuaries. ⁵⁴

In this case, there is a success report from the Minister of Armaments from the end of the year. Speer informed the commander of the reserve army on the 15th. December 1944 with, that hospital inmates work seven million hours a month for armaments; That corresponds to the output of 28,000 full-time employees. ⁵⁵

The prisoners held in penitentiaries and prisons represented a considerable labor reserve. Their number had more than doubled since 1939 and amounted to almost 200,000 in September 1944, including 73,000 foreigners, mostly young people (around 70 percent) ⁵⁶. In May, the Minister of Armaments and the Minister of Justice agreed that all prisoners, including those held at short notice and those from small prisons, "If possible, to be used for armaments production with the greatest possible speed." ⁵⁷ In September, we found ourselves Minister of Justice Thierack already reported 90 percent of prisoners "in work that is directly important to the war effort," either in the prisons themselves or at branch offices and construction sites of armaments companies and departments. ⁵⁸

Since the end of 1943, when the SS tasked with relocating V-weapons production underground let ⁵⁹, and especially since the formation of the Jägerstab's work began

52 B.A Sachsenwerk, prelim. No. 55 I, REl. RMRuK, July 17, 1944; with reference to decrees of November 12, 1943 and March 13, 1944.

53 BAP, FS, Movie 1729, Erl. RMRuK ex. "Youth working time in the Armaments program", November 29, 1944; cited herein. Statement RArbM, September 5, 1944.

54 BAK, R 3/3035, RMRuK (Saur) on military district representative, April 8, 1944.

55 BAK, R 3/1956, spear at Jüttner, December 15, 1944.

56 DZW, Vol. 6, p. 266 f., report Thieracks, Sept. 1944.

57 BAK, R 22/5022, common Decrees RMRuK u. RmDJ, 12. u. May 26, 1944.

58 How Note 56.

59 Please refer II, S. 154 ff.

The treatment of concentration camp prisoners is taking on new proportions. The number of "auxiliary camps" and "external commandos" grew several times, from 165 in April to over 500 on End of 1944.⁶⁰ The number of Working prisoners exceeded half a million. A large Part worked under indescribable conditions conditions the completion and setting up the underground structures, especially for the fighter plane, aircraft engines and V-weapons production, a growing part also in the Arms production itself. Hardly any arms company that didn't also have concentration camp prisoners working for them.

Under the pressure of the labor situation, the SS was increasingly interested in prisoners who were able to work. In August 1944 the main economic administration office was waiting There are still over 600,000 "new arrivals" from the previously occupied areas, including 400 000 A resident of rebellious Warsaw, 90 000 Hungarian Jews and 60 000 Polish Jews and other prisoners.⁶¹

As far as the Jewish prisoners were concerned, the SS actually made a turnaround in the spring of 1944 from the strict pursuit of the "final solution" to the segregation of those fit for work forced labor in Germany. Undoubtedly not without Hitler's place and, as Speer testifies⁶², sometimes against the fierce resistance of the Gauleiter it happened that since May/June 1944 Tens of thousands of Jews, albeit at sharper Isolation and guarding, in large and medium-sized armaments factories, on the construction sites of the Jägerstab, etc. throughout Germany, although under grueling working and living conditions.

c) Jewish Deportees out of Hungary

A special, little-explored part this tragedy is the Deportation of Hungarian Jews Work in Germany. In barely eleven weeks, from the end of April to At the beginning of July 1944, according to the German "success" reports, 437,402 of around 800,000 were Hungarian Jews after Auschwitz transported been.⁶³ The deportees should - as last

60 DZW, Vol. 6, p. 377. An extensive literature has now been published on the topic, including many on regional history Work; most recently Struve, Walter, Rise and Reign of National Socialism in a small industrial town. Osterode on Harz 1918-1945, Essen 1992 (p. 452 ff.); Wysocki, Gerd, Work for War, Braunschweig 1992 (p. 136 ff.); Kaienburg, Hermann, "Destruction through work". The Neuengamme case, Bonn 1990; Fröbe, Rainer, etc. a., concentration camp in Hanover, 2 Vol., Hildesheim 1985. See DZW, Vol. 5, S. 221; Vol. 6, S. 273, p. 377; see Section 3 in the previous chapter.

61 DZW, Vol. 6, S. 269 (quote Write of SS-WVHA, August 15, 1944).

62 Spear, slave state, S. 402 f.

63 Hilberg, Rau!, The destruction the European Jews, Frankfurt a. M. 1990, TB edition, Vol. II, P. 863 ff. (p. 915). Varga (Varga, Lasz16, Hungary. In: Dimension of genocide. The number of Jewish victims of National Socialism. Ed. Wolfgang Benz, Munich 1991, p. 340; p. 351) estimates the Number of Hungarian Jews on March 19, 1944 (after Qualification Hungarian legislation) to 795,000. According to Varga (ibid. p. 344), the number of deportees increased to 444,152 through "special operations" and the like. - Immediately after March 19, 1944, the establishment of the Sztojay puppet government and the infiltration of Hungary by an army of German commissars and "Advisor", had the SS special operations command Hungary under Adolf Eichmann began his work on the "Final Solution" in Hungary.

Victim the "Final solution" - be murdered immediately. Nevertheless, "woke up at the SS new hope for "big business" with Jewish workers ⁶⁴, especially since the Jägerstab's huge construction projects, in which the SS was directly involved, could not be carried out without large amounts of additional workers.

For the first time, Hungarian Jews were included as workers in the "Führer meeting" (Hitler - Saur). 6th/7th April 1944 mentioned. ⁶⁵ Hitler explained that he was getting "personal with the Reichsführer SS get in touch and cause this to happen Hungary the "to raise the required approximately 100,000 men by providing appropriate Jewish contingents" if for the construction of the large underground aircraft factory he wanted There was a shortage of workers in the "Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia". ⁶⁶ In May and later it was in Hunter staff very common the Speech about the Hungarian Jews, the one urgent as workforce wanted to use the bunker and cave buildings for the aircraft, aircraft engine, electrical engineering, etc. industries. Fröbe rightly notes, that the Representative the Industry already closed this Time

"Exactly expertise above the Course the deportations" owned. ⁶⁷

The Intentions of Himmler, Pohl, Kammler and of SS special operations commandos Hungary under Adolf Eichmann, at the price of a temporary postponement of the "Final Solution". Apparently, some of the Hungarian Jews have to be sent to Germany for forced labor Conflict with their fundamental Target located, the "Final Solution". the murder of all Hungarian Jews to bring the desired conclusion, which Hitler also pushed for. For the Hungarian "work assignment". Jews in Germany put urgently the Minister of Armaments, the GBA, the OT and numerous other institutions and Organizations that, according to reports from the Foreign Office, "are used to record Jewish workers (out of Hungary - D E.) Representative after Berlin sent" had. ⁶⁸ Under this one that the "organizations" that were queuing up at the **WVHA in Berlin** for such workers were the Reich Coal Association and the Iron Reich Association, but also individual large corporations.

The Foreign Office took part actively both in herding the Jews, in their deportation and in the handling of the Hungarian authorities on this issue as well as in the discussion above her very next Fate. Already center April appears, dem report of

"Reich Plenipotentiary and Envoy of the Greater German Empire in Hungary", Edmund Veessenmayer, according to between AA, SS, Horthy, dem Honved and dem Hungarian Inside-

64 Hilberg, S. 998.

65 Already in In 1943 the Minister of Armaments via the Foreign Office the Hungarian government 6 000 Jews for the work in the Serbian copper mines in boron against copper "exchanged" (ibid., p. 872 f.); see also Chronicle, July 19, 1943.

66 FB, April 6-7, 1944, point 17. The from Hitler mentioned number of workers for the The large underground aircraft factory was possibly identical to the demand of the OT, which ordered "100,000 Hungarian workers for work in the Reich." According to Veessenmayer, these workers would have to "work at the SS Administrative and Economic Main Office (SS -Group leader Glücks) to be requested about the Jews coming from Hungary are ordered to be deported." (BAP, Case XI, No. 375, Bl. 217, Doc. NG-2059, Tel. Veessenmayeran AA, May 8, 1944).

67 Froebe, Rainer, Der Work use of concentration camp prisoners and the perspective of the Industry. In: Herbert (ed.), Europe and the "Reich deployment", p. 360 (p. 359 ff.).

68 AdaP, E, Vol. VIII, p. 77, Doc. 39, Record. f. Sts., May 26, 1944.

There was an agreement between the Ministry and Hungary that by the end April at least 50 000 able-bodied Jews were made available to the Reich. The practical measures are already underway through action initiated by the SD and the Hungarian police." The Hungarian government would shortly Calling Jews between the ages of 36 and 48 to work and "drafting them in"; this "allows them to it may be possible to add more during the month of May 50 000 Working Jews for the Reich and at the same time the number of Jews grouped together in work battalions in Hungary 100,000 to 150,000." ⁶⁹

Whether and to what extent this first action was carried out It is not clear whether and when means of transport were available. ⁷⁰ In the meantime The Eichmann commando was there in mid-April Help the Hungarian administration and police began Jews in large collection camps to concentrate, and on the 15th It rolled in May first death transport to Auschwitz. From now on four drove every day Trains with a total of 12 000 until 14 000 people there. On July 9, 1944, 437,402 Jews were deported from Hungary. ⁷¹

One the Jewish "specialists" of the Foreign Office, Legation Councilor Eberhard v. Thadden, visited the relevant German authorities in Budapest in May and reported on Eichmann's overall plan, by the end of July 900 "According to the findings so far, about a third of the deported Jews are fit for work. Immediately after their arrival at the Auschwitz collection camp, they will be distributed to the offices of Gauleiter Sauckel, the OT, etc.." ⁷²

It is not known how many Hungarian Jews in Auschwitz went to forced labor in Germany (or in the Protectorate or also in the General Government) were sampled and complained about. The ones at v. In any case, the magnitude cited by Thadden will not have been remotely achieved, even if one were still on foot in October/November 1944 from Budapest across the nearest border into the Reich, ie Austria Jewish women and Jews, after Varga 76 209, after others Sources 30 000 up to 50,000. ⁷³ But the question was not just existential important for those affected the the Forced labor a reprieve, possibly the rescue dem death, but at the same time it represented a significant, particularly dark chapter in German forced labor policy represents.

The figures for those who survived the deportation provide a general indication. Varga, who does not explicitly discuss the "work commitment" of Hungarian Jews in Germany, quantifies it Total number of deportees 508,861; 121 of them are 500 returned to Hungary by the end of 1945, about 5 000 would have survived without there to return. ⁷⁴ Must man here also those settle up, the as

69 BAP, Case XI, No. 375, BI. 212 f., Doc. NG-1815, Tel. Veessenmayer f. Ribbentrop, April 14, 1944. See also Varga, p. 342.

70 Varga, p. 342 f.

71 Hilberg, S. 914 f. Before dem 15.5. gave it two Advance transport with in total 4 000 sacrifice (27th and April 28, 1944; just that. 901).

72 How Note 68 (p. 74 ff.).

73 Varga, S. 348 f.; Hilberg, S. 922 ff. (lower Numbers according to different Sources); s. a. AdaP, E, Vol. VIII, Doc. 275; 280; 298.

74 Varga, S. 351. The addition the stated above Pay Vargas results however 520 361.

Those who went into hiding or were sick and who escaped "work" are forced laborers in Germany War economy again those tens of thousands To be added are those who died while working in Germany, in the camps or infirmaries or on death marches in the last weeks of the war - Given the inhumane work and Living conditions, especially in underground structures ⁷⁵, at least a very significant number.

The The death rate of Hungarian Jews, like that of Jewish and concentration camp prisoners in general, was less high actual arms production is particularly high On the other hand, they work in construction, primarily in underground construction. In the subcamps of the concentration camp Mauthausen, above the Investigations exist, lay she more than the average. In Melk, for example, people died during the construction of an underground factory for ball bearing production by Steyr-Daimler-Puch from June 1944 to May 1945 by around 3,500 Hungarian Jews 1 432 (41 Percent); in Ebensee, at the Building one similar cave complex, 1 849 from about 4 000 (46 percent). In Melk he got it Most of them died in the winter of 1944/45, in Ebensee in March/April 1945. ⁷⁶

Anyone who asks for concrete information about the work of Hungarian Jews in the If you look for the German war economy, you will ultimately find a whole series of evidence. They have been since the summer of 1944 apparently everywhere in Germany and also in the General Government ⁷⁷, often in Significant numbers were employed in armaments factories and on armaments construction sites above and below ground. At first they seem to have worked primarily for the "Sonderstab Kammler" in the large bunkers and cave buildings of the Jägerstab. ⁷⁸

Fritz Schmelter, the representative of the Hunter staff for labor issues, had found himself in Auschwitz early on looked around and was skeptical about the ability of the deportees to hard work: "So far, two transports have arrived that are in the SS camp Auschwitz. Offers were made for the Hunter buildings children, women and Old people with whom there is very little to do. If not already the next transports men in working condition Old bring, should the whole action not very successful become." ⁷⁹ 14 days later offered he the interested companies except "about 20 000 German Concentration camp prisoners

75 See Fröbe, The employment of concentration camp prisoners, p. 365 ff.; Karny, Miroslav, "Annihilation through work" in Leitmeritz. The SS command staff in the German war economy. In: 1999. Journal for Social History of the 20th and 21st centuries, H. 4/1993, p. 37 ff.

76 Melk: Perz, Bertrand, Project Quartz. Steyr-Daimler-Puch and the concentration camp Melk, Vienna 1991, p. 316 and passim; Ebensee: Friend, Florian, cement labor camp. The Ebensee concentration camp and rocket armament, Vienna 1989, p. 161; p. 461 and passim.

77 BAK, R 70 Poland/78, AN HSSPF/GG, "Points for the discussion with the President of the Main Labor Department on July 3, 1944": "Fundamental ban by the RFSS on the use of further Jewish concentration camp prisoners from the Reich or from Hungary in the General Government." From this you can Transports of Hungarian Jews Work into the GG to June closed become. Please refer also Speer, Slave State, p. 388 f.

78 Speer, Slave State, p. 401 f. About Kammler, the He was responsible for construction matters on the Jäger staff, but at the same time he also reported to Himmler and representative by Göring, see *ibid.*, p. 331 ff.

79 Hilberg, S. 999; quote stenographer report ex. d. Hunter staff meeting v. May 26, 1944.

... 10 000 to 20 000 Hungarian Jewish women" at.⁸⁰ That was back then interest of the defense companies were still subdued, "since the security and accommodation problems were almost insurmountable".⁸¹ This may have happened later; But at the beginning of June, Hilberg notes, let even the IG(farben), Himmler's most loyal customer, ... this now in Stich."⁸² Two months later, the IG company Agfa Landsberg (Warthe) was still missing them "Prescribed accommodation options" for 1,000 Hungarian Jews, which were offered to him. In total, the company offered several thousand Hungarian Jews to its plants at the beginning of August 1944. "But the Jews could only be taken on in blocks of 500 men each become. The Jews would be guarded by the SS, they would have to be accommodated in closed barracks, the workload in terms of separate work rooms, etc. would correspond to that of concentration camp members."⁸³

Since June/July 1944, transports of Hungarian Jews have been running to all regions and armaments districts in Germany. In order to accommodate these workers and other prisoners of Jewish or other origins from concentration camps, Factory-owned concentration camps often emerged. The took over guard always more often factory employees, the specifically for this the SS were trained.

According to the sources, the Jewish workers from Hungary in the German armaments factories were predominantly women. Some of the men were from the Hungarian army in Labor battalions been drafted and was not under German access. The majority of the male deportees were forced to work in the underground buildings of the Jägerstab under the SS and OT regimes.

The operational sources often show an arrival of (Jewish) concentration camp prisoners in the summer and autumn of 1944, without providing any further information about their nationality. **With** most likely it was become considerable Share around Hungarian Jews.

Hundreds of Hungarian Jews worked in large companies in the Ruhr area, such as Krupp⁸⁴ and the Bochum Association.⁸⁵ The Henschel Flugzeugwerke had its own factory concentration camp for a few hundred prisoners in Schönefeld near Berlin.⁸⁶ The Württembergische Metal goods factory in Geislingen obtained in July, that her the **WVHA** 700 Jewish women out of Hungary allocated.⁸⁷ Since End July negotiated the Osram GmbH with dem

80 HSG archive, Hamburg, shorthand. report ex. d. Hunter staff meeting v. June 9, 1944.

81 Hilberg, S. 1000.

82 Ibid.

83 BAP, IG Colors, NW 7, exchange W, prev. No. 44, AT August 8, 1944.

84 DZW, Vol. 6, S. 273 (August 1944). Please refer also IMG, Vol. 35, S. 55 ff., Doc. D-258 and D-288, Affid. Trees/Hubert Cards etc. Wilhelm Jäger, September 17th and October 15, 1945. (shocking Reports about d. living conditions of the prisoners); Hilberg, p. 1000. Detailed information about the fate of 520 Hungarian Jewish women at Croup: Manchester, William, Croup. Twelve generations, Munich 1968, S. 515 ff., S. 555 ff.

85 Seebold, Gustav-Hermann, A steel company in the Third Reich. The Bochum Association 1927-1945, Wuppertal 1981, p. 172 f. (Prisoners from Buchenwald; from June 1944).

86 Budrass, Lutz/Grieger, Manfred, The morality of efficiency. Employment from Concentration camp prisoners using the example of the Volkswagen factory and the Henschel Flugzeug-Werke. In: JfW, 1993/2, p. 122 f.

87 Hilberg, p. 1000; Schäfer, Annette, The subcamp of the Natzweiler concentration camp in Geislingen/Steige. In: 1999. Journal. f. Social studies d. 20th and 21st century, issue 3/1990, p. 98 ff.

WVHA due to 1 750 concentration camp prisoners for her Production facilities in Saxony and for the expansion of the cave works in Litoměřice. Since then, the SS office has constantly offered the company Hungarian Jews and other prisoners who were the Osrām representatives were able to choose themselves in Auschwitz and in the Flossenbürg and Groß-Rosen concentration camps. On November 13th, for example, the SS reported that 1,200 Hungarian Jews in Groß-Rosen were again up for selection.⁸⁸ At the end of December the same thing happened again in Flossenbürg. "With us Disposal provided prisoners", reported the Osrām people your superiors, "These are Hungarian Jews, almost all of whom are between the ages of 20 and 40 years and look physically good. The camp doctor had examined everyone beforehand and divided them into health classes, so that it was easier for me to reject sick and susceptible people."⁸⁹ In a factory concentration camp in Osterode/Harz there was There were "many Hungarian Jews".⁹⁰ The armaments departments reported the arrival of thousands from Dresden, Kassel and Thuringia.⁹¹ The Daimler-Benz engine works in Genshagen got 1 in September/October 000 selected female concentration camp prisoners Ravensbrück, including Hungarian Jewish women.⁹² Even among the 800 concentration camp prisoners, the the one for the Flick Group belonging Wagon factory in Bautzen were notified, it was very likely that they were Hungarians from Auschwitz.⁹³

The path of these abused ones Victim, the Those who escaped immediate death in the gas chamber in this way probably often went through the concentration camps, mostly Ravensbrück, Groß-Rosen or Buchenwald. The SS finally handed them over to the armaments companies only on the condition that they provided the guard. A representative of the United Steelworks reported on a "work assignment meeting" in the Ruhr area at the beginning of August, "that it the employment of new workers is poor. Soon should Hungarian Jewish women on the works used become. The Mission is very difficult, there appropriate Women's guard available placed become must.

88 Kamy, "Annihilation through work", p. 50. Judging from Kamy's information, Auto Union AG also benefited on a large scale from such workers when expanding their cave works near Leitmeritz, especially after the heavy air raid on the company's tank engine factory in Chemnitz-Siegmarsdorf on September 11, 1944 (ibid., p. 47 ff.; p. 51 ff.).

89 Demps, exploitation from concentration camp prisoners, S. 430, Doc. 9.

90 Struve, S. 457.

91 Spear, Slave State, p. 402 f.; there cite. AN Rüin IX Kassel, September 6, 1944: "It are until now 2 000 Jewish women came into the district..." Among the scattered sources see also Vaupel, Dieter, forced laborers for the dynamite AG. In: 1999. Journal. f. Social studies d. 20th and 21st century, H. 1/1987, p. 50 ff. Please refer also Kogon, Eugen, Der SS state. The system of German Concentration camp, Munich 1988 (19th ed.), p. 235 (6,115 Hungarian Jews in Buchenwald).

92 Please refer Section 3 in the foregoing Cape. - An eyewitness (Hungarian Jew) according to were only approximately 80 Jewish women the 1st 000 prisoners; 60 from They (Hungarians) came first in the December 1944 into the factory. The witness reported that she and others from this group were among the deportees belonged to those who in November walked from Budapest to Vienna and from there by train via Nuremberg and Weimar (in Buchenwald the men remained behind) came to Ravensbrück (Roth, Karl Heinz/Schmid, Michael/Fröbe, Rainer, Die Daimler-Benz AG 1916--1948. Key documents on the company's history, Nördlingen 1987, p. 322 (report by Eva Fejer).

93 case 5, S. 191, Doc. NI-3026, Wagon factory Bautzen, Monthly report August 1944.

This should three weeks in Mecklenburg in an SS camp (Ravensbrück - D E.) be trained ." ⁹⁴

A list of foreign workers and prisoners of war in the German war economy out of the second half of 1944 according to the figures of Reich Labor Ministry is inaccurate in two respects, even if certain proportions become visible. The aforementioned deported Hungarian Jews and the concentration camp prisoners of all nations, who have so far been neglected in the literature, are not included included, and enjoyed according to the testimony of time two more to go two and a half million citizens out of the USSR (except "Eastern workers" and prisoners of war, especially "evacuees") should be added. ⁹⁵

Table 89

Foreign workers and prisoners of war in the German war economy according to origin/change, August 1944

country	In total	of that: Civilian worker	Prisoners of war
USSR	2 758 312	2 126 753	631 559
Poland	1 688 080	1 659 764	28 316
France	1 254 749	654 782	599 967
Italy	585 337	158 099	427 238
protectorate Bohemia and Moravia	280 273	280 273	
Netherlands	270 304	270 304	
Belgium	253 648	203 262	50,386
In total	7 651 970	5 721 883	1 930 087

Source: Herbert, foreign worker, S. 271, Tab. 42 (after: Der Working in Greater Germany Reich, No. IO, October 31, 1944). Total in Herbert: 7 615 970 (= misprint; see *ibid.*, p. 270, table 41). The difference between individual totals and Total number includes workers Southeast and Northern Europe.

Regardless of the overall significant influx of workers from the sources mentioned, he feared Minister of Armaments from the in ever shorter intervals Wehrmacht, the especially the one that is melting away core of the Skilled workers and foremen met, serious repercussions on the Arms production. ⁹⁶ The initial

⁹⁴ Thyssen archive, VSt/620, AN ex. "Work deployment" discussion in Witten on August 4, 1944, August 8, 1944. See also Budraß/Grieger, p. 127.

⁹⁵ Herbert, foreign worker, p. 271; P.430 Note 3. However, among the latter there were undoubtedly a large number of people unable to work.

⁹⁶ The SE III campaign in the winter of 1943/44 had already caused serious fears in the industry. Krupp steel construction, even back then at 60 Percent foreign workforce, saw further withdrawal German workers in particular jeopardizing V-boat construction: „... that with Due to the special characteristics of V-boat production, various important welding work is only carried out by German workers can be carried out... The Insertion of foreign workers or. prisoners of war would have to here because of the Security of boat basically be banned

"Agreement" with Goebbels as "Reich Plenipotentiary for the Total War" gradually gave way to stubborn arguments about the manpower problem ("Is it better to have more soldiers or more weapons?").⁹⁷

At the beginning of October 1944, Speer finally saw "breakdowns in the coal mining industry, in the reconstruction of chemical plants and in armaments." for October and November unavoidably ahead, after the SE-IV action of July 10th had already had a serious impact on armaments and "after July 20th 1.) first from me 50,000 men voluntarily, then 2.) from the Reich Plenipotentiary for the total war effort 150 000 Man, for the most part, without my consent and now 3.) more 60 000 man should be conscripted on the orders of the Führer, (and) 4.) a further conscription quota in November of at least 80 000 man out the Armament and war production is provided." That would be alone since July total 340 000 UK-provided, "almost exclusively Special Forces".⁹⁸ On October 12th he warned Hitler of the consequences: "The increasing confiscations have such serious consequences for all new weapons and equipment that all of the ramp-up figures given under the previous conditions are in practice increasingly increasing dimensions prove to be impracticable. Called I used the run-up of the Karabiner 43 and the MP as an example 44, the IG 42, the Flak 3.7/43 and 8.8/41, the 38 t assault gun, the aircraft 262,335, 163 and others"⁹⁹

At the same time, he obtained the authority from Hitler to decide on the allocation of concentration camp prisoners to the armaments industry in the future - possibly an equilibrium, albeit a weak one, that is no longer very worthwhile

the." In the assembly department there are only 18 percent German permanent workers: "This percentage in itself is already too low for the foreign ones Workforce to supervise like it actually be should." (BAP, case X, Movie 615, Doc. NIK-10490, Croup at Rükdo Eat above "Assumed impact of the 1943/44 campaign on arms production", February 9, 1944). The industry increasingly tried, and often successfully, to attract foreign workers using targeted incentive and employment methods for to attract qualified work (Herbert, foreign workers, S. 274). The SE IV action of July 10, 1944 tore a particularly large hole in the skilled worker population (deduction of 20 percent of all UK applicants born in 1906 and younger); the The SE VI campaign (January 12, 1945) withdrew up to twelve percent of the remaining UK recruits born in 1901 and younger from the armaments industry (BAK, R 10 111/28, Rs. the RVE of August 29, 1944 and February 2, 1945).

97 Timeline, August 25, 1944; in more detail Janssen, S. 274 ff.

98 **BAK, R 3/1576**, Speer to Dönitz, October 3, 1944; According to Janssen, p. 404 note 105, identical letters were sent to Göring, Himmler, Guderian u. a. Hitler received the same Day in and day out more detailed writing is the same Content (BAP, FS, film 1732, spear to Hitler, October 3, 1944). Speer wrote on December 6, 1944 to Hitler in the same sense, now quite apparently to own insurance (ibid.).

99 FB, October 12, 1944, point 15. At the planes it around the so-called High-performance aircraft Me 262 (two jet engines), Do 335 (two piston engines) and Me 163 (liquid rocket engine). - In December, Speer summarized to Hitler that since the "Key Forces Decree" of February 19, 1942 (see II, p. 196 ff.) 687,000 British recruits, almost all of them aged 06 and younger, had been drafted been, including 254 000 alone since August 1, 1944 (BAP, FS, film 1732, spear to Hitler, December 6, 1944, "Dkschr. to d. guide about Recoveries from d. Armor").

valent for the bloodletting of German skilled workers, but in any case “a significant loss of power” for the SS.¹⁰⁰

In the transition from summer to autumn 1944, a significant change took place in the labor sector, which made the controversial issue of military drafts so intense was fought, increasingly defused. In dem The so-called Tomberg report became one extensive and very early dated statement made about this: “Despite the further appointments, including those from the arms industry “For the first time in this war since August 1944, this has had enough manpower, at least overall.” Tomberg, Employees of field economics office, called three Reasons: the Measures of

“Reich plenipotentiary for the total war effort” (expansion of the obligation to register women, civilian combing-out operations, Closure of technical schools, reduction of cultural activities), which requires “significant numbers of workers” freed up for armaments; the evacuation of previously occupied areas in the east, west and southeast, from which “a strong influx of workers flowed into the Reich”; and finally overall “more of a shrinkage” in the total volume of armaments production. From the rapporteur's point of view, there was an “unusually high level of labor” in November the Armaments and other industries are available, so “that numerous companies are available for newly recruited, untrained workers, especially for those who can only be employed part-time, show little interest.”¹⁰¹

The The downside of that medal was Admittedly an often extraordinary one more acute Local and company labor shortages where favorable production conditions existed or had been restored.

On December 30, 1944, Sauckel sent his last “success” report to Hitler.¹⁰² So skeptical were his figures are to be judged individually, so did he but the The fundamentally changed labor situation in 1944 was clear.

The report was more or less a compulsory exercise and was much briefer and less precise than usual. The Foreign workers were no longer broken down by country. According to Sauckel, they came predominantly from the “Eastern Regions,” where the January 1944 quota had supposedly been fully fulfilled. In Western and Southern Europe on the other hand, “not yet once a tenth of application target “achieved”. In terms of German workers the number of “implementations” is four times higher high as intended. Here too, the report did not provide any precise information about the composition of the “residents”. that it remained unclear whether concentration camp and prison inmates were counted were.

100 Kaienburg, S. 293; s. a. BAP, Case VI, Movie 419, Doc. NI-638, Rs. **RMRuK**, October 9, 1944; detailed trials, vol. 9 (Krupp trial), P. 836 ff., consultation. Walther Schieber, May 27, 1948.

101 BAP, FS, film 4571, report by. ORR Walter Tomberg, FWiAmt (?), “Military economic findings from five years of war”, November 1944. Hereafter also the following. See also Jans sen, S. 225; too late set and undervalued ibid, p. 281 f. - However, it worked the There is still a shortage of labor regionally and at least in certain key areas of the economy third quarter continued unabated further, for example in the area of Rül n III (Berlin-Brandenburg): “The development the fronts as a result of the general onslaught the Enemy powers in West, South and East forced in the 3rd quarter of 1944 for the first time, actually all of them somehow for war-important and war-decisive things to mobilize forces that can be used for tasks.” (BAP, FS, Film 3386, KTB der Rül n III, “overview” of the third quarter).

102 BAP, FS, Movie 3353, Sauckel at Hitler, December 30, 1944. Hereafter also the following.

Table 90

Labor procurement 1944 (in 1 000)

	plan from the 4. January	Result by 30. December	In percent of plan
Newfound ones "domestic"	500	1440	288
"Implemented":			
- Out of more civil production		225	
-Out of Administration and public life		438	
Foreigner	3 550	1 024	29
Prisoners of war		186	
<i>Together</i>	4050	3 313	82

Source: BAP, FS, Movie 3353, Sauckel at Hitler, December 30, 1944.

Sauckel praised the overall result as "still quite favorable" given the circumstances. His Subordination under Goebbels and spear described he deliberately: In He had drawn up his 15-point program in "coordination" with Speer, and Goebbels had he shares his experiences "made available.

2. The "Herb action". Ruhr industry, Nutritional science and forced labor

In the early summer of 1944, a large-scale test began in a number of armaments factories in the Ruhr area by nutritionists from the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Occupational Physiology on civilian and prisoner-of-war forced laborers from the USSR and Italy. This experiment, also known as the Krautaktion after the leading scientist, the Butterbrotaktion, ended towards the end of the year due to the now chaotic war and economic situation. Its background and results are not only relevant for the History of the location a very large part of the "foreign worker" army, which numbered millions, but also informative with regard to the overall military, political and economic situation that the Nazi regime was facing at the time. Also in the post-war period its evaluation still played a certain role in western Germany.

The discussions in The ruling circles of the Nazi regime about methods and prospects for employing foreign workers, especially forced laborers, began early and were never actually completely stopped. Their stages reflect faithfully, even more clearly than the relevant labor and social legislation or the - undertaken hesitantly, often postponed or even prevented Changes to the forced labor regime, the respective situation on the forced labor "market" and thus also the situation in the occupied territories of Europe the reservoir for forced labor. A comprehensive analysis and Presentation of those discussions and programming

table ideas are still pending ¹⁰³; she would undoubtedly provide important information about the character of the regime and its interests and goals of its elites.

At this point we want to follow a process that... a Spotlight on the The food question has played a dramatic role since 1942, that is, since the system of mass forced labor was established in Germany War economy, played. Since the beginning of the mass deportations and the mass employment of Soviet prisoners of war and civilian workers the occupied territories of the USSR in the spring of 1942 there are disputes over the pitiful starvation existence of these people. The reason was simple and had nothing to do with humanity: leading to thousands of deaths through hunger and exhaustion leading Malnutrition the Soviet Workforce was it in primarily _

- in addition to their brutal treatment and merciless oppression-, the prevented the huge armaments from "extracting the highest possible performance from the undoubtedly capable and useful... workforce". ¹⁰⁴

This food policy, for which the fascist authorities, especially the Four-Year Plan Organization (Goering) and the Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture (Backe), are responsible drew and at the one height Death rate absolutely taken into account was, as the Reich Industry Group, summarizing the industrial concern, admitted in March 1942, "desirable for political reasons"; but from the "point of view of the use of labor" from, „the according to the situation of the current In our opinion, circumstances cannot be taken into account any less, the design of the catering does not appear to be appropriate, since instead of increasing performance a reduction in performance is achieved that is not justifiable with regard to the ultimate goal." ¹⁰⁵ The Wehrmacht High Command already put forward its objections at that time with the same argument that was the basic aim of the Krautaktion two years later was: „The Terms 'Work', 'hard work' and 'Hard work' must detached from ethnic affiliation, viewed objectively as the turnover of calories in muscle strength. It is a fallacy that you can do the same work with 200 people who are insufficiently fed as with 100 fully nourished. On the contrary: the 100 fully nourished people achieve far more, and her Mission is much more rational. Are against it those spent for the mere preservation of life Minimum rations, as they There is no equivalent value for work, to be recorded as a pure loss in terms of the national economy and the war economy, which is based on the costs incurred Means of transport and administration increased even further." ¹⁰⁶

In the fall of 1942, when the number of recruits in the East fell drastically, even the man known as a "slave driver" The infamous “General Plenipotentiary for Labor Deployment”, Gauleiter Sauckel, used similar tones and intensified his **criticism** after the defeat at Stalingrad. In “full agreement” with the Reich Industry Group, Sauckel addressed the issue on January 9th In 1943 an “inspection of the Eastern Workers' Deployment” and together with the Reich group set up a “Committee for Eastern Workers' Affairs” a. Agreed became a line that formed the Reichsgruppe Industry announced at the end of February 1943: “The labor

103 Sources and first Analyzes at Eichholtz (I; II) and with Herbert, Foreign workers.

104 BAP, FS, Film 1737, Elfi Hildesheim to RArbM, April 22, 1942. In more detail s. II, S. 214 ff.; S. 168 ff.; Herbert, foreign workers, p. 161 ff. and passim.

105 BAP, FS, Movie 1737, RGI to RMEL, March 5, 1942.

106 Ibid, boss OKW at GBA, March 25, 1942.

The deployment, which has so far been primarily devoted to quantitative solutions, must now and in the future be increasingly geared towards the qualitative side." The main concern of the armament powers was clearly formulated: "On our part, we must ensure that the development is directed in a direction that serves to increase the performance of the companies."¹⁰⁷

During 1943 this line appears to have been practiced to a large extent and with particularly serious consequences through graduated "performance nutrition". Food rations too increase, came for the Regime that had just given up the Kuban region and large parts of southern Russia and Ukraine must, not in question; stepped here, like us will see, only in Summer 1944 a change. The clever system of the hunger whip as a means of "increasing performance", which increased rapidly within a year the Industry had expanded was at the end of 1943 by the Minister of Armaments officially sanctioned, the it strongly advised all companies to "through the To issue two types of food to educate or punish the poorer working part of the prisoners of war ! " but also for many of those forced laborers who forced themselves to exert themselves to the utmost because of hunger.

In the spring of 1943, Backe and Kehrl in the central planning department, assisted by nutritionists (Flößner, Berlin, and Emil Woermann, Halle), explicitly opposed the increase in food rations for forced laborers, especially for Eastern workers, with the argument that an improvement was needed Rations must reduce the nutrition of the German workers and thus their performance and therefore bring more loss than profit.¹⁰⁹

In the summer and autumn of 1943 - for the last time - several hundred thousand workers from the USSR to Germany, who were driven along with the German retreat. The deplorable ones People who had often lived in hunger for years under German occupation were housed in the industry and trained. Their work productivity was low from the start, usually far lower than that of the others Categories from forced laborers including the prisoners of war. The complain

107 **BAK, R 13 XX/299**, Rs. RGI to the industrial departments d. regional economic chambers and economic chambers and to the economic groups, March 6, 1943. Regarding Sauckel see II, P. 219 f. The inspection mentioned should not be confused with the "Central Inspection for the Care of Foreign Workers", the was established by agreement of June 2, 1943 between the GBA and the DAF (IMG, vol. 29, p. 95 ff., Doc. PS-1913, agreement of June 2, 1943; with implementing regulations of September 20, 1943). - "Scientific" The work science department showed interest in the question Institute the DAF (AWI), the around those Time with the elaboration above "Aptitude for work and performance of Eastern workers in Germany" began. A preliminary report for this was available in May 1943 (BAK, R 41/274), the report itself in March 1944 (BAP, FS, Film 2348, elaboration of the Inst. f. World economy (1945), "The war economic contribution of Eastern Europe to the Reich 1936-1944"; only quoted here. Both sections are completely in the HSG archive).

108 **BAK, R 3/1818**, Rs. **RMRuK**, „At the German operator!", December 23, 1943. Please refer II, S. 277 f.; Herbert, foreign workers, p. 267; Dispute, p. 268 ff. - Speer's letter referred to prisoners of war, especially the Soviet ones; however The industry had been using the system for a long time and also against Eastern workers.

109 ZPP, 39. Meeting, March 24, 1943.

The companies did not let up that many of the newly assigned workers were children and old people and were not fit for work at all.

To At the same time, several hundred thousand were killed Italian soldiers, former "allies", as "Military Internees" into the coercive system of heavy industrial labor (mainly in mining), of hunger, terror and harassment. Among them, too, the absences were exceptionally high, and the work productivity was unusually high under the unusual, difficult, discriminatory conditions low.

The report from a Flick Group mine sheds light on the nutritional status of Soviet and Italian prisoners of war ("Monopoly" in Kamen), on the 500 Soviet and 300 Italian prisoners worked. The Soviet prisoners took after that from End October 1943 until End February 1944 average around 4.63 kg off, the Italians

in the same Time around 4.41 kg. *wI* – Still considerably worse Pay find itself in one

Report from the Krupp company to the Essen Armaments Command dated March 29, 1944: "Since December 1943, i.e. within a quarter of a year, 300 randomly selected military internees have lost weight of up to 22 kg. The average weight loss of the 300 men weighed 9.1 kg in the same period." ¹¹¹ The sick leave in Mining in North Rhine-Westphalia (Military District VI) was on the 1st. June 1944 the "Russians" 18 percent, for Italians 14 percent. There are still "an alarming extent" of further admissions "to sick, especially emaciated ones, completely exhausted, with Edema and pulmonary tuberculosis afflicted Russians and Italians" in the Hospitals and Sick bays.

"A restoration of the ability of these people, who are usually severely reduced, to work Mining, if possible, takes many months." ¹¹²

Since the winter of 1943/44, the leading circles of the defense industry have been concerned about rising costs, falling performance, high levels of sickness, increasing numbers of "leaves" and the uncertainty of new inflows of workers The search for a remedy is more urgent than before. The initiative for the "Krautaktion" came from the most renowned representative imaginable of German financial capital, namely from Albert Vögler, Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG, the largest German mining company. Vögler, the mentor and close confidant of the Minister of Armaments, had taken on a central position in the war economy in August 1943 as the leading figure in Ruhrstab ¹¹³. Chairman of the Board of Group was since October 1943 Walter Rohland, Vöglers right hand also in the Ruhrstab, the after dem War stated, he be to even this time (7. October) with Hitler yourself with a memorandum was presented in which Among other things, he considers the nutritional situation the I mentioned forced laborers critically and referred to reports from the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Work Physiology in Dortmund. ¹¹⁴

110 case 5, S. 207 f., colliery monopoly at Walter Tengelmann, March 9, 1944 (Doc. NI- 3420).

111 Quote after Cajani, p. 299.

112 case 5, P. 204 f., Medical report (military district doctor VI) to the Ruhr district group for hard coal mining, June 22, 1944 (Doc. NI-3037).

113 Please refer II, p. 143 f., u. Cape. I in the prev. Vol.

114 BAP, Case XI (Wilhelmstrasse Trial), No. 724, Bl. 148 ff., Doc. Pleiger-416, affidavit. Explain Rohlands v. April 22, 1948, appendix v. April 16, 1948: "Contents about my memorandum on the total war effort, autumn 1943".

It was Vögler, by virtue of his significant position in the armaments industry, military economics apparatus and research management (he had been president of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society for the Advancement of Science since Carl Bosch's death in 1940), the scientific research mentioned at the beginning. Large-scale experiments were encouraged and supported. He took up this the scientific potential and experiences of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute mentioned for work physiology. This institute was well known to large industry and especially to the Ruhr monopolies and had been carrying out research since the Weimar Republic years for the Rhenish Westphalian Coal Syndicate, the Association for Mining Interests, Harpener Mining AG and for other business associations and companies.

The institute's first expert in the field of nutritional physiology was Heinrich Kraut.¹¹⁵ As official advisor of Reich Ministry for Nutrition and agriculture in Since the beginning of the war in 1939, Kraut, together with the Reich Statistical Office, had been collecting data on the weight and nutrition of German factory workers on "Workers' Nutrition Issues." He wrote after the war that science was "already prepared for this by the First World War."¹¹⁶ In 1943, at the objection of the Ministry of Propaganda, the weighings banned and the investigations stopped.

In the meantime, however, experiments on forced laborers had already begun. The first of these attempts involved a group of Soviet prisoners of war (25 men) at the Friedrich-Alfred-Hütte Rheinhausen (Krupp Group) carried out simple, heavy work (unloading construction rubble, etc.). He began to judge from the sparse sources¹¹⁷, in May/June 1942, and Kraut reported to that Reich Ministry of Food about it on 23. March 1943.¹¹⁸ representatives of the Krupp group or the Hütte and Partner Krauts were at this attempt Helmut Spitzer, the also district employment engineer of the Ministry of Armaments.

The test group had so far achieved an output of 2 t per man per hour a meal that Per Head straight the calorie value of the allocation for German "normal consumers" (2 400 calories).¹¹⁹ Given should be an allowance Bread, Meat, Fat and Sugar, in total 500 until 600 Calories. Krauts Instruction at

115 Kraut, Heinrich Albrecht, Prof., 1893-?, 1928-1956 head of department at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute and Max Planck Institute for Work Physiology, 1956-1965 director of the Max Planck Institute for nutritional physiology; 1963 Grand Federal Cross of Merit, 1973 with star.

116 Kraut, Heinrich, nutrition and performance. In: Working Group for Research of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia, H. 3 (3rd meeting on September 19, 1950 in Düsseldorf), Cologne/Opladen 1951, p. 48. See also Archive Thyssen AG, VSt/158, correspondence of the Nordwest district group d. Wigru Esl/United Stahlwerke AG with KWI for work physiology (Kraut) because of a nutritional experiment with German night workers (1940/41).

117 About this only: Heinrich Kraut's estate (in the BAK). The holdings of the Fried Historical Archives. Krupp GmbH were not accessible to me during the war.

118 BAK, NL 198, Kraut, No. 18, various AN Kraut, April/May 1942; *ibid.*, No. 4, report from March 23, 1943 (f. RMEL); *ibid.*, No. 33, Kraut to RMEL, May 3, 1943.

119 Herb, nutrition and performance, S. 48. - All examinations lay following physiological norms of calorie consumption basis: 1800-2000 = basal metabolic rate+ necessary body movements; 2400 = "normal consumer"; 3600 = heavy workers; 4500 = heavy workers.

Spitzer said: “Don’t give the allowance straight away, but record your performance carefully. Allowance for saving. After 14 Days of precise registration, give allowances, continue to register.”¹²⁰

The result of the experiment brought Kraut down to the simple denominator, “that every fluctuation in calorie intake a change in performance follows”. An increase in the calorie balance of the Nutrition at 24 percent (that allowance of 500 until 600 calories). 62 Percent more performance is achieved because “only the calorie intake that exceeds the resting metabolism (basal metabolic rate) can be used for physical work. However, if the calorie intake increases, this increases proportion to a much greater extent than the total amount of calories.”¹²¹

Incidentally, this elasticity of performance corresponded to a - far more typical for the Soviet forced laborers - Elasticity of hunger, which causes physical deterioration in malnutrition in relation to food deprivation temporarily slowed down and the herb Elsewhere, scientifically very “objectively” explained: “The body weight decreases Basal metabolic rate, namely it decreases more than yourself corresponds to the amount by which the Basal metabolic rate of one usually lighter people lower would be; around 15 percent is to be used as 'more' of the sinking. As body weight increases, the mass of the body that has to be moved during work also decreases, which is the case in many jobs one size role plays. Besides that becomes automatically the human inclined, his body movement limit as much as possible And finally, if these three moments not from are enough to maintain the balance of weight, then the work itself is limited. This limitation of work performance also occurs automatically through a reduction in willingness to perform.”¹²²

The malnutrition The “Ostarbeiter” emerged all too clearly from Kraut’s undoubtedly unembellished figures in this case. (Table 91)

Table 91

Working calories Deduction of basal metabolic rate

	Normal consumer	Long-term and night workers	Hard workers	Hard workers	Mine rs
German	340	620	1030	1 750	1 750
"Eastern Workers"	340	370	700	1100	1160

Source: BAK, NL 198, Kraut, No. 33, Kraut to RMEL, May 3, 1943. Although the experiment was carried out on Soviet prisoners of war, the calorie calculations are largely based on the officially determined allocations to “Eastern workers”. - Kraut took 1,700 as a basic turnover for German workers, for Eastern workers “as a result of them smaller size and their lower weight” 1 600 calories and 1,500 calories for prisoners of war; that reduces the informative value of the table significantly.

The hardest in the long run The major deficiency was the severe undersupply of dietary protein. (Table 92)

120 BAK, NL 198, Herb, No. 18, AT Herb, re: Telephone conversation with Sharpener v. May 6, 1942.

121 Ibid., no. 33, herb at RMEL, May 3, 1943. Hereafter too the The

following. 122 Herb, nutrition and performance, p. 51.

Table 92

consumption at exploitable protein (in grams Per Day)

	Normal consumer	Long-term and night workers	Hard workers	Hard workers	Mine rs
German	47.9	56.7	66.1	79.5	79.5
"Eastern Workers"	43.6	44.9	52.9	62.3	64.8
<i>of that animalistic protein</i>					
German	19.7	23.7	26.5	32.3	32.3
"Eastern Workers"	6.3	7.5	10.1	12.6	15.1

Source: How Table 91.

Already in the Rations the German workers, so Herb, move itself the Amount of protein „at the lower Border of "Required". Be more scientific Findings was here: "In our experience, the effect of an insufficient protein diet is first expressed in a decrease in the will to work, [which] provides a physiological protection for the body before to extensive meltdown of the Protein stocks of the body. If a higher physical work performance is nevertheless forced, the breakdown of the muscles leads to progressive exhaustion and thus a reduction in the amount of work to be accomplished...."

The overall result the investigation is that the diet of the Russian Prisoners of war and Eastern workers in terms of calories, protein, fat and vitamins are not sufficient to enable them to perform such a high physical work performance in the long term that would correspond to their constitution. A reduction in rations in any respect must necessarily lead to a further decline in them lead performance. As long as it is not possible for the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture to provide larger quantities of food for foreign workers, there are major concerns about increasing the number of foreign workers from a nutritional perspective. Even with the rations German workers will Performance largely limited by diet. She would at a more plentiful one Cost certainly more afford. The amount of food available to us allows, if distributed correctly, according to the severity of the job only one certain maximum amount of physical work. She is undoubtedly lower than that of the same group of people optimal nutrition receiving work. You multiply in this one situation the number of out of If the same quantity of food is to be fed, the necessary consequence is not an increase but rather a reduction in the quantity of work to be maintained."

The overall assessment and the Conclusions from the experiment differed in of their Quintessence not of what also in Circling the Defense industry at that time was discussed ¹²³, and essentially already took them Examination results the Herb action from 1944 in advance. But the early point in time this assessment or. the discussion is

123 Please refer e.g BAP, case XI, No. 727, Doc. Pleiger-465, Memorandum from Wilhelm Tengelmann (Mountain-

important. It was a phase of the war (spring/summer 1943) in which the German rulers could and were expecting new mass supplies of manpower from the USSR in the future and in which the arms forces cannot yet be assumed to have that they feared unrest among the forced laborers if the war ended unfavorably for Germany or, after a defeat, that the victors would demand accountability for their crimes. Especially acted it itself not about humane impulses of so meticulously analyzed hunger regimes or a **criticism** of forced labor policy in recognition of its criminal character. The scientific experiments described and the conclusions from them were rather exclusive on the economic The effectiveness of the use of forced labor was oriented and pursued nothing other than the goal of optimal use of both the available human and material, i.e. industrial and food resources, in the interest of a better functioning war economy.

Another study by the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for work physiology concerned 13 (in the last phase 31) in the period from autumn 1943 to spring 1944 at the Friedrich der Große colliery in Herne (Ilseeder Hütte group). Soviet forced laborers who, as coal miners, mined seven tons of coal underground on a diet of 2,780 calories per day, including 66 g of protein. These workers were given “an allowance in the form of a sandwich (400 calories - EN) ...against the promise, over the course of 4 weeks their performance on 12 cars per man per shift (9.6 t - DE) to increase.”¹²⁴ The workload was reached in the fourth week, “but the Russians ... lost an average of 1.2 kg in weight by the beginning of the 6th week.” The allowance was then increased to 660 Calories increased. Using potatoes and rye meal rose the nutrition of the From February 1944 onwards, the test group finally set a daily calorie value of 3,600 (75 g of protein). This meant she was “only about 200 calories under today's Diet of the German miner.” The original body weight of the Soviet workers was regained and maintained.

“It is clear from these experiments with certainty,” the results report concluded, “that the performance of the Russian miners from of their Nutrition is limited. Increasing the calories consumed by 30% from 2,800 to 3,600 resulted in an increase in performance of 8.7 13 cars = 50%. Calculate the basal metabolic rate Russians consumed 1,600 calories, which was originally the total amount of physical activity 1,200, now 2 000 Calories for Available, then 67 % more. The extra effort of calories thus largely benefited coal production.

The use of labor and the amount of food consumed is now much cheaper as earlier. Per Dare became at first 320 Calories spent, today 280 Kalo-

werksgesellschaft Hibernia AG Herne) about “Experiences from the employment of foreign nationals in the Ruhr mining ...”, May 1, 1943: “In the general budget of State is it cheapest and “The most economical approach in terms of nutrition is to employ fewer, but fully operational and well-fed workers.” (BI. 102).

124 BAK, NL 198, herb, no. 26, elaboration of the KWI for Work physiology about “The dependence of the performance of foreign miners on nutrition,” May 22, 1944.

rien, that is 12.5% less. In terms of production and utilization of the amount of food available to us, it is probably considerably cheaper to limit the number of foreign miners, but to bring their diet closer to that of German miners."

The The result of the investigation was as official paper of Institute on the 22nd May 1944 issued here. It looks exactly like that out, as whether the report serves as an important document for the memorable meeting the next day served, the The start of Krautsche's major campaign was te.

After the war, Kraut described the reason for his action as follows: "In the winter of 1943/44, industry complaints about poor health and low performance increased the Russian prisoners of war, the Eastern workers and the Italian military internees as a result of their inadequate nutrition. Dr. Albert Vögler, whom I met in his capacity as President of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society for the Advancement of Science our observations (at the previous investigations - D E.) oriented, drew my attention to these complaints and arranged for this in May 1944 a discussion between the Reich Food Minister Backe, the two Gauleiters of Westphalia, representatives of the Industry and me. It was decided that ... Investigations to be repeated on a large scale." ¹²⁵

The Meeting of May 23, 1944, regarding "State of Health, "Nutrition and performance of foreign workers" was one of Vögler's ideas. He persuaded the food minister to who, by the way, was First Vice President of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and therefore Vögler's deputy there, himself took over the chairmanship of the meeting, which took place in the house of the Wiedenbrück district farmers' association. He had apparently also made sure that the two invited Gauleiters, at least Albert Hoffmann, had an informed say and fully supported his and Kraut's concerns. Another guest invited was Kurt Schmitz from the board of Ruhrstahl AG, a confidante of Vögler strengthened the industrial side and at the same time in his capacity as a member of the "Gauführungsrat", an advisory body the Gauleitung (Westphalia-South), recorded. ¹²⁶

Table 93

entry list the Meeting at the 23. May 1944

Reich Ministry for Nutrition and Agriculture

Reich Minister Herbert Backe

Reichsobmann Behrens

gau Westphalia-South

Gauleiter Albert Hoffmann

Pers. Speaker Gebhardt

125 BAP, case v (Flick Trial), film 596, Doc. White-1030, Oath Explain Prof. Krauts v. 7.6. 1947.

126 BAK, NL 198, Herb, No. 33, AT re: the Meeting v. May 23, 1944. Hereafter too the The following.

Table 93 (Continued) Gau

North Westphalia

Gauleiter Dr. Alfred Meyer, head of
staff Bertelmann district economic
consultant Middyay

KWI for Work physiology

Prof. Dr. Heinrich Kraut General

Director Dr. Albert Birder

Gau leadership council Chamber/ "social economy"

director Kurt Schmitz

Source: BAK, NL Herb, No. 33, AT re: Discuss v. May 23, 1944.

Hoffmann and Vögler initially described the “untenable” situation, namely “the poor state of health and the inadequate performance of the foreign workers as a result of inadequate nutrition”. The official ration rates, especially those for Soviet prisoners of war and Italian military internees, were not sufficient “to get the foreigners to provide the services that would be required of them to carry out operational tasks.”

She led some drastic examples at: „In a group of The iron-making industry with extensive processing operations is currently the sickness rate of Russian prisoners of war is 15%, that of Italian prisoners Military internees at 11 %. From about 12 Of the 2,000 foreign workers assigned, 2,600 were lost due to illness or death. Specialists Studies in the Bochum district have shown that 10% of Russian prisoners of war suffer from tuberculosis (including 30 % open TB) are sick. Similar findings have been made in other districts been. To the great danger for the ... German population being point out.”

The Numbers are obviously unadulterated; because it was the speakers to it, the real describe the situation. In contrast It is noticeable that e.g. B. Kraut, according to the sources Judging from the end of April 1944, he had knowledge of much higher sickness rates (25%) that the Friedrich Alfred-Hütte Rheinhausen (Krupp) had reported for its 750 Italian military internees. „On numerous Works in the Ruhr area,” it said in the relevant document Report from the Krupp Group, e.g. from the Mannesmann company in Duisburg-Huckingen and Großenbaum the Hoesch company in Dortmund, near the Good Hope Hut In Oberhausen and at the Krupp company in Essen the number of sick people is similarly high.”¹²⁷

Hoffmann and Vögler demanded “an improvement in the meal rates and a fundamental the change of previous "work assignment procedure". It have none Purpose, "constant new foreign Workforce to use, the man not sufficient feed

127 Ibid., No. 18, Fried. Krupp/Friedrich Alfred Hut to KWI for work physiology, April 28, 1944. - In the letter, Lwowski and Spitzer von Krupp reported an average weight loss among Italians of 8.7 kg in three months (including weight losses of up to 24 kg in individual cases!). See also Cajani, p. 299.

If, on the other hand, the performance of the existing forced laborers increased through additional food, the armaments industry could perhaps even send workers to other commercial enterprises economy or to agriculture" hand over.

Kraut stated that his experiment at the Friedrich der Große colliery in Herne had resulted in "an increase in output of 50% and thus roughly the output of German miners", and Schmitz reported that "a company in the iron industry required 300 physical and Italian military internees from various companies who were rated poorly in terms of performance were brought together and fed better. The performance is approximately 100% of the German output increased, the sickness rate of 10 % decreased to 1.5%."

"A perfectly executed one Large-scale experiment," says suggested Kraut, „would the general economic impact of the proposed dietary changes ."

Backe, who was primarily responsible for the starvation and death rations from the beginning, claimed that "That's him too from Beginning to the point of view represent have, the performance of the foreign ones in use Workers through better ration rates instead of unlimited new ones Foreigners too advertise, the man but not sufficient could feed me." So the following happened Decision conditions: "1) In different works A large-scale experiment will be carried out in the Westphalia South and Westphalia-Nord regions under the leadership of the KWI for work physiology with 5 - 10 000 foreign carried out by workers. 2) The foreign ones employed in the commercial economy of the two districts To improve their health, workers receive German rations worker minus a percentage to be determined. Leads this Measure after one certain start-up time to the expected Reducing the number of sick people should after Measurement of the achieved Additional performance superfluous foreign Workforce the Agriculture to Disposal placed who the."

The measure mentioned in second place would have 207,000 forced laborers in the Westphalia-South Gau alone affected, namely 125 000 Civilian worker and 82 000 Prisoners of war. In the sources there is no indication that this far-reaching second part of Resolution implemented or that his Realization too would have been tackled. Apparently Backe preferred it from the end of June 1944 (first for two allocation periods, from August 21st - by decree of July 24th - then finally) to prescribe a nutritional allowance "uniformly throughout the Reich" for Soviet prisoners of war and Eastern workers ("Reichszulage"), which, as we will see, is not insignificant for the course of the experiment influenced.

Between May 24th and May 4th In June, Kraut and his helpers visited the possible plants proposed by the companies. On June 5th, the KWI for work physiology published the "Guidelines for the implementation of the nutritional campaign for Russian prisoners of war, Italian military internees and Eastern workers".¹²⁸ At the same time, Backe received information about Gauleiter Hoffmann the program for the implementation of the action and confirmed it on June 17th. The Münster State Nutrition Office provided the allowances through the nutrition offices ready.¹²⁹

128 As Appendix printed.

129 BAK, NL 198, Kraut, No. 4, "First report about the large-scale nutritional experiment on foreign workers", September 1, 1944; for the time v. center June to Mid August. In the following in text quote as

From the outset, such corporate plants were selected for the attempt to whom all or almost all of the forced laborers in question could be included. Sickness and accident frequency were at all investigated. However, performance increases are only measured in selected groups with appropriate work processes. The following data on the participation of corporations or group plants is available:

Table 94

At the “Herb Action” involved factories

-
- 1) Ruhr steel AG, plant Henrichshütte in Hattingen
 - 2) Ruhr steel AG, Wittener Cast steelworks in Witten
 - 3) Ruhr steel AG, Annmer Cast steelworks in Witten- Annen
 - 4) union Sils van de Loo & Co., plant Werl
 - 5) union Sils van de Loo & Co., plant Froendenberg
 - 6) Gelsenkirchen mine AG, colliery Prince Hardenberg in Dortmund
 - 7) Hoesch AG, Radbod colliery in Bockum- Hövel
 - 8) Hard coal mine Frederick the Size in Herne
 - 9) Mining AG Ewald König Ludwig, Ewald colliery continued in Erkenschwick
 - 10) Fried. Croup AG, Friedrich Alfred Hut in Rheinhausen
-

Source: BAK, NL 198, Kraut, No. 4, "First Report ...", September 1, 1944. - The first six plants belonged to the group of United Steelworks, Plant No. 8th to the group Ilseder Hütte, work no. 9 to the Reichswerke “Hermann Göring” group.

The Scholven hydrogenation plant was also intended to participate, but was canceled as a test plant due to severe damage from air raids.

The fact that overall the study turned out to be somewhat more modest than planned, particularly with regard to performance measurement, is shown by the numbers of employees ultimately involved.

Table 95

At the “herb campaign” involved forced laborers

	Soviet military units	Italian military int.	Eastern workers	In total
Attempt I and II	2 343	360	216	2 919
Only Attempt I	672			672
Only Attempt II	1 893	1 155	163	3 211
<i>In total</i>	4908	1515	379	6 802

Source: How Table 94. - Experiment I = determination of the increase in performance; Attempt II= Determination of the improvement in sickness and accident frequency.

1/with page number. Accordingly is quoted as II: “Second report on the large-scale nutritional trial on foreign countries Workers”, November 4, 1944 (ibid.); as of the end of September.

The distribution on the factories offers the following picture:

Table 96

'Number the at the "herb campaign" involved forced laborers after works

	Soviet military units	Italian military int.	Ostarb.
1) Henrichshütte in Hattingen (Beginning the food allowance: 31.7.)	907	332	25
2) Cast steelworks in Witten (21.8.)	804	32	24
3) Cast steelworks in Annen (24.8.)	415	305	
4) union Sils van de Loo & Co. plant Werl (24.7.)		104	
5) union Sils van de Loo & Co. plant Froendenberg (21.8.)		102	
6) Gebag, colliery Prince Hardenberg (21.8.)	540		
7) Hoesch AG, colliery Radbod (24.7.)	1 090	140	330
8th) colliery Frederick the Great in Herne (10.7.)	672		
9) colliery Ewald continuation in Erkenschwick (30.8.)	480 (Soviet War GFG and Eastern Starb.)		
10) Friedrich Alfred Hut in Rheinhausen (ongoing)		500	

Source: **BAK, NL** 198, Herb, No. 4, "First report ...", September 1, 1944.

The nutritional supplements were only issued after a certain period of time - three to four weeks - Work performance and sick leave had been checked and recorded on index cards, so end at the earliest July (with Exception from Rheinhausen and Herne), by the end of August at the latest. The armaments minister, however, propagated the action already on the Linz Armaments Conference. It would, like that did he know there, given the inadequate nutrition and performance, for example Italian military internees, "At the moment, large-scale tests have just been carried out in the Ruhr area by Minister Backe at the suggestion of Mr. Vögler, how much more work performance through a sensible diet." ¹³⁰

herb and his employees knew Location and Working conditions of forced laborers from long-term, intensive observation. For this reason, they set the conditions for the works, for example, that the increase in performance of the test groups and people could not be forced through motivation. ¹³¹ However, no matter how unbiased, scientifically and morally unimpeachable these scientists appeared to be in their reports, this was not the case with them but the prevailing slave-owning and racist attitudes prevailed. They did not shy away from the forced laborers previously announce to let, „that after 4 weeks one increase hers Ar-

130 BAK, R 3/1551, Speer's speech from June 24, 1944. To the Linz conference. Cape. I. Hans-Joachim Riecke (RMEL), representative and right hand Backes, mentioned in his speech the relevant one

"Entertainment (with a spear) about the Imis and the Eastern workers. A way will be found." (Ibid.). Speer's statement can also be found verbatim in other of his speeches from the summer of 1944.

131 Please refer Attachment. Hereafter also the The following.

workload a certain amount is required". The factories had instructions to withdraw the allowance "if the requested increase in performance does not occur within 4-6 weeks." During the experiment (probably the second half of September) "it was arranged that by the foreigners, the one significant increase in weight receive and a normal average weight had achieved, one higher performance, if necessary Threat of withdrawal of allowances is demanded." (11/1)

The scientific nature of the experiment was questioned from the start because the workers were all starving and mostly intimidated because they were hungry and also out of Fear - before Violence and terror as well How before dem withdrawal the allowance - obviously demanded an extreme amount of work from their weakened bodies. That can the Experimenters not hidden been be. Actually was nearly everywhere "Already in the start-up period before the nutritional supplement an increase in performance can be observed, which is due to the more intensive observation of the foreign workforce. In some places it was up to 10 percent, but was mostly due to a small loss in body weight accompanied." (11/3) In Werl (Union Sils van de Loo & Co.) an extreme case occurred: "Contrary to our experimental plan, the Italian military internees had already been informed at the beginning of July that in order to benefit from a In order to receive nutritional supplements, their performance would have increased significantly. In fact, performance increases were achieved as a result between 20 and 70 percent taken out. She but were accompanied by not inconsiderable weight loss. In some cases, work even had to be interrupted for a short period of time due to exhaustion "(1/8)

The allowance was originally supposed to be distributed everywhere in the form of warm soup during the shift. With the miners Instead, underground, the decision was made to have a "sandwich" during the breakfast break because of the lower organizational effort. On average, the amount of calories increased by 16 percent as a result of the allowance. Kraut's report contained the following figures:

Table 97
Nutritional Supplements the "Herb Action" (in calories)

	Increase for Italian military prisoners		increase at Soviet war veteran u. Ostarb.	
	from	on	from	on
Average consumer	1,870	2,180	1940	2190
Long workers	2090	2 390	2040	2 410
Hard workers	2 330	2 650	2420	2 690
Hard workers	2650	3 350	2 750	3 380
Hard workers underground	2 800	3 380	2810	3410

Source: BAK, NL 198, Herb, No. 4, "Second report ...", November 4, 1944.

An absolutely reliable statement about the improvement of the Nutrition cannot be obtained from the calorie values because their nutritional value also depends on the nature the Groceries and from the Art the Food preparation depended. Before everything but was,

Even if the calculation was correct, it has not yet been decided whether this increase in rations will also be reflected in the plate of the individual Eastern worker ¹³² Kraut himself found when checking for "Frederick the Great" that on every "butter sandwich" with - before written - 175 G Bread, 15 G fat and 25 G sausage each approximately Five grams of bread, fat and sausage were missing. ¹³³

In the middle of the ongoing action, the "Reichszulage" decreed by Berlin arose as a "complication" of the attempt. initially for two allocation periods (June 26th - August 20th); Here, Soviet prisoners of war and Eastern workers were affected, according to performance categories. "The regulation of the diet of Russian prisoners of war has almost reached our allowance since the 66th nutritional period (beginning August 21, 1944) and the transfer of the Italian military prisoners to free employment on September 1, 1944 made the nutritional experiment more difficult from a psychological point of view, as the incentive of the allowance for the workers involved in the experiment was thereby eliminated." (11/2) ¹³⁴

With effort and hardship, Krautsche's large-scale experiment seems to significantly hindered by increasingly chaotic conditions, especially from the "increased air raids on the industrial area and their accompanying effects, such as increased work interruptions, reduction in rest time, loss of operating resources, material stockpiles, destruction of accommodation" (11/2), still until End of 1944 continued been to be. Beginning In February 1945, Kraut requested the final results reports from the factories. ¹³⁵ A final report apparently could no longer be written. End In March, the Americans occupied Bad Ems, the KWI's alternative office for work physiology; The battle for the Ruhr basin had been raging since April 1st, and on April 13th American troops stormed Dortmund, the headquarters of the institute.

However, Kraut's legacy contains evidence that the scientist who continued to serve published a publication after the war (1948 ?). about the overall experiment brought out. ¹³⁶

The result of the "large-scale experiment" was as expected, that is, it was very similar to that of the previous experiments. The earlier picture of "unsatisfactory performance" and "poor physical "Constitution" of forced laborers, that's what it said Report from November 4th, has been everywhere "already now (i.e. end September- D. E.) fundamentally changed. At the start of the experiment, the performance of the foreign workers was mostly between 60 and 80 % the German Normal performance. Now they lie between 80 and 100 %; at individual Place became even 100 % the German Performance exceeded. Next to the

132 Herbert, foreign workers, S. 267.

133 BAK, NL Kraut, NO. 33, Kraut to the management of the Hard coal mine Frederick the Size, 24.7. 1944.

134 After the war it was read differently: "The joint efforts of industry and our institute better nutrition for Russian prisoners of war, the Eastern workers and the Italian military internees were successful insofar as by decree of the Reich Food Minister from the July 24, 1944 the Nutrition the Russian prisoners of war and the Eastern workers from the 21. August away that one the others prisoners of war equal became." (Please refer Note 125).

135 See e.g. b. Mining archive Bochum, 10/525, Frederick the Great mine Large (Ilse der Hütte) at Kraut, March 16, 1945.

136 See BAK, NL Herb, No. 35.

An increase in body weight has occurred almost everywhere, on average more than 1 kg per man." (11/1)

With a weight gain of one kilo, however, given the severe underweight of so many - probably most - workers from a "fundamental change." the speech be. Rather, what was typical was out of the It was reported with particular satisfaction at the Radbod colliery, the plant with the most test subjects, that "the allowance granted was almost completely put into work." "In some places (Radbod colliery, Union-Fröndenberg, Gußstahlwerk Witten) the limit to the increase in performance that could be achieved through the allowance was clear for long-time workers, heavy-duty workers and extremely difficult workers recognizable. Performance improvements from 22 - 31 % led to Weight standstill, 38% increase already led to a weight reduction." In the Witten cast steelworks and elsewhere "it was observed that despite a lack of increase in performance, there was no increase in weight. This is what it is about to be particularly special heavy Forms of work that have so far exceeded the strengths of foreign workers, as can be seen from the disease statistics and the need for frequent changes workers employed emerges." (11/5)

Estimated for the end of September herb, "that... the average Increase in performance is at least 15%" - which did not correspond to the figures stated at the beginning of the report. If one further takes into account, "after the normal weight has been reached, the weight gain that is now observed can also be converted into performance, the calorie increase of 16% an increase in performance of at least 25% must be achieved." (11/2)

The Sick leave the foreign forced laborer, the starting of Winters 1943/44 "a worrying height "achieved" was since April is on the decline. The nutritional supplement had a demonstrable additional effect on severe deficiency diseases, such as starvation edema; The rate of sickness absence increased significantly here back. (11/6) For the Time from July to center October numbers are available the Friedrich Alfred-Hütte, where the sickness rate among Italian military internees reached its peak in mid-March at 25 percent ¹³⁷:

Table 98

Sick leave the Italian military internees on the Friedrich Alfred Hut, Rheinhausen, 1944

	percent		percent
3. 7.	17.8	4. 9.	14.2
10. 7.	16.2	(50 % become free worker)	
17. 7.	17.9	11. 9.	9.5
7/24 _	12.5	(Remainder will be free)	
31. 7.	14.0	18. 9.	8.0
7. 8th.	13.0	25. 9.	5.0
14. 8th.	13.0	2.10.	6.7
21. 8th.	13.8	9.10.	8.0
28. 8th.	14.2	10/16	5.2

Source: BAK, NL 198, Herb, No. 33, hs. Table v. October 18, 1944.

137 Please refer Note 127.

Indicative of the physical condition of the test subjects were that with the issue be the Nutritional supplement "a rapid, temporary increase in digestive diseases in almost all places" occurred. Kraut certainly knew what the problem was: "The body has to get used to even such relatively small changes in diet." (11/5)

At certain operating points the means of production - for example the 1500 t press in the Henrichshütte - the limits of performance improvement. When the forced laborers there gained weight which no longer resulted in an increase in work performance, Kraut came to a characteristic conclusion: "Here it becomes clear that that the additional stress caused by heat none yet Hard worker ration justifies if high demands are not placed on the muscles at the same time." (II/4f.)

There is a performance table for an average of 317 foreigners (Soviet prisoners of war) working at 15 operating points (Strebe) from the Frederick the Great coal mine in Herne for the months September to December 1944. Compared to the initial value of 75 percent of performance of the German workers surrendered itself in the recorded an average performance of 92.84 percent over four months; According to the group's calculations, this meant an increase in performance to 112 percent¹³⁸. However, the range of variation ranged from 46 percent to 185 percent of the comparable German tusk performance. In November and especially in December, performance fell compared to September and October (September= 94.1; October= 95.5; November= 93.0; December= 88.8 percent).¹³⁹

At the 5. March 1945 stepped one general Ration reduction in Power. Thereafter were valid for the 72.

Map period (5.2. until 4.3.) retroactively the following Regulations:

- renewal the Period of validity from four on four and a half weeks
- reduction the Cheese ration from 125 G on 62.5 G
- Announcement that in the April no Sugar issued will: so Reduction of the sugar ration by a third.

For the 73. Map period (5.3. until 1.4.) became features:

- Period of validity four and a half weeks, d. H. from the 7. March until 8th. April
- reduction the Bread ration around 1 000 G
- reduction the Nutrient ration around 250 g
- reduction the Butter ration around 125 G
- reduction of the Sugar ration around 292 G (= one third through the failure in the April).¹⁴⁰

138 Incorrect calculated. Correct = 124 Percent.

139 How Note 135 (Write v. 16.3. with Table v. March 15, 1945).

140 BAK, NL Kraut, No. 4, Kraut to RMEL, March 12, 1945. - One third of the canceled sugar ration should obviously be offset against the 72nd, 73rd and 74th allocation periods .

The daily calorie value the one to Eastern workers and Soviet Prisoners of war officially Shared food decreased during this time

- "normal consumers" from 1 774 on 1 305 (73. allocation period); against it German on 1 289
- hard workers from 2 207 on 1 690; German on 1 877
- hard workers from 2 497 (Miners underground: 2 657) on 1 968 (2 234); German on 2461 (2719).¹⁴¹

The cards for the 73. The allocation period was the last one to be issued, at least in the Ruhr region became.

An evaluation of the herb campaign in the sense of a general one Redetermination rations for Soviet prisoners of war and Eastern workers or even a reorganization of the entire rationing system for foreign workers was therefore no longer conceivable .

It should be added that Kraut and the other leading scientists at the KWI for work physiology apparently continued their careers without interruption after the war, whereas theirs Patrons Vögler and Backe that took life - the one when the Americans marched into the Ruhr area, the other a little later in Nuremberg prison. First, fabricated Kraut and his team reports for the occupying power, according to which the foreign Workforce "sufficient were fed"; yes, it said in this, that They, at least the civilian workers, were better off than the Germans: "The foreign civilian workers received better food before the occupation than the German workers."¹⁴²

In the it appeared the following time It was particularly important for the successors of Vögler and his associates, such as Walter Rohland, to provide exculpatory documents "for a possible industrial trial". The "large-scale investigations" of the KWI for work physiology from 1944 played a role in this a big role: "Around August 1944," it was said, the facts of the case appropriately right-winging, in an expose from the United Steel Works, "on the basis of these studies, an increase in food allocations for workers - also for foreigners - "Overall, the nutrition of the workers has been improved through the care of the defense companies to such an extent that the result is "an approximately normal average weight of all employees until the armistice". In order for the KWI to prepare the relevant documents, individual plants should provide the institute with "as complete kitchen reports as possible". "The KWI is recognized by the **military** government in this area and consulted on an ongoing basis."¹⁴³

141 After *ibid*, No. 38, „Report above the different Nutrition between the German and foreign workers" (Wehag Westdeutsche Household Supply AG Bochum), August 15, 1945; sent by Kraut with a cover letter dated August 23, 1945 "on behalf of General Director Dr. Rohland" to Ruhrstahl AG, Witten.

142 *Ibid*.

143 Archives of Thyssen AG, VSt/1406, file note about. "Meeting with Professors Lehmann, Kraut and Graf", August 19, 1946 (signed: E. Linz).

Kraut later actually acted as a trial expert for the IG Farben Group and the Flick Group. In March 1948, he provided the defense attorney of IG Auschwitz officer Walther Dürrfeld with an affidavit that drastically characterized the depravity of such science: "Since the concentration camp prisoners received 3,080 calories per working day, there was no caloric overload given the amount of work performed. The plant manager therefore had no reason to do so to protest against the employment of prisoners on nutritional-physiological grounds." Kraut also discussed "the Salary of the food the individual nutrients, according to the needs of the human body" and found them to be "sufficient" and only "short" of fat: "At least the rations were enough of prisoners in protein and of fat in order to prevent nutritional damage caused by protein or fat deficiency." ¹⁴⁴ As far as I know, this affidavit appeared in the IG Farben process himself - in difference to the one in the Flick process - not on; it becomes in its Pharisee-like mendacity also the defense as too compromising be published.

In the last two years of the war, the regionalization of forced labor policy increased: „In dem dimensions, in dem the military events however forced to make ever new concessions, the negotiations at the highest level lost as well as the decrees that are constantly being produced are increasingly becoming less relevant to reality, while the use of foreigners has long been one in practice independent laws had gained momentum. The initiative went more and more to the regional, local and company Regime representatives about". ¹⁴⁵

This observation is correct if "regime representatives" include both representatives of the state, the Political party and the DAF as also those the Defense industry and the "self-responsibility" the war economy can be understood. In our example, it was precisely the activities of Vögler, the Ruhrstab and the Ruhr companies involved that made the tendency towards regionalization of forced labor policy recognizable. This was not changed by the fact that the plan underlying the cabbage campaign envisaged a change in the overall concept of this policy in the long term.

However, it seems as if towards the end of the war the German armaments factories were becoming increasingly arbitrary in allocating food to their forced laborers. They solved the problem "Increasing performance" rather than through real nutritional supplements, rather through the company system of "performance nutrition" ¹⁴⁶, which threatened the physical existence of the weaker and sick by denying them food, even food to which they were officially entitled, and actually caused many thousands of deaths ("departures"). ¹⁴⁷

144 BAK, NL Herb, No. 58, Oath Explanation herbs, March 17, 1948. -Please refer also Note 125.

145 Herbert, foreign workers, S. 351.

146 Please refer Note 108.

147 Pioneers of this murderous method of treating physically weak foreigners as "lives not worth living" was the one for year and day Upper Silesian Heavy industry. Example liable for the last months of the war a report the group of Königs- und Bismarckhütte, after dem that in the The processes used at the Falvahütte plant are "excellent "proven": They have "moved over to all long-, heavy- and heavy-duty worker allowances, which were granted to the Eastern workers "to be combined" and according to two performance levels (100 or 80 percent of performance a German worker) only "to the best workforce" after

Attachment

June 5,
1944

Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nutrition campaign at Russian prisoners of war, Italian military internees and Eastern workers

The action consists out of two Test series and that is

I Test the More efficient as a result nutritional supplement,

II Test the improvement of sick leave through the nutritional supplement.

Over A precise protocol must be kept by each company involved throughout the entire course of the experiment lead to what the The most important information and test conditions can be seen are divided according to the number of people involved, selection of companies and operating locations, identification of the general operating conditions and any changes during the test period, changes to production, disruptions caused by air raids, climatic conditions, psychological influences general kind. In the Final report will be below addition of the further down mentioned card index the Overall results compiled and evaluated.

For the execution the action should be uniform the following Guidelines complied with become:

1. At the beginning, the age, height, weight and maximum circumference of the right calf of all people involved must be determined. The weighings should be repeated every 2 weeks and the calf circumference should be determined every 2 weeks 4 weeks. The Weighings and calf measurements should in the morning before the Shift if possible sober, in any case always under the same conditions - take place, which Weighings either naked or lightly dressed with a shirt and trousers, always without shoes. The sensitivity and correctness of the scales is to check and calibrate. With the Persons responsible for weighing must be instructed in detail (if possible, the foreign ones to consult doctors). The results of the weighings and measurements must be reported weekly to the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Occupational Physiology in Bad Ems/Lahn, Haus Vier Turme.

2. The health picture of the test subjects is recorded in a common way Examination by the camp doctor and Dr. Droese from the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Occupational Physiology discovered. The same standards are used to assess sick leave in subsequent examinations to apply.

For experiment I (performance improvement) is next to the assessment according to body weight also the to determine the general condition of the workers. In experiment II (Improvement of the sick number) Discharge from medical treatment must be carried out according to uniform criteria become. Diseases related to diet are not related, e.g. B. Accidents are excluded.

A diagram is included to group the diseases, which is based on: official disease statistics follow.

3. The diet of the test subjects must be carefully monitored by sending the weekly menu to the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Occupational Physiology. Fluctuations in supply can be avoided by maintaining sufficient stocks. The activity of the factory kitchens is continuously checked by 2 technical assistants from the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute.

4. If possible, the allowance should be given in the form of a warm soup for the first breakfast, or on night shift as warmth Soup in the Midnight break. A smaller Part the Allowance can also be given in the form of a sandwich for the second breakfast.

5. The Catering the test subjects from the the non-participants fully separated to hold,

Work performance and "leadership and attitude". distribute. (BAP, FS, film 1780, Falvahütte to RVE, December 12, 1944); sat Herbert, foreign worker, S. 294 f., with to positive judgment about the Effects of "performance nutrition".

with that There is no exchange of food. The Output and the Consumption must be monitored closely. If possible, are the at the Try to provide accommodation for those involved kept separate and marked in some way.

6. To close monitoring of the attempt is for every one involved Create a file card containing the man's main data, his employment, his place of work, his previous performance and their changes emerge. Furthermore is to provide space for comments about outer influences, state of health, Any days of absence, operational implementation and general identification of the man's physical and psychological attitude during the experiment.

7. The selection of jobs has to be taken into account to monitor performance and increase performance as precisely as possible. Instead of an increase in performance that is not possible with machines can also the Savings of workers consistent total workload as Dimension of success should be considered. At bound employment relationships, e.g. b. Depending on the speed of the machine, in special cases the working time can also be increased. Companies should also attach great importance to avoiding absences due to repairs, lack of materials and other failures. All such incidents must be recorded in detail.

8. The scope and type of allowance to be granted will be determined by the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute by July 10, 1944 companies involved and the appointment for the start of the allowance is agreed with them. At the beginning of the allowance is to inform the foreigners involved that after 4 weeks a Increase your workload by a certain amount amount is requested. There are no commitments to be made regarding the duration of the allowance. If the requested increase in performance does not occur within 4-6 weeks, the allowance must be withdrawn. The amount of the required increase in performance is agreed upon by the participating plants with the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute. Even in the start-up period is one performance increase to be expected and must be pursued and held. She is but not to be forced by drive.

The beginning of the experiment, the implementation and the The expected results are presented to the companies in a suitable form the one with the test subjects working master, foreman and workers. These are instructed the Track performance and to give the attempt the necessary amount of interest and support.

9. To Judgment whether the requested more performance or the reduction of the Number of workers with the total workload remaining the same set correctly was primarily used to control the weight and the calf circumference.

A further indication of the effect of the nutritional supplement is the observation of the test subjects' behavior before and after the shift (attitude when starting, exhaustion at the end of the shift), as well as the comparison of behavior during the day and night shift.

10. It remains reserved, after more sufficient Length of time of Experiment I the allowance still to increase.

Source: BAK, NL 198, Herb, No. 4.

3. Armament industry and Working class life in the province Brandenburg. A regional historical study

The industrial city of Berlin, the "Reich Capital", had its surrounding area already in the pre-war years included in the upgrade. The but happened apart from a few large chemical plants (Prenzlitz, Landsberg/Warthe, Schwarzheide, Wittenberge), mainly on the outskirts of Berlin. In 1944, Brandenburg was absolutely full of armaments industry, and together with Berlin formed the country a armaments center, the, with

With the exception of the Ruhr area, it had no equal in Germany. Geographically and in terms of armaments, the priorities were different developed, but almost every type of armaments production was found: iron and steel (Brandenburg; Hennigsdorf), the chemical plants mentioned, numerous ammunition factories, aircraft and aircraft engine construction (Heinkel/Oranienburg; Focke-Wulf/Cottbus, Sorau, Gassen; Henschel/ Schönefeld; Arado/Potsdam Babelsberg, Brandenburg, Rathenow; Daimler-Benz/Genshagen-Ludwigsfelde), armored cars (Demag/Falkensee), torpedo and underwater weapons (Julius Pintsch KG/Fürsten walde), poison gas (Auergesellschaft/Oranienburg; IG Farben/Falkenhagen).

a) Berlin "relocated" after Brandenburg

Waves of bombing raids by the British Air Force against Berlin began in early 1943 reached its first peaks in March and August/September, and in mid-November it turned into the so-called "Battle of Berlin". By the end of 1944, the Bomber Command flew 14 heavy attacks during this air offensive, mostly at night, in which the bombers were too overkill 7,400 missions started.

From March 1944 onwards, the US Air Force also took part in the attacks with many thousands of missions, which affected the population of Berlin and the surrounding Brandenburg region almost without interruption until the end of May Areas in fear and Inflicted terror, killed thousands, wounded tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands made people homeless and caused serious damage to industry.¹⁴⁸

Berlin industry reacted to the attacks in August/September 1943 with great vehemence. She pushed into the province to escape the deadly air threat and save her valuable machinery from destruction. Large-scale industrial relocation - Since then, this has occupied all armaments departments in Brandenburg, which is a preferred target due to its proximity to Berlin and its central location in Germany the relocation was.

Hundreds of companies and parts of companies Berlin and even from the Saxon and Anhalt region were accepted in Brandenburg. Of course, these companies were looking for factory premises that were ready to move into, and there was no abundance of this anywhere in the fifth year of the war, not even in Brandenburg. Extensive shutdowns, particularly in the consumer goods industry, were intended to create space. The decommissioning operations were less painful for the affected entrepreneurs, who carefully stored their machinery or were able to lease it out cheaply and receive compensation and whose families were supported partly by the state and partly by the imperial groups (industry, trade), as for the workers who were conscripted into military service, often in new professions. As a rule, the general population was also disadvantaged, whose supplies deteriorated as a result of the closures and production stops.

Of course, decommissioning was nothing new this time. The war brought shutdowns from the start from thousands Small- and Small businesses particularly in Crafts and trade

148 Groehler, Olaf, Berlin in the bomber sights. From London seen, 1940 to 1945, Berlin 1982, p. 18 ff.

with it, often because the business owner was drafted into the Wehrmacht. Since the beginning of the war, companies had also shut down their civilian production or parts of it in order to order armaments or supplies for arms production.

However, the decommissioning actions of the "Total War" had a new dimension. The declaration of the "Total War" gave the Minister of Armaments the means to enforce systematic decommissioning in larger industrial and craft businesses, although in addition to those affected, local and regional authorities also opposed this up to the Gauleiter often offered strong resistance. At the end of July, Hitler agreed to Speer's plan to "convert large companies in the consumer goods industry into those in the armaments industry ... not only 500,000 German workers, but also their management staff and the factory facilities as units of urgent programs."¹⁴⁹ The closed "implementation" involving the workforce of entire companies in the defense industry was the actual goal of this action, for which the minister specifically appointed a "General Representative for Company Implementation".¹⁵⁰ With aggravating Speer issued an order that ensured that the redeployment of the workforce, including management staff, was "fundamentally complete".¹⁵¹

The implementation campaign took place in various German regions, primarily in Brandenburg, from the beginning into a different type of decommissioning and implementation about that about the same time initiated and enforced by means of "leader decrees".¹⁵² It was forced by the growing air threat to the arms industry and existed in the relocation of the in industrial areas and large companies concentrated arms production in less bomb-prone areas.¹⁵³ In Brandenburg, hundreds of Berlin companies, which had been pushing out of Berlin en masse since August/September, took up almost all available capacity and workforce. Month after month, the Potsdam and Frankfurt/Oder armaments commands reported lists of such relocations. One of the first lists dates back to August 1943 and contained 34 cases for the area of Luftwaffe armaments of the Frankfurt/Oder Armaments Command alone, of which¹⁵⁴ were :

149 Spear, *Memories*, p. 287 (July 26, 1944).

150 Please refer II, S. 150 ff.

151 BAK, R 3/1877, REL. RMRuK "Re: operational implementations", December 15, 1943.

152 BAK, R 3/1988, two Hitler decrees, June 28, 1943 (decree to secure rooms for the start of armaments production from air-threatened areas and to accommodate armaments workers in air-damaged areas"; decree on "industrial relocation to the protectorate, the general government and the occupied eastern territories").

153 About the problems and the numerous "Disagreements in the organizational implementation of the relocation" see. the SD report from October 4, 1943 (reports from the Reich, Vol. 15, p. 5842 ff.; vol. 14, p. 5686 ff., Ber. v. August 26, 1943); see chap. I in the preliminary vol.

154 BA/MA, FS, Film 8253, report d. Armaments Command Frankfurt/Oder, regarding August and November 1943. The abbreviations and sources used in the text below refer to the filmed war diaries of the Armaments Inspectorate III Berlin-Brandenburg (Rüln III), the Armaments Commands Potsdam (RüKdo Potsdam) and Frankfurt/ Or (RüKdo Frankfurt/O.). These are the following films from the BAP and the BA/MA: 2328; 3386; 8253; 8261; 8263 (see concordance in the source appendix).

Eltron, Dr. Th. Stiebel
Berlin-Tempelhof
Eresburgstr. 22/23

Dürener Metalworks AG
Berlin-Borsigwalde
Eichhorndamm 141/65

Helion Precision optics
Hertel, Urban & Co.
Berlin-Weißensee
Franz-Joseph-Str. 140

Aviation apparatus
construction GmbH Berlin SO
36
Silesian Str. 26

Fritz people, Aerial imaging
devices Berlin SO 36
Silesian Str. 31

Neumann & Borm, Apparatus
Construction Company Berlin W 35
Bülówstr. 56

Franz Rasemann, Electro
acoustic devices
Berlin SW 68
Ritterstr. 76

Friedrich Bollemann Ing.
Mach., device and
apparatus engineering,
Bremen

relocated in

Tuchfabrik AG
Sommerfeld N L. plant II

and Cloth factory Kulcke & minor, Summer field

Summer fields Textile factories
Fritz Tillmann, Summer field N L.

and Traugott Schulze, Finsterwalde N.L. _

W. and F Baumgarten
Neudamm, 3rd floor

Vierguts storage facility,
Königsberg/Nm. *and* Falkenthal Brewery,
Königsberg/Nm. *and* Klauswalde cattle
stable

Train Botschow (Camp)

Cloth factory v. Müftling & Co.
Cottbus

Cloth factory Hugo brush, plant II
and Cloth factory Högelheimer, Forest/Lausitz

Cloth factory Paul Altner,
Forst/Lausitz

Wilhelmshütte b. Sorau
and Brickworks Albrechtsdorf b. Sorau

In the Month November stood for example on the List:

Minerva steel Bushels & Wolf
Hagen/Westf.
Elberfelder Str. 48

Hall RAD warehouse,
Züllichau *and* Günther carpentry,
Züllichau *and* earlier spinning &
weaving,

owner City Züllichau

Wintershall AG
injection molding
plant Fusor Berlin-
Rudow Kanalstr.
103/115

Welzow glassworks, Germaniahütte,
Bienefeld & Co. GmbH, Welzow N. L.

Adrema mechanical
engineering GmbH BerlinNW
87

Gotzkowskystr. 20

Argus Motors works GmbH
Berlin-Reinickendorf East
Flottenstr. 39/42

Telefunken Total f. wireless
telegraphy mbH
Berlin-Zehlendorf
fourth ring - East way

Rheinmetall Borsig AG
Berlin-Tegel

George Wissinger, Spremberg, Roßplatz 4
and Alfred Hanke, Spremberg
Bautzener Str. 10

United Lusatians Glassworks AG, plant F,
glass factory Fürstenberg/Oder

gym and afterwards. Sports field owner city
of Bomst

Bombshell Krs. Züllichau

New glassworks,
United Glassworks AG, Plant F,
Fürstenberg/Oder

This phase of mass relocations to the provinces was preceded in earlier years by certain individual relocations, even on a large scale, but which had a different character; They were prepared for the long term, and as a result, new branches, including large companies, were created on greenfield sites, which did not necessarily involve the closure of local companies, but at least created a large workforce the affected places and their surroundings. One of the most important cases this Kind was the of the Focke-Wulf aircraft group out of Bremen, the after the the first Allied air raids in 1940/41, extensive "alternative planning" developed. This plan was officially known as "relocation of series production ... east of the Stettin - Berlin - Munich", but basically amounted to the construction of several large new series factories, which were essentially paid for by the Reich. The factories in Cottbus and Sorau were also built in Brandenburg the branches and suppliers in alleys and Sommerfeld, further large companies in Poznan and Marienburg/Westpr. The caution and foresight of the Focke-Wulf managers were exceptionally developed: "A second set of operating resources was already available as a precautionary measure a year and a half ago (i.e. in mid-1941! - DE) and is stored in a shed in Fürstenberg/Oder." At the end of 1942, Focke-Wulf requested from RüKdo Frankfurt that "the Nieder-Ullersdorf stoneware factory be used as an alternative location (to) reserve for Cottbus." eat

On October 15, 1943, armaments and economic departments, economic groups, the DAF and others and made far-reaching decommissioning decisions for the district: "The textile companies are shut down, then shut down. Glashütte Germania will be completely shut down. From apprentices and individual employees from the closed timber companies A wood working group will be founded to carry out Fimag ¹ s ⁶ sub-deliveries." (RüKdo Frankfurt/O.)

155 BAP, FS, film 3957, report Focke-Wulf to RLM/GL planning office regarding. "Contingency planning of the companies belonging to the SA F4 in case of aircraft damage", November 28, 1942.

156 FIMAG = Finsterwalder Maschinenbau AG; produced including machine sets for ammunition production and searchlights.

Well sat a more tedious, often fierce battle for Factory premises, workers and Accommodation options. The Berlin companies used the relocations to Brandenburg "in most cases ... to expand operations" (RüKdo Potsdam, November 19, 1943), although the not more authorized was. She held also Workforce in Berlin back.

"As a result of the relocation of Berlin companies to the Frankfurt/Oder district... the need for workers has increased extraordinarily, as the relocated companies never brought the full number of workers they needed from their previous location and this was replenished by the employment offices now responsible in the area Frankfurt/Oder demanded." (Rü Kdo Frankfurt/O., November 1943)

Accommodation options were also scarce for the relocated or conscripted workforce. Disused shops, restaurants and schools (gymnasiums) were in demand. It was often delayed production start-up, because the Companies had to expand their own accommodation or have new ones built. The Potsdam Armaments Command reported, "that "The Gauleiter's provisions for disasters and the party's demands for meeting space, even in the smallest villages, have left only properties that are completely unsuitable for accommodating followers." (RüKdo Potsdam, March 10, 1944)

The Brandenburg companies were anxious to stay in business, but at least to get their machinery safely through the war. In the textile companies Lusatia had them Local Finns apparently enforced that up to 40 Percent of their premises were left to them for the storage of their "high-quality machines". However, as far as possible, they wanted to participate in the armaments business and secure a, albeit mostly modest, part of the war profits. There were different options, depending on the capacity and specifics of production Possibilities, to come to terms with the large arms companies. Since April 1944, at the Finna FW Schmidt cloth factory in Guben, "75 percent of the followers worked for the benefit of the Lorenz company (Berlin) and 25 percent for external production under their own direction."

It seems strange when this company submitted the application in September 1944, "with the 40 [workers who have been eliminated since April due to aging] are back to 30 To put looms into operation for the opening of a textile corner." In fact, it was approved for this "textile corner" to be used in armaments production otherwise unfit for action and approximately 19 French prisoners of war" to set up.

At this time, when the closure and "implementation" of the textile industry in the Frankfurt district was more or less completed, the armaments command came to the sad conclusion that the production of civilian clothing had fallen to "approximately a sixth of the previous production." (Rüln III, III quarter)

b) Underground Relocation

As Hitler in Spring 1943 "at a distance View" to strive for ordered, "that most sensitive Production such as crankshafts, bevel gears, electrical equipment, etc. are carried out in factories that are fully protected by concrete.¹⁵⁷, she announced herself chaotic phase the under-

157 FB, April 11, 1943, Point 4. Please refer II, p. 154. For the The following see. also Cape. I in the prev. Vol.

daytime relocation and concreting of armaments production, which began with the founding of the Jägerstab in the spring of 1944. Those responsible for armaments and industrialists were initially skeptical about Hitler's cave and bunker fantasies. The German economy seemed to have the time and energy for it not having the necessary effort left over. In addition, they could approximately the Ruhr area and the Under no circumstances should you place hydrogenation plants underground or under concrete.

The "Battle of Berlin" and the "Big Week" (one week - End of February 1944 - heaviest attacks on the German aircraft factories) left the The mood appears to be changing widely. Even in Brandenburg, companies feared for their means of production.

"Due to the recent increase in air raids, various companies are planning to move their most valuable machines into the basement and... as far as possible to be kept at full loss. Most advanced [are the plans the] Fa. Mans feld-Werk Prenzlau.... The List company, Teltow, has submitted an application to the building police to build a corresponding bunker of around 100 square meters as quickly as possible." (RüKdo Potsdam, February 29, 1944)

But the were ridiculous Standards in the Comparison to dem, what the hunter's staff planned. According to Hitler's orders, a number of huge bunker factories were to be built, so-called hunter factories, from ever 600 000 until 800 000 sqm Operating area arise, where the now so endangered production of fighter planes be multiplied should. **No** only one this

Concrete towers became complete. So concentrated Nazi and economic leadership Possibilities that are "most sensitive "manufactures" under the earth to relocate: in mines, existing Bunker systems (Maginot Line), tunnels, caves, covered valleys and gorges. The first large underground Attachment, already in the Autumn 1943 in attack taken, was the one at Nordhausen

("Mittelwerk"), intended for the production the Miracle Weapon V2 .

Brandenburg's geography offered little opportunity for this. As far as underground facilities were concerned, Berlin industry had to move elsewhere; in the last year of the war finally in Berlin yourself still one Number of particularly important ones Production moved to brewery basements, subway lines and basement garages. So far there are two for Brandenburg larger underground projects have become known dem Daimler-Benz Group assigned to the relocation of its production in Genshagen/Ludwigsfelde and in Berlin Marienfelde and one for the ball bearing works in Erkner.

The size Daimler-Benz aircraft engine factory in Genshagen became at the 25. March 1944 for the

first time by allies Bombers attacked, and this accelerated the negotiations in Jägerstab about his relocation. In addition to a gypsum mine near Obrigheim am Neckar and the "Rothe Erde" minette mine near Esch (Luxembourg), parts of the underground fortifications of Hochwalde envisaged near Meseritz, the by Built in 1937 in the Oder-Warthe-Bruch near the former German-Polish border and later as Bunkers for Fuel reserves were used.¹⁵⁸ also was the We're talking about the above- and underground facilities at the poison gas factory in Falkenhagen, just 25 km east of Frankfurt/Oder. At the same time, the Daimler-Benz plant in Berlin-Marienfelde was supposed to relocate parts of its tank engine production to Hochwalde.

158 BAK, R 3/1576 ff., Hunter staff logs v. 8th., 11. u. April 15, 1944.

On April 12th, the hunter staff met at the Genshagen plant. "The underground relocation must take place as quickly as possible," decided those present. However, the date was unrealistic from the start:

„I. Hochwalde [near Meseritz/Obrwalde, code name "Schachtelhalm"] Accommodation option for 500 until 600 Machinery. 10 000 sqm. Using machines for ventilation helps Genshagen themselves. Intermediate exits and fire bulkheads desired. Three nearby camps are to be used with the help of the Gauleiters made available for accommodation become. Start of relocation May 1st, completion of relocation and start of production 15.5. required.

II. Falkenhagen [unrealized project] Accommodation for 650 large machines with accessories. 7,500 sqm underground, 1 500 sqm above ground. According to Colonel Wolf (Armaments Command Potsdam) ... available. Clarification as to whether Falkenhagen assigned Daimler-Benz can be made until April 14th. Date as requested for Hochwalde." ¹⁵⁹

The relocation from Genshagen to Hochwalde took place, albeit about a quarter of a year late. At the end of July, the Frankfurt/Oder Armaments Command reported: "Following the relocation of Horsetail I to Hochwalde from Genshagen, the relocation of Horsetail II is now taking place to Hochwalde from Marienfelde. 1,200 followers had to be accommodated, as well as 200 additional "assigned" Soviet prisoners of war. (July 28, 1944). "Schachtelhalm I" began production in August. (RüKdo Frankfurt/O.; management report for August).

"It was in Hochwalde a Part of small manufacturing as well the complete charger production. The operation was partly underground, but mostly in barracks and large wooden halls accommodated. It was considered bombproof because it was very difficult to find." ¹⁶⁰ About the planned strength and composition There is a note from Karl C. Müller (Daimler-Benz Genshagen; head of the special committee for Daimler-Benz aircraft engines), which he probably used as a basis for the meeting on April 12th.

Table 99

For "Horsetail/" (Daimler Benz Hochwalde) intended workforce, April 1944

		= percent
German(men)	602	23.3
German women)	173	6.7
foreigners(men)	484	18.8
foreigners(women)	22	0.9
"Eastern Workers" (men)	507	19.6
"Eastern Workers" (women)	69	2.7
Italian military internees	452	17.5
Concentration camp prisoners (only Men)	270	10.5
<i>Together</i>	2 579	

Source: The Daimler-Benz book, S. 411, **AT Charles C Müller**, April 5, 1944.

159 The Daimler-Benz book. A defense company in the "millennial Reich". Ed. v. d. Hamburg Foundation for Social History of the 20th Century, Nördlingen 1987, p. 413.

160 palms, Frederick, records above the airstrike at the 6. August 1944 the Daimler Benz-

In Erkner near Berlin, the Vereinigte Kugellagerfabriken AG produced a large factory. After a series of air raids on the German ball bearing industry - "Terrible attacks", "most serious burglaries" ¹⁶¹ - the four main plants in Schweinfurt, Cannstatt, Erkner and Steyr at the end of February 1944 almost completely shut down, the relocation of industry was forced. The plant in Erkner went with the most important Production sections underground or under concrete (code name "Village I"; "Village II"): "For Erkner, a maximum of 5,000 square meters in the Rüdersdorf lime mines will be developed in the form of tunnels. In one tunnel section, the... the first machines are put into operation. The large carousel lathes and grinding machines that were preserved during the last attacks in Erkner for the production of the large swivel bearings for the tank domes are bunkered down and the most important grinding machines are moved to basement rooms of around 4 000 sqm, which received appropriate concrete reinforcement from above. The remaining part of the production will be relocated underground from Neckarzimmer after completion."

The expansion of lime mine made apparently big Difficulties. Still in In the third quarter, the armaments inspection reported delays: "In Village I of this plant, the completion of the tunnels for production was delayed because the pressing mountain caused the brick lining tunnels must be intercepted." (Rüln III, III. quarter 1944)

c) The "Dilemma of lack of people"

During the The year 1943 began until the last armaments factory in Brandenburg by striking, which was done by Colonel General Alfred Jodl, Chief of the Wehrmacht Command Staff, on November 7th 1943 in one secret speech the "Dilemma of "lack of people" called, namely

"the interaction and conflict between the need for soldiers at the front and the need for workers at home." ¹⁶² Several circumstances combined to lead to severe labor shortages and even forced certain production restrictions on armaments in 1944.

The heavy one defeats the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front and - since mid-1944 - So-called special confiscation actions (SE actions) also promptly followed on the Western Front. Then it went to the one that had been carefully guarded by the Minister of Armaments and had so far been successfully protected essential inventory Specialist and key workers in the Production. Hitler and the Wehrmacht ordered such an SE action during the Battle of Stalingrad. The second, even more profound one followed in the fall and winter of 1943. Finally, in the fall of 1944, Speer predicted "breakdowns in the coal mining industry, in the reconstruction of chemical plants and in armaments" as unavoidable because without his consent out of the Business still once nearly 300 000 Man moved in become should. ¹⁶³ "Total protection" before the Convocations gave it only in the rarest cases, in the military district Pots

aircraft engine factory Genshagen District Teltow. After Diary entries v. Summer 1945, Ms., edited and abridged by Gerhard Birk, p. 4.

161 BAP, FS, film 3857, report Philip Kessler at Spear, April 6, 1944. Hereafter also the following.

162 IMG, Vol. 37, S. 662, Doc. L- 172.

163 BAK, R 3/1576, spear at Donitz, October 3, 1944. Please refer also Section 1 in the prev. Cape.

dam only in three companies, namely the United Ball Bearing Factories in Erkner and two ammunition factories (Hohensaaten; Döberitz).

The Waffen-SS had an additional recruiting method: they recruited volunteers under 16 and 17 years old. Brandenburg companies complained about „that Apprentices from WE Lagem [Wehrerprüfungs-lagem - D E.] no longer in their companies return because they have now been recruited as volunteers for the Waffen-SS and their volunteer registration has not yet been completed without taking into account the company and their status Teaching delivered have she hear through Coincidence from others followers or Belongings that an apprentice is already serving in the Waffen-SS." (RüKdo Frankfurt/O., July 1943)

Entrepreneurs who given the lack at skilled workers and supervisory staff Foreigners Those who wanted to transfer supervisory and control functions, especially to Polish and Russian workers, had to be careful that they did not get in the way of the Nazi ideologists. "Secret State Police Office announces arrest of Kunz company manager Gnädig & Graciously, Birkenwerder, with. G. had a Pole the supervision of German followers transferred." Gnädig was expelled again after about ten days the "protective liability" dismissed, „with the obligation, the business no longer to enter and exit the to leave the company." (RüKdo Potsdam, 13th and March 26, 1943)

Significantly contributed the relocation of the Berlin industry contributes to the labor shortage after Brandenburg. As mentioned, the Berlin workforce rarely moved their company in the required numbers.

"While on the one hand a number of followers refuse to leave Berlin, see yourself on the other hand the The Berlin employment office is unable to employ these workers here This Forces must therefore out of dem district [Frankfurt/Oder] be provided. Apart from that there are other powers required to the Arrangements to be made for relocation. Because of the earlier withdrawal of workers from the provinces to Berlin have been significantly fleeced, now occurs a second fleecing for the Berlin armaments industry at the expense of the domestic industry." (RüKdo Frankfurt/O., Oct./Nov. 1943)

The air raids on Berlin resulted in a double, albeit temporary, withdrawal of workers. Workers were brought to the capital for "disaster operations". Brandenburg companies, in turn, often waited for days for their Berlin specialists after attacks. "Because of the air raids On November 22nd, 23rd and 26th, 1943, due to traffic conditions, more than 50 percent of the workforce at the Genshagen plant were unable to report for duty." (RüKdo Potsdam, December 2nd, 1943) These forces were irreplaceable, How In our case there were 18 test stand operators alone, so production output stalled.

"[K. C.] Müller: After each attack on Berlin is missing 2,000 to 2,500 workers from the Have to come to town. We are already sending every attack people the main train stations in Berlin, which are armed with large boards giving instructions on how the workers should travel. We also use our few buses, exposing ourselves to the risk that... she confiscated by the police for disaster relief become. Nevertheless, after heavy attacks on Berlin, 2,000 to 2 are missing 500 men, who then after 2, 3 Arrive slowly in days, depending on whether she are themselves damaged or in live in a badly damaged part of town.

Sour: Could She then not with Daimler Benz in Marienfelde one mutual assistance

to agree on a test drive for the tanks that will be driven south from there [make] followers to you?

Müller: The main difficulty was that in the last attacks the... southern train stations were more or less destroyed. It is therefore very difficult to determine a meeting point for our people in advance. We already have collection points in the individual companies turned off. After each attack are but other districts Hoses are barricaded so that trucks can finally get through, but not the heavy tank. We immediately sent people from Genshagen to all the train stations that night so that the railway could be told which routes needed to be repaired particularly urgently. This time, in contrast to before, we have also achieved that the destroyed railway lines on the Lichterfelde-South - Anhalter Bahnhof was put back into operation very quickly."¹⁶⁴

The Brandenburg's industry suffered itself increasingly under Attacks, especially in Berlin outskirts. There were many deaths. At the beginning of December 1943, 63 dead and 35 seriously injured "Eastern Workers" lay under the rubble of the air raid shelter of the Heinrich List company in Teltow. "DAF will send the district liaison man there as a speaker [to the funeral] so that the intended speeches by the Eastern Workers themselves and the Company can be avoided." (RüKdo Potsdam, December 4, 1943). On August 6, 1944, in one of the worst attacks that Brandenburg's industry experienced, 32 employees were killed and 8 injured in the Opel plants in Brandenburg alone. At the Daimler-Benz plant in Genshagen the number was more than three times so tall. "For example, the E. Müller company, which manufactures armored cars and assault defense parts, lost 30 percent of its workforce to death and injuries in an attack lost." (Rüin III, third quarter 1944)

*From the reports of the Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production about air raids, May and August 1944*¹⁶⁵

- I. "Notification about Effects of enemy air attacks on the war economy important facilities", dated May 29, 1944 (regarding the attack on May 28th at noon): "Schwarzheide b. Ruhland: Brabag, 5-600 bombs. Hit: Gas tanks, switchgear, six of seven Koppers systems, generator system, buildings 30, 106 and 118. Magazine burnt out. Main workshop splinter damage. 20 more duds. - Due to the failure of gas generation, the **plant is at** a standstill. Production is expected to start in around four weeks with ten percent."
- II. "Notification of impacts... in the Time from the 29th to May 30, 1944", dated **May** 30th (regarding the attack on May 29th May noon): "Kottbus: Airfield: Hall 1 (final assembly) destroyed with 20 aircraft [Focke-Wulf fighter planes]. Hall 2 was around 80 percent destroyed, Hall 3 (pre-assembly and preparation shop) was 100 percent destroyed, Hall 4 (intermediate assembly) was slightly damaged. Hall 5 (painting) OK. Hall 6 (entry operations) and halls 8 and 9 (entry operations) were severely damaged. Hall 7 80 percent damaged. Hall 9a (small parts warehouse) destroyed, as was Hall 10 (Focke-Wulf camp 200) and

¹⁶⁴ Roth/Schmid/Fröbe, S. 302, Doc. 114a, Jägerstab protocol, March 26, 1944. - Charles C. Müller was a board member of Daimler-Benz AG and director of the aircraft engine factory Genshagen and head of the Armaments Ministry's special committee for the Daimler-Benz aircraft engines.

¹⁶⁵ BAP, FS, Movie 3383; Report V after Movie 3386.

- Shooting range destroyed. Eight barracks and headquarters buildings were also destroyed. 50 aircraft destroyed. Electricity and water supply disrupted. Sorau: Focke-Wulf (airfield): carpet bombing. Hall 4 was almost completely destroyed. Hall 5 (final assembly) and Hall 3 severely damaged. Some barracks set on fire. Assembly is no longer possible until further notice."
- III. "Report No. 10 above Effects ... in the time from 6. for the 7. August 1944", from August 7th (regarding the daytime attack on August 6th): "Rü In III Berlin[-Brandenburg]: The following places were particularly targeted. Districts reported: Teltow, Genshagen, Großbeeren, Stahnsdorf, Ober- and Niederschöneweide, Johannisthal, Baumschulenweg, Neukölln, Marienfelde, Priestweg, Friedenau and Schöneberg. ... Brandenburg: Arado aircraft works Carpet bomb drop. An important production relatively little damaged. Otherwise serious damage to the factory. Access roads impassable. Opel works: Serious damage - initially 100 percent failure. Elisa Beth-Hütte: Significant damage, initially 100 percent failure. Eberswalde: Forest fire north of Ardet-Werke. Wittstock: cloth factory [four words illegible] warehouse thrown on fire."
- IV. "Report No. 11 about effects ...", from August 7, 1944: "... Addition to yesterday's daily attack: Rü In III: Daimler-Benz, Genshagen (only assembly of aircraft engines): Numerous workshops damaged. Numerous long-term detonators on site. Greater loss of life. Production downtime cannot yet be overlooked. Arado-Flugzeugwerke, Brandenburg plant: South front of the construction building damaged. Flight control hall and Workshop T heavy damaged. Further damage at others workshops. plant Neuendorf: One Workshop (Development) destroyed, five more workshops damaged. Aviation technology preschool burned down. Plant-path interrupted. Some Airplanes destroyed or damaged. Production downtime is expected to be minimal. Adam Opel, Brandenburg (motor vehicles, trucks 1.5 t): administration building destroyed. One workshop collapsed, other halls were severely damaged. more easily damaged. Foreigner camp burned down. Temporary production downtime 100 percent. 15 dead, numerous injured. Elisabeth Hut 0. Wiederholz (metal casting), Brandenburg: workshop and foreigners' camp severely damaged. Temporarily 100 percent production downtime. August Spitta Söhne leather factory, Brandenburg: factory building severely damaged. Production downtime cannot yet be overlooked."
- V. From the "Overview" of the Armaments Inspectorate III for the IIIrd quarter 1944; regarding attack on Schwarzheide (Brabag mineral oil synthesis plant) at the 24. August 1944:
- "As a result of the fogging carried out over a long period of time, the enemy fighter planes circled over the factory premises for 1 hour 10 **minutes** without dropping bombs. The drop then took place within 16 Minutes through 10 Waves with continued fogging.... Of the 8 anti-aircraft batteries used to protect the work became 5 400 Shot without recognizable Success delivered Through the attack became the plant again completely shut down."

In the In September 1944 ,^{1,66} reported the highest loss of working hours of all companies in the province :

	<i>percent</i>
Niederbarnimer aircraft engine factories,	21.3
Basdorf Auergesellschaft AG, Oranienburg	17.9
plant Julius Pintsch KG, Fürstenwalde plant	16.3
Kurmärkische rayon wool and cellulose AG,	14.3
Wittenberge Dreilinden Maschinenbau GmbH,	14.2
Kleinmachnow Brabag AG, Schwarzheide-Ruhland	14.0
plant	13.6
Adam Opel AG, plant Brandenburg	12.1
AEG, Hennigsdorf plant	

Chaos was already approaching Summer 1944, when Special rods like the "Geilenberg Staff", who was supposed to use fire brigade operations to rebuild the bombed hydrogenation plants in Germany, use Hitler's special powers to "ruthlessly" bring out workers everywhere and "if necessary" also "in productions of the highest urgency" could intervene; as "Special actions" (quick actions, violent actions) repeatedly confused the armaments and manpower potential. Hitler himself often ordered such actions, which, depending on the short-term armament needs of the front, sometimes focused on types of weapons (infantry guns, Flak, infantry weapons, Aircraft weapons), sometimes on ammunition for these weapons "bazookas" etc. were directed. Difficulties, passive resistance and that moment of inertia made some of these actions obsolete before they could be carried out. But overall they were leading to "heaviest." Charges" the Armament industry and to chaotic difficulties "due to a lack of coordination in the higher authority", that is, from the military district commands and armaments inspections right up to the "Führer". (Rüin III, III quarter)

As in In July 1944, the Red Army advanced to the Vistula and was no longer very far from the German border, the Frankfurt/Oder Armaments Command reported the "withdrawal of Germans workers through party offices, among other things arms factories, for entrenchment work in the East. The withdrawal of key personnel could initially be reversed." (July 31, 1944)

In late summer and autumn the steered German arms industry is inexorably heading into crisis. Since August and September 1944 in the reports of the armaments departments on the workforce situation a new sound unmistakable. For the first time there was talk of "burglaries" in the Production the Speech, which can no longer be intercepted or balanced could become. The most important The causes, mentioned in the management report for August (RüKdo Frankfurt/Oder), were the "Aktion Zielenzig" (entrenching work in the extreme east of the province), the "implementations" under the keyword "**SM**" - Special mineral oil campaign (reconstruction of Brabag/Schwarz heide), the mass conscriptions into the Wehrmacht and the production losses due to many "checks" and "implementations" that were associated with the increasing employment of people with no production experience German women, for Part in home work, in were related .

„This Actions have in of their entirety to one Burglary in the production guided. The full impact cannot yet be overlooked. In addition, production is being implemented in home work and group work, in RAD camps, penitentiaries, prisons, military penitentiaries and air raid police."

In the September and in the following months the same Position - so aggravated

"as a result of that "Delivery in many cases stalled". At that time the German railway network, especially in its Main connections from the Ruhr area to the east and south, the main target of the air raids. But this had a paradoxical, opposite effect a: workers became unemployed, because The companies were missing materials, semi-finished products and supplier parts.

d) Working class life

Within the Workforce shifted since 1943 the conditions with greater Speed. The number of German workforce in the Industry declined; in the In the armaments industry, on the other hand, it appears to have increased slightly in 1943 (due to "implementations", the inclusion of unemployed women and the generation of high birth rates) and then decreased only in 1944. Ultimately, only German skilled workers remained the older ones, mostly aged 50 years and about it. Newly trained young people People and apprentices came and went back soon, if she - in increasingly younger ages - were called. The unskilled class was mainly filled by childless and older women who had to report for "total war action".

The social structure of workers Population was heavily modified and damaged in the later years of the war. There is hardly a family in which there is not a father or Son was drafted into the armed forces or "conscripted". The iron broom of "total war" took more and more women and mothers from the household to the business or for home work the armor. Many provided an evasive activity or one Certificate for half-time work. Hundreds of thousands of women and children were evacuated from bomb-prone cities and areas, and students and teachers with their schools were sent to "Kinderland deportation camps". sent.

One Substructure formed the seven millions foreign workers (with Prisoner of War genes), artificially divided into many "classes" and layers and all classified as second class below the German worker. Almost 60 percent came from the USSR and Poland, another 20 percent were "free" and prisoners of war French; the rest came from a dozen other occupied European countries. In the German industry in September 1942 from the employees, for example 15 Percent foreigners, end of May 1944 it was over 40 percent; in the defense industry it was around 25 and 50 percent, respectively. In individual cases Branches and new works rose the Proportion of foreigners even to 60 percent and more; at the Daimler-Benz plant in Genshagen for example in March 1944 on 63 Percent.

Arms production rose far faster than the number of workers. Production improvements and simplifications, new machines, concentration on fewer types of weapons - i.e. increased productivity and rationalization in many forms - played no small role here. But what was probably more effective was the sharp pace of work, the driving and, above all, the up to to 72 hour week extended long working hours, from which terrible exploitation and drudgery of the forced laborers and concentration camp prisoners, not to mention. Further was the physical and mental stress caused by the Air raids in 1943/44 were enormous.

Nevertheless, the armaments departments regularly reported a "calm" and "satisfied" mood among German employees.

"The mood of the followers everywhere was good according to the times. The failure through disease is on average 5 to 6 percent." (RüKdo Frankfurt/Oder; July 1944) "The mood of the followers is satisfactory. Disease status on average 5 percent." (August 1944) ",... is the The mood in the companies among the German followers is good more serious become, but in the generally quiet." (RüKdo Potsdam; III. Quarter 1944)

The average sickness rates were of course deceptive. The same reports the Berlin-Brandenburg district also included entirely other numbers, without names of Companies to name: "In individual plants the sick numbers up to 13 Percent increased." (Rüln III; third quarter of 1944) "... in individual companies [the sickness rate] reaches up to 20 percent of the workforce. The reasons for this are the following: a) colds, caused by the weather and insufficient heating; b) greater vulnerability with regard to the for the Partly inadequate nutritional status (absence of vegetables); c) Overstress due to long working hours." (RüKdo Berlin V; III. Quarter 1944)

What made the German workers so silent, hard-working and obedient? Sure, Nazi terror threatened everyone expressed a different opinion. Refusal to work and strikes led to Gestapo imprisonment and concentration camps. But the overwhelming majority of Germans supported the regime, not least through diligent, precise work. It had conquered half of Europe, supplemented their supplies with captured and stolen food and other goods and filled their minds with its propaganda phrases about socialism and national community German master race and Jewish and Slavic or Bolshevik subhumanity. The workers experienced this every day in their company one situation, in the them little by little to it were used to being "master people" on foreign ones To look down on forced laborers, to command and harass them, even to beat them. Anyone who was soft-hearted and even showed solidarity was punished.

Hence the tireless, disciplined work of so many workers and employees for armaments that prolonged the war. The workers often stayed at the factory at night to... to save tiring driving to and from home -p especially at the end of the month when the planned production figure should be fulfilled. A designer at Daimler-Benz Gensha gen reports: „Or we have in the Night from the Saturday to Sunday went through and came on Sunday afternoon home. For us This was a matter of course when haste was required, but also a necessity, because we wanted to make ourselves indispensable so as not to be drafted." ¹⁶⁷

As after one airstrike the mechanical engineering and Railway requirements AG in Potsdam- Babels mountain was completely still because the main electrical supply cables was destroyed, concentration camp prisoners should be brought in to a dud bomb to dig up before the Electricity plant went for repairs. But things turned out differently. "Two people from the company's following immediately agreed to uncover the unexploded bomb," he said that one fetched Fireworks whose Defusing make could. Until for the Arrive the concentration camp prisoners

"Every danger had already been eliminated and the power station could immediately begin repairing the cable." (RüKdo Potsdam, June 21, 1944) A remarkable one Case of misguided service zeal and enthusiasm!

In the "total war" the Nazi regime also submitted the German women (from 17 to 45 years; until August 1944 increased to 55 years) of a reporting and service obligation "for tasks of the Defense of the Reich". From now on there was it two categories of German armaments workers, namely women who had been working for years, during the war and mostly before the war, and many of whom did heavy armaments work, for example in the ammunition industry, and women from the "compulsory registration campaign", which is strange were approached timidly, especially if they came from "better circles".

The Nazi leaders had various reasons for this above all, the fear of a decline in mood both among the female population and among the front-line soldiers, whose wives had previously sat at home, supported by the state. The most popular argument, however, was the "necessity of preserving its (the German people) DE) biological health" to "under to prevent under all circumstances that even when used again German woman or girl could suffer damage to their physical and mental health." (Sauckel) ¹⁶⁸

Armament departments and companies had a hard time employing new female workers. These women in particular were the recipients of the sigh of relief from the "labor deployment engineers" who were responsible to the Minister of Armaments for "work deployment" and work performance in the armaments factories. There were now more and more new workers in the companies, „the from business life, from Machines, tools, machining processes and manufacturing principles." ¹⁶⁹ The women were allowed - as in the employment office district Oberbarnim - not in the third layer can be used, although others re German women "for a long time" also worked at night. "The company Frieske & Höpfner received a rejection from the trade supervisory office in response to its application to employ German women in 12-hour night and day shifts," even though it... According to information from the company, "eight to twelve German and 20 to 24 foreign women in each shift volunteered." (RüKdo Potsdam, November 18, 1943)

The employment offices couldn't please the companies if they didn't react "with sufficient severity" to women's extremely frequent requests and requests for part-time work decided, still if she the "Total War", like the companies thought,

„too hot' understood and urged that the women in the Production and not administration. It presented very much soon find out that the newly signed ones Women were unable or unwilling to take on heavier work, and that "German women of older age groups cannot be seen as a full replacement for workers capable of hard work." (RüKdo Potsdam, September 1944) This left armaments departments and companies are constantly busy "converting" German men and foreign workers, especially Eastern workers, from lighter to heavier jobs and thus freeing up "suitable jobs for German women."

168 IMG, Vol. 27, S. 611, Doc. PS-1739, Sauckel's speech at the Reich and Gauleiter conference on the 5th/6th 2.1943.

169 BAK, R 3/3035, Rs. District AEI Upper Rhine at Chairmen AEI, September 7, 1944.

The companies were also unable to accept the home-based work that was strongly advocated by the Ministry of Armaments in 1944, because of theirs. According to "the performance of the German woman in the company structure should be significantly larger than if you the same work is assigned as home work." (RüKdo Potsdam, September 1944)

On the other hand, the armaments companies tried early on to recruit "maidens" from the Reich Labor Service, who were accommodated and looked after by their organization and for whom a wage below the collective agreement and a small levy had to be paid to the RAD. For the Norddeutsche Maschinenfabrik Luckenwalde were in March 1943 80 work maids provided; she were supposed to move into the local HJ home, which was to be built specifically for this purpose. However, there seems to have been unease and fear among those responsible that the girls and young women, whose through the Nazi ideology predetermined fate it was, "Lebensborn" for a new one To be a generation of soldiers in which armor would be worn out. After a serious accident in a tracer ammunition factory took man Distance of that, she further in the ammunition industry to occupy:

"Because of the danger associated with the production of the Deleu company, Schönhagen, and in view of the recent fatal one In the event of an accident involving a maid, no more maids may be employed in the future with the consent of the Armaments Inspectorate. Armaments Command Potsdam has the company an offer was made as a replacement if necessary "To employ 40 to 50 female prisoners." (RüKdo Potsdam, March 18 and 22, 1943)

Armament departments and judicial authorities agreed since about mid-1943, that more and more prison inmates were put "into urgent armaments production": men out Sonnenburg and Brandenburg and women the women's prison Cottbus. In Cottbus there are "plenty of female convicts available" for the ammunition industry, it said in the files of the Armaments Command Frankfurt/Oder. Arms production also began in the prisons themselves. "AEG-Hennigsdorf will make production facilities for the production of synthetic resin bearing bushes (Adolf Hitler tank program) available to the Sonnenburg prison." (August 9 and October 1, 1943)

In the critical time of autumn 1943, as a defense worker As supplies became more and more scarce at every turn, the Wehrmacht and the economy took a stand Goebbels it expressed, "good business" with the labor of 600,000 Italian soldiers.¹⁷⁰ The news of the unexpected new labor resources reached the companies in Berlin Brandenburg still in September.

"Re: Italian 'military internees' as workers.

1. In the next few days is with the arrival of larger Italian transports 'Military ternate' and their transfer to the companies as workers.
2. Allocation takes place taking into account the following guidelines: ... Accommodation is in our own warehouses take place. Wooden or wire fencing at a height of 2.00 m is required. Guarding to a limited extent is provided by the commander of the prisoners of war, additional security guards from those taking over Companies...
3. The Companies will be on the unique opportunity to procure workers." (RüKdo Berlin V, September 27, 1943)

¹⁷⁰ Please refer Section 1 in the prev. Cape.

Already on 1. October reported IG Farben Group for his **plant** in Landsberg/Warthe is in great demand. It should try "immediately." 750 Italian be used." The Company representatives were only concerned that the prisoners for The work in the Perlon spinning mill had less "tact" than the women who otherwise worked there. (RüKdo Frankfurt/O., October 1, 1943)

A few days later (6. October) thousands of Italians were already "dispersed" (here only: Armaments Command Frankfurt/Oder): "As part of the Italian campaign, a significant number of workers were supplied to the air force companies, namely:

Focke-Wulf, Sorau	600
Focke-Wulf, cottbus	120
Lorenz, Guben	200
Eltron, Summer field	100
Pelzer, Alleys	100
Focke-Wulf, alleys	150
Rheinmetall-Borsig, Guben	515
different Spremberg companies	200
different Guben companies	250
Hirth AG, New Dam	35
I. G. Colors, Landsberg/Warthe	750
record rubber factory, Schwiebus	150
Nettelbeck, Räschen	80
Schlegel, Golssen	100
Air base Königsberg/Neumark	100"

The rapid procedures in Brandenburg was not at all common practice. The "General authorized for Special questions of the chemical production" complained in In December, the Main Construction Committee (Armaments Ministry) reported that the "Imis" were not as numerous as announced Germany made it and that she Weeks and months of clean-up work in bombed-out cities were "often not very expedient... because, on the one hand, their work activities were not closely monitored enough and, on the other hand, the nature of the work did not always appear to be particularly urgent."¹⁷¹

They came Italian soldiers after a long stay in the camp and Transport and after such operations in the Companies were usually in a miserable condition, hungry and shabby, and often sick. „Fa. Märkisches Walzwerk Strausberg reports that The Italians captured in the war were heavily lice-stricken possible symptoms of illness can be attributed to transmission." (RüKdo Potsdam, November 17, 1943)

"During the inspections it was found that the use of the Imis in protected rooms and on machines provided satisfactory work performance shows (in smaller companies this is even the case). one 80- to 100% work performance versus performance of achieved by German workers). When working outdoors in cool, damp weather, performance is extremely poor and physical deterioration occurs Imis striking. The Southern Italians are so ours climate not grown. It are sufficient also in this one cases trains- _

171 BA/MA, FS, film 8322, AT re: meeting GB Chemistry/HA Building, December 8, 1943.

rations were not outstanding. Symptoms of hunger (edema) have already been identified in several farms been. Around 150 Imis had to be taken to the Stalags to be nursed because they were completely exhausted "(RüKdo Frankfurt/O., January 1944)

"Fa. Ebeling, Prenzlau, has found that the work performance of the Imi's is very low and through small experiments was determined, that the Food is completely inadequate. In special cases, allowances were given to particularly skilled workers, which resulted in an increase in work performance by 100 percent. (February 29, 1944) ... achieved increased work performance with the Imi with a food allowance, but regrets not being able to continue this procedure." (RüKdo Potsdam, March 11, 1944)

Since 1942, the main reservoir of foreign workers has been civilian forced labor ("Eastern Workers") and Prisoners of war from the USSR. She became, from the Nazis as treated as an "inferior race". and insulted, far worse fed, worse - the prisoners of war not at all - paid and driven and harassed more harshly than any other foreign one workers, including the Poles. "Although the achievements of the "Eastern workers are better than those of Poles despite poorer food," complained the Potsdam Armaments Command (1st quarter of 1943), and more wages would be deducted from them for accommodation and food.

In the course of year 1943 It was even noticed in Wehrmacht and party circles that that the miserable existence of the Soviet workers, especially hunger and exhaustion, caused their performance to drop drastically. The district armaments departments constantly had to listen to complaints from companies about the "decline in the work performance of the Eastern workers," "because of the deterioration in food due to a lack of potatoes," as the Seiffert & Co. company reported. Like some other companies, Seiffert & Co. tried to buy potatoes in the area; After all, potatoes were the main and at times only food for Eastern workers and Soviet prisoners of war. But in its intention, the company reported, it encountered the obstacle of the "absolutely high prices" that the farmers were demanding. (RüKdo Potsdam, December 2, 1943)

One such "private initiative" saw the Nazi authorities in the general even not gladly. "The Provincial Nutrition Office must make every attempt to improve the diet of Eastern workers reject as being to the detriment of the German population." (RüKdo Potsdam, January 31, 1944) Finally was none other than State Secretary Backe from the Reich Ministry of Food deal with the title of German "food dictator" flattered, together with Göring was responsible for the Eastern workers rations from the beginning.¹⁷²

Jaws, spears and the armaments industrialists inaugurated later the infamous system of "performance nutrition". One of the inventors and promoters of "performance nutrition" was the Flick Group (Lauchhammer; Hennigsdorf). End of 1943 The Armaments Minister recommended the system to be used by all German companies.¹⁷³

Also in the last year of the war it no thoroughgoing Improvement of the nutrition of the Eastern workers, although many entrepreneurs repeatedly **criticized this** . „Although they (the Eastern workers - D. E.) represent the best workers among foreigners, they will worst catered", complained, for example in the summer of 1944 Julius Pintsch

¹⁷² Please refer in addition Section 2.

¹⁷³ Please refer II, S. 277.

KG (Fürstenwalde/Spree). It is therefore not surprising that cases of typhus still occurred in the Eastern worker camps and that prisoner of war camps had to be quarantined due to the risk of epidemics.

The heads of the industrial special committee appointed by the armaments minister called for more concentration camp prisoners to work in armaments for the in Brandenburg represented arms production - for example Karl C. Müller from Daimler-Benz Motoren GmbH Genshagen (for the aircraft engine industry), Heinrich Nordhoff from Opel-Werke Brandenburg (for the motor vehicle industry) and Dietrich Stahl from Bergmann & Co. KG (for ammunition production):

"When it comes to the narrowing of the labor market for German and foreign workers, reference is made to the completely insufficient utilization of the labor power of many thousands of concentration camp prisoners, with whom Heinkel, Oranienburg, has had the very best experiences. The Armaments Command is asked to make a strong commitment to the use of male and female concentration camp prisoners during the inspection [of the concentration camps]. The Reichsführer SS is likely to explain his willingness because the surveillance measures caused him considerable difficulties due to the constant withdrawal of men, while the Do this task too can be solved more easily by female prisoners. In the camp Ravensbrück near Fürstenberg in Mecklenburg alone is said to be around 10 000 be tangible to people. The use is only worthwhile if the requirements are greater, but in this case, from the novice to the scientist, there are definitely useful forces and of course one Large number of unskilled workers tangible." (RüKdo Potsdam, March 26, 1943)

In March 1944, a year after this meeting, Himmler reported that in the Air Force Armament 36 000 concentration camp prisoners worked. "The increase to a total of 90,000 prisoners is planned." He named them by name Heinkel works in Oranienburg as the one that operated with almost 6,000 prisoners was far at the top. "This means we represent 60 percent of the plant's total workforce."¹⁷⁴

Table 100

Concentration camp prisoners out of Brandenburg Store in the air force armor, March 1944

camp and Operation	number d. Inmates intend ed	used	Work working hours Jan. 1944	performance
<i>Ravensbrück:</i> testing site of RLM,	600	598	125 000	Construction measures
Peenemünde- West				
Equipment factory Pomerania GmbH, Stargard	550	283	81 129	Manufacturing of aerial torpedoes
Heinkel works AG, Bart	2000	1 721	435 155	Aircraft manufacturing

174 IMG, Vol. 27, S. 356 f., Doc. PS-1584 (III), Himmler at Goering, March 9, 1944.

Table 100 (Continuation)

camp and Operation	number d. Inmates presented see	entered puts	Work working hours i. J. 1944	performance
Mechanical workshops GmbH, Neubrandenburg	4000	1 981	529 126	production from bomb-dropping devices u. Fz. G. 76 Prod. Result January: 23 000 Castle 50/X 1 500 Lock 2 000 150 PVC 1006 500 Rowing machine 400 HE 4 L- >2<
Siemens u. Halske, Berlin, factory Ravensbrück	2400	872	242 867	production from messaging devices (and a. larynx microphones)
Silva metal works GmbH Genthin	600	596	154 224	Manufacturing from Anti-aircraft ammunition Prod. Result Jan.: 518 200 2 cm cartridges 927 500 2 cm cartridges (various Execution) 965 000 13 mm Cartridges manufacturing
Veltener mechanical engineering GmbH, Velten	600	596	146 873	Airplane parts
<i>Sachsenhausen:</i> Heinkel works AG, Oranienburg	6500	5 939	1699978	Aircraft series production Prod. Result Jan.: 15 Airframes Hey 177 Manufacturing u. Repair of balloons Prod. Result Jan.: 120 Balloons maintained set and Partial work for 40 new Balloons
Airship construction Zeppelin GmbH, Oranienburg	300	221	54006	

Source: IMG, Vol. 27, S. 360 f., Doc. PS-1584 (III), Himmler at Goering, March 9, 1944.

Even in this list, which was limited to air armaments, 2,000 female prisoners from Ravensbrück, who worked for Heinkel, and 1 000 out Sachsenhausen, who worked in the Berlin-Hakenfelde aviation equipment factory. On a list that Karl Sommer made at the time deputy Head of office D II in the WVHA, in Nuremberg before Court to protocol gave,

There were, among others, a further 2,000 prisoners from Sachsenhausen for the Auergesellschaft (Oranienburg), 1,700 for the AEG (Berlin-Oberspree and Hennigsdorf). and 1 200 listed for you mens; Siemens had also large Workshops within the concentration camp Ravensbrück with several thousand female prisoners.¹⁷⁵

The absurdity of the Nazi ideology was revealed in the policy towards Jewish workers. In the spring 1943, as Goebbels Berlin "free of Jews" made, should in the Frame the "Final solution" too Jews who were still working in the province of Brandenburg disappear and are "on transport". the Extermination camp go. In the Brandenburg economy, that was the name it in one "Review" of Armament Commands Potsdam on the 1. quarter 1943, "The expulsion of Jews should be carried out completely "Companies like Heinkel (Oranienburg) and the Grieneberger Metallwerke offered Armament departments concentration camp prisoners as compensation. In fact, the Nazi extermination machine seized all the Jews it could arrest, including skilled workers and scientists. "The Jewish doctor assigned to the medical care of the Eastern workers at the Kurmärkische Metallwarenfabrik, Liebenwalde, had to be withdrawn at the instigation of the Main Security Office [meaning the **RSHA- DE**]." (**RüKdo Potsdam, 1st quarter 1943**)

Hardly any more as a Year passed, and Jews became again to sought-after workers. In the form of a total of around 500 000 from Hungary Since the summer of 1944, the deported Jews became a new source for the SS, the GBA, the Ministry of Armaments and the armaments companies on. Preference was given to Brandenburg with this predominantly in Auschwitz's "selected" workers apparently "supplied" air armament companies, for example Henschel (Schönefeld) and Daimler-Benz (Genshagen).¹⁷⁶ "300 Jewish women have arrived at the Lorenz AG [Guben] company and are being trained. The forces thus freed up should be handed over to the Neumarkwerk, Küstrin." (RüKdo Frankfurt/O., August 29, 1944)

e) Daimler Benz Engines GmbH, Genshagen

On May 1, 1939, the Daimler-Benz engine factory in the Genshagen Heath celebrated an unusual event. The company, which was built from the forest floor of the heath in 1936/37, had already had 2 since the end of 1936/beginning of 1937 500 Daimler-Benz aircraft engines were manufactured for the Luftwaffe and employed almost 7 people at the time 000 people. He received that desired Name of a "National Socialist model company". Everything that is there in terms of modern production facilities, training workshops, factory settlements and the "beauty of work" - ridiculed by critical workers as "flowerpot romanticism" and "facade socialism" - was created and seemed worthy of an award to the Nazis. At that time, it was 95 percent financed with state money, but was firmly in the hands of the Daimler-Benz Group.

Genshagen/Ludwigsfelde was there throughout the war the leading German serial work aircraft engine industry, whose capacity in the first war years only the June

¹⁷⁵ anatomy of war, S. 474 f., Doc. 268.

¹⁷⁶ Please refer Section 1 in the prev. Cape.

kers engine works in Dessau and in kassel and against At the end of the war, the BMW works in Munich-Allach almost reached this level. The DB 601 and 605 engines were used to equip the most popular German warplanes: the Me 109 and Me 110 (Messer Schmitt fighters), He 111 (Heinkel bomber) and later also part of the Focke-Wulf-Jäger (Fw 190). •

Table 101

production from Daimler-Benz aircraft engines, 1936-1944 (in pcs.)

	Total	of it DB Genshagen	in percent
1936	419		
1937	1 265	428	34
1938	2065	1 427	69
1939	3 700	2 249	61
1940	6276	3 176	51
1941	7 431	3 659	49
1942	LO 161	4920	48
1943	19625	7702	39
1944	28669	LO 535	37

Source: The Daimler-Benz book, S. 354, Tab. 27.

The climax of the production reached the **Work** in first half of 1944 with well over a thousand Engines monthly. The workforce by then had grown to almost 17,500 men; Of these, 62.6 percent were foreigners and concentration camp prisoners.

The Work was called after a village in the Genshagen Heath, lay but not in the immediate vicinity of Genshagen, but rather of Ludwigsfelde, one Also a small village in the Teltow district, which had 224 residents in 1933, 478 at the start of construction and 3,259 in 1939 and continued to grow steadily. ¹⁷⁷ Well camouflaged in the Brandenburg pine forest, A dozen large halls were built there on an area of around four square kilometers, each with almost 6000 m ² of floor space, with the large assembly hall in the middle, 150 m by 400 mm in floor plan. Four test bench complexes with a total of 14 engine test benches were in place Terrain distributed. ¹⁷⁸ Still ahead the war were like the plant itself was financed mainly with Reich funds and Reich guarantees, for the Daimler-Benz permanent staff, especially for the skilled workers, small settlements with 436 individual houses, most of time without sewerage or basement. After the start of the war, a further 552 so-called two-story people's apartments were built Apartment blocks. For conductive Separate houses with greater comfort were built for the staff. Wooden houses and barracks were quickly built later .

¹⁷⁷ Birk, Gerhard, A gloomy Chapter Ludwigsfelder History 1936 - 1945. Creation and Downfall of the Daimler-Benz aircraft engine works in Genshagen/Ludwigsfelde, (Trebbin) 1986, p. 47 note 3.

¹⁷⁸ The Daimler-Benz book, S. 394 f.

Back in 1939, the factory management wanted to use "people's apartments" to attract those "very good skilled workers from the Ostmark and Sudeten Germany, who are very hard-working and willing", many of whom had already gone home in those months already darkened by the war and who could not yet be forced to stay, as was the case later. " **We** can only do these good men "We can appease us by repeatedly giving them the prospect of the settlement apartments being completed soon."¹⁷⁹

Apartment for a thousand and more German families were created, but their lives took place under special circumstances. Nothing happened in town anymore that was not regulated and controlled by the factory management, the Luftgau command and the Nazi officials who were compliant with them became - himself the camouflage painting of houses with "dirty paint" and the Ban on felling trees (of course not reasons of environmental protection). The plant was surrounded by a two-meter-high solid fence and sharp by plant security guarded. You could only enter with a forgery-proof ID, which was only valid for certain parts of the company.

Apart from a **cinema**, there were no cultural institutions. Things were bad with school conditions and shopping opportunities. In addition, the engines on the fourteen test benches roared unmistakably day and night. "Several residents of Ludwigsfelde reported that the roar of the aircraft engines still rings in their ears in nightmares today, 40-45 years later. Cattle in the surrounding towns, for example in Großbeeren and Genshagen, refused to eat because of the unusual noise. With a larger one Number from children took nervous disorders to. There was noise pollution then during the war there was an unpleasant smell, Because with every air raid alarm or when enemy aircraft approach or fly over, the location and the work is fogged up. The persistent acrid smell called out many times but especially in children, catarrh, nausea and Eye inflammation out and had furthermore to As a result, many children developed rashes."¹⁸⁰

During the war years The factory's workforce grew two and a half times the status of 1939. The number of German employees remained more or less constant, but the fluctuation was large, the level of qualification of the German workforce decreased and their position in the company changed. More and more, especially in 1943/44, skilled workers, foremen, foremen and supervisory staff were drafted into the Wehrmacht dem the there was the greatest shortage. Instead of In many cases, semi-skilled and unskilled people made do other companies and industries in Berlin and Brandenburg, but also from the rural environment, until down to Jüterbog. There were many women among them, after all over 20 percent of Germans. The number of war disabled people and other people unfit for military service increased.

The core workforce was long before were "cleansed" of critical, anti-fascist forces after the war. The Nazi ideology "Germany over everything", the "national community" and racism were already deep in people's minds when thousands of foreigners came to the work, a small number of them voluntarily or on the job Recruited on the basis of state contracts

179 Ibid, S. 238, Daimler Benz Engines GmbH at RLM, April 22, 1939.

180 Birk, S. 13.

(Italy), the majority of them forcibly recruited from occupied countries (France, Belgium, Holland, "Protectorate") or carried off (Soviet and Polish workers, Italian "Military internees"). Any German who was now considered reliable or even politically active could quickly rise to the ranks of foremen, masters and supervisors. In the past, the German skilled worker had successfully used his own professional and trade union, and often also political, authority against company incentive methods; Now he could, as soon as he was incorporated into that non-commissioned officer corps of production, compensate for the loss of such authority through the power to dispose of the foreign workers .

The tragedy of the German workers and employees was precisely that they not only... all in 100 years rights and rights fought for freedoms had been deprived, but that under this regime even so many men and women as Driver, beating and He allowed people to commit murder against foreign forced laborers, German Jews and other persecuted people, "instead of seeing from their fate how far down they themselves had fallen." ¹⁸¹

And yet, besides the roaring ones, there were and brawlers Drivers who set the tone in the halls with their "Go, go, up, up" were also inconspicuous German workers who practiced simple human solidarity and secretly showed small acts of kindness to the forced laborers. That was often life-threatening, but life-saving for many of the starving and miserable "Eastern workers", prisoners of war and concentration camp inmates.

The peculiar composition of the Genshagen workforce, consisting of a third of German workers, some selected and some mixed together, and almost two thirds foreigners, all of whom were under strict surveillance in the **factory** , made any resistance a particularly difficult and fatally risky undertaking. In the older sister company that has grown organically for decades in Berlin-Marienfelde, who had mainly built tank engines since 1943 and armored car mounted ("Panther") it bigger, since Resistance groups made up of communists, social democrats and other anti-fascist forces have been active in the south of Berlin for years. In Genshagen, on the other hand, a few from Berlin organizations built approximately dem "Fighting League against Fascism", coming workers like the A judge, Arthur Ladwig, who had been at the plant since 1937 and lived in Ludwigsfelde, founded a communist-led resistance group that included around 30 men. Most fell on the 21st. May 1943 the Gestapo in the Hands. Ladwig, Ernst Kühn and one A number of others were sentenced to death on March 30th by the People's Court under the chairmanship of its President Roland Freisler and executed on July 10th, 1944 in the Brandenburg-Görden prison. ¹⁸²

181 Kuczynski, Jürgen, Die history of Position the worker in Germany from 1789 to to Present. Vol. 6: Depiction the situation of workers in Germany from 1933 until 1945, Berlin 1964, S.

320. At this Job be on the recently published, important and rich in materials Book above the "Forced labor at Daimler-Benz". no longer used for the present study could be (Hopmann, Barbara/Spoerer, Mark/Weitz, Birgit/Brüninghaus, Beate, Forced labor at Daimler-Benz, Stuttgart 1994).

182 Birk, S. 25; Roth/Schmid/Fröbe, S. 196 f., Doc. 76, Excerpt from the Criminal case against Erich Prenz Lau and others before the Berlin People's Court, March 30, 1944.

The number of in the According to recent publications, the number of foreigners working at the Genshagen plant can be stated with some degree of accuracy, although the company statistics were unreliable and, for example, did not count Eastern workers, prisoners of war and concentration camp inmates as "followers".

Table 102

Workforce strength from Daimler Benz Genshagen, 1937-1945 _

		German	labor including Concentration camp prisoners	Forced labor in percent
End	1937	5,437 _		
	1938	6 828		
	1939	6,845 _		
	1940	8th 096		
	1941	7 895	2 399	23
	1942	7 135	6 611	48
	1943	8th 084	7,642 _	49
Marc h	1944	6 525	10914	63
End	1944	6 625	7 814	54
28.2.	1945	3,802 _	5 010	57

Source: The Daimler-Benz book, S. 342, Tab. 19; p. 411.

Until 1942 it was predominantly Italians and French prisoners of war. In 1942 the plant received 2 500 Soviet workers were "assigned". In 1943, 2,000 to 3,000 new French, Belgian, Dutch, and later Italian skilled workers from metal-working professions came to the Trebbin workers' camp. From autumn 1943 Hundreds of Italian prisoners of war arrived into the Work ("Military Internees"), and in autumn 1944, as size Parts the German and foreign Workforce after West in the had been transported underground to the underground relocation facility near Obrigheim am Neckar (codename "Goldfish") Daimler-Benz directors 1,000 prisoners out the Ravensbrück women's concentration camp to assemble the engine parts delivered from Obrigheim. Their work began on October 1st. At the end of November 1944, Daimler Benz representatives in Ravensbrück were selecting deported Jewish women from among Jewish prisoners Hungary, "supply" for Genshagen, presumably as a replacement for those who had since dropped out due to illness or death.¹⁸³

Most of the large foreigner camps were in or near Ludwigsfelde: one each for "Western workers", one for "Eastern workers", for French Prisoners of war, for Soviet prisoners of war and for SS prisoners (delinquents). SS members).¹⁸⁴ The mentioned large camp in

183 Roth/Schmid/Fröbe, S. 303, Doc. 114b, AT Daimler Benz Engines GmbH (Summer), 20.10. 1944; *ibid.*, S. 322, Doc. 115b, report Eva Fejer (see Attachment, Doc. III).

184 Listing in The Daimler-Benz Book, P. 346, Table 22. About 1 000 SS convicts with longer prison and prison sentences had already come to Genshagen from Danzig in March 1943 (*ibid.*, p. 423).

Trebbin accommodated Italians, Czechs and "western workers" who came along every day without being guarded the so-called Daimlerbahn to Ludwigsfelde Work lead. The female concentration camp prisoners stayed there for a short time in the barracks of the SS convicts who have since been moved to Obrigheim and then directly on the factory premises one the one after the air raid from the The halls were restored on August 6, 1944.

"An insight into the social composition one The factory hall delivers them detailed planning documents, the the Genshagen plant at the end of October 1944 - so in the '2. stage' of relocation - on the occasion of the move from Hall 07 to 'Goldfisch' set up.

The Workforce the Hall 07 (Okt. 1944):

	Men	Women	In total	percent
German	15	4	19	17.8
Foreigner	21	2	23	21.5
"Eastern Workers"	19	46	65	60.7
<i>In total</i>	55	52	107	100.0

What is striking about the relocation list is that for precision manufacturing in a metal processing company Operation very high proportion of foreign workforce; In total they represented more than 80 percent of all employees in this hall. Especially in the Group of Eastern workers have a proportion of women that is well above the hall average in the eye; overall, however, were in this Hall approximately employs equal numbers of men and women. The social hierarchy of the operating department was completely clear: under the leadership of the German head master Hochhaus, Master Grübele was responsible for the automatic machine tools and Master Uhrig was responsible for parts production. Among them were 17 fitters, mostly Germans; however, according to the names, too a Dutch and two Eastern Europeans for can qualify for this activity. They were served Lathes, automatic grinders, milling machines, bench drills and multi-spindle automatic lathes are almost exclusively made by foreigners, with one worker for a certain number of machines on the day and night shifts. in one case there were six - was responsible. Those over 60 Foreign workers listed as operating personnel almost all came from Eastern European countries. The majority of the machines were probably operated by semi-skilled Eastern workers, a sign of the high degree of specialization and rationalization in production, which resulted in extremely monotonous work processes. Concentration camp prisoners, SS prisoners and Italian military internees were in the Hall 07 - in the Unlike other halls - at this point apparently not in production busy." ¹⁸⁵

It succeeded dem Daimler-Benz management actually some Years long, out of one like that A diverse workforce of thousands of people, mostly only briefly trained and controlled by a very thin layer of German skilled workers, fitters and masters, was able to achieve astonishing production performance under ultra-modern technological conditions. To this end, it combined "the technological Violence of the thoroughly rationalized machinery and the perfected Cycle times with additional violent methods, around

still high work performance and at the same time divide the workforce through a finely graded system of threats to life and measured benefits." ¹⁸⁶

At the beginning of March 1944, a few days after the founding of the Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production's hunter staff, decided to the Daimler-Benz Group at the suggestion of the Reich Aviation Ministry, the Genshagen plant with machines and people in the expanded Tunnel system of the Obrigheim am Neckar gypsum mine. This enormous undertaking - to put a factory that produced more than 1,000 aircraft engines per month underground many hundreds of kilometers away without allowing any significant reductions in production - was only then one project among many similar ones. But it was one of the earliest and largest undertakings; finally It was the Daimler-Benz group with one of the most important Luftwaffe armaments plants, which was to be brought out of the Berlin danger zone, no matter the cost.

Apparently the company's interests coincided completely with those of the state Armament departments (hunter staff; Reich Aviation Ministry) and with whom the SS, which, according to instructions from Hitler, Göring, Himmler and Speer, was supposed to brutally enforce the V relocations with the labor of concentration camp prisoners. But there were also differences here that had a significant influence on the Events in Genshagen had.

The hunter staff pressed the pace. The company, on the other hand, demanded "ready-to-use" underground rooms, above all sufficient mountain safety, ventilation and heating of the tunnels in order to protect the valuable machines from Genshagen, and demanded reasonable accommodation for the German Workforce - after opinion in the Hunter's staff should the

"Follow members" sleep in the tunnel! - and more and more concentration camp prisoners for the heavy earthworks and construction work. For his part, he criticized the SS, which he found to be too slow and unprofessional worked.

The SS had also been coming and going in Genshagen since mid-March 1944 to prepare for the "move." At the end of March, the relocation program was finalized: "The final assembly of the engines and the test benches were to remain in Genshagen, and some of the machines were to be moved to Obrigheim ('Goldfish') and partly to be relocated to the Hochwalde fortress codenamed 'Schachtelhalm'. In principle, it was planned to complete each Factory departments including the machines and to the existing operating staff." ¹⁸⁷ Only, instead of Western workers, there should be twice as many male and female Eastern workers and significantly more concentration camp prisoners and Italian military internees at the relocation site work, i.e. people you could interact with at will .

But it took until June 25th before the first machines from Genshagen headed west loaded became. About 7 000 workers should with you relocated be, of which 4 000 Germans. ¹⁸⁸ "It has been established that by the individuals responsible for the relocation The necessary care and caution was not shown. Shifts on such a large scale but demand the complete commitment of everyone to it involved Place, around the production not to endanger. Supreme principle must the

186 Ibid, S. 248.

187 Ibid, S. 410 f.

188 Ibid, S. 419.

remain: 'Relocation without a drop in delivery'. The following guidelines should help to fulfill these tasks:

[1.) Machine transport ...]

II.) Followership transfer.

1. Each Gfm. receives a Marching orders handed out[...]
2. The hall manager is responsible that the Gfm to be put on the march. 5 days ago Travel will be reported to the Plabü using the 'Followship Overview'.
3. Prisoners and IMI are 7 days before departure to report.
4. For transport in personnel carriers, it is necessary that prisoners and IMI are transferred in groups of at least 50 men.
5. Lt. Reichsbahn, with the exception of IMI and prisoners, the other Gfm. are transported in passenger cars, which are attached to the machine transport. Requirement is however, that at least one group from 50 Man is relocated.
6. The hall manager heard from the GM. You must collect a permanent pass and identification tag from the ID card office to supply.
7. Work ID cards with iron frames are invalid. The relevant directors have decided to issue new ID cards. personal to be found at the ID card office.
8. The ID cards of Eastern workers must be provided if photographs were taken years ago are, through New recording replaced become. The Eastern workers are therefore 2 days before the ID office is relocated to supply.
9. If French workers are to be relocated, the passports stating the location of the relocation must be forwarded to the plant security team by the hall manager 4 days before the relocation, thus creating a new certificate of residence can be obtained . It is to ensure that the papers are returned on time become.
10. The Gfm. Please note that the following personal items should be taken with you: Towels, Knife, Fork, Spoon, coffee pot O. etc., Cover u. Bedding.
11. The stamp cards are given to the Gfm by the hall manager. to be picked up and handed over closed by the transport operator at the place of relocation.
12. Changes about Departure day, meeting point and Transport guide has each the Announce hall manager .
13. The transport leader must look after the group assigned to him until work begins .
14. The processing of formalities at the relocation site etc. must be accelerated in such a way that that the group arrives at the workplace in work clothes at the prescribed time.
15. Every leader who is relocated must receive marching orders from the hall manager .
16. The rearrangement of the Gfm. must always be done in groups. Individual trips are not permitted. The hall managers are instructed to contact their Gfm. to be informed accordingly." ¹⁸⁹

189 Roth/Schmid/Fröbe, S. 343, Doc. 127, guidelines of the planning office of Daimler-Benz Motoren GmbH regarding relocation to Obrigheim, July 9, 1944.

Only sparsely informed and relying on rumors, they drove into the unknown; It was only on the spot, far from home and family, that the harsh reality hit her like a shock: twelve hours of work every day in poorly ventilated, hot or... near the entrances and exits - drafty, cold tunnels, ceiling collapses with many fatalities, mass accommodation in often unfinished, primitive makeshift homes and barracks, immediate confrontation with the sight of the of the SS driven and harassed concentration camp prisoners to the point of blood.

The airstrike from the 6. August 1944

In the July it ran relocation Genshagen at full capacity Tours. The uninterrupted ones Heavy air raids on German fuel plants and other industrial targets caused concern the Daimler-Benz mightys extraordinarily. They were now pushing for the factory to be evacuated as quickly as possible.¹⁹⁰ Regardless of the throughput program that had previously been decided on, they were now loaded to Obrigheim in great haste that Railway wagons, machines and vehicles soon began to pile up at the small Neckarelz arrival station.

It was August 6, 1944 a Sunday. The air raid came like a catastrophe to the factory and confirmed it the worst Premonitions of the Daimler-Benz directors. He hit the fully working plant hard, laid down size Parts the Production was paralyzed and irreplaceable special machines were destroyed. In Hall 11 alone there were 60 deaths, "including the best fitters" (Director Joseph Sommer).¹⁹¹ The work was not How otherwise, been fogged in. The male workforce had been instructed to continue working.

A young designer who had escaped to the basement of the design office later described the critical phase of the attack and its effects according to his diary entries¹⁹²: "Suddenly a nerve-racking whistle in the air, a dull thud, the us all to floor threw. I flew away in a high arc the boxes [with construction drawings] down and hit hard on the cement floor on. The whole The building seemed to be swaying and cracking at every joint. At any moment you thought the ceiling would fall down. Air pressure swept dust and blue-black smoke through an opening in the wall, a more disgusting smell of burnt, exploded powder breathing for Torment. You could protect yourself from haze and Hardly any dust people on the see the other side of the basement wall. Rattling all around. We held tissues to our mouths. We huddled together on the floor and in the corners of the cellar...

I saw myself at the top first once around. Everything was gray on gray. Dense smoke and Clouds of smoke drifted through the forest, like that that one none 100 meters wide could see. The Sun had darkened. Although yourself the weather had not changed, saw it out of How at a cloudy November day. Our building had collapsed halfway down to the basement ceiling. The other part was on fire. Here and there the masonry collapsed...

Looking for cover, I ran down the street to the [air raid] tunnel. The business administration burned in everyone Floors, only the Centerpiece was still intact. A

190 The Daimler-Benz book, p. 426.

191 Ibid, S. 429.

192 palms, S. 8th ff.

a powerful wind had arisen. It seemed as if the flames were creating a storm of their own. Flying sparks and flying ash flew into my face; you could hardly breathe...

Just ahead the entrance [of the nearest one Halle], several bombs had fallen. Here we probably had just several Men the They wanted to leave the hall and ran right into the detonation. A naked and half-mangled corpse hung in a bicycle rack. Another burning corpse, mutilated beyond recognition, lay between the bicycles. We gave us into the half-destroyed one Hall and penetrated down to the basement. The bombs hit the side of the basement with devastating effect. Everything was torn and covered in inches of cement dust. Pieces of concrete, pieces of iron and other obstacles blocked us the way. We could only us work through it with difficulty. Finally we came back into the daylight. There was nothing left to do here.

They piled up in front of the tunnel entrance to the bunker People. The women also gradually came into the light. Many broke into fits of screaming and crying out when she saw the picture of the saw destruction. They probably thought so to their men who had to remain in the halls during the inferno. I was standing off to the side with some people from our office who had gathered here and seemed infinitely small and helpless to me.

Injured people were carried past. The bandages were mostly soaked with blood. There was an excited back and forth in front of the bunker. Everywhere, including in front of it At the entrance to the bunker, you could see deep craters...

Staying on the factory premises was dangerous. The bombs had snapped the tops of the pine trees. Now and then the crowns fell down with a loud noise; Someone else would almost have been killed. Before we returned to our workplace, we left on a Sand dump down around us to rest. I rummaged in the bag and picked up my bread out. Unfortunately gave it nothing to drink. Our throats were parched from the heat and smoke. There was a strange, indescribable atmosphere. We lay there and talked. Despite the catastrophe all around us, we were overcome by a cheerfulness that was difficult to explain; we were happy to escape with our lives to be ...

We helped with bandages, medication etc. to recover. We carried some of it to Hall 11 over, where a greater Requirement duration On dem Away there had to we to the [engine] test benches over. Here saw it wild out of. Several were completely destroyed and collapsed. In front of it, the gasoline and propane tanks were burning in huge flames. We couldn't pass by on the street; the heat was unbearable and there was a risk of explosion as the boilers were not underground as usual. One was straight been busy moving containers. We got there by a detour then to Hall 11. Here too there was chaos. Next to the Hall on a A large black tarp was spread out on the open grassy area. We wanted to put the bandages on it. But when I looked closely, I noticed that there something lay underneath. I lifted opened the tarpaulin and, to my utter horror, I saw that there were lots of dead people underneath - Row after row, one next to the other. The bodies were torn and unrecognizable, heavily blackened by the powder slime and partly charred. It was a terrible sight. After In my estimation this was solely due to this Place about 50 Dead. I left the Plan to fall again quickly...

Over the Overall effect of Attack:

The Northern part of work was for the Part spared remained. A Part the after latest

Materials testing based on principles burned out and destroyed by explosive bombs. The metallographic examination department is equipped with the most modern equipment The X-ray laboratory, also equipped with the latest equipment, was nothing more than a smoking heap of rubble. Also the material storage and the raw parts warehouse were badly battered. Here, cast and forged steel lay scattered wildly in the forest. Due to the incredible explosive power the Bombs had been thrown all over the area.

It was partly visible in the production halls not quite that bad because most of the machinery, approximately 70%, had already been relocated. Around half of the machines had been removed from most halls. Especially in the open spaces where before the the machines that had been relocated were the Bombs fell, and the The remaining machines remained undamaged. The cylinder block and crankcase fabrication was only slightly damaged.

Things looked much more desolate in the other halls; Machines were completely shattered, displaced meters from the pressure. Lathe beds were thrown through the roof of the hall at one point and fell back into the hall at another point. The camshaft production was almost completely destroyed. Special lathes and grinding machines were difficult or impossible to replace confused mess. In The assembly halls, especially the repair departments, contained the tools, especially special equipment, almost without exception unusable. Test stands were burnt out, gasoline and Oil had fire caught. Girders and assembly bridges had merged into grotesque shapes .

Destruction and more destruction all corners and end up of work. The There had been targeted drops by the bomber units. It couldn't have been more precise. Contrary to all propaganda were only hit purely military targets been. Not a bomb fell in the Ludwigsfelde factory settlement, which is close to the **factory** . 1,500 bombs severe and of the heaviest caliber were on the Plant demolished. Over 140 alone Duds and Time fuse bombs had to be defused. Incendiary bombs and canisters fell to such an extent that their number could not even be determined. The forest was burning everywhere."

This ended the dream of outsourcing the plant's production without a decline in production. Despite cleaning up and rebuilding day and night, production in August fell to 37.5 percent of the previous month.

What the workers knew from experience also happened at the Ludwigsfeld plant: the Wehrmacht took action those who are because of the who temporarily lost their jobs due to damage to the company; "Whenever a **factory** was damaged by bombs, If production was disrupted or completely collapsed, a certain percentage of personnel were released for the Wehrmacht." ¹⁹³ The designer whose records we already quoted, met this lot. He was drafted into the infantry in August.

In September, production increased under almost unbelievable work efforts and "exhaustion all Reserves". In the October fell she again, still under the August level.

Table 103

production from Aircraft engines in the Daimler-Benz factory Genshagen, 1944

Month	Piece	Month	Piece
January	806	July	1200
February	1 002	August	450
March	1 050	September	700
April	1202	October	410
May	1 211	November	602
June	1202	December	700

Source: USSBS, Aircraft Division, Aircraft division Industry Report, Table VII- 1.

This time it was due to the lack of deliveries from “Goldfisch” and the Difficulty, due to a lack of engines, the thousand female concentration camp prisoners Ravensbrück instead of the after West transported New workforce to learn. This Women should now in 14 1/2 hours of working time on weekdays and Sundays to catch up on the delivery backlog of many hundreds of engines.

The plant management scheduled 36-hour shifts for the entire company. The German workers were also treated in the same way as the forced laborers had been treated before. For two weeks, until the end October, “They were allowed the Do not leave the factory premises; the They spent a few hours of rest on straw sacks in the offices.”¹⁹⁴

The Daimler-Benz Group continued its hopeless race against time for almost four months. In the fall of 1944, the Genshagen plant still had an order backlog of over 15, according to the plans of the Luftwaffe and the Jäger (now: Armaments) Staff, which had long been unrealistic 000 aircraft engines. Hundreds of engines were still being produced every month by thousands of fanatics apathetic Germans and hunted, sick, starving and freezing foreigners and prisoners.

From February to March 1945, Germany experienced the heaviest air raids of the entire war on its territory cities and Transport routes. Now it made itself Total disruption of the transport system in Brandenburg too Thorough arms industry noticeable.

Table 104

Major attacks ally Bomber, February until April 1945 (Selection)

Date	urban area	Attacking aircraft	Dropped bomb load (t)
3.2.	Berlin	937	2266
6.3. . . 2.2. . }			
9.2.	Magdeburg	1 751	3 914
14.2.			
15.2.			

194 The Daimler-Benz book, S. 441.

Table 104 (Continuation)

Date	urban area	Attackers Airplanes	Discarded Bomb load (t)
15.2.	cottbus	435	1 064
22/23.2.	"Clarion"*	18 188	?
25/26.2.	Berlin	1 066	2 795
18.3.	Berlin	1 221	3 091
28.3.	Berlin	384	1 038
31.3.	Brandenburg	265	719
10.4.	Oranienburg	417	1 211
April 14/15	Potsdam	512	1 716

Source: Groehler, *Bombing War*, p. 422 f. - *) Clarion = Major operation against that German railway and road network.

"From the end of February" so recalled a French woman since the 1st October 1944 When a Ravensbrück prisoner worked at the Genshagen plant, "the excessive work rate that we had had to demonstrate since our arrival slowed down. It There was no more money, every moment the electricity fell off, and the machines walked only in slow motion. But it didn't make things much better for us, because we had to replace the failure of the machines with manual work."¹⁹⁵ A fellow prisoner, a 17-year-old Hungarian Jew at the time, reported that man have approximately around Easter around no Work more for the Prisoners had. "We were driven in the forest for picking brushwood the Civilian population." Shortly after Easter, the concentration camp prisoners were evacuated from the plant and transported back to Ravensbrück via Sachsenhausen.¹⁹⁶

The deportation of the concentration camp prisoners was entirely in line with the company management, which at that time was also trying to "get rid of all the SS prisoners" and to get rid of the majority of the foreign workers, "to make fun of these work activities that might still make a mockery of us" and them wanted to give SS or party positions.¹⁹⁷ The group was already in the process of the Shift from the war to the post-war economy to convert. It Apparently there was another wave of evacuation from the Genshagen plant to western Germany; an action that now, there the Red Army is in Pomerania moved towards Stettin and in the west Trier and Cologne passed into the hands of the Allies, saving the remaining valuable machines for the post-war period.

¹⁹⁵ Roth/Schmid/Fröbe, S. 321 (see Attachment, Doc. II).

¹⁹⁶ Ibid, S. 325 f. (see Attachment, Doc. III).

¹⁹⁷ Ibid, S. 368 ff., various documents, Beginning March 1945.

Documents: forced laborers in the plant

document I

"We were nobody." From the report of a former Russian forced laborer about the years 1942 to 1945 at the Daimler-Benz aircraft engine plant in Genshagen/Ludwigsfelde

We have once at night, once during the day, worked once at night, once during the day. It changed every week. And on Sunday at that. But not twelve hours on Sunday, and not every Sunday either. On Sunday was sometimes free. But if the production demands it, it means: You, you, you, you have to prepare so that the others come along.

I was first the milling machine. My predecessor at the machine was also a Russian, he gave it to me shown. My master has the Parts placed. There. Complete. After two days I was already ready, so it worked...

Those who didn't understand it straight away were beaten. This is how they drove us to work. These were civilians at the plant and they wanted to increase our number to the prescribed number. And all day long, go, go, up, up, everyone already knew what that meant.

When we went to Genshagen came, the Belgians were already there, already there There were Dutch people there, but not too many, there were also Germans there, older semesters, you could say, or seriously wounded people, invalids were there...

Through The whole situation has changed for us. Just what the production regards. There were 24 blocks required per day, engine blocks, 12 cylinders. 24 pieces per day, that was the norm. As but the Russians were there, it was increased for so long, up to 96, that had to be achieved, and they hit for it.

There Hatred already arose in the work inside. When I mill, and he For example, makes threads for screwing in candles, and in between there is a control that checks whether it is correct, that was a German, a little further there was a Belgian or a Dutchman. If I get beaten back there, I have to do more somehow, so they had Others have no choice, it's a treadmill...

Of course it didn't happen all at once from 24 to 96. They initially brought it up to 30. Then on, on and on. And then you got hostile, even with other foreigners.

Later I also cut the threads for the spark plugs. First by hand. There was control behind it; you weren't allowed to overlap. As soon as there was a red cross on the engine block, people became unsafe. Who made the mistake? Sabotage was accused. They could interpret it however they wanted, we were nobody. It happened that she took people away. You never have them anymore seen. That was rarely. But it happened.

We made engines. Not complete aircraft, but complete engines. Nobody explained to us how they were used, but we could guess. You have it made to only his own skin to rescue. Refuse? They have us way, way too much intimidated. If there was anything, there it was no matter what he currently at whoever had his hand, whether camp commandant or superior, in the camp or in the factory, there was a strike, just like with a piece of cattle, and even worse...

"Potsdam". Is in Potsdam also something been? „Potsdam". So has it called, if

something was going on: "Potsdam". So the masters threatened us: "Potsdam". Just be careful, otherwise it's "Potsdam." In our case, the whole room disappeared, from Odessa, the best people, at least nine people, and never showed up again. Before that, they were beaten by the camp commandant. He tore out a chair leg, solid, turned, and them beaten through, I thought, could a human being be so wicked...

Our hall 13, The Americans bombed them before we got to Neckarelz are, at the Sunday lunchtime, at twelve o'clock. We have it thrown, by one wall to others. Everything burned out upstairs, we were in the basement. A lot of people died there the Russians, from the French people ... And as we have come out, lively, there has When you saw what the attack had done, your first thought was that the canteen was somewhere and I could reach into the cutter's bucket and take out a few cabbage leaves that were there, mixed with briquette bag... And that's where I got my head master I saw the hall manager coming and thought, now you have to duck... It's automatic, instinctive, you could say, when you've seen a superior and you're not at your place somewhere, you have to duck .

After the bombing do we have still something have to clean up, man has for the Part People were found who were torn apart, you looked to see who they were - but that's a chapter in itself, I couldn't do that.

Then all the Russians who were left got back into the wagons in the direction South probably. And like us arrived in Neckarelz the warehouse already there. It wasn't as big as in Ludwigsfelde, and there was no barbed wire either. And there you are somehow like that mentally a bit relieved, like, no Barbed Wire? A Feeling at least ... On the way to We became work also not guarded, but marched in Groups over the bridge, into the tunnel, the Up stairs.

Perhaps gave it in Neckarelz also better Bread, that man it cut could.

Source: The Daimler-Benz book, S. 474 ff.

document II

Out of dem Experience report a French woman (Prisoner in concentration camp Ravensbrück; since October 1944 in the Daimler-Benz aircraft engine plant in Genshagen/Ludwigsfelde)

The Motor Street took the size central hall of building completely; We had to go there two of us already fully assembled engines on attach to a common chassis. In the middle of the hall there was a small band that I was assigned to was; that's where they were respective individual engines. Working on this little volume about twenty women, Polish and French; the Whole formed one closed unit, a kind of small factory in the big. Master Hermann, a foreman every morning from Berlin came, was the head of the department. We got our instructions only from him and could the work only at his signal there leave; He also very often ensured that we worked overtime and could only leave long after our comrades. To At the beginning Hermann spread Terror in our ranks. He was a German of about forty, tall and fat, never smiled, wore a long, gray coat and baggy Boots, those to him the Nicknames "Muschik" was introduced had. At first Day

He received us very harshly and showed everyone the work she had to do; then put it down he no longer with hand at, but limited himself on it, with With his chest puffed out and his head held high, he walked up and down between the women he had to supervise. He did not allow any negligence and demanded regular and constant top performance. If one of us made a mistake or caused a delay on the assembly line, he would fly into a violent rage and shout that could be heard throughout the hall. I believe, he must the prototype of narrow-minded to have been Nazis all Commands that he receives, carries out to the letter and with blind conscientiousness, who never questions any work instructions from his superiors and cannot even imagine that one all his orders not immediately and could comply conscientiously. During the The following months developed Feelings that I felt towards Hermann at the very beginning, a little more in his favor...

One day had he an exchange of words with one Warden. She was a young girl of about twenty years, the obviously knew nothing about assembly. She wanted to give advice in a rude manner; Hermann coolly asked her not to exceed her authority. When she turned her back on him, he didn't have time to look full of deep contempt her had to be hidden from us. I began to hate Hermann less deeply. His attitude confirmed to me that he with us only therefore like this dealt harshly because he Was afraid of getting in trouble with the management. I suspected that Hermann the Type of the German, who is not cruel by nature and certainly does not bear responsibility, but is an unconscious witness to the outrages of the great empire, paralyzed in his perhaps otherwise upright and generous nature by the egoism of a man who wants a good job or a has a lucrative position he ons would set game. Hermann demanded top performance from our poor, emaciated bodies, but he never showered us with sarcasm or harassment, but instead limited himself to following draconian company regulations to the letter....

[Morning roll call in the factory area] The men of the camp had chosen this moment to give us theirs to make final announcements. So we see ourselves surrounded by an entire army of guards. Surely something extraordinary is going on that gives rise to such a display of energy this morning. We are led silently and very slowly to the last fence on the factory site. An angry north wind is blowing and the mood is gloomy. Suddenly it becomes us the explanation with It becomes clearer every time we get closer: a woman is hanging in barbed wire. One by one we must file past this horrific spectacle; A young Russian woman, Nioura, hangs there, frozen, crooked, a pair of pliers in her hand, one would almost think she was taking a huge breath she in its pull pulled. The unfortunate one was last night a killed by electric shock. We fully understand what happened; We all know that the wire fences are energized, and truly, it couldn't have occurred to anyone to cut these wires with metal pliers. All of this looks too much like a staged scene; The poor woman was brought here by force and for the sake of an example with pliers in hand thrown into the fence. In Germany do you like it, if a lesson easy for everyone and fast understood will, and there is so little fear back to a murder! The Electricity is for switched off for a moment, and one of her comrades she has to get out of the barbed wire tear. Now it's laid out

stretches in the undeveloped area in the middle of the debris, and the Procession continues, past the corpse. In a word, the commander had easily decided to join us this morning come together too late, around us to communicate, that the fences be energized, and he had had this little idea, um the Lesson "more alive" to design... Approximately to this Time stroked man us the Salt. We had to one sweetish Soup eat that is all about us Beginning disgusted, but you get used to it very quickly used to. From time to time it happened that the turnips were thrown into huge cauldrons by the cartload were, on the ground of container secure and burned: that gave the soup one Taste, which is very appreciated became. At least tasted them then for something! Somewhat later we were pampered then with maggot soups. That's what we called one Soup from corrupt Grain in which the Worms everything Eatable had replaced. The bags came from a stock that you really with the best will in the world, no more could give to the cattle. They were graciously sent to us. In spite of everything people felt against this at the beginning Spoon full of little animals a bit of reluctance. But you got used to it to everything other. Marie France, however refused to eat the soup and I remember a funny scene that made me cry laughed: Marie-France tried, above in their dovecote ¹> sitting, in vain trying to choke down a few spoonfuls without maggots. To this end, she examined them carefully and threw the maggots down; However, there they regularly ended up in Marguerite's plate, she sat beneath her; this one was so in her steamy Plate deepened, that they add the maggots not even noticed and good and preferably double ration consumed with appetite. This scene, carried out with so much seriousness by both of them, amused them whole

small Group, the she witnessed, considerably.

The was hungry secure one the worst tortures in this camp, however, was he not yet what I suffered most from.

The cold should me far worse Torment prepare....

Opposite my engine there was a long pipe running down from the ceiling that came from the washing machine where the engines were washed. A stream of boiling water was constantly running down there, and this pipe was the Fixed point that all women from the small band and many other constantly in had an eye. You had take a moment to see where Mr man and other Superiors continue were, be careful that no Warden in Visibility was, make sure that there is no black angle ²> in If you were nearby, quickly jump over to the pipe, lean your body lengthwise against it and run back very quickly. How much this pipe made me miserable become! How many times did I run there even though I knew full well that I would get beaten would. I had to at all costs get a little warmth. And what have I at strengthen Face slaps from from the guard when I crossed the aisle! But neither these still the footsteps of the in The German women employed in the dismantling department ever managed to hold me back. One day Paul, the head of the dismantling department, poured a large bucket of boiling chlorine on me; I was badly burned and in terrible pain. Marie-France helped me and treated me. Knowing how poorly I tolerated the cold, she kept an eye on the surrounding heat sources and politely let me know when they were there there was the least danger. The hunger is for so many comrades terrible and been degrading; for was me he this far less than the cold.

The most terrible moments, the hardest to bear, were certainly at the end of the month. Then we had to all day and the all night in the They stayed at the factory to work but received no additional food. We had to finish all the engines we had started, the inventory of the material and the clean the entire factory. With empty stomachs, limbs tired from work and fingers frozen stiff, we then had to fight against sleep. By the end of the first month we spent at the factory, every moment was torture. We hadn't gotten used to this yet Convict existence used to it, and our eyes actually closed and our heads sank towards the engine. Then the guard came and woke us up with a hard slap in the face. What slaps I received that first night! And we had to do it quickly, very quickly quickly, so that everything in the morning was finished. The Women at the beginning of the band, the earlier were finished when the at the end, made themselves to it, cleaning thoroughly, sweeping, hauling huge trash cans, and so on.

- 1) Meant is the top bunk of the multi-story bed frame.
- 2) Political Prisoners wore the red triangle on their concentration camp clothing. The black one Angles were worn by criminal prisoners, prostitutes and prisoners known as "anti-socials".

Source: Mallet, Mireille, *Sous le signe du triangle*, Dijon 1949, after the German translation in: Roth/Schmid/Fröbe, p. 308 ff. Italics in the French original German.

Document III

From the report of a young Hungarian Jewish woman (prisoner in the Ravensbrück concentration camp since November 1944; in the Daimler-Benz aircraft engine factory since December 1944 Genshagen/Ludwigsfelde)

During this One day, around Easter, I went to the toilet at night. The path led the room of the past the supervisor on duty, where the Inmates usually listened to the radio that was on for a while. There were a few female guards in the service room whose conversation I could overhear. They debated what should happen to us. Three options were considered:

- 1.) The Factory with the prisoners bust,
- 2.) Bust and the Prisoners after Ravensbrück evacuate,
- 3.) the Factory let stand and the Destroy prisoners. Of course I spread what I heard.

We had the next few days None in the yard either work more. We were driven in the forest for picking brushwood the civilian population. In that one After a while we were given new clothes and the familiar concentration camp equipment, but again without headgear ...

We were evacuated from Genshagen about two days after Easter. After receiving a daily ration they marched us about five up to six kilometers to Berlin-Zehlendorf. From here we took the subway through Berlin; I remember that wit passed the Anhalter Bahnhof. After getting out we had to go again small We walked until we arrived at the storage location in Oranienburg-Sachsenhausen. Here we were divided into several groups women's blocks, the still not very overfilled were. There Sachsenhausen only Men's camp

had been, you had it Men's blocks not isolated, and so on could we the male prisoners see. We received the camp soup and stayed overnight. The next morning it was while of appeal suddenly declared, that itself all Prisoners, whose numbers were called out, should be set up separately. We soon noticed that it itself just about Jewish women acted, which really depressed us. First we were told to be taken to a bathroom. The matter seemed strange to me.

After we meet in an anteroom had undress We were forced into this very brutally so-called bathroom. The fact that we were not given soap worried us. Me It also seemed eerie that the windows had thick rubber seals, but I kept quiet about my observation. So we stood tightly packed in this room, which seemed to me to be hermetically sealed off, and waited in vain for water. I can't estimate how long we spent like that, but it was at least an hour, but it could have been three hours. The psychological effect on us was catastrophic, despair was universal, some suffered screaming fits and other conditions, others became hysterical or insane. I stayed completely still and fatalistically submitted to the situation. I hoped for an end as quickly as possible. As the When the situation had already become unbearable, two SS men suddenly tore open a door and started shouting: "Get out, get out, get out!"

We would Naked as we were, herded into some trucks. I only remember how I did with others Women were packed tightly together. We were driven to another bath, obviously the real bath of the camp. We were given soap, towels and granted accommodation a warm shower bath, that to us had a good psychological effect. Afterward we received our original equipment back if it nor were they individually the same pieces that each one of us received. During the bathing procedure, young SS men watched us, who made sexually vulgar jokes about us in the most vile manner. After the previous ones Experiences touched it me at all anymore. It fell to me on too, that some of our group here were missing, the I never saw him again later. We were later told that they had wanted to gas us, but the proximity of the This would have seemed inappropriate to the Russians because the SS no longer wanted any additional burden.

As we everything behind us had, we became approximately 80 Persons - our Jewish group from Genshagen perhaps even some other Jewish girls - in an open goods wagon loaded We lead away and came still before Burglary the dusk in Ravens bridge on. There we were unloaded and led to the camp. We had to take a bath again let it go after we had stood on the main square <Appellplatz> for some time. Once our old Polish block elder showed up and threw his arms around me and said in her strange accent, "Children, you're lucky! The crematorium was destroyed an hour ago."

Source: Fejer, Eva, As Interpreter at the Genshagen plant, according to: Roth/Schmid/Fröbe, p. 325 f. - Easter was on 1./2. April 1945.

Chapter IV

decay of Occupation system (studies)

1. Economic collaboration and “Eastern Companies” in occupied countries (1941-1944)

a) For the Expression the economic collaboration

Anyone who deals with the history of the World War and the Occupation has to learn something else. Concept of collaboration going out, as the politicians and lawyers did it during the disputes and trials of the post-war period. For the historian, collaboration is initially a twofold object of study. Both on the Page In the German occupying power as well as in circles in the occupied countries, it presupposed a commonality of certain interests, both material and institutional. Basics for Realization of these interests, the willingness to collaborate, and also a certain strategy, or at least ideas in the tactical area. Especially in the field of economics it becomes clear that collaboration was carried out by two different acting subjects who were independent and relatively autonomous.

The The underlying political, social and political interests of the collaboration were always of an ambiguous nature: in certain areas they agreed, in others they did not. Madajczyk speaks generally of two mutually reacting "subsystems", a "leading" one (the occupiers) and a "subordinate" one (the occupied ones); an idea that is appropriately applied to our topic can be.

It would be up for debate whether the term cannot be defined in a narrower sense than historians usually do. In my opinion, there are social forces and circles, finally too Individuals who itself in complete dependence on the Germans went and joined the German war interests completely subordinate, Strictly speaking, not more in the area of What we specific as collaboration should understand and investigate. The meets to Example on the SS mercenaries to the different countries that are under German leadership served and of the Germans paid and provided were the but in some publications right now as Model case of collaboration applies. Who completely gave up his national identity and declared himself as Part the understood German power - for the For example, as part of the occupying force in the occupied Soviet territories -, who fulfilled the actual Facts of the case the collaboration already not more.² With it want we

Madajczyk, Czesław, chaos, systematicity or system? The Third Reich in the phase of military expansion. In: Germany and Europe in The modern era. fixed f. Karl Otmar Fr. by Aretin on his 65th birthday Birthday. Edited by Ralph Melville et al., 2nd edition, Stuttgart 1988, p. 946.

2 Louis De Jong differs in one early Work clear between "Treason" and collaboration (De Jong,

not the Permeability the Boundary between collaboration and this form of total voluntary assimilation is overlooked, especially within the country's own fascist associations and movements.

So let's go assuming that The collaborators in the occupied countries "earned" their name precisely because they served their own political, economic, etc. interests, which were different from those of the occupying power, as well as ruling and exploiting the country for the occupying power, "peace and order." "Keep it and be there with him own military, Saving on administration and labor helped. Then it lies classic case of collaboration in the various types of cooperation (political, military, economic, cultural) between the occupying power and the ruling elites in the occupied countries, d. H. those forces, Groups and classes, in whose disposal or under whose influence the main means of power and resources were located. The expression "classic case" or "classic form" I use this with the reservation that the collaboration understood in this way had a broad spectrum both on the German side and, above all, on the part of the aforementioned elites and leadership classes and had extremely numerous variations in terms of objectives, scope and intensity. This refers to the level the Governments and state authorities as well as on the the economic circles involved. What big differences existed, for example, between the collaboration between the establishments that were clearly under criminal pressure and dominated by the German IG Farben group Kuhlmann, the Collaboration the French Production Minister Francois Lehideux and Jean Bichelonne and the collaboration of the Belgian financial groups and Corporations, represented before everything by Alexandre Galopin and the Societe Generale de Belgique!

The politics of collaboration at the Sides were always highly influenced by the general military and political situation. This primarily related to the military course of the war. But also the respective political atmosphere, ie the goals and methods used by the occupying power, especially the form of the reign of terror, and the resistance in Lands weighed heavily in relation on the attitude of the circles willing to collaborate.

The the course of the war showed on both Pages significant effects. The The most important turning points were, on the one hand, the German military successes in 1940/41 and in the summer of 1942, and on the other hand German defeat Moscow and the entry into the war the USA (December 1941) and the events of Winter 1942/43 (German occupation of southern France; German defeat at Stalingrad; British offensive in North Africa; Resolutions of the Casablanca Conference) and the subsequent German defeats and retreats. The effect of these cuts seems to be in the Rule seems to have been contrary. Certainty of victory and The euphoria of victory increased expansionism, Annexationism and leadership ambitions on the German side and narrowed the scope for concessions to collaborators. Defeats and economic They, in turn, caused difficulties German side in the Looking for people willing to collaborate auxiliary staff more willing to compromise, without that she for example, intensified political repression renounced.

Louis, Between collaboration and Resistance. In: The Third Rich and Europe, Munich 1957, S. 138 f.)

Conversely, grew in the occupied countries the extent of the German sphere of influence and of consolidation the German rule over continental Europe the The tendency to collaborate with the occupiers, and their defeats, deterred cooperation with the Germans and weakened the influence of the collaborators in politics and the economy.

The general line of collaboration policy on the German side was extremely vague and subject to great fluctuations, even in relation to the same country (such as France). This line and that Steps towards its realization were almost certain exclusively by standards more tactical and hardly ever strategic nature. On the one hand, a truly generous conception in the long term was made impossible from the outset the excess and the inhumanity the German war goals and on the other hand the Expectations of the occupying power and its uncertainty regarding the final German victory. The misconceptions and prejudices of leading Nazi figures, especially Hitler and others, also had a paralyzing effect Görings, and the Confusion of responsibilities and competency battle between the German authorities.

Even if we probably go the furthest and therefore very informative Case of collaboration on economic investigate area - namely the inclusion of political and business circles in occupied northern and western European countries countries in economic exploitation and colonization the occupied areas of the USSR -, So we find that the German side has no clear ideas about control, extent, duration, consequences and perspectives for this collaboration.³

On the German side, the actual policy of economic collaboration took place at the level of the economic and military economic authorities and the state-monopoly business groups (economic groups, imperial associations, Main committees of Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition (or for Armaments and War Production) and of the leading banks, corporations and group groups (including Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, IG Farben, mining companies, metal companies, mechanical engineering groups). Further investigations are pending, but will certainly provide insights into interesting groups and phase differences. For the time being, at least for Western Europe, one can identify an early phase of cooperation in the field of armaments and armaments supplies (aircraft and motor vehicle industries) that is controlled primarily by German military authorities, to a lesser extent by the Foreign Office and the Reich Ministry of Economics, by business groups and individual German corporations) and a later one, which began with the outmaneuvering of Göring as the highest steering authority for the economy by Albert Speer run of year 1942 started, but first in the fall of 1943 after a new dimensioned concept of a “European Production planning” should fully start.⁴

For analysis and assessment appear real Gradations in the intensity and Effectiveness the Economic collaboration significant, ever after, if it itself around the Delivery from

3 Even in the heyday of the idea of the “Greater Germanic Empire”, around 1942, and in the negotiations with fascists like Quisling and Mussert, this idea had a strong influence the ideas of Hitler, Himmler and their circle always the sense a rigorous submission of the relevant “Germanic” countries, their “annexation” and even their state Extinction.

4 See. II, S. 159 ff.

War material at the Germans acted to the Production of other goods and around Services for the German Wehrmacht, deliveries of goods and services for the German economy or civilian, "peaceful" production. There were such gradations it determined international law Fundamentals that Belgian business representatives, for example, have relied on with some success when it comes to avoiding obvious ones Armaments production for the Germans went down. However, there were boundaries between the gradations mentioned extremely vague, and of course each type of economic activity could easily be substituted for another by the occupiers. Albert Speer and Bichelonne even made a system out of it when they came to an agreement in the fall of 1943 and developed a plan to make the French consumer goods industry work on a large scale for German needs let, with it appropriate capacities and workers in Germany for arms production would be freed up.

Economic collaboration in the occupied countries therefore presupposed shared economic and political - at least domestic - interests with the occupiers. Such interests were among the capitalist elites of the occupied western and northern European countries are examined here and the all one proportionately had a high level of industrial development.

A general refusal of all economic activity in a developed industrial country, in contrast to the cessation of political activities, is simply unthinkable. There was such a refusal Of course, it wasn't in the occupied Soviet areas either, although the conditions there were different as a result of the industrial relocation to the east. of Lack of private capitalist property and the significant dimension of resistance initiated, led and controlled by the CPSU. In Western and Northern Europe, on the other hand, private capitalist entrepreneurship largely dominated, strongly dominated by large corporations and financial groups (particularly in Belgium, where the Societe Generale controlled around 800 companies and thus, according to different sources, 30 to 30). 60 percent of the total industrial assets controlled). Decades of traditional business connections and also capital ones interweaving passed with German big capital (e.g. Solvay; **AKU**; Unilever; Norsk Hydro).

Economic collaboration was based on interests that the collaborators had in common with the occupiers, including German business circles, and on their own specific interests. There were common interests

- Maintenance production, transport, etc., primarily on the German side those products and Services, at those the German Wehrmacht, **The economy** (arms) and population participated;
- Maintenance from "Peace and Order" by obtaining work and means of subsistence for the mass of the population;
- Continuation the old business connections with Germany and - possibly - Participation in the large (Eastern) European one loot cake;
- Conversion of the National economy on the new foreign trade Conditions (raw material procurement; sales markets).

In the latter point, a specific interest of the occupied country may have predominated. Special interests were primarily targeted

- on the Maintenance of property at the means of production;

- on the Probation the power of disposal at this one means of production;
- to profitable exploitation of the one created therein Capital and thus the possibility of amortization Investments and the appropriate pursuit of one's own existence ;
not least also to the preservation and expansion of property and economic power beyond the end of the war, whatever that may be.

Louis De Jong, to whom we the only detailed, very stimulating discussion of the problems of economic collaboration thanks, is here for the Netherlands more specifically: the goal of the Dutch collaborators was it, the German To prevent capital infiltration ("interconnection") and the appointment of German commissars, and also to slow down the Dutch fascists ("NSB'ers") who were advancing on the factories and in the factories, the workers like that to keep them in the company for as long as possible - that soon meant protecting them from being recruited to work in Germany - and the supply situation to protect the population from a drastic fall. ⁵

Of course, if one moralizes and one-sidedly and excessively values the honorableness and altruism of such goals, one would like to man this Art from Collaboration already in the nearness of Resistance back, how which Belgian historians actually do. ⁶ For the Dutch business community and economic bureaucracy, De Jong remains at more sober, more balanced Findings. The core the Matter, means he, is not the

- 5 De Jong, Louis, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de tweede wereldoorlog*, vol. 7/1, s' Gravenhage 1976, S. 124. See recently Hirschfeld, Gerhard/Marsh, Patrick (ed.), *Collaboration in France. Politics and Culture during the Nazi Occupation, 1940-1944*, Oxford etc. 1989, p. 8th ff. (German edition Frankfurt a. M. 1991; with an article by Michel Margairaz about "Germany, Vichy and the economic Collaboration"). The tape from Hirschfeld/Marsh as well *How La France et l'Allemagne en guerre, September 1939 - November 1942*. Edited by Claude Carlier/Stefan Martens, Paris 1990, contain numerous analyzes of political and ideological-cultural collaboration, but only marginal statements about economic collaboration. For the present one Work could not be evaluated Margairaz, Michel, *L'Etat, les finances et l'economie. Histoire d'une conversion, 1932-1952*, 2 vols., Paris 1991, and Vinen, Richard, *The Politics of French Business 1936- 1945*, Cambridge UP 1991. According to these and other titles and according to the Belgian and Dutch literature to judge, grows but the scientific Interest, How at the Collaboration in general, like that also in economic collaboration. Further Numerous older works contain important material on the topic, such as Jäckel, Eberhard, *France in Hitler's Europe*, Stuttgart 1966; Milward, Alan S., *The New Order and the French Economy*, Oxford 1970; the same, *The Fascist Economy in Norway*, Oxford 1972; Klemm, Peter Fritz, *German Economic Policies in Belgium from 1940 to 1944*, 1972 (Diss., Univ. of Michigan); Gillingham, John, *Belgian Business in the Nazi New Order*, Ghent 1977.
- 6 Approximately Verhoeven, Etienne, *Les industrial belges entre collaboration et resistance: Je m'occupe de la guerre*. In: *L'Occupation en France et in Belgium 1940-1944*. Edited by Etienne Dejonghe, Vol. 1, Lille 1987, P. 367 ff.: "Concluons: les grands industriels belges ont 'collabore' avec l'occupant, non pas pour Je servir, mais pour lui nuire." (p. 376). In the same volume. a. De Vlaminck, Michael, *L'industrie de l'armement en Belgique sous l'occupation (1940-1944)* (p. 379 ff.), which begins with the programmatic title one own publication quoted: *Les industrial belges sous l'occupation en 1940-1944: collaborer afin de nuire à l'occupant, produire dans la perspective de l'après-guerre*" (Vlaminck, M. *DeNos*, L. D., in: *revue belge d'Histoire militaire*, May - June 1985).

distinction that is so important in traditional international law between production for military, ie German, and non-military purposes. The difference The benefit for the occupiers is not so great here, it is not of a fundamental nature. "The core of the matter was in one basic Conflict: It was a Dutch Interest, that Germany lost the war and that, as a result, regardless of risks and disadvantages, the Germans were deprived of the Dutch economic potential; - and it was also in the Dutch interest that the population kept their jobs and was not deported or starved, and that consequently the Dutch economic potential was made available (beschikking) to the Germans." ⁷

It would be absurd, says De Jong, to bring the entire working population before the judge because their work contributed to increasing Germany's war potential. But on the collaborating ones native administrative apparatus, The question of the national meaning and face the moral right of collaboration. You could do it cheaply do not ask whether they had even passed on and processed the German orders; but the question must be: "To what extent have you done this? Have her a maximum or delivered a minimum? Have her everywhere where you that was possible, resisted (tegenwerkd) within the imposed cooperation?" ⁸

As far as the Dutch Department of Trade, Industry and Shipping and the twelve imperial offices (similar to the German imperial offices) as a whole are concerned, De Jong makes a clear judgment. "... one has to say that resistance in the sense of delays in the execution of German orders only became clearly apparent after the April-May strikes of 1943; One has so with this resistance within the imposed cooperation started very late." ⁹

A field of investigation in itself is the social and political motivation of economic collaboration. Continuing production and supply even under German dictates initially meant maintaining "peace and order" in the country. What seems important to me in this context is that the relationship between the entrepreneurs and their employees was subject to considerable changes under occupation rule. On the one hand On the other hand, a new, additional, intensified contrast emerged here. The forces that offered active resistance fought bitterly against the collaborators and were in obvious, sometimes openly expressed, opposition to the vast majority of workers, especially to those who were directly or indirectly for the German war and oppression machine produced. On the other hand, the occupation rule with its consequences - national humiliation and oppression, certain forms of terror, the increasing social distress in the occupied country - also a certain dampening effect Effect on the class differences. In Belgium, large-scale industrial entrepreneurs developed a strategy on their own that would avoid the confrontation

⁷ De Jong, Vol. 7/1, S. 126.

⁸ Ibid, S. 128.

⁹ Ibid, p. 129.

tation with the organizations of the labor movement and opted for an "alliance structure and operation" ¹⁰ ran out.

Of course were significant sections of the bourgeoisie in general, the business community in particular is deeply caught up in anti-socialism and anti-communism; And it was precisely their militant anti-Sovietism, which the German side did everything they could to stoke, which was a good part of their motivation at the Establishment of "Eastern Companies" and "Eastern Committees" made up te. They were the same anti-Sovietism and the fear of a victory for the USSR over Nazi Germany, which had many collaborators in the later years of the war until the very end Cooperation with the occupying power was recorded.

A general assessment of the economic elites as collaborators, even if they did business with the Germans, produced for the needs of the occupying power and delivered directly to Germany, is not appropriate. Both after individuals as There is also a very noticeable differentiation between groups be.

By groups: Certain economic circles oriented themselves, in accordance with the main ones German capital groups, strategically on the - to be reassigned - European Large area. Although they with the usurped "German leadership" in this one Large. They developed space that had to be calculated also its own offensive expansionism. This can hardly be demonstrated with greater clarity than with the initiators and founders of the "Eastern societies" mentioned. In this group there were particularly militant anti-socialist and anti-Soviet forces, usually with a great affinity for fascist or Nazi ideology.

As We can do another, very extensive group the more careful Collaborators recognize that from the beginning or later in the war against one sought to reassure German defeat, both with the respective government in exile and, in various cases, with resistance circles. These included, although not as a rule, politically more liberal, socially open-minded business circles.

Not sharp there was a limit it certainly between this and one third group, the traditionally western economically was all British oriented and politically relevant nationally conscious, not infrequently also belonged to the democratic and "pacifist" (Lenin) faction of the bourgeoisie. When forced to cooperate with the occupiers, this group stood between collaboration in a complicated way and resistance.

10 Gotovich, Jose, *Resistance en Belgium et dans Je North de Yes France*. In: *L'Occupation ...* (How

Note 6), Vol. 2, Lille 1988, S. 755. Gotovich raises the difference to France: "Le patro nat fran." ais, de son côte, pratique Yes repression a outrance au meme titre que J'occupant" (ibid.).

Between the Belgian unions and the Comite Central Industrie! On the other hand, extremely informative agreements were reached: "Principes et methods de collaboration paritaire" (April 10, 1942); and the so-called "Pacte Social" (confirmed on April 20, 1944), which, with regard to the post-war period, contained four fundamental agreements "Options" contained: 1) Discussion about socio-economic conflicts should take place in a climate of social peace; 2) the (existing) balance of forces (rapport des forces) between workers and entrepreneurs should be maintained; 3) Social progress is dependent on economic growth and depend on productivity; 4) Social policy remains limited to one politics of increase in income and for their safety, not on their redistribution. (Hemmerijck, **Rik**, *Les syndicats unifies et leur doctrine syndica le*. Ibid., p. 804 f.).

They are general traditional capital relationships and capital interests of the to examine the financial groups, corporations and companies involved, which sometimes spanned the entire world (e.g. Societe Generale de Belgique and the Solvay Group, the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, at Philips or Royal Dutch Shell) mostly had their focus in one direction (German or European) or in the other (Atlantic, colonial).

According to individuals: In detail, the relationships between the representatives of the occupying power and the German economy on the one hand, and the representatives of economic administration, industry and banking in the occupied countries on the other were of unmistakable diversity. Stanley Hoffmann expresses this pointedly when he says that there have been as many forms of collaboration as there have been collaborators.¹¹ Collaboration history will therefore not work without taking individual circumstances and peculiarities into account. Perhaps more has been achieved in this regard in fiction literature than in historiography.¹² The historian's primary interest should be in particular (former) business connections, certain political connections and affinities of the actors, but also relationships of a family nature, for example with exile and resistance circles, as well as special personal experiences with the occupation regime and with German business partners apply. In this particular case, willingness to collaborate could also serve as an alibi for resistance activity.

b) "Eastern societies" as an extreme case of economics and political collaboration

The "Eastern deployment" of occupied countries in the economic field, i.e. the collaboration of the countries concerned with Nazi Germany in the colonization and exploitation of the occupied Soviet territories, is a matter that has so far hardly been explored by research - much less developed than that of the use of SS volunteers and other military henchmen in the East. And yet we can straight the Researching these A particularly interesting topic and very differentiated look into create the complexity of economic and political collaboration.

Theoretical analyzes and generalizing-comparative works are not available. Only Louis De Jong has one Section his multi-volume history of the Netherlands in the Second World War, the "Oostinzet" of the Dutch, especially the Nederlandse Oost compagnie (NOC), in more detail examined.¹³ Be main material regards the never-

¹¹ Hoffmann, Stanley, Collaborationism in France during World War II. In: Journal of Modern History, Vol. 40 (1968), p. 375.

¹² Also in the German Literature; s. Houses, Harald, Where Germany lay (1947).

¹³ De Jong, Vol. 6/1, s' Gravenhage 1975, p. 449 ff. Only in mentioned in a footnote in Hirschfeld, Gerhard, Foreign Rule and Collaboration. The Netherlands under German occupation 1940-1945, Stuttgart 1984, the the important holdings R 6 of the Federal Archives Koblenz (Reich Ministry for the occupied Eastern areas) not evaluated has and the "Oostinzet" inadmissible shortened as "SS Eastern Expansion" characterized (p. 193; S. 288, Note 316); no mention recently in Eu

Dutch participants, primarily the National Socialist Movement (**NSB**) of Anton Adrian Mussert and Meinoud Marinus Rust van Tonningen, the General secretaries, in particular the head of the economic department, Hans Max Hirschfeld, and the Dutch business circles and business organizations. The German influence comes into the picture much weaker in De Jong's work.

The Dutch Oostinzet is examined in more detail in a case study below. It represented the most extensive and developed form of collaboration of this type represents.

In Denmark dealt with after the war a parliamentary commission to deal with collaboration issues and also examined how it came about of so-called Eastern Region Committee of the Danish Foreign Ministry (Udenrigsministeriets Ostrumsudvalg). Erich Thomsen uses them printed reports and sources of this commission.¹⁴ His portrayal of the The Danish Eastern Region Committee is also based on files from the German Foreign Office. In Denmark, unlike in the Netherlands, the local fascists apparently played almost no role in the conception and execution of the project. Well-known entrepreneurs, “outstanding and financially strong businessmen”¹⁵, and a minister the Social Democratic-led government were the founders and operators of the Eastern Region Committee, which was directly sponsored by Foreign Minister Erik Scavenius and operated as the official committee of his ministry.

The NOC and the Danish Eastern Region Committee were, apart from two Dutch subsidiary or sub-organizations, the only “working” Eastern companies, both prepared by working committees and commissions in 1941 and in the first half of 1942 founded. But they weren't just different in terms of the political and social background of its founders and members, but also in the scope of their actual activities in the occupied Soviet territories.

A significant part of the history of the two active Eastern societies is research - almost all of which includes De Jong - so far left out, namely their actual work in the East, ie the effort in terms of labor, means of production and invested capital and the relationship of this effort to the success achieved. Not to mention the working and living conditions of the many thousands of workers, farmers, fishermen, agricultural experts, engineers and entrepreneurs - Among them, by the way, as we read in De Jong, there are quite a few crooks, adventurers and so on were soldiers of fortune. Those sent to the East There were too many workers a certain, unknown percentage there only for They were active for a short time, but to some extent they remained until well into 1944, at least in the Baltic States and in Belarus, and occasionally also in the General Government. Many of them suffered a harsh fate, imprisonment and death.

ropa under the swastika, Vol. 3: The Fascist occupation policy in Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (1940--1945). Edited by Ludwig Nestler and a., Berlin 1990.

14 Thomsen, Erich, German occupation policy in Denmark 1940--1945, Düsseldorf 1971, p. 88 ff. The sources in Beretning til Folketinget afgivet af Folketinget ... nedsatte Commission ..., Vol. V, and Bilag til Beretning til Folketinget ..., Vol. XIII/1-6, Copenhagen 1948; 1954.

15 Bilag til Beretning til Folketinget ..., Vol. XIII/1-6, Copenhagen 1954, S. 1142, Doc. 595, record by. Weizsäcker about conversation with envoy Otto Mohr, 6.1.1941.

Case example: Netherlands

It was the Netherlands in particular whose activities in the occupied Soviet territories are often reflected in the columns of the in the German-speaking press. "The Netherlands," a German press release from July 1942 said, "have, as is well known, adopted the new European Eastern idea to the greatest extent."¹⁶

"Greater Germanic" settlement plans were introduced by Himmler and his offices, especially the office of the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of the German Nationality, soon after they began of war with express references to the Involvement of Dutch people (in Himmler's view: including Flemings) was discussed. In the above-mentioned Himmler Reich Commissariat there was talk of two to three million Dutch people, who could be "resettled," according to Himmler, mainly as part of the "Eastern Settlement planned after the war."¹⁷

Very soon after dem 22. June 1941 sat the Preparatory phase for the Dutch "Eastern mission" on USSR territory, in which numerous German departments and institutions and various Dutch official, business and NSB circles took part. The most important organizations of the Dutch "Eastern mission" were the Nederlandse Oostcompagnie (NOC), the "Work service Ukraine" (later:

"Holland factory service") Culano („Commissie tot uitzending van landbouwers naar Oost Europa") and the "SS front worker" operation. The present study focuses on the Oostcompagnie, whose control function later, in September 1942 and early 1943, also included the Holland factory service and the SS front workers extended.

The Culano must at least be mentioned as being particularly early, as early as the summer of 1941 established settler organization. Arthur Seyß-Inquart, Reich Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands, had directly after dem raid on Soviet Union the Dutch

"national community" called upon to use their energies in the service of the exploitation of the conquered and to be conquered areas in Eastern Europe deliver. At a rally in the stadium of the Amsterdam Ice Club on June 27, 1941, he propagated the comprehensive "operation in the East". Germany was fighting for Europe's future in the East; "The Dutch people must direct the energy on Eastern Europe that they have previously invested in the East and West Indies have". "Netherlands, look to the East!" he exclaimed.¹⁸

A corresponding one was already formed in August 1941 "Organizational Committee" with the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture or with the current Secretary General.¹⁹ Around this time, Hitler had given State Secretary Herbert Backe "authorization to support Dutch and Danish farmers the management the conquered Soviet Russian areas". Backe was primarily looking for managers for "large companies" and "assistants" in shape from "agricultural foremen, possible with machine knowledge

16 BAP, FS, Film 10612, "The European reconstruction effort in the Eastern region", information from the press office of the Advertising Council of German Business, July 27, 1942.

17 Quote from Ulrich Greifelt's "Report on the preparatory work to attract Dutch and Flemish settlers for the new eastern territories" (in Poland) from May 9, 1941; further (2-3 million) from Greifelt's letter to Himmler, June 11, 1940; in: De Jong, Vol. 6/1, p. 451.

18 After De Jong, Vol. 5/1, s' Gravenhage 1974, p. 104; S. 117 f.

19 BAK, R 6/440, BI. 1 f., AT for RMtbo (Graf Grote, The Hague), December 10, 1941.

sen". This was done by the Dutch State administration "a share in guaranteed additional yields in the form of bread and fodder grain".²⁰

So was created in the course of 1941 Culano, launched by Hans Max Hirschfeld, Secretary General both large economic departments²¹, S. L. Louwes, General Director of the Reich Office for Food Supply (subordinate to the Ministry of Economics) and C. Staf, Director of the Nederlandse Heide-Maatschappij. In total, the Culano has about 600 agricultural workers mediated to the East, including a good number of Dutch Nazis, "many things Adventurers, completely and half illiterate".²²

NSB leader Mussert was apparently not enthusiastic about this Art a pragmatic barter of labor for grain. He, who wanted the independence of the Netherlands as a "greater Dutch state" with an extensive colonial empire in the greater Germanic federation - at Mussert: "Great Empire" - had in mind,²³ represented one Conception of large-scale settlement of Dutch people East. He negotiated on the 3rd. January 1942 with Rosenberg and "placed particular emphasis on the fact that (the) Closed settlement of Dutch people Associations carried out would.... Mussert asked that this should be an area by the sea. When I asked whether a large river would suffice, Mussert replied in the affirmative if this river led to the Black Sea."²⁴

The German positions gave way this point carefully out of and laid not yourself firmly. At Commissioner General Fritz Schmidt in The Hague informed man itself internal about it, that

"In the first five years, settlement is out of the question and you only need skilled workers and engineers for the start-up period."²⁵

Hitler and Himmler's ideas for the future ran completely counter to the Greater Dutch plans. However, De Jong interprets them inadequately when he interprets Himmler's decisions Rejection the "dietschen empire idea" and his Conception the "Germanization" the

20 Ibid.

21 The Dutch general secretaries, originally commissioned by the exiled cabinet, led the occupation during the occupation "a kind of state secretaries' committee" (see Hirschfeld, p. 86 ff.) similar to the ministries (departments) in Belgium. Hans Max Hirschfeld stood for trade, commerce and shipping and for Agriculture and fishing. G. Hirschfeld (p. 243, as note 13) tends to critically view the general secretaries as "organs of the occupying power". (said General H. G. Winkelman). Further information about the very ambiguous role of HM Hirschfeld (banking expert; since 1931 in the Ministry of Economic Affairs; after End of war discharged "honorably") e.g. b. at Hirschfeld, S. 129 ff.; S. 259 f., Note 108.

22 De Jong, Vol. 6/1, S. 449 (quote: writing v. J. S. (?) to Culano, February 15, 1942). - The total number 600 is certainly too low; In the RMfBO report "Activities and achievements of the food and agriculture chief group in the occupied eastern territories" from autumn (November?) 1944, 900 Dutch people alone were stated who were considered "Germanic" at the time of the greatest expansion of German power Foreigner the Agriculture were used (BAK, R 6/34, BI. 13).

23 See, for example, Umbreit, Hans, On the way to continental rule, in: The German Reich and the Second World War, Vol. 5/1, Stuttgart 1988, p. 333; Hirschfeld, p. 168 ff.

24 TO RMfBO (Rosenberg) about reception from Mussert on January 3, 1942, January 5, 1942; quoted in De Jong, vol. 6/1, p. 450 (see note 28).

25 "Report above the Service meeting at GK Schmidt", January 5, 1942, quote ibid, S. 450 f.

Netherlands - in its Terminology: Lower Germany - ²⁶ equates Hitler's imprecise, wavering, very often situation-dependent statements ²⁷.

Mussert commissioned one of his Gauleiters (di strictsleider), AWJ Borggreven, to "handle the Eastern business" ²⁸, who had been working since the end of 1941 on behalf of Hans Fischböck, the General Commissioner for finance and economics, and under the leadership of the head of the German central contracting office, Erwin Nimtz, the recruitment of craftsmen for the "Work Service Ukraine" organized. ²⁹ End January 1942 Borggreven into the Eastern Ministry invited. Rosenberg's officials made it clear to him that they workers for road construction, Accommodation construction and river clearing, as well Specialists for transport, petroleum industry, Metallurgy and coal mining needed. ³⁰

The initiative in founding the Nederlandse Oostcompagnie was ultimately in the hands of Rost van Tonningen, Mussert's party comrade and rival, and one particularly close to the SS NSB economist, the since spring 1941 with Himmler's help to important positions Dutch collaboration administration had been smuggled (President of the Dutch Bank; Secretary General in the Ministry of Finance and in the Ministry for special economic Tasks). ³¹ Clearly are the However, there are no circumstances surrounding this founding, neither regarding the relationship between German and Dutch Initiative nor in terms of the share of the "wrong sector" ³² and the reputable circles of the Dutch business world, or as far as the exact date of founding is concerned.

In February 1942, after Borggreven's trip, there was apparently a lively discussion about the "Eastern operation" and a tussle between various interested parties and interest groups. ³³ Multiple was in particular from one participation the Royal Dutch Shell Co.

26 Himmler to Heydrich and Redieß, February 16, 1942 (quoted just that. 453): "I can it to me but don't imagine that Individual states of this Germanic empire would now get special territories, so that Northern Russia would get Norwegian or Danish provinces, and the Netherlands would get some other part of Russia as a province. This is what I think "impossible."

27 IMG, Vol. 27, p. 288, Doc. PS-1520, note from Rosenberg "about a conversation with the Führer", May 8, 1942: "The Führer says, in principle to let the Dutch come in to the east, because if there were no more than 1000 people, then they could be digested. He just doesn't want any large colonies." Hitler referred to itself on the scope of the Settlement, Himmler, on the other hand, the was definitely an advocate of mass resettlement, on the state quality of the populated territories.

28 BAK, R 6/440, BI. 7, AN Rosenberg on discussions with Mussert on January 3, 1942, January 5, 1942 (see note 24).

29 Please refer De Jong, Vol. 6/1, S. 454 ff.

30 BAK, R 6/440, BI. 9, TO RMfBO about travel Borggreven, January 20-23, 1942.

31 Please refer BAK, R 58/977, rust van Tonningen at Himmler, September 22, 1942. To biography rust s. De Jong, Vol. 1, s' Gravenhage 1969, p. 372 ff.; Hirschfeld, passim (see p. 274 f., note 70); most recently Berger, Peter, Meinoud Marinus Rost van Tonningen, representative of the League of Nations in Austria. A research report. In: contemporary history, 18th year 1990/91, H. 11/12, p. 351 ff. (especially 359 ff.).

32 "foute sector": in the Dutch standing Expression for NSB following...

33 As far as observed by the RMfBO, this documented in BAK, R 6/440. Seyss-Inquart accepted the discussion active share. After he at the Dutch one had enforced positions, that the country retroactively from July 1941 50 million RM per month as a "contribution to the waging of the war against Bolshevism" in the German war chest paid, said he his partners (i.e apparently the business

or their Dutch Subsidiaries "participating in the development of Russian oil reserves" are mentioned, including 20 000 skilled workers and the like Device could be placed³⁴; The Germans suggested that Shell should work under the direction of the relevant Reich Commissioner (Caucasus) or the Continental Oil AG.³⁵

The behavior of the German Chamber of Commerce for the Netherlands, the leading German business circle, was revealing at this time included Hermann J. Abs (Deutsche Bank), Carl Lürer (Dresdner Bank) and the Cologne banker Kurt Frhr. v. Schroeder. The Chamber made in of their Magazine "Netherlands. German-Dutch "Business magazine" has been strong since 1941 Propaganda for the "giant task" the 'young' People, ... the vast Russian land is once again becoming a productive and first-rate sales area for the whole of Europe."³⁶ The magazine ran at the beginning of 1942 a new Column "Looking East"; the Chamber appointed the General Secretary of the Commissioner General for Finance and Economics as its "plenipotentiary for eastern issues". "At the request of the Reich Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of The chamber worked very hard to promote and educate the occupied eastern territories of suitable specialists for the occupied eastern territories."³⁷

At the end of March 1942, the Reich Commissariat in The Hague "decided to set up a working committee for the Dutch one Use in the occupied eastern territories General Commissioner Schmidt ...".³⁸ Only the representatives of the Reich Commission sat on this committee, and so on was he a stillborn child from the start. It soon became official in meetings between the Reich Commissariat and Eastern Ministry, noticed, that the committee "was not suitable in this form ... to mobilize the economic and labor capacities available in Holland for use in the East".³⁹

In the April switched gears itself Rust van Tonningen in the negotiations a, the "already since a long time"⁴⁰ - including as Secretary General for Finance - was concerned with the "Eastern operation". Supported by Himmler and Rosenberg, Rost took the "leadership in this matter".⁴¹ Im Eastern Ministry welcomed it Rosenberg's Special Representative for the "Eastern-

neral secretaries) to advocate "that in the newly won settlement area in the east the Dutch interests are also protected with regard to the payments in question Performance appropriate be taken into account" (Europe underm Nazi swastika, Volume 3, p. 175, Doc. 81, Seyß-Inquart to Reich Finance Minister Schwerin v. Krosigk, February 9, 1942).

34 BAK, R 6/440, BI. 20 f., TO RMfBO about meeting Alfred Meyer with Mussert, February 19, 1942.

35 Ibid, BI. 39, AT RMfBO about meeting in Holland, February 28, 1942.

36 BAP, Deutsche Bank (F), No. P 7270, article "Then and now", signed JWB, in: Netherlands. German-Dutch Business magazine. Organ of the Germans Chamber of Commerce for the **Netherlands** and the Central Commission for the Occupied Dutch Territories, No. 13/41, August 1, 1941.

37 Ibid., annual report of Treasurer of the **DHK** f. d. Netherlands fd Fiscal year 1942, presented on March 27, 1942.

38 BAK, R 6/440, BI. 79, TO RMfBO, April 2, 1942.

39 Ibid, BI. 112, AT RMfBO, May 12, 1942 (re: Trip Dr. Coste in the Netherlands).

40 Ibid, BI. 35, AN RMfBO, March 4, 1942.

41 Please refer Self-presentation rust in BAK, R 58/977, rust at Hans Rauter, March 25, 1944; s. a. ibid, Rost to Himmler, September 22, 1942.

sentence", Walter Malletke, that rust is now a "solid" and "workable" organization, especially since "everyone involved Circles of banks, the Industry and trade ... there is a great will in Holland to approach these problems and you to put it into practice".⁴²

Despite his high administrative positions, Rost did not have the significant influence within the Dutch business world that Hirschfeld and his friend Henri Louis Woltersom, a Rotterdam banker and president of the Dutch business organization (Organisatie-Commissie [since April 1942: Raad] before the Bedrijfsleven),⁴³ had. He expressed, that his plans for the east

"could only be realized if large Dutch companies were willing to cooperate."⁴⁴ His most important negotiating partner, Woltersom, declared himself ready "for a start" at the to take part in the "Eastern Mission" and said, "he assumes that a "Part of Rotterdam's business community is (also) interested in it." De Jong doubts it True, "the willingness went very deep"; but in continued negotiations at several levels, Rost finally succeeded in bringing together the founding committee (later the supervisory board) of the Nederlandse Oostcompagnie with FBJ Gips, vice president of the Woltersom Entrepreneurs' Association, one in the Eastern business (Baltics) experienced wood wholesaler, and with E. J. Vofite and F. E. Müller, the mayors of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, together.⁴⁵ Woltersom himself had of course his Don't participate definitely agreed; above but he should wait until the Announcement of the Starting a business "some outstanding ones Personalities from the commercial world "Economy" won who would join the "Council of Commissioners" of the NOC. There were initially four shareholders in the NOC: the Dutch state, the Nederlandse Bank and the municipalities Amsterdam and Rotterdam.

The negotiations were visible on the German side from a slightly different perspective. East Ministry and Reich Commissariat attributed the initiative to themselves and claimed overall supervision of the company to be founded. The representative of the Eastern Ministry reported on the results of his Trip in May to The Hague: „It was possible, Commissioner General Schmidt Establishing the Society to arrange and the preparatory work for their founding to bring to a conclusion. In this society a decisive influence is exercised by the Secretary General in the Dutch Ministry of Finance, President Rost van Tonningen, led economic group. It is envisaged that the Vice President of the Main Committee of the Commercial Economy, FBJ Gips, will be entrusted with the management. All sectors of the commercial economy are included in the company (Industry, Trade, craft, work effort, Traffic, banks) through tailored

42 BAK, R 6/440, BI. 103, AT RMtBO, April 16, 1942.

43 In more detail about Woltersom see Hirschfeld, p. 144 ff.: De Jong, vol. 7/1, s' Gravenhage 1976, p. 22 f. Rost denounced Hirschfeld to Himmler as Half-Jews, but in vain because of his outstanding capacity and position: "The weakness of my position lies in the fact that in the state sector the half-Jew Hirschfeld Ministry of Economics occupied. Were it Not possible for you, at the Reich Commissioner to achieve that in the The Hirschfeld practice reports to me becomes?" (BAK, R 58/977, Rust to Himmler, September 22, 1942).

44 De Jong, Vol. 6/1, S. 458. Hereafter also the following.

45 The supervisory board later also included De Kock van Leeuwen, President of the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce.

famous personalities will be represented. For the agricultural sector, a powerful personality will be appointed by General Commissioner Schmidt. The company will be financed with Dutch capital estimated at 20 million guilders. The suggestions about the The company to be founded will be in the next few days here (in the Eastern Ministry - DE) submitted become. It is envisaged because of of these proposals Pentecost in Holland in consultation with dem Commissioner General Schmidt and Minister Fischböck founded the company through the **business circles led by Rost van Tonningen.**" ⁴⁶

The founding but then a hasty start June 1942 instead of, Apparently shortly before Rost, Gips, three other "false" Dutchmen and three representatives of the Reich Commissariat traveled to the Baltic republics for two weeks via Berlin on June 7th at the short notice of an invitation from the Eastern Ministry. ⁴⁷

When they returned they found the Dutch public in a greatly deteriorated mood. The business community was greatly offended by the fact that on June 10 some large Dutch-Indian plantation companies had been placed under German administrators; at 19. In June, this happened at various other companies. According to Rost's denunciation, "various of the English-affiliated companies were informed (by an officer of the armaments inspection who referred to the "four-year plan") - DE) that they did not have to cooperate with the NOC. Among them was the 'Internatio' Woltersom's economic circle, which formed the main role in the group assembled by Woltersom for economic deployment in the East." Under these circumstances, "Woltersom withdrew his planned cooperation with the NOC." ⁴⁸

The background to this matter remains unclear. At least Reichskommissar Seyß-Inquart seems to be yourself "after the fact." in attendance all Supervisory Boards the NOC" to have spoken of a sabotage of the work of the NOC. ⁴⁹ Investigations into the role of Fischböck, the although Commissioner General for Finance and economy, only in passing with the founding of the NOC and provide more information about his relationships with the four-year planning departments, with Deutsche Bank, etc.

It also caused a great stir when, on June 9th, newspaper articles about the founding of the NOC talked about the "living space for three million Dutch people" ⁵⁰ that the society would create in the East. Although voluntary emigration was written about and deportation intentions were denied, this did not seem credible given the huge number (a third of the total Dutch population), and the population was deeply disturbed, especially there the Germans A few days later, Zahl was forbidden to continue publishing, but she did not deny it. The resistance movement the London radio etc. dealt intensively with the topic.

46 How Note 39 (May 12, 1942).

47 De Jong, Vol. 6/1, S. 459.

48 How Note 41 (Rust at Rauter).

49 Ibid.

50 "German newspaper in the Netherlands"; "Het Nationale Dagblad"; according to De Jong, Vol. 6/1, S. 451 ff.; S. 459.

The reputation of the NOC was considerably battered. The executive Director of the NOC, D. Krantz, later testified that the mountains of letters and offers that reached the society came mainly from unsound and incompetent people and the "piles of applications ... almost exclusively from rogues." insured, so he complained at Rost van Tonningen, "that he his own Employees will be able to choose from very experienced and sociable people... This category of persons, with one exception, has never appeared." ⁵¹

De Jong vividly describes how bad it is Management of the NOC worked and how senseless the state funds - 15 millions gulden - wasted became, before everything "because of the bureaucratic struggle so typical of the Third Reich, especially in relation to the expansion of their sphere of influence in the occupied territories The Soviet Union was run with incredible tenacity." ⁵² Nevertheless, the sources reflect considerable activity the NOC up to that Year 1943 and even 1944 reflected. She organized that An infiltration of several thousand Dutch people into the occupied Soviet territories. It acted This includes workers and technicians in the fishing, agriculture, forestry and peat industries as well as construction workers, craftsmen, engineers and corresponding management cadres.

The NOC was apparently at the height of its negotiations and activities between September 1942 and February 1943. ⁵³ In September 1942 it took over the organization of the "Werkdienst Holland" and from then on was responsible for recruiting and Training the Handyman and workers. As but despite the promise of Eastern Ministry from May 1943 that these several hundred workers, who were mainly active in the Ukraine, could become self-employed after a year of work in the East, the Reich Commissioner for Ukraine, Erich Koch, did not want to stick to the agreement, the NOC stopped further immigration. ⁵⁴

Early 1943 became that too SS front workers organization placed under the control of the NOC. By then there were about 2 300 builders from Dutch small business owners for The SS Economic Administration Main Office was employed and in many cases treated and cheated by the entrepreneurs "in a shameful manner". ⁵⁵ The second director of the NOC, PS Heerema, Standartenführer in the Dutch SS, set up the organization, which became a newly founded subsidiary of the NOC , which was incorporated by Nederlandse Oostbouw NV, from voluntary to compulsory advertising. Until End 1944 came like that A further 3,700 Dutch people were sent to the East, some forcibly conscripted by German "skilled recruiters" via the Dutch employment offices, and some sent directly from the German penal and forced camps in Ommen and Amersfoort. Since the beginning of 1944, the workers were used to build bunkers and roads Construction battalions of the Waffen-SS ⁵⁶

51 letter from the March 27, 1945; quote just that. 459. "Attitude rags" also in the Original German.

52 Just that. 460; also BAK, R 6/448, Bl. 66, rust on v. Harder (RMfBO), January 22, 1943: "We had a lot of trouble together, especially due to the lack of organization in a situation that was raised so quickly Action like the Dutch operation."

53 Please refer report rust at Himmler above Task and plans the NOC, September 22, 1942 (BAK, R 58/977).

54 De Jong, Vol. 6/1, p. 460.

55 Ibid, S. 461.

56 Ibid, S. 461 f.

Four hundred to five hundred "peasants", many of whom have never run a farm the NOC sent to training facilities (Vilna, Rovno) from autumn 1942 onwards. and agronomist schools (Baranovka). Until to the spring of 1943 should be at least 300 to 400 Dutch "agricultural guides" educated especially "independent base managers on state-owned farms of around 10,000 hectares".⁵⁷ A Dutch "economic commission" acted for the NOC center December 1942 with dem Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine stated that, as in "Ostland" has already happened, a "model good" from 1,000 to 1,500 ha with its own right of *use* will farm; furthermore should the Company will take over management of a total of 24,000 acres (6,000 ha).⁵⁸

The heads of the NOC apparently had the idea of centralizing the entire Dutch "Eastern operation" in their hands before. they founded to this end From late autumn 1942 onwards, a whole series of subsidiaries: in addition to the aforementioned Nederlandse Oostbouw NV, there were also companies for Oostbaksteen (for brickworks), Oost binnenvaart (especially for river shipping), Oostbagger (for river regulation and similar work) and for Eastern trade. At the beginning of 1943 there were also companies for fishing, shipping and peat extraction and timber industry being founded understood.⁵⁹

The contribution of Dutch industry to the eastern deployment as a whole appreciates De Jong very much small amount a: „Nearly the the entire commercial economy declined the eastern deployment. Only some entrepreneurs, almost all NSB people, were ready to find their happiness in the East to try where she then had to try many times to get Russian state-owned companies back to get going: brickworks, a wooden shoe factory, a textile factory, a laundry, a lemonade factory - all quite insignificant. A Dutch thermal power plant company established operations in Kiev and Rovno; it soon suffered from a lack of materials".⁶⁰

The cardinal problem for the NOC was and remained the Restraint of the masses major Dutch companies and most influential representatives of the Dutch economy. Their skepticism and rejection of a more extensive industrial and financial "Eastern operation" had various reasons. The "subservience to England" denounced by Rost or consideration for the mood against the occupying power - i.e. political caution or conviction - there was certainly only one of them. The entire economy was also affected by the German coup against the large colonial and plantation companies annoyed. When the Bataafse Petroleum-Maatschappij (subsidiary of the Royal Dutch Shell Co.) from its German Administrator was asked in the summer of 1942 to take part in the recommissioning of the - yet to be conquered! - to participate in oil production facilities in the Caspian Sea (Baku). already before the October Revolution from the old Deterding company Installed been were, refused itself nearly all executives Employees to participate. It

57 BAK, R 6/448, BI. 11 ff., AN RMTbO on "Conference of the Dutch Economic Commission at the RKU", December 10-12, 1942. Hereafter also the following. - The work of the Dutch Commission had "been underway for six months" (ibid.).

58 Some information about the goods in the final report of the economic staff East (German economic policy in the occupied Soviet territories 1941-1943. The final report of the East Economic Staff..., edited and submitted by Rolf-Dieter Müller, Boppard 1991, p. 139 ff.).

59 BAK, R 6/448, various pieces.

60 De Jong, Vol. 6/1, S. 463. Hereafter also the The following.

was further the speech of that an operation by the Dutch plantation companies "in the large Don bow planned" be.⁶¹ Also this Societies performed, according to De Jong, successfully resisted the pressure of their German administrators to cooperate in the East.⁶²

Of course, there were also supporters of eastward expansion in circles among the large Dutch overseas companies. Schwerin v. After the war, Krosigk, then German finance minister, remembered a conversation "with one the directors of one of the large colonial companies in Holland" (1942?), the their colonial empire Indonesia had already written off and "were not at all averse to the idea of a replacement".⁶³ "The company of my interlocutor was an Tea cultivation in Great ones in Crimea. He came it to know whether people in Germany only want their capital or whether they should also approach the development of Russia with people and experience." The latter is a demand that the Reich Commissioner also supports support.

One of the most serious problems consisted of, that the Dutch Entrepreneur - How all other foreign participants - from the Germans none fixed contracts or binding accept on future property titles and assured profit were able to obtain. Interestingly, at the end of April 1942, Commissioner General Fischböck had already drafted very far-reaching concession provisions for the Dutch Eastern Company that was to be founded, but these were obviously remained without any echo. They affected the city and port of Libau (Liepaja/Latvia) with an associated one agricultural area in the extent of 500,000 ha. In addition to the right of exclusive management and supply or "supply to the city and the port as well as to agricultural businesses with all necessary goods "commercial economy". the Society all "dispensable" agricultural products can be shipped to the Netherlands. Probably the most important provision of the draft was that, that the Dutch Society on all commercial and agricultural property not intended for the local population "an option to acquire the right of ownership ... for the benefit of Dutch interested parties for a reasonable time and at an appropriate time Conditions" should be received.⁶⁴

At the end of 1942, the Eastern Ministry prepared "principles" for the use of foreign companies, which were intended to solve the question of ownership as the most acute problem. But discussions regarding "property-like relationships, for example concessions" did not go beyond discussions.⁶⁵

After the German defeat at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942/43, the Dutch defense weakened Initiative. rust complained Beginning March 1943, „the Pioneer spirit the Dutch (be)

61 BAK, R 6/448, BI. 22, AN RMfBO, O. D

62 De Jong, Vol. 6/1, S. 463.

63 ItZ, ZS/A-20, NL Schwerin v. Krosigk, Vol. 12, "Personal Memories by Lutz Graf Schwerin v. Krosigk", Ms.-druck, undated, p. 308. Hereafter also the following.

64 BAK, R 6/440, BI. 127 f., AT RMfBO, April 30, 1942, Attachment.

65 BAK, R 6/448, BI. 16, AN RMfBO about meeting on November 1st, 1942, November 3rd, 1942. - Difficulties also arose in the Dutch eastern trade. Rost complained that "in countries like Hungary and Sweden, trade movements with the East take place step by step, while in action a Dutch one trading company no only Guarantee is given that something in return could be provided in the foreseeable future." (Ibid., BI. 198, Rost an RMfBO (Malletke), March 31, 1943).

no longer exists." ⁶⁶ The Eastern Ministry noted particularly critically that "since the December meeting in Rovno no practical result of industrial relocations has been achieved be," but approved the NOC in view of the strong opposition mood in the Netherlands "that it would be impossible for her to contact well-known Dutch companies Industrialists on a voluntary basis." With Rost's tactic, "in order not to be idle, smaller industrialists, practically mostly out of NSB circles, interested and Having promised them the most extensive financial support", the German side did not intend to be satisfied. German authorities were now in a position to "use indirect pressure to induce well-known industrialists to relocate their industries... Director Brocke (from the Netherlands Armaments Inspection - DE) explained that in the course of total war the arms inspection now had completely different powers and options at its disposal. A Rūln representative was recently appointed to each of the Dutch Reich Offices ⁶⁷ in order to set up the Reich Offices in the spirit of the Rūln. Brocke was the authorized representative general for the entire Imperial offices become. He is authorized to issue orders admit, Scrapping industries like he also practically every one means in the have hand to to force sabotaging Dutch industries. Also have he size Stock of machines that he could make available. From these reports it appears that the possibilities of mobilizing Dutch industries for the East have improved rather than deteriorated. It has now become less important how far the NOC succeeds Depoliticization to carry out. It seems appropriate The aim is to ensure that the industries that are desired in the East are put to the question by You Brocke, either on a voluntary basis Basis under commercial principles to go to the East, or be forced to scrap their industries immediately allow."

This brutal show of strength could not change the eventual fiasco of the "Eastern operation". End March 1943 reported rust in one alarming letter at Malletke from the "Shaking the confidence of our peasantry" because of their treatment in the East (whole apart from the activity of Partisans, among them many claimed lives); about the "deep indignation ... among the broad masses of our workers" because of numerous breaches of contract on the part of the German side (particularly towards the "Werkdienst Holland"); about the "discontent" among the Dutch "managers and experts" because of the lack of success or the cancellation of promised trips the East; and finally about the "discontents in the circles of my supervisory board members" and their tendency to be hopeless and unproductive to step down due to the disputes with the many German authorities. ⁶⁸

The NOC continued to place hundreds more Dutch people until at least the beginning of May 1943 workers and Handyman after dem east (Tabel). But the events of

66 Ibid., BI. 173R (171 ff.), RMtbo report on a trip to Holland March 2 - 5, 1943, March 6, 1943. Hereafter also the following.

67 Dutch: Rijksbureau; twelve influential and highly staffed institutions to supply all areas of industry and agriculture with raw materials and other goods. Formally subordinate to the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Corresponded roughly to the German "Reichsstellen" with z. T ministerial powers (see Hirschfeld, p. 128).

68 BAK, R 6/448, BI. 198 ff., rust to RMtbo (Malletke), March 31, 1943.

Spring 1943 - especially the April-May strike and the imposition of the police station on the right, that the Dutch one Population well over 200 loss of life - finally initiated the phase of decline of the NOC and the winding up of its affairs, even before the Summer-autumn offensive the Red Army them out of a large part of their area of activity.⁶⁹

Overall, the NOC was at its peak Activity - included those of her Taken over in 1942/43 Organizations of "Werkdiensts Holland" and the Dutch "SS front worker" - at least 7,000 Dutch workers.

Table 105

Transports Dutch Workforce in the occupied Soviet areas,

1. April - 10. May 1943

1. April	23 farmers for Rovno
	1 Carpenter for Waka T
3. April	18 workers for Work service Holland
4. April	3 agricultural Leader after Rovno
6. April	3 Man Excavator command
	6 farmers for Waka T
8th. April	29 farmers for Rovno
	6 Peat workers for Kyiv
14. April	25 Peat workers after Baltoje Voke
15. April	5 Peat workers after Kyiv
16. April	37 workers for Work service Holland
20th of April	10 workers for Work service Holland
April 27th	7 workers for "wanted"
29. April	3 gardener after Waka T
30. April	3 construction worker for Soetens, Rovno
	30 Excavator professionals

In the Month April 349 construction worker for the SS deployment

1.	3 fisherman, Transport Incident Command after Pskov
May	61 fisherman, Mission Lake Peipus, (after) Pskov
6th	15 Shipbuilding workers for shipyard U. S. M. A.,
May	Kyiv 1 Painter for the de Bok company,
7th	Zhitomir
	1 painter for company de Bok, Zhitomir.

10. May

Source: BAK, R 6/448, BI. 214, AT RMfbO/BfS for Rosenberg, May 14, 1943, Attachment;
Transcription the place names as in the document.

The offensive the Redden army in the Middle section the German-Soviet Front, the at the
 23. June 1944 started and in few weeks until at the Vistula presented became, ended-

69 In mid-May 1943, the Eastern Ministry soberly stated that "for political reasons" it was "in" in the Netherlands anti-German circles showed the strongest resistance" against the "operation in the East" (ibid., BI. 197, AN RMfbO/BfS, May 13, 1943); sat ibid, AN RMfbO/BfS (f. Rosenberg and Meyer), May 14, 1943.

ended the Dutch deployment to the East abruptly. When many Dutch workers were sent back home by the NOC soon after the offensive began, it seemed it was still “incomprehensible to the German authorities that the representatives of the NOC were so apolitical can act.”⁷⁰ The Rosenberg ministry announced in August itself to all Dutch people in the Ostland land management company at the end of the month.⁷¹ The land management company Ukraine had already begun to “loan” Dutch people to the General Government.⁷² In the following weeks there were heated bureaucratic disputes between the NOC and German authorities over where the Dutch experts, farmers, gardeners and workers should be deployed, whether in East Prussia, in the “Warthe gau”, in Pomerania or in the Kurmark (Oderbruch), or further in Inside Germany. There was also talk of the Rhineland; But they wanted to refrain from doing this because “otherwise enemy propaganda could easily claim that the Eastern mission from the Ukraine has now been withdrawn to the Rhine.”⁷³

At the beginning of October 1944, the Red Army surrounded the German troops (HGr Nord) in the Baltic States; A few dozen remained in the “Kurland Pocket” with an uncertain fate Dutch farmers and other NOC forces returned.⁷⁴

Denmark

When Hitler received the new Danish envoy in Berlin, Otto Mohr, in the “Wolf's Lair” on September 11, 1941, to present the credentials he to him in detail “about the need for one Involvement of others Countries in the reconstruction of the Eastern region”.⁷⁵ The social democratic Danish government and leading Danish business circles responded immediately with offers of economic cooperation. The Danish business world had already been favorably promoting the as capital owner of Dansk Cement Central AS himself interested transport minister Gunnar Larsen came up with a plan to ask the Germans for “concessions in forestry and agriculture as well as for the exploitation of mineral resources” in the Baltic region to make an effort.⁷⁶ The Danes were, How Secretary of State Serious v. Weizsacker stated, “the first who agreed to engage in economic activity with us on what was previously Russian territory.”⁷⁷

On the initiative of Foreign Minister Erik Scavenius and Minister of Transport Larsen met a committee of five in Copenhagen on October 22, 1941, with Thorkild as chairman Juncker, Oil mill owner in Aarhus, How Larsen as owner earlier participation

70 BAK, R 6/446, BI. 102, AT RMtbo/BfS, July 7, 1944.

71 Ibid, BI. 137 f., AT RMtbo/BfS, August 11, 1944.

72 Ibid, 81. 168, AT RMtbo/BfS, August 18, 1944.

73 Ibid, BI. 151, AT RMtbo/BfS, August 18, 1944.

74 Ibid, BI. 249, van Haarlem at Malletke, October 12, 1944.

75 Thomsen, p. 88.

76 Meissner, Gustav, Denmark underm Nazi swastika. The Northern invasion and the occupation Dane marks 1940-1945, Berlin/Frankfurt a. M. 1990, p. 214 f.

77 Bilag til Beretning til Folketinget ..., Vol. XIII/1-6, S. 1145, doc. 598, B.C. Weizsäcker to Fritz Todt, January 27, 1942.

gen directly interested in companies in the Baltics, as well as the manufacturer J. C. Hempel, the entrepreneur-engineer Knud Højgaard, the large agrarian Folmer Lüttichau (Rohden) and in a semi-official capacity Knud S. Sthyr, like Larsen, closely associated with Dansk Cement Central AS and head of the advisory board since 1939 trade policy committee of the Foreign Ministry. Constituted on December 11th This committee calls itself "Arbejdsudvalget to Fremme af dansk Initiative i Øst- og Sydøsteuropa" (Working Committee for the Promotion of Danish Initiatives in Eastern and Southeastern Europe). He received the necessary "finger-pointing," as the envoy and plenipotentiary of the German Empire in Denmark, Cecil v. Renthe-Fink, put it, from Berlin.⁷⁸

The Danish government, as stated in the Foreign Office, "had this reason (Hitler's statements to Mohr - DE) was used to emphatically take up the idea of cooperation with Germany in the context of an economic reorganization of Europe, with the focus of Danish interest being on reconstruction work in the eastern regions. The Danish side is in agreement A committee consisting of outstanding representatives of the state and business has been formed with the Copenhagen government."⁷⁹

In the spring of 1942, Larsen and Juncker accepted an earlier invitation from Rosenberg to visit the Baltics. In mid-May, the envoy Karl Schnurre negotiated in Copenhagen on behalf of the Foreign Office with the Danish government, the "Arbejdsudvalget" and other business representatives about future cooperation between the two countries in "reconstruction in the East". The two foreign ministries should be responsible and the at this one departmental mutual Government committees be. The

"Arbejdsudvalget" was intended to pool Danish interests and "to raise its position by delegating official personalities." "The Danish interest focuses on the following groups of questions: a) Investments to restart former Danish companies (Port-Kunda cement factory, Libau oil factory, etc.). b) Personnel deployment of qualified Danish forces Industry and economy in Eastland and later also in other areas. The focus here is on the question of the return of numerous Danes who were previously economically active in the Baltic states. c) Questions relating to the movement of goods, delivery of Danish products, in particular the machinery industry, to the East. Naturally, the main interest of the Danes is to find out what them as consideration in prospect is provided. 4.) Special interest found Suggestions from Juncker, the Ask from cultivation contracts for oilseeds, in particular

78 BAP, Foreign Affairs Office, No. 61120, BI. 107, Tel. Renthe-Fink at AA, December 13, 1941; sa Beretning til Folketinget ..., Vol. V, Appendix, p. 559.

79 Ibid, BI. 100, Record v. Trützschler, March 30, 1942.

80 Helk, Vello, Dansk Ministerbesøg i Balticum. In: Eesti Teadusliku Seltsi Rootsis Aastaraamat/Annales societatis litterarum Estonicae in Svecia, vol. X, 1985-1987, Stockholm 1988, p. 143 ff.; Thomsen, p. 90. Meissner, p. 216, explains the delay with the deterioration of the political situation mood in Denmark to dem entry into the war the UNITED STATES. Rosenberg reported to Hitler at the May 8th over the highly tensioned plans the Danes after this trip; it should be in Port Kunda (Estonia) will soon be producing 75,000 tons of cement annually, peat extraction is being prepared on a large scale, large gypsum works, concrete factories and clog factories, dairies, shipyards, etc. will be operated (see note 27).

Linseeds to be tested in the East. In this way, Denmark hopes to obtain part of the oil cake resulting from the use of linseed. What's on the way about the agricultural Danish exports would fully benefit [us]." ⁸¹

On June 2, 1942, the private "Arbejdsudvalget" was promptly reorganized into an official "Eastern Region Committee of the Foreign Ministry" (Udenrigsministeriets Østrumsudvalg), in where the same gentlemen sat, "With the exception of Mr. Knud Sthyr, who as Representatives of the Foreign Ministry now join this committee official stamp." ⁸² The chairmanship remained with Juncker.

The work of East Room Committee became strongly inhibited by the German jurisdiction dispute between foreign affairs Government office and Eastern Ministry and - not last - through this,

„that no position was ready, the Cost of the Danish to take over the mission". ⁸³ The Danish government refused to transfer their surpluses to the German-Danish clearing account for benefits Danish Entrepreneur available in the east to ask, and only gave up the possibility of compensation transactions.

After all, they offered itself for the Financing of shops in Baltic States Danish Landmandsbank and the Hansa-Bank in Riga, controlled by Dresdner Bank. From Clea ring resources were only allowed a medium-term loan of up to 200 000 crowns are claimed for Wage transfers at engineers and Special forces were reserved in the Peripheral states the USSR worked. This loan became only in the amount of almost 18,000 crowns claimed. ⁸⁴

The judgment of the Economic Staff East (**OKW**) may apply at the interstate level, after "the one with the Danish "The negotiations conducted by the government about this (about the "Eastern operation" - DE) did not lead to any tangible practical results. An agreement could not be reached between the Reich departments involved on the implementation of the operation." ⁸⁵ In fact, in the course of 1942, various Danish companies showed, with or without mediation from the Eastern Region Committee, business activity in the Baltics. The head of the committee, Juncker, became an oil mill in Latvia, which had belonged to him until 1940, was "left to be managed in trust." ⁸⁶ The Port-Kunda cement plant in Estonia, in which Dansk Cement Central (Larsen; Sthyr) showed lively interest for the same reason, came to fruition under Danish management in August 1942 after repairs to the plant and power plant, albeit with difficulty. going again. Engineers with machines and equipment for peat extraction arrived from Denmark. ⁸⁷ Namely the Company F L. Smidth, Copenhagen, the belonged to Larsen's business partners, in 1942 "because of machine deliveries to the East" with the Eastern Ministry

81 Bilag til Beretning til Folketinget ..., Vol. XIII-6, S. 1148, Doc. 601, Tel. Purr at AA, May 20, 1942.

82 BAP, FS, Film 10655, Kurt A. Buck (HGF of the German Chamber of Commerce in Denmark) to August Heinrichsbauer (HGF of the Southeast European Society), November 9, 1942.

83 Thomsen, S. 91.

84 Beretning til Folketinget ..., Vol. V, Investments, S. 560; s. a. Meissner, p. 217.

85 The German Economic policy ..., S. 142.

86 Ibid.

87 Helk, p. 157.

Connection and expressed "lively interest in the Peat farming in the East".⁸⁸ The German Chamber of Commerce in Denmark, which was closely monitoring the course of events, wrote at the beginning of 1943 recommending at the Southeast European Society: "From Mr. Fabrikant JC Hem pel, member of the Eastern Committee of the Danish Foreign Ministry, and three members of the Grosserer Societ ts Komite, namely director Jernert, wholesaler Bue Bj rner and wholesaler Kaj Lundby, a few months ago the company Transdania NS, Copenhagen, Klosterstraede 19, with the intention of conducting commercial business primarily with the East, Ukraine and the South-Eastern States. The shareholders of the company are respected merchants who provide full support for their endeavors earn."⁸⁹

Nevertheless, Juncker told the German envoy in September that the Danes had had "disappointing" experiences with the armed forces in the Ostland Reich Commissariat (deduction from workers) and with the authorities, and spoke about the plan to "shift the focus of the Danish mission to southern Russia."⁹⁰

After the turn of the war in the East in the winter of 1942/43, Danish interest died out as quickly as it had flared up a year earlier. In view of the increasing anti-German sentiment and the large August strikes in Denmark, the German occupying power imposed the State of emergency and forced resignation the Scavenius government - hated by the population. The Danish capital circles took this fundamental political change as an opportunity to stop the work of the Eastern Region Committee.⁹¹

The new Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark, Werner Best, there was nothing left but all attempts that Danish to revive cooperation, for "to Time conceivably unfavorable". In his report to the Foreign Office⁹² from the end of November/beginning of December 1943 it was said that the "surrender of a larger number of farmers would have a detrimental effect on Danish food deliveries to the Reich. In the commercial sector Technicians and specialists, to the extent that they are expendable in Denmark, are already deployed in Germany without this even coming close to satisfying German needs. In addition, the war-important work in Denmark (including fortification work against an invasion) that was undertaken on higher orders requires EN) There is currently a particularly strong commitment from Danish companies and skilled workers. Now more than ever we are forced to use the entire Danish economic forces for the conduct of the war and the securing of our war-decisive remuneration from Denmark."

88 BAK, R 7/589, report d. RWiM liaison man in Wistab Ost. a trip to Sweden etc. Denmark v. April 4th to April 13th, 1943, April 19th, 1943. The rapporteur emphasized that in 1943, in contrast to the previous year, "interest in peat farming in the East had decreased considerably."

89 BAP, FS, film 10655, K A Buck at A. Heinrichsbauer, January 30, 1943.

90 Bilag til Beretning til Folketinget ..., Vol. XIII/1-6, S. 1153, Doc. 606, Tel. Renthe Fink at AA, September 11, 1942.

91 This happened on August 31, 1943. Managing director Niels Erik Wilhelmsen received the LiO. his termination (Meissner, p. 218). The society did not dissolve, but left its own Business is at a standstill.

92 Presented by Sts. Steengracht (Bilag til Beretning til Folketinget ..., Vol. XIII/1-6, p. 1155 f., Doc. 608, Steengracht to Gauleiter Meyer/RMfBO, December 18, 1943). Hereafter also the following.

Best articulated one of the most important problems of the Danish interests in the East quite openly; namely that “a prerequisite for a future strengthening of the Danish mission in the East would be a final regulation regarding the restoration of Danish private property in the East. Without such a regulation it would be difficult to arouse the necessary interest in the Eastern mission, especially "But the Danish financial world cannot be won over to provide capital."

Norway

Similar to in the Netherlands was the “Eastern operation” mainly in Norway Fascist concerns Circles. Different to there was the Quisling Party (Nasjonal Samling; NS) in Norway government (de facto since September 1940; Vidkun Quisling was appointed Prime Minister on February 1, 1942), although controlled and controlled by Reich Commissioner Josef Terboven.⁹³

The Norwegian Nazi leaders, a number of whom had previously been politically and commercially active in Russia, welcomed the German attack on the USSR “with eagerness and Optimism”. Still in Summer and autumn 1941 different ones emerged memoranda about Norway's interest in "Bjarmaland" (Northern Russia), the most important of which came from Quisling's close foreign policy colleague Finn Sofus Støren, head of the Directorate for Foreign Policy Orientation (in the Ministry of Culture and Public Education). Støren went away Norway's military participation in the war against the Soviet Union as part of a Norwegian-Finnish defense alliance, which ensured extensive restoration the Norwegian sovereignty is assumed and the Before the Reich Commissioner would have eliminated or restricted the Quisling government's influence. The whole of northern Russia - from Kirov in the south to Novaya Zemlya in the north, from the Finnish border to the Urals - should then fall to Finland and Norway, "who together could build a wall towards the east." (October 2, 1941)

Frederick Prytz, Timber dealers, too high Nazi official and Intimus from Quisling, Later (1942) Finance Minister, however, advocated pan-Scandinavian expansion and cautiously left it open whether the Scandinavian-Germanic settlement area in northern Russia Germany would remain directly subordinate to or from dem future Scandinavian defense alliance become. (September 13, 1941)

The memoranda by Støren and Prytz reached Himmler and a few other German “key people”, but not Terboven. Here the first, euphoric phase of Norway's dreams for the Eastern region came to an abrupt end. Himmler had no understanding whatsoever of a Norwegian or Scandinavian one Special position in the “Germanic settlement areas” let alone for the cession of conquered territories. All such thoughts, wrote he at 16. February 1942 to Heydrich and Wilhelm Redieß, HSSPF in Norway, should be "rejected in a nice but ideologically clear and definite form."

⁹³ I owe the material for this section to the work of Ole Kolsrud (Kollaborasjon og imperialism. Quisling-regjeringens “Austrveg”-drøm 1941-1944. In: Historisk Tidsskrift, Vol. 67, Oslo 1988, S. 241 ff.), the in the following too the unsubstantiated quotes originate. For any important information on the subject, please contact Dr. Fritz Petrick, Greifswald, grateful.

Also the German defeat before Moscow and the Permanent renunciation of offensive actions in northern Russia contributed to that the Quisling politician In the following period, they concentrated more on pragmatic attempts to obtain orders and concessions from the German authorities for a lucrative "operation in the East". Stören and the Ministry of Trade succeeded in to come into closer contact with the Eastern Ministry. The Ministry of Trade pushed for permission to send a delegation of representatives from the various Norwegian authorities and economic sectors to the East, similar to the Dutch and Danes. "This Commission," said Secretary Thorolf Fjeld's submission Fretheim for Minister Eivind Blehr from 9. July, „would the The main task is to investigate in which parts of the occupied territories people are living best at the Work could help. Another mission the delegation would have would be to investigate what delivery options in the future e.g. b. with regard to grain, Tobacco, rock phosphate, oil, cotton, etc. exist. - You would also have to investigate which products we could export."

In November 1942, a "Study Committee of the Ministry of Trade for Norwegian Activities in the Occupied Eastern Territories" was established, although its importance was far behind the "Russian Accounting Office" founded by Stören in 1941.

During this time, Terboven made violent attempts to join the Norwegians in their own negotiations Donut Place a to make an end. He complained on the 17th November at Himmler about the "whole mentality" of the Norwegians, "taking advantage of every opportunity that comes their way, driving on several tracks, doing strange tours and one to play one German office off against the other." It must remain ensured that "invitations from German authorities to Norwegian party and state offices only go through me, and that I remain absolutely involved in any kind of correspondence." He already had Quisling's party minister on October 31st Rolf Jorgen Vuglesang was harshly informed that that Rediess alone is responsible for "1. Dealing with all Eastern questions that arise, 2. Dealing with all racial-political and racial-biological questions, 3. Dealing with the question of the political peasantry." Due to the objections of the Reich Commissariat, the plan supported by the Eastern Ministry to create a Norwegian Eastern Company (Norsk Ostkompani) finally failed in January 1943 (AIS) .

Nevertheless, the Norwegian did "Eastern operation" in 1943 made certain progress, which was primarily due to Stören's activities and his ability to "run on several tracks". The situation in the East also made it seem urgent to the Germans to accept foreign aid, with which German forces and resources could be relieved, without much fuss. The line of Eastern Ministry sat has become stronger since this time.

Stören, now working directly in Quisling's government chancellery, took part in a three-day trip to Rovno, the headquarters of the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, Gauleiter Erich Koch, in June 1943 as the highest-ranking Norwegian in a study commission that was formed at the Eastern Ministry. Koch "said his full support for the use of Norwegian craftsmanship and the Norwegian industry." The German wishes were primarily aimed at deploying 150 younger craftsmen and on the cooperation

- with management staff and machines - at Production and delivery of packaging for canned goods. The Norwegian side showed is primarily interested in Operated by the wooden interior

industry (production of wooden houses), on the establishment of sawmills, on a regular shipping line Oslo - Königsberg, on land concessions and on the establishment of a Land credit institution for Financing the related projects .

Around this Project went it in the negotiations over the next few months. First used Quisling and Disturb the new Economy, around one central institution for the entire "The whole plan," Stören wrote on June 26, "is conditional on the fact that both the initiative and the leadership, but above all the control of the people, as well as all negotiations in the Must be in the hands of the representatives of the Norwegian state.... It will be a public institution 'Austrveg' built. The management of this institution is appointed by the Prime Minister."

"Austrveg" was removed from Stören's directorate by Quisling's decree of July 17, 1943 and was spun off and subordinate to the "Russian Kontor". - under Stören's management - directly to the Prime Minister. Headquarters of the organization in the East should be Rovno, which is what it is up to Soviet offensive (Rovno was destroyed in early February 1944 released) no more came. The organization tried to secure contracts between Norwegian companies and German occupation authorities and economic institutions, for example between the *NS* Heggedal Bruk and the German Peat Institute for the East in Kauenas (Kaunas), and particularly pursued the plan "the possibility of transferring a state area for independent management by Norway" (Stören in Berlin, November 8, 1943).

• In the June 1943 was a Ukrainian land project with 500 000 ha been in conversation. In October it was about an "area on Norwegian account" in the area of Baranovici (Belorussia). For this purpose, Georg Lund, the office manager of "Austrveg", presented a "plan for the administration of an area of approx. 10,000" on December 17th km² - with 300,000 inhabitants under a "fylkes commissioner" (District Commissioner) and a "Directorate of Internal Affairs", whose functions were outlined: "The Fylkes Commissioner is the highest authority and is responsible only to the Prime Minister, not to dem individual Ministry in Norway The first and Most important in this restless region of Europe the Maintaining peace and order - the is the Basis for the entire development The Slavic mentality it's like this: She has respect from power and at the same time values justice and good treatment. And not the other way around! Power must therefore above all be handled, even at the expense of the people if necessary Justice."

This project now played a central role for the Norwegian Nazi politicians; the idea of a Norwegian came up Mandate area and Fylkes commissioner like the directly to the imperial plans of 1941. Just as Hitler had his Reich Commissar in Norway, Quisling would have his Fylkes Commissar in Baranovici! On this basis, Norway would have a kind of equality be a partner of Germany with its own mandated territory and as such cannot be left in a protectorate status .

These late illusions of the Norwegian fascists quickly evaporated, partly because of the behavior of the German authorities, but mostly because of the military catastrophes of the next few months. The promised tour of the Project Baranovici never took place. A last Attempt, in the District Grodno one other mandate area to receive,

"Austrveg" made in June 1944, immediately before the start of the Red Army's Belorussian operation, which liberated both Baranovici and Grodno within weeks.

If at all Norwegian Skilled workers (Handyman) and mechanical Facilities for the "Eastern deployment" came therefore doubtful. According to Støren's announcement, the first agreed machine deliveries were due the Eastern Ministry in mid-December 1943 "Ready to ship." The Eastern Ministry said at the beginning of November that they were "already on the way." „It should still be in this year of the Norwegians one small City from Log houses for the peat institute, peat power plant etc. (in Lithuania - DE) will be built." In any case, Gauleiter Koch was "disappointed" by the Norwegians' inaction and was still outraged that that Disturb him at the time after his Visit in Rovno so arrogant thanked have, "as if a Sovereign dem others Sovereign write." ⁹⁴

Apparently There were multiple reasons for the Norwegian fiasco "Eastern operation". The Terboven's clear dislike for the Norwegian plans stirred secure ultimately from his general ideas about German eastward expansion, which - as in the "General Plan East" - no protectorates others, including allies or "Germanic" states or similar territorial concessions. In this particular case, Quisling's concept had to be submitted to the Reich Commissioner on suspicion and encounter rejection; controlled quisling but on the way the Eastward expansion very much directly his goal the Norway's "national rebirth" by significantly increasing the reputation of the Nasjonal Samling in Norway as Hitler was also there east as ally and wanted to offer an independent partner. Therefore, Terboven narrowed the government's foreign policy anyway could act independently, systematically limited the scope for maneuver.

Furthermore, the disunity and hesitation of the German authorities, who wanted to seek help but did not want to make real concessions, paralyzed the Norwegian initiative. It also appears that the vast majority of Norwegian entrepreneurs hesitated lastly, yourself to participate in the exploitation of the occupied Soviet territories, and in any case did not want to be drawn into this adventure by the Quisling government.

France

Research has so far taken no notice of the efforts in France and Belgium to found Eastern companies and similar organizations to exploit the East. After certainly inflated Evaluation of the economic staff East, "as part of the not insignificant activity of the commercial economy of these countries in the East ... a number of agricultural processing and processing operations are also sold to Belgian and French companies Fiduciary management companies hand over 95 However such activity only began in 1942/43, and the planned establishments of Eastern companies remained stuck in statu nascendi or in even less developed preliminary stages.

Since the spring of 1942, there was a growing interest on both sides involved French economic potential the exploitation of the occupied eastern territories

94 BAK, R 6/465, AT RMtbo/BfS ex. Discuss at RKU on October 29, 1943, November 8, 1943.

95 The German Economic policy ..., S. 142.

to use. The German side primarily tried to acquire French rolling mills and power plant equipment and complete petroleum refineries in the Ukraine and the Caucasus. The French side was increasingly accommodating here, but continued to tension Interests.

at the beginning of March 1942 was at a visit to the Vichy Ministers for Industrial production, Lehideux, agreed in Berlin, a French refinery, "one of the largest and most modern refineries in Europe", "against the exceptional assurance of participation "in the operation in Russia", as Lehideux had demanded, be transferred to southern Ukraine (Cherzon).⁹⁶

The German embassy in Vichy signaled further "French readiness and practical options... to Participation in economic Structure of the Eastern Territories".⁹⁷ The Eastern Ministry and the four-year planning authority had now agreed that, without revealing the German initiative, broad French business circles should be won over to „itself through posting of managers, engineers and foremen as well as by the Taking and delivering factory equipment to participate in the economic reconstruction of the occupied territories of the Soviet Union." Large French land and mine owners voluntarily formed a community of interests, initially of a purely private nature, under the leadership of Nikolaus Freiherr von Fermor, and liquidated more than a billion French francs. Initially, the interest of this working group was only related to the sugar beet industry, but further proposals about mining, petroleum and textile industries were promised to the embassy."⁹⁸

⁹⁹ several times in connection with the previous fall and winter a future "Eastern operation", but not France as a "non-Germanic" Country. As Rosenberg's last word, the Foreign Office noted that "in well-founded individual cases, nothing stands in the way of the use of French companies":⁰⁰

It took almost a year before Rosenberg had the opportunity to get Hitler's consent to an actual deployment the French industry" ¹⁰⁰ in the to catch up east. This enabled "France's participation in the reconstruction of the in the East on a broad basis" ² The episode may initially have remained that in February 1943 Karl Rasche, board member and "foreign minister" the Dresdner Bank, invited Rosenberg's special representative Malletke to give him his and his industrial Friends interest on a "possibly. new French companies to be established society". Malletke noted that the people of Dresden Bank wool apparently "with the bank de Paris et of Pays basic (she!) one study society

96 BAP, FS, film 3716, Record AA, March 6, 1942.

97 Ibid, Record AA (Wiehl) ex. Discuss with envoys Rudolf Rahn, April 23, 1942.

98 Ibid, Record AA (Walter f. Wiehl), April 27, 1942.

99 BAK, R 6/34a, BI. 51, Record Werner Koeppen (SA staff; more personal Speaker Rosenbergs) ex. "Evening table" b. Hitler, October 17, 1941.

100 BAP, FS, film 3716, Record AA (Walter f. Wiehl), April 30, 1942 (Addendum).

101 BAK, R 6/465, BI. 118, AT Rosenberg "Report at the Leader", March 20, 1943.

102 Ibid, BI. 115, report RMfBO/BfS, November 10, 1943.

company with a capital of about 5 mill. frs. which should have the task of preparing for the Eastern mission." He made it clear to Rasche that the Rosenberg Ministry was responsible and would examine the project if necessary. "In itself, such a foundation seemed valuable, as there would then be a uniform negotiating partner in France. Is unsympathetic included the Involvement of Bank capital. Dr. Rasche expressed then that from the French side first-class names of the company also in public would be called." ¹⁰³ In March 1943, lively negotiations and preparatory work began among the Eastern Ministry, the military commander and the Laval government. Laval declared that "he wanted a contribution from French industry on behalf of the state, that he intended to set up a society for this purpose and that this contribution would be considered a contribution to the fight against the Look at Bolshevism please." ¹⁰⁴ **With** Minister of Industry Bichelonne (Lehideux's successor) and Minister of Finance Pierre Cathala was responsible for sending an official French business delegation to Ukraine (Delegation économique française en Ukraine).

"The first trip of the French economic delegation led by President Villemer to the Reich Commissariat in Ukraine took place from June 26th. until July 2, 1943. The practical outcome of this trip was a series of proposals for industrial relocation voluntary private sector Basis and possible uses handed over to the French by French construction companies. In order to define the individual operational objects in more detail, a second trip was led by the French economic delegation from Mr. Tarot to Ukraine in the period from August 17th to 24th, 1943 undertaken. On the basis of this second trip, the French business delegation received options for the following business objects in Ukraine: takeover of a hotel, takeover of a paint factory, takeover of a laundry, takeover of the Shidni-Bazar stamping factory, takeover of a pesticide factory, all located in Kiev." ¹⁰⁵

At the beginning of August 1943, those involved negotiated the establishment of the French Eastern Company that Laval had spoken of. It should take the form of a Société Anonyme, equipped with state funding and state guarantees. ¹⁰⁶ Apparently there is no more information about the foundation itself came, probably also under that Impression of the beginning of major offensive operations by the Red Army in Ukraine.

In the fall and winter, all plans fell through, partly because of German maneuvers against those announced by the French "Options" on Soviet factories and hotels (in Kiev and Zaporoz'e), on the other hand and finally as a result of German withdrawal from eastern Ukraine.

By mid-September, Bichelonne had already turned against the worsening conditions, the in the protocols the second Delegation trip from the August held wor-

103 BAK, R 6/408, Bl. 76, AN RMfBO/BfS, February 10, 1943. Together with Rasche, Malletke's interlocutors were Hugo Stinnes and the "Chairman of the Board of Henkel-Persil", Dr. Richter.

104 How Note 101.

105 As note 102 (Bl. 115 f.). After the first trip, the French options focused mainly on a machine factory in Kiev, extends to two technical workshops in Zaporoz'e and two hotels in Kiev (ibid., delegation to MBH/MV boss, August 3, 1943).

106 Ibid, AT MBH, August 4, 1943.

the goods. Firstly, she wanted to German side (Eastern Ministry and **RKU**) the French only trust agreements “on an uncertain basis”. of the originally envisaged “contracts of a certain and fairly long duration”; secondly, the largest part of the after the Machinery, equipment and equipment brought to Ukraine materials are bought from French companies and thus become German property; Finally, the French services should not be compensated by transferring profits, but rather by salaries dependent on sales become. Bichelonne stated clearly to understand that it requirement for the “Branch French industrialist of Ukraine”, “They provide the broadest guarantees regarding the duration of their use, the ownership of the material and their profits.”¹⁰⁷

The German Page understanding very good, that herewith the crucial Ask after the “Fundamentals for (the) French economic engagement” was provided.¹⁰⁸ At the beginning of October, the Eastern Ministry and the military commander negotiated again about how “the French operation could be placed on a new basis.” However, Ukraine was now largely lost - at the November 6th liberated the Red Army Kiev -, “The French operation had to be postponed until further notice because all the objects were in areas that had been evacuated by the German troops became.”¹⁰⁹

In December 1943 all negotiations were postponed. Nonetheless The Eastern Ministry maintained its intention to offer the French government objects in Lithuania as a replacement.

Belgium

The first efforts for the “Eastern operation” in Belgium also date back to 1942. From the outset, they came from political and business circles that belonged to or were close to the fascist movements in Belgium. Against At the end of the year a “Belgian-European syndicate for agricultural and industrial settlement” was founded, “about the possibilities to study and collect material in the East. no Possibly was this Organization identical to the “Red Earth Society”, from the im The Falkenhausen trial was in question and “which had the purpose of exploiting the Russian territories” (exploiter).¹¹⁰

At the beginning of May 1943, after negotiations with representatives of the Eastern Ministry, the military commander reacted. He welcomed the proposed “immediate deployment in the East on a voluntary basis” as “a **means** of politically easing the internal situation in Belgium” and still directed in In the same month, an “Eastern department” with the head of the Military administration a, that it as considered his task, on which Work towards the establishment of a Belgian Eastern company. A Belgian commission was to be sent to travel to the East.¹¹²

107 Ibid, BI. 98 f., Bichelonne at Elmer Michel (MBH/MV boss), September 13, 1943.

108 Ibid, BI. 73, AT RMtO/BfS, September 13, 1943.

109 How Note 102 (BI. 116).

110 The German Economic policy ..., S. 142, Note d. Ed.

111 BAK, Alles. Proc. 4 (Falkenhausen trial), No. 1 ac, hearing Eggert shipowner, December 13, 1946.

112 BAK, R 6/468, AT MBH/WiAbt., May 8, 1943.

First apparently happened few. First in the September 1943 drove a certain van Roey went to Lithuania through the Eastern Department and held discussions about the use of Belgian craftsmen.¹¹³ It was in December Draft statutes for an Eastern society. As leading in the preparatory work Establishing the society became someone specific Called Mathieu Gilot, "Scientist and industrialists"; a number of entrepreneurs and other interested parties with more or less strong ties to fascist organizations were also involved.¹¹⁴

In the Eastern Department, however, the recommendation was made that "the establishment of the Eastern Society should be refrained from at the moment should be, since the entire public opinion of the country an eastward movement to time is completely opposed." Then the began Organization (Societe de l'Est - Oostmaatschappij; Societe sans but lucratif) their work under the label "society in the process of being founded", "without, however, appearing in public on a larger scale".¹¹⁵ Gilot took over its management. It was financed "until further notice the crew costs at the Mil. Bef. in Belgium and Northern France".¹¹⁶ About the status of the matter End of April 1944 reported that Eastern Department of the military commander:

"In order to give the Belgian eastern mission internal unity and a uniform image to the outside world give, is the Production of uniforms has been arranged, and it Badges are being prepared to be worn on the sleeve. ... A number of particularly suitable small and medium-sized entrepreneurs have been identified, some of which offer promising model assignments can be expected in the east (Lithuania). The first assignment (construction company Boi from Bruges) is on March 23rd. d. J. has been sent to Kauen and has been working there for about three weeks with a incident command. He will shortly with about 40 - 50 Belgian workers and craftsmen work in Lithuania. Further assignments will follow in the next few weeks (construction companies, sawmills, individual craftsmen, technicians, etc.)."

The Eastern company had "after considerable Initial difficulties were uniformly good Relationship" to the three greater fascist Groups in Belgium (Devlag, VNV, Rex movement), despite their fierce struggle for leadership in the organization.

The Belgian general secretaries as heads of the country's collaboration administration were not prepared to finance the company. General Secretary De Winter (Agriculture Department) even declared himself against any Belgian "activity in the East".

Much more than "some small missions from Belgians entrepreneurs"¹¹⁷ brought the society in did not materialize in the following months. As on the 17th September 1944 the Military Commander's Office was dissolved, found hers Activity comes to a silent and silent end. The main opponents of the occupiers at the "Eastern operation" were therefore collaboration governments, Entrepreneur and Business people, fascist parties and movements.

113 Ibid, report d. conductor of East ref. ex. d. Trip (September 26th - October 2nd, 1943).

114 Ibid., AN Ostref., February 4, 1944. In addition to van Roey, the source mentions Troosters, owner of an intermediary firm, and Petit (both Rex movement), Schoorens (VNV), employee at the Ministry of Agriculture, Boi (Devlag), building contractor from Bruges, de Pauw and Servais.

115 Ibid, East ref. at RMfbO/BfS, February 4, 1944.

116 Ibid, BI. 114 f., "First report of Eastern Department", April 26, 1944.

117 Ibid, memo East ref., July 24, 1944.

It is important to observe that especially the entrepreneurs, as long as they are not members or sympathizers of the were fascist groups and parties, were conspicuously reserved, with the exception of the Danish (as far as France is concerned, the sources are not yet sufficient for an exact assessment). The majority of "serious" entrepreneurs in In the Netherlands, Norway and Belgium, especially big business, preferred to leave the adventurous business in the East to the local fascists. There was undoubtedly commercial caution and fear of compromise in one's own country and in relation to the exile, but also mistrust of the Germans and, to a not small extent, political ones wisdom and a real assessment the course of the war that they facilitated the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition and the USA's entry into the war.

c) The German interest at the foreign "Eastern operation"

The policy of the German side on the foreign issue "Eastern operation" has not yet been examined in a coherent manner. According to sources, various levels of management and departments were involved in formulating and implementing this policy. The investigation would have to focus primarily on Hitler himself, on Himmler and the relevant SS departments, on the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, on the Foreign Office German business circles and organizations and those involved Reich Commissioners and military commanders. Interests and positions of the German authorities and organizations were quite different and could also differ within the same department. As mentioned, the circumstances of the time, especially the war situation, had a great influence.

The earliest Time, at dem itself Hitler above one participation another Countries at the The "reorganization" of the occupied and yet to be conquered Soviet territories took place in the fall of 1941. Back then, after graduation the heavy fighting Smolensk, Hitler developed quite detailed ideas for a future "all-German and European economic order" taking advantage of Northern and Western European "racial" and economic forces - Ideas that would keep him busy for a few more months: "We are not allowed to leave Europe for any more Germanic people America let go. The Norwegians, Swedes, Danes, Dutch have to we all in the usher in eastern territories; these will be limbs of Reichs. We stand in front of the big future task, planned racial policy to drive What the Plannedness

As far as the economy is concerned, we are still at the very beginning, and I imagine that it is something wonderfully beautiful to build a pan-German and European economic order... If you take together what is happening in Europe - Germany, England, Nordic countries, France, Italy - of powers to be more creative If design is slumbering, one must say to oneself: what are the American possibilities?" ¹¹⁸

118 Picker, Henry, Hitler's table conversations in the Führer's headquarters 1941-1942. Edited by Percy Ernst Schramm and others, Stuttgart 1965 (2nd edition), p. 143 ff., entry by. September 8-10, 1941. The entire table conversation including those mentioned Quotes is at home - probably faulty - one month earlier (8.-11. 8.1941) dated (Adolf Hitler, Monologues in the Führer headquarters 1941-1944 .

The records Heinrich home. Ed. v. Werner Jochmann, Munich (Hyne) 1980, S. 54 ff.).

At the 11. September laid he such Thoughts for the first time before a representative the apostrophized one countries, namely before the newly appointed Danish Ambassador Otto Mohr, who presented him with his credentials in the "Wolfsschanze". His "thoughts about (the) European metropolitan area, its development and the associated European cooperation, especially in East", made the decision back then Danish government and Danish business circles made a "deep impression".¹¹⁹

„I have myself in thought of these days," said A few weeks later he continued his thread of thought, "whether one should not ask the economic leaders of Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and Finland should gather together to to give them an idea of the new economic opportunities? Most business leaders have no idea what the economic cycle looks like to us. But these are the people who have a positive are interested in seeing something happen for their countries. You do it clear to them: The surplus of the Population can be accommodated and the Homeland is supplied with everything it needs, then I don't think it's out of the question, that they fly with Flags pass over to us. The first step will be similar to what happened with the Customs Union at the time."¹²⁰

On October 17th he spoke, "through the (travel) report by Dr. Todt stimulated", again by the "opening up of the Russian expanse" (including Ukraine, Crimea and the Caucasus!) through "German" streets, cities and farms: "In 10 years there are 4, in 20 years at least 10 Millions of Germans settle. Not only will you out of the empire, but mainly come from America, but also from Scandinavia, Holland and Flanders. The rest of Europe could also take part in this development of the Russian expanse."¹²¹

Denmark joined the Anti-Comintern Pact on November 25th. Out of this occasion Two days later, Hitler received the Danish Foreign Minister Scavenius and gave him a rather confused and vague lecture about the Abandonment of the "European bloc" at the Opening up the East "for Europe". We must "pursue a common economic policy and work together on economic development Europe's approach."¹²²

On December 14, 1941, Hitler, obviously disillusioned by the military events on the Eastern Front, instructed Rosenberg during a lengthy conversation that "he did not consider it expedient to force other peoples to cooperate (in the East). - EN) to request that you have a legal claim for later could see. He does this on a case-by-case basis in individual negotiations."¹²³

After that, the "Leader" hardly spent any more time on fundamental issues or practical problems of the "Eastern operation" expressed, although Rosenberg and Himmler often reported to him about it. Judging by his reaction to such reports, he later, in Difference to his euphoric, on the post war period related Omissions

119 BAP, Foreign affairs Government office, No. 61120, BI. 104, Telegr. Renthe-Fink at AA, October 27, 1941; printed in: Bilag til Beretning til Folketinget ..., Vol. XIII/1-6, p. 1141, Doc. 594.

120 Hitler, monologues, S. 79 f., October 13, 1941.

121 BAK, R 6/34a, BI. 51, record. Werner Koeppen above "Dinner Table" at Hitler, October 17, 1941. Identical in meaning with the notes from Heim (Hitler, Monologues, p. 90 f., October 17, 1941).

122 AdaP, D, Vol. XIII. 1, Doc. 510, S. 705f.; s. a. Hillgruber, statesmen, S. 655; p. 658.

123 IMG, Vol. 27, Nuremberg 1948, p. 270, Doc. PS-1517, Rosenberg's "Note above "Conversation with the Führer on December 14, 1941".

from the autumn of 1941, the “Eastern operation” was pragmatically intended to relieve the burden on the German military and occupying forces in the East, albeit on a rather modest scale.¹²⁴

As an expert in the East Settlement and for the “Germanization of East” he looked at Himmler. However, it is not clear whether he fully followed the basic line of Himmler and those SS offices that were active in the context of the “consolidation of the German people” and were responsible for the “General Plan for the East.” Himmler not only couldn’t imagine it other states or members of the “Germanic Empire” would get large, contiguous settlement areas (“provinces”)¹²⁵, but in the sense of the “General Plan East” it was about “German settlement” out of. It has quite the appearance as floated him as of course before, also the to this one Purpose out of everyone others

“Germanic” To “Germanize” settlers to be brought together from different countries. Hitler vacillated between future utopias of a rather vague type of “European” cooperation East and petty concerns about the practical application of his ideas, Himmler’s line of smuggling all available German, “ethnic German” and “Germanic” forces into the “Eastern area” as Germans or those to be Germanized was already clearer.

In the Foreign Office and the Reich Ministry In 1942 they spoke for the occupied eastern territories anyway from “from the Leader approved guidelines” for the participation another Countries

“on the economic development of the eastern regions.”¹²⁶ Whether such guidelines explicitly existed or whether Hitler’s statements from the fall of 1941 could be viewed as This is not yet known.

The Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories soon saw the “Eastern deployment” from the occupied countries as its own mission. The “tendency” of the ministry was initially to “The foreign countries should be taken into account when individual proposals come from there would be made, the “fitted well into the framework of our development plans”.¹²⁷ Over the course of Conflicts with dem Foreign Office Responsibility and competencies, particularly with regard to Denmark¹²⁸, the Eastern Ministry moved in the course of 1942 took over all negotiating powers and took control of the organization of the “Eastern operation” with a special “representative for Special questions” (Walter Malletke) together. Since spring 1942 got busy Malletke “with the Ask, in the individual occupied territories such as Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Croatia etc. some form of organization create, which guarantees the ability to work”.¹²⁹

124 Rosenberg “about a conversation with the guide” at the May 8, 1942 (see Note 27). See also Rosenbergs Speech at Hitler at the 16/17th 1943 about “the large-scale Work peat extraction and peat research ... and the participation of the Dutch, Danes and Swedes, which could potentially reach enormous proportions since Germany controls 60 percent of the peat reserves.” (BAP, Case XI, No. 363, BI. 96, PS 039, AN Rosenberg “about meeting in the Fuhrer headquarters on 16/17/1943”).

125 Please refer Himmler at Heydrich and Rediess, February 16, 1942; quote at De Jong, Vol. 6/1, S. 453.

126 BAP, FS, Movie 3716, recording AA above opinion d. RMfbO (Malletke), April 30, 1942.

127 Ibid.

128 See Bilag til Beretning til Folketinget ..., Vol. XIII/1-6, Copenhagen 1954, p. 1143 ff., various documents .

129 BAK, R 6/440, BI. 92, Malletke at Commissioner General Fritz Schmidt (Reich Commissariat Never derlande), April 4, 1942. - discussion the Jurisdictional issues also at Rolf Dieter Müller (The

At the beginning of August 1942 informed Gustav Schlotterer¹³⁰ the representatives of the supreme Reich authorities, the occupation administrations from all over occupied Europe and the German eastern companies in brief about the foreign "operation in the East". He limited its importance to the relief of German economic power and its "bottlenecks" one, so represented the most widespread pure utility point of view, and at the same time emphasized the sole responsibility of the Eastern Ministry.¹³¹

After failure of German advance Stalingrad and to Caucasus took the activities of the Eastern Ministry still visible to; Yes, it looks like that out of, as if she approximately peaked in May/June 1943. When the defeats and retreats of the Wehrmacht in the summer and autumn thwarted the occupiers' calculations, you led them Negotiations with the Norwegian and Belgian partners as well before further, now despite all Frustration about it oracles, "that in the future Europe systematically controlled west-east migration is almost like a meaning of this murderous struggle on the Eastern Front will and must emerge."¹³²

Leading German business circles were concerned with the foreign "operation in the East" in the summer of 1942 when, especially in the form of the Nederlandse Oostcompagnie, former organizational took shape and in the euphoria of new German victories East gained wider publicity. The Reich Industry Group regularly monitored industry in its then monthly appearing organ "The Eastern economy" the Continuation the Things at the "European Community Task in the East". In March 1942, when "the pan-European interest in the reorganization of the eastern regions ... still seemed to be quite low."¹³³ Editor-in-chief Hans Thode welcomed the participation of "all European peoples" as "a desired contribution to the European New building".¹³⁴ In the June/July number the NOC and the Danish "Working Committee for Eastern and Southeastern Work" (forerunner of the Eastern Region Committee) presented. The magazine assessed the development positive, but evaluated the organizational ones found Forms still considered necessary for war "Improvisation". Not too overlook was the skepticism opposite more far-reaching imperialist Aspirations

see economic policy ..., p. 138, note 131). Malletke had been on Rosenberg's staff since April 1941 and acted as head of the economic policy cooperation department in the ministry.

130 Ministerial Director; Head of the chief group Business) of the RMfBO and the East Economic Staff; at the same time head of department in the Reich Ministry of Economics.

131 "The participation of foreign countries with people and goods in economic development in the East is desirable in order to relieve German bottlenecks. In Holland, Denmark and **Hungary**, societies are already closed as organizational forms for the using these economies. All negotiations of the (German - DE) Eastern companies with foreign countries require the prior consent of the representative for Special questions in the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, Senior Division Manager Malletke Economy in the Occupied Eastern Territories").

132 BAK, R 6/468, MBH Belgium/Northern France, Eastern Department (Krausskopf) at Malletke, October 30, 1943.

133 BAP, FS, Film 10632, "The Eastern Economy. Journal of economic issues of the East. Published on behalf of the Reichsgruppe Industrie", No. 6/7-1942 (June/July). Hereafter also the following.

134 Ibid, No. 3 - 1942 (March).

another Countries, like it in an interview with a Dutchman (retired minister F. E Posthuma) for the Agency "Europe Cable" became public. Posthuma had, by the way, just like Mussert, "the settlement the Dutchman-y_n closed rooms" in the Frame one "Generous colonization in the Eastern European territories" was declared necessary.¹³⁵ In contrast, "Die Ostwirtschaft" favored a completely different variant: "For the best possible development of the eastern areas, the 'selective' Personnel deployment (by specialists for certain economic sectors - D E.) of outstanding importance at all." Basically become the Eastern deployment "under German Primate" take place. However should it in the east no "Acquisitiveness", no "exploitation", no "poor position" of others as "annoying competitors". The conclusion was reached: "It is necessary, also in in this case European to think."

Various he also spoke and commented Advertising Council of the German economy (President: Heinrich Hunke) in his press releases the events under the permanent heading "European Economic Community": "During reconstruction and the As is well known, Germany attaches great importance to the greatest possible participation of other European countries when developing the eastern areas. The deployment of the participating countries takes place according to their needs historical Development and specialized professional experience."¹³⁶ For The Advertising Council developed a well-developed, idiosyncratic concept for an "operation controlled in this way". For a "northeast group" of countries (Netherlands; Denmark), "latvia and Estonia, later the further eastern areas Question". As "species-specific" areas of work peat extraction, fish processing, horticulture and livestock breeding were mentioned, for which machines, ships, Cattle, Seed- and planting material Etc. from the group to delivery would be. To one

The Advertising Council counted Hungary and Romania as the "southeast group", "with the areas immediately adjacent to Romania and Hungary". dealing with industrial sales and raw material extraction or with the development of the annexed territories ("Transnistria").

At the same time the general manager was traveling the Southeast European Society, August Heinrichsbauer, an experienced business journalist and lobbyist for major industry¹³⁷, the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland). The real purpose of his trip was to examine the economic interests and forces of Northern Europe, to what extent with their help the economic "Reorganization "Europe" should be advanced in southeastern Europe. He was marginally interested in the "Eastern mission", especially during his research in Denmark.¹³⁸ General What is informative is the sober conclusion he draws on the spot based on the knowledge he gained and his experiences pulled. The "Reorganization Europe" must, so wrote he in his confidential Away-

135 Quote after the Excerpts in the Information bulletin of the Press office of Advertising Council the German economy, July 27, 1942 (BAP, FS, film 10612).

136 Ibid, „The European Construction use in the East" (July 27, 1942). Hereafter also the The following.

137 Heinrichsbauer was already before 1933 one of the most important Liaisons between Ruhr industry and the NSDAP.

138 See BAP, FS, Film 10655, correspondence between Heinrichsbauer and Kurt A. Buck, Managing Director of the German Chamber of Commerce in Denmark, 1942/43.

final report, "everyone peoples Europe and others traders a Advantage offer.

... Only for the sole benefit of Germany or for the sake of an ideology (they! - EN) ... you won't lift a finger."¹³⁹

The history of the foreign "operation in the East", primarily of the Eastern companies, is just a relatively small section in the history of war, economics and occupation, but it illuminates the problem of collaboration in a unique way. The main purpose of societies is economic collaboration; However, when they were planning and preparing for their founding, they were already based on a special political concept (imperialist "Reorganization of Europe", "Fight against Bolshevism"). To the extent that they actually became active on occupied Soviet territory, they exercised not only economic, but also political and often even military functions; military not only in the construction of fortifications and roads, but also also very immediately the "Securing" occupied territory, agricultural operations and industrial facilities and especially in anti-partisan warfare.

There was another, even more important, difference between the economic collaborators who exploited the domestic economic potential and their own working population the Occupiers and their war machine exploited, and the collaborators in the Eastern societies. The Eastern companies took part - voluntarily, without coercion or external pressure - in the exploitation of a foreign population, namely the population of the occupied Soviet territories, and they themselves carried out functions of occupation rule, with economic, political and military gain for Nazi Germany .

Furthermore: The role of those recruited by the Eastern companies Workers, farmers, fishermen and craftsmen must be reassessed. With regard to any occupied country would be Although it is conceivable, it is based on the real circumstances and in the sense of a corresponding analysis of the concept of collaboration It is completely absurd to describe the population working there as collaborators. During the "Eastern operation" the same workers, farmers, etc. were henchmen and enforcers of the German occupation rule. How Dutch "LA leaders" often beat Soviet farmers or denounced them to the Germans, just as Dutch craftsmen often did their Ukrainian unskilled workers? They took on a mission in the East the German occupiers directly relieving way at the Realization of economic exploitation, in the political oppression of the population and also in the military security of the German occupation rule, an active and undoubtedly conscious part. This was made clear to them at the latest when the partisans came or the Red Army troops liberated the country.

139 Ibid, film 10631, A. Heinrichsbauer: "Northern Europe - Southeastern Europe. Impressions from a trip to Scandinavia at the end of July - beginning of August 1942" (confidential).

2. The End the Raw material deliveries out of the occupied Balkan countries (summer/autumn 1944)

The military and political events of Late summer 1944 initiated the collapse of the German economy's supply of raw materials. That Sweden restricted and ultimately broke off trade relations with the Reich and that Finland from the The "brotherhood in arms" parted had been predictable. But the worst blow came to the Germans in southeastern Europe with the Soviet offensive, which began on August 20th. In a few weeks, the Red Army drove them out Germans Romania and Bulgaria, transformed both countries from German into allies in their own right, forced the evacuation of Greece from German troops and were soon fighting on Yugoslav and Hungarian soil.

a) The "Minimal economic area" without "Southeast Region"

Just before the Offensive, from August 18th to 20th, was Minister of Armaments Speer with Hitler at the Führer headquarters in East Prussia. In the minutes of this "leader meeting" find it itself a remarkable note, the of the research so far has hardly been taken into account:

"4. The guide defines a 'minimal economic area', for which it is to be determined in detail how long with the existing supplies and the existing productions therein increased armor carried out can be." ¹⁴⁰ So Hitler left assumed that the Wehrmacht would be able to hold a certain area and demanded information about whether and for how long Germany would be able to hold out in the war with the raw materials in this area.

After Speer's memorandum "Metals" dated 5. September 1944 ¹⁴¹ Hitler's ideas of such a space can be reconstructed, which he maintained and dominated for a long time to be able to "Leader" apparently convinced. He was counting on it the possible loss of the Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish raw material deliveries, designated but exactly only the borders to be maintained in the south and southeast: "... for Italy - Southern area of the Alps, possession of the area east of Trieste; in Croatia - the Save line; in Hungary - the Tisza line."

Not long ago, both Hitler and Jodl, chief of the Wehrmacht command staff, had "dominated the Balkans as part of Fortress Europe from an operational, military-political perspective and economic Reasons (as) decisive for the war" ¹⁴² viewed. Hitler had only three weeks earlier, on July 31, 1944, the importance of the Balkans and the specific role of Bulgarian allies highlighted. ¹⁴³ Now, apparently under dem

140 FB, August 18-20, 1944, Point 4; Timeline, August 20, 1944. Please refer also Chapter I, Section 5 in the prev. Vol.

141 BAK, R 3/1525. Hereafter also the The following. Please refer also sour, September 5, 1944.

142 IMG, Vol. 37, S. 652, Doc. L-172, speech Jodls before the imperial and Gauleiters, November 7, 1943.

143 Hitler's briefings, P. 589 f., July 31, 1944: "Because without Bulgaria it is practically impossible for us to secure the Balkan area in such a way that we can get out of Greece etc. ore receive. We Bulgaria needs this under all circumstances. Also for the We need security against gangs etc. in Bulgaria."

fresh impression of the Soviet offensive that had been breaking out from the Ia i - Kisinev area since the morning of August 20th, both of them considered evacuation or forced withdrawal from the Balkan Peninsula.

Barely a year earlier, in November 1943, the Minister of Armaments had written three memoranda for Hitler on the raw material situation in the iron and steel sector, which had an impact on supplies the occupied territories Sweden and the Türkiye related.¹⁴⁴ The requirements of back then were what the holding of Krivoj Rog and Nikopol had long been obsolete. German rule over the Franco-Luxembourg Minette district, a top supplier of iron ore since 1941¹⁴⁵, was lost in August 1944. Swedish iron ore deliveries shrank to 40 to 50 percent since mid-August due to the failure of Swedish shipping and to a minimum after Swedish territorial waters were closed at the end of September 1944.¹⁴⁶ The nickel mines of Petsamo, the German troops regardless of the Finnish-Soviet negotiations from August/September (ceasefire on September 19th) were evacuated on October 14th before the onset of the Red Army.

How Speer's calculations now looked like where he the possible ones Loss of the Balkans, half of Hungary and Italy had to be added? His - apparently researched in a hurry - according to numbers it was at some raw materials already in run of year 1945 with a total loss for armaments can be expected (sulphur, low-phosphorus iron ores). The general collapse of war production was to be expected at the end of 1945 or the beginning of 1946 (loss of aluminum, chromium, antimony, ferrosilicon, molybdenum and tungsten). For mineral oil - the most critical point - Such information was missing from the memorandum at all.¹⁴⁷

Table 106

Expiry dates for the production in the "Minimal economic area"

	Raw product	armor	Remarks
aluminum	June 1, 1945	January 1, 1946	75 % Residual production
-Failure Hungary	March 1, 1945	January 1, 1946	25 % remaining production
chrome - Total failure Balkans	July 1, 1945	January 1, 1946	
antimony	August 1, 1947	February 1, 1948	
- failure the Slovakia u. Hungary	July 1, 1945	February 1, 1946	

144 "The Meaning from Nikopol and Krivoy Rog for the German iron production", November 11, 1943;

"The importance of the supply of Swedish and Norwegian iron ores for German iron production", November 11, 1943; "The alloy metals in armaments and the importance of chromium supplies from the Balkans and Turkey", November 12, 1943; all in BAP, FS, Film 1732. See also II, p. 370 f.; p. 476 f.

145 Hunter, S. 180; S. 183 ff.

146 Ibid, S. 191 f.

147 But see 3rd hydrogenation memorial Speer for Hitler, August 30, 1944, in Birkenfeld, fuel, p. 250 ff. Jäger (p. 306 ff. and passim). the only one who the memorandum "Metals" has evaluated in this regard.

Table 106 (Continuation)

	Raw product	armor	Remarks
molybdenum - failure Balkans u. Norway (incl. tungsten insert)	October 1, 1945	April 1, 1946	
tungsten	October 1, 1945	April 1, 1946	
nickel - failure Southern Norway	1. 1.1946	July 1, 1946	50 % Residual production
zinc - failure Balkans u. Norway		August 1, 1948	
copper	December 1, 1946	June 1, 1947	
Lead - failure Balkans	1. 1.1948		
Ferrosilicon - failure Italy, Norway, Sweden	1. 1.1945	July 1, 1945	
- with Mission from Carbide furnaces	1. 5.1945	February 1, 1946	
manganese ore	1. 1.1947		
- failure the Slovakia u. Hungary	December 1, 1945	June 1, 1946	
sulfur - with Norwegian production, without German production increase	1. 6.1945	June 1, 1945	30-50 % remaining pro production rayon cuts by 50% by the end of 1945; then again full cover
- failure Norway, with 8th 000 t German Monthly production remainder 1944; 1945 rising on 16 000 t (away 1.2.1945)			
Iron ores			
- rich in phosphorus for Thomas steel	1. 4.1946	May 1, 1946	30 % Residual production
- phosphorarrn for SM u. Electrical steel	1. 6.1945	September 1, 1945	60-65 % Residual production

Source: How Note 141 (Memorandum "Metals").

With these numbers, Speer made it clear to the "Führer" that in the "minimal economic area" there was no longer any chance of waging a long war; that rather, already in the course of 1945 German war economy - even with "normal" processes; ie in the absence of disruptions and catastrophes (air war!) - go into a rapid decline and soon will have reached zero point. In the text the memorandum came this even clearer than in expressed in the numbers, on clearest in the section above the Chromium supply.

The 100% German import dependency on chrome, the most important steel alloy metal, was already mentioned in the metals memorandum from last year the need the Ore supplies out of the occupied Balkan states pointed out been.¹⁴⁸

„Chrome is absolutely necessary for the Manufacturing from 90 percent of all alloys steels."

148 How Note 144 (Memorandum v. November 12, 1943). Hereafter also the The following.

Even then, German stocks of ferroalloy metals were lowest for chromium (5.6 months).

If you count all stocks of chrome and chrome ore in Italy, the Balkans and in the Turkish ports ¹⁴⁹ together, like that let this number be 8.4 increase months. "In gang-occupied areas There are another 9 camps in Albania 000 tons of ore, equal to **1,400** tons of pure chromium". That means an increase to 8.8 months.

"With one monthly Financial support from Chrome ore can expected become

in Greece	3 100 metric tons	=	630 metric tons Chrome,
in Bulgaria' ⁵⁰	7 600 tons	=	1 620 metric tons
chrome, in Serbia	100 metric tons	=	20 metric tons
Chrome, in Albania	600 metric tons	=	130 metric tons Chrome,
in Turkey	2 000 metric tons	=	500 metric tons Chrome,
[together]			2 900 metric tons Chrome.

... prerequisite for covering chrome requirements and thus [for] the production of all alloy steels is the preservation of the Balkans and the securing of ore transport. If the Balkans and with it the Türkiye fails, the coverage of chrome requirements is currently only 5.6 months... ensured. After the raw block stocks have been depleted, this means that the various most important branches of armament (all aircraft, tanks, motor vehicles, tank shells, submarines, almost all ordnance production) will be phased out one to three months after this date, since by then the "The reserves in the supply chain have been used up."

This forecast was simply continued in September 1944 in the memorandum "Metalle". However, it now had a much more current and bitter meaning for those involved. That is were the Metal stocks by 1. August 1944 higher as 1943 (33 000 t against over 21,000), but also the monthly consumption had increased from 3,750 to 3,900 t. If the alloy changes succeed, Speer wrote, this number could rise to 3,200 to 3,500 be pressed. "This means that the existing quantities will be sufficient for ten months after deliveries from the Balkans stop. Taking into account the storage and Lead time the processing factories would those of it dependent Production, i.e. the entire arms production, at the 1. January 1946 leak."

at can assume that Hitler was impressed by Speer's calculations and warnings. However, from the outset he does not seem to have associated the idea of a "minimal economic area" with any generous defense strategy idea. On August 22/23, 1944, Hitler's well-known exchange with the Commander-in-Chief took place Southeast, Field Marshal Maximilian v. Weichs, instead, the results of which were the "Führer's order" to Weichs from 26. August to watch is. The Basic concerns of command duration expressly in this, "Even if the situation changes," that is, if the Red Army advances further or if an Allied landing occurs from the Aegean or Adriatic, "to keep the central Balkans, which is important for military purposes, firmly in our hands and the most important transport connections in the Southeast room to keep it open". Around the Forces therefor to focus, rank Hitler itself

149 With the Türkiye duration 1943/44 a two year old Delivery contract on Chrome ore (Hunter, p. 258 ff.; see chap. V d. preliminary vol.).

150 Refers to v. a. on the Bulgarian occupied Macedonia.

through to this, the relocation of troops Southern and central Greece the Central Balkans and the "withdrawal of all troops and installations south of the Corfu-Corfu line." Ioannina - Kalabaka - Olympus" to be prepared.¹⁵¹

b) The Chromium ore shipments from the Balkans and her End

Jäger has already 1969 pointed out that the crucial role of Raw materials from the occupied areas of southeastern Europe for the German war economy have not been sufficiently recognized and taken into account in economic history works.¹⁵² It was there Even before the war, it was clear to the leading circles in Germany, especially at the time to the industrial representatives in the Reich Office for Economic Development, that in the "Mob case" the German "large-scale military economy" without the obvious inclusion of the Balkans is unthinkable, especially the chrome problem without recourse to Yugoslavia or Macedonia could not be solved.¹⁵³

Chromium was irreplaceable as the most important steel alloy metal, and warring Germany was since 1939 or since 1941 completely on the Deliveries out the occupied Balkan countries. In the pre-war years, Turkey and the South African Union were the main sources of supply. Greece was in third place.

Table 107

German chrome ore import, 1936-1939 (in 1000 t)

		of that (in Percent)		
		Turkey	South Africa	Greece
1936	123.4	53	30	7
1937	132.2	49	35	9
1938	176.4	30	32	8th
1939 (Jan. -Aug.)	157.2	61	21	12.5

Source: Hunter, S. 151, Tab. 18.

South Africa fell with Start of war as Country of reference out of. The Türkiye extended the until for the

31. August 1939 current trade contract with Germany no longer and delivered until **Years** are only 18 400 t ore; She did not start making deliveries again until March 1943. The USSR committed itself to the German-Soviet trade agreement of February 11, 1940, within one Year 100 000 t to delivery, exported but until for the 22. June 1941 actually only

151 Europe underm Nazi swastika, Vol. 6, S. 355, Doc. 307, command Hitler's at GFM Maximilian v. Weichs, August 26, 1944.

152 Hunter, S. 257 u. passim.

153 Eichholtz, The "Greater defense economy" for the huge War, S. 89 ff.; S. 118 f.

26 300 t. Anyway made her Deliveries 1m Years 1940 71 percent the extremely reduced German imports. ¹⁵⁴

Table 108

German chrome ore import, 1939-1941 (in 1000 t)

		of that (in Percent)	
1939 (Sept. - Dec.)	36.3	Türkiye	51
		Greece	17
1940	37.0	USSR	71
		Yugoslavia	12
		Greece	4
1941 (Jan. - April)	3.4	Yugoslavia	65
		Bulgaria	29

Source: Hunter, S. 247, Tab. 36.

Accordingly, sank imports rose to six percent of the total by April 1941 peacetime importation. The political and military conditions - especially those British Naval blockade and the fact that the large Yugoslav (Macedonian) chrome mines were dominated by British capital - made it impossible for the Germans to obtain more than minimal quantities of ore from the Balkans. The consequence of the shortage was that German chrome reserves in one and a half years on the half sank. The rest (in the April 1941 fewer as 29 000 t Cr) covered at that time Consumption still meets requirements of ten months. ¹⁵⁵

The German occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece fundamentally changed the situation. After the loot had been divided, all important chrome ore deposits were in Bulgarian (Macedonia) or Italian (Greece; Albania) hands. The Germans Authorities and arms companies ensured that the mines were operated by the German occupying power "for the duration of the war" and their promotion of the German War economy was available. ¹⁵⁶

The administration of all mines rested with the "General Representative for Metal Ore Mining Southeast", Franz Neuhausen (also "General Representative for the economy in Serbia"), a shop steward Hermann Göring. The Individual plants were partly run by Wehrmacht officers or units (Wehrmacht Mining Battalion Southeast; Technical Battalion 26 Motorized (Mining)), partly by the Todt Organization and by representatives of German corporations (mostly in the uniform of special leaders). "supervised" and managed.

Significant investments were made, particularly to modernize surface operations, the loading and Transport systems and -stretch; they delivered itself alone in Albania

¹⁵⁴ Hunter, S. 245.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, S. 248.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, S. 249 ff. Hereafter that too The following.

while of one year under German occupation (September 1943 - September 1944) to seven million RM. The largest ore processing plant in Southeast Europe at the time was built in Skopje (Macedonia) and went into operation in the spring of 1944.

Table 109

Chromium consumption and -import Germany 1938, 1940-1944 (in 1000 t Cr)*

Year	Consumption	Total imports	including Yugoslavia	from Greece	Bulg.	Alban.	From the Balkans in total	In% of import	In% of consumption
1938	40.1	49.9					9.1	18	23
1940	31.3	10.4	1.5	0.6	0.9		3.0	29	10
1941	25.6	8.6	2.1	2.3	3.6		8.0	93	31
1942	21.7	32.8	15.3	13.0	1.7		30.1	92	139
1943	35.8	32.8	14.7	6.0	1.3	1.4	23.4	71	65
1944**	37.4	48.8	24.6	4.7	1.0	6.3	36.6	75	98

**) Jan.- Nov.

Source: Jäger, S. 255 and 263, Tab. 37 and 38. - *) Recoverable chromium content (= 75-85 percent of the analytical chromium content). Table is with the preceding Tables (re: chrome ore). directly comparable.

Measured against German imports, came from the Balkan countries in 1941 and 1942 93 and 92 percent, respectively, whereas in 1943 and 1944, as a result of the renewed Turkish deliveries, 71 and 75 percent respectively. In this way, Nazi Germany secured a supply of chromium for its economy in the occupied Balkan countries at "peacetime" levels for over three years.

In August 1943, the mining department of the Reich Ministry of Economics (Oberberghauptmann) extrapolated the metal and ore deliveries from the Balkans for 1943 to their share of total German production. Chromium made up 65 percent, antimony 40 percent, lead 18 to 19 percent, copper 15 percent and Bauxite 10 to 12 percent. The Balkans' contribution to Germany's metal supply is essential, especially when it comes to the metals mentioned Protection of the Pits, especially the smaller chromium and antimony plants, are urgent. "Some of these companies have already been attacked by gangs and many have been destroyed. Production often stopped for months. The main chrome ore mines are now from Mining soldiers and State riflemen secured In Brevity become more Mountain construction soldiers before everything on the Large facilities for the Mission come." ⁵⁷

The largest chrome ore mines were in Bulgaria occupied Macedonia (northwest and northeast of Skopje), several smaller ones in Greece. The Ore mining in Albania in the huge pits Kukes and Letaj became directly after the takeover from Italy-

157 BAP, FS, Film 3365, Ed. RWiM/OBH ex. „Meaning of the Balkans for the supply of raw materials to the Germans Armaments Industry", August 6, 1943.

National administration (September 1943) in corridor brought and expanded; later more mines were operated.

The mining department estimated for 1944 a yield of 201,100 t of chrome ore in the southeast area (53,500 t of metal content), around a third more than in the previous year.¹⁵⁸ The increase should be overwhelmingly come to the Albanian mines. Actually was The exploitation of the chrome ore mines was successful until August 1944. However, the occupiers achieved this success in constant, exhausting defensive battles against the partisans.

Since autumn/winter 1943 stood more and more entire metal ore mining in occupied southeastern Europe under the influence of partisan activity. "Apart from the sometimes significant damage to property resulting from the destruction of machines, tools and means of transport and the removal of explosives, pack animals, food and money, the attacks are the Bandits almost without exception with the Part major funding losses tied together."¹⁵⁹ More and more armed forces were necessary in order to "create the conditions necessary for the pacification of the wider surrounding area and the Securing transport routes as well as that There should be protection of the companies against gang attacks and, to a modest extent, against air raids on particularly valuable objects."

On the 21st April 1944 presented the Türkiye theirs first in March of the previous year again deliveries of chrome ore were recorded, although certain quantities of ore apparently still reached Germany by November.¹⁶⁰ As a result, a "Führer's order to increase chrome ore production" was issued, which obviously drove the German authorities to be more active extended powers and empowered.¹⁶¹ This was probably the reason for the appointment of the General of Southeast Transport in May as authorized representative for the increase in chrome ore transport; Since then these transports have traveled like Wehrmacht goods with Wehrmacht trip number.¹⁶²

In the summer of 1944, securing the mines had become the primary "tactical task" of the entire occupying force "due to their critical importance in the war," as determined by the General Staff of the 2nd Panzer Army.¹⁶³

158 Europe under the Swastika, Vol. 6, S. 278, Doc. 201, Record RWiM/OBH ex. Discuss v. October 18, 1943, regarding chrome ore mining in Albania, November 2, 1943.

159 Just that. 297, doc. 226, RWiM/OBH at OKW/WWiStab, January 17, 1944.

160 Jäger, p. 259 f. However, it is likely that the statistics show deliveries months later and transports from earlier months appeared, as often happened in foreign trade statistics (see Chapter V in the previous volume).

161 "The Führer's order..." dated April 25 (?) 1944; announced in two OKW orders v. May 1, 1944 (the wording is not yet known); Mentioned in BAP, FS, Film 10642, GBM Südost to **RWiM/OBH**, June 10, 1944. The GBM Südost announced that its applications from April had been "accepted in full by the Führer" in the "Führer's order". According to records of various meetings, these requests and demands were aimed generally at a "pacification of the southeast area" and specifically at the "immediate procurement" of trucks and truck tires, at the "provision of machines, materials and, above all, mine wood" and on the procurement of workers (ibid., AN RWiM/OBH v. 24.4. and V. "May" 1944).

162 Hunter, S. 256, Note 3.

163 Europe under the Swastika, Vol. 6, p. 338, Doc. 284, guidelines of the bosses d. General staff of the 2nd Panzer Army, July 4, 1944.

At the end of August, Oberberghauptmann Oskar Gabel personally addressed the field economics office of the OKW with the urgent request that the Wehrmacht must protect the metal ore mining in the "southeast region". "The most important thing is chrome ore, since chromium only replaces other metals in the production of stainless steel can be replaced on a small scale, with the exchange metals themselves being among the deficient metals. There is no other way of extracting chrome ore in Europe, except in the Balkans... The protection of chrome ore mining and chrome ore transport must therefore be one of the most urgent Tasks the German Wehrmacht viewed become After this one facial

viewed in terms of points, it turns out for the protection the Mining facilities following classification of each Companies or mining districts:

1. Chrome ore mining in the rooms from Skopje and northern Albania. One Task this area would have the most serious consequences for German steel refining.
2. Chrome ore mining from Valandovo (railway route Skopje - Salonika) and in Southern Albania.
3. Chrome ore mining in Central Greece (Pit Domok6s at the Railway line Skopje - Athens)." ¹⁶⁴

Around this time, at the end of August/beginning of September 1944, the military and transport conditions led to the extensive cessation of everything mining in the southeast. The security troops were under pressure from the Since July, the partisan offensive from Montenegro to Serbia has been withdrawn from the mines and factories everywhere and has been increasingly thinned out. The main transport connections from Macedonia and Greece to Belgrade and Agram (Zagreb) were the most critical points for ore transport. "Experienced through communist sabotage and the effects of enemy air raids, which continued to intensify the Traffic situation one significant deterioration; Over 100 locomotives broke down in one month alone; the Eastern route has been at all since the beginning of August no longer, the The western route is only partially accessible." ¹⁶⁵

In the first September half sat the final crisis a. From Soft reported Jodl:

"With the political and operational enemy successes in the Romanian (incorrectly quoted: Russian - D E.) and the Bulgarian region are coordinated red gang associations in the Within the southeast area, the decisive attack on the traffic lines and positions of power of the occupying troops was launched. The center of gravity is perfect in Serbia and Macedonia Actually is it Tito already succeeded, in the Collaborate with the Anglo- American

"The German Air Force almost completely paralyzed the railway traffic from Greece to Belgrade". ¹⁶⁶ Here Hitler himself got involved, who was impressed by the dangers for The chromium supply was impressed: "The Führer attaches great importance to the fact that chromium is in the area Southeast is held, therefore (are) 5 000 air force men Southeast (to be left)." ¹⁶⁷

One detailed Depiction the crisis in the September 1944 comes from from the boss of military

164 Ibid, S. 356, Doc. 309, RWiM/OBH OKW/FWiAmt, August 30, 1944. - It Molybdenum and pyrites (Mackatica), antimony (mines in western Serbia), lead, zinc, bismuth (Trepca), copper (boron) and bauxite (Mostar etc.) followed in the list.

165 Ibid, S. 370, Doc. 329, Situation report ChiefWWiStaff Southeast f. III. quarter 1944, September 30, 1944.

166 Ibid, S. 366 f., Doc. 323, v. Soft at Iodine!, September 20, 1944.

167 IfZ, ED 115, NL Iodine!, Vol. 3 (Diary Iodine!), September 23, 1944.

Southeast economic staff: "Because the Bulgarian occupation corps marched out of Serbia and found itself in Macedonia Bulgarian friend in turned an enemy, they were eliminated Fuses at all mines in Macedonia and the largest part the mines in Serbia. Increased Raids communist gangs were the result. Who repeatedly in meetings with Mbhf. Südost and in particular OB Südost renewed attempts to replace the security forces with other forces failed because the small number of German troops and the on your Serb associations fighting on the side were only used to actively combat the well-equipped communist gangs and the (Fuse the) extremely endangered Traffic routes use find had to.

... Instructions from OKW/WFSt, which were given several times during the month of September, to keep the chrome ore operations and the Bor copper mine at all costs and to remove the stockpiles, could not be done in view of the further development of the military situation and because of the failure of the railways carried out become".¹⁶⁸

In the Did, the OKW and Hitler themselves switched off several times through desperate stop orders (12th, 18th, 21. September) in that happened. After Speer had once again warned the Führer on September 21st or 22nd about raw material difficulties due to "settling movements"¹⁶⁹, Hitler immediately demanded "orally... that everything must be done to clear out the stocks lying in stockpiles and, moreover, to allow metal ore mining to start again. The army group has that to take the necessary security measures."¹⁷⁰ The hopelessness was such "Leader decisions" clear to everyone involved. The Armaments Minister himself had already announced on the 6th. September the OT units withdrawn from the mines. Nobody undercounted at that time the dramatic circumstances of the partisan offensive, the advance of the Red Army into eastern Hungary and the German retreat southern Greece, with corresponding concrete, operational orders to Army Group F and the head of transport.

While chrome ore mining was also stopped in the last mines in September, it apparently worked despite it Until October, certain quantities of ore from the to clear pits and dumps, albeit with a constant struggle for wagons and trucks or for the protection or restoration of the main traffic connections. On September 28th, Neuhausen reported that it was "ready for removal" five moves with chrome ore (2 500 t), the "south of Mitrovica on the route" lay, and 5,000 tons ore and 600 t concentrate in Zostoff and Radusa (Macedonia). Hundreds of tons of chrome ore would be ready for shipment in Salonika. "All other ore reserves, especially chrome ores in northern Albania, will only be accessible once security has been restored and technical repairs have been carried out."¹⁷¹

Actually concentrated yourself in these weeks efforts and actions of the central and occupation economic authorities focused entirely on ore transport. The chief miner demanded a fundamental elaboration above "The current meaning of the

168 How Note 165.

169 FB, September 21-23, 1944, Point 17.

170 BAP, FS, Movie 10642, AT BfV v. 25.9. ex. Telephone v. September 23, 1944 with VOFFz.

RMRuK d. Chiefs OKW. There are also the mentioned orders from the OKW/WFSt.

171 Ibid, report GBM Southeast at BfV, September 28, 1944.

central Balkans for the supply of the German arms industry with mineral raw materials", it is "at least the removal of chrome ores from the Skopje area and northern Albania urgently required." ¹⁷² Jäger put an end to all ore transports with the capture of Belgrade by Soviet and Yugoslav forces on December 20th. October 1944 at. ¹⁷³

The closure and evacuation and the destruction of the mines and the associated production and transport facilities, carried out according to the capabilities of the occupiers were of course running in the affected countries different. In Greece, chrome ore exports in 1943 fell almost by half compared to 1942. The first partisan actions against the chrome ore mines took place in the winter months of 1942/43. In February/March 1943, these actions led to the closure of several mines. According to the Greek Defense Economic Staff, these were the Olympos, Elafina, Chromion and Tsangli mines. ¹⁷⁴ Since the end of July 1944, Hermann Neubacher's Athens representative reported, the Germans in Greece "no longer controlled a large contiguous area." ¹⁷⁵ From Colonel General Alexander Löhr's directive of August 4th, "to get what is possible out of the country" ¹⁷⁶, probably already expressed a resigned insight into this reality.

Nevertheless, it grew Greek chrome ore production until August 1944 constantly on. The loss of funding with those standing still Pits were through the The achievements of the others, especially the Domok6s mine, which in total provided more than half of the Greek ore output, more than made up for this. From January to August 1944, almost as much ore was removed (94 percent) and not much less mined (85 percent) than in the whole of 1943. ¹⁷⁷

Table 110

Financial support and Removal from Chrome ore out of Greece, 1942 -August 1944 (in t)

	Financial support	Removal
1942	49600	62000
1943	38000	33000
1944, January - August	32 300	31 000
In total		
(1.1.1942 - 1.9.1944)	119 700	126 800

Source: How Note 177.

172 Ibid, elaboration RWiM/OBH, September 14, 1944.

173 Hunter, S. 254.

174 Europe under the swastika, vol. 6, p. 361, doc. 316, report d. WWiStab Greece Mining Group to FWiAmt d. OKW, September 10, 1944. According to this, from January 1, 1942 to September 1, 1944, 119 were born in the Greek area 700 t Chrome ore mined (1942: 49 600; 1943: 38 000; 1944: 32 100) and 126,800 t transported to Germany; Figures that are obviously far too high, at least for 1943 and 1944 (see table).

175 AdaP, E, Vol. VIII, S. 259, Doc. 136, Kurt v. Graevenitz at Neubacher, July 28, 1944.

176 Quoted in Europe underm Nazi swastika, Vol. 6, S. 74.

177 BAP, FS, Film 10660, GBM Southeast/Beauftr. Greece, "August monthly report and final report ex. d. Metal ore mining in Greece", September 10, 1944.

"On August 31, 1944 received this in the Greek Mining Technical Batl. 26 (mot.) 'mining' the order to clear all Greek mines with the exception of Domok6s (chrome) and Axioupolis (molybdenum)." ¹⁷⁸ Two days later Domok6s also had to be evacuated and left with an ore supply of 20 000 t the Greeks be handed over; not without that The Germans flooded the mine and took away important parts of the plant and machinery. Greece was reported as being "cut off" in terms of traffic on September 6th, "because the railway lines at different positions through Air strikes so lasting are destroyed that the restoration 3 - 4 weeks to complete should take." ¹⁷⁹

In Macedonia, the main supplier from Chrome ore, gave it center 1944 major production losses after production and ore removal had already exceeded levels in 1942 and 1943. The fact that the transport ran quickly at first is probably partly due to the rigorous measures taken by the OKW in accordance with the aforementioned "Führer's order". attributable.

The Bulgarian security forces pulled early, at the beginning of September, from Macedonia. "According to the announcement from the senior construction manager in Skopje, they are beginning Bulgarians, the Macedonian to leave room. This leads to extensive ground fighting." ¹⁸⁰ For the time being, they remained Pits still occupied by German mining soldiers. "However, no work is being done because the military tasks of the soldiers fully utilize it." ¹⁸¹

Between September 9th and 17th, all mines in Macedonia were closed cleared. "The Mining Battalion - as far as used in Macedonia - received the final order to leave the mines from the Wehrmacht commander in Macedonia on September 9, 1944 and the Securing the railway and supply routes to take over." ¹⁸² Here too the Pits everywhere "paralyzed" and caused to drown. It is questionable, if and how ore could still be removed from the dump for a long time.

The Albanian chrome ore mines, which were partly in Old Albania and partly in the Kosovo area, fell in September 1943 with the invasion of the German 2nd Army. tank army to Albania under German direction. Immediately after the military occupation, the "General Plenipotentiary for metal ore mining Southeast" a representative "to protect the German mining interests" in Tirana, "which has the consent of the (just now with German help installed - D E.) provisional Albanian government for the Acquisition of chromium ore mines through the Reich's own Südost-Montan GmbH". ¹⁸³

From October 1943 to August 1944, chrome ore production increased thirtyfold, to over 10 000 tons in August, ie almost to the level of the Macedonian pits.

178 **BAK, R** 3/1967, **BI**. 22, "Preliminary Report" of the **GBM** Southeast f. September 1944, September 17, 1944. That too The following hereafter and one after the other *ibid*, monthly report of **GBM** Southeast for August and September 1944, October 1, 1944.

179 BAP, FS, Movie 10642, AT RWiM/OBH ex. Telephone with GBM southeast, September 6, 1944.

180 *Ibid*, AT RWiM/OBH, September 1, 1944.

181 How Note 179.

182 How Note 178 (October 1st).

183 Europe under the swastika, Vol. 6, S. 402, Doc. 364, final report d. Military administration Southeast, April 10, 1945.

Table 111

Extraction and removal of chrome ore from Albania, October 1943 - August 1944 (selected months; in t)

	Financial support	Removal
October 1943	354	894
January 1944	1 263	652
April 1944	5 800	
July 1944	7 761	6 570
August 1944	10 267	5 203
In total (October 1943 - August 1944)	42902	28 832

Source: See note 183; for April 1944: Europe under the Swastika, Vol. 6, S. 325, Doc. 266, **RWiM monthly report** regarding Albania for April 1944; for July 1944: BAP, FS, Film 10638, OKW/FWiAmt, monthly report for July.

The southern Albanian mines, of which only one could be put into operation until the evacuation¹⁸⁴, were already on 28. August 1944 cleared "with the return of all important material".¹⁸⁵ In northern Albania and the Kosovo region, the situation worsened in September Position fast. In some pits seems the Funding still until center September undisturbed continued running to be; other information say, that but already at the September 10th "because of the complete impossibility of obtaining even the smallest quantities of ore still to to transport away", the Task the Pits had been ordered. On the 11th September "were in Albania, for example 30 000 t chrome ore, without that there was a prospect of removal in the foreseeable future."¹⁸⁶

In the Kosovo region at the same time (September 10th) due to the "deterioration of the situation" the railway introduced the transport of ore; nine trains were stranded due to the damage to the Mitrovica bridge.¹⁸⁷

"While in August there were only insignificant threats to the mining areas from red bands, the activity of the partisans increased rapidly in September and, after various raids and lively battles, forced the evacuation of all the mines, since strengthening security was impossible given the existing strength situation and parts of the security force (Skanderbeg Division) deserted." On September 12th the mining battalion (1st company) withdrew to Serbia; "The Representative of Albania GBM joined forces with the Southeast Montana taking the ready-to-drive vehicle with you Motor fleets."

184 Above all, the activity of the partisans prevented the Germans from exploiting the southern Albanian mines. At the end of May 1944, the Armaments Minister asked Speer Himmler's help, ie the position of SS police units, "under whose protection the extraction and the regulated transport of the chrome ores without doubt could be ensured." (BAK, R 3/1583, BI. 49, Speer to Himmler, May 27, 1944).

185 How Note 178 (I.10.).

186 How Note 178 (September 17th).

187 How Note 178 (I.10.); hereafter also the The following.

Originally, in the fall of 1943, the German authorities had different ideas, anyway but high figures were estimated for chrome ore production and import from the Balkans in 1944: according to the chromium content between 44 000 tons (Reich Ministry of Economics) and 53 000 tons (Reich positions) or. 55,700 Tons (Representative for Chrome ore mining southeast; one sl. 2,200 tons from Bulgaria). At that time, the Reich Ministry of Economics calculated the total German requirement to be 58,500 tons. With 36,600 tons (according to Jäger's figures) actual imports in nine to ten months the German occupying power had the proportionate fulfillment of the planned figures at 80 up to 90 percent enforced ¹⁸⁸ - an astonishing result given the resistance and difficulties.

The GBM Southeast assumed even more favorable figures: "A compilation of the target and actual figures for the The first eight months of 1944 give the following picture:

Should: 111 600 t ore with one Chromium content from 29 924 t,

Is: around 170 200 t ore with a chromium content of around 41 900 tons. The results for this eight months of additional performance according to the quantity around 58 600 tons ore (plus 52 percent) and around 11 in terms of salary 950 t of chrome (plus 40 percent)." ¹⁸⁹

Table 112

Chromer promotion and -departure from Yugoslavia (Macedonia), Greece and Albania, January to August 1944 (in t Cr content)

	Total* (removal)	Macedonia Financial support	Rejection	„Should” according to Planning for 1944
January	2 237	1 305	1 150	1 938
February	3006	1 850	1 822	2020
March	4 375	2 718	3 281	2 148
April	5454	3 137	4074	2148
May	5 747	3 993	4058	2420
June	7 074	4 801	4 879	2455
July	7 323	4 772	4 719	3 148
August	6680	4,235 _	4 540	3 148

	Greece Financial support	Rejection	„Should”	Albania Financial support	Rejection	„Shoul d”
January 1944	596	678	722	327	401	374
February	710	667	722	485	495	374
March	1 277	648	722	835	446	374

188 Jäger, p. 255 f. = deployable Cr content; (15 to 25 percent below the analyzed Cr content); Europe underm Nazi swastika, Vol. 6, p. 278, Doc. 201, Record **RWiM** ex. Discuss at the October 18, 1943,

2nd II 1943; *ibid*, p. 353, Doc. 302, report d. GBM southeast, August 21, 1944; s. a. Tab. 112. The GBM Southeast calculated 43 for January to July 1944 alone 000 t of chromium mined - undoubtedly an embellished or incorrect calculation.

189 How Note 178 (I.10.).

Table 112 (Continuation)

	Greece Financial support	Rejection	„Should“	Albania Financial support	Rejection	„Should“
April	853	593	722	730	787	374
May	586	919	765	1 281	749	782
June	840	994	765	1 548	1 178	782
July	823	1 004	765	1 937	1 600	782
August	902	922	765	2 379	1 218	782

*) Until June including one low Crowd Chrome ore out of Serbia.

Source: BAP, FS, film 10638, Monthly reports of GBM Southeast.

What remains is the assessment of the last act before the occupiers' final withdrawal: the destruction of the production and transport facilities in their hands. All mines, conveyor systems, associated power plants were whenever only opportunity remained, „partially paralyzed, partially destroyed“. ¹⁹⁰ The official instructions of Representative for the four-year plan from 8. September 1944 was to "paralyze" everywhere, but not to "destroy" with a few exceptions, with the argument that the enemies had their orders enough chrome and copper, but for Germany the Balkan mines are the ones only source, and one must continue to use it immediately after the reconquest. "1. The mining operations are undergoing expansion to paralyze functionally important organs. 2. From the mining operations to transport away only those machines that are used in the Reich and are certain to leave can be. 3. In lead-zinc operation Trepca is [only] to destroy the hut. 4. Otherwise there is no destruction to be carried out." ¹⁹¹

However, due to its late date, the instructions often did not appear to have arrived in time.

The further destruction of economic objects - Ports, bridges, train stations, railway lines and rolling stock - Although they generally did not have an exclusively economic purpose, they were intended to paralyze the economic regeneration and development power of the evacuated land for years to come. In Greece During their retreat, the occupiers blew up 52 road bridges, destroyed 68 railway bridges, systems and facilities at 42 train stations, caused 73 locomotives and 505 wagons to crash, destroyed airfields and ports. ¹⁹² In the Port of Salonika became size and small steamers, tugs and sailing ships were sunk, "all piers, cranes and facilities were destroyed Blasting and the Halls through Fire destroyed. Likewise became the Train stations

190 Europe under the swastika, Vol. 6, P. 377, Doc. 337, appendix to Report Mayor Southeast/OQu to boss d. Gen. staff b. Mayor Southeast, October 15, 1944.

191 BAP, FS, Movie 10642, BtV at GBM Southeast regarding ARLZ campaign in Mining southeast, September 8, 1944. The instruction was issued "in agreement" with the RMRuK.

192 Europe under the Swastika, Vol. 6, S. 381, doc. 342, report d. High Commands the Hgr. E to GFM v. Weichs, 31.10.1944.

and tracks completely destroyed. Experts said it would take 10 years to repair the extensive destruction to restore".¹⁹³

Albania can do that too reported the German military administration Shortly before the end of the war - now with false regret - after the blowing up of a large part of the bridges and the destruction of the country's ports, "its modern development will be set back by decades".¹⁹⁴

3. Everyday crew life on Crete 1943-1944. One documentation

From Hagen butcher

a) The German occupation rule until to Italian surrender

As early as June 1941, the "Führer Instructions" No. 31 on the island of Crete, which was conquered with heavy sacrifices, has a "special position" assigned: "Organization and construction of this base, its security and its supply is in the southeast area the to most urgent task at this time"¹⁹⁵. Although Hitler partially meets the wishes of his ally and of the four Cretan prefectures (nomarchies), the eastern one (Lasithi) is subject to Italian occupation, this too is "in all tactical questions that relate to the unified defense of the get to the island", the German "commanders of the Fortress of Crete" under an air force general who exercises executive power largely autonomously. The other "Gau"¹⁹⁶ (Chania, Rethymnon, Heraklion) are already under German territorial administration.

In this context is it required, the to correct the almost universally accepted thesis of the Nazi regime's total territorial disinterest in Greece.¹⁹⁷ In fact, since 1941, the Naval War Command of the Naval High Command (**OKM**) had expressed its long-term interest in the unsinkable aircraft carrier; in July 1942 she submitted the Führer headquarters one eleven-page memorandum, in the the Eventuality handing over Crete to the Italians is decisively rejected: not only for the duration of the war, but especially afterward, the island's importance "for the surveillance of the entire southeast area ... within the framework of the European security system a key position to". This statement does not only apply to the "excellent important" military significance of this "dominant Riegels for the Dardanelles and the "Total Aegean" and "in Addition German bases at the Black Sea"; much more be "also

193 Ibid, p. 380 f., Doc. 341, crime report d. group Go. Field police 621 ex. d. Time v. 13. until October 29, 1944, December 5, 1944.

194 As note 183.

195 Hitler's Instructions for the warfare, S. 124 (9.6.41).

196 Is repeated the Greek administrative unit Nomos or nomarchy "Gau" translated. In practice, however, this proposal cannot be compared to the enforce the well-known term "prefecture" (or district).

197 See Fleischer, Hagen, Geostratigika schedia tis nazistikis Germanias gia ti metapolemiki Kriti, Historica, 16 (June 1992), pp. 135-158, as well as references to literature and sources there.

especially in political terms... the Possession of Crete in German hands "Peace of decisive value" because it "strengthens Greater Germany's position of power the Balkan countries and Turkey are clearly documented" and the "Russian-Asian power projection" is curbed. At the end of its assessment of the situation, the OKM once again emphatically points out the outstanding situation Meaning Crete (comparable to that of Malta for England!) in war and especially "for peace"; thus "the political leadership is given the preservation of Crete in German possession in terms of naval strategy and economics and political interest of the Greater Germans Issues urgently recommended."¹⁹⁸

Hitler, the (at Tables) its position to The topic of permanent Mediterranean outposts of a future German empire has been revised several times and at times has dealt with the Furnishings one KdF station wants to "satisfy" finally agrees to Raeder's intervention.¹⁹⁹ At this point in time, the island is already one of the areas with the highest occupation density in all of Europe, and the Three parts of the Wehrmacht are installing enormous amounts of concrete, as if they were planning at least for the conscious people a thousand years.

Alexander Andrae, who replaced General Student as island commander in the summer of 1941, tried to break away from the harsh conditions to discontinue his predecessor's reprisal policy and he offers Civilian population demonstratively extends the hand of reconciliation.²⁰⁰ This policy of "pacification" is not without success.

At the same time, the fortress commander repeatedly undertakes his own, but no significant, actions Powers of attorney continue expand and bypass hierarchical Intermediate members (namely the commander of southern Greece) to achieve a direct subordinate relationship with the Wehrmacht commander southeast or even to negotiate on their own initiative with Berlin departments. Cum grano salis Andrae therefore acquires it because of his "extremely far-reaching autonomy and his "fullness of power" on Crete the epithets "Emperor".²⁰¹ He tries stubbornly in the Spring 1942, „his" island from economic chaos of mainland and the hyperinflationary drachma - Significantly, at the same time as the Italians' analogous (and ultimately successful) efforts to respond to their de to introduce an "Ionian Drachma" into the annexed Ionian Islands Project one Cretan Separate currency (covered through olive oil and other unit

198 BA/MA, RM 7/235: No. 1. Ski. Ib (plan) I381/42g. K bosses, situation assessment, July 28, 1942; (Pas

say in Schreiber, Gerhard, Italy in the power-political calculations of the German naval leadership in 1919 until 1945, Sources and Research out of Italian Archives and libraries, 62 (1982), S. 263f.).

199 See Wagner, Gerhard (ed.), Lectures by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy before Hitler 1939-1945, Munich 1972, p. 409 (8/26/42); Hitler's table discussions in the Führer's headquarters, p. 272 (May 8, 1942); other citations in: Fleischer, Geostratigika, p. 143 ff. - The naval leadership was not completely cured of such ideas even in the winter of 1944/45 (after the evacuation of the Greek mainland!). See the memorandum of Admiral General Saalwächter "on spatial expansion" and Base questions" (writer, Gerhard, To continuity of Large- and striving for world power the German naval leadership, Military history Announcements, 2 (1979), S. 154).

200 See. in particular the bilingual "Newspaper for Crete", passim (esp 17/18/25/27.9.41).

201 Archives Diplomatiques, Paris (AD), Guerre 1939-45, Vichy Europe, vol. 395: Legation Fran ai se en Grece 49/30.5.42 (to Foreign Ministry).

mix Products) wins the General in Berlin the **OKW**, the Reich Ministry of Finance and the Reichsbank Directorate; but the Reich Ministry of Economics and especially the Foreign Office, alerted by the Athens embassy, ultimately brought down the "oil money experiment" because of its inherent financial difficulties and political consequences.²⁰²

In the fall of 1942, Andrae fell from grace after a conflict with Göring and was replaced; but also be successor general Bruno brewer, although veteran the operation "Mercury" steers a relatively moderate course towards the Cretan population. The new commander is also following in Andrae's footsteps in his economic policy, at least temporarily. he shies away but also before gross interference in the civil administrative powers and tax sovereignty of the Athens regime. So Bräuer, under its own authority, raises a billion-dollar levy "in the three German districts" (prefectures) to improve the situation Situation of the Wehrmacht workers - without that embassy, the special representative Southeast of the AA or at least that one Commander in Chief Southeast also just to inform. Only when the angry Italians informed the political authorities of this high-handedness did the latter protest to the Foreign Office, which in turn caused the OKW to intervene. The action will stopped, the money collected will be - as will be explained - used for social purposes in a way that allows the fortress command to avoid losing face.²⁰³

On another level, it should not go unmentioned that the Cretan mountain landscape has homeland associations, especially with South Germans and "Eastern Märkers"; moreover, the locals find more favor from the occupiers' strict, "racially trained" gaze than the mainland Greeks: the Cretans are classified as more solid and hard-working, which is explained by the fact that especially in remote regions the island has the Doric component is still clearly perceptible.²⁰⁴

The bottom line is that evidence of long-term German aspirations will not go unnoticed by the attentive observer. For example, the Vichy government's chargé d'affaires has no doubts about the occupiers' intention of "Bismarck's mistake of 1878" (as an "honest broker" the British Cyprus without in return) after the war was won to be corrected on Crete.²⁰⁵ Yes the Germans deny any such intention²⁰⁶, and the til today The valid doctrine of Berlin's territorial disinterest in the Greek area is as follows one the few Long-term successes the German propaganda - if also on one "Secondary theater of war" - to evaluate.

202 Interviews Andrae and Altenburg with Vf.; Memoranda, minutes etc. in **BAK**, R 2/14569, BI. 49-61; PA AA, R 27320, BI. 45 f.

203 BAP, AA, No. 68610: Reich Representative for Greece to AA, 847/15.3.43; No. 68611: 1241/4/20/43.

204 See for example: Geiseler, Erich, Kret after a year of development work. A strong, hard-working people works hard his Future. Donauzeitung, June 28, 1942; further sources in: Butcher, Geostrategika, p. 154 ff.

205 AD, Guerre 1939-45, Vichy Europe, vol. 395: Legation Française en Grèce 49/30.5.42 (to Foreign Ministry).

206 Criticism Kiryx (Cretan herald), 29.11, 12/2/43.

b) The occupation force as control body

administration

After the Italian surrender, the newly created office of the military commander took action Greece, together with everyone others Commanderies also the "Territorial area the Fortress of Crete" with a provisional service instruction²⁰⁷ firmer to bind. Of the assigned tasks, the following are of particular importance in this context:

"1.) Maintain of peace and order in their area, security of military and military facilities....

5.) At sight above the Civil administration.

Senior field commander, field and local commanders lead according to the instructions of the Mil. Command. Greece in your Area the At sight above the entire Civil administration

tung including the Greek Administrative Police She have for that to care for, that the Administration remains ongoing and legally orderly conditions prevail. In principle, civil jurisdiction remains unaffected unless the jurisdiction of the courts-martial is given... The prefects, sub-prefects, mayors and community leaders are bound to the instructions of the field and local commanders. Where previous administrative board members have fled or their use appears inappropriate, the local commanders suggestions for the senior field commander or the field commander the new appointment of the Place through respected and reliable people native Population before...

6.) regulation of economic life.

The senior field commander, the Field- and local commanders care for for the entrance management of the economy and its exploitation for the needs of the German war economy...

III. Responsibility the commander.

...responsible for orders and measures that are limited to their area of command. They bring orders and measures of fundamental importance Importance, especially above all measures that affect the country's economy and finances, or are of general political or military importance, the approval of Mil. Command. Greece a The commander the fortress

Crete is authorized to issue legal regulations for its area of command. Before their publication, the regulations are - apart from urgent cases - the Mil. Command. Greece to present.

IV. Traffic with others Departments.

Intercourse with the authorized representative of the empire, the special representative of the Reich for economic and financial issues in Greece as well as dealings with the Greeks. Central authorities is exclusive the military commander Greece reserve... The commander of the Crete Fortress is not bound by this instruction...

207 BA/MA, RW 40/126: military commander Greece Ia/Qu. - Br.B. No. 2557/43 gKdos, 10/16/43 (on Kdt. Fixed Crete, u. a.).

V. jurisdiction

The courts of the Oberfeld and Feldkommandanturen are responsible .for the prosecution of crimes... the residents of the country, to the extent that this affects the interests of the German armed forces."

Already out this Instructions will be given to them expanded powers of the Fortress commanders visible. In practice, they benefit from the ongoing controversy between the leading territorial and tactical command authorities in Greece and the Balkans. The latter, Army Groups E and F, protested to the **OKW that** the commander of a fortress cannot report to a territorial commander; the same applies to the Cretan District commanders.²⁰⁸ Thanks to this unresolved internal feud that despite occasional and repeatedly canceling instructions continue to smolder until the end of the occupation, the freedom that Commanders Bräuer has gained and (from the beginning July 1944) Frederick Wilhelm Müller to almost unrestricted Autonomy_2<J9

How the civil one under such circumstances Self-government on Crete German supervision was practiced can be seen in the files, which were rescued under adventurous circumstances, albeit incomplete Pursue prefectures of Rethymnon and especially Heraklion (Heraklion). German-Greek official correspondence has survived, often down to the smallest detail (as well as the internal Greek extensions from the orders of the German authorities); but unfortunately there is no counterpart information from internal German files.²¹⁰ This documentation is therefore based almost exclusively on the aforementioned holdings, which are now stored in the Historical Archives of Crete (**IAK**) .

As for filling the top positions in the Greek As far as administration is concerned, the occupying authorities at the higher hierarchical level give the Greeks a free hand to a certain extent. One reserves oneself against unpleasant personnel policy decisions a right of veto; emerge first later stressful moments, like Corrupt or incompetent administration, Anglophile attitude, "Jewish kinship" are, depending on the severity, the Greek superiors the replacement ordered, recommended, or even just brought into consideration. In general, the German authorities only find out about the "mistake" through "well-meaning" Greek "trustees" who expect their own benefits from denunciation; however, a lack of efficiency is often criticized by Germans.

With regard to new appointments, the files often contain suggestions from the occupying authorities, on those latter however not absolutely consist. More stubborn show

208 **BA/MA, RH** 19 VII/10, Bl. 141, 147; 59053/4, report Kronsbein 11/11/43; **RW** 40/168: Kdt. Crete fortress, 1a 3000/44 gKdos 3.7.44; Fleischer, Hagen, In the Cross Shadow of the Powers. Greece 1941-1944. (Occupation - Resistance - Collaboration), Frankfurt 1986, p. 369 ff.

209 The other side of the coin is that after the end of the war, the former fortress commanders full responsibility for everyone Events on the island is allocated. So will be on May 20, 1947, the sixth anniversary of "Operation Merkur", Bräuer and Müller were shot in Athens, her predecessor Andrae receives four life sentences, but will pardoned under (Federal) German pressure at the beginning of 1952.

210 Also the relevant stocks of **BA/MA** (namely Kdt. d. Fstg. Crete, out of **RW** 40, and 22nd Inf. Div., from **RH** 26-22) contribute relatively little to this topic.

Please feel free to cast of key positions, so around the beginning of 1943 own favorite Ioannis Passadakis, who had previously proven himself as prefect of Heraklion in the German sense, was elevated to the chair of ministerial governor.²¹¹

The succession carousel rotates by far most frequently among mayors. Fastest running the Procedure if the old Officials "his position "used to do dirty business" and the district command took advantage of the excitement of the affected population (majority) to own. Two Days after departure, one day after receiving the German one request answers the Prefect, the Detachment be already completed, after Police investigations had "partially confirmed the residents' accusations "212

In cases of embezzlement and similar machinations, the German authorities are responsible interest of the Efficiency as well of own reputation of the prevailing opinion (and also include the question of succession); They pursue personnel changes with even greater emphasis as soon as the official clearly lacks the necessary authority, "To the local residents "to enforce against" ²¹³ Probably the most important indication for such a diagnosis is the lack of "any initiative in the position of the workers" for the needs of the Wehrmacht. ²¹⁴

labour market

Hitler's early directive to develop Crete into a fortress is not even close to the Wehrmacht's manpower resources and the potential of local volunteers (or unemployed). fulfill. Different as on the mainland, where itself the German needs for a long time to be covered by the urban proletariat and only at the beginning of 1943 complementary plans for civil mobilization worked out become (the then opposite dem in the meantime organize ten Resistance not to enforce are) ²¹ 5, exists on Crete since the first Occupation Ta a basic work obligation: "At the request of a German office or the mayor" The entire able-bodied population can, "regardless of the profession, age and gender", for everyone activity used become. In the In practice, men between the ages of 16 and 45 (or even up to 60) are primarily affected, who spend a quarter of their time (15 every two months). days) must be made available to the new masters. After different Modifications he follows in the February 1943 one new, partially ver-

211 Passadakis is one of the few well-known Collaborators who are committed to an almost "unconditional" collaboration prescribed have. (Butcher, Hagen, collaboration and German politics in the occupied Greece. In Europe underm Nazi swastika. occupation and collaboration (1938-1945), see 395).

212 IAC, PI, v. 5a1: KKI at PI, 7/26/43; PI at **KKI**, 7/28/43.

213 IAK, PI, v. 7a: KKI to PI, 13.3. u. 2.4.44 - However, if a Mayor proven and assertive against "Quitter" has proven to support him the German authorities against internal Greek resistance and even rejected his own wish to resign because of more physical and psychological exhaustion to are equivalent to. (v. 7a, KKI at PI, 12/15/43).

214 IAC, PI, v. 7a, KKI at PI, 11/25/43 u. 1.3.44.

215 Butcher, cross shadow, pp. 167,625.

Stricter regulation of the fortress commander, which also includes the compulsory employment of work animals and severe punishments for cases of "refusal to work" provides.²¹⁶

The Success, again, remains low. Despite the mandatory Register with the newly created "employment offices", many Cretans know how to evade the obligation to work in one way or another; especially in the countryside - where the main part of the population lives in often inaccessible mountain villages and compensates for the barren and primitive conditions of Cretan agriculture with a lot of time must - The willingness to do the poorly paid "angaria" (slave) is even lower. The occupying power therefore transfers power early on the responsibility for the list recording and the subsequent recruitment of the required workers to the municipalities and especially the mayors. The latter are tried to be subdued alternately with carrots and sticks: through preferential allocation of scarce foodstuffs or reprisals, contributions that are imposed or waived, and the like.

This frustrating guerrilla warfare, especially during the first phase of occupation until the summer of 1943 one of the German main concern, with the construction of a major airport in Tymbaki, at the strategically important but traffic-wise untapped South coast probably employs one percent of the Cretan population. Tymbaki thus becomes a symbol of servitude and oppression, and as a result of the passive resistance of those forced to do so, completion is delayed from month to month until the loss of North Africa. The airport was not only unnecessary, but also (as a potential entry point for the Allies) downright closed a risk factor: The systems are then blown up by their own builders.²¹⁷

After the Italian capitulation, the German need for labor decreased. Not only place the former allies a not insignificant potential at "those willing to help" but also the construction of fortresses will prove everything to the contrary. Despite directives out of limited for practical reasons, while that after Strategically expanded road network is largely completed. But not even the reduced German demands can be covered by the voluntary labor market, especially since The resistance campaign is becoming increasingly effective.

The demand from the district command, renewed in November 1943, for a list of the municipalities still outstanding with the number of all able-bodied men aged 16 is directed against the deportation strategy practiced at the local level - 60 years old". After more than two months just lying for a few communities Numbers because most village mayors ignore repeated inquiries - despite interim ones replacement of the Bosses the Greek Labor Department. In the May 1944 follows another German warning with the Target, the "defaulters communities". cause of their

216 Various regulations in **IAK**, PI, from left et al.; Paratiritis (Observer}, 17.2.43 (= Doc. 1): See also Xylander, Marlen v., *The German occupation of Crete 1941 - 1945*, Freiburg 1989, p. 40 ff.; Hadziiossif, Christos, *Greeks in German war production*. In: Herbert, Ulrich (ed.), *Europe and the "Reich deployment"*, p. 214 ff.

217 Archives University of Crete, Rethymnon: *Final Report on SOE Missions in Crete, 1941-1945* (unpublished; hereinafter: *Final Report*).

Reporting requirement to comply,²¹⁸ but the Successes remain small, however those preserved until the end of the occupation Show files.

However, such "non-work" behavior could only be permitted in those localities the - in the literal sense - far from Shot lay, d. H. far from the centers of permanent German presence. In any case, the richer communities were generally easier to access and therefore had to expect graduated punitive measures if they "disregarded an imposed duty".²¹⁹ In addition, the occupying power used the means of additional punishment Work commitment beyond the normal "should" out, as Penalty for other offenses occur.²²⁰ On the other hand, they are too German authorities are prepared to exempt certain groups of the population from compulsory work, such as war invalids, civil servants and armed collaborators. The same applies to those enrolled students, although in older age groups one suspects that they could be shirkers about compulsory work.²²¹

Finally, it should be mentioned that in Crete the advertising for the use of labor in the empire is even less important than in the rest of Greece, as there is also a local gap in demand the required transport effort is much greater. First 1944 the picture shifts somewhat in view of the priority given to the home front in the labor market. Not only are several hundred "gang suspects" transported to the Reich, but also one Promotion becomes raised.²²² The Success remains small amount; added come

- especially among female volunteers - unforeseen problems with the Cretan moral code.²²³

Production, trade and distribution

At everything German interest, "free" Workforce capacities try to skim off the occupying power but, the Not production only not to affect, but after Possibility to increase. Unproductive activities such as playing cards are therefore frowned upon, corresponding establishments are closed, and even the traditional Kafeneion, in which the (male) Greeks can spend countless hours is suddenly considered bad address and is only allowed to open his welcoming door after the end of official working hours.

The Agriculture, of the (together with the fishing) already in peacetime nearly 70 percent of the population lives,²²⁴ has to support an even higher proportion under the harsher conditions of the occupation. The German authorities take this into account when they distribute seeds, fertilizers and pesticides. Often enough, priorities have to be weighed up. Compromises are necessary, so soon complex "strategic construction work" in time-bound phases of field cultivation attack, as well as in particular also in the so-called Exclusion zones - Villages and Re-

218 Please refer Doc. 2 away and 3.

219 Doc. 4.

220 Doc. 6.

221 IAC, PI, v. 6, **KKI** to PI, 3.11.43; PI at KKI, 11/12/43.

222 Doc. 7, u. a.

223 Doc. 8.

224 Ruprecht, Paul, Crete economic structure, hamburger foreign newspaper, 11.6.41.

gions whose residents are accused of “favoring gangs” or (near the South coast) as a result of the Danger evacuated from enemy landings. Exceptions were successful for a limited time become especially for bringing in the valuable olive harvest.²²⁵ A regular tillage of the fields or only Grazing in the Exclusion zones remains still prohibited. This means that military considerations take precedence over the otherwise applied principle that fertile land should be prevented under all circumstances.²²⁶

When distributing the harvest or the production has the Wehrmacht generally had first access. This is particularly the case with shortages of various types of goods, such as eggs and fresh vegetables up to cigarettes.²²⁷ That requested for the occupiers The quota is occasionally higher than the (at least the officially reported) total production, but Modifications upwards and downwards are possible.

Seasonal supply shortages (in spring) of fruit and vegetables are overcome by the majority of communities surrounding the large garrisons entire production to the central distribution point the Wehrmacht has to hand over what is easier to control than the quota regulation. For those affected However, this is the case additional problems associated with that not only the Sell on dem free market is punishable, but also the distribution to other German authorities²²⁸, which is not always possible in practice. All too often, roving units (or “lone fighters”) are trying to improve their own kitchen list it with purchases among more or less gentle pressure, with requisitioning (sometimes disguised as reprisal) or even with outright theft. If the Affected farmers complain to the German authorities - usually “without sufficient information” to identify the uniformed perpetrators²²⁹. The investigations that were initiated without any particular enthusiasm usually come to nothing. In some cases, however, complaining about German (or Italian) food theft helps the locals, own consumption or To conceal taxes paid to neighboring partisan groups.²³⁰

It should be noted that after the catastrophic hunger winter of 1941/42, the warring powers, with Swedish mediation, agreed on a remarkable relief operation: Canadian wheat and others Food is included Granting free Escort transported to Greece on Swedish ships - on the condition that everyone produced in the country Local foods Population remain reserved; consumed by the occupying troops or - as “surplus” - exported products are through at least equivalent Introduce to compensate. This in the second World War

225 See. Doc. 29.

226 See. IAC, PI, v. 7/3, PI at KKI, 4.4.44; KKI at PI, 2.5.44. After one 1942 issued Ordinance “every inhabitant of Crete can cultivate someone else's field that has been neglected due to laziness” free of charge and receive the necessary seeds under extremely favorable conditions (if not free!). (v. 6a/5, E. Iatrakis to fortress commanders, July 15, 1943).

227 IAC, PI, v. 6, KKI at PI, November 20th u. 12/23/43; v. 8th, KKI at PI, 2.5.44.

228 IAC, PI, v. 8th, KKI at PI, 2.5.44.

229 See. further down.

230 interview of the Vf. with dem former Partisan leader Manolis Paterakis.

unique agreement was largely adhered to, ²³¹ at least as far as the registered German withdrawals were concerned. offered opportunities for "nutritive attacks". particularly in the context of "gang operations" ²³². Even if the "looted cattle" had to be delivered to collection points and thus benefited the "peace-loving majority of the population", one could still count on the fact that the German units involved had already kept their "tithe". ²³³

Compensating for German consumption through imports is also much more difficult on Crete on the mainland - namely from At the end of 1943, when the Allied dumping rates skyrocket and supplying the island with even the bare necessities becomes a permanent problem for the German leadership.

Nonetheless respected the latter that the native grain production - when stretched with surrogate substances such as carob - still not even enough for the islanders; Supervision of olive oil, which is indispensable for Greek consumers, is also carried out within the framework of the the above agreement is left to the International Red Cross (**IRK**) . ²³⁴

In the Practice is the IRK, however forced, itself the organizational Help to serve the collaboration authorities and thus also the occupying power ²³⁵; This assistance is only too readily granted, as it can largely extend food deliveries to the partisans be prevented.

The basic economic policy concept behind the German measures is subject to fluctuations, although the bottom line is that a "liberalization" can be observed. A turning point forms the one in October 1942 action by the "Special Representative". for economic and financial issues Greece", Hermann Neubacher, who, not without success, strives for the "most wicked war economy heresy": the creation of a free market. ²³⁶ The lists of maximum prices for "essential goods" ²³⁷, that dominated the image of the daily press in the first two years of occupation are disappearing suddenly, and just "price gouging and usurious profits" are punishable. Since this threat, which is often unenforceable in practice, has only had limited success, local Greek authorities have repeatedly tried to reactivate the familiar maximum price system however respectively to (new) Order called back. ²³⁸ Longer in Power remain the

231 See. Aeischer, cross shadow, S. 116-127: „Hunger, Bread and Propaganda".

232 S. about Metzsch, Friedrich-August v., History the 22nd Infantry Division 1939-1945. Kiel 1952, p. 61: "The operations against the groups of the gang leader Panduwas [Ban douvas] were quite unsuccessful... It only managed to eliminate large herds of sheep and goats to drift away from the mountains and thereby deprive the gangs of their nutritional basis."

233 For the official submission of the "Prey" in so-called Wehrmacht goods, see Note 279 and Doc. 26. It should be taken into account here that around the end of the year The troops disbanded in 1943 Crete only for seven days with fresh meat was in stock (BNMA, RH 19 VII/23, **Bl.** 390, 12/29/43).

234 Doc. 9.

235 Doc. 10.

236 Aeischer, Crossshadow, S. 174 ff.

237 I. Cereals; II. bread; III. Legumes; IV. Vegetables; V. fruit; VI. Miscellaneous (sugar, oil, dairy products, etc.); VII. Meat and poultry; VIII. Fish; IX. Cheese; X. honey; XI. Soap; XII. Money.

238 IAK, PRe, v. I: Deputy Governor Crete, 41/30.6.44 representative at Gendarmerie HQ Rethymnon.

Wage tables ²³⁹ whose maximum rates even Greek entrepreneurs are not allowed to exceed in order to prevent Wehrmacht workers from being poached.

In September 1943 fall from the Italians in "their" Trade barriers erected by the prefecture and the island becomes an economic entity again. But then wholesalers and speculators take advantage of local price differences by approximately the Hoarding cheaply bought grain in one district and selling it elsewhere at a favorable time is one of those affected Nomarchs ²⁴⁰ the intervention of the occupying power. However, the export bans issued between the districts for certain agricultural products do not prove effective and also run counter to the principles prescribed by Neubacher. They were repealed on February 1, 1944 with immediate effect. ²⁴¹

The prerequisite for this is the interim increase in the supply of goods through the establishment of an "import union" suggested by Germany. to Stimulating and cheapening trade with the mainland. ²⁴² This initiative as well as the Reich's own company "Überlandtransport" ²⁴³, which was founded in the summer of 1943 they should supply of the Cretan population, while their surpluses are donated to charitable purposes. As highlighted in published press releases, both receive significant "German subsidies" - What remains unmentioned is that these payments are at least partly from the previously unauthorized raised by the fortress commander levy or the special account set up with it. ²⁴⁴

Quite general the interest of the military administration clearly to prevent hunger and all too blatant social injustices (and thus an increase in resistance potential); Conversely, it is hoped that an "adequate" supply of the population will also "pacify" the population. ²⁴⁵ At the same time, it also applies to the producers and suppliers to keep you happy. This is how the prisoners become to resemble fish Shares are distributed to the Wehrmacht, the needy and the fishermen, although the German buyers reduce the price considerably for themselves.

²⁴⁶

239 Doc. 11. - The Table shows the Gradations in the Evaluation of the different professional groups. Since none at this point Maximum prices are no longer set, the plaintiff made the following analogy older tables are calculated. According to this, the maximum daily wage of a quality skilled worker (see A. 4.b) corresponds to the equivalent (in retail) of either 32 eggs, 8 Oka potatoes, 4.8 Oka lentils or 3.5 Oka mutton (1 Oka = 1.28 kg). The price of bread was not used here because it is subject to the greatest fluctuations on the actual gray market.

240 IAK, PI, v. 6a, PlanKKI, 11/17/43.

241 IAC, PI, v. 7b, KKI at PI, 1.2.44.

242 Doc. 12, published in: Kritikos Kiryx, 12/2/43; see. also: PI, v. 7b, Report on the control of the management of the Import Union (to KKI), January 16, 1944.

243 Doc. 13.

244 interview Altenburg with vf.; see note 202. - See also the instructions of the fortress commander (PI, v. 5a, 7.10.43) to the Bank of Greece, "from the account 'Special levy for military workers' 225 million Dr. for the hospitals etc. in to be paid out to the districts of Heraklion and Lassithion; similar: v. 7/3, p. 173 (7.5.44).

245 interview Andrae with Vf.; see. IAC, PI, v. 6, KKI at PI, 12.5.44.

246 Doc. 14 away.

care for the needy

In the December 1943 he has Fortress commander the Setting up public kitchens to meet the actual needs of the people "to take into account the really poor population" ²⁴⁷. The required funds must be raised from various sources; the most important factor is the IRK and its direct or indirect aid - including the right to dispose of half of the "concentration", the compulsory submission of the locals mix staple foods. But the cigarette tax and assets controlled by the occupying power are also thrown into the big "soup pot".

Apart from numerous technical questions during preparation, the Organizers particularly address the problem of "fair" selection criteria, so that those who need it most can benefit from free meals. ²⁴⁸ The number of these poorest of the poor is for Iraklion initially at 1 000 and by the eve of liberation the number of public kitchen users would only increase by 10 percent. In addition, there are 5,058 users of "children's kitchens" throughout the district. counted, ²⁴⁹ because school children's meals (which even start a few weeks earlier) are given the same priority as adult public meals. The students (and the teachers) receive "very nutritious" free rolls made from mixed grains, olive oil and raisins at least a few days a week. ²⁵⁰ But even the school meals, which are given priority according to the instructions, or the stocks intended for this purpose, are exposed to interference. This is the beginning In March the distribution of the rolls stopped for over a month contrary to the care plan 6 1/2 (of 15) tons Grain was diverted elsewhere - on command of Greek Ministerial Governor for his guard company and the Civil service and on instructions from the district command to the Greeks Wehrmacht workers. ²⁵¹

Although in retrospect the... German leadership is trying to... To avoid a repetition of such incidents is an unmistakable conflict of principles. On the one hand, social justice is to be achieved by supporting those most in need; on the other hand, there are opportunistic reasons for supporting certain population groups with an important function for one's own position (civil servants, security organs; the "Greek company" of armed collaborators, Etc.). The transitions in motivation are often fluid enough, as the support has a "pacifying" effect for both categories mentioned, or at least should have an effect; moreover, they are ongoing already chronically underpaid civil servants under the conditions of a every salary adjustment With hyperinflation far ahead, there is already a risk of losing their social status as the "new poor".

The supply plan already cited is informative for evaluating the priorities the population, which, in addition to public and children's kitchens, also includes the gendarmerie, fire brigade and state officials includes. ²⁵² Same applies to oil allocation. After related

247 Doc. 15. - The initiative takes effect to a few more Or less successful attempts from the previous year .

248 Ibid., PI, v. 8th, **KKI** at PI, 2.2.44; v. 7/3, **KKI** at PI, 5.2.44.

249 **IAC**, PI, v. 8th: PI at **KKI**, 8/20/44.

250 Doc. 16 a/b.

251 **IAC**, PI, v. 7a: PI at **KKI**, 5.4.44.

252 **IAC**, PI, v. 7/3, **KKI** at PI, 5.2.44.

Omissions have occurred the district commander the prefecture before any general distribution social institutions such as children's kitchens, public kitchens, etc. to provide" ²⁵³. The next list only includes such facilities and (without a quantitative breakdown) Calling "state officials and other poor people" who also received the lion's share, the district command suspects rubbish; a reorganization of the distribution system is even being considered, since supplying the population and especially the "really needy" districts is "an urgent and important task " ²⁵⁴ be.

These considerations are taken up again as then, the seasonal rhythm according to, under the Cretans the Willingness to active resistance increases and the "Core bonds" in the mountains swell. In May 1944 the command suggested to the prefect that the "circle the to supporters" above the public kitchen users to move further out, "to avoid unrest among the rest of the poor population" ²⁵⁵. For this purpose, "the recording of the groups of people who actually need support" is required, i.e. in plain language of all - from civil servants to pensioners - dependent on a fixed income Persons. As then however the prefecture 39 318 Those in need prestigious might,

d. H. almost a quarter of the total population, slows down the military administration: The guideline number of 25,000 must not be exceeded under any circumstances become; as part of the reduction The military night workers should be deleted from the new lists, whose supply is now regulated by Germany from other sources. ²⁵⁶

c) protection and repression

The "Special allocations"- stimulant and Reward

Such as imposing additional contributions is a tried and tested method of occupation power, her displeasure over the To demonstrate the behavior of the population noticeably (in the truest sense of the word). receives the extraordinary - individual or, more rarely, collective - Allocation of nutrients functions as a reward for practiced (or to be practiced) "good behavior". But even in these cases the component is missing the social need only rarely. With the watering can principle, only the special allocations personally ordered by the commander of the Crete Fortress are distributed on special holidays - first line to Christmas, but also to Easter and at the Greek National holiday (25. March). The folk and children's kitchens serve meat dishes out of; at all Residents are distributed food (oil, grain, raisins, legumes, etc.) and other sought-after goods (soap, salt, cigarettes). The German side attaches great importance to timely distribution so that "the meaning and purpose" the campaign is fulfilled, as well as corresponding announcements in the Press. ²⁵⁷ Some times are but only Beneficiary - next to the public kitchen

²⁵³ IAC, PI, v. 786: KKI at PI, 10.1.44.

²⁵⁴ IAK, PI, v. 7/3: P.I to KKI, 7.3.44; KKI to PI, 3/21/44.

²⁵⁵ IAC, PI, v. 6: KKI at PI, 12.5.44.

²⁵⁶ IAC, PI, v. 7/1: KKI at PI, 5/28/44; PI at KKI, 1.7.44; v. 8th: KKI to PI, 8/13/44.

²⁵⁷ Doc. 17 away, 18 away.

users - the "immediate Wehrmacht workers"²⁵⁸, which not only contradicts the agreement with the IRK, but at least in one case also undermines a German aid campaign.²⁵⁹

In the case of calendar-independent special assignments, the military administration usually responds to requests in this regard, although sometimes a preliminary agreement may have taken place - namely if the petitioner is employed by a German agency and additional factors come into play, as was the case with the distressed mother of three underage children at the same time hard-working cleaning lady and widow one fallen collaborators is.²⁶⁰ Help is given wherever possible even those without means itself for the Work use in Germany had committed themselves and had to return for recognized reasons²⁶¹ or who could credibly demonstrate that them because of their German-friendliness before (or during) the Occupation were or still are subjected to persecution.²⁶²

Receives positive feedback also the Heraklion Civil Service Association, the a grant in natural products for his starving members he asks, "so that she carefree theirs fulfill duty Favor of the Germans and the Greeks Authority".²⁶³ The application by the officials of Ano-Archane, from the Secretary until for the Gravedigger: Yours increased workload - since the municipality is the largest in the district and also the division headquarters - is recognized by Germany; In addition, officials hardly have any Opportunity to trade and "To thereby acquire the goods necessary for life".²⁶⁴

Remarkably, the German authorities repeatedly use the bread basket as a kind of reparation for their own actions. At the request of the mayor and the priest, a community whose harvest is for the Wehrmacht was confiscated, partly compensated; The fortress commander intervenes personally - after a negative decision from the district command.²⁶⁵ Support is also granted to the mother, whose husband and breadwinner has been in a German hostage camp for months,²⁶⁶ as well as the widows of Cretans who were "accidentally" killed by the Germans or were shot because of a misunderstanding. It is helpful if the person who died so suddenly was a military worker²⁶⁷ or but the Request from an unsuspecting one informant is supported - for example a mayor who has proven himself "at all times to the best of his ability" in the German sense.²⁶⁸

258 IAC, PI, v. 7a: KKI at PI, 3/16/44.

259 See. above, Note 251.

260 IAC, PI, v. 5a1: Fixed pi. section size 1/8 at PI, 5/23/43.

261 Doc. 19.

262 Doc. 20, or. PI, v. 6/5a: Request N G. Mavrakis at KKI, 1.12.43.

263 IAC, PI, v. 6: Civil Service Association Heraklion at PI, 1.12.43: for the Authorization see. v. 7/3: KKI at PI, 5.2.44.

264 IAC, PI, v. 6: local district Ano-Archane at KKI, 3.12.43; KKI to PI, 6.12.43; v. 7a: Community Ano-Archane at PI, 4/13/44 u. Ortskdtr. Ano-Archane at PI, 4/18/44.

265 IAC, PI, v. 7, S. 145, 147, 1041.

266 IAC, PI, v. 6: Request Olga Dretaki at KKI, 11/18/43; KKI at PI, 11/20/43.

267 Doc. 21.

268 IAC, PI, v. 7B5: mayor and local district Thrapsano at KKI, 1/25/44; KKI at PI 1/26/44.

The category of those in need, whose care can also be provided without it, should not go unmentioned own application is initiated by the German authorities, there itself latter for services rendered - no matter what kind - want to show clearly. This includes the volunteer interpreter the busy local headquarters Ano Archane ²⁶⁹ as well the "surviving relatives of victims of the murderous terror" of the resistance movement. ²⁷⁰ Finally, the prefecture is instructed at regular intervals to provide assistance to the staff of "Services B". (I, II and III) cheap oil and to spend grain. Only over the With the accompanying Greek documents, it was possible to decipher the shamefully concealing initial without any doubt (as brothel). ²⁷¹

The civilian population as Suppliant

Most of the submissions came from the civilian population, either directly to the German authorities or via the prefecture concern the issue of food supply that has already been discussed. Surprisingly rare - at least in the surviving files - the requests for clemency due to the verdicts of the German military courts, which, in the event of a positive decision, are often announced in bulk on special occasions, such as "The Führer's Birthday". ²⁷² However, applications that require compensation for a wide variety of things appear relatively frequently acts of arbitrary occupation by the occupying forces.

Apart from the fact that, for understandable reasons, these petitions are mostly formulated in a euphemistic and cautious manner, the primary prerequisite is of course that the respective arbitrary act also according to the criteria the new masters are such. This is particularly the case with Property crimes, whereby the The witnessing Greek authority is diligently choosing between the "regulated seizure" the German authorities and the unauthorized requisitioning by roaming (often Italian) soldiers. ²⁷³ Incidentally, complaints about Italian attacks continued to be heard after Badoglio switched sides, although many of the perpetrators were undoubtedly "people willing to help or fight" who had hired themselves out to their former Axis partner. ²⁷⁴ However, the suspicion against the Italians is primarily based on the fact that civilians from objective reasons cannot be considered as perpetrators, ²⁷⁵ involvement can from Members of the Wehrmacht are not excluded be, even if the complaining community leader it deemed inappropriate to suggest such an eventuality.

At losses from draft animals are the opportunities for one at least partial Compensation divided. So becomes for a when colliding with Horse killed by a German **truck** "for reasons of equity" paid a financial compensation, ²⁷⁶ whereas the owner of one

²⁶⁹ Doc. 22 away.

²⁷⁰ **I**AK, PI, v.8: **K**KI to PI, 13.7.44. - The list submitted by the prefect on July 27, 1944 contains the names from 29 victims, the respectively impecunious Familys with 2 to 5 members leave behind.

²⁷¹ Doc. 23; also PI, v. 7: S. 692-694, 766-771 .

²⁷² Z b. Criticism Kiryx, 4/20/44.

²⁷³ IAC, PI, v. 6: Gendarmerie guard station Embaros 2.8.42; et al.

²⁷⁴ IAC, PI, v. 6: Flughorstkdr. at KKI, 2.11.43; KKI on PI, 3.11.43; u. a.

²⁷⁵ IAC, PI, v. 7a: mayor from Mallia above PI at KKI, 6.4.44.

²⁷⁶ IAC, PI, v. 7a: KKI on PI, 6.3.44.

a donkey that died under similar circumstances is less fortunate.²⁷⁷ The case of the “poor farmer” who, after losing his daughter (assigned to work in the Reich), also lost his mule (confiscation) is more complicated (as compensation for the daughter?) requested no The father is referred to the prefecture for grain, but without corresponding instructions to the latter; Before the animal is released, the unit in question must be named, which is not possible for the applicant.²⁷⁸ However, the basis for the decision is clear when, in “atonement actions” Livestock is driven off: Even if there is proof of whereabouts, a return to the owner is a priori excluded.²⁷⁹

What all of these cases have in common is that the interests or even just the reputation of the Wehrmacht affected in some way were. If the quoted service instructions for The territorial commander orders them to "ensure that the administration remains in progress," this includes also the worry about the maintaining one certain authority of the State-owned administration: This is within the scope of what is possible The thesis of an independence, albeit limited, of the collaboration regime and the administrative apparatus subordinate to it is to be maintained among the population.

Accordingly, the military administration repeatedly directs requests and complaints within Greece Disputes should be referred to the prefecture, noting that they concern matters the the Greek Authorities: “We are therefore requested to issue further instructions from there.”²⁸⁰

However, the criterion of the "internal Greek matter" is handled quite flexibly, and one or another German body often sees a starting point that justifies its own intervention - especially if a Favorite should be protected. Such interventions, in which the commandant's office also acts as the top of the Greek administrative pyramid in domestic Greek affairs, have already been mentioned in another context with the replacement of mayoral positions referred - a doctor's office, which conforms to the principles of German military administration. Far more problematic is the insistence on one Special permit for a Greek one employees to this - despite contrary Instructions from the Governor of Ministers - an additional income provide.²⁸¹ Similar applies to the intervention in a inheritance dispute - although only in

277 Doc. 24.

278 Doc. 25.

279 Doc. 26. - The integration of the prey cattle into “Christmas goods” is in flagrant contradiction with the international agreements on aid to Greece. Relevant reminders from Mbff. Greece are from the Hgr. E not passed on, because, in their opinion, “the troops would not comply with such an order”. This was then requested at the higher (Balkan) level the Mbff. Southeast the IF Southeast (ed. F) around a “clarifying one Command fail the Troop”: In towns whose destruction becomes necessary in the "gang fight" there are supplies and live cattle - "within the limits of what is militarily permissible" - to be ensured and handed over to the responsible prefect to care for the population. With regard to the obligation to compensate, “the troops are prohibited from using food or livestock as loot for their consumption claimed to take”. (BNMA, RW 40/86: Mbff. southeast, Yes, 1336/44 dated, 6.3.44).

280 IAC, PI, v. Sat!; KKI at PI, 2.12.43; u. v. a.

281 IAC, PI, v. 7/3: local district Ano Archane at PI, 10/22/43; This. at KKI, April 26, 1944; u. a.

the rights of use and not the ownership rights - to prevent fields from lying fallow.²⁸² In clear contrast to the Mbtb directive. Greece to leave civil jurisprudence "fundamentally unaffected",²⁸³ however, the district commander's request to the Heraklion Criminal Chamber to strike down the proceedings pending against a "hard-working" (Wehrmacht) worker and to deny the plaintiff - who is dismissed as a rich, anti-social troublemaker - "to point out that there is currently no time to conduct unjustified lawsuits."²⁸⁴ A flagrant infringement on the reserve rights of the Greek administration is also the instruction to the prefecture to promote six deserving firefighters and their references to increase - after it the Despite repeated reminders, the Greek government "did not consider it necessary" to respond to corresponding German "suggestions".²⁸⁵

It requirement none further examples, around to show, that the German Place above her "Responsibility" decide for yourself - i.e. about whether the oft-cited interests of the defense force are "affected" or not.

Resistance and repression

As part of this study, the Cretan resistance is²⁸⁶ only of interest insofar as it challenges reactions from the occupying power that affect everyday life on the island - excluding the major "cleansing operations". In this context, it should be noted that on Crete there is a broad balance between the communist-controlled EAM and the nationalist resistance - in contrast to the mainland, where the EAM clearly dominates almost everywhere. Relations between the two camps are not exactly cordial, but prudent leaders on both sides can - to the chagrin of the occupying power - prevent the outbreak of civil war at least as long as the external enemy is on the island. The Wehrmacht repeatedly tried to pull over at least some of the nationalist groups, which were divided into family clans, but they succeeded that only in the first occupation phase and then again a few weeks before own deduction, than it is easier to keep them still with a few truckloads Weapons are literally bought.²⁸⁷ In the But in the meantime is the Wehrmacht hardly in the Position to determine whether behind an act of sabotage, ambush or skirmish a "red" or one "blue band" is stuck, even less so their spheres of influence often overlap. Accordingly regard also the German Punishment squads at the Selection of their

282 IAC, PI, v. 7/3: PI at KKI, 4.4.44; KKI at PI, 2.5.44.

283 See note 207.

284 IAC, PI, v. 5a1: KKI on Criminal Chamber Heraklion, 11/10/43.

285 IAC, PI, v. 7/3: KKI at PI, 9.3.44; u. v. a.

286 One short Overview contains Xylander, p. 66 ff.

287 In the first case (1942) it concerns Manolis Bandouvas, the most famous nationalist partisan leader; also in September 1944, despite the interim bitter Confrontation is again a "gang" of Bandouvas clans at involved in these contacts. (Fleischer, Hagen, Contacts between German Occupation Authorities and Major Greek Resistance Organizations. Sound Tactics or Collaboration? In: John O. Iatrides (Ed.), Greece in the 1940s. A Nation in Crisis, Hannover, NH, and London, 1981, p. 49 f.).

"Atonement prisoners" only rarely on the criterion of the (always blurry) ideological affiliation - although the collaboration authorities repeatedly make representations in favor of "the best and most conservative class of society".²⁸⁸

But actually follows the bloodiest German revenge campaign, of all things Miscalculation by the nationalist leader Bandouvas. In order to prevent British speedboats and submarines from landing and making contact with the Cretan resistance, the military administration had in August 1943 set up exclusion zones in the coastal areas and arranged for the population living there to be evacuated.²⁸⁹ A company deployed to monitor these measures fell into an ambush in Bandouvas a few days after the Italian switch of sides and given the Rumors of an impending Allied invasion believe the time has come to strike. There When he finally kills the prisoners after his attack, the German retaliation degenerates into an orgy of blood. In mid-September 1943, a dozen villages Eparchy (subdistrict) Vianos more or less razed to the ground; at least 440 inhabitants - including old people, women and children - fall victim to the Peloton's bullets, or are killed in more gruesome ways.²⁹⁰

The larger part of the eparchy is then declared a restricted zone. The (surviving) residents have theirs Villages within eight to leave for days, but they are "allowed to take their belongings with them, including their livestock." Only "ownerless livestock" is to be handed over to the Wehrmacht.²⁹¹ A final extension of the deadline "ends irrevocably" on November 6, 1943. After that, anyone found in the restricted area is threatened will be shot without prior warning.²⁹² Even the wells there are systematically destroyed.²⁹³

As already mentioned, exemptions are nevertheless granted for the collection of the important olive harvests,^{but} not for grazing by herds. This grazing ban also applies to the "normal" (3 km) exclusion zones and especially for the as particularly at risk of landing and gangs applicable south coast.²⁹⁵ The reason lies in this, that the wandering shepherds - in contrast to the sedentary ones and therefore easier to control oil farmers - are not wrongly considered the partisans' most important informants. This also explains the beginning of the year issued regulation, which with the shepherds Death penalty prohibits "whistle signals" when German troops approach to give²⁹⁶ - their tried and tested method, Herd and dogs too conduct... So it is not lacking the Piquancy if that Distributed have to determine that in their olive groves are German Not just units harvest undisturbed, but also graze herds that they confiscate elsewhere have.²⁹⁷

288 See. Doc. 27.

289 Doc. 28.

290 See those prepared on behalf of the Greek government Report: Ekthesis tis Kentrikis Epitropis diapistoseos omotiton en Kriti, Iraklion 1983, pp. 43-55.

291 IAC, PI, v. 5a: KKI at PI, 9/16/43.

292 IAC, PI, v. 6a: KKI, Notice 10/23/43.

293 BA/MA, RH 19 VII/71: Kdt. fortress Crete, situation assessment, 10/12/43.

294 Doc. 29; see. also: IAC, PI, v. 6: KKI at PI, 10/22/43.

295 Doc. 28; in particular also: IAC, PI, v. 7b: KKI at PI, 3.1.44.

296 Paratiritis (Observer), 7.1.43.

297 IAC, PI, v. 6: PI at KKI, 11/16/43.

Proven "favoring the enemy" in serious cases, sabotage, prohibited possession of weapons and namely German losses at human life become from the Wehrmacht bloody "Atoned for." Precisely to prevent such conclusions, the press is often prohibited from publishing the news of the executions,²⁹⁸ although of course the respective extent of "action" and "reaction" also depends role plays, as well the currently the dominant trend in occupation policy.

More insightful, especially in the context of this study, as the brutal monotony of bloody reprisals²⁹⁹ is the range of "economic reprisals", when determining them Occupiers often resourcefulness and a remarkable one commercial Demonstrate talent. The German authorities have the most leeway when the perpetrators are known. Your assets can then be confiscated without compensation are, often in favor of the already mentioned Wehrmacht goods³⁰⁰, which is therefore a constant thorn in the resistance Eye are.³⁰¹ Less radical measures are taken against officers who do not comply with their weekly reporting obligation and are fleeing: you Assets will not be touched, only the payment of salaries or pensions to family members will be stopped.³⁰²

On the other hand, the next municipality will be held responsible if the The perpetrators are unknown or their assets are not sufficient to compensate for the "wehnnittel damage" to be punished. Mostly it acts itself about cable sabotage, not only those relatively easy to accomplish is, but also promises the author material profit. The borderline between resistance and theft is therefore not always clear.³⁰³ Of the 17 cases of cable sabotage recorded in August 1944 (27 in July). only once the culprit is identified, in all others cases become Atonement measures at the expense of local population arranged,³⁰⁴ da this the German "pacification campaign" and the corresponding calls³⁰⁵ have disregarded. The punishment is in money or, more often, to pay in kind; the Collection is entrusted to the community board. As approximately the City

298 Doc. 30.

299 Until today is not written determine how high this bloody one is tribute was. After by no means exhaustive research, they determined Cretan prefectures 1945/46 the following "provisional" numbers: Circle Chania: 1,432 executed; Rethymnon: 905; Heraklion: 924; Lasithi (until September 1943 under Italian occupation): 213. (Fleischer, Hagen, I Machi tis Kritis. Skepseis gia mia nea prosengisi. In: Kriti, Istoria kai politismos, Heraklion 1987, vol. II, p. 515).

300 IAK, PI, v. 7/3, **KKI** to PI, 5/17/44: see also Doc. 26. - In others cases will probably be the "prey" for the Germans "philanthropic subsidies" are used.

301 So made the Partisans .at one raid on the Wehrmacht asset Asomatos considerable Prey; the Germans losses amounted 6 dead, 11 wounded and 16 missing people. (BA/MA, **RW** 40/173: Kdt. Fortress Crete, daily report 12.9.44).

302 Please refer approximately the Name list in **IAC**, PI, v. 8th: **KKI** at PI, 8/30/44.

303 Characteristic is approximately that of Germans like also Greek informants The removal of mines from minefields reported to the Vf., which initially caused great concern for the local German authorities, until yourself turns out, that the "saboteurs" had the dynamite charge needed for (predatory) fishing...

304 BA/MA, **RW** 40/172: GFP Group 621, Activity report 8/27/44.

305 So approximately Doc. 31.

Rethymnon is sentenced by the district headquarters there for interrupting a military telephone line and the Theft of 1 LO m cable compensation within a week of 70 Raising ³⁰⁶ million drachmas will amount to ten million paid to the municipal treasury. For does most of the rest the Municipal council 108 natural or legal persons are liable for amounts between 100,000 and 4 million drachmas. ³⁰⁷ Occasionally In such cases, however, the occupying power is also called upon as an arbitrator to ensure a fairer distribution of the burden - so about as a mayor half of what is to be paid Contribution imposed on a neighboring monastery. ³⁰⁸

The occupying power repeatedly grants discounts, for example when, due to an isolated act of resistance in a (different) monastery, its entire grain supply (above the nutritional minimum) is confiscated became and at the request of the abbot, almost that half to "Continuation of "Gutsbetrieb" returned becomes. What is crucial here is the positive overall impression of the farm, which the obviously competent "district manager" wins during his inspection. ³⁰⁹ The situation is different the sabotage the telephone line, where the next town is to replace what has arisen damages in money as well as one "Natural contribution from 500 okay potatoes". the Army Directorate is condemned. As the community board a mentally disturbed woman as perpetrator makes known, accepted the Command this Explanation - not quite believable when hacking out and Stealing 30 m of cable, However, the excuse is only valid to a limited extent: Knowing that the woman was mentally ill, the village community should have prevented her from approaching the pipes. Nonetheless the fine will be reduced to 300 Oka. ³¹⁰

Lies the Crime scene between two or more communities, like that becomes the Contribution to be made - money and goods in kind How Oil, Raisins, wine, but also live cattle - d i v i d e d according to the principle of the greatest possible "fairness" ³¹¹. The same applies to services such as monitoring obligations and compulsory labor. ³¹²

Out of The frame finally falls a kind of material penance, which on the German side Particularly imposed at the end of the occupation period: the delivery of coffins "for the German soldiers who died as a result of gang operations". ³¹³

306 According to the plaintiff's calculations (see Doc. 11), this amount corresponds to around 100 monthly salaries of male, university-educated employees in positions of responsibility Place" (senior graduate engineers, doctors with higher education, etc.).

307 IAC, PRe, v. Ia, S. 20-24: municipal council minutes, 5.1.44.

308 IAC, PI, v. 7a, S. 919 ff., 930 f.

309 IAC, PI, v. 6: district farmer, report at KKI, 10/31/43; KKI at PI, 11/11/43; u. a.

310 IAC, PI, v. 5a2, S. 75/81.

311 Compare, for example, the division of contributions in a ratio of 4: 1, as an important one Cable 200 m further dem City exit from Ano Archane in Direction of Kato Archane intersected becomes. (IAK, PI, v. 6: KKI to PI, 9.11.43).

312 Doc. 32 a/b/c.

313 Doc. 33; as well IAC, PI, v. 8th: KKI at PI, 8/12/44; u. a.

d) *The "Core Fortress"*

According to the one already mentioned Escalation of "gang activity" in the first half of August 1944 answers the German Leadership with hard blows. After According to their own statements, 13 villages are destroyed, around "500 bandits and bandit helpers" shot, hundreds of others arrested; in large-scale raids in the cities under the descriptive code name "Pied Piper" will be alone on 1. September 343 Wanted arrested. After the situation has "largely calmed down" in this way, ³¹⁴ are requirements for that given the opportunity to withdraw relatively unmolested. The fortress commander gives instructions, to refrain from "wanton and senseless destruction" in order to the good reputation of the German Wehrmacht ... not to be wiped out by a bandit-like withdrawal". ³¹⁵

Because the British despite overwhelming superiority In the air and at sea, the German dropping maneuvers initially hardly interfere at all, but appear to provide discreet "escort" - this can happen Gros the German occupation on Crete (as well as the entire Aegean archipelago) within two weeks the to be brought to the mainland. On Soviet and other protests However, put in the second half of September Fierce British bombers attack, which significantly reduce German transport services. The OKW then made the difficult decision to stop the island evacuation in order not to upset the entire schedule. ³¹⁶

On the 21st September becomes island commander Müller was instructed to report to the commander of the the following day Fortress artillery Hans Benthack took command about the remaining Germans Forces to hand over. Latter be in the Western part the Island to defense one

"Core Fortress" - namely "until the last cartridge" - to summarize. According to the orders, the defenders are "of the magnitude of this soldierly task... penetrated" ³¹⁷. First of all, ask them but - at the Evacuation of Heraklion the first week of October - commercial skill under Proof. Various equipment as well as personal and Trucks "in good condition" are sent to the Sold to civilians, accepting German and Greek money as well as gold sovereigns as payment. ³¹⁸ In particular, the Germans - after secret negotiations with the Metropolitan and other Greek officials - for 80 or 100 gold pounds to buy the promise not to blow up the port facilities that are vital for supplying the island. ³¹⁹ Benthack gets the upper protection by of Army Group E telegraphed, with the prepared explosion went "high cultural Values from Minosan (she) and Venetian Time lost." There was also the threat of unrest under the population that has so far had supported the eviction preparations "through action and a loyal attitude". ³²⁰

314 BA/MA, RW 40/170: Kdt. Crete fortress, Ia, Management report September 12, 1944; RW 40/172: Front Reconnaissance Troop 382, 7.9.44.

315 BA/MA, RW 40/170: Kdt. Fstg. Crete, eviction notice, 8.9.44.

316 Butcher, cross shadow, S. 525,532 f.

317 BA/MA, RH 19 VII/43: Okdo HgrE, Ia at Kdt. Fstg. Crete, 9/21/44.

318 Criticism Kiryx, September 28th, 9/30/44.

319 Final Report on SOE Missions in Crete, p. 42, or. petrakis, EL, I Ethniki Organosis Kritis (EOK) Tmima Irakliou kata tin Gennanikin Katochin, Heraklion 1953, p. 66 f.

320 BA/MA, RH 19 VII/49, part 1: Kdt. Firmly. Place Crete, Yes, at Obkdo Hgr. E, Yes, September 28, 1944.

After the evacuation of the vast majority of the island at the beginning of October - at the same time that Admiral General Saalwächter was still fighting for the annexation of Crete advises³²¹ - defend 11828 German, a short one fifth of the former maximum strength, as well as a few thousand Italian Hiwis, the "core fortress" in the area of Chania and the strategically important Suda Bay.³²² The new front initially only consists of an imaginary line, but is then poorly secured with mines, barbed wire and constant patrols. Yes benefits the "Division Crete" from the disunity between "Nationalists" and "Communists" so that there are only sporadic fights. Due to the lack of visible enemies one therefore suspects on the German side, „that the Opponent systematically contaminated prostitutes works“³²³.

To the most burning problem for the However, the remaining command is formed Nutritional difficulties. These are partly due to the fact that in the first phase, traders from free Athens brought "lots of drachmas" to the core fortress with sailors and bought everything up until the military administration confiscated some ships with "contraband" and a short-term export ban imposed. At the same time puts she - nearly three Years after Andrae's plans for an "oil drachma" - the sales price of the key products it controls (electricity, water, operating materials) in olive oil (or in cigarettes for smaller amounts) and required for export (of oil, soap, oranges) in the unoccupied part of the island grain of the same value; Commercial traffic also comes with the mainland gradually into more regular channels. They drive for their own needs occupiers a lucrative trade in discarded military equipment; still have to the Bread and meat rations be reduced, "although further drastic cuts no longer seem to be acceptable without the possibility of compensation." Gardens cultivated by the troops provide vegetables, and there in the area the Core Fortress so far barely Grain cultivated became, he goes Command, for each 100 Man sowing a hectare of grain. However, almost only oats are available as seeds; turnips and corn should be used Serve stretching. But it will Don't harvest until mid July 1945 may be possible, and the available food will only last until End of **May**.³²⁴ The feared supply gap is forestalled by the general surrender of the Wehrmacht, but the British liaison officers leave it alone on the The island gave the Germans their weapons and even entrusted them with "maintaining order" in certain areas. This is intended in view of the rival Cretan ones Partisan organizations

321 See note 199.

322 Fleischer, Kreuzshadow, p. 533. The target number of 50,000 Germans on the island (all parts of the armed forces included) was slightly exceeded or fallen short of several times in the last quarter of 1943. (See the director's reports from Hgr. E on the supply problem in BA/MA, RH 19 VII/23 and RH 19 VII/75). The actual strength decreases first half of 1944 continuously and amounts to August 28th. still on 34 250 Germans (24,100 Army, 7,050 Luftwaffe and 3,100 Marine); the 22,550 classified as "fencing parts". are marked "1. Urgency" for evacuation and most of them are leaving the island; What remains behind are most of the 2nd (9,450 supply troops and cables) and 3rd emergency levels (2,250 fencing units with "low combat value" as well as almost all of the 6,500 "foreign tribes" the 4th and final level of urgency. (RH 19 VII/44).

323 BA/MA, RH 19 VII/49, Kdt. Firmly. Crete Yes, 663/44 gKdos., Situation report 12/7/44.

324 Ibid. - See. also: Vrontakis, Stavros G., I Ochira Thesis criticism, Athens 1976, passim.

the safety of the ex-occupiers from the retaliation of the locals be guaranteed; he continues to play thought of the thwarting of an attempted coup the Left with. There the gradual transport to the North African prison camps takes off until the beginning of July, the soldiers of the "core fortress" - albeit as shadow existences of an absurd theater - the last organized arms carriers of the "Greater German Wehrmacht".³²⁵

e) Documents*

All Documents out of IAC (PI/PRe) with Tape- and, provided paginated, Page reference.

document 1 (paratiritis, 17.2.43)

Kdt. the fortress Crete, regulation from the February 13, 1943

1. All able to work Residents are responsible for any work and provision of work animals for them occupation force obligated. The Requests for this are made by departments occupying power or the mayor.

2. All Municipalities are obliged to provide one upon request fixed number of workers or animals.

3. All Entrepreneur are obliged, on demand certain works to carry out.

4. No worker is allowed to leave their workplace without it Approval of the Leave the office or give up .

5. Workers, entrepreneurs, mayors, etc. must refrain from doing anything that harms the interests of the occupying power; they must follow the orders given and those assigned Carry out work and orders conscientiously. Damaging work equipment, vehicles, animals, materials etc. is prohibited.

6. Who the above provisions contravened will be considered Work refusers or Saboteur punished with a fine, prison or penal servitude, in serious cases with death. Against communities, the Contributions will also be imposed for those who do not provide the specified number of workers and animals.

7. This order comes into effect on the day of her Publication in force. At the same time, the ordinance of June 26, 1941 expires.

Document 2 away (PI, v. 7/3, pp. 243, 230)

available KK/to PI, 11/12/43

The district command requests the list of those still outstanding communities with the number of all able-bodied men aged 16- 60 years.

disposition KKI at PI, 5/16/44

The number of people who are able to work is still available for a number of communities men out. It is important that the defaulting communities finally report the number of men who are able to work.

document 3 (PI, v. 8th)

Out of the disposition KKI at PI, 7.12.43

The ones lately at the Greek Labor authority made Experiences make it seem necessary that a Change in the Line (Director and deputy) performed becomes. About it

³²⁵ See. Butcher, cross shadow, S. 534 f.

In addition, it should be examined whether additional manpower can be saved at the authority, especially since the scope of work is now significantly smaller in the winter months. According to the district council. It is completely sufficient if a reliable, A hard-working and energetic leader is appointed who, in addition to the interpreter, also has 1 - 2 female assistants are available. The Overall supervision is still exercised by the district command.

Document4 (PI, v. 6, S. 767)

*Out of the Disposal **KKI** at Community Alagni (above PI), 25./0.43*

The responsible construction management the Kreiskdtr. informed that the Gde. Alagni since long under 50% of the committed worker contingent available for the construction site. This means...disrespect for one imposed duty. Now assuming that the community in the future the committed contingent is completely provided and one voluntary fine of 500 Okay The Kreiskdtr wants to provide oil until November 10, 1943. refrain from further punitive measures. If further has defaulted but the community with serious reprisals can be expected.

document 5 (PI, v. 6, S. 488)

*Out of dem Request PI at **KKI**, 11/15/43*

Almost all departments [have] switched to accepting Greek workers from the employment office for one Duration of 30 - 40 days to keep busy, even though the corresponding command of Commanders the fortress Crete there is, that this workers every 15 days alternated become should ... We ask you please. a corresponding Instruction to the Germans units to give, so that They rotate the workers every 15 days so that they are able to do their actual work in order to be able to live.

Document6 (PI, v. 6, S. 734)

*Out of the Disposal **KKI** at PI, 11/1/43*

On the night of October 26/27, 1943 there were... Area of Ano and Kato assites from an English aircraft weapons, ammunition and clothing thrown off. Part of this Things became voluntary and at the instigation of the mayor delivered. The population is to deliver the rest Objects under threat of the heaviest Punish ... been requested. In view of the sensible behavior of a part of the population, more severe retaliatory measures are not intended at the moment. However, from now on, apart from the commitment notice from the district command, providing workers, from the Municipality of Ano Assites 15 and from the Community de Kato Assites to provide 25 able-bodied men in addition to the expansion of the path. The position of the workers comes to an end as soon as the road is completed in the opinion of the local commander. It is therefore up to the workers to determine the length of time for which they are recruited .

document 7 (PI, v. 7a/3d)

*Out of the Disposal **KKI** at PI, 7.4.44*

Enclosed is the Kreiskdtr. 3 advertising leaflets each to recruit Greek workers for use in the Reich. It is requested that Contents ... to be noted in the press; aside from that The advertising leaflets must be visibly displayed in a suitable place. The district commissioner accepts reports from people of both sexes. at any time.

Document8 (PRe, v. 1, S. 63f)

Out of dem Write German consulate Chania at PRe, 2/29/44

The Gospel Joanna Sklavaki, born 7.3.26, ... came as Domestic pregnant women in the university woman

enklirik in Tübingen, where she is now about to give birth. The girl makes an extremely melancholy impression, due to the complete separation from her parents' house and homeland. But Johanna doesn't think about writing to her parents because they have strict morals. Crete respects and fears... I now ask whether the parents can be informed through your intervention. Despite the Father and mother also have to have strict morals worry about the whereabouts of the child.

document 9 (PI, v. 6, S. 215)

Out of the Disposal KKJ at PI, 12/29/43

After an agreement between... dem Representative of the Swedish Government for the Relief operation in Greece on the one hand and the Special Representative of the AA for the Southeast on the other hand, it has been determined that that the Olive oil in Crete through the **IRK** is detected. acquisition and Export of Olive oil is only permitted to the company Eläon commissioned by the IRK. In order to make it easier to collect the olive oil... oil press owners to report the following to the district: ... a) Name and place of residence of the producer ..., b) the quantity of olives delivered, c) the amount of olive oil produced. The mayors are for the accuracy before everything the Declarations under b) and c) responsible to make ...

- Still The question of how this is affected by the troops and population is not entirely clear. Amount of oil needed on Crete is collected. In any case, care will be taken to ensure that these oil quantities are available from the Eleon company before any export. must be provided.

Document 10 (PI, v. 7b5, p. 16f)

Out the Disposal KKJ at PI, 1/25/44

The IRK has the remaining amount of grain from the concentration stock for distribution the Greek administrative organizations released. By order d. Kdtn. d. Fstg. therefore reach the following de Organizations the following quantities for distribution: 1) People's kitchen 3 tons, also 100 g of legumes daily to the people's kitchen participants ...; 2) Gendarmerie 9 to; 3) Fire department per capita and 5 Oka grain per month and additionally per family member (wife and children) an Oka grain; 4) school child 3.6 to. (With the distribution is to start immediately and that is for the Months January to March 1/3 of the above quantities to be issued.) 5) Officials: The distribution of 13 tons has already taken place by decree. v. 15.1.; 6) 100 to through the Import Union to the Population according to available information v. 19.1. - Regarding these distributions, it should be noted that neither side has a claim to ... wheat, but that the largest amount is barley and oats, of which currently... nor those largest stocks are available, are issued...'. Of the remaining amount... may only on the instructions of the Kreiskdtr. be issued.

document 11 (paratiritis, 10/24/43)

Kdt d. fortress Crete, Pay table (away 1.10.43)

A Male hourly wage earners (all information in drachmas):	
1. master (Director one Workshop), shaft master, Polish	1 310
2. master (Head of one partial workshop), Auxiliary foreman Etc.	1 180
3. Foreman, Director one Column, machinists Etc.	1050
4. skilled workers, a) with heavy or dangerous Work	920
b/c) Quality/other Skilled workers	850/ 790
5. away) Motor vehicle driver with without esp. technical Training	920/ 790
6. Semi-skilled workers workers	730
7. Unskilled workers	660
8th Apprentices and teenagers up to 16 years	290
. Female Hourly wage earner:	
b.	

1/2/3. Foreman/skilled/assistant /worker	690/520/390
4. teenagers until to 16 years Male	260
C monthly wage earners:	
1. Leading graduate engineers, doctors pp.	388 000
2. University-like preformed, in not senior position	305 000
3. Upscale technical u. Office workers with good technical education	239 000
4. Interpreter (full Language fluency in word/writing)	388 000
5. Simple technical forces, Porters with knowledge of German	206 000
6. a) language mediator (also female Interpreter)	282 000
b) Porters without German linguistic proficiency	140 000
7. Female chefs/head chefs	162 000/195 000
D Monthly wage earner:	
1. doctors	239 000
2. First class Shorthand typists with knowledge of German	206 000
3. Shorthand typists with language skills, low Practice	162 500
4. Technical assistants, Nursing service	162 500
5. Office workers with German or strange language skills	140 000
6. Office workers without Linguistic proficiency; perfect cooks	118 000
7. serving girl, Cleaning ladies pp.	92000
E Married people male Forces receive daily Family allowance	2000
F Special Wage supplements may to be paid :	
a) for particularly heavy or dangerous Work	16%
b/c/d) for Overtime, sun, holiday u. Night work (22-5h)	50%
G. At Presentation from animals u. Carts may paid become:	
Donkey/mule/horse	the 2/3/4 times
Donkey/mule or horse with cart and harness	that 4/6-?fold
Donkey/mule or Horse with cart without Dishes	3/5- 6fold

of hourly wage one unskilled workers (see A7)

If the feed is provided by the client, it is for the Animals only to pay half of the above rates.

Annotation: The workforce are fundamental after the activity to pay for what they actually do.

document 12 (PI, v. 711, S. 72)

Out of the Instruction Kdt. d. fortress Crete, Chief Genst., at KKI, 3/21/44

For cheapening the imported foods on the one hand and to increase the incentive for importers to import into Crete, on the other hand, from now on... proceed as follows:

1. The importer must be given up to 50% of the imported goods for sale on the open market. To achieve this, the price of the goods taken over by the import union must be reduced accordingly. The percentage by which the price set based on the calculation is reduced can, can't rigid be determined, there itself this in the general after The profit margin depends on the importer with the released goods in the open market can achieve. That means that the Price for the through the Import Union taken over Goods around so stronger can be pressed, the bigger the The margin between the calculated price and that of the free market is.

2. There the Import Union constantly at that of her to be inserted and the goods taken over become creditable funds loses, the commission is on the imported goods at 7%.

3. The reduction in the number of goods to be taken over by the import union should not lead to a deterioration the care the Population lead. This is through this to to reach, that through the

The prefecture determines the number of actually poor population groups and only distributes the food taken over by the import union to them. As far as the poor sections of the population are concerned, these are primarily those sections of the population that depend on a fixed wage or salary in question, especially that Civil servants and Wehrmacht personnel. Added to this that circle, not that one in the Position is, on the to earn a living on the free market, i.e. those people who are already partly included in the public kitchens... The Kreiskdtrn. The prefects must support this in every respect.

document 13 (PI, v. 8th)

*Out of the Disposal Kdt. fortress Crete (above **KKI**) at PI, 6/20/44*

It becomes requested note below to translate u. in the Ztg. "Kritikos **Kiryx**" in one the to have the next editions published:

The Reich's own company "Überlandtransport". The Reich's own company "Überland transport" was excluded from the German side. German means founded in July 1943 and has the sole task, the non-profit organization for the purposes of Crete serve. The Pursue is under the leadership of the commander of the Crete Fortress, military administration; with the management of the business is G. E Daskalakis-Chania commissioned. The 4 trucks put into service were brought from Germany to Crete... Although that German Reich owners and is the company's supervisor, it waives all income ... after deducting the necessary operating costs ... exclusively for Greek welfare purposes.

Document 14 a/b (pl, v. 7B3, p. 1230, v. 713, p. 170)

*order **KKI** at (Greek) Hafen-Kdt. Iraklion, 4.2.44*

Through Available d. Kdtn. d. Fstg. is with effect from 1.2. the price of fish 15 000 Dr. OK for them Wehrmacht and 50th 000 Dr. per Oka has been set for the needy population. At the same time will pointed out that the Results of the Fishing in three equal parts for the Wehrmacht, for the needy population and to be distributed to the fishermen.

*Disposal **KKI** at PI, 8.5.44*

The price of fish has been increased to 120 with immediate effect 000 Dr. per Oka for the Wehrmacht and on 240 000 Dr. ever Oka set for the needy population. The General Administration. Crete was instructed to Tax on fish for the Wehrmacht and for the needy population to be waived.

document 15 (PI, v. 8th)

*Out of the Disposal **KKI** at PI, 12/30/43*

Around the actual needs the really poor Population The invoice to carry, has the Kdt.

d. Fstg. Crete by order v. 12/24 ordered that people's kitchens should now be set up. The For this purpose, prefects of the Kreiskdtr. to submit a list of those poor people who absolutely need admission. When selecting these people, the following factors are primarily considered to consider: a) inability to work, b) Age etc. weakness, c) illness and d) widows with small ones children. Before the list is drawn up, the relevant ones are in place Welfare associations from Iraklion to hear about it. The following guidelines have been given for the people's kitchens: If at all possible, the food allocated should be cooked in accordance with the spirit of a people's kitchen and handed over to the designated people at the location of the people's kitchen. The advantage of cooking the Groceries - instead of an edition in kind - lies in this, that the food is actually used for food purposes...

Daily minimum rates below of food must be allocated to the public kitchens: 100 g legumes, 50 g flour, 30 G Oil, 20th g raisins and 5g Salt ... It is left at home, that the district council. in the Frame of their Available options in Cooperation with the prefectures this sentences he-

heights... Since the reliability and the ability of the for the group of people required to manage such a social institution (e.g Prefect, mayor, church) is different in the individual districts it the Kreiskdtm. leave it up to which people they come with the Commission the people's kitchen to be set up... which has so far been used to reduce the price of goods from the MV group of the Import Union The funds allocated are now for the people's kitchen available deliver. Furthermore, the people's kitchen is now available out of the Funds collected from social security contributions... at a percentage to be determined. To what extent the Greek state, the general administration. Crete or the rich population will give funds ... still needs to be clarified.

Document 16 a/b (PI, v. 7b5, S. 69, 58)

Off the Disposal KKI at PI, 12.12.43

The Prefecture are hereby... 1.2 tons of grain for the Students and teachers assigned to all schools in the city of Raklion. This amount of grain must be taken from the concentration stocks. The amount taken will probably be reimbursed by the **IRK** ...

Around the Bread for the To make school children nutritious, they should like Raisins and olive oil are added in the previous year.

Out of the Enforcement notification PI to KKI, 10.2.44

In response to your letters dated January 10, 1944 and February 1, 1944, we inform you that the allocation of school children's meals ... began on January 10, 1944. We distributed 3,850 rolls three times a week. She were out mixed grain, oil and raisins and were 40 Dram heavy... The Allocation ... has one very well received after they are very nutritious and free to be delivered .

document 17 away (PI, v. 6, pp. 283,

280) Out the Disposal KKI at PI, 12/11/43

The Kdt. d. Fstg. Crete has by decree. from 6.12. for the Heraklion district the following special allocations of food to the population for Christmas Approved: 1) 10 t of olive oil (from tax in kind), 2) 45 t of raisins, 3) 8 t of soap, 4) 22 t of grain. This amount can be taken from the grain tax... 5) Salt. The output will be in the discretion of the prefecture provided and depends on the existing ones stocks. 6) Cigarettes...

Out of the Enforcement notification PI at KKI, 12/20/43

In response to your letter of December 11, 1943, I honor you we would like to announce to you, that ... the allocation to the population begins ... (per capita): 1-3) 100 Dramia each of olive oil, soap, legumes; 4) 200 Dramia Barley; 5) 50 Dramia macaroni; 6) 15 Dramia tomato puree; 7) 2 Oka raisins; 8th) 7 boxes Cigarettes Per Smoker. Concerned Notice is ... published.

Document 18 away (PI, v. 7a, S. 848,

846) From the decree KKI to PI, 3/16/44

On the ... Greek national holiday there is a public kitchen that can be made possible with the allocated funds to give out improved food (meat, vegetables, etc.). More appropriate report is ... a sufficient.

Out of the Enforcement notification PI at KKI, 3/26/44

On March 25, 1944, occasionally our national holiday, meat dishes were given to both the people's kitchens and the children's kitchens. In addition, each participant's family received half an Oka soap, all of them this is free to the Participants submitted it and created the best impression.

Document 19 (pl, v. 5a1, P. 91)

*Order **KKI** to Pl, 8.5.44*

The bearer of this letter, who returned from work in Germany due to her daughter's illness and here is penniless, are made the stocks there something oil and Soap out to hand.

document 20 (Pl, v. 6, p. 464)

*Request of priest Emm. Venianakis at **KKI**, 11/23/43*

I hereby have the honor to ask you for permission from the Prefecture of Heraklion to grant 100 Oka grains to feed my family. On this occasion, I undertake to inform you that my economic... Condition currently is very bad, since I have no assets at all and because of my profession as priest the foods mine family of 7 cannot easily obtain from the so-called black market. Besides, I suffer from heart disease and my Ms. e.g. Currently is pregnant. Make a note please, that I am a friend of German politics from the start and as such I have everything possible for them German authorities did so I am not ashamed to say that my life is in danger. - Looking forward to your benevolent decision, I thank you in advance.

document 21 (Pl, v. 6, S. 476f.)

*Out of dem Request the widow Eleni Maravgaki at **KKI**, 11/17/43*

I have the honor to inform you that my husband Georg Maravgakis, who works as a worker at worked on the structures at Kastelli airfield, is at dem Payment office... to receive his daily wages. But because there are a lot of workers in the office were, he didn't get his daily wages and he is from Kastelli gone away, how dark it is became and without too know that the curfew passed by. - As he was passing the German guard at Agios Ioannis, the guard called him to stop; But because he was deaf, of course he didn't hear and so he was shot by the guard and he left me and his [8] orphaned children without any protection Since I am Mr. District Commander completely destitute am, and I and mine Children to Hun

ger Suffer, so please I She me one matching Crowd from Grain grant to want.

***KKI** at Pl, 11/21/43*

Ur. the prefecture forwarded with dem request that Applicant after Possibility to support.

Document 22 a/b (Pl, v. 6, p. 233/.) Local

*command Ano Archane at **KKI**, 11/26/43*

The Greek citizen Angelika Psaldakis has been a citizen since mid-September 1943 as an interpreter at the local headquarters busy. It performs its service in an excellent manner without demanding any compensation. It is requested that P. be allowed to purchase food (grain, etc.) at reduced prices.

*From the order **KKI** at Pl, 12/1/43*

The Greek Angelika Psaldakis from Ano Archane is 30 Oka grain, 5 Oka legumes and 3 Oka oil to be ordered against payment.

document 23 (Pl, v. 7a, S. 771) Order

***KKI** to Pl, March 20, 1944*

Against this instruction are the office b. I 44kg Oil at a price of 30 000 Dr. per kg (and) 22 kg of grain at a price of 10 000 Dr. per kg to be delivered against payment.

document 24 (PI, v. 7a, S. 639f)

Out of dem Request of Nicholas Arvanitakis at KKI, 8.3.44

At the 6. March 1944 during I with my Donkey, the I with fresh Cheese approximately 60 Okay loaded had,

...on the way to Heraklion was, all of a sudden a German truck with license plate WL 412990, which drove towards me at lightning speed, passed over my donkey in an instant and with it the Donkey died immediately. At the same time the 60 Oka cheese in were completely destroyed. There I, very Dear Commander, I am a poor farmer and I only get my food by using my donkey ?member family (including 5 underage children) would have I She sincerely asked for Granting one others the Wehrmacht not necessary Donkey, um I the To be able to continue earning food for my family. Otherwise, you decide what you think about the proper settlement of my matter.

KKI, *Ur. back above PI, 3/24/44*

The truck unit 412990 cannot come from here be determined. In order to process this application, it is therefore necessary to provide details of the office.

document 25 (PI, v. 7a, S. 702f)

Request of John N Prinari at KKI, 3.2.44

After the capture of the island by German troops, my daughter Marie Prinari worked as a cleaning girl at the guard station in Strubula worked and she has been in Germany for 2 1/2 years driven, where she her services the German Wehrmacht contributes. There I a poorer I am a farmer and mine Family, which consists of 10 There are people who cannot feed themselves I would like to ask you to send me one to approve an appropriate amount of grain and to free my mule from confiscation so that I can support my family.

KKI, *Ur. back above PI, 7.2.44*

The prefecture is responsible for allocating grain. Because of the release of a mule, the Kreiskdtr. first inform which unit confiscates the animal and where and since how long it has been used for the office is.

document 26 (PI, v. 7b5, S. /03)

Request of mayor E Chantsidakis at KKI, 12.1.44

On August 26, 1943 at the destruction of the Worisa town was given to me by the German soldiers took a two-year-old black bull, a breeding sow and three small pigs. Since it's me without that beef is impossible my field to order, can i mean Not family feed. That's why I ask for the return of the cattle and the breeding sow that were in Ambelusos (Wehrmachtsgut). are.

KKI, *Ur. back above PI, 1/25/44*

Dem Applications of Evangelos Chantsidakis can not corresponded become.

document 27 (PI, v. 8th)

Out of dem Request PI to Kdt. fortress Crete (Müller), 6/28/44

Excellency,

Please allow me to extend my warmest congratulations on taking on your new official duties to transmit, and to wish you also the highest to receive military degrees and awards for the well-being of the brave German nation and the salvation of European culture and Christianity. Like you... As will be known, around 50 people have been arrested recently in the city of Iraklion and from some villages been... Most of these people come from the scientific, commercial and agricultural circles, ... who have no relationships with criminals and communists, ... belong to the best and most conservative social class, and is particularly interested in that entire population for her Chic-

sal. **With** the confidence that thanks to your fair and benevolent decision If it is right, I would like to ask you to accept the expression of my highest respect.

document 28 (Pl, v. 6a, p. 940) Off

the Instruction KKI at Pl, 8/10/43

The commander of the Crete fortress has by order dated July 24, 1943 for the area of West-, An exclusion zone of 3 km deep was ordered to be established on the south and east coast. Based on this command it is ordered: 1) The exclusion zone is over reasons of Security...to evacuate in full. The evacuation must be carried out by the prefecture and must be completed by August 24, 1943... 3) Deriving the population must be carried out in areas as far away from the coast as possible. All shepherds and their flocks must also be removed from the exclusion zone... 6) From August 25, 1943, anyone found in the exclusion zone will be shot at.

document 29 (Pl, v. 6, S. 639 f)

disposal KKI to Pl, 11/11/43

I request that the enclosed notice be published in the newspapers Kritikos Kyrx and Paratiritis. At the same time are the Mayor of the adjacent areas the The prefecture has to be particularly informed that this is not the case through non-observance the regulations, unpleasant incidents occur...:

The owners the olive groves in the restricted area ... the harvesting of the olive harvest in the period from November 15th to December 15th inclusive allowed... a) The harvest... on the outskirts of the exclusion zone... can be done in such a way that this area Entered at 7:00 a.m becomes; it is then until 4 p.m. to leave again... b) In the more remote parts... from which a daily return is not possible, can they with the harvest employed people remain in the area even at night. However, you must report to the local headquarters before entering the area. The local command gives them an ID card in their name... The local command also decides in agreement with the Troop, where a closed overnight stay should take place. You are not allowed to leave this overnight spot after 4 p.m become. People who are still outside the camps after this time run the risk of to be treated as bandits and shot.

Document 30 (pl, v. 6, p. 226)

order KKI at Pl, 12/23/43

The Greeks 1) Ennr. Vidakis, 2) Jos. Kanakosaki, 3) Matthew Kalsadakis, everyone out of Panajia, 4) Ennr. Larnbrakis from Arkalochori and 5) Manolis Disperakis from Karnares were charged with being hostile to the occupation. Sentenced to death for behavior or for aiding the enemy and prohibited possession of weapons. The Judgment was at paragraph I -4 on December 14th and at digit 5 on November 30th executed. The Mayor of the The communities in question must be informed of this. Publication in the press is prohibited.

document 31 (Pl, v. 7b, S. 107)

Press call "To the Greek population in the Iraklion area and in the eastern part of Crete" (KKI to Pl, January 25, 1944)

The occupation force notes, that in the last few weeks Sabotage of cable lines has increased. This means a breach of the pacification campaign, which had generally started with great success on the island. The occupying power for the time being refrains from ... with stricter measures against the civilian population to answer ... The public is asked to report any suspicious elements. In the event of further cases of sabotage, the occupying power is forced to intervene.

Document 32 ABC (PI, v. 7a, S. 660, 657, 468)

From the decree KKI to PI, 3/12/44

About 3 km west. of the village of Kalessa on February 29th one Cable sabotage detected... It This is the second case of sabotage within a short period of time. As a retaliatory measure, the following is ordered: 1. Before the transfer of the Curfew on 19 h for a period of 2 months, 2. Forced labor of 20 male people for a period of 2 weeks, ... and 3. Payment in kind of 500 Oka oil and 1000 Oka wine as compensation for damage caused.

Out of the Disposal KKI PI, 3/26/44

How later? was discovered, the sabotage site is not directly in the municipality of Kalessa, but in area of Kavrochori Municipality, namely close the District boundaries of the municipalities Kalessa and Tilissos. The ... contribution in kind ... is therefore on the three communities ...ever to to convert to a third ...; besides, they are in digit 2 mentioned 20 male people to be used proportionately by all three municipalities.

Out of the Disposal KKI at PI, 6.4.44

Within a short period of time, the area of... o.a communities The third cable sabotage has now occurred. All efforts to identify the perpetrator and the call for residents to help... have been so far unsuccessful. For the deed and for the The resulting damage must therefore be the 3 communities to be held responsible... I) As Substitute of any damage caused the Paymaster's Office of the Kreiskdtr. until as of April 15th to pay the Municipality of Krussona 20 mill., the Municipality of Tilissos ... and the municipality of Kalessa [each] 10 million Dr.; 2) the following contributions in kind are imposed on the communities: the Municipality of Krussona the delivery of 20 Sheep to the military farm Ambelusos, the community Tilissos the delivery of 500 Okay Oil...and the Community Kalessa the delivery by I 000 Oka raisins.... meeting for delivery is April 15th, Failure to comply... will result in contributions doubling Consequence. 3) will be given to the communities... the monitoring of the Telephone lines for the Length of time one Monthly... imposed... Furthermore, all 3 communities once again left at home, to use all possible means to ensure that acts of sabotage are avoided in the future. Further incidents would result in severe retaliation.

Document 33 (PI, v. 8) Order

KKI at PI, 8.8.44

For those through gang involvement fallen German are soldiers until Wednesday to deliver 9 coffins to the district headquarters on August 9th at 10 a.m.

*) In the documents become mostly the Greek Weight measurements used: I Okay = 400 drams(ia) = 1.28 kg; 1 Dram = 3.2 G. spelling, orthography and grammar the Documents are retained been, provided the Understanding not impaired becomes.

Chapter v

The German Foreign trade in the Second World War

From Bertholdt Puchert

1. To prehistory and Definition

a) To prehistory

When Hitler and those around him aimed for self-sufficiency, they thought at a future “German living space” that should be economically independent of the rest of the world.' In order to prevent other states and peoples from prematurely engaging in coordinated resistance They avoided provoking it, the geographical dimensions of this “living space” concept clear to define. Dem Mosaic individual statements, starting already with Hitler's book “My Struggle” can, however It can be seen that ultimately the entire European continent, primarily its eastern half, was meant.

However, that was the long-term goal. The “living space” first had to be brought under German rule, for which in one case or another economic means and the threat of violence might be sufficient, but at least larger states and peoples did defeated militarily had to be, namely - so one hoped - gradually in each with short blitzkriegs with regeneration breaks. The Nazi leaders were well aware that until... In addition to the exhaustion of internal German resources and the loot in the subjugated territories, foreign trade with sovereign states remained unavoidable: food, Raw materials and at least certain semi-finished and finished products the Industry goods to import and to raise the The means of payment required for this required numerous German products, including industrial goods that were urgently needed at home, to be exported. During the war preparation phase, exports also had to be used to obtain **funds** through at least partial interest payments and repayment of older debt obligations states, the the to appease those who were suspiciously watching the German military build-up and to discourage coordinated reactions.

In the this chapter should to be shown, that and How the German foreign trade played its role as a necessary factor in the conduct of the war in its various phases, including the preparation for war.

See, among others, Döring, Dörte, German Foreign Trade Policy 1933-35. The synchronization of foreign trade in the early phase of the National Socialist regime, Berlin 1969, p. 36; The German Empire and the Second World War (hereinafter: The German Reich), Vol. 1, Stuttgart 1979, p. 195 ff.; Volkmann, Hans-Erich, foreign trade and rearmament in Germany 1933-1939. In: Economy and armaments on the eve of the Second World War, Düsseldorf 1975, p. 83; Boelcke, Willi A., Germany as a world trading power 1930-1945, Stuttgart 1994, p. 31 ff.

The foreign trade situation ² and which, although not only, but in The foreign exchange situation, which was largely caused by this, was extremely unfavorable in the first years of the Nazi regime. Straight but that's why there was one for drastic trade and foreign exchange policy Coercive measures created a favorable atmosphere, beyond the facilitation of dictatorial interventions in economic life, which resulted from the abolition of the parliamentary system. What was unfortunate was the end of the global economic crisis Raw materials that are needed to stimulate industrial production, but also to cover increasing mass demand as unemployment decreases Food and other consumer goods had to be increasingly imported, became more expensive on the world market, while external demand for German manufactured goods increased only slowly in quantity and to that the on the world market with it not redeemable prices adequate increases, not to mention the administrative import barriers that were erected or increased in many countries during the crisis. Through the German export of goods consequently the for The means of payment needed to import goods could not be obtained in sufficient quantities, and there was also a lack of foreign currency to pay off foreign debts. despite significant relief from reparation obligations were still high, appropriately so serve what would have been a prerequisite for new bonds and loans from other countries.

Any other government in Germany would have faced these difficulties at that time, including you experienced enormous aggravation by the course of systematic preparation for war that was adopted when Hitler came to power. But this initially did not need to be openly announced to justify drastic trade and foreign exchange policy measures because the economic predicament resulting from the global economic crisis seemed plausible enough as a reason for many.

After this and that individual regulation had been issued since January 30, 1933, as a continuation of the anti-crisis measures that had been in place since 1930, ³ the Reichsbank President Hjalmar Schacht, who was commissioned to assume the office of Reich Minister for Economic Affairs on August 2, 1934, made a decision on July 3, 1934, before his appointment, he followed until 30. September 1934 limited general authorization Use and in September and October 14 issued regulations, circulars and the like ⁴ which were in the public domain in summary as "New Plan" were designated. The "Ordinance" issued in agreement with the Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture on the movement of goods" bears the date of 4. September 1934. ⁵ In the coming months and years, this package was fleshed out with hundreds of additional regulations. ⁶

2 See, among others, Döring; Zumpe, Lotte, economy and state in Germany 1933 to 1945 (= economy and state in Germany, Vol. 3), Berlin 1980, p. 22 ff.

3 To foreign exchange management and Import control measures 1931-1934 please refer Döring, S. 58-65.

4 Printed as appendices in: The New regulation of the German foreign trade. A practical guide through the applicable regulations with the help of from clerks the official bodies and the imperial estate German industry. Edited by Franz Reuter, Berlin or J. (1 934), S. 77-132 (hereinafter: The New Regulation).

5 RGBI. 1934 I, S. 565.

6 A board member of Deutsche Bank spoke of 242 circulars in 1935 alone: Schlieper, Gustaf, Banks and Foreign trade. Series of the financial weekly "Die Bank", H. 4, 1936, p. 14.

In what is most important for us here Circular No. 1/34 Ü.St. from September 11th In 1934 it was said: "On the 24th. In September 1934 a new regulation of foreign exchange management came into effect for the import of goods. After that, the monitoring sites As a rule, instead of the foreign exchange offices, there are foreign exchange management bodies, as far as payment for imports is concerned from Were out of abroad in question stands. Purpose the New regulation is, under task of to bring the import of goods into line with the foreign exchange income of the German economy using the previous system of general foreign exchange permits for imports and the repartition procedure, which was only intended as a transitional arrangement, and to achieve this, that the largest possible dimension at Security for the Payment of the Import created becomes. For this purpose, foreign exchange certificates are issued for individual import transactions. The import of goods for which a foreign exchange certificate has not been issued is not prohibited; However, the importer cannot under any circumstances count on obtaining the necessary authorisation for their payment."⁷

The new regulation applied to the import of goods from all source countries (until February or March 1935 with the exception of the Soviet Union and the Saar region). The German goods directory, the containing thousands of line items now in 24 size Groups of goods were divided into groups, and the types of goods that could not be classified into these groups were combined into a 25th group, see above that there was no product that did not fall under the new regulatory system. Accordingly, 25 monitoring centers were set up, four of which were called "Reichsstelle"⁸.

The latter were already existing institutions for internal German market regulation for agricultural products, through which agricultural imports were also regulated had been regulated in detail even before the "New Plan" came out. German agricultural producers and processors had already needed it since the spring/summer of 1933 for each batch of goods that they wanted to bring onto the German market a takeover certificate for the Reich office responsible for the respective product. Foreign agricultural products could also be used only on dem German **market** be implemented after itself the importer had obtained such a takeover certificate⁹ - if he succeeded.

Everyone corresponding application to these Reich offices (for agricultural products) and now also to the monitoring bodies (for non-agricultural products) had to go with me one Variety of documents be stocked. Such an effort overwhelmed smaller business people in particular and often left them resigned. Traditional business relationships with foreign countries were disrupted as a result of bureaucratic pressure procedures that Quick access to favorable opportunities on foreign markets was almost ruled out, relaxed or disappeared completely lost, what officially was often quite desirable. But even if the importer provided all the documents, the success of his efforts depended on whether the responsible monitoring body allowed him to participate in the foreign exchange quota, which is generally not sufficient for all applicants.

The declared goal of the "New Plan" was es, the import of goods corresponds to the amount of foreign exchange dem Export of goods in accordance to bring. To this one Purpose became the diverse

7 The new regulation, S. 88 f.

8 Ibid, S. 15 ff.

9 RGBI. 1933 I, S. 143 ff.

The foreign exchange regulations from previous years were strictly systematized in the "Law on Foreign Exchange Management" of February 4, 1935.¹⁰ In the implementing regulation¹¹ issued on the same day it was stipulated: "The goods that are exported from the German economic area are for the for the purposes of foreign exchange control." An export value declaration had to be submitted for each batch of goods exported, and the foreign currency received had to be submitted Reichsbank or one of this authorized foreign exchange bank, unless authorization has been given to use the received foreign cash or claims in foreign currency to settle certain imports or other payment obligations abroad.

In order to facilitate imports that are particularly desirable in terms of economic policy, i.e. imports that are increasingly important for armaments, there were exceptions to the approval procedure of the monitoring bodies. In this one cases acted the State tax offices as Foreign exchange offices

- For very large amounts, contact the Reich Office directly Foreign exchange management -, while the monitoring bodies, their advisory boards consist of representatives of those concerned Industries normally have one had a certain opportunity to participate in these special cases were not allowed to decide, but were only allowed to express themselves in an expert opinion for the state approval authority was non-binding. The most important of these exceptional cases included "the payment of imported goods through private clearing transactions", "the use of raw material credits to pay for imported goods" and "the payment of imported goods from released export proceeds from a raw material loan transaction", so Transactions that involve large companies with trained organizational systems, with a wide range of products and services and, in most cases, a non-one-sided focus on imports and exports most smaller companies .¹²

In order to offer other countries incentives to buy German goods and at the same time to enable the necessary increase in essential imports to Germany without placing greater strain on the overall scarcity of foreign exchange Adopted the slogan "Buy from your customer" and pushed for bilateral clearing, i.e. foreign exchange-free settlement of the mutual invoice amounts at the level of the central bank of Germany and the respective trading partner country. This method had been in practice between various countries since 1931/32. How As Boelcke puts it, "the Clearing or settlement transactions ... the 'cash currency' into a 'commodity currency'. Bilateral clearing agreements concluded in primarily capital-poor debtor countries with each other, with those of multilateral le compensation not worked."¹³ The Limitation "in first Line" is to be taken into account, because the interests of the various countries were too complicated to simply divide into two Groups of clearing or payment agreements objectively interested person had divided. That shows that the following list: Owned in 1937 Germany Settlement agreement with Argentina, Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece,

10 RGBI. 1935 I, S. 106-113 .

11 Ibid, S. 114 ff. In addition Guidelines ibid, S. 119-152 .

12 Further information: Puchert, Berthold, Some problems Of the german Foreign trade 1933-1939.

In: Jtw, 1989, T. I (hereinafter: Some Problems), esp. p. 66 ff.

13 Boelcke, S. 37.

Iran, Italy, Yugoslavia, Colombia, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Turkey, Hungary, Uruguay as well as with the Soviet Union.¹⁴ While that agreement with the USSR on the specifics the reacted to the social order there, the offsetting agreements with "strong" partners such as the Netherlands arose from their efforts to secure the repayment of German debt obligations more effectively. On the other hand, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Japan, Canada, Manchukuo, New Zealand, The South African Union and Syria-Lebanon concluded payment agreements with Germany.¹⁵ **With** had sophistication the German delegation in the Negotiations with Great Britain prevented, similar to vis-à-vis the Netherlands through an offsetting agreement there is room for maneuver in repayment old debt obligations.¹⁶ Not In any case, it was in the interest of "strong" partner countries to conclude payment agreements with Germany, face the cumbersome, The clearing method tends to inhibit the flow of goods and capital. This only worked to the extent that it Deliveries and services had to be offset against each other. For a one-sided delivery surplus free foreign exchange was needed again. A balanced trade balance between two countries represented an ideal that had never been achieved and was practically unattainable. Germany in particular had to cover its raw material needs in countries that only were to a small extent considered for the sale of German industrial products, and this often also applied vice versa, although export surpluses to countries with strong foreign exchange were naturally desirable was because with it free Foreign exchange could become available for any purchases on third markets (actually claimed creditor countries a part of it for the Interest and repayment of older German debts, e.g. T. under threat of something that is definitely undesirable on the German side forced clearings¹⁷). In the opposite case, ie if the German import surplus was not payable through clearing or with foreign exchange and was reflected in "frozen" Reichsmark balances of foreign trading partners, these were transferred in a detour via "special accounts for foreigners for domestic payments". (Aski) forced by additional Purchases of goods and others in Expenditures to be made in Germany This method was used against creditors from many countries, but very frequently and to a considerable extent from southeastern European states, and was inevitably readily accepted by the latter due to the lack of other sales markets, which made them increasingly economically and also politically and military dependent brought from Germany.

However, the application of this method soon took place then increasingly to difficulties in Germany itself, because the armaments industry the production of products for inhibited exports. That's why 1935 was as rigorous as in the previous months import, a control, regulation and promotion system for the Export installed.¹⁸ For the expert regulation of exports, including the examination of all relevant business documents, in particular the factual pricing, belonged, became on arrangement

14 Ibid, S. 56.

15 Ibid, S. 61.

16 Ibid, S. 59 f.

17 Purchert, Some Problems, p. 75.

18 U. a. Zumpe, S. 144 f.

Statement by the Reich Economics Minister of June 18, 1935, "testing bodies" under the direction of the economic groups and endowed with state powers. furnished. All (except small) companies in the respective industry had to pay differentiated levy amounts into compensation funds ¹⁹, from which export premiums were financed, which were intended to cover the differences between (higher) domestic and (low) foreign sales prices. Export demands and promotion remained essential in the pre-war years, but also during the war, in order to make the necessary imports financially possible.

The four-year plan, whose stated aim was to... most serious Alleviating bottlenecks in the supply of raw materials meant, at least for the time being, that the need for imports increased enormously.

Already in 1934, but also after the war ²⁰, There were discussions about why a shaft so complex, bureaucratic, by himself in public as "something hideous" ²¹ set up a regulatory system for foreign trade and vehemently opposed the fact that Germany, like other countries before it, devalued its currency against foreign countries. Here is not the space to discuss all the arguments that are widespread above the Foreign trade problem go out and especially from Mass psychological aspects that the Nazi leaders always considered important, but also foreign debt, wages, domestic market prices, etc. are affected.

If the Reichsmark had been devalued compared to other currencies, imports would have become more expensive, i.e. inhibited, and exports would have been stimulated. So generally considered The devaluation had the desired effect for German foreign trade at the time, without the need for regulatory administration. However, the raw material imports required for the production of the export products would have increased the cost of goods sold, and it would then have been far from certain German versus British industries were on the world market proved to be competitive in terms of price, because England enjoyed advantages in the Commonwealth due to the Ottawa Treaties of August 20, 1932, including when it came to purchasing raw materials. Under peaceful circumstances but this problem of the in technologically modernized in the twenties and in this respect not only the German industry, which is superior to English competitors, can probably be mastered.

Given that immediately after Hitler came to power chosen course for war preparation but would be increased import prices for raw materials for both the Armaments production as also for the Creation of inventories for the wartime was a hindrance. Furthermore, it was at least uncertain whether, without administrative foreign trade regulation, exports would not have placed excessive demands on Germany's industrial potential, that is, at the expense of armaments production. In any case, there would be relatively free development opportunities for German foreign trade (it had never been completely free of state intervention), its dependence on fluctuations on the world market and new crises in the global economy would have been greater, and this could only have been detrimental to the boom in the defense-related economic sectors that was likely to last several years.

19 Examples s. Puchert, Some problems, S. 72.

20 Critical in particular Radkau, Joachim, Decision-making processes and decision-making deficits in German foreign trade policy 1933-1940. In: History and Society, 1/1976, p. 39 ff.

21 In one speech in Weimar on October 29, 1934, quote just that. 39.

It was due to the fundamental political course of the Hitler government that the Reichsbank took a decisive stand against the open devaluation of the Reichsmark against other currencies, with Schacht becoming demagogic. Replacing the word devaluation with the word devaluation increased. But that didn't stop him from actually carrying out partial devaluations in the form of different transfer rates in trade agreements and different exchange rates for non-commercial purposes Reichsmark to practice, the However, most people were not aware of it if they not as business people or Travelers had to deal directly with these manipulations.

Despite the reorganization of the Reich Ministry of Economics as well as - especially with regard to foreign trade - the Four Year Plan Organization 1938 ²² and Schacht's increasing disempowerment in both of the highest economic and monetary policy offices he held whom he finally in November 1937 and January 1939 respectively quite left, the regulatory mechanism for foreign trade that he created in 1934/35 remained essential in the last pre-war years unchanged. That's just how he was designed to ensure that regulation could be carried out in any objective and geographical direction deemed to be of primary importance, as long as it was objectively possible. And the "Ordinance on the Movement of Goods" of August 18, 1939 ²³, issued a few days before the start of the war, differed only slightly from Schacht's ordinance of the same name of August 4. September 1934 that one can state: The regulatory system set up in 1934/35 was also for the Control of the German Foreign trade deemed suitable during the war.

It is clear from this that the top leadership of the Hitler's empire and the Economic circles that had influence over them knew of no better way to promote foreign trade that political predetermined economic goal, so they could also get through the Feel empowered by statistics. Of course Foreign trade could have really benefited the German people if it had served their peaceful needs as part of a peace economy. But that was with the general thing Course of systematic war preparation not compatible.

After the traditionally passive trade balance (the high capital imports) before the global economic crisis in the balance of payments) during the crisis up to 2.87 billion RM had become active, the year 1934 had brought a passive balance of 284 **million RM**, which was not compensated for by capital imports. In the following years the trade balance closed with 111 (1935), 550 (1936) and 443 **million RM** (1937) plus balance. Schacht's goal of keeping German imports within the framework of foreign exchange income was achieved, but at a level that was already at a level that in 1937, according to current prices (which had already been reached again after the low point of the crisis). a few years of had experienced an increase). 5,468 billion RM at Import and with 5,911 billion RM at Export only little above that was standing of the crisis year 1932 and far below dem was standing the previous years of crisis. ²⁴ However, if one uses the price basis from 1928, then: the index looked like this:

22 AO Göring's v. February 4, 1938. „The four-year plan“, 2. Jg., Consequence 2, Berlin, February 1938, S. 65.

23 **RGBl.** 1939 I, S. 1431 ff.

24 Zumpe, p. 155.

Table 113

The German export and import, 1932-1937 (Price basis from 1928; in mill. RM; 1929 = 100)

Year	export	import
1932	59	70
1933	56	69
1934	50	73
1935	54	66
1936	59	64
1937	69	75

Source: Zumpe, Lotte, *Business and state in Germany 1933-1945*, Berlin 1980, S. 155.

After fixed prices, the balance was always passive from 1932 onwards, as was usual before the global economic crisis. So was considered Schacht's plan failed. Only was the acute Problem the German foreign trade regulation just those Affordability in the due year, d. H. not at fixed prices, while the strategic problem should be solved by gaining "German living space".

In the last full pre-war year 1938 came it then despite all Regulation closed again a liability balance based on both fixed and current prices at an even lower value level than in 1937²⁵, which apparently has to do with the price increase on the world market for raw materials important for armaments In view of the danger of war, there is now increasing demand from other countries were, and with the despite everything Export promotion strong export fatigue as a result of the arms orders in Germany. This state of affairs could be seen in the minds of those around Hitler - to the extent that foreign trade issues were taken into account there at all - only strengthen the urge to get rid of the annoying raw material import problems as quickly and as widely as possible by extending one's own sphere of influence to the raw material sources.

Also in the geographical reorientation the trade flows, the one Follow the Bilateralization was and the Effects of the In order to significantly reduce the British blockade that would be expected in the event of war, some progress had been made by 1938, but by no means decisive progress.²⁶ Southeastern Europe delivered only 12.1 percent in 1938, Great Britain (with dependencies) still delivered 16.5 percent, Latin America (excluding British and French dependencies) 15.4 percent (an intended relative growth success, but which was very susceptible to blockages), Scandinavia and Finland 10.3 percent of total German imports, whose most important reference regions are named.²⁷ The target regions had similar proportions German exports but - How explained - at that time the The main function to be fulfilled was to obtain means of payment for imports.

²⁵ Ibid, Tables 33 u. 34.

²⁶ Lately in addition Boelcke, S. 49-55 .

²⁷ In more detail, special above the Southeast European Portion at the German Foreign trade in the thirties: Puchert, *Some Problems*, pp. 75-81.

b) Definition

While the term "German foreign trade" in the pre-war period was undisputedly related to the passage of goods across the border of the legally fixed "German economic area" ²⁸, which, with a few deviations, corresponded to the German Reich territory, define and its sales can therefore be measured precisely this criterion, which is based on official trade statistics continued to serve, in objectively for the war years the Definition not readily acceptable. Exports and imports were now not just sales sovereign states (i.e. H. Neutrals or allies), but also with territories, the under German occupation stood, recorded, while in German Empire incorporated areas, i.e. annexed in violation of international law - formally in line with the law on trade statistics - no longer appeared in this.

For goods movements between Germany and those occupied areas, in those not once for Apparently one local government had been established, m. E from the outset Term "foreign trade". The definitely affects that General government and occupied territories of the Soviet Union, but also applies to Norway and Greece and Serbia, where the occupying authorities are locals Ministers tolerated or himself but in fact left them no room for maneuver and decision-making. For areas occupied by German troops in which a local government existed and functioned more or less independently under German supervision (Denmark, Vichy France) or whose government had fled to hostile foreign countries (against Germany), high officials were responsible for administrative tasks had commissioned in this capacity accepted by the occupying power (particularly the Netherlands and Belgium), it is more difficult to decide whether and to what extent their trade in goods with Germany should be viewed as foreign trade. Accordingly, this chapter takes a differentiated approach and occasionally takes a look at them Territories thrown.

In principle, however, occupied countries are not considered foreign trade partners for us because their trade in goods with Germany was not based on the needs of the national economy of these countries, but rather those of the occupying troops and the German war economy. Essentially, the plundering of occupied areas was merely covered up by forms of foreign trade, which in some countries was a problem for local entrepreneurs and politicians Collaboration or collaboration with the occupation force facilitated and was profitable for them, if necessary even positive side effects for them to local workers.

In a "Breakdown of the clearing balances by the German Clearing Fund" prepared in June 1944, it was stated that the foreign trade statistics of the Reich Statistical Office included "imports of goods for German account into the occupied territory and exports of goods for German invoice the occupied territory ... not included". ²⁹ The se Expression, the - provided she at all applies - only Questions of form of payment and

²⁸ See the preliminary remarks on the main section "Foreign Trade" in each year of the Statistical yearbook for the German Reich.

²⁹ **BAK, R 7/3628, RWiM III Gr. 7** at Kirchfeld, June 22, 1944.

clearing transactions, in no way refutes our previous assessment, but rather underlines the usefulness of involving local entrepreneurs occupied areas in the trade of goods with Germany. In a letter the Reich Ministry of Economics at the Reich group Industry from the January 1941 read we:

"I fundamentally agree with your opinion that deliveries to the Wehrmacht in the occupied territories are not possible as export deliveries are to be viewed. Such deliveries will also - insofar as they are recognizable as deliveries to the Wehrmacht - not funded by the ZAV. The same would probably apply to deliveries to other German departments in the occupied territories, which are intended only to cover the own needs of these departments."³⁰ However, the limitation of the applicability of the above-mentioned principle was limited by a cartel example added where the principle of Despite the Transport of the goods via the German Customs border as export get ranked should.³¹ The postulated The principle was therefore by no means consistently applied.

Furthermore, the deliveries of goods from the most important occupied country in this regard, France, to Germany far exceeded the amounts cleared in clearing (including services), the according to the final report the German armistice delegation for business from the armistice in 1940 to the end of August 1944 amounted to eleven billion Reichsmarks (with offset German considerations amounting to 2.5 Billion RM, like that the last one German debt balance 8.5 billion RM).³² In the final report it was also stated that the deliveries booked on the clearing accounts were out Further deliveries of goods from France to Germany in the amount of almost half of these amounts were financed from the occupation costs paid by France: "The further from the accumulated Occupation cost credits were used to buy up scarce goods on the black market amounting to around 3 billion RM alone, as well as the Reichskreditkasse bank notes issued in France but redeemed for the occupation costs purchases made in Height of again 2 1/2 **Mia RM** predominantly benefited the homeland in the form of goods."³³ The corresponded to more than 17 Percent of all French occupation costs paid during the occupation period. This information proves sufficiently how little the movement of goods between occupied territories and the German Reich territory involves real foreign trade had in common, even if in the country in question own government existed and the occupation force officially limited itself to exercising "supervisory administration" in economic (and other) issues.

In contrast to the official trade statistics, the interministerial statistics refer to The Trade Policy Committee (HPA), which, as before, including during the war years, coordinated German foreign trade policy, consistently did not include the occupied territories, with the exception of Denmark and France, in its deliberations and decisions.³⁴

30 BAK, R 7/3451, Bl. 168, Schwitzkowski to RGI, January 31, 1941. - The ZAV (additional export procedure) was introduced in 1935 to promote and reward exports.

31 Ibid, Bl. 168R.

32 **BAK, R 7/2287**, 6. Activity and Final report from the Germans Ceasefire Delegation for Economic Affairs, p. 11.

33 Ibid, S. 12. - **Mia** = billion.

34 Boelcke, S. 138.

The following Explanations are in Sections accordingly the phases of war divided: from the September 1939 until for the 2. quarter 1940, from the 3. quarter 1940 until for the 2. quarter 1941, from the 3rd quarter 1941 until the 3rd quarter 1943, from the Autumn 1943 to spring 1945. It become all for the German Foreign trade important partner countries or.

-regions are treated, provided they are in the respective area war phase appeared as foreign trade partners (in the sense explained above).

2. From the September 1939 until for the 2. Quarter 1940

a) General

At a first glance at the statistics, the restrictions on German foreign trade that the outbreak of war at the beginning of September 1939 brought with it do not appear to be as noticeable in percentage terms as those at the outbreak of war in 1914. Of the German imports in 1913, almost 80 percent and from the German export nearly 75 percent on countries are eliminated that became enemy states in 1914 or with because of the British blockade, transport connections could hardly be maintained. At the start of the war in 1939 the corresponding shares (1938) were only around 50 and around 40 percent.³⁵ To some extent this was the case out of the regulation outlined in the previous section and reorientation of German foreign trade in In the course of preparing for war. It had, different than before First World War, the Import quota even one Bloating due to over Exceeding the ongoing need for the import of strategic raw materials to create reserves.³⁶ However, 1939 extended the interruption of foreign trade connections to a relatively greater extent than 1914 on the import of armaments and war-important goods.

What is not to be underestimated was the fact that fewer states initially entered the war in 1939 than in 1914. As a result, more states remained particularly close to Germany than de facto or at least as potential trading partners receive. What was even more important in some cases: neutral or "non-belligerent" states could serve as brokers and transit countries for urgently needed goods from overseas and other distant countries. Particular attention should be paid to this In this context, the fact that there was no agreement between the Western powers and the USSR the collective defense of the aggressor had come about. By the When the Soviet Union concluded the non-aggression pact and economic treaties with Germany, it was given considerably greater weight than in the autumn of 1939, after the rapid occupation of Poland by both sides trading partner and transit country for Germany in the last years before the war. As a result, efforts by the Western powers, such as the naval blockade of Germany in 1914, were prevented from the World market to cut off, only limited Effects time. Add came, that

35 Puchert, Berthold, foreign trade and occupation economic policy 1939-1945. In: Zumpe, Economics and State, Vol. 3, p. 366 f. (= Cape. 13; hereinafter Puchert, foreign trade).

36 Hunters, especially Ch. III. - Boelcke, S. 67, however, says: "It largely failed Currency-financed stockpiling of raw materials for the war envisaged." Certainly let Especially when purchasing and importing strategic raw materials, the clearing method does not always and always solve the foreign exchange shortage.

the Western powers in first half to nine months of During the Second World War, they used their existing military options to block German trade relations See not consistently exploited.

That's what they were for economic reasons and political considerations are decisive. At the start of the war (in some cases since the spring of 1939) the diplomatic activities of both belligerents were ³⁷ Sides towards the neutral states are also aimed at encouraging them to disadvantage their respective counterparts in the exchange of goods. However, this goal was probably not pursued particularly emphatically at the beginning; even prevailed in British government circles certain Be wary of putting more pressure on the neutrals to exercise the purpose for which one is itself on negative experiences dem First World War called³⁸. The focus of diplomatic activity was on both warring sides the Goal, itself even the Continuation of the Delivery to secure urgently needed goods from neutral countries. The state of the international division of labor, the historical interdependence and interdependence of the European economies countries apparently caused that the belligerent powers preferred In principle, the neutrals should be allowed "normal trade" with the other side, ie more or less the right to trade turnover up to the average level of the last pre-war years to maintain what has been made. It corresponded entirely to this line when the British Naval blockade in the first three months of war (until November 27, 1939) was not at all against the export ^{of} German goods, but was only aimed at preventing the direct or indirect transport of goods that were considered contraband to Germany .

With the control of neutral ships with regard to those intended for German customers Goods were for the producers who trading companies and the Shipping from neutral countries high bureaucratic effort, loss of time and additional costs when heading to the British control ports (in the Downs, **Kirkwall**, Gibraltar, Haifa, Aden) and at itself sometimes a longer stay there ⁴⁰, not to mention the dangers that lead to war zones explained sections of the sea salvaged. That's why neutral companies and governments - as much as they diplomatically oppose blacklists ⁴¹ and other interference with their international trade activity protested - in the practice more or less willing to provide written guarantees to the British consulates that no batch of goods imported by sea will be re-exported to Germany will be ⁴², and also in your own Ports (i.e. in the territory more neutral or. not-

37 Puchert, foreign trade, p. 370 ff.; specifically regarding Sweden please refer Wittmann, Klaus, Sweden's economic relations with the Third Reich 1933-1945, Munich/Vienna 1978, **chap. IV**.

38 See. also Medicott, William N., The Economic Blockade, Vol. I, London 1952 (2nd edition 1978), P. 37 f. (hereinafter: Medicott 1).

39 Ibid, S. 117.

40 Ibid, S. 52 ff. and 70 ff.; BAP, AA 67864, BI. 37, Metal Society AG at Keppler, November 8, 1939.

41 More details For this see Boelcke, S. 125.

42 BAP, AA 67935, BI. 11 f., Clodius u. v. Mackensen at AA, Rome, October 12, 1939; BAP, AA 67864, BI.

47 ff., German Consulate Trieste to AA, November 2, 1939; *ibid*, BI. 41R, Wiehl to German Embassy Rome, November 17, 1939; *ibid*, BI. 58 ff., Rüter to various Reich ministries and military command posts, February 1, 1940.

belligerent States), e.g. B. still during the first months of year 1940 in the Italian ports of Trieste and Genoa, their shiploads of Allied troops to have officials inspect and if necessary to transport the contraband identified in the process to Allied ports so that corporate law proceedings could take place there in the Rule for Confiscate me led.⁴³

A more consistent practice of the The naval blockade of Germany by the far superior British fleet, reinforced by the French Navy, was also opposed by political considerations in the first months of the war. Neither in London, Paris nor in Berlin had anyone completely given up the idea of lifting the state of war between themselves (almost only symbolic in practice anyway). A more effective use of warships on both sides could only have harmed the realization of this idea. Therefore he left Commander in Chief the German Navy, Admiral General Erich Raeder, Danish Merchant ships partly on course for England spare⁴⁴ and ban On Hitler's instructions, German warships occasionally attacked French ships and ports, as well as certain activities against British shipping.⁴⁵ On the other hand, the British fleet left in the first months of the war many ships with German coal from Rotterdam and Antwerp to Italy can pass unhindered⁴⁶, and the French Navy handled the contraband control in the Ligurian Sea, which was its responsibility The prevention of the import of Spanish goods, including raw materials important for the war effort, via Italy to Germany was extremely lax.⁴⁷

A complete miscalculation of British diplomacy regarding Italy contributed to this. It was generally known that the fascist government of Italy had concluded the "Steel Pact" with Nazi Germany on May 22, 1939, as well as other agreements before and after it, thereby establishing itself as an ally of Germany acquaintance. In September 1939 she explained but then neither Poland nor England nor France went to war. Rather, Mussolini tried to last decade of August at the urging of military circles and his nes Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano, Hitler for a new edition of the Munich Agreement instead of unleashing it to win the war, with which he however only the postponement of the attack on Poland some days.⁴⁸ That was based on that speculation British government circles, which describes itself as "non-belligerent" significant Italy could be like 1915 (as it despite its membership in the Triple Alliance on the side of the Western powers had entered the war) would be deterred from participating in the war on Germany's side and perhaps even made an ally of the Western powers.⁴⁹ This speculation is not as nonsensical as it may seem in retrospect. Let us not forget that Italy was in the second half the thirties Years because of his War adventures in East Africa and in Spain be-

43 BAP, AA 67864, BI. 65 ff., Eisenlohr at OKW, February 10, 1940.

44 Puchert, foreign trade, S. 372; see. also Medlicott I, p. 167.

45 The German Reich, Vol. 2, Stuttgart 1979, p. 164; Madajczyk, Czesław, Polityka III Rzeszy w okupowanej Polsce, Vol. I, Warsaw 1970, p. 88; the same, The Occupation of Nazi Germany in Poland 1939-1945, Berlin 1987, p. 50.

46 First away March 1, 1940 had the British fleet Command, this Transports to prevent.

47 Medlicott I, S. 509.

48 ADAP, D, VII, esp. the Doc. 271, 320,349,395,411,417,418,474,478.

49 Medlicott I, S. 280.

A large part of the political and economic interests in Austria and southeastern Europe had to be sacrificed to the German competitor and rival without a fight.⁵⁰ Mussolini's deep displeasure may also have passed over the shabby behavior his ally Hitler, the in the contradiction to dem agreed schedule unilaterally as early as 1939 the war provoked and, in Mussolini's view, Italy collapsed revealed⁵¹, could hardly have remained completely hidden from the Western powers.

However, Italy's claims to supremacy in the Mediterranean region still existed, which then proved to be paramount in the early summer of 1940 when France was under attack by the German Wehrmacht collapsed militarily and the Italian government believed it had to hasten to enter the war on Germany's side so as not to be too late to realize these claims.

b) Italy

That the Italian government in the fall of 1939 for military and economic reasons Considerations The fact that he shied away from declaring war quickly proved to be an advantage not only for Italy, but also for the German war economy. To a certain extent, government circles on both sides have already faced such a situation taken into account beforehand and prepared within the framework of their departmental competences (which were certainly not decisive for the decision on war or peace). In these activities, aggressive fascist complicity is intertwined with capitalist profit-seeking and competition against each other. While the German troops were still in the process of conquering Poland, but on the other hand the British and French declaration of war Not in Germany This resulted in active fighting on the German Western Front, albeit a longer one War into the realm of probability the chairman reported of German Government Committee⁵² for Economic negotiations with Italy, Carl Clodius, on September 14, 1939 from Rome to the Foreign Office in Berlin⁵³: "Italians are practically ready to promote Germany's trade with third countries via Italy by all means." In this respect i.e. loyalty to the alliance. But there was therefor of course objective barriers, and these were also suitable for being exploited subjectively, ie to be inflated if possible. Clodius drives in his telegraphic Report continued: "Financially, however, options are very limited, as Italians explained Due to our own shortage of foreign currency, all payments for goods and freight from third countries would have to be paid in foreign currency. Over and beyond demanded she generally payment Sea freight in currency and explained itself only after

SO See, among others, "The German Economist", 10th year, No. 7 of November 15, 1935, p. 301; ibid., No. 20 of February 14, 1936, p. 914 f.; Schinzinger, Francesca, War Economics Aspects of German-Italian economic relations 1934-1941. In: War Economy and Armament 1939-1945, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 169 f.

S1 ADAP, D,VII, Doc. 226 u. 364.

52 With all states, with which Germany clearing contracts on the Area of After foreign trade was concluded, bilateral trade was regulated by permanent government committees from both partner states.

53 BAP, AA 67927, BI. 68 f., Clodius at AA, Rome September 14, 1939.

"We are prepared to at least maintain the current situation (traffic via Adriatic ports in clearing) for the time being." Italian Foreign exchange receivables sound quite plausible at first, because it must have seemed safer to have foreign bills of exchange denominated in internationally well-respected currencies than to hold hand than just a credit balance in the clearing account

to be credited. Italy's foreign exchange balance for the However, the year 1940 showed such a marked improvement ⁵⁴ that there can be no doubt that this was due to the services provided to Germany grown up was. The Italian authorities and the at the Transit to Germany Italian companies involved played in the nine months of her "Nonbellige Renza", as she opposite your German partners at the longer Lever arm sat, always How the basically real, but at the same time also happy exaggerated "Foreign exchange shortage" in order to make extra profits from the war conditions.

In contrast to 1914, in 1939 there were only very few German investments and assets abroad that could be used could be used to finance urgently needed imports of goods. Therefore, German companies and government agencies were keen to expand existing export markets, especially in countries from which access could easily be blocked as soon as the British blockade was extended to German exports. with Help from partners third countries itself to preserve or also first to open. This was achieved in individual cases via various neutral neighboring countries of Germany, but particularly systematically via Italy. Ship transport of falsely declared Germans Lots of goods under Italian flag would of course not long be feasible. There were no illusions about this. The more effort was made to explore the possibilities in addition to use them as long as they existed, that is, as long as the other side used them for the above-mentioned political considerations, but also because they were still insufficiently functional Economic Warfare System was not destroyed. On the export side, IG Farbenindustrie AG was particularly active in this regard with its extensive international network of subsidiaries, equity investments, cartel partners and trading agencies. ⁵⁵ In anticipation of the sooner or later blocking of the Sea connections for the camouflaged German trade transit via Italy was in 1939 on Hitler's Wish one An Italian airline was set up under the name LATI, which relatively regularly transported pharmaceutical products, propaganda material and other things to the Iberian Peninsula and Latin America on the Rome-Spain-Dakar-Brazil route on behalf of Germany and on the way back (in the opinion of the William N. Medlicott, then working in the British Ministry of Economic Warfare), constantly brought in significant quantities of mica, industrial diamonds, platinum and other metals of low mass but strategic value. ⁵⁶ The LATI was able to continue its operations since the summer of 1940, following an irregular secret flight plan, until the USA entered the war at the end of 1941.

So very Italy dem German Foreign trade until for the May 1940 (and by means of the LATI still

54 BAP, AA 68971117a, BI. 56, v. Bismarck at AA, Rome May 9, 1941.

55 BAP, AA 67867, BI. 190 ff., Strictly confidential report from Weber (Cofa Milan) and Müller (Wipo Berlin of IG Farben), Innsbruck June 12, 1940, under d. Heading "Disguised Export"; see also Medlicott, William N., *The Economic Blockade*, Vol. II, London 1952 (2nd ed. 1978), p. 165 (hereinafter: Medlicott II).

56 How Note 55 (both Sources).

longer) as a transit country served, that's how it was especially yourself Import- and export partners. With the start of war In this respect it not only overtook Great Britain, but also the USA (1940 then also the Netherlands and Sweden). This is how Italy became the leading supplier and buyer country German foreign trade. How previously existed Italy Deliveries largely consist of fruit and tropical fruits and wine, while the raw materials for industry (zinc ore, pyrites, bauxite as well Textile and raw materials for chemical products) made up the smaller part and were not consistently delivered in larger quantities than before. After the start of the war, coal took up an even larger share of the many types of goods supplied from Germany than before because England greatly reduced its coal exports or stopped them completely (not only to Italy). Despite Hermann Göring's assessment published shortly after the start of the war, which led the magazine "Der deutsche Volkswirt" to write the headline "Coal is cash currency"⁵⁷, let the British fleet ships with German coal from Dutch and Belgian Italian ports in the first months of war happen unmolested. This made it possible, in particular From the payment side, it is essential to maintain and expand the German-Italian exchange of goods. As the head of the trade policy department of the Foreign Office, Emil Wiehl, told his concerned superior, Reich Foreign Minister Joachim, on August 30, 1939 v. Ribbentrop and State Secretary Ernst Fr. v. Weizsäcker, announced that the contractual commitment to Italy to deliver 755,000 tons of coal per month was based on the fact that 630 of them 000 t would be transported by sea as before.⁵⁸ For military purposes would even Railway wagons withdrawn, So coal deliveries by rail to Italy will be reduced. What but heavier weighed: Even at Provision of more Waggons were considered the result of analyzes carried out by German and Italian railway experts between October 1938 and February 1939 the railway lines across the Alpine passes are considered insufficiently permeable for "orderly transport in abnormal cases"⁵⁹, i.e. also for a shift in coal transport from ships to rail routes.

The British fleet only stopped delivering German coal to Italy in March 1940 by sea, it had given the Axis powers enough time to bring about a situation through organizational improvements and construction measures as well as through the use of Swiss railways that would allow them to accept the British offer to Italy to deliver English coal and for that financial relief give one away (certainly with the intention of destabilizing the "Axis") counteract by as result of one Ribbentrop's quick visit 13. May 1940 an agreement above the The delivery of one million tons of German coal to Italy per month was completed.⁶⁰ This amount, um approximately a third higher than previously contractually agreed A few days later, the Italian Trade Minister Raffaello Riccardi also said in a speech that everything transported by land would.⁶¹ Falis not to propaganda

57 "The German Economist", 13. Jg., No. 50 v. September 15, 1939, S. 2414.

58 ADAP, D, VII, Doc. 464.

59 BAP, AA 68730, Bl. 65, Third Secret protocol Of the german etc Italian Governing Committee v. February 13, 1939.

60 Medlicott I, S. 303 f.

61 BAP, AA 68971/17a, Bl. 50 f., v. Mackensen at AA, Rome May 24, 1940.

was exaggerated for this purpose (as was assumed in England), this meant that at least in this important sector the soon entry into war of Italy one had received certain protection.

c) Spain and Portugal

On October 19, 1939, Wiehl informed his minister in a special recording the Possibilities and the already in the Difficulties in trade with Spain that arose in the first weeks of the war: "The regulation of economic relations with Spain under wartime conditions presents particular difficulties, since the movement of goods will only be possible in camouflaged transit via Italy as long as the sea connections are subject to disruptions by the enemy powers. Our interest is to get as many Spanish raw materials in as possible in this way and to prevent the Spanish from resuming deliveries of raw materials to the enemy powers. The Spanish government has repeatedly assured our ambassador of its best intentions before the start of the war taken economic Cooperation despite of After the war However, Wiehl was quick to point out that the results were "only proportionate to previous plans small amount can be".⁶² This restriction referred to the Difficulties of camouflaged transit via Italy. Another fear that subsequently emerged was only hinted at proved to be valid: the Franco regime would endeavor to escape the subordination to the economic demands of German imperialism, forced upon it in gratitude for Hitler's help in the civil war ,⁶³ by developing its economic relations with England. Such an effort arose not only from the subjective desire of the extremely nationalistic⁶⁴ new rulers of Spain, who were therefore also allergic to the machinations of their alleged friends from Berlin to acquire natural resources like colonial masters. It was because of the country's dependence on Food and raw material imports from Germany couldn't come back then, as well as from objectively necessary for financial reasons, especially in the severe economic crisis in the wake of the civil war.

The Western powers used this circumstance as a starting point for their negotiations with Madrid. after the French negotiating partners did not make much progress in the first few months were, the British government took over Leadership for the Allied side and brought a complex of war trade agreements with Spain was signed on March 18, 1940 and essentially contained the following:

62 BAP, AA 67865, BI. 42, recording Wiehl for Reich Foreign Minister (R.A.M), October 19, 1939.

63 Ruh!, Klaus-Jörg, Spain in the Second World War. Franco, the Falange and the "Third Reich", Hamburg 1975, p. 40 f. - There p. 309 f. further references.

64 Smyth, Denis, The Moor and the Money-lender: Politics and Profits in the Anglo-German Relations with Francoist Spain 1936-1940. In: From competition to rivalry. From Competition to Rivalry. British-German relations in the countries of the European periphery 1919-1939. Tue Anglo-German relationship in the countries at the European periphery, 1919-1939. Edited by Marie-Luise Recker, Stuttgart 1986, pp. 143-174 (hereinafter: From the competition).

"1. A trade and payments agreement which provided for the establishment of a clearing system to ensure the repayment of accrued debts to the United Kingdom, as well as current ones Trade with the Sterling zone too finance;

2. a loan agreement which granted Spain an amount of two million pounds sterling for expenditure in the Sterling Zone;

3. an agreement under which certain goods could pass Allied controls into Spain, but could not be re-exported without Allied consent were allowed to be."⁶⁵

The Spanish government therefore did not have to undertake to restrict the export of goods produced in Spain to Germany. Given the and such strong opposition from a number of leading Falangists to the relaxation of cooperation with Germany and Italy, a British attempt to impose such a commitment would certainly have caused the negotiations to fail. However, under the objective economic conditions to which the Franco regime was subject, the above-mentioned provisions of the agreement offered the British side sufficient opportunities to implement delayed measures or limited Fulfillment of delivery promises Madrid by case to case to persuade them to give in to allied interests.

Especially in the first months of the war itself the German import Spain in a camouflaged transit via Italy, which Ruhl assesses as "relatively insignificant"⁶⁶ and is probably therefore not examined in more detail, by no means only on smaller batches of goods, but also on iron ores. Because the actual clients, including the Metallgesellschaft Frankfurt/Main and the Fried. Krupp AG⁶⁷ as well as Otto Wolff, Cologne,⁶⁸ difficult before kept secret from the many Italians and nationals of third countries involved in such transactions, as well as from allied consular officials and secret service agents⁶⁹, because furthermore the insurance companies refused, in the event of confiscation for incorrectly declared items Consignment of goods

to make payments⁷⁰, and because finally intermediaries, Freight forwarders and shipping companies of neutral companies register their entry in the Allied black lists feared⁷¹, What the This method found that German trade with increased costs for the camouflaged transit the Iberian Peninsula and with overseas countries, overall quantitatively narrow application. But individual transactions must be for the participating companies and for the German war economy may well have been significant when considering such risks and additional costs didn't shy away.

The Portuguese government, allied with Franco-Spain since March 17, 1939 through a pact of friendship and non-aggression and political since the Spanish Civil War and foreign trade stronger as previously on Germany oriented, was nevertheless-

65 Medlicott I, S. 510.

66 Quiet!, S. 41.

67 BAP, AA 67866, BI. 3, Plessen at AA, Rome December 28, 1939.

68 BAP, AA 67865, BI. 175 f., Otto Wolff Cologne Dept. Abroad branch Berlin at AA, December 4, 1939.

69 BAP, AA 67866, BI. 46, Graeff to AA, Rome November 29, 1939. - Also in other reports point this out.

70 Ibid., BI. 111, Reich Office for Foreign Trade, Wingen, to AA, January 25, 1940, with 'Copy a message from Soc. At. Mercantile Esportazioni Mesport, Genoa.

71 Ibid., BI. 165, Reich office f. stones etc. Earth, Klessen, to AA, with Copy of a communication from the Deutsch-Südamerikan Bank AG Hamburg branch v. January 12, 1940.

Niger interested in the traditional Trade and capital relations to Great Britain. She avoided the conflict, which had been conducted intermittently since September 1939 Negotiations to have the British side determine its trade relations with Germany. The London Ministry of Economic Warfare was busy in the first months of the year 1940 considers that "Portugal is increasingly becoming an entrepot for the German trade will. In the agreement with Italy was one strength increase in trading volume intended, and goods of value for Germany went in large ones quantities Italy. One growing Number smaller, but more valuable goods were achieved and left the peninsula by air; it was e.g. B. known that five tons Portuguese wolf rams on the were transported from Spain to Italy by German airline."⁷² Finally the British succeeded Negotiators but at the end of May/beginning of June 1940, the economic Interest of the Portuguese government for a three-sided to create agreement that u. a. provided that with English financial aid food out of the Portuguese colonies and other countries for the consumption in Bought in Spain and on Portuguese ships were brought in. Based on what was mentioned previously British-Spanish agreement were allowed these goods not re-exported become. Related With this agreement, the Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Oliveira Salazar drafted a protocol that he together with Francisco Franco (who met on 12. June 1940 as had declared "not at war" on 29. Signed in July 1940. This reaffirmed the will of both states to maintain their independence and those concluded with third countries contracts to hold on. In Consideration of even achieved military Germany's victory over France meant this protocol and the British-Portuguese-Spanish Colonial Goods Agreement an important success for Great Britain, at least one given the war situation in the country Summer 1940 threatened unilateral binding of Portugal and of Spain at the Axis powers avoided became.⁷³

d) Northern Europe and Baltics

After the governments of the four Nordic states already in the previous ones Months basic Agreements with the German and the British government the had agreed to maintain their foreign trade relations in the event of war them at the meeting of their prime ministers and state presidents on 18/19. The principle of "normal trade" was introduced in Copenhagen in September 1939.⁷⁴ However, the German government wanted to - in the Contrast with the British - including Understand the re-export of goods imported to Germany by the neutrals, which then applies in many specific cases to the matter in question Country brought difficulties with the other belligerent side.

Relatively little was affected until the beginning of April 1940 the Danish trade because the warring sides were objectively interested in it: England wanted products, as usual the Danish Livestock breeding relate, by which Denmark currency redeemed, the it for the

⁷² Medlicott I, S. 513.

⁷³ See. in addition *ibid*, S. 510-515 .

⁷⁴ Medlicott II, S. 21; BAP, AA 67734, BL 152 f., telegram v. Hassei (and v. Renthe-Fink). AA, Copenhagen September 2, 1939, among others

Purchase of feed needed overseas. Germany needed it Delivery of butter and other animal products from Denmark, which is why the prerequisites just mentioned for the Maintenance the Danish livestock farming had to let it exist. So then enjoyed Danish Merchant ships due to a bureaucratic reporting procedure ⁷⁵ of In each case, protection was granted when passing through the naval blockade areas of both fleets, although this did not completely rule out Danish ship losses.

It has already been mentioned that and why the British tried to influence the trade of the neutrals, including Sweden, with the German sphere of influence primarily using more cautious methods. Sweden, on the other hand, was opposed to continuing its trade Great Britain and generally with overseas partners on the German side exposed to strong pressures. It went so far that... German Navy frequently violated the Swedish territorial waters ⁷⁶, which were widened by Sweden to four nautical miles ⁷⁷, to control merchant ships flying Swedish and other flags. It worked probably not so much the prohibition certain transports, as before everything therefore, Sweden, that in In the first months of the war, negotiated war trade agreements with both warring parties and, understandably, based on concessions ⁷⁸ or pressure from one side, arguments against the other other side to derive their own desired benefit a tougher negotiating position towards Great Britain and more leniency towards Germany to move. The fate of the Swedish However, negotiators managed to negotiate two war trade agreements with Great Britain in December 1939 (on December 7th signed, on 20. came into force, but first on the 28th. December in announced in a general communique that avoids details) and with Germany (signed on December 22nd and also made public without mentioning any details) to fundamentally preserve their country's trade neutrality. ⁷⁹

However, in the first phase of the war, Sweden found itself forced to make war-economic concessions ⁸⁰ Germany in order to allow ships to move in and out of the country North Sea and Atlantic to some extent secure circulate let to can. This To-

75 BAP, AA 67765 re: "Trade relations between strange States. Danish Food ships to England October 18, 1939 to January 29, 1940" (various applications), etc. AA 67766, similar "January 30, 1940 to ...".

76 Sweden already in 19. century championed claim to four instead of how usual, three Territorial waters nautical miles wide was based on the fact that on Baltic Sea exit at Falsterbo within three miles only ships with 5 m, but in the fourth mile those with a draft of 8 m could sail (see Wittmann, p. 160 ff.).

77 The German Empire, Vol. 2, p. 160 f. - In December 1939, the German naval command even prepared a study for the possible occupation of the southern Swedish region of Skåne (Schonen) in order to bring the Baltic Sea exits completely under German guard. Ibid., p. 161.

78 It should be seen as such that at the beginning of the final phase of negotiations the Trade Policy Committee, which did not know that the Swedish-British agreement was already perfect, agreed that "about 60 - 80 in German ports to investigate contraband Swedish ships held in custody and consigned to neutral ports should largely be released" (Wittmann, p. 165, citing the HPA protocol dated December 7, 1939).

79 To the negotiations above the both "War Trade Agreement"s. Wittmann, S. 153-169.

80 By Sweden ultimately his both negotiating partners motivated to in dem particularly for his Iron ore deliveries to Germany cause a significant dispute over the term "normal trade"

After the occupation of Norway and even more massively in connection with the German attack on the Soviet Union, confessions experienced such an increase that was extremely worrying for a neutral, such as the approval of the transit of German military transports.

The Transport more important to the war effort Swedish exports to Germany, especially the ⁸¹, which are considered indispensable in terms of quantity and, above all, quality Iron ores from central and northern Sweden, was in fact not subject to any war-related impairment, provided it took place on the Baltic Sea. The happened throughout the one for the Production of quality armor steel, especially Siemens-Martin steel, particularly suitable low-phosphorus iron ores from central Sweden pits, the itself for the Part in German Capital ownership were ⁸². Because of the icing of the Gulf of Bothnia, which regularly lasts almost half a year, they had to phosphorus-rich iron ores mined in northern Sweden were used for the production of Thomas steel and made up the majority of Sweden's ore deposits and also its ore exports, are mainly shipped via the Norwegian port of Narvik ⁸³, from where German ships preferably carried out further transport to Germany close to the coast, i.e. within the territorial waters of neutral states. The was however big ships only possible in some areas. The chartering Norwegian ships were limited by the German lack of foreign currency, especially since they were already for which when driving close along the Significant amounts of foreign currency had to be spent on the Norwegian pilots, who were indispensable on the coast. ⁸⁴ From September 1939 to March 1940, 2,112,000 tons of iron ore were shipped via Narvik, which was 1,570 000 t less than in the same period a year earlier. ⁸⁵

Accepting 1938 as the base year (Wittmann, p. 158), it was certainly primarily pursuing its own economic interests and social interests. Came at the same time it but with that the German position very much far against taking the year 1939 (ibid., p. 155), in whose delivery figures the armaments industry was particularly strong knocked down, and rejected the British demand, the last ten years before the start of the war to the calculation basis to do (ibid., p. 157), the This means that it was significantly lower due to the effects of the global economic crisis were.

81 The German one guide like that too mining industrialists were considered Swedish Iron ores even after that Summer 1940, when the Lorraine Minette deposits and the Ore mines French North Africa to were available as indispensable. - On the conflict of opinions among historians about this see above all Karlhom, Rolf, Sweden's Iron Ore Exports to Germany, 1933-1944. In: The Scandinavian Economic History Review, XIII (1965), p. 65 ff.; Milward, Alan S., Could Swe have stopped the Second World War? In: Ibid, XV (1967), p. 127 ff.; Jäger, Jörg-Johannes, Sweden's Iron Ore Exports to Germany, 1933-1944. A Reply to Rolf Karlhom's Article on the same Subject. In: Ibid., p. 139 ff.; Karlhom, Rolf, Swedish Iron Ore Exports to Germany, 1933-1944. A Reply. In: Ibid., XVI (1968), p. 171 ff.

82 Wittmann, p. 115 f.

83 In 1935-1938, Narvik's share of the total shipment of iron ore from northern and central Sweden fluctuated between 49 and 55 percent, while the remainder was concentrated in Luleå, Oxelösund and other Baltic Sea ports distributed; Fritz, Martin, German Steel and Swedish Iron Ore 1939-1945, Göteborg 1974, p. 66 f. (hereinafter: Fritz, German Steel).

84 BAP, AA 68730, Bl. 67-68R, "Note about the meeting on questions relating to German-Norwegian trade in goods with special consideration of the questions of sea transport between Germany and Norway on October 9, 1939 in the AA".

85 After: Fritz, German steel, S. 43, Tab. 18.

After 6. Meeting of the Allied Supreme War Council on 28. March 1940 in London, where the tightening the Economic warfare it was decided ⁸⁶, started the British Fleet began laying mines on these ore transport routes, initially on April 8, 1940 in the Norwegian three-mile zone off Narvik. Shortly afterwards, with the German military occupation of Denmark and Norway, a completely different strategic situation arose, also in terms of trade policy.

In the diverse range of goods German counter-deliveries for which are by no means only made from iron ore Of the existing imports from Sweden, coal played the prominent role. Role. It was particularly urgently needed in Scandinavia after the ⁸⁷ deliveries from England, which had initially been on the right, were no longer available or had declined sharply ⁸⁸. It was easier ^{for} Germany to deliver coal by using the Polish mines the delivery of some others in Scandinavia required goods.

Next to coal and coke was Sweden is primarily interested in rolling mill products, coke pig iron and potash from Germany, for which the German side was prepared to make high delivery commitments when individual problems relating to the concrete implementation of the war trade agreement were being negotiated further. A "price scale" that was probably unique in terms of trade policy was also agreed: a price scale based on the 1939 for The most important goods exchanged between Sweden and Germany were subject to a fixed price relation system, which was intended to limit the price increases that were to be expected under the war circumstances and to balance it out for both sides. The system of "price scales" that not only iron ore and coal, but at the beginning of the 30th percent, later up to 90 Percent of all goods traded between the two countries remained in operation until 1944. That this system came into being at all at Swedish suggestion and then retained became, that thanks to this system "the from "The prices paid by Sweden for German coal during the war were 60 to 70 percent lower than those that had to be paid for it in Switzerland" and that as a result - in contrast too many others countries Europe - the prices within Sweden remained relatively stable, testifies to the importance that the German war economy the trading partner

86 BAP, AA 67864, BI. 225 ff., Report of the German Embassy, v. Selzam to AA, The Hague April 16, 1940. - prime minister Chamberlain explained in addition: "If we are to bring this war to a close with the least possible destruction and dislocation of our common spiritual and material civilization we must deprive Germany of the materials most essential for the prosecution of her aggressive policy. The Allies are therefore determined to prosecute the economic war to the maximum of their power." (Ibid., BI. 225R).

87 Salmon, Patrick, Anglo-German Commercial Rivalry in the Depression Era: the Political and Economic Impact on Scandinavia 1931-1939. In: About the competition, p. 119.

88 In Denmark, German diplomacy was still trying to prevent the intended Danish state monopolization in March 1940 the coal trade. By halving the coal prices, which had risen sharply since the beginning of the war, the English competition on the coal market was to be eliminated and continued Deliveries of food to Germany are secured. BAP, AA 67771, BI. 154 ff., van Scherpenberg to RMEL and **RWiM**, March 28, 1940.

89 In the 1930s, only once (in 1937) did Poland remain below 40 percent of Sweden's hard coal supply, which means that it more or less on par with England and far ahead Germany lay (Wittmann, p. 138 ff.).

ner Sweden, and of the purposeful use of this situation by Stockholm .⁹⁰

More problematic than with the ones mentioned so far three northern European states in here first phase to be treated during the war trade with Finland. The old trade agreement and the associated settlement agreement expired at the end of 1939, and agreeing on a new one was impossible in view of the Soviet-Finnish war and its consequences are quite severe.⁹¹ Due to the non-aggression and friendship treaty that had just been concluded with the USSR, Hitler felt compelled to reject the war material deliveries requested by Finland. Only 50 anti-aircraft guns were allowed to be delivered Agreement reached in October 1939 that Finland would have another three His for years total copper production to Germany, copper production will increase even further and the Nivala nickel deposit reveal, not reveal.⁹² The led to discontent in Finland, especially in business circles, which was reflected in a reluctance to buy German goods.⁹³ Furthermore, the purchase of nickel was important for the German war economy and molybdenum the northern Finnish one Petsamo area essential. Through the Although this area was affected by fighting, it remained part of Finland after peace was concluded, but the The Soviet Union sought to acquire the mining concession there, which would have at least put deliveries to Germany in question.⁹⁴ The German-Soviet competition of interests offered the Finnish government room for maneuver.

The loss of English coal supplies, which had covered 70 percent of Finland's needs before the war Finland if necessary can be compensated for by its abundance of wood. At least I could it in this field resist German pressure more easily than other countries. After the Finnish-Soviet peace agreement, Finnish shipping was interested in Baltic Sea orders get⁹⁵, there her Yes the Access to the world's oceans (except from Petsamo out of) practically hardly any was open. Everything in Above all, the trade relations between Germany and Finland from late autumn 1939 to May 1940 must be described as unregulated.

90 Wittmann, S. 170 ff. (Quote S. 172).

91 BAP, AA 67820, BI. 257-261R, Vennerk about German-Finnish economic discussions on October 18th, 20th and 24th, 1939, Berlin October 26th, 1939; *ibid.*, 81. 270 f., note Wiehl for RAM v. Ribbentrop and State Secretary v. Weizsäcker, November 18, 1939; *ibid.*, BI. 272 u. R, recording van Scherpenberg for v. Weizsäcker and Wiehl, December 18, 1939.

92 BAP, AA 67795, BI. 35R, van Scherpenberg to Schnurre (currently Moscow), October 25, 1939; BAP, AA 67822, BI. 73, Record of Besser about the meeting (senior official of the RWiM and AA) on March 28, 1940 regarding Finland (BI. 71 ff.). - See also The German Reich, Vol. 2, p. 153.

93 BAP, AA 67795, BI. 38 ff., Wigru wholesale, import and export trade, Department of Foreign Trade, October 27, 1939 (without addressee); *ibid.*, 81. 83 ff., Reichsstelle fd Foreign Trade to AA and the RWiM, April 2, 1940, with a copy of a letter from Hartkopp & Krüger to the Rheinisch-Westfälische Wasserreinigungs-Gesellschaft mbH Hanover, Helsingfors February 26, 1940.

94 BAP, AA67822, BI. 73 f. (as in Note 92). - Please refer also Hunter, p. 229 f.

95 BAP, AA 67822, BI. 113, German Embassy record of negotiations between Ges. Schnurre (AA) and MR Ludwig (RWiM). dem Finnish Foreign Minister Tanner and a., Helsinki May 3, 1940.

The trade of the Baltic states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with Great Britain, this despite a strong increase in German share remained the most important trading partner of these countries in the last years before the war⁹⁶, but when war broke out on the German side were rigorously prevented, and the Baltic exporters had to be happy that they could now find additional sales for their accumulated goods in Germany on a clearing basis instead of against currency .

e) Southeastern Europe and Türkiye

Because it German imperialism had only partially succeeded in binding the Southeast European states economically in the pre-war years, and since the Western powers by no means maintained their more or less strong capital positions in these countries - as has sometimes been claimed - had given up, was this Region especially in the Initial phase of the war venue for the economic war between states at war with each other. While the Governments of Southeast Europe and the Türkiye, on the one hand, is under dem pressure from both pages Some of whose demands had to give in, but on the other hand they were also able to - to varying degrees - to retain certain freedom of action and partial advantages, e.g in the pricing, to win. It But it would soon become clear how much their trade relations depended on the development of the war situation. This statement does not only apply to Yugoslavia and Greece, which were occupied militarily in April/May 1941.

The fact that most of the southeastern European states were courted by both belligerent sides at that time was mainly due to the fact that their soil contained a number of raw materials that were important for the war effort, which Germany sought to secure and which England sought to withhold from it. Great Britain's pre-emptive policy was particularly aimed at chrome ore from Turkey, Greece, Norway and Yugoslavia, the four countries of origin from which the German war economy could not be cut off by the British naval blockade.⁹⁷ Although in the previous ones years more than half of German chrome imports from the After Turkey came and Germany had taken the largest share of Turkish foreign trade overall, Great Britain managed to achieve this through various means, not least through more attractive loans than Reich Economics Minister Funk was able to promise the Turkish government⁹⁸. but understandably also under that Impression the Italian occupation Albania, the Türkiye in the May 1939 more or

96 Hinkkanen-Lievonen, Marja-Liisa, Britain as Germany's Commercial Rival in the Baltic States, 1919-1939. In: About the competition, p. 39 f. - See also Volkmann, Hans-Erich, Economics and Power Politics. Latvia and Estonia in the political-economic calculations of the Third Reich (1933-1940). In: History and Society 2/1976, pp. 471-500.

97 Medlicott I, S. 261. Please refer also Cape. IV in the prev. Tape.

98 To Funk's offer of October 1938 and the (but then not ratified) credit agreement of January 16, 1939 see BAP, AA 68764, BI. 188 f., Ripken note for Wiehl, February 27, 1942; BAP, AA 68751, BI. 18 ff., Clodius note for the RAM, April 15, 1942; Wording of the credit agreement v. January 16, 1939 and associated Confidential protocol with the lists of goods: AA 68749, BI. 250-254R.

less on his to pull page. On May 12, 1939, a British-Turkish Mutual declaration of support concluded and on June 23rd by a Franco-Turkish one added. These declarations were the precursor to what had already been announced at the time, on October 19, 1939, not least under the impression of The alliance formed by the German-Soviet pact and applied in the event of an attack that would lead to war in the Mediterranean. On this The basis was the tactic Turkish government then in In the years that followed, they were very clever at keeping their country out of military action.⁹⁹

The German-Turkish agreements from 25. July 1938 ran on July 31st. August 1939 which resulted in a situation without a contract between the two states in terms of trade policy.¹⁰⁰ Even if this did not stop all trade, it did not include the Turkish products that were important to the German war economy. After Germany in 1939 the Record amount of 114 500 t chrome ore the Turkey had imported the entire Turkish chrome ore production for the period up to the beginning of 1943 was sold to England (and France).¹⁰¹

The Western powers were almost as successful with Greek chrome ore - despite the proverbial dependence of the entire Greek economic system on tobacco exports to Germany. According to the Anglo-French Declaration of Guarantee for Greece from April 1939 (Loans for Greek imports). on the 23rd August 1939 although still a German-Greek trade agreement came about, but was this through a British-Greek agreement of January 26, 1940: England bought for at least 500,000 f: Greek tobacco, which it actually did not need, chartered 60 Greek seagoing ships and agreed to supply Greece with coal. Above all, it achieved that him Greece 55 000 t chrome sold, while after Germany only 1,000 t were allowed to be delivered. This quota later had to be increased somewhat because Greece was for the wanted to buy ammunition for the expected war with Bulgaria, the Great Britain could not deliver it to him and Germany was only willing to sell it to him in exchange for chrome.¹⁰²

The well-measured approval, reduction or refusal of arms deliveries to the states of the proverbial "Balkan powder keg" (desired also, but by no means only, in order to partially "unfreeze" the clearing balances that had been frozen in Germany in previous years) was actually an instrument that the German government representatives and Hitler himself in 1939 and early 1940 again and again used to the To force the governments of Southeast Europe and Turkey to make military economic contributions and also to make them politically submissive.¹⁰³

In Yugoslavia they achieved this when the government announced in September 1939 its intention to export ores from the French (Boron) and British (Trepca) Capital ownership

99 Krecker, Lothar, Germany and the Türkiye in the Second World War, Frankfurt at the Main 1964, S.

39 ff. u. passim.

100 BAP, AA 68765, BI. 131, v. Süsskind-Schwendi at the RMRuK O. D (probably End 1943).

101 Ibid.; Krecker, S. 78; Hunter, S. 244 f.

102 Medlicott I, S. 267 f.

103 See especially Hitler's statement of principles and his decisions regarding Romania's specific wishes Türkiye, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia the Chief of OKW on July 22, 1939 Wiehl transmitted (BAP, AA 68736, BI. 25 f.).

to buy up existing mines against payment in dinars (instead of contractually in standard world market currencies) in order to purchase weapons. On October 5, 1939, it concluded an agreement with Germany to purchase weapons and military equipment for 50 **million RM** in exchange for agricultural products, but also raw copper, lead, Lead concentrates, aluminum and antimony. In the following months, the British government succeeded in persuading the Yugoslav government not to further increase raw material deliveries to Germany by, among other things, making it easier for Yugoslavian imports to pass through the naval blockade. In particular, it was probably successful in preventing deliveries of chrome ore to Germany.¹⁰⁴

Despite the great effort spent on developing synthetic production, the supply of fuel to the German armed forces and other users was an absolute bottleneck. The German war economy was the first to expect mineral oil deliveries Line of Romania, the 1938 in the Product group "Petroleum and tar, raw" with quantities moderately less than two percent and in value 1.3 percent of German imports were in fifth place among all supplying countries and in the "fuels and lubricating oils" product group, with less than twelve percent of the volume and just under 16 percent of the value, they were in third place.¹⁰⁵ However, **when** the war began, Romania was next to the Soviet Union, with which trade relations were established should first be normalized again, the only supplier country from which Germany was not cut off by the Allied blockade. Despite the economic contract from 23. March 1939 was but just those Delivery to Germany with Oil is by no means secured, there this one branch to nearly 70 percent in predominantly English-Dutch and French as well also American owned capital. At the start of the war, the destruction of the oil fields was even considered been.¹⁰⁶

From October 1939, the above-mentioned oil companies took part in the boycott policy coordinated by the London Hankey Committee by demanding excessive prices for their oil, buying up the production of the subsidiaries from the parent companies and refusing to sell to German buyers. The Romanian government did not dare to oppose this because it counted on British support in the controversial border issues with the USSR, Hungary and Bulgaria. A secret agreement with Germany, oil exchanging for weapons became in the domestic political one Confusion following the assassination of Prime Minister Armand Călinescu on September 21, 1939 not effective.

Ultimately, however, the German willingness to supply weapons was the decisive factor again: in December 1939 guaranteed the Romanian Government the from the Reich Economics Ministry

104 Medlicott I, p. 261 ff. - Grenzbach jr., William S., Germany's informal empire in east-central Europe. German economic policy towards Yugoslavia and Romania, 1933-1939, Stuttgart 1988, p. 168 ff., clears the Yugoslavian ore shipments Priority over those of agriculture products. In his opinion, the British were not fully informed about the extent of Yugoslavia's surrender. (Ibid., p. 172, note 112).

105 Calculated after: Statistical Yearbook for the German Reich 1939/40, Tab. VII, 11.

106 For this and the following see. The German Empire, Vol. 4, Stuttgart 1983, S. 330 ff - How the massive foreign Capital concentration the Negotiation the Romanian Government and influenced the implementation of the state agreements in the weeks before and after the outbreak of war, has Grenzbach, chap. X, completely disregarded.

rium required monthly Delivery of 130,000 tons of oil and valued the leu from what the price increases carried out by the oil companies lost their prohibitive character. In January 1940 it set up the General Commissariat for Petroleum, to which the in Allied-owned companies the sale of Petroleum and whose Delivery after Germany could not refuse. After on 6. March 1940 one preliminary agreement for the delivery of 200 000 tons of petroleum in exchange for Polish and Czech weapons, the Oil-Arms Pact was signed on May 27, 1940, which established a fixed price ratio between the mineral oil products to be delivered by Romania, regardless of their respective daily prices market, and the him to supplying weapons. 107 This for The German side remained a very profitable compensation basis until October 1940 in effect. Meanwhile had the Romanian territory will experience a significant reduction (which the Romanian government has made through its concessions to Nazi Germany), and the military collapse of France had also deprived Romania of the support of the Western powers. For the next few years, Romania became a vassal of the Hitler regime politically, economically and militarily .

In all countries of southeastern Europe, Great Britain operated through the special to this United Kingdom Commercial Corporation Ltd. was founded for this purpose. a pre-emptive policy. However, their success remained quite limited because, overall, there were not enough funds for comprehensive purchases of raw materials and food for were made available, above all but, because England the from the Southeast European could not or did not want to deliver the armaments and other heavy industry products that countries wanted. Nevertheless, the southeastern European countries increased their trade with Germany temporarily Benefit from these British economic war actions during the phase covered here German buyers also contributed during the war cause higher prices to be paid could. ws

f) Soviet Union, Further and Middle east

After the Exchange of goods between Germany and the USSR primarily which had been minimal for years for political reasons, the intended goal, the beginning, was achieved after the signing of the economic and political agreements in August/September 1939 the thirties Years existing level again to cannot be achieved quickly, even with a joint effort. Added to this was, that the Mutual distrust, which is already time to be reduced would have required new food right away received, as the German delegation to opening the Economic negotiations at the 8/9 October 1939 a complete out of-

107 BAP, AA 68735, BI. 10-16, "Secret Provisional Agreements" v. March 6, 1940, Bucharest, signed by Slavescu and Neubacher, with appendices; just that. 35 ff., agreement on the exchange of German military equipment and Romanian mineral oil products, signed v. Slavescu et al. Neubacher, Bukarest May 22, 1940.

108 BAP, AA 67864, BI. 226, German embassy, v. Selzam to AA, The Hague April 16, 1940; BAK, R 63/293, BI. 121, "The industrial-economic consequences of the decline (and increase) of German political influence on Southeastern Europe since 1938", elaboration n.d. n.d.

formulated draft contract for an immediate program (which was only just about to be negotiated). presented the maximum German demands. Schwendemann, author of a recently published book on German-Soviet economic relations 1939-1941, describes it as "all the more astonishing" that Foreign Trade Commissioner Anastas Mikoyan referred to this concept, which gave the Soviet Union the "status of a junior partner in service the German war economy" assigned, already on 10. October responded with far-reaching general promises.¹⁰⁹ I see the something different: it was the beginning of October the situation for Moscow in basically taken not different as on the 23rd August 1939. Despite the Declarations of war had been made perspective there the constellation between the great powers not changed. The war between them wanted to continue, and the Soviet Union did not want to be directly involved. But Moscow's fear that the belligerent powers could come to an arrangement and act together against the Soviet Union was also still relevant. So they wanted to gain time in Moscow.

In the weeks that followed, some big words and general promises were heard, and these were used for propaganda purposes everywhere. In fact, it was lengthy and tough the specific conditions of future trade wrestled. The delays were not only due to mistrust, and this was only occasionally expressed directly. The slow start to the actual exchange of goods had primarily objective reasons. After the Soviet side made it fundamentally clear that... equal rights and a balanced relationship between deliveries and counter-deliveries must form the basis of economic relations. It was determined that significant Soviet deliveries of grain and other raw materials could not take place until at least the most urgent orders for German industrial products that the Soviet side wanted to purchase had been placed (as a rule there is more time for the completion of certain machines required for the provision of raw materials). As a rule, detailed negotiations take place at a lower, professional level, especially when it comes to industrial products should correspond to the specific wishes of the future user. In our case, the factory tours, model demonstrations and arguments over prices dragged on even further. This was due to the fact that the previous business relationships between certain works had been interrupted for years, so the production profile, price and other conditions of the work in question were no longer available to the purchaser from the outset, as is the case with permanent business partners or were less known. Second went it the Soviet interests asked for the inspection of the latest weapons, which are generally approved been was, but in many individual cases encountered obstacles because of the obvious danger of espionage. Third was the Soviet bureaucracy and the wave of purges that had barely subsided in the Political party-, State, military, security and economic apparatus. Yes, understandable fear of responsibility is a time-consuming factor: before signing a delivery order it was better to ask in Moscow. On the German side there were even more obstacles in the fall of 1939 as before the war of Contradiction between arms and export orders and the high price demands of industrial companies when concluding contracts.

109 Schwendemann, Heinrich, Die economic cooperation between the Germans Reich and the Soviet Union from 1939 until 1941. alternative to Hitler's Eastern program?, Berlin 1993, S. 89 f.

In the conflict between the interested German authorities over the question of whether, in return for the urgently desired Soviet raw materials, part of the contingents of raw materials, machines and weapons intended for the Wehrmacht could be exported to the Soviet Union could be diverted, Hitler was finally asked to make a decision at the beginning of December 1939. Already completely focused on his campaign in France fixed, forbidden he, to use raw materials for Soviet production orders at the expense of the Wehrmacht, the ongoing armament program for example, due to short delivery times to the USSR, in particular to hand over machines for ammunition production. Deliveries to the USSR should only take place within the framework of the already reduced export capacities, ie with deferral of exports to other trading partners.¹¹⁰

In order not to allow economic relations with the USSR to effectively end before they had really begun again, the interested departments formulated compromise proposals, the amounted to one Part the ordered military by civilian Industry products to replace the delivery times over several years, to request additional Soviet iron supplies for the production of machines for the USSR. This

"Compromise" proposals would have had little chance, the to save the expected Soviet deliveries, especially since the Soviet Commission had many of their order requests anyway remained unsuccessful, at the same time with excessive price demands had been confronted and after the negotiations were adjourned on the 13th. Returned to Moscow in December 1939. As the German ambassador Friedrich Werner Graf von der Schulenburg presented Mikoyan with the "compromise" offer on December 14, 1939, and he received it on December 15th in response, Germany definitely has to for the Soviet raw materials provide appropriate value, but not at excessive prices.¹¹¹

Although delegation negotiations resumed in Moscow on December 18, 1939, for the No progress at the end of the year View. At the 31. December switched Stalin then intervened directly, effectively taking over the lead in the negotiations, by In the following weeks, however, in the face of new German demands, he did not shy away from threatening to break off the negotiations, but ultimately concluded the economic agreement of February 11, 1940 with his German negotiating partners, whom he considered to be conveyors of Hitler's opinion lock. This included the quantities to be delivered from the USSR by August 11, 1941 with a total value of 655 million RM, of which 420 were - 430 Mill. RM until 11. February 1941, the German considerations for naval and air force equipment were listed in detail, for "civilian" industrial products, mainly capital goods, but only a Reichsmark framework was set. Yielding to constant German pressure, the Soviet side agreed to fix the volume rates and deadlines with it agreed, that the compensation of the Soviet raw material deliveries of the first twelve months (ie until February 11, 1941) by German counter-deliveries could extend until May 11, 1941. The same procedure should then be followed in the second year of the contract, as follows that the total volume of the two-year agreement amounting to 655 million RM from the Soviet side on August 11th 1941 and on the German side on May 11th be fulfilled in 1942 would. In certain time lapse

¹¹⁰ Ibid, S. 114 f.

¹¹¹ Ibid, S. 119 f.

stands should be mutual Deliveries be accounted for, whereby the Page, who had not received enough, the Right was admitted, her to temporarily stop deliveries .¹¹²

Schwendemann rightly explains why Stalin personally took over the leadership of the negotiations at the turn of the year 1939/40 with the reaction of the Western powers to the Soviet-Finnish war, in particular that of Franklin D. on December 2, 1939. Roosevelt announced a "moral embargo" by the USA, particularly on arms technology,¹¹³ which had previously sold military goods to the USSR, with the French and British preparing for attack on the Caucasus and Stalin's increased efforts to keep Hitler from entering into an arrangement with the Western powers.

There the German Publicity the on equal rights and mutual Benefit based Agreement text didn't know it, it fell to Nazi propaganda light to announce that Goal in the east stand far now open, the British blockade henceforth be ineffective. Factually came the mutual ones

Deliveries also in the weeks and months after graduation of economic agreement of February 11th Not in 1940 right in momentum. The agreement was initially once not more than one - important - Declaration of intent from both sides, but through concrete delivery contracts between plants, commercial organizations, etc. had to be stocked. Here worked again the same obstacles on both Pages like previous months. It also made itself continues to be Moscow's political Caution in view of the unclear war situation and the Allied military preparations noticeable towards the USSR. Once again Stalin's efforts to gain time dominated it with none of the warring sides completely too spoil (with England became economic negotiations initiated), itself not irreversible to one side tie. A more real breakthrough when concluding delivery contracts only took place towards the end of May 1940, when the outcome of the German campaign in France is foreseeable was. The statistics clearly speak against the view that what Hitler without the Soviet Raw material deliveries not the offensive in the

west would have begin can¹¹⁴.

In a treatise from the Silesian Institute for Economic and Business Research in Breslau from August 1940, not intended for the public and "edited as a collection of materials", it says: "The agreement is between Germany and the Soviet Union been hit, the Total scope of the movement of goods on this as quickly as possible until now to bring the highest level achieved. That would for the German import in 1930 with a total of 436 **Mill. RM** and for the Export to the Soviet Union that Year 1931 with an amount of 763 **Mill. RM** ... Germany's total imports to date the Soviet Union was during the first half of the year Approximately 1940 so large, such as the import of three months

112 Ibid, S. 145.

113 Ibid, S. 120.

114 So especially Friedensburg, Ferdinand, The Soviet war supplies to the Hitler Reich. In: quarterly magazines on economic research, 1962, No. 4, S. 331-338; Hillgruber, Andreas, Hitlers Strategy, Politics and Warfare 1940-1941, Frankfurt am Main 1965, S. 31; one Back then, Birkenfeld, Wolfgang and Stalin gave more differentiated assessments as Hitler's economic partners (1939-1941). In: Quarterly on social and economic history, Vol. 53, 1966, pp. 477-510.

th in the highest year to date. The export to the Soviet Union was in total during the first half of 1940 only approximately as large as the average export of one month in the previous peak year."¹¹⁵

From December 1939 to May 1940 were all equal Soviet deliveries together (almost 40 percent still based on the credit agreement of August 19, 1939) amounted to 99.6 **million RM** (according to other information less), which means that they are considerably less than ten percent of the made up Germany's total imports. As the most important goods, the until end of May 1940 were delivered, are cereals/legumes, primarily Barley, for 36.9 **Mill. RM** and mineral oil for 25.3 **million RM**, while chrome ore, manganese ore, copper, nickel and tin not at all, platinum for 2.0 and phosphates for 0.5 **million RM** from the USSR to Germany.¹¹⁶

In a "Confidential "Reichsbank Matter" marked minutes from June 18, 1940 about a meeting of the Reich Office for Foreign Trade, In which the heads of all foreign trade offices also took part, Reichsbank director Rudolf Eicke noted that the speaker, ministerial director Gustav Schlotterer, had complained that the Soviet Union had disappointed German expectations.¹¹⁷

In the opposite direction, however, the situation gave cause for disappointment: by May 31, 1940, exports were worth 16 **million RM** under the credit agreement of August 19, 1939 and 43.5 **million RM** under the economic agreement of February 11 1940, with less than 1940 of the latter item half was delivered in the form of goods, the rest was credited as a down payment for the cruiser "Lützow" which was sold to the USSR and was still under construction and for construction drawings and other documents for the reproduction of capital goods and military equipment.¹¹⁸

From the numerous reports from economic experts, the the military economic staff of the high command of the The Wehrmacht had caught up with it right at the start of the war. Incidentally, the euphoric assessment of the Commander-in-Chief of the Kriegsmarine, Raeder, and several other military officers as well as Hitler said that thanks to the treaty with the USSR, the British blockade was "almost over." "Doomed to fail" was not shared from the start. A decisive impact was only expected after two to three years of war.¹¹⁹

In British government circles, the German-Soviet economic relations of that period were apparently also viewed quite soberly. After examining this question, the Ministry of Economic Warfare came to the conclusion in October 1939: "...if the Soviet Union does not want to destroy its own economy and sends Germany only its normal exportable surplus, then the economic support, that Germany would receive would be negligible. If the Soviet Union

115 **BAK, R 2/17307**, overview about German-Russian goods and payment transactions, quoted from Schwendemann, p. 370, table 5.

116 **BAK, R 7/3413**, „Pay to Development of German Foreign trade since beginning of war", S. 7 f.

117 BAP, German Reichsbank 6612, BI. 621-629, "Foreign trade the future", Transcript Eicke, June 18, 1940.

118 Schwendemann, S. 178.

119 The German Rich, Vol. 4, S. 99 ff.

would make some sacrifices for political reasons in order to supply Germany with raw materials, so All of Germany's deficits in manganese, asbestos and phosphates and, by the second and third years of the war, significant parts of its needs for petroleum, cotton and iron ore could be covered. The Soviet Union could not supply Germany with copper, nickel, tin or a number of rare alloy metals except from its own reserves or by entering into the entrepot business." The ministry mistakenly believed that the USSR could not supply food and fodder to any significant extent Deliver oil seeds and oil cakes. The hindrance caused by transport difficulties was overestimated, especially for oil deliveries to Germany.¹²⁰

Beneficial for the German side were under the conditions of the British naval blockade the Transit routes through the Soviet Union, especially for imports Japan, the Manchuria (especially soybeans for Closing the "fat gap")¹²¹, Iran, with which on the 8th October 1939 a new economic agreement was concluded became¹²², and also from China, with which the exchange of goods had been declining for a long time as a result of the Sino-Japanese war¹²³. As important as the transit through the Soviet Union was undoubtedly, it was limited not only by the harsh Siberian winter, but also by other factors been: the for some types of goods disproportionate high transport costs, Allied reprisals against Asian business partners and against the USSR itself, which was therefore neither able nor willing, overseas Covert purchases of strategic raw materials for Germany to do¹²⁴, as well as the German side's lack of ability and willingness to pay and counter-deliver to its Far Eastern partners, and last but not least, Japan's lack of willingness to cooperate. The decline in sales as a result of the naval blockade could not be nearly compensated for by rail transit across Soviet territory. When dealing with the war phase of 1940/41, a summary assessment is made of the actual benefit of Transits over Soviet territory from autumn 1939 until June 1941 take place.

g) Switzerland, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg

Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg were in the phase to be dealt with here During the war, in addition to transit routes through Germany and Italy, there were also transport routes across Allied territory or through sea areas controlled by the Allies for

120 Medlicott I, S. 316 f.

121 BAP, AA 68 971/6, BI. 2 ff., Record "Strictly confidential for personal information based on confidential Discussion with State Councilor Wohlthat", BI. 2, no Vf. no D.

122 BAP, AA 68762, BI. 26--32, record of negotiations in Tehran, undisclosed, October 28, 1939, with Confidential protocol from October 8, 1939; BAP, AA 68722, BI. 112, Hand files Clodius, German Iranian economic agreement v. October 8, 1939.

123 BAP, Deutsche Bank (F) 21702, BI. 1-8, "What else can we do? China?" Economic policy maker Lecture given by Dr. G. Probst, head of the Siemens China Company, on December 7, 1939 in the China Study Society Berlin.

124 This was like many other things also with big words promised and even in the economic agreement v. Taken February 11, 1940 been. - Schwendemann, p. 143.

compliance. Their neutrality had to be respected by both belligerents pages be more or less respected in your own interest.

The Switzerland and Germany had already in the September 1938 and in June 1939 on diplomatic ways each other benevolent examination the Ask the Guaranteed to maintain through traffic in the event of war.¹²⁵ On the other hand, it took several months of negotiations before Switzerland could also sign with the Western powers within the framework of the War Trade Agreement dated April 24, 1940 a contractual regulation for their transit of goods achieved. As the Western powers were of course aware, the German war economy could benefit at least indirectly from this perforation of the Allied blockade. This conclusion of the treaty shows that Switzerland is by no means a weak pawn between the great powers was to be treated, so no less the behavior of Germany, which, instead of being able to place additional orders with Swiss industry at the start of the war, was first forced by the agreement of October 24, 1939 to pay off debts that had accumulated in the last months before the war: through additional deliveries of goods Germany was out the 80th By the spring of 1940 there was a German balance of 40 million francs in the clearing account.¹²⁶

The statistics of Swiss goods exchange overall and especially with Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, the neutral states of Europe and America for 1938, 1939 and that full Year 1940 shows stable values of ¹²⁷, in contrast to the years after, when the total value of the Imports and exports increased, but sales with the individual partner countries clearly reflected the war circumstances.

Luxembourg struck in In September 1939, in the interest of strict neutrality, all steel and iron exports to belligerent states would be stopped for the duration of the war. However, Berlin immediately forced it to accept the principle of "normal trade".¹²⁸ At the beginning of 1940, there were heated arguments in Berlin with a Belgian-Luxembourg business delegation. what England allows him, that is, the Belgian government "one attitude taken that he (Ministerial Director Wiehl from AA - BP) must be addressed as particularly unneutral."¹²⁹ As a concrete example, Wiehl cited the fact that the Belgian-French iron-coke agreement meant that by February 1940 one tripling the Iron export after England entries, while German-

125 BAP, AA68744, BI. 21 f., Verbal note at the Swiss Embassy in Berlin, June 28, 1939.

126 Hornberger, Heinrich, Swiss trade policy in the Second World War, Erlenbach-Zurich/Stuttgart 1970, p. 30. - The author was on the complicated ones Switzerland played a key role in negotiations with the warring parties during all years of the war.

127 BAP, AA 68818, BI. 2 f., Statistical Reich Office Dept. II, "Imports from Switzerland according to countries of origin" and BI. 20, Reich Statistical Office Dept. II, "Exports from Switzerland according to countries of destination".

128 Medlicott II, S. 21.

129 BAP, AA 68898, BI. 49 f., note from Sabath about a meeting between Wiehl, Ambassador Eisenlohr and VLR Sabath with MD Gerard from the Belgian Foreign Ministry, January 12, 1940; right there, BI. 52-53R, record above about a meeting at the RWiM with the Belgian-Luxembourg business delegation, Berlin January 12, 1940.

country only the half should receive his previous normal salary. There They said that Belgium placed great value on the supply of German coal (probably because of the difficulty of obtaining coal from England). German representatives only 20 percent of previous amount to do so the Belgian-Luxembourgish economic union larger minette, iron and Steel supplies after Germany as well as to Rental of 10 000 Railway carriages ¹³⁰ In these negotiations, the mutual dependencies that resulted from the international division of labor were expressed very eloquently and were mentioned here at the beginning.

3. From the 3. quarter 1940 until for the 2. quarter 1941

a) General

An important turning point for German foreign trade took place in June 1940. With Italy's entry into the war ended the period, in the some German imports and Exports out of and after neutral and even enemy countries in broken transit over Italy could be managed. In a way, this one took over But then France functions. After the ceasefire, industrial and agricultural production capacities were so strong of the occupied as also of initially still unoccupied France available to the German war economy. However, unlike in Poland, deliveries and counter-deliveries took place in forms of foreign trade for the French Entrepreneurs made effective payments (albeit largely from dubious sources such as the occupation cost account) and thus profits. This junior partnership and profit opportunity was at the same time a stimulus for the German war economy to obtain raw materials from the French colonies that were particularly urgently needed the Petain government recognized, as well as from other overseas territories to France import and then re-exported to Germany.

Further moved along the Subjugation of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway and with Germany's ever-increasing influence on its friends or allies as well as on the remaining neutral states, a significant innovation in the realm of possibility: a European central clearing system ¹³¹, with foreign trade settlements no longer between two partner countries as before, but multilaterally with Berlin as a clearing center ¹³² should be done. It "serves the organic preparation of the European metropolitan economy... Its realization becomes without delay in the Paths guided." ¹³³ The last quoted sentence the Full-

¹³⁰ Ibid, BI. 50R.

¹³¹ For more information see: Puchen, foreign trade, S. 390 ff.

¹³² Apparently at the end of 1941 the Italian government demands that, in addition to Berlin, Rome should also function as a clearing center and, accordingly, the lira should function as the key currency alongside the Reichsmark; BAK, R 7/3283, BI. 143, Write or Vf. (with Pencil: Reichsbank director Puhl). Manlio Masi, Director General of the Italian Ministry of Treasury and Currency, December 12th 1941, in response to his letter v. November 15, 1941.

¹³³ Ibid, BI. 36, Schultze-Schlutius at Goering, Berlin July 19, 1940.

At this point in time (July 1940), the move report from the Reich Ministry of Economics to Göring was valid as part of the so-called interior (or narrower) circle. The outer (or wider) circle to include, was only grasped at the beginning for the post war period into the Eye; but went under dem Impression the military successes this project as early as 1941 in his Realization phase.¹³⁴ The assignment to the two circles was intended as follows: "The central clearing initially includes the mutual payment transactions of all areas politically and actually controlled by Germany, i.e. Luxembourg, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, the General Government, Protectorate and Slovakia, to include - narrower circle. In addition, billing must be made via Berlin and thus to incorporate into central clearing all suitable payment transactions between the areas of the narrower circle and the states economically dominated by Germany, i.e. Sweden, Switzerland, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and the states that are otherwise connected to the areas of the narrower circle e.g. Currently in commercial transactions; e.g. B. Italy, Greece, Turkey, Iran, USSR, Spain and Portugal - wider circle."¹³⁵

On its own and under other circumstances, a central clearing system would have been a major advance on continental economics Integration can be. However, it was an instrument, in a sense a first step, to Creation of the from the German imperialism has long sought and now with fascist Violent methods to build the large economic area under German leadership, whereby the Partial violence brutally open and partly packaged in ideological phrases, conceding junior partnerships to selected capital circles in other European countries.¹³⁶

The British side took the new situation on the continent into account in such a way that that she all freight ship traffic above the Atlantic to and from continental Europe 1. August 1940 to prevent announced, provided the neutrals Ships itself not dem "Navicert" or the "Certificate of origin and interest" system.¹³⁷ The "Navigation certificate" issued by the British authorities upon request (Navicert) meant the promise for the neutral ship being allowed to pass the British blockade towards Europe with its cargo; the "Certificate", also issued at the request of the British authorities of origin and interest" (COI) confirmed, that the from the European continent outgoing

134 Ibid., appendices to note 132 mentioned letter: BI. 144 ff., "Note on the Italian memorandum regarding: Two-sided clearing and multi-sided clearing", as well as BI. 147, "Overview of the status of the multi-page report conducted via Berlin Clearing transactions in Europe".

135 BAP, AA 68939, BI. 127 ff., Appendix to the HPA protocol v. July 23, 1940; excerpts reproduced in Puchert, Foreign Trade, p. 391.

136 Because of the differentiated approach to power politics, see, among other things, the report of the Reich Economics Minister Funk, who coordinated the large-scale planning, to Göring, August 6, 1940, and his response from. August 17, 1940, printed by: Freymond, Jean, *Le Ille Reich et la reorganization eco nomique de Europe 1940-1942. Origines et projects*, Geneve 1974, Annexes, p. 242 ff. - Incidentally, the Reich Foreign Minister protested against the fact that in the "planning and design of the German European economic area". Competencies circumscribed became. - BAP, AA 68766, BI. 8-9R, v. Ribbentrop to Göring, July 9, 1940.

137 Medlicott I, p. 422; BAP, AA 67866, BI. 313 ff. (see AA 68759, BI. 6 ff.), Rüter to various Reich ministries, the OKW among other things regarding "Tightening of the British economic war Lake", August 1, 1940.

The cargo came from a neutral country of origin and that little or no German supplies (including coal for energy production) were used to produce the goods (usually a maximum of 25 percent, but occasionally only five percent, "enemy content" was permitted). Of course, the realization of the warning contained in this announcement to neutral shipping and trading companies not to serve the interests of the German war economy depended on the - repeatedly complained about as inadequate - the strength of the war fleet to effectively manage the control of shipping across the Atlantic.¹³⁸

Nor were the German Navy and air force able, the as reaction on the British measure on August 17, 1940 proclaimed "total blockade"¹³⁹ the British islands even to some extent fully realized. In addition, on the German side it was clear that a certain tolerance of the international division of labor between neutral European countries and overseas partners, including those in enemy states, was definitely in the interests of the German war economy.¹⁴⁰

b) Italy

Were before Italy entered the war a third of its imports come from its main trading partner Germany and a quarter of its exports went there¹⁴¹, so achieved during the period from June until December In 1940 the corresponding shares were 47 and 41 percent.¹⁴² Of the great importance of agricultural products, of gardening and viticulture traditionally for the Italian exports to Germany, and that through the allies te Based on Germany's increased needs during the blockade, they agreed Agriculture ministers of both countries, Richard Walter Darre and Tassinari, at their meeting on March 30th. In September 1940 in Verona, far-reaching principles for further cooperation were laid down.¹⁴³ First and foremost was the agreement that the Italian producers on the Specifics of German market set and there a "secured Paragraph to adequate, possible

138 Medlicott I, S. 423. - Even harder than the Sanctions against that without The ship encountered with these documents meant that all ships of the shipping company in question would in future be exempt from all services in accordance with the "ship warrant scheme". in Territories under British Reign like coal and drinking water supply, Dry docks, repairs, insurance and storage of cargo were excluded. (Ibid., p. 422).

139 BAP, AA 67864, BI. 262-263R, knight to the German embassies in Ankara, Madrid, Moscow, Rome (Quirinal), Tokyo etc. the German embassies in all neutral European states, September 27, 1940.

140 Ibid., BI. 262R.

141 BAP, AA 68971/17a, BI. 50 f., v. Mackensen to AA re. "Explanations of the Minister (for trade and payment transactions - BP) Riccardi on contemporary issues in Italian trade policy", Rome, May 24, 1940.

142 Ibid., BI. 55, v. Bismarck to AA regarding "Explanations of the Italian Minister for "Goods and payment transactions on Italy's trade policy", Rome, May 9, 1941.

143 BAP, AA 67935, BI. 165 ff., "Agreement on German-Italian cooperation in the field of agriculture", Darre and Tassinari, Verona September 30, 1940.

should have "stable prices" but without "unreasonable profits". In expert discussions in the following months, the Principles are concretely supported in the various sectors.¹⁴⁴

At this time you can regarding the Trade relations We are not yet talking about a satellite relationship between Italy and Germany. On the contrary: in theirs With a winning mentality, Italian government and business circles in the Summer 1940 also the one or another test of strength with German competitors, which IG Farbenindustrie AG, among others, complained about.¹⁴⁵ There was also friction because of the joint German-Italian control of French foreign trade¹⁴⁶ as well as because of the treatment of Italian capital shares in the countries under German occupation administration, for example because of the 25 percent Italian capital share in the International Sleeping Car Company based in Brussels.¹⁴⁷

It is probably partly due to the increase in nationalism and chauvinism associated with the entry into the war, when self-sufficiency tendencies, the had already made itself felt in previous years and was reflected in the law on the "Prodotto Nazionale". found had, in the second Half of 1940 in some Industry and trade, with the support of the administrative authorities, were increasingly expressed in competition with German business partners. After the loss of other important trading partners, with the help of state-monopoly "importation companies" Import barriers inevitably erected mainly German supply companies as well as Italian production and trading companies in which German capital was involved or in those German Nationals held senior positions. This form of competition was primarily effective in the consumer goods sector, but also in sales of chemicals and electrical engineering products. Currently at In these sectors, the law on the "national product" made it easier for the "often slavish imitation" of German branded products, for which Italian patent law already offered little protection.¹⁴⁸ However, one motive for import restrictions should not go unmentioned: that the Clearing, that for Italy became passive was, through the The war material and raw material deliveries, which were now required to an even greater extent, were significantly burdened. War important Deliveries to Italy also took place on the German side Priority: In the first few months of year 1941, as in Germany the production for the export not more as

144 BAP, AA 67936, BI. 511-514R, protocol above Expert meetings in Vienna, March 17-20, 1941.

145 Ibid, BI. 221 ff., IG Paint industry AG (v. Schnitzler u. Pope) at the **RWiM**, August 17, 1940; ibid, BI. 293 f., German Consulate General Milan, forwarded by German Embassy to AA, Rome November 21, 1940.

146 Ibid., BI. 265 f., record o. Vf. for submission to State Secretary v. Weizsäcker and RAM v. Ribbentrop, November 28, 1940.

147 Ibid.; see also ibid., BI. 319 and 319R, Memorandum of December 3, 1940, initialed "CI AG" (apparently: Carl Clodius and Amadeo Giannini, chairmen of both sides of the German-Italian government committee).

148 BAP, AA 68940, Treatise on German-Italian trade relations, n.d. n.d. (apparently after September 1940), BI. 5, 7, 9 f., 21 f., 58, 80, 83 ff.

was recognized as a priority, exports to Italy (and in the USSR) . ¹⁴⁹

c) Spain and Portugal

With the military occupation of the French Atlantic coast until Biarritz and the Manufacture of the The secure railway connection between Spain and Germany, although its limited passage capacity did not compensate for the loss of sea transport options, did not begin a period of clear, close cooperation between these two states ruled by fascists. Ideological similarities and the hope for German support in the incorporation of Gibraltar and parts of North Africa into Spanish rule were more prevalent in Spanish ruling circles or less the Libra with the fear of indirect or even direct domination by Hitler's Germany. Added to this was Spain's dependence on food and other supplies from overseas could be cut off by the British fleet. Spanish government members constantly wavered between the warring parties, but Franco understood that through occasional concessions on both sides as well as through ministerial changes between the warring parties active participation in the war of Spain to avoid (except the later, more symbolic posting the "Blue Division" to the German-Soviet front) and to maintain his dictatorship beyond the war.

In the here to treating phase of the war, however, exceeded the Spanish deliveries to Germany exceed the counter-deliveries several times over. In the German import statistics for the first half of 1941, which, as already mentioned, also listed the occupied areas, Spain was only in 13th place with 89.5 **million RM (behind Italy, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark,** Soviet Union, Sweden, Norway, Hungary, Romania, Switzerland, Slovakia), but the import surplus was 70.5 **million RM** , far more than the towards other independent states. ¹⁵⁰ That's not just possible absolutely with the current one Explain the balance of power. It should also be taken into account that in a confidential protocol dated February 28, 1941, the German side agreed to pay the remaining considerable claims from its deliveries and services to the Francoists during the civil war in 1936 - 1939 until after the end of the war ¹⁵¹ . However, this was precisely the reason why the Spanish side was able to demand concessions regarding the offsetting of current trade balances.

However, it could yourself in the mentioned Balance sheet already too one refined practice the British economic warfare that had previously - as shown in Southeastern Europe had - on the one hand too economical and on the other hand too little differentiated applied

149 BAP, AA 68792, BI. 23, Reichsstelle f. d. Foreign trade, "Brief summary of the reports from the foreign trade offices on the current export situation. As of May 1, 1941", 'May 14, 1941.

150 According to: BAP, AA 68759, BI. 47 ff., "Germans Foreign trade balance for the first half of 1941", sent by the AA to the German missions and professional consulates on October 25, 1941.

151 Quiet!, S. 41.

had been det to achieve a significant effect: the pre-emptive policy. Now the representatives of the British Ministry for Economic Warfare did not pursue the goal of buying up huge quantities of raw materials that the German war economy urgently needed and thus minimizing their export to German territory, but rather they only acquired carefully calculated critical quantities of certain types of goods, with which they intended to trigger such an increase in prices on the Spanish and Portuguese **markets** (also in other neutral countries) that the German buyers would ultimately lead to a reduction in prices. Quantities that she were able to pay would be forced.

The British pre-emptive policy Related at the time on the Iberian Peninsula especially on tin, tungsten and what the British consider to be "dangerously high" copper supplies, but also to other types of goods for which one is responsible. The imminent noticeable shortages expected in the German territory in the near future, such as animal feed, fish, fish and vegetable oils. The Pre-emptive policy was through one each only on short. The rationing of the quantities of certain raw materials that were allowed to pass through the blockade for import into neutral or non-belligerent states was supplemented and effectively supported by fixed deadlines (two to three months).

The increased prices for goods that Germany imported were offset by increased prices for German export goods. In contrast, British economic warfare used the weapon of price undercutting in certain markets after the failures of the first phase of the war in London, it was understood that one could not limit oneself to buying raw materials from the neutrals that they would otherwise sell to Germany, but that one also had to supply them with goods that... she otherwise received in return for their goods from Germany.¹⁵²

In contrast to the German-Spanish trade in goods remained the turnover of trade between Germany and Portugal overall quite right low, whereby the Balance sheet in the first Half of 1941 even slightly active for the German side failed.¹⁵³ In In the second half of 1940 and beyond, the British pre-emptive policy was counteracted by the German war economy looting large quantities of strategic raw materials in France, including tungsten. In contrast, the German-British buyout battle experienced. There was no weakening of tungsten due to the "hole in the east": from the traditionally most important production and supply area, the Far East, flows overland flowed through the Soviet Union contrary to expectations and contractual agreements - as Jäger shows¹⁵⁴ - practically no tungsten was added to the German war economy. The quantities that reached Germany in this way were not enough once for production of the with it to Delivery of finished goods to be manufactured in the USSR. So, in spite of what had been captured in France, there raged Stocks in Portugal and Spain a dogged Wrestling around tungsten ores, the

- provided she not in pits were mined, the already in British or owned by German capital - often from deposits that have no competition in times of peace withstood had, with most primitive Methods promoted and transported away became

152 Medlicott I, S. 424 f., 515, 526 ff.

153 How Note 150.

154 Hunter, S. 267 f.

and sharply rising prices, with the Spanish and Portuguese states also collecting large amounts of taxes.¹⁵⁵

As countries bordering the Atlantic, Spain and Portugal also benefited from the USA's stance on the British blockade mainland Europe. The desire to... not to allow their own business to be affected, if possible the previous markets of the belligerents countries for themselves to win, had the USA companies The British government and its fleet did not dare to speak out as forcefully^{as} they did against the deliberate disregard of British naval blockade regulations by US trading and shipping companies since the beginning of the war it against weaker neutrals did. In the here to phase of the war that was under discussion the USA their Goods deliveries under the Slogan, you can the peoples of the neutral and also the of the Countries occupied by the German Wehrmacht should not be allowed to starve. This humanitarian justification was announced particularly for Vichy France.¹⁵⁷

An episode that is representative of the attitude of the USA should be mentioned in this context: German cannons were loaded onto a Brazilian ship in the port of Lisbon for transport to Brazil. When the ship arrived despite the refusal of British approval lake stung, became it from the Navy after Gibraltar upset. Following the intervention of the US government, which argued These cannons were needed to "strengthen the defense of the Western Hemisphere," but it was ultimately decided by the British this weapons transport approved and the ship and its cargo were released.¹⁵⁸ realiters were used to pay for goods sold by German trading houses based in South America there and e.g. T. also purchased in the USA, to Spain and Portugal sold and transported so that they could reach Germany from there.

d) Northern Europe

The Conquered Norway was from then on under direct German occupation administration. Representatives of the remaining Norwegian authorities or those installed under Quisling were unable to conduct trade negotiations with Germany and were rarely able to take part in negotiations that German officials conducted on Norway's behalf with third countries, and then only in an advisory capacity.¹⁵⁹ In general, there could be no question of real foreign trade.¹⁶⁰

155 Ibid, S. 270-278 .

156 BAP, AA 68759, BI. 1, record Rüter re: "Attitude the neutrals Countries against the English and French 'Black List'", October 10, 1939.

157 See. in addition Medlicott I, S. 578-584 .

158 For this and to similar ones cases see. just that. 494 ff; see. also Boelcke, S. 172.

159 BAK, R 7/3008, Norway country sheet. - Milward, Alan S., Do Fascist Economy in Norway, Oxford 1972, the yourself though always of The term "foreign trade" is used and a Gaqze's chapter in his book (pp. 139-170) is titled this way, but leaves no doubt that Quisling's ministers responsible for economic issues have no influence whatsoever on the movement of goods between Norway and other countries could exercise if they even tried to do so.

160 The statistical designated, the exceeding pre-war values Digits for Import, export and

The without occupied by military resistance Denmark was treated differently. Of course, the interests of the occupier also came first there, which is why British naval warfare had every right to continue its blockade without restrictions after April 1940 also applied to Denmark. However, there was still a Danish government whose limited powers at least left it a certain amount of room for maneuver in the country's economic life Exchange of goods with Germany, with the other occupied countries as well as independent states on the European mainland also allowed Danish interests to be asserted to a certain extent.¹⁶¹ As early as June 1940, it achieved price increases of up to 20 percent for Danish agricultural products delivered to Germany.¹⁶²

Behind Denmark's special position, which was supposedly based on international law,¹⁶³ there was a sober calculation on the German side. The through the elimination of the Feed deliveries The ability to produce and deliver was undermined from overseas but was urgently needed for the German war economy Danish livestock breeding and the agricultural processing industry could not be maintained to any extent through brutal force methods, but rather by keeping the Danish administrative authorities, business associations and ultimately the producers and traders by leaving them alone Opportunities to win and freedom of choice Individual questions as well as tolerance of one for that time of relatively high nutritional levels stimulated.

Despite the nutritional problems In the German area, the German authorities in Berlin and Copenhagen limited themselves to participating the Danish government delivering quantities at foods, but also counter-deliveries, particularly from coals and Coke,

Active balances are therefore misleading. - On the exploitation of Norway for the German war economy, the in front of yourself everything on his Shipping (if not too evaded the Allies), especially (as before) for the Transporting Swedish iron ores, its fishing industry and the Use of Hydropower reserves for the Development the Aluminum production extended, see II, p. 400 ff., and other literature mentioned there.

161 The German-Danish agreement above the mutual movement of goods from the March 1, 1934 or 24. 1.

1935 was also extended for the years 1941, 1942 and 1943 (BAP, AA 68711). In May 1940 we found... in the Previous years negotiations of the joint government committee instead of. If only this time the German wishes determine the Results were like this were also Danish Wishes discussed and e.g. T in the agreement recorded (ibid., BI. 176-199 ,

"Results of the government committee discussions of May 1940" above, May 18, 1940, with various appendices, minutes, etc.). Representatives of the Danish government negotiated with third countries after prior coordination of their negotiation program with German government bodies (BAP, AA 67771, BI. 246, van Scherpenberg to RMEL and **RWiM**, June 7, 1940).

162 BAP, AA 67771, BI. 256 ff., Meyer-Burckhardt transcript (RMEL) about one Meeting on June 19, 1940 re: "Price policy at the import agricultural products out of Denmark"; right there, BI. 255 & 255R, record van Scherpenberg for Wiehl, June 27, 1940.

163 Despite military occupation, the "German government" had on April 10, 1940 the Danish government the Maintenance the Danish sovereignty assured"; BAP, AA 67768, BI. 257-262 (quote BI. 257), "Result of the negotiations of the German and Danish government committees on the import of Danish agricultural products to Germany in the second year of the war economy", n.d. (probably: Walter, chairman of the German government committee), n.d.

to negotiate. Of course it went it included not without leverage away. It stayed but the It was up to the Danish government to decide whether and how it managed food within the country. The Danish government did not lead in 1940 or later meat or egg rationing for Danish consumers. Ratios were set for butter and margarine, but there were also plenty of other sources of supply. An official exercise of influence Generation and Buyout for German needs were met mainly through the allocation the overall insufficient quantities of imported Feed. The population's consumption was restricted not so much through official management measures as through price increases on the market, which was mentioned in an official German report on the second year of the war economy (October 1, 1940- 30. September 1941) to "up to 80 percent of the previous year's prices" for Beef was quantified, but overall it probably did not reach the proportions as in other countries. ¹⁶⁴

Danish deliveries of meat, butter and cheese to Germany were greater than in the 1940/41 **financial year** in the following years. ¹⁶⁵ The is before mainly due to the loss of the most important Danish export market caused by the occupation, England, and feed imports from overseas (which is why many animals also had to be slaughtered) ¹⁶⁶, probably also due to inventory levels.

Germany's trade relations with Finland revived in the second half of 1940 ¹⁶⁷, Although efforts were initially made to hide the underlying motives, which were primarily directed against the Soviet Union, from the Soviet Union. Although Hitler's decision in the summer of 1940 to prepare for war against the USSR in 1941 was of course only a small one Circle of entrusted to the military been It apparently resulted in a warming of the political atmosphere between Berlin and Helsinki, which was similar to Berlin's officially reserved attitude during the Soviet-Finnish war and the shock that the occupation of Denmark and Norway had caused in their neighboring countries was hardly to be expected, although there were fears the Red Army will be like short before in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia soon invaded Finland, which contributed to the warming. ¹⁶⁸

The fact that these atmospheric changes very quickly had a beneficial effect on German-Finnish trade relations is demonstrated by the mutual agreement according to which Finland would in future supply 60 percent of the nickel ore produced in the Petsamo area to Germany Lifting of the extradition ban for Weapons to Finland from August 1940 and the so-called Veltjens Agreement on extensive arms deliveries signed on October 1, 1940. ¹⁶⁹ In return, Finland, which had just joined the USSR, evacuated in negotiations above Concession rights at the Nickel ore mines at Kolosjoki

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ See. II, S. 502.

¹⁶⁶ In addition, etc. a. BAK, R 7/3407, "The most important ones Danish benefits for Germany", p. 5, O. Vf., Copenhagen June 14, 1944.

¹⁶⁷ BAP, AA 68714, Bl. 96 f., recording purr, July 1, 1940.

¹⁶⁸ The German Rich, Vol. 4, S. 367.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid. - Joseph Veltjens was a lieutenant colonel the Luftwaffe and was considered a personal friend of Göring .

(Petsamo) was standing, Germany a blanket "right of first refusal". on all the Greater Germans Concessions of rich interest in Finland".¹⁷⁰ was held in IG Farbenindustrie AG and in Reich Ministry of Economics already after the contracts of June and July 1940 the entire ongoing German Nickel requirements for covered¹⁷¹, so lock the IG Colors but at the On February 19, 1941, an additional nickel ore supply contract was signed with Petsamo-Nikkeli OY.¹⁷² By handing over its nickel ore resources to the German war economy, the Finnish government to stop trade between the USSR and Finland.¹⁷³

These are not just trade policy Processes were accompanied by the Finnish permission, from September 1940, German troops numbering 5,000 men with their heavy weapons above Finnish Railway lines to Northern Norway to transport and to whose Protection and supply German Wehrmacht bases along the route with additional 1 800 - 2 000 man crew to be set up, which remained in place afterwards.¹⁷⁴

To which is getting closer and closer becoming economic cooperation then belonged In addition to the exchange of traditionally traded goods, also that in the spring of 1941, when food rations in Finland were lower than in warring Germany as a result of the difficulties with imports from overseas¹⁷⁵ ¹⁷⁶, about food deliveries was negotiated from the German dominion to Finland. The occasionally as¹⁷⁷ ^{The 177 agreements dated March 7, 1941,} known as the trade agreement, provided the basis for Finland now having more the half his imports and Exports were oriented towards Germany, at a strong predominance of imports.¹⁷⁸

For Sweden it was still as a result of German military successes in April to June 1940 more complicated become, his neutrality not only formally, rather also factually at-

170 Ibid, S. 372.

171 Ibid., p.373.

172 Ibid., p.374.

173 BAP, AA 67822, BI. 303, v. Blucher at AA, Helsinki March 5, 1941.

174 The German Rich, Vol. 4, S. 372.

175 The Finnish delegation leader v. At the end of June 1940, Fieandt had committed himself to stopping trade with Germany's enemy powers (BAP, AA 68714, BI. 96a, Schnurre record on the German-Finnish economic agreements of June 29, 1940, July 1, 1940), which was due to objective constraints and was not followed absolutely due to different political aspirations in Finnish government circles.

176 BAP, AA 67822, BI. 305, note van Scherpenberg above one Meeting with MR Ludwig (RWIM), March 18, 1941.

177 Third parties objected to this, primarily for diplomatic and tactical reasons States LR van Scherpenberg in a letter from. March 22, 1941 to LR Kreutzwald (ibid., BI. 364). On December 31st 1940 was the Period of validity of commercial contract from the March 1934 by changing notes between State Secretary v. Weizsäcker and the Finnish ambassador Kivimäki were extended again by one year, until December 31, 1941 (BAP, AA 68714, BI. 135 f., notes from December 31, 1940).

178 BAP, AA 68714, BI. 144-150, "Confidential Minutes of the Negotiations between a German and a Finnish delegation on questions of German-Finnish goods and clearing transactions in 1941 from March 7, 1941", signed by Blücher and Witting, Helsinki March 7, 1941; BAP, AA 67822, BI. 305, note van Scherpenberg over one Meeting with MR Ludwig, March 18, 1941; ibid, BI. 354 ff., "Report from our confidant" v. March 17, 1941.

to keep. Under the sword of Damocles threatened military attacks, possibly even an invasion of Swedish territory by the Wehrmacht, the Swedish side tried to retain as much room for maneuver as possible, sometimes giving in to German demands and at least verbally deviating from previous agreements with the British government. At the one for Conversations between diplomats sometimes involve uncharacteristically tough arguments acted it itself apparently not just about calculation staged verbal battles intended to persuade the interlocutor to make concessions. On the Swedish side, there were also different attitudes between the Social Democratic-dominated government and the military leadership towards the warring parties. German side was before and after April 9, 1940, when German troops occupied Denmark and Norway conquered, very well notes that the Norwegian-Swedish border, favored by the mountainous geographical structure, is in a defensible condition on the Swedish side and the railway line, which is extremely important for German armaments production, between the iron ore mining area around the Swedish Kiruna and the Norwegian port of Narvik on the Swedish side on at least 17 positions for Detonation was prepared.¹⁷⁹

Apart from that from Finland with its Northern Sea port of Petsamo and from the USSR (with the political relations had been extremely bad during the Soviet-Finnish war) with their trade largely not in line with Sweden's traditional trade directions Transit routes¹⁸⁰ was that Swedish foreign trade is now completely from the Goodwill from Berlin dependent. Had Swedish ships before April 1940 from and to ports West Coast using the Territorial waters of neutrals Norway, the naval war zones somewhat evasive, To be able to sail across the Atlantic, that's how it became It is now essential to negotiate agreements with both warring sides in order to be able to maintain any kind of overseas traffic. How common, was part of the Swedish Merchant fleet was traveling far from home even when war broke out, and at the 9. April 1940 had itself a bit more as the half of her Clay located west of the Skagerrak Dam. Both belligerent sides were not only concerned with preventing... Swedish ships goods through that Naval war zone through promoted, which then possibly the war opponents would benefit, but didn't want to allow that either itself the respectively beyond the own blockade zones and mine barriers, the Swedish tonnage, which could be chartered out to the enemy, was increased.

After lengthy Double negotiations the Swedish Government, the not without for a neutral, questionable concessions above all, the Swedish permit for rail transit of Wehrmacht goods and German soldiers to and from Norway, departed, became finally after more factual approval the British Government through a

179 Wittmann, S. 183 f.

180 Nevertheless, Germany should aim to ensure that "not much more than normal exports for Russia's own needs can be exported through the countries of the North and Baltic Seas without our control". - From a lecture note dated April 23, 1940, in the Results of a meeting that took place on April 18, 1940 are held with Ambassador Ritter, who is responsible for coordinating economic war issues; quoted *ibid*, p. 188.

The so-called Gothenburg traffic was installed following the German-Swedish exchange of notes on February 7, 1941: under careful control by the in the The German "conduct slip office" stationed in the Swedish port of Gothenburg was allowed, for four different overseas regions (South and Central America, USA, Japan, China), to take a certain number of Swedish ships with certain goods and people on board that were subject to German approval into the North Sea. and come in from there.¹⁸¹

Contrary to the Germans pads followed the Swedish ones Captains expressed the desire of the British Navy to visit the Faroe Islands on the way across the Atlantic in order to be controlled there by the other belligerent side. Both sides were wary of maintaining the balance between ships arriving and departing from Gothenburg to and from overseas, although, as the following years showed, considerably more in terms of quantity and value was landed in Gothenburg than was shipped.¹⁸² The Gothenburg traffic, in which Sweden participates for supply and employment reasons, but also in order not to completely lose its traditional markets for the post-war period and in order not to be completely in the continental European It was vitally important to be included in Germany's sphere of influence the years until the end of the war by both warring parties used as a means of pressure on the Swedish government, first more from the German side and later more from the Allies, depending on the development of the balance of power. However, since both warring parties also had a certain interest of their own in maintaining **economic** life and domestic political stability in Sweden, Gothenburg traffic remained fundamental despite repeated temporary interruptions until well into 1944 into function. At this point in time, Sweden could no longer be blackmailed in this way thanks to the supply depots that had been created in the meantime and which were considered sufficient until the foreseeable end of the war.

The German war economy remained in 1940/41 although still in Swedish Iron ore required. But for how long the Swedish willingness to deliver with counter-deliveries, especially in Shape of the urgently needed coal, bought or whether whether it would be enforced by military means was the cardinal question constantly before the Swedish government in that phase of the war. The British government's hope, despite the current war situation, is to produce iron, steel and ferrochrome To be able to move into Sweden under these circumstances - despite almost complete British control of the Sweden's oil supply routes hardly fulfilled. It also had to give up its efforts to persuade the Swedish government to stop deliveries of ore to Germany and make do with its assurances that these deliveries would not increase above the 1938 level.¹⁸³ In addition to the military threat, the feasibility of which may have been overestimated in Stockholm in view of the tasks set for the Nazi Wehrmacht in other parts of Europe, the German leadership had, above all, the means of exerting pressure on Sweden to supply sufficient coal, less coal or no coal at all The maintenance of Swedish economic life depended entirely on delivery from the German area.

181 BAP, AA68699, BI. 9ff., AAHaPolllanOKW, OKM, OBdL, RWiM, RMEL, RVM, February 19, 1941.

182 See. Wittmann, S. 328, quoted Statistics.

183 Medlicott I, S. 617.

During the bilateral government committee negotiations in November/December In 1940 the Swedish side reached for the period from 1. January to December 31, 1941 delivery commitments in the amount of 4 million tons of coal and 1.7 Mill. t of coke.¹⁸⁴ 1938 were out Germany 653 070 t Hard coal and 576 850 tons of coke were delivered.¹⁸⁵ In the same year, Sweden had a total of 5 773 000 t Hard coal and 1 940 000 t coke imported.¹⁸⁶ The German commitments for 1941 therefore fell short of Sweden's total import requirements for the last full pre-war year by 31 percent for coal and twelve percent for coke. But it was taken into account the fact that Sweden's imports came mainly not from Germany, but from England and Poland. Taking the Swedish demand for grades into account to a certain extent, the above-mentioned protocol stipulated that of the agreed quantities, at least 720,000 tonnes of coal and 1.7 million tonnes (i.e. the total amount) of coke would be supplied by the Rhenish-Westphalian coal syndicate and at least 2 520 000 t of coal from the Upper Silesian hard coal syndicate would be delivered. The rest of Quotas should be both Syndi divide kate between each other.¹⁸⁷ Since the German Reichsbahn under They had to suffer from a lack of wagons the Swedish State railways 500 Freight wagons a 20 t Loading capacity to Rent after Germany, exclusively for the transport of coke from the Ruhr area to German shipping ports should be used towards Sweden.¹⁸⁸ At The determination of how much of the deliveries to Sweden would go to the Rhenish-Westphalian coal syndicate or the Upper Silesian hard coal syndicate was certainly not about finding sales opportunities for to seize the moment, because there was no shortage of coal and coke in the belligerent Germany has plenty of needs. Rather, they were with rivals German syndicates strive to stand up for to create a favorable starting position for the competition in the post-war period, which was soon expected at the time.

In the first half of 1941, among the countries that were not occupied or de facto dominated by Germany, Sweden ranked third in German imports and exports (behind Italy and the USSR), although the trade balance with Sweden was slightly active for Germany.¹⁸⁹

While Sweden made some questionable concessions to the Nazi Empire regarding the interpretation of its neutrality status during the phase of the war under discussion, it remained so since the middle 1940 consistent hard in the Rejection his Inclusion in the so-called "Reorganization of Europe", especially in the planning and organization of the "large European economic area". As the main argument It was repeatedly stated in statements that Sweden's specific economic structure absolutely required access to the entire world market and not self-sufficiency, not even on the continental level Scale, endure would. It became also not in the nearly everyone social circles of the country cherished fear-

184 BAP, AA 68739, BI. 37R, Annex 4 to the "Confidential Minutes of Meetings of the German and Swedish Government Committees for the Questions regarding payment and goods traffic from November 25th. - December 16, 1940".

185 Statistical Yearbook fd German Rich 1939/40, Tab. VII 15, S. 309.

186 Ibid, International Overviews Tab. D 17, S. 191* f.

187 How Note 184.

188 Ibid.

189 As note 150.

the information was kept secret its integration into the major European economic area under the command of German imperialism would deal a death blow to the bourgeois-democratic conditions in Sweden. Even the more moderate choice of words that Berlin tried to use in the later years of the war in order to present its large-scale plan did not find favor in Sweden.¹⁹⁰

However, this fundamental refusal did not exclude Sweden from becoming Germany's monopoly seller of coal and coke on the European market. The price offensive launched on the continent in 1940/41 gave way and in return there were no correspondingly strong price increases for its ores push through could. At least it had an effect the principle of the "Price scale" that the price gap between German and Swedish deliveries was not as wide as was usual in the "major economic area".¹⁹¹

e) Southeastern Europe and Türkiye

With Italy's entry into the war, the Mediterranean became a war zone, which meant¹⁹² and the Türkiye further complicates their situation commercial with^{the} Allies¹⁹³ and partners overseas, especially since the Istanbul-Baghdad-Basra rail connection in Syria was now under Italian control. Intentionally or unintentionally, the economic orientation of these countries towards Germany and Italy increased in the middle of 1940. Won in Turkey political, military and Economic circles that were more inclined towards Germany than towards the Western powers regained some influence on the government.¹⁹⁴ Compared to the first phase of the war came first to one slight stimulation the Trade relations the Turkey¹⁹⁵ and Greece's¹⁹⁶ to Germany, and in

190 BAP, AA 68971/10, BI. 1 ff., German embassy, Thomsen, at AA, Stockholm August 11, 1944.

191 Olsson, Sven-Olof, German Coal and Swedish Fuel 1939-1945, Gothenburg 1975, p. 162 f.; Wittmann, p. 198.

192 Berlin stock exchange newspaper v. March 15, 1941, "Bulgaria secured supply situation".

193 In 1940, essentially up to May, 497,306 tons of mineral oil had been shipped to Great Britain and 171,398 tons to France via Constantinople. Until then, the British-French capital participation in Romanian oil production had been able to maintain a significant influence on the export of this raw material, which was important for the war effort. For comparison: throughout 1940 achieved 1.4 Mill. t to Germany, into Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia and in the Slovakia (BAP, AA 68738/1, BI. 13-37, report of Special Representative f. economic issues, Neubacher, „The Romanian Petroleum industry in the Years 1940", Bucharest January 24, 1941).

194 BAP, AA 68696, BI. 2 f., note v. Weizsacker for the R.A.M., June 18, 1940.

195 BAP, AA 68749, BI. 228-249, special and payment agreement on the German-Turkish exchange of goods v. July 25, 1940. - On British countermeasures see Medlicott I, S. 601-611.

196 BAP, AA 68719, BI. 1 17-120R, "Confidential Protocol about the Result of the fourth together Conference of the German and of Greek government committee", signed by the committee chairman, Envoy Morath and Varvaressos, Governor of the Bank of Greece, Athens June 27, 1940; ibid, BI. 1 27R, Agreement regarding payment of German war material deliveries to Greece, signed by the same people, Athens June 27, 1940.

In Yugoslavia, the German share not only grew in the exchange of goods ¹⁹⁷, but also in industrial capital (at the expense of the French one) ¹⁹⁸.

The Yugoslavian Government had to itself Beginning August 1940 even oblige, at **hit** lers Krieggeiner to no longer supply raw materials and agricultural products ¹⁹⁹, and in this regard submit to "a prior agreement" with the German government as to whether previous contractual agreements that were still valid could be fulfilled ²⁰⁰. She gave in September 1940 also German requirements to declare their willingness to integrate their country into the desired "European metropolitan economy". ²⁰¹ As it soon became clear, however, Turkey and Greece, and finally Yugoslavia, with strong fluctuations, remained essentially oriented towards the opposite side, and not only in political relations.

The United Kingdom Commercial Corporation (UKCC) has taken action in recent months of year 1940 and early 1941 extraordinary Efforts are being made to reduce goods traffic, particularly Turkey, through large purchases of goods well above world market prices (according to the German model), but also through the delivery of goods needed there with to move to the German territory. According to perhaps not entirely reliable calculations by the British Embassy in Ankara, in 1940 to reduce Germany's share of Turkish exports and imports enormously compared to 1939.

Table 114

Percentages Shares some Countries at the Turkish foreign trade, 1939, 1940

country	export		import	
	1939	1940	1939	1940
Great Britain	5.73	10.36	6.25	14.02
Germany	37.29	8.69	50.86	11.73
Romania	1.40	10.76	1.98	15.68
Hungary	1.22	5.81	no specification	no specification

Source: Medicott I, S. 610.

197 **BAP, AA 68726, BI. 70 ff.**, "Eleventh Confidential Protocol" from July 31, 1940, signed from the chairmen of the German and Yugoslavian Government Committee, Landfried and Pilja.

198 Dimitrijevic, Sergije, *Das foreign capital in Yugoslavia before dem Second World War*, Berlin 1963, especially p. 54.

199 **BAP, AA 68726, BI. 76R-77**, Change of notes between Pilja and Landfried, chairman of the bilateral government committee, August 1, 1940.

200 **BAP, AA 68802/I, BI. 26**, Landfried at Pilja, Belgrade September 28, 1940.

201 **BAP, AA 68726, BI. 91 u. 9IR**, Record about one Meeting on September 23, 1940, Landfried and Pilja, Belgrade September 24, 1940; **BAP, AA 68802/I, BI. 25 and 25R**, like; *ibid*, BI. 23 f., Pilja an Landfried, Belgrade September 24, 1940, as well as its confirmation.

The decline in the German share was somewhat compensated for by the increased share of some countries under German control. Turkish companies and government agencies thereby circumvented British demands not to deliver certain types of goods to Germany or purchase them from there. And out of German files It is known that Hungarian authorities and companies in particular offered their services to procure goods in short supply for the German war economy from Turkey and other countries.²⁰² However, such efforts apparently remained successful limited. The same may also apply to a German-Bulgarian agreement from March 1941. The German Reichsbank provided the Bulgarian National Bank foreign exchange until for the Total value of eight **mill. RM** for the Procurement from raw materials for the Bulgarian Business to Disposal. In addition became set:

"Should itself for Bulgaria above the Amount from 8th millions Reichsmark out more Opportunities for obtaining important raw materials revealed, like that is the German government agreed that the Reichsbank of the Bulgarian National Bank provides further amounts of foreign currency with the proviso that Bulgaria offers half of these earnings to Germany for purchase."²⁰³

¹⁹⁴¹, Yugoslavia and Greece were occupied by German, Italian and Bulgarian troops. On the basis of "friendly agreements," German troops had already been stationed in Romania and Bulgaria. By mid-1941, all of them were there Countries in Southeastern Europe except Türkiye under the control of the Axis powers. However, that did not mean that in the exchange of goods between Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary with Germany native business circles These countries would no longer be able to protect their own interests to assert. Not just in terms of formal international law, but also factually differentiated In many ways they differ from countries that have been militarily defeated and placed under occupation regimes.

Of all the Southeast European countries, Romania was undoubtedly the most important for the German war economy because its oil was indispensable for supplying fuel to the armed forces. It was only in the second half of 1940 that a shift in domestic political power was achieved in Romania, this country economically out of its²⁰⁵ capital and trade connections that were still in effect until May 1940 particularly in the petroleum sector with the allied countries to solve and clearly heading towards Berlin orientate. Consequently

202 BAP, AA 68825/1, BI. 484 ff., "Transcript about the result of the meetings, the on the occasion of the conference Of the german and of Hungarian Government committee in Budapest from the 4th to

16. January 1940 on certain military questions," signed v. FM Lt. v. Györfy-Bengyel, envoys v. Nickel (Chairman of the Hungarian government committee), Ambassador Clodius (Chairman of German Government Committee) u. Radtke, specifically BI. 486 and 486R, "III. Special Business"; Medicott I, p. 677 f.

203 BAP, AA 68691, BI. 98, chairman of the German Government Committee for Economic Negotiations with Bulgaria, Landwehr, to the Chairman of the Bulgarian Government Committee, Zonev, March 28, 1941.

204 The Reich Office for foreign trade reported on May 14, 1941 (BAP, AA 68792, BI. 12, "Brief summary of the reports from the foreign trade offices on the current export situation. was standing on May 1, 1941"), "very good orders" had been received from Yugoslavia right up to the critical days, advance payments had been made and old invoices had been paid.

205 Please refer Note 193.

This was already stated in the economic agreement of March 1939 The ten-year plan for the development of the Romanian national economy, to be drawn up and implemented jointly and under German aegis and objectives, was only practically tackled towards the end of 1940 through concrete agreements.²⁰⁶

This was preceded by two for the the overriding interests of Romania's ruling circles and their consideration by Berlin. At the 22. May 1940 came an "agreement on the exchange of German military equipment and Romanian mineral oil products".²⁰⁷ The Romanian government, which is now with state means of power the additional Delivery from petroleum products, also through the companies operating with significant British capital participation, wanted in return not means of production for the development of their industry and agriculture, but war equipment because they felt threatened by neighbors, especially the Soviet Union. The agreement stipulated a surcharge on the pre-war price for Romanian petroleum products, but at the same time also set surcharges on the then usual prices for military equipment that was to be delivered from Germany and Bohemia to Moravia in the future, including then however, at least for Part, also captured weapons. As the daily prices of petroleum fluctuate, but given the limited supply and the as expected As demand trended upwards, the offsetting regulations were aimed at maintaining stable price relationships between oil and weapons. The regulation was still in effect in August 1944^{8th}

The second agreement with which the ruling Circles of Romania for a one-sided, firm cooperation with Germany was achieved a minutes dated 8. August. 1940. In order to ensure a "long-term and generous determination of quantities and prices and thus to ensure the health and further development of Romanian agriculture," the German side agreed to "take over Romania's grain surplus at fixed prices" or "export it." ".²⁰⁹ After the experience of the chronic agricultural sales crisis, such a sales guarantee based on fixed prices was of course impressive, but it meant also, that Romania later could not take advantage of any more profitable sales opportunities that might be available. Nevertheless, these two examples prove that the During that phase of the war, the German leadership tried to show a certain degree of conciliation towards the ruling circles in Romania, according to which the special representative for **economic** issues contributed the German embassy in Bucharest, Hermann Neubacher, in In another specific context (financing of German troops in Romania) in the fall of 1940, the maxim was that "damage to Romania's economic strength ... would happen in the short term or long on the Romanian Services Germany opposite have a retroactive effect had to.

206 BAP, AA 68735, BI. 121 and 121R, "Protocol on German-Romanian cooperation in the Carrying out one ten year plan for the structure of the Romanian economy", signed by Ges. Clodius, State Secretary Dimitriuc and Grecianu, December 4, 1940.

207 Ibid., BI. 35-36R, Agreement on the Exchange of German War Equipment and Romanian Petroleum Products, signed by. Slavescu and Neubacher, Bucharest May 22, 1940.

208 **BAK**, R 7/2275, Clodius at armament and Minister of Economic Affairs general Dobre, Bucharest 11.8. 1944.

209 BAP, AA 68735, BI. 45 ff., minutes, signed v. Neubacher and Economics Minister Leon, Bucharest August 8, 1940.

The war-important, even war-decisive significance of the Romanian mineral oil deliveries prohibited any experimentation from the outset."²¹⁰

Primarily for objective reasons Romania found itself in a less unfavorable situation than other southeastern European countries during that phase of the war. But that's what it was for in the Spring 1941, after meetings between Göring and Ion Antonescu, in those economic sectors in which the ruling circles in Romania were less interested, especially in wholesale and retail trade, were subject to particularly vehement pressure to Germanize, e.g. T. exposed under the guise of "Aryanization".²¹¹

At a meeting in Vienna on March 5, 1941, the Romanian head of state learned of a much more fateful impending event when Göring asked him to with German Help still in the the same Year the Romanian Annual production at oil to increase by 1 million t, ie by the amount that could have been imported from the USSR in 1941 on the basis of the German-Soviet treaties.²¹²

f) Soviet Union, Further and Middle east

Only the phase from June 1940 to spring 1941 can be considered the a really close economic cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union, with each Party definitely theirs pursued his own interests. At the same time they worked in these months, especially since September 1940, when As political conflicts arose and came to a head between the two states, particularly with regard to Southeastern Europe, two lines of attitude towards the USSR emerged in the German leadership. These were not championed head-on in public or internally. Stalin did not see through this and therefore drew fatal conclusions. The one line that actually dominated was embodied by Hitler, who was able to rely largely on the leadership of the army and on the NSDAP and SS leaders. This line pursued the Eastern expansion as directly in to attack the immediate target and put the confrontation with the non-continental opponents, rivals and competitors in second place. The another line embodied - by no means as solid group - the Foreign Office with Ribbentrop, occasionally and inconsistently Göring, and various business circles with different Competitive and other economic interests as well as - to a certain extent autonomously - Raeder and his admiralty²¹³. This no less imperialist current considered the fight against England and the expansion of its possessions in Asia and especially in the Near and Middle East to be a priority, and for this it needed peace and close economic cooperation, possibly even an alliance, with the Soviet Union.

210 BAP, AA 68736, BI. 69, Neubacher at Gauss, April 2, 1942.

211 BAK, R 63/127, BI. 7--45, travel reports Stoeger (Vienna Chamber of Commerce) v. 24.2., 9.4. and July 24, 1941.

212 Schwendemann, p. 292.

213 However, the head of the naval command, Rear Admiral, pleaded Kurt Fricke, in his "Considerations on Russia" of July 28, 1940, for the annexation of the Baltics and part of the Ukraine for economic policy reasons (The German Reich, vol. 4, p. 112).

Hitler was fully occupied with preparing the military attack on the USSR and mixed itself - how nice before - into economic relations with the USSR only if he was explicitly asked to make a decision. Not only from the Soviet side, but also from the German side from June 1940 forced trade exchange including the long-controversial delivery of modern German "model weapons" for reproduction (the start-up time, of course, although less than Soviet own constructions, required) served ideally as camouflage for military attack preparations. Schwendemann's consistently held and proven interesting basic thesis, which is likely to be confirmed rather than shaken by future file discoveries, reads in a selected passage: "Stalin was up to for the 22nd June 1941 not in the Location, the double face the to recognize German politics. The Kremlin leader certainly assumed, based on his own self-image as a dictator, that his counterpart in Berlin held the reins just as firmly in his hand and handled the political and economic interplay with the Soviet Union in a similar way to himself. That Hitler was in large areas of the German -was uninvolved in Soviet relations, was beyond Stalin's imagination. Here Ultimately lies the key to the answer to the still unanswered question of why Stalin made his judgment about Hitler's had completely miscalculated his intentions and even in the face of On the march of the Wehrmacht in the spring of 1941 all warnings had turned a blind eye to a German attack." ²¹⁴

Since the German negotiators from the Foreign Office increasingly turned not to the responsible specialists or diplomats, but rather to Mikoyan, Molotov or Stalin personally, "on behalf of the Reich government", Stalin believed that they were conveying Hitler's personal opinions, wishes or answers. And sober consideration of the world situation must indeed lead to the rational conclusion: Germany should not, without necessity, start a war on two fronts by conquering war-ravaged areas Soviet areas could it Hardly so in the short and medium term much grains and How to extract raw materials through the maintenance of trade relations that are getting better and better; Realpolitik must surely reflect on the racist and anti-communist Eastern expansion intentions announced in "My Campaign". prevail.

In order to support such a conclusion in Berlin too and one who still feared actually not quite to be excluded agreement of the Stalin set himself the task of depriving war opponents of breeding ground to the detriment of the USSR after the surprisingly quick German response Victory over France demonstratively the Page Hitler's Germany, etc. a. by an attempt at rapprochement Churchill's on January 1st July 1940 brusquely rejected and before everything the Soviet deliveries to Germany were forced. In the months from June to August 1940, according to reports from the Reich positions (How all monitoring points for the German imports since August 1939 were called) Goods for 178.7 million RM (FOB values) the USSR including its ports towards Germany, which is approx. 44 percent of the annual total from 1940 corresponded. After German foreign trade statistics, the only the transition of the Were in that German customs territory, they were in the mentioned period 128.4 million RM = approx. 34 percent of there determined annual sum; Because of the time delay, the information is taken for July until September 1940, so acted it is around Were for 188.8 mill. RM = approx. 49 Pro

cent.²¹⁵ Also from the German side Deliveries, which had previously been quite sparse, now increased sharply, despite the ordered armament conversion and although in this context the The USSR's priority among exporting countries was abolished. According to the German foreign trade statistics, which recorded export goods after they left the German customs territory, in the months of June, July and August 1940 for 81.4 **million RM** Were in the USSR, which accounted for approximately 38 percent of the annual total for 1940.²¹⁶

At the time the Page Hitler's Germany and not to provide England, Moscow also held Interest of his policy to expand the national territory of the USSR in the Baltics and Southeastern Europe. In the given situation, this did not seem to require the consent or toleration of Western powers, but only of Germany. Berlin granted it in the summer of 1940, even though it shifted the front line in the future war to the west. This Moscow's apparent success was soon to come to fruition as Occasion for diplomatic conflicts, although not as a reason for the war of aggression against the Soviet Union that Hitler intended anyway.

Economic relations also approached a critical point in the fall of 1940, when the USSR made use of the contractual clause to cut its own deliveries due to the renewed decline in German deliveries (as a result of the industry being overwhelmed with arms orders) and in the second half of September and October 1940 held preliminary discussions with Great Britain about possible trade contract negotiations.²¹⁷ About the planned Soviet raw materials, especially those now considered urgent considered Göring ordered the rescue of grain deliveries on the 15th. October 1940 all Industrial delivery orders for the USSR entered emergency level IA²¹⁸ and gave instructions not to allow the fulfillment of Soviet orders to fail until May 11, 1941, even at the expense of its own armament requirements²¹⁹. At about the same time, Germany reduced the long-controversial, previously significantly inflated price demands for naval and air force equipment to be delivered to the USSR.²²⁰

It was probably also Göring's fault that during Molotov's visit to Berlin in November 1940, which was politically extremely negative due to the conflicting interests in Southeast Europe and Finland, one new revitalization of the economic relations was initiated.²²¹ The again and again Stalled negotiations above a new economic agreement, that seamlessly the Economic agreement of 11 February 1940 should connect intensified. Engaged, itself the German War economy difficult dispensable to

215 After: Ibid, p. 367 f., Tab. 2.

216 After: Ibid, S. 368, Tab. 3.

217 Just that. 218, 220 f.

218 Ibid, S. 214 f.

219 The ad hoc campaign against Yugoslavia and Greece then postponed the planned attack on the USSR until than latest possible Appointment required June 22nd. - The uninitiated need not suspect anything special behind the date set by Göring, May 11, 1941, because an interim balance was agreed on that date.

220 Schwendemann, S. 222 f.

221 Just that. 225 ff.

Moscow hoped to keep the war away from their own country and to perfect its own defense capabilities with the help of German counter-supplies.

The result of the negotiations was the "IO Agreement. January 1941 on mutual deliveries of goods based on the economic agreement between the German Reich and the Union of Socialists Soviet Republics of February 11, 1940 in the second contract section" ²²², ie for the period from February 11, 1941 to August 1, 1942, and other agreements and protocols with regulations regarding, among other things, German interests in the Baltic states incorporated into the USSR.

Table 115

In the German-Soviet Economic Agreement from the /0. January /94/ agreed mutual deliveries (in mill. RM)

quarterly section	Soviet supplies	German deliveries
11.2.41 - 11.5.41	115	
11.5.41 - 11.8.41	170	117
11.8.41- 11/1/41	87	143
11/1/41 - 1.2.42	86	142
1.2.42 - 1.5.42	86	142
1.5.42 - 1.8.42	86	86
<i>In total</i>	630	630

Source: Schwendemann, Heinrich, The economic Cooperation between dem German Reich and the Soviet Union from 1939 to 1941, Berlin 1993, p. 255.

As was already the case in 1940, deliveries were to begin at different times. It meant, that the German side, in addition to the deliveries that were still outstanding from the first year of the contract, until no obligations as of May 11, 1941 to had fulfilled, while the By then, the Soviet side should have realized around 18 percent of its total newly agreed exports to Germany in terms of value.

The German delivery backlog from 1940 was considerable, and this repeatedly led to controversies with the Soviet side. Mikoyan reports on one of these in his memoirs: "A few months before the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, Germany proposed to reduce the execution of orders that have already been placed. I received the German representative for economic affairs Schnurre. On behalf of his government, he persistently proposed canceling part of our machine tool orders in exchange for an equivalent amount of gold. After listening to Schnurre, I told him, personally was against such a proposal because it was contrary to the Convention signed in August 1939. 'You have a developed machine tool industry,' I explained, ' and you have the opportunity to fulfill the obligations you have assumed to fulfill'. Over the Conversation with Purr informed I **1. W. Stalin**. At-

²²² ADAP, D, Vol. 11, Doc. 637.

Given the stubbornness of the Germans, we had no choice but to agree to their proposal." ²²³

Although the Soviet side in had given in to this case, efforts were made in Berlin now wants to better fulfill its own obligations. The fact that the Soviet commitment was made at the beginning of February 1941, around February **11th** , **may have contributed to this** until August 11th 1941 Germany 6,000 tons copper, 500 tons of tin, **1** 500 tons of nickel, 500 tons Tungsten and 500 t molybdenum - strategic raw materials, the sale of which had long been controversial - to deliver. ²²⁴ Even if products of this were to be manufactured to Soviet orders, delivery at this point was still very advantageous for the German war economy.

In total became From January to June 1941 more goods were sent from Germany to the Soviet Union than in the whole of 1940 delivered.

Table 116

The German export in the USSR, January 1940-June 1941 (in mill. RM)

Period			
	1940		1941
January	3.0		29.6
February	1.8		19.4
March	2.6		20.6
April	8.1		51.0
May	15.1		47.1
June	30.8		53.2
July	25.8		
August	24.8		
September	19.9		
October	14.2		
November	25.0		
December	37.7		
<i>total</i>	208.8	<i>1. half year</i>	220.9
<i>Total 1940/41</i>			429.7

Source: Schwendemann, S. 368 f., Table 3 (according to reports from Statistical Reich Office: **BA/MA**, **RW** 45/13-15). Total corrected by me - 8. P

²²³ Mikoyan, A. I., V pervye mesjacy Velikoj Otecestvennoj Vojny (prepared for printing v. SA Mikoyan and GA Kumanev). In: "Novaja i novejsaja istorija" 6/1985, p. 94.

²²⁴ Volkmann, Hans-Erich, Nazi foreign trade in the "closed" War economy area (1939-1941). In: War Economy and Armaments 1939-1945, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 99.

Table 117

The German import out of the USSR, January 1940-June 1941 (in mill. RM)

Period			
	1940	1941	
January	4.7	24.0	
February	10.2	19.9	
March	9.7	31.4	
April	16.7	22.2	
May	21.1	50.6	
June	34.2	58.0	
July	26.6		
August	67.6		
September	94.6		
October	42.4		
November	28.0		
December	27.0		
<i>total</i>	382.8	<i>1. half year</i>	206.1
<i>Total 1940/41</i>			588.9

Source: Schwendemann, p. 367 f., Table 2 (based on the monthly reports from the Reich Statistical Office above the development of the German Foreign trade: BA/MA, RW 45/13 -15). Total corrected by me - BP

Here the German foreign trade statistics were preferred to other statistical surveys because they actually the crossing the German customs border registered goods. The figures provided by the Reich offices (for import permits) and the testing bodies (for export permits) are naturally higher.

That the imports the USSR in the last few months the 22nd June 1941 not even higher Values have, not least had two Reasons, which should not go unmentioned. Soviet grain was sold off March 1941 Germany (unlike other **markets**) delivered at a reduced price ²²⁵, and since April 1941, Soviet goods have been piled up at the borders because the German railways, because they were overloaded with troop transport, were unable to provide enough wagons for the takeover of the Soviet deliveries of goods to provide ²²⁶. Interestingly proven these last weeks In terms of value, it was also the high point of German exports to the USSR.

Loud that of the Economic and Armaments Office OKW The USSR delivered the War Economic Situation Report No. 22 from June 1941 the four months of February to **May** 1941 in total 597 716.6 t Grain, legumes and Oil cake, 19 780 t Cotton, 3,292.6 t of heavy metals (including ores), 232.5 kg of platinum and 193 835 t of petroleum and petroleum products. ²²⁷

²²⁵ Schwendemann, p. 317.

²²⁶ Ibid, S. 323 u. 331.

²²⁷ After Boelcke, S. 145.

Even though the figures from various German statistics differ from one another, they tend to agree that the trade balance of first half of 1941 the USSR out German perspective slightly active designed. In an information that the Foreign Office sent to the missions and professional consulates on October 25, 1941, is the German import out of the USSR with 215.6 mill. RM and the German exports there were valued at 240.3 **million RM**.²²⁸ All in all, there remained a considerable one on the day of the German attack Balance in favor of Soviet Union open. Also at more loyal From a German perspective, compliance with the agreements would have resulted in a liability balance (of a different amount) on this date.

In the first week of July, the First Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade presented the USSR, Aleksej Krutikov, representatives of the British Embassy in Moscow a list with the quantities of all types of goods that the USSR delivered to Germany from September 1, 1939 to June 22, 1941. This list largely agreed with the estimates that the British Ministry of Economic Warfare had previously carried out.²²⁹ According to this, the Soviet Union exported 4.541 million tons of goods to Germany over the entire period, of which 0.146 million tons were in the last four months of 1939, 3.033 **Mill. t** in the Year 1940 and 1.362 million t in the first five months and three weeks of Year 1941. The main positions the Mass after barley was included 968 000 t, Grubenholz (props) with 457 000 t and wood to wood mass for the Paper production (pulp-wood) with 404,000 t.²³⁰

Of course, these quantities alone do not provide a sufficient picture of the qualitative significance of the goods deliveries for the German war economy. More important in this regard are the 200,000 tons of gasoline that were delivered exclusively in 1940 280 000 t nearly exclusively 1941 delivered Petroleum products²³¹ or even the quantitatively comparatively low 165 000 t²³² to two Thirds in the second half of the year 1940 delivered manganese ores as well as the 23,000 t of chrome ores delivered between September and November 1940²³³. Germany had a total of 176 of the latter in 1938 000 t, 60 of them 000 t from South Africa and 53 000 t out of the Türkiye, imported while on manganese ore a total of 426 000 t introduced been were, of it more than half from South Africa, 48,000 t from Brazil and 61,000 t from the Soviet Union.²³⁴

228 BAP, AA 68759, BI. 47 ff., „German Foreign trade balance for the first half year 1941“.

229 Medlicott I, p. 667. - Those from Schwendemann, p. 372, table 7, on basis The information from the Reich offices mentioned by BAK, R 2/17307 is lower because wood is not included there and the deliveries in June 1941 are not even included.

230 Medlicott I, S. 667, from me converted, Declarations in metric tons.

231 According to the source used by Schwendemann, p. 374, table 9b, BAK, R 3/1889 “Mineral oil import 1940-1942 after countries and Varieties”. of mineral oil 1940 approx. 607,000 t (= 32.5 percent of total German imports of mineral oil) and in 1941 approx. 268,000 t (= 10 percent) from the USSR based.

232 According to Schwendemann, S. 375, Table 11, reports used by the responsible Reich office (BAK, R 2/17307) amounted to that total quantity 1940/41 to approx. 185,000 t.

233 Medlicott I, S. 667. - As well the in Note 232 mentioned Source.

234 Calculated after: Statistical Yearbook f. d. German Rich 1939/40, Tab. VII 11, S. 282.

Albeit the assessments of the importance of the Soviet Union as a transit country for overcoming the effects of the British naval blockade within the German one leadership were broad - Euphoria with Hitler and Raeder, sobriety with Thomas, to name just extremes - It is clear that for Germany the possibility of a railway connection to the Far East and parts of the Middle East is an advantage over that situation in embodied the First World War. After Ribbentrop and Molotov on 28. September 1939 in Moscow the Transit question basically regulated had, became at the

8th. October 1939 Iranian Deliveries after Germany agreed (22 500 t Cotton, approximately 6 000 t Wool, 20th century 000 t Wheat, 10 000 t Barley, 20 000 t rice, 3 000 t hair, for 3 million RM leather, for 1 million RM skins and for 25 Mill. RM dried fruits).²³⁵ Essentially, however, it was all about continuing trade the pre-war period.²³⁶ From September 1939 to May 1941 a total of 108 arrived 000 t Iranian goods on the rail route through the USSR to Germany.²³⁷

In this context, there were also trade agreements with Afghanistan This country kept sales opportunities open for its products, but these were hardly of any significant importance for the German war economy.²³⁸ The German side should be for that mainly interested in this neighboring country of British India espionage and diversion activities.

What was really interesting from a war economic point of view was the railway transit through the USSR for Germany's goods traffic dem Far East. Was there man itself in Berlin is aware that the previous trade relations with the top-ranking people there Trading partner China largely through the Japanese invasion had been destroyed.²³⁹ Around so more was interested the German war economy for the officially ally Japan, the from this one The so-called Manchukuo Empire and Pacific regions were formed in parts of China in the factual or desired power or at least sphere of influence Japan, including French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies. What was initially overlooked in Berlin was the fact that Japanese imperialism pursued its own goals of expansion and domination and was therefore a rival to German imperialism in the long term. The opposing global long-term goals of the two allies already had an impact on their foreign trade relations back then.²⁴⁰

Like the climatic Conditions at the trans-Siberian railroad and also be agreed Soviet interventions Places have occasionally been a hindrance, so They should even indicated inter-imperialist Contradictions the Main reason been be,

235 BAP, AA 68762, BI. 26--32, „Records above negotiations of author in Tehran”,

O. Vf. (probably Clodius), October 28, 1939; there BI. 30, Confidential protocol v. October 8, 1939.

236 BAP, AA 68722, BI. 112-118, German-Iranian Economic Agreement v. October 8, 1939; Wohlthat to UStS Bader October 20, 1935 (notes on older agreements).

237 Medicott I, S. 671.

238 From January 1940 to May 1941 a total of 2 arrived 430 t, almost exclusively Cotton, wool and dried fruits, from Afghanistan via the USSR to Germany (ibid., p. 670).

239 BAP, AA 68971/6, BI. 2 u. 4, records O. Vf. O. D (allegedly between February and June 1941).

240 See. in addition Puchert, foreign trade, S. 380 f.

why the exchange of goods between the areas of control or interests of Germany and Japan from Autumn 1939 until the early summer of 1941 it developed quite visibly. While the transit of goods from Japan, Manchukuo and China through the Soviet Union to Germany reached only 166,000 t in the whole of 1940, it amounted to 212,000 t in the first five months of 1941.²⁴¹ These deliveries were spread across a variety of types of goods. Given the absolute Deficit in certain Even small amounts of alloy metals were important for the German war economy. Finally, in 1940, 260 t of antimony ore and 175 t of manganese ore came from the Far East (out of a total German import of 156 000 t manganese ore in years 1940²⁴²), exclusively 1941 whole 22nd t nickel, also 24 t antimony (metal) in 1940 and another 18 t of it in the Years 1941. The on this one ways delivered Amount of rubber increased itself from 3,199 tim Years 1940 on 12 236 t in the January-May 1941. By far the most ins Weight dropping deliveries consisted of Soy- and Japanese beans (1940 = 58 477 tons; 1941 = 109 402 t), Whale oil (1940 = 44 957 t; 1941=33157 t) and Fish oil (1940 = 11 756 t; 1941 =

13,005 t). Although the Japanese government insisted that Manchukuo should be primarily Japan's need for oil fruits would have covers, acted it join in the Soybean deliveries to Germany, which, by the way, are covered by a German "bridging loan". to "Industrialization" of Manchuria was already paid for in advance in 1938²⁴³, so worth mentioning quantities that in a record, the 1941 in foreign affairs Office was created, probably exaggerating a bit was declared, thanks to these deliveries - there, however, higher than estimated in the transit figures presented here - it "succeeded in closing the fat gap that is particularly difficult for us".²⁴⁴

When Göring's confidant Helmuth Wohlthat was given a "new important special mission" in the first half of 1941 and sent to Japan to negotiate, it was not only to contractually secure the exchange of goods "exclusively war-essential goods for both countries" at a higher level, but also above all, to follow the tendencies of the Japanese side to counteract, already closed at this point the entire trade of the Far East with Europe from Tokyo out of to control („trade in Yen block below "to monopolize his direct management"²⁴⁵) and thus to anticipate the desired post-war order in East Asia, without Hitler's Germany, still preoccupied with the war in Europe, being able to have a decisive say in terms of its own ideas of world domination.

g) Vichy France and his overseas Possessions

The German exchange of goods with France after its military defeat requires one differentiated Consideration. For the the German military commanders in Paris and in Brussels assumed parts of the country France could we get up ours intent,

241 Medicott I, S. 669 f.; there also the following Details.

242 Statistical Yearbook fd German Rich 1941/42, Tab. VII 11, S. 301.

243 BAP, AA 68971/6, BI. 4 (like Note 239).

244 Ibid., BI. 2.

245 Ibid, BI. 5 f.

under occupation regime not to regard these areas as foreign trade partners. But the one in the war phase that is of interest here We cannot leave out the part of France that was unoccupied from mid-1940 to mid-1941, even though it was subject to various controls by military and civilian German authorities. ²⁴⁶ Petain's "Etat Fran ais" was implemented in particular by the USA, but practically to a certain extent also by Great Britain, like a sovereign or at least as a not completely his State deprived of sovereignty deals with what internally, on the one hand, with humanitarian consideration on the population, and on the other hand with the hope of being able to open up opportunities for diversion in the German area. The German side had cleverly calculated that the non-occupation of a part that was not urgently needed in terms of military strategy or economics of metropolitan France and the Approval of education one a government willing to collaborate had the opportunity to use the economic resources not only of the south of France, but also of at least one of them part of of the French colonial empire. This calculation worked the here treated war phase and still some time also widely available. Although the British government extended the naval blockade to the entire German territory in Europe, including French North Africa, in July 1940, the Royal Navy allowed French ships to sail individually as well as Convoys, the sometimes accompanied by French warships, often just a lightly armed sloop, mostly unmolested to Closure of the most suitable road from Pass Gibraltar. The maintenance more diplomatic Relations between Washington and Vichy and American diplomatic interventions in London against decisive economic warfare measures with regard to the movement of goods between French possessions in North and West Africa, partly also to others overseas countries, and Vichy France made it possible Quite a few quantities of various raw materials were supplied to the German war industry via the port of Marseille (in London "Marseille's Leak" was a household word) . ²⁴⁷

The German Economic politician and Industrialists were clever enough, French To let trading companies and government politicians benefit from these transactions. At that time, the word "collabo" arose in the French language, which was often forgotten after 1945. According to certainly incomplete information, the following was obtained by June 30, 1941 from the part of the French external possessions that professed support for the Vichy government Quantities of goods above France after Germany: 81 390 t fertilizer phosphates, 29 974 t

Ouenza iron ores, 7 221 t Peanut oil, 327 t palm kernel oil, 2 688 t Peanut cake, 1 789 t Peanut meal, 1,000 t cocoa, 1,029 t bananas, 1,400 t quebracho extract. However, significantly more goods had been brought to southern France via the sea, and their onward transport to Germany was made difficult by the lack of railway wagons - certainly not least because of the huge demand for the deployment of the Wehrmacht to the attack

246 Regarding the movement of goods and payments with other countries, including the occupied part of France, see: **BAK, R 7/2257**, report above. Vf. o. D., section "Foreign trade in goods and payments"; **BAK, R 7/2281**, "Activity report of the Germans Ceasefire delegation for economics Paris-Wiesbaden for them Period from July to December 1940", p. 31 f.

247 See. Medicott I, S. 423,453 ff., 558-568, 578 ff.

the USSR - delayed, u. a. 12 258 tons of peanuts, 4 200 t palm kernel oil, 11 000 t peanut cake and -grist, 6 500 tons Cocoa.²⁴⁸

Total Indochinese production of 68 000 t of rubber was to be divided as follows in 1941: 25 000 t to Germany, 15 000 t to Japan, 18 000 t to France, which was obliged to pay 75 Percent of tire production reduced to 40 percent of pre-war production to Germany, and also 10,000 t to other countries, primarily the USA, whose pre-war supply contracts should be respected. Germany was to receive 14,000 tons in the first half of 1941. Although there are already 17 in total 630 t shipped in Indochina had been met until for the June 1941 only 2 200 t in Germany and another 2 000 t in France.²⁴⁹ Next to the The general war situation also contributed to the delay annexation efforts at the time Japan's vis-à-vis French Indochina as well as French reactions to the German negotiating delegation's refusal to honor the Petain regime's "favor" with urgently needed large deliveries of coal to southern France and the French colonies. By and large, the coal deliveries remained limited to the quantities required in the south of France for aluminum production and soda ash production as well as some bunker coal, ie they were intended to serve specific purposes directly from the German war economy.²⁵⁰

The official German statistics for 1940 (certainly only after June) showed imports from "France" worth 224 **million RM** , **but only** for 13 Mill. RM exports there²⁵¹ and for that first half of 1941 for 310 million RM imports and 102 **million RM** exports.²⁵² Under all necessary reservations that meant that "France" in 1940 ninth in the German import, on 27. Position in German export, in first half of 1941 then second in German import and 14th. position in German exports.

h) Switzerland

With the defeat of France and Italy's entry into the war Switzerland completely surrounded by territories of one belligerent side. Nevertheless, after heated discussions, the British government decided between the Economic War Department and the Foreign Office, the blockade regulations against areas controlled by the enemy, which were tightened at the end of July 1940, did not apply Switzerland, even more, to grant it a certain amount of "economic assistance" if Switzerland continued to strive to maintain its neutrality and "a certain degree of independence from control by the Axis powers".²⁵³ The main reason for London's willingness to compromise undoubtedly the one wish that-

248 BAK, R 7/2283, 2. Activity report the Germans Ceasefire delegation for Business, S. 45 f.

249 Ibid, p. 42 f.

250 Ibid, S. 47.

251 Statistical Yearbook fd German Rich 1941/42, Tab. VII 12, S. 321.

252 How Note 150.

253 Medlicott II, S. 207.

ses country as international Financial center simultaneously Spy switchgear to keep existing. Berlin was also interested in both.

Despite France's withdrawal, the Anglo-French-Swiss war trade agreement of 25. April not repealed, through the the Switzerland is affected by quantitative restrictions Import, like she had been imposed on other neutrals, remained free only against them Swiss Guarantee, the imported goods not "en stat" (ie in the same condition in which they were imported) to be exported. The Western powers wanted to tolerate their export in a processed state, apart from limiting the export Exports of certain classes of manufactured products to the enemy.²⁵⁴ Naturally, the fundamental retention of this agreement appeared with the German-Italian occupation or control France's unrealistic, and at first No goods from overseas arrived in Switzerland either. But there was a common interest between England and Switzerland Continuation of at least some of the earlier exports of manufactured goods to England and its Empire. Because the German war economy wanted to purchase products from Switzerland they are also indirectly interested in such a compromise. This also explains that on the German side away 1. September 1940 A consignment note system was in place through which certain Swiss export goods could, on a case-by-case basis, be permitted by the German embassy in Bern to transit through Germany or France and also towards England.²⁵⁵

Until the British decision to allow deliveries from overseas to Switzerland to pass through again, basically fell and while she then with a delay It came to practical use in doses and was negotiated, although the British side could not easily put pressure on the Swiss negotiators because Switzerland had already built up large stocks of some raw materials before the start of the war.²⁵⁶ The Swiss negotiating position was opposite the German side now more difficult. In the transport geographical island situation in which Switzerland found itself since June 1940, the existence of important branches of its industry was at risk and there was a threat of mass unemployment. From Switzerland's arms and ammunition exports in 1939 were worth 64 **million** francs alone went to France for 40 million and to England for 2 million, and in the first months of 1940, when it was still possible, deliveries were made there for 26 and 21 million francs respectively.²⁵⁷ The range of Swiss export products was much broader and did not only include items that were important for the war effort. To achieve this, orders from Germany and its occupied areas had to be sought. At the same time, the continuation of industrial production in Switzerland depended on the continuous supply of coal from Germany.

In this situation saw itself the Switzerland forced, on 9. August 1940 for the first time Germany one for the time until End June 1941 certain clearing credit of 150 million francs with a federal transfer guarantee, ie a loan that - different from the so-called coal loan from 1917 - not in free currency to any use to Disposal placed

254 Ibid.

255 Medlicott I, S. 588.

256 Ibid, S. 586.

257 Ibid, S. 588.

became, but exclusively for purchases of goods (and other payments) in the Switzerland could be used. Heinrich Hornberger attributes to it the character of a job creation loan ²⁵⁸, especially since the conditions were such that manufacturers of non-war-important products, even those classified as luxury goods, were also allowed to participate in the awarding of the contract consideration found. „**With** the institution of Clearing credits ... let also secure Switzerland's coal supply at least until the end of the year.“ ²⁵⁹ In this statement Hornberger, the director of the suburb (board) of the Swiss Trade and Industry Association and in this capacity a member of the Federal Council, i.e. “Permanent” appointed by the Government of Switzerland "Negotiating delegation" suggests that the position the Switzerland in this war phase, as in Berlin imaginations above the

"Reorganization of Europe" and the creation of a large economic area under German leadership were booming, was noticeably weaker than in the first phase of the war. Although more and more industrial companies were taking orders from Germany, including for armaments, the Switzerland deliberately lagged behind other countries with the necessary coal and iron supplies. ²⁶⁰

Indicative of the relationships at that time the Content of the at the 7. Signed in Bern in February 1941 German-Swiss protocol. In it the granted Switzerland another advance loan in the amount of 317 million. francs for German army orders. ²⁶¹ In return for the "significant" deliveries of "important war material", Switzerland was granted the "maintenance the German coal deliveries to the previous extent for the months January to April 1941 inclusive (approx. 145,000 tons per month) were promised". A promise for a longer period and for the larger quantity requested was refused. In an internal comment on this it was stated that the Switzerland continues to deliver two thirds of its aluminum production to Germany, provided that alumina continues to be delivered from Italy and France.

Another interesting thing about these negotiations at the beginning of 1941 is that the chemical industry Switzerland now The export of aniline dyes and certain textile auxiliary materials to Egypt, British India, the Dutch Indies, Australia, New Zealand and Canada was approved by Germany. The reason for this: It should be prevented that competitors from the USA this in peacetime often with took over markets supplied with German goods. To do this, the Swiss government had to agree to “influence the Swiss paint industry so that they could reach price agreements with the German industry meets" (for paragraph in European countries). Similar Pressure was also put on the artificial silk industry in Switzerland. ²⁶²

258 Hornberger, S. 49.

259 Ibid.

260 BAP, AA 68763, BI. 30, Sabath at various Reich ministries, OKW u. a., February 21, 1941.

261 Ibid., BI. 29. - According to Hornberger, S. 62, explained herself Switzerland is prepared to “grant a new clearing credit of 165 million francs to facilitate the placement of German orders and the associated advance payments”.

262 BAP, AA 68763, BI. 29-32R, Sabath on various Reich ministries, OKW etc. a., February 21, 1941, notification of wording or Contents of at the 7.2.1941 in Berne signed German-Swiss Protocols about the Granting of a further advance loan of 317 million sfr German army orders and additional protocols.

After official German statistics took the Switzerland 1940 with 166 Mill. RM 13th place in the German import and with 273 Mill. RM eighth place in the German Aus drove in.²⁶³ In the one that has already been used several times and also includes sovereign and occupied countries equally internal statistical compilation occupied the Switzerland in first half of 1941 with 126 Mill. RM took eleventh place in the German import and with 188 Mill. RM eighth place in the German Export.²⁶⁴ In the Years 1938 had she on the 18. or. dem seventh Place confessed.²⁶⁵

4. From the 3. quarter 1941 until for the 3. quarter 1943

a) General

With regard to German foreign trade, the phase from the summer of 1941 to the summer of 1943 (Mussolini's fall) is characterized by the fact that the number of real foreign trade partners in Europe decreased as a result of the military occupation of other countries and that the connection to the remaining non-European partners as a result of the loss of the Transit options over Soviet territory and the increasing elimination of transit options over Western Europe became increasingly difficult to maintain.

At the same time, in the autumn of 1941, there were efforts, with varying degrees of intensity, from the ministries involved to encourage entrepreneurs from the allied, occupied²⁶⁶ and neutral countries of southeastern, western and northern Europe to take part in the rather peculiar recapitalization^{267 planned} the occupied areas of the Soviet Union participation, officially referred to as "involvement of European states in the economic development of the occupied Russian territories".²⁶⁸ This found the most resonance in the Netherlands and the in this question very much willing to collaborate Government of Denmark.²⁶⁹ Sweden was on though a regulation for his previous Equity investments in the 1940s Baltic republics incorporated into the USSR, but apparently not interested in further involvement in a large-scale European economy under German leadership. Switzerland stated no interest in economic involvement in the occupied areas of the USSR, which on the German side neither was desired. Romania and Finland was held Berlin for enough with dem Digest the them approved conquered parts of the territory be-

263 Statistical Yearbook f. d. German Reich 1941/42, Tab. VII 12, S. 321.

264 How Note 150.

265 Statistical Yearbook f. d. German Reich 1939/40, Tab. VII 12, S. 293.

266 Eichholtz, Dietrich, economic collaboration and "Eastern societies" in Nazi-occupied countries (1941-1944). In: Europe under the Swastika: Occupation and Collaboration (1938-1945), Berlin/Heidelberg 1994, pp. 433-459. In this vol. see Chapter IV Section. 1.

267 They should operate production facilities, invest in them, they but he cannot acquire it as private property.

268 BAP, AA 68701, BI. 4-19, Clodius, "Memorandum above "The current status of preparations for the involvement of European states in the economic development of the occupied Russian territories" for the RAM, the State Secretary and senior officials of the AA, November 21, 1941.

269 Please refer Cape. IV, Section 1.

works. Bulgaria shouldn't at all because of the traditionally great sympathy of the Bulgarian people for the Russian people must first be taken into consideration.²⁷⁰ Overall, in November 1941, when people still believed that the Soviet Union would collapse soon, people in Berlin probably did not have particularly high expectations that entrepreneurs from other European countries would take part in the exploitation of the resources in the occupied Soviet countries under the conditions offered areas in to an appreciable extent would want to participate. These conditions were actually even a right clear indication for foreigners willing to collaborate, that the loot should remain in German hands as undivided as possible. "The actual involvement of the economy of this States has focused on use so far a number of experts, so especially Dutch farmers, in "limited to the occupied eastern territories," Wiehl summarized in January 1942.²⁷¹

b) Italy

Statistically speaking, Italy remained Germany's most important trading partner. However, this was mainly due to the fact that Fascist Italy was completely unprepared for the contemporary economic demands of war. If Hitler did not want to give up the southern flank, he had to provide Mussolini with troops (German Africa Corps), but above all with weapons and ammunition and others Military equipment support. Given the Location and of material requirements at you can on all fronts the Italian counter-delivery can hardly be seen as adequate, neither quantitatively nor qualitatively.

On March 31, 1943, a detailed study "The development of quantities and prices in German-Italian foreign trade since 1939" (Vowi 4807) was completed in the economics department of IG Farbenindustrie AG. In the The general characterization of the mutual exchange of goods is reproduced verbatim in the following: "In terms of the composition of its goods, the German-Italian exchange corresponded and corresponds Foreign trade through **Climate**, Mineral resources and Degree the industrialization conditional Differences at the countries. German imports from Italy ... consisted primarily of agricultural products, namely food: Fruit, tropical fruits, fine vegetables (cauliflower, tomatoes, lettuce, etc.), wine, potatoes, rice, and textile raw materials such as hemp and silk. However, the purchases of mercury and sulfur were less important than the goods mentioned she formed the lion's share of the total German imports this with the raw materials. The only significant semi-finished and finished goods were artificial silk and silk and artificial silk fabrics.

The export Germany after Italy ... contained nearly exclusively raw materials and Industrial products. The single item that far outweighed everything else was coal. However, finished goods were mainly exported: machines for a wide variety of purposes, Hardware, bar and molded iron, pharmaceutical products, chemical products.

²⁷⁰ How Note 268, BI. 10, 13 f.

²⁷¹ BAP, AA 68766, BI. 42, Wiehl to the German diplomatic missions in Rome, Budapest, Sofia, Bern, Bucharest, Agram, Pressburg, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Helsinki u. Brussels, January 13, 1942.

In the last ten years before the war, Germany's trade balance with Italy closed year after year with a positive balance Germany...

The war did not change the characteristic features of German-Italian foreign trade, but only made them more pronounced, because under the pressure of the blockade, the numerous mutual complementarities of both economies had to be as complete as possible be exploited as possible. The of course applies particularly for armaments production, to which the extraordinary increase in German deliveries of semi-finished iron products to Italy can probably be attributed. From 1939 to 1940 the value of German exports to Italy doubled, and imports from there increased by almost 80 percent. H. too. The German active balance tripled and was larger than the total imports from Italy had been in most years before the war. A similarly strong increase in imports and exports in 1941 compared to 1940 There was only a slight increase in 1942."²⁷²

After complicated calculations Reason inadequate statistical information, their results author the cited study even with has strong reservations, he came to the following conclusions:

"From the main out of Italy related Were received Germany so 1942 only 20 v. H. more than in 1939, but delivered some of the most important export goods in the same year well over the year the double quantity to Italy. Italy supplied what little it had for two and a half times as much price, which it had increased sharply, especially in 1942; Germany delivered at not quite double the price, which had remained practically unchanged since 1941.

If one relates the import goods that were the largest items in 1941 and the hard coal, the most important export good, to one another in such a way that the average values of these Were in Hard coal converted, like this surrendered, that Germany at Since 1939, the majority of these imported goods have had to spend considerably more on them in hard coal than they did back then.

purchasing power the most important import goods against Hard coals.

metric tons Hard coals [ever ton imported goods]

	1939	1940	1941	1942
Raw silk	118,1	114.5	119.9	174.4
hemp	6.3	5.1	7.4	7.7
potatoes	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.7
Apples	1.3	1.2	1.6	1.8
Lemons	1.5	0.9	1.0	1.3
oranges	1.5	0.9	1.3	1.7
Almonds	10.4	6.3	5.8	13.2
cauliflower	1,1	0.7	0.9	1.6

272 BAP, AA 67863, BI. 286, Vowi report 4807 "The quantity and price development in German and Italian Foreign trade since 1939" from March 31, 1943.

The declines in potatoes and lemons indicate that both are cheaper than hard coal became, are perhaps the Consequence the Cutting off Italy from its other export markets, if there are any real price declines at all. In principle, it would be worth investigating to what extent Italy today on Germany as buyer is dependent on export surpluses that have become unsaleable. The other way around is definitely not the case Case, because Germany has neither above excess Money nor iron anything else which goods, for the production of which both are needed in addition to other raw materials ."213

The strange amalgamation of war-related mutual Dependence between the economic How militarily unequally strong allies Germany and Italy on the one hand and their rivalry with one another on the other hand was also expressed in questions of the economic exploitation of their current or supposed future territory by third countries.

Out of dem together occupied Greece pumped as well as Germany as also Italy, to which Hitler granted the "preponderanza" as an occupying power, had horrendous occupation costs out of here. The requirements exceeded the Quadruple the for 1941 estimated

Greek State revenue²⁷⁴. Because of the repeated Memoranda of Finance ministers the under the occupation regime incumbent Greek Government, Satrius Gotsa manis, saw man itself but forced, the Burden the Greek Finance to mild, around not even the exploitability of country for to completely undermine military and war economic purposes.²⁷⁵

Hermann Neubacher, the Italian side, was appointed by Hitler in mid-October 1942 as "Special Representative for Economic and Financial Questions in Greece". the banker d'Agostino placed on an equal footing was, succeeded - not even per form the taking note of the Greek "government". - through dictatorial interventions of a personnel, material and financial nature, also against the Wehrmacht and other offices of the occupiers, a temporary weakening of the inflation and by organizing food supplies from other southeastern European countries and by banning exports Greek Staple food as well as hers buyout through Occupation troops and departments to achieve a certain improvement in the food supply of the Greek population.²⁷⁶

While the before the war Greek tobacco production from Thrace and Macedonia east of the Strymon, which was largely exported to Germany, where Bulgaria not only exercised military occupation functions from mid-April 1941, but also effectively annexed²⁷⁷, so as Bulgarian export after Germany reached, played itself around war

273 Ibid, S. 289 f.

274 BAP, AA 68721, BI. 10, Memorandum from the Greek Finance Minister Gotsamanis to the Plenipotentiary of the German Reich, Ambassador Altenburg, Athens October 10, 1941.

275 Ibid, e.g. BI. 102 ff., report Altenburg, Athens September 25, 1941, and BI. 108-119, statement of the economic staff of the Plenipotentiary of the German Reich for Greece on the memorandum about Greece economic and state economics Location, Athens September 25, 1941.

276 See. also Fleischer, Hagen, In the Cross Shadow of the Powers. Greece 1941-1944, Frankfurt a. M./Bern/New York 1986, p. 174 ff.

277 Ibid, S. 67 ff.

economically important products Italian occupied zone (almost all Areas west and south of Mount Olympus, numerous islands in the Aegean Sea and the eastern part of Crete) from the beginning to for the collapse of Mussolini regime a constant struggle between the two Axis powers. At least the German side was able to meet the demands of the Italian foreign trade commissioner that Italy participate in the exploitation of the assets that were bought, leased or otherwise acquired by German companies immediately after the invasion Greek ore mines taken into possession participate - although it In peacetime, in contrast to Germany, hardly any ores out of Greece had received ²⁷⁸ -, can probably be repelled relatively easily through dilatory treatment. The Italian demand was against this after handing over from 60 percent the Greek Silk cocoon crop of the year 1941 (for Comparison: 1939 had France 63 percent, Germany 35 percent and Italy only bought two percent) was underpinned by the warning that Italy would otherwise not be able to deliver the preliminary products for parachutes ordered by the German Air Force. (Shortly before that Italian government has already done so imposed a delivery stop to ensure additional coal deliveries Germany too force.) To the almost one hundred percent Dependence of his air force To overcome Italy in this area, Göring then made sure that Silk cocoons were increasingly produced in Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia and were delivered to the German Air Force for a period of 15 had to be contractually guaranteed for years. Göring demanded that the German negotiators reject the Italian claims, to purchase the entire Greek cocoon harvest for the German Air Force and to involve Greek business circles in the processing work in this way Italian buyers of raw materials to beat the field. ²⁷⁹ The outcome of this dispute between the allies cannot be determined.

In August 1942, when Mussolini as well as Hitler again in Victory rush were located and in Italy public plans for the design of the "Italian "Lebensraum", the Italian government tried to negotiate a binding arrangement with the German government for the exercise of rule over Egypt, which they believed could be conquered within a short time. The support of the Italian troops by the German Africa Corps and the at the same time (certainly mainly because of the huge need for the German-Soviet front) unreliable German supplies Weapons, ammunition and other military equipment aroused suspicion in Rome about the intentions of the German ally in North Africa. When German and Italian government representatives were negotiating in Brioni about mutual economic transactions, the German negotiator, Clodius, received telegraphic instructions from Berlin on August 5, 1942 from the head of the trade policy department of the Foreign Office, Wiehl, to accept Italian proposals regarding German-Italian Agreements on Egypt reserved and stalling to encounter. ²⁸⁰ The German ambassador in Rome, Hans-Georg v. quirks

278 BAP, AA 68721, BI. 30--41, suggestions from the Italian Foreign Trade Commissioner for the division of the Greek export 1941/42 and note by German economic staff Athens on this, undated, undated (probably appendices to: Gotsamanis to Clodius, Athens October 15, 1941).

279 Ibid, BI. 44-46, "Note No. 1 re: Silk", O. Vf., Athens October 13, 1941.

280 BAP, AA 68760, BI. 1, Wiehl at Clodius, August 5, 1942.

sen, announced in a telegram dated August 28, 1942, marked "Secret Reich Matter". his concern about the reaction of the Italian government on the attitude of the German representatives Brioni with. The Italian negotiator Amadeo Giannini is out Brioni "came back very upset" because of "our rejection, us there with to speak openly to the Axis partner about the economic question arising from a joint occupation of Egypt." Mackensen concluded: "I do not know the reasons that stand in the way of an open discussion about the economic question with regard to Egypt, but I do not want to omit pointing them out danger warnings associated with this restraint." ²⁸¹ At 19. In September 1942, Wiehl noted, "regarding the agreements with the Italians concerning In Egypt, following a presentation by the Reich Foreign Minister, the Führer continued to speak out against the establishment of a commission. However, a message could be given to the Italians to allay their fears. They could be told quite clearly that we would give them the advantage in Egypt in every respect, including economic aspects." ²⁸² On 7. In October 1942, Wiehl transmitted v. Ribbentrop a "modified Draft of the declaration requested by Rome: "In accordance with the principle that Italy has political primacy in Egypt, the imperial government will shape the economic conditions in Egypt to the Italians Government " ²⁸³ That sounded more conciliatory, but hardly went beyond Hitler's decision from mid-September 1942, which gave the Italian blind man a feeling of Should produce satisfaction, but the question of German participation in the exploitation of Egypt was essentially kept open. It is not known whether this or a different declaration was handed over to the Italian government. In any case, since October 23, 1942, the Italian-German troops were driven out of the part of Egyptian territory they had previously conquered by a British counter-offensive and were also quickly pushed back to the west in Libya. On the 7th/8th In November 1942, Allied troops landed in French North Africa.

It seems absurd how the Conflicts between the German and Italian imperialism for spheres of influence and market shares in various areas of Europe continued regardless of the development of the situation on the fronts. On October 13, 1941, too one Time, as it so looked like if Everything in Europe is based on their ideas Develop regimes Germany's synthetic fiber industries had and Italy, with the consent of the responsible ministers Funk and Riccardi, the European market including the Mediterranean region for present and future, but especially for the post-war period with what is expected Decline in sales, in a German, an Italian and one shared zone. Despite various frictions in... the practice was this agreement at the 14th. March 1942 again affirmed been. In Delegation negotiations from the 6. until 16. December 1942 explained the Italian side however, she was unwilling to carry out the contract in practice. "Italy obviously wants its own synthetic fiber policy too in countries, the Germany as Area of influence awarded been were, operate.

281 Ibid, BI. 2, v. Mackensen at AA, Rome August 28, 1942.

282 Ibid, BI. 45, note Wiehl, September 19, 1942.

283 Ibid, BI. 46, Wiehl at RAM, October 7, 1942. - For the Germans troops became Special rights reserved.

But this is precisely what must be avoided at all costs," emphasized the State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs, Friedrich Landfried, in a letter dated February 10, 1943 to State Secretary Fr. v. Weizsäcker, in which he called for "pressure" to "compel" the Italian government to fulfill its contractual obligations.²⁸⁴

This escalation of the conflict occurred precisely in the months when the German and... Italian troops in Stalingrad and suffered devastating defeats in North Africa so it associated hot topics war economy Problems had to be faced, instead of yourself about the Market division according to to fight for the final victory. So complained the Italian government in November 1942 that the supply of its troops with weapons and fuel from Germany is "completely inadequate," "That Italy is on the same level treated in other countries ..., that in many cases too the Deliveries to Italy as part of a general export plan without special consideration of the war economy needs of Italy would be determined."²⁸⁵ In the same month I judged the head of the high command the Wehrmacht, Keitel, made an imploring written appeal to the Reich Minister for armament and ammunition, Speer: The Italian high command reported to him, "that the Italian armament was completely affected by the lack of German supplies suffers significantly and in the Production, especially on modern weapons such as tanks and Pak, strongest in had fallen behind. Both on the coal and in the iron field they are The quantities promised under the government contract are largely behind the promises left behind. The recently very strength Stress of our Italian ally and his heavy losses in war material during the retreat fighting in Libya requires that at least the quantities to be delivered according to the government contract are actually delivered and that backlogs are made up as far as the overall situation allows. ME, tangible help is now offered immediately. The leader wishes that Italy must now be supported as strongly as possible in every respect..."²⁸⁶

However, the military and war-economic collapse of Italy progressed inexorably, until finally in July 1943 Mussolini was overthrown and in the September 1943 the parts of Italy not yet conquered by the Allies (such as also Albania and the Italian occupation areas in Greece, Yugoslavia and France) fell under German occupation.

c) Spain and Portugal

In the German foreign trade statistics, imports from Spain in 1941 - In 1943, despite the secure railway connection, it was comparatively low. In the calendar year 1941, Spain was in 13th place with 146 **million RM** . Position (immediately before Finland with 145 **million RM**), 1942 with 166 **mill. RM** at 14. Job and in the full calendar year 1943 with 210 **mill. RM**

284 BAP, AA 68724, BI. 15 ff., Landfried at v. Weizsäcker, February 10, 1943.

285 Ibid, BI. 5 f., file folder, O. Vf. O. D

286 Ibid, BI. 4, Keitel to Speer, November 11, 1942 (Copy).

(according to another compilation 220 Mill. RM) on 15. Job.²⁸⁷ Behind the stated sums of value hid e.g. T. considerable Price increases. Converted to average prices from 1938, the import totals in 1941, 1942 and 1943 were 131, 81 and 89 respectively **Mill. RM.**²⁸⁸ Since countries that were not occupied generally only remained ready to deliver if they received at least certain counter-deliveries, goods had to come from Germany, and probably also from other countries under German control for 57 or 119 or 190 mill. RM after Spain exports become.²⁸⁹ In Of course, these values also conceal price increases, especially for the weapons requested by Spain²⁹⁰, the the **OKW** because of that only released out of necessity in view of the rapidly increasing own needs. Of the imports from Spain²⁹¹, tropical fruits and other plant-based foods accounted for almost 50 percent of the value, and fish deliveries were also included not unimportant for protein supply, yes essential The war economy mainly relied on various ores and metals, primarily wolfram. The Reich Ministry for Armaments estimated the monthly requirement for tungsten purchases in Spain and ammunition in the April 1943 with 150 t for approx. 15 **million. RM.**²⁹² Straight about that increasingly expensive tungsten raged in Spain and Portugal are the buying competition between the warring sides. Nevertheless, in 1943, 39.5 percent of German tungsten imports came from Spain.²⁹³ The reference options were for the German war economy run the here However, not only the phase of war to be dealt with out of economic reasons, but also to a large extent because after the end of the war, especially in the Mediterranean, the Spanish head of state, party and military leader Franco, apparently wavering for foreign and domestic political reasons, but actually carefully maneuvering, always leaned more decisively towards the Allies.²⁹⁴

Under the impression of the completely changed military situation in North Africa Spain passed a German-Spanish goods agreement on December 17, 1942 - the first formal agreement on German-Spanish trade in goods since the Civil War - was signed after the German side had now agreed to the Spanish demand for full balance settlement, which had previously been controversial for months, in rapid delegation negotiations within a week: every batch of raw materials supplied by Spain had to be equipped with weapons on the German side corresponding to those already available from Spain

287 After: **BAK, R 7/3639**, The German Foreign trade in the years 1938 until 1943, a) Import; **BAK, R 7/3279**, Reich Statistical Office, share of the most important goods in German imports from Spain in the years 1938, 1942 and 1943.

288 **BAK, R 7/3639**, German imports of goods in the years 1939 to 1943 from **11** countries according to the respective price level and the price level from 1938.

289 Ibid, The German Foreign trade in the years 1938 until 1943, b) Export.

290 **BAK, R 7/3640**, Section "**IV.** foreign trade" one in the Order of conductor of Report on the German economic situation prepared by the planning office at GBrüst 1943/44.

291 **BAK, R 7/3279**, (How in Note 287).

292 **BAK, R 7/3648**, HPA protocol v. April 16, 1943.

293 **BAK, R 7/3280**, Handwritten Draft "Spain", O. Vf. O. D

294 For detailed information on the German-Spanish negotiations and the efforts of German leadership circles to exploit and inflame domestic political disputes in leading circles in Spain in order to make Franco more submissive or even to overthrow him, see Ruhl, *passim*.

Wish list to be paid.²⁹⁵ Since the Wehrmacht, in contrast to the first years of the war, just under Deferral of weapons for urgent personal needs Export to Spain was able to provide it, but on the other hand, the German armaments industry had an urgent need, particularly for tungsten, and reserves of this needed to be stored quickly, as long as that War situation at all Ways to Raw material procurement left open, The Spanish side had an advantage when haggling over the prices for each other's supplies .

"Spain, treated for years by Germany as a raw materials colony, rose to become an equal trading partner with the appearance of the Allies in the Mediterranean."²⁹⁶ Ruhl's assessment is a bit too absolute in the first part (which is objectively determined and subjectively desired by relevant circles in Spain , but also for them German war economy not only disadvantageous maintenance of trade with overseas countries, which only thanks to a certain amount of room for maneuver the Spanish government in its policy towards Germany war opponents feasible has already been discussed here). As a result, Ruhl's assessment cannot be viewed as an exaggeration.

In Portugal had them Brits were overweight from the start. While Spain has been... June 1940 as "non-belligerent" referred to and in the Time the Germany's military successes sympathized with Germany without breaking with the Western powers British Portugal from the outset as its ally, even though its government officially declared itself neutral. More important, however, were the traditional trade and capital relations of both warring parties with Portugal. In the first years of the war, German imports from Portugal totaled only about a fifth of that - not high - German import Spain. 1942 came she this then closer (121 million RM current value). 1943 they stagnated Values the Import and export between Germany and Portugal. Nevertheless, the German import total from Portugal in 1943, calculated in pre-war prices (31 **million RM**), was the highest during the war.²⁹⁷

of paramount importance for the German war economy as a supplier of tungsten²⁹⁸ . In March 1943 the Interministerial Trade Policy Committee estimated the Location like follows: "In principle, we should continue to adhere to the fact that that us the half the Total production in Portugal receives tungsten (principle of equal treatment of power groups). In practice, however, the implementation of this principle is currently not possible, since the annual production of the tungsten mines in English hands alone is around 3 000 to is, while the The mines in Portuguese and German hands currently only produce around 1,200 tons per year. It should therefore be de In fact, only the Portuguese are being tried, in addition to the German one production possible largely for Germany to to back up; the HPA is

295 Ibid, S. 164 f.

296 Ibid, S. 223.

297 How Note 288.

298 Milward, The New Order, pp. 244-253, gives a summary of this raw material, which is extremely important for armaments, and shows that Portuguese Deliveries could not be replaced by forced funding in France.

is clear that all in all, at best the delivery of 2,100 tons can be achieved." ²⁹⁹ At the same time, the head of the trade policy department of the Foreign Office, Wiehl, made a less optimistic judgment in a note for the Reich Foreign Minister: There itself the Portuguese attitude stiffened under English pressure it is to be expected that in addition to the 1,200 t, the the in German capital-owned mines, only half of the production from Portuguese-owned mines will be available. He recommended that a high-ranking German diplomat should speak directly to Prime Minister Salazar about this matter. ³⁰⁰

In addition to the direct exchange of goods, Spain and Portugal were still important for the German war economy for the procurement of certain imports from South and North America as well as from East and West Africa. This happened until the USA entered the war - As already mentioned - with LATI aircraft as well as on German blockade runners and ships of neutral states, which found sufficient hiding places on the Atlantic islands of the Iberian states to unload contraband onto German submarines, but mainly onto unsuspecting coastal ships, mail steamers, fishing trawlers, etc. which were practically impossible to control by Allied warships. Naturally it was this costly smuggling traffic mostly inconspicuous freight of relatively small volume, but of high value. So transported the LATI from the 1. December 1940 until for the

11. December 1941 loud Estimates of the British War Trade Department 10 666kg mica, 4.3 kg of diamonds and 281.7 kg of platinum, the the Allies the greatest importance for specific products of the German war industry, across the Atlantic to the Iberian Peninsula. When the US State Department threatened the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey in October 1941, they on the Blacklist if she the Fuel supply to the LATI and the Condor aircraft did not stop, an attempt was made for Such transports are carried out by civil airlines in Spain and Portugal, but above all by normal parcel post to the Iberian Peninsula. ³⁰¹

d) Northern Europe

"Northern Europe formed from the 22nd June 1941 in the imagination of the German imperialists a peripheral zone of the huge continental bloc, which was supposed to extend to the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line and beyond. In this new dimension, the economic importance of Northern Europe increased she sometimes sharply. That affected before everything the Swedish iron ore, in the future Danish food production and finally also Finnish wood resources. The mentioned goods should be more plentiful, cheaper and without detours the usual one Foreign trade out of the occupied Soviet areas flow." ³⁰² Such (Wish) Imaginations found however in the first months of war against the USSR still

299 **BAK R** 7/3648, HPA protocol v. March 26, 1943.

300 BAP, AA68734, BI. 2 f., note Wiehl, March 22, 1943. - Ambassador Eisenlohr was to travel to Lisbon as special representative.

301 Medlicott II, S. 166 ff.

302 Please refer II, S. 400.

not and later, as the advance not as desired continued, first right none **Never**
The punch in the practical Foreign trade and in negotiations about it.

In the German-Swedish government committee meetings in September 1941 was from "the _increased German demands import Swedish Were and "Using Swedish services" the speech. Despite Sweden's now further deteriorating geopolitical situation, its representatives were able to insist on appropriate compensation from the German side, precisely because the latter was even more dependent on Swedish supplies and services in view of the new dimension of its war economic needs. This increased need should for this reason "through Correspondingly increased German exports to Sweden must be taken into account.

While the balance of trade with Sweden has long been generally an asset balance for Germany had shown, they brought them with them the war against them The demands on the German economy associated with the Soviet Union began to change at the end of July 1941. "About the growing German clearing debt "to remedy or at least largely mitigate the difficulties that have arisen and are still to be expected in the German-Swedish trade in goods," were initially for the rest of the year 1941 as a "transitional measure" made some additional arrangements. In values of at least 1 00 mill. skr should Sweden in first half of the year In 1942 additional purchases of German goods, especially coal, coke, iron and so on chemicals. Until Back then, people in Berlin believed that the Russian campaign had already been completed victoriously have. The German side explained himself also ready in the months of October to December 1941 monthly 255 t to supply lubricating oil. How strong the interest was in Sweden's continued willingness to deliver was shown even more by the determination that the ongoing deliveries of gasoline and petroleum from Romania to Sweden, which Ölexport GmbH Berlin had previously received "free from the Romanian-Hungarian border station, including taxes and stamps "had been paid in full in free foreign currency, from 1. October 1941 "until until further notice Half should be compensated by way of the German-Swedish settlement agreement" ³⁰³, although free foreign exchange was still urgently needed on the German side .

At the same time renounced the German negotiator also the Sweden opposite not on putting trading partners under political-ideological pressure: we have to make economic concessions for that clearly show that German blood also for their protection would be sacrificed to the Bolshevik danger. Therefore the Swedish side should the gap between the for the Payouts at the Swedish suppliers and the payments from Swedish recipients of German goods that arise during clearing settlements, but which are not sufficient due to the German delivery backlog, should be completed by state or at least state-guaranteed loans. The Swedish government declared itself in tough disputes between the government committees of both countries, some of which also found resonance in the Swedish public finally at the end of 1941 ready, limited bridging loans to concede. In Berlin government circles, the around negative Effects on the Swedish one Readiness to deliver

303 BAP, AA 68739, Bl. 52 f., results protocol, signed v. M.D Walter and. M.D Hägglöf, Stockholm September 22, 1941.

feared, was one in the the following months at least made sure to get through rapid repayment to respect the transitional nature of these loans.³⁰⁴

Apparently also for the purpose of dismantling the German debt to Sweden³⁰⁵ from deliveries of goods that were considered indispensable for the war economy, the German leadership felt compelled to accept decisive demands from the Swedish government - who increased their country's defense capability at the time in order to be able to better withstand the pressure on the neutrality status - to give in and her in December 1941, despite the huge need for supplies the German Eastern Front to contractually promise the delivery of 110 howitzers with 300,000 rounds of ammunition. The one that completely contradicts German planning Course of the war caused then, that until Beginning March 1943 only 40 howitzers and 80 000 rounds of ammunition were delivered to Sweden. Still dared the Even then, a few weeks after the Stalingrad debacle, the German leadership refused to withdraw from its commitment to Sweden. Rather, it happened now the strict instructions, monthly only (but still) four guns and 10 000 rounds of ammunition to be released.³⁰⁶ It was just January 1943 Sweden can be persuaded to promise unchanged deliveries for 1943, provided that German commitment to deliver five million tonnes of coal and 300,000 tonnes of iron would be fulfilled. In addition, the Swedish government had agreed to a "mutual transaction" Swedish charcoal pig iron against to exchange German coke pig iron. At this time, Swedish charcoal pig iron was of increased importance for the German industry War economy because this after the loss North Africa to the Allies no more iron ores containing phosphorus could be obtained from there.

Sweden, on the other hand, has now refused any concessions on credit issues after the German Page the "of the Sweden with 40 **mill. RM** advance delivery promises for war equipment from the end of 1941" were not fulfilled and the coal required by Sweden's economy in January 1942 was only "unsatisfactory" had delivered.³⁰⁷ The shortfall compared to what was agreed amounts amounted to a third.³⁰⁸ The Trade Policy Committee had to state on January 21, 1943, "that Sweden was the only European country to react negatively to German loan requests."³⁰⁹

How little those cited by Eichholtz imaginations of the German rulers turned out to be real, according to a report written by employees of the planning office in mid-1944. This included an import share of 44.1 percent for 1942 and for 1943 a share of 47.1 percent of the German "total supply" with iron ores and a significant role was assigned to deliveries from Sweden. In the calendar year 1943, Germany was the first among the neutral states in both imports and exports Hire.³¹⁰ In the Years 1942 it said in the German Imports with 410 million. RM Hungary

304 Wittmann, pp. 263-273.

305 In addition to current Trade issues stood the successive Redemption earlier Bonds regularly on the agenda of the bilateral government committees.

306 **BAK, R 7/3648**, HPA protocol v. March 5, 1943.

307 Ibid, HPA protocol v. January 21, 1943.

308 Olsson, S. 170, Tab. 14.

309 How Note 307. - In more detail above the problem of Clearing settlement see Wittmann, pp. 263-282.

310 How Note 290.

(541 **mill. RM**) and Romania (429 **mill. RM**) after, if man the at the time Price level based. However, you calculate the Import according to average prices from Years 1938, like this was standing Sweden also in 1942 clearly the Great (with 288 **Million RM** before Hungary = 266, Denmark = 203, Bulgaria = 170, Romania = 152 **mill. RM**).³¹¹ Lays man the ongoing ones

Based on prices, Sweden was included in the official German statistics in 1942, which included not only sovereign states but also all occupied territories such as B. the General Government included, on the import side with just under five percent in eighth place³¹² and on the export side with over five percent in seventh place.³¹³

While in peacetime a large part of Sweden's iron ore deliveries were shipped to Norwegian ports due to weather conditions (due to the long-term icing of the Gulf of Bothnia), this was not possible in 1941 - 1943 (and after) only happened to a small extent, as the following table shows.

Table 118

Scandinavian Ore shipments after Germany, January 1942- October 1943

Period	In total (1000 t)	Sweden (1000 t)	percent	Norway (1000 t)	percent
<i>1942</i>					
January	375.6	359.2	96	16.4	4
February	77.8	59.4	76	18.4	24
March	73.9	58.6	79	15.3	21
April	330.6	281.3	85	49.3	15
May	939.4	860,1	92	79.3	8th
June	1262.7	1 140.7	90	122.0	LO
July	1 177.0	1 105,1	94	71.9	6
August	1 177.7	1 132,1	96	45.6	4
September	1 184,1	1 142.3	96	41.8	4
October	895.4	868.9	97	26.5	3
November	774.4	749.0	97	25.4	3
December	754.3	724.8	96	29.5	4
<i>in total</i>	9,022.9 _	8th 481.5	94	541.4	6
<i>1943</i>					
January	655.5	637,1	97	18.4	3
February	423.0	385.0	91	38.0	9
March	619.8	583.5	94	36.3	6
April	629.5	593.3	94	36.2	6
May	1 328.5	1 283.6	97	44.9	3
June	1 327.3	1295.8	98	31.5	2
July	1 299.4	1 270.0	98	29.4	2

311 How Note 288.

312 BAK, R 7/3639 (How in Note 287).

313 How Note 289.

Table 118 (Continuation)

Period	Total (1000t)	Sweden (1000t)	percent	Norway (1000t)	percent
August	1 109.7	1 088.0	98	21.7	2
September	964.5	948.3	98	16.2	2
October	704.6	699,1	99	5.5	1
Jan. - Oct. in total	9 061.8	8th 783.7	97	278,1	3

Source: **BAK, R 7/3273**, Reichsvereinigung Eisen, Gochtmann to **MR Ludwig (RWiM)**, Berlin December 9, 1943, appendix "Scandinavian ore shipments to Germany in the years 1942 and 1943".

Accordingly, only from February to April 1942 a maximum of just under a quarter of the ore deliveries could be shipped via Norwegian ports.

Out of a report from the German consulate in Lulea from End of 1943 The total for 1942 and 1943 was slightly lower than those shipped to German ports of destination Ore quantities ³¹⁴ 4, yes it ran ultimately on the same thing beyond, if more Erzmen via other accessible ports in areas within the German territory, in particular about Danish or Dutch transported to ports became. In 1942 and 1943, well over half of the ships used to transport ore from Luleå (69 and 59 percent respectively), carrying 54 and 41 percent of the cargo, respectively, carried the Swedish flag; 1942 and 1943 followed - in different order the German, Finnish, Danish and Dutch flags. ³¹⁵ Since the German Navy managed to defeat Soviet Submarines the Exit out to prevent the Gulf of Finland from coming There were shipping losses when transporting ore almost exclusively on the Northern Sea Route, and these were lower in 1943 than in 1942. ³¹⁶

In August and September 1943 then came in Ore transport from Sweden to Germany stalls, once because as a result of the heavy air raids on Hamburg and northwest Germany the lay and unloading times in the German North Sea ports were extended, and on the other hand, because the Swedish State Railways on 20. September major repair work on the ore railway during the the following two months cannot be postponed explained - perhaps a pretextual reason given the war situation that arose at the time and in view of Churchill's announcement of an invasion of Norway. ³¹⁷

There were certainly very similar motives the caused the Swedish government to reject an extension from mid-1943 of the agreements made under the threatening circumstances in mid-1940 regarding the transit of the Wehrmacht through Swedish territory. While the Duration this agreement were on the Swedish Egg-

314 **BAK, R 7/3273**, page 33, German consulate Lulea, Thomsen, at AA, "Ore export out of Northern Sweden over Lulea in the Years 1943", December 27, 1943.

315 Ibid, Bl. 34.

316 Ibid.

317 Ibid, Bl. 34 f.

Around 2.14 **million** German soldiers and around 100,000 wagonloads of military goods were transported by railways to and from Norway, Finland and the German-Soviet front, and Swedish warships and aircraft transported German troops and military cargo through Swedish territorial waters escorted, alone in 1941 Total volume of 650,000 GRT to and from Finland.

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To the extent that the war situation became unfavorable for Hitler's Germany, Sweden also felt encouraged German side concessions to deny the particular resentment of the other belligerents Page closed were suitable for excitation. This was also evident in the dispute over Swedish mica in 1943, which was considered the best in Europe. **Like** Wittmann the Sources reported arrived this to Insulation in radios, radio tubes, etc. Necessary raw material of "decisive importance for the war", of which Sweden had more than its own industry needed and whose entire production surplus AEG wanted to buy up, initially only in small quantities of mostly lower quality to Germany due to the restrictive handling of the export license procedure. In 1942 the Swedish Government then "under the Hand especially in the question of qualities too "Ready to make concessions." In 1943, their attitude solidified again, so that "significant contracts were no longer concluded." ³¹⁹

In February 1943, the German Foreign Office considered allowing the states that purchased petroleum products from Romania, i.e. not only Italy and Switzerland but also Sweden, to contribute to the "increased air defense costs for the Romanian oil areas". The argument was that Sweden and Switzerland would have to make "at least an ... indirect contribution to the costs of the fight against Bolshevism." Actually it worked it at This endeavor is more about the to reduce German clearing debt by encouraging the neutral buyers of Romanian oil to finance the defense of Western Allies Airstrikes on Romania Price surcharges on petroleum products originating from there. ³²⁰

The increasingly precarious situation did not dampen but sometimes stimulated the zeal of German authorities the Look for leverage to use could be achieved, that Sweden is his Deliveries and Services continued and increased as much as possible, without that you yourself have to provide appropriate compensation. This also served this purpose one as of August 1943 from commercial attache Behrens "Investigation into the blockade resistance of the Swedish economy" written at the German Embassy in Stockholm. The author arrived at this Conclusion: „It is Sweden succeeded, no Dependence on the Coal and coke imports still in the years 1940 and in 1941 a supply block would most likely have brought the Swedish economy to a standstill, now so largely to mild that it in one now If a blockade occurs, this will be possible, with severe consumption restrictions in non-essential areas and under conscience difficulties a Period from at least 6 months to

318 Wittmann, S. 256.

319 Ibid, S. 246.

320 BAP, AA 68736, Bl. 225 ff., note Lurtz for Wiehl, Clodius and Tannenberg regarding "Participation of Italy (Sweden and Switzerland) in the increased air protection costs for the Romanian oil areas", February 25, 1943.

321 For this purpose, Sweden wanted to use the existing resources of wood and peat. The investigation report assumed that Sweden's mineral oil needs could also be largely bridged thanks to the expanded substitute material capacity (wood, shale oil, various tar oils), with the aim of expanding the Shale oil production for the Swedish Navy was pointed out.³²² The author believed that the rubber shortage was due to the British blockade measures (due to fears that natural rubber would be re-exported to Germany). precarious. According to his calculations, the reserves might have hold for six months can. For the same Period he estimated reserves of feed and fertilizers as well as iron, but rock salt for at least two years.³²³

The German side continued to hold its ground against Denmark in the 1941 phase - 1943 at the formal respect for the Danish government and others Danish institutions. There was promise from there - not without Success³²⁴ - More willingness to deliver and perform on the part of Danish agriculture and industry for German purposes war economy than a direct German occupation administration could have achieved. However, as the general war situation became more severe, the pressure on the Danish authorities increased and cases of direct intervention in Danish economic life increased under Disregard of the official agreements. As itself from 1942 on 1943 the stay costs of the German troops in Denmark to be borne by the Danish National Bank more than doubled³²⁵. This resulted not only from the complex construction of coastal defense systems that had been undertaken. Contrary to the regulation in force since April 1940 that the supply of those stationed in Denmark German troops as Danish exports to Germany charged should be³²⁶, made namely not only these troops, but also from the Reich territory Commands made bulk purchases in Danish slaughterhouses and the like and had these financed from the subsistence expense account³²⁷. The ones in the detailed Presentations about agricultural supplies

321 **BAK, R 7/3275**, BI. 146, „Investigation above the Blockage resistance the Swedish National economy. After dem As of August 1943 written by commercial attache Behrens the German Embassy in Stockholm".

322 Ibid, BI. 165 ff.

323 Ibid, BI. 175 ff.

324 For 1941, very meaningful: BAP, AA 68712, BI. 18-33, The Commissioner for Economic Affairs, [Ebner], to the Plenipotentiary of the German Reich (von Renthe-Fink) to AA, Copenhagen January 31, 1942.

325 BAK, R 7/3407, Memorandum (from the Danish Foreign Ministry) regarding the economic conditions during the war, p. 15, Copenhagen June 14, 1944.

326 Ibid., p. 16: Just to save on transport should be agricultural Goods can be purchased straight away in Denmark, instead of first being exported to Germany and then used for catering the German Soldiers to be transported back to Denmark. At the "Friendly agreed Occupation" was namely on the German side been promised, that the German troops would be supplied from Germany.

327 BAP, AA 68712, BI. 195 f., telex AA at the authorized representative of German Reich in Copenhagen (Best), February 1943.

from Denmark in Volume II The numbers ³²⁸ mentioned still require an addition, which, however, cannot be assigned exact numbers here. The Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark pointed out to his superiors in Berlin on various occasions that such peculiar practices were inappropriate for him the fulfillment of his tasks made more difficult. No doubt they were too contribute to this, that the standby the cooperation with the occupying power 1943 sharply declined, to which this responded at the end of August 1943 with the complete disarmament of the Danish army ³²⁹ and with the declaration of a military state of emergency ³³⁰.

Since Great Britain refused to grant Navicerts for grain transport from America to Finland in June 1941, the latter was from then on completely dependent on the exchange of goods with Germany and the European countries under its occupation or at least control. The fact that the USA continued to maintain diplomatic relations with Finland after entering the war did not change this. Finland was completely at the mercy of Berlin's decisions, not only when it came to importing grain, machinery and other industrial goods, but especially war material. His dependent position was also characterized by that it no longer exists due to his active participation in the war against the USSR was remotely able to pay for imports through exports. Except in the textile industry, where there were many unemployed due to a lack of raw materials, but Germany had no interest in importing their products³³¹ had to go in Finland as a result an extremely high call-up rate of male workers to the army, numerous companies are limiting their production or even shutting down, especially in some export-oriented sectors (lumber wood, plywood, cellulose, paper). The mutual interest in increased nickel, copper, pyrite and molybdenum production in the Petsamo district German Wehrmacht offices acted in Finland itself disagrees. They used German army food to entice numerous Finnish workers away from the construction projects at the ore mines and their processing, transport and supply facilities, until finally, in mid-1942, the food rates for the staff of the Petsamo district and their family members were increased through additional German deliveries. ³³²

In the circumstances mentioned, it meant for them a ruinous burden on the Finnish economy if its exports to Germany nevertheless increased in value.

328 II, S. 502 ff.

329 BAP, AA 68712, BI. 212, telegram Knight at Best, August 27, 1943.

330 Ibid, BI. 222 f., telegram v. Ribbentrop to Best, August 31, 1943.

331 BAP, AA 67823, BI. 43 ff., German file note Embassy Helsinki about the Meetings between Schnurre and Ludwig on October 23-25, 1941 with Finnish government representatives, 4. 1. 1941.

332 Ibid., BI. 127-128R, record (probably: van Scherpenberg) on German-Finnish economic agreements, March 2, 1942; ibid, BI. 193-199, Minutes of the Result of the negotiations between the German one and the Finnish government committee above Questions of German -Finnish Were- and clearing transactions v. June 9, 1942.

Table 119

The German import from Finland, 1939-1943 (in million RM)

Year	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943
In ongoing prices	76	79	145	149	272
In average prices from 1938	83	73	123	105	155

Source: **BAK, R 7/3639**, III Gr. 7 Krüger(?), Berlin October 26, 1944, "The volume of German foreign trade in the years 1939 to 1943 calculated according to the price level of 1938", appendix "Overview 2: German imports of goods in the years 1939 to 1943 from 11 countries according to the current price and according to the price level of 1938".

In opposite According to the respective price level, goods worth 80 were sold **mill. RM** (1939), 83 **mill. RM** (1940), 253 **million RM** (1941), 371 **mill. RM** (1942) and 400 **Million RM** (1943) moved.³³³ It should be noted that the German exports to Finland mainly covered types of goods for which the war-related price increases were particularly large.

After Finland had turned from a food supplier into a country dependent on grain deliveries from German territory and, despite the "Führer's" orders, its requests for coal (and iron) could only be "more or less fulfilled", the German from the Finnish government in June 1942, to take coercive measures against the private Finnish timber industrialists, not only because of the lack of labor, but also from financial reasons and because of the threatening Inflation with timber deliveries to Germany "reserved" had become.³³⁴ To the Finnish To make up for wood delivery backlogs from 1941 and in 1943, bringing more wood, especially mine wood, to Germany became one on the German side Price increase granted³³⁵ and the Deployment foreign workers (Poles, Norwegians) promised.³³⁶

However, it was precisely the latter solution that led to sharp interventions by the Swedish and US governments with the Finnish government, which has been in charge since the beginning of 1943 anyway growing Peace movement in the Finnish people like also in Parts of the industrial entrepreneurship and even within the governing parties began to pay more and more tribute.³³⁷

333 How Note 289.

334 BAP, AA 67823, BI. 229 ff., Schnurre's note on the result of the German-Finnish economic negotiations, June 10, 1942.

335 BAP, AA 68714, BI. 183, note d. Chairman d. Germans government committee, Purr, to the chairman of the Finnish Government Committee, v. Fieandt, Helsinki August 18, 1942.

336 Ibid., BI. 209 f., The Chairman of the German Expert Commission for the Wood Plan 1943, Gräbner, to the Chairman of the Finnish Expert Commission, Mecklin, Helsinki November 9, 1942; *ibid.*, BI. 211 ff., (supplementary) transcript from Gräbner, Mecklin, Kahra.

337 BAP, AA 68715, BI. 10 f., Telex Wiehl via RSHA to Reich Commissioner in Oslo, February 1943; *ibid.*, BI. 15, Telegram Wiehl via RSHA to Senator Otte at the Reich Commissioner in Oslo, February 12, 1943; *ibid.*, BI. 18, Telegram Blücher to AA, Helsinki February 24, 1943; *ibid.*, BI. 35 f.,

es Southeastern Europe and Türkiye

In the October 1941 initiated Wilhelm Zangen and Tilo Mr. v. Wilmowsky in a joint "proposal from the Reich Industry Group and the Central European Economic Day for economic planning in the southeastern European area"³³⁸ activities of the institutions that are still separately involved in studies of southeastern Europe (Institute for Economic Research Vienna, Southeastern Association of Eastern Mark Universities Vienna, Institute for Economic Research Berlin, World Economic Institute Kiel, Southeast Europe Institute in Breslau, Central Europe Institute in Leipzig, Foreign Studies Institute at the University of Berlin, Economic Committee of the MWT Berlin and its branch in Vienna) to examine the current situation and development opportunities for the economy of the countries of Southeast Europe, especially their relations with Germany Economy. They wanted these activities - including the branch organizations of Germany's commercial economy - to be subject to uniform control by an economic planning committee at the Southeast European Society in Vienna.

In the period that followed, "tasks of economic planning" were formulated.³³⁹ In the (unfortunately not dated) preamble to such a secret planning approach it was said: "We must be clear about this: that Germany's economic and political influence in Southeastern Europe is now much smaller in many places and greater in only a few places as in the Years 1938. Back then we had in the Southeast region practically has undisputed economic and political supremacy. We were almost exclusively the arms suppliers, had the largest share of foreign trade, and through the clearing policy (two-way trade) we always had the southeastern countries 'in a pinch'. In the Yugoslavian area we were almost exclusively responsible and were happy to leave the rest of the foreign trade to other countries, as this would give us the Care was taken of Yugoslavia's need for industrial raw materials. Today, Ljubljana is an Italian province, Dalmatia (bauxite!) and Montenegro are Italian, and the barely viable Croatian state is Italian is partly under Italian influence, Greece even more so. If you want to organize the west of the Balkan Peninsula in a uniform industrial policy today, you need to have a confrontation with Italy (and partly with Hungary and Bulgaria), which was not necessary in 1938. We have to be more considerate of Hungary today than before because they are our allies. The Hungary-Romania antagonism initially only complicates our economic policy efforts. In contrast have we in Romania in many relation-

Telegram Blücher to AA, Helsinki March 13, 1943; *ibid.*, BI. 45 f., Telegram Blücher to AA, Helsinki August 28, 1943.

338 BAK, R 63/293, BI. 325 ff., "Proposal from the Reich Industry Group and the Central European Economic Day for the Economic planning in the Southeast European Space", piers etc Wilmowsky, October 1941. - In August 1941, the Reich Industry Group and the MWT about the organizational basis for their joint approach to the Southeast European industry was agreed upon. See: *Reaching out to Southeastern Europe*, p. 136 f.

339 BAK, R 63/293, BI. 87 ff., "Tasks of economic planning. Stand v. June 1942".

hung economic policy far stronger influence won as still in 1940, and Bulgaria is generally at least as easy to work with as before. The Serbian Government must be complete bow to our influence. A whole series of border changes have been made in the entire area since 1938, which in many cases have completely reshaped the industrial economy situation."³⁴⁰

The whole action should not in scientific studies exhaust. pliers and Wilmowsky left it about practical measures. Therefore write: "Following this statement from the practical economy by the forum of the relevant Reich groups on the planning proposals drawn up by the SOEG-Vienna, the third phase is now the formation of political will by the responsible government bodies. They are now in a position to base their decisions on economic science well-founded reports from the SOEG-Vienna as well as the practical experiences of the economy. As is well known, in the further course of political decision-making, the interstate Negotiations in the government and their subcommittees a crucial role. In the final phase of practical implementation, the responsible Reich groups will decide, in consultation with the ministries, on a case-by-case basis whether The practical implementation must be entrusted to individual companies, consortia or economic organizations, unless the state itself reserves the right to manage and implement projects of a certain type."³⁴¹

So much for goals and wishes for 1941/42. Disillusionment soon appears to have set in due to actual developments be. On the 31st May 1943 wrote the general manager of the Southeast European Society, August Heinrichsbauer, a Dr. v. Rischka in Vienna, that "according to the consensus will of the Foreign Office and of the Reich Ministry of Economics in everyone Southeast questions from us too short must be kicked ... we us passive behave should ..." ³⁴²

Based on what was not published at the time official German foreign trade information, which we rely on with many reservations regarding the inadequacy statistical recording ³⁴³, those that violate international law Territorial division etc., but have to be supported due to a lack of better material, the following tables can be put together:

340 Ibid., BI. 117 f., "The industrial economic consequences of the decline (and increase) of German political influence on Southeastern Europe since 1938", handwritten: "received from Dr. Seifert".

341 Ibid, BI. 328 („Suggestion"). - SOEG = Southeast European Society.

342 BAK, R 63/251, BI. 13R, Heinrichsbauer at v. Rischka, Vienna May 31, 1943.

343 Information that differs slightly from this is in: BAK, R 7/3639, German imports of goods from 11 countries in the years 1939 to 1943 according to the respective Price status and according to the price level of 1938.

Table 120

The German import out of Southeastern Europe and the Türkiye, 1941-1943 (ongoing Prices)

Neutrals, allies and occupied Countries or. parts of the country	Mill.RM			Percent of total German imports		
	1941	1942	1943	1941	1942	1943
Türkiye	82	100	160	1	1	2
Bulgaria	187	286	300	3	3	4
Romania including "Transnistria"	347	430	320	5	5	4
Hungary	351	541	620	5	6	8th
Croatia	35	75	100			
Serbia, Albania, Montenegro	128	121	190	2		2
Greece	81	130	100			

Source: BAK, R 7/3639, The German Foreign trade in the years 1938 until 1943, a) Import.

Table 121

The German export after Southeastern Europe and Turkey, 1941-1943 (ongoing Prices)

neutrals, allies and occupied countries or parts of the country	Mill.RM			percent the German total exports		
	1941	1942	1943	1941	1942	1943
Türkiye	26	109	250	0	1	3
Bulgaria	260	289	370	4	4	4
Romania including "Transnistria"	435	716	990	7	9	12
Hungary	350	431	670	5	6	8th
Croatia	55	175	320		2	4
Serbia, Albania, Montenegro	108	49	70	2		
Greece	11	59	80	0		

Source: BAK, R 7/3639, The German Foreign trade in the years 1938 to 1943, b) Export.

Out of this one Import- and Export data results itself the the following Balance sheet accounting.

Table 122

import surplus(-) or export surplus (+) of German foreign trade towards Southeast Europe and Turkey, 1941-1943

Origin- and Sales areas	1941	1942	1943
Türkiye	- 56	+9	+90
Bulgaria	+73	+3	+70
Romania including "Transnistria"	+88	+286	+670
Hungary	- 1	- 110	+50
Croatia	+20	+100	+220
Serbia, Albania, Montenegro	- 20	- 72	- 120
Greece	- 70	- 71	- 20

Source: How for the Tables 120 and 121.

This balance sheet calculation could lead to completely unrealistic conclusions if three factors were ignored: Firstly, there are very different things hidden behind the current prices Rates of increase. Higher value amounts were by no means offset by adequately increased quantities of goods. In the negotiations of the bilateral government committees took the Haggles over Price surcharges always significant Space a. Second is in this context to consider: The more precarious the military situation and the inner Security situation in the Southeast European one countries, the more more were weapons and other military equipment the statistically as German export captured goods involved. If one takes this fact into account, the predominantly active balances of the German trade balance with Southeastern Europe will be over the course of the year Years 1941 - 1943 plausible, although the goods were delivered from the allies there and occupied countries or parts of the country did not decrease overall. The fact that the German trade balance with Romania was very active despite its great importance as an oil supplier was due to Romania's extremely strong participation in the war against the Soviet Union. The relatively high German active balance towards Croatia can be explained in a similar way. The Ustasha government was indeed from the fascist Italy politically dependent, what her Representatives in trade negotiations with Germany tried to use this to persuade the German representatives to make larger concessions. But in the fight against the partisans, the Croatian fascists were more dependent on German arms supplies (and direct use of German armed forces). Thirdly, this balance sheet should not be confused with Germany's clearing debt to the Southeast European countries, which also includes previous liabilities as well Payment obligations outside of movement of goods contain were. So became For example, the German clearing debt to Bulgaria in March 1943 was estimated by the official German side at around 400 million RM.³⁴⁴

A much larger role than the above tables indicate was played in German foreign trade policy as a functional field of foreign policy during the period discussed here war phase 1941 - 1943 Turkey. Since the beginning of war to the opponents German-

344 BAP, AA 68709, Bl. 16, recording Morath for the Office of R.A.M, March 29, 1943.

lands inclined, it approached this somewhat during his advance into the Territories around the USSR, especially as size Parts of the Black Sea coast came under German control.

Just like it seemed opportune, called it Türkiye continues to be considered a “non-belligerent” during this phase of the war or also as “neutral”. Given the Situation in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean, but also in Iraq, as well as the increasing German-Soviet differences had she already on the 18th. June 1941 Germany one in the Publicity often as

"Friendship Treaty". Non-aggression and consultative treaty concluded, but without the secret additional protocols offered to it as bait about territorial expansions at the expense of third parties. At the same time, however, she stuck to her alliance with Great Britain.

That itself the Rapprochement with Germany despite one on October 9, 1941 The economic agreement that came about and an “agreement to regulate the movement of goods and payments”³⁴⁵ concluded on April 18, 1943 did not have a particularly significant impact on trade turnover, they show above tables. Had a significant influence on it the already mentioned fact that Turkey had committed in 1939 to send its chrome ore production, which was particularly important for the war economy, virtually exclusively to England until January 7, 1942 to export, whereby the British side received a corresponding one in 1939 Option for the following year (until January 1943) had been admitted. In the war situation At the beginning of October 1941 and again in the summer of 1942 The Turkish government then felt compelled to initially... the British in 1939 to implement the option granted to them, but supply contracts for the to refuse the following time, but the German negotiators were willing to grant it of export permits for 12 000 t copper, 7 000 t Cotton and 8 000 t olive oil, but especially 90 for 1943 and 1944 000 t of Turkish chrome ore deliveries. However, this happened under the condition that the German side complied with Turkish purchase and loan requests, especially in regarding materials and machines for Turkish armaments factories, replacement parts for Airplanes and certain weapons that had previously been promised to Turkey by the British side, but which Ankara was unable to deliver in view of British own needs and the through the Due to the current war situation and the difficult transport conditions, doubts arose were. In the relevant German-Turkish negotiations Hitler himself also became involved in May and August 1942 turned on.³⁴⁶

Until for the 7. July 1943 were from the first rate the compatible bound Chrome ore ferments in Height from 45 000 t then but only 13 933 tons realized³⁴⁷, and this despite the in one

345 More details about this please refer Kreckler, S. 176--189 .

346 BAP, AA 68764, 81. 41, FS Eisenlohr at Knight, October 4, 1941; BAP, AA 68765, 81. 35, Clodius at

Numan Menemencioglu, Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Ankara October 9, 1941; *ibid*, BI. 38R, Clodius to Numan Menemencioglu, Ankara October 9, 1941; BAP, AA 68764, BI. 189, Ripken on Wiehl, February 27, 1942; BAP, AA 68751, BI. 38, Ripken, „Recording regarding negotiations with the Turkish military expert commission" for Wiehl, June 4, 1942; BAP, AA 68764, 81. 283 and 283R, Ripken, „Recording regarding the trade policy part of the recording for the reception of the Turkish ambassador in Berlin, Saffet Arikan, at the Reich foreign minister and with the Führer" to the Dept. Protocol, August 5, 1942; see also note. 100.

347 BAP, AA 68764, BI. 416, Ferroalloys Department the Wigru Chemical Industry, Hoffmann, to OKW, Economic Staff, Transport Group, July 8, 1943.

Foreign meeting Government office on the 24th July 1943 as "good" transport position, the one in primarily for the wanted to use the procurement of chrome ore, copper and antimony.

³⁴⁸ Crucial for the The slow delivery of Turkish chrome ores was not due to a lack of them provision, nor lack of Transport space or uncertainty of the Transport routes (e.g. through the Dardanelles to Bulgarian ports), but the fact that the demands of the German Eastern Front, which repeatedly exceeded any planning, required the extradition of Turkey, particularly through the agreement of December 31, 1942, the so-called "arms loan" ³⁴⁹. The weapons and armaments materials granted were repeatedly prevented, but Turkey only issued export licenses step by step in proportion to the German deliveries received.

Like the agreements in the now changed war situation after the middle of 1943 have been fulfilled, will be in to be dealt with in the following section of our investigation. Regarding the phase of the war to be discussed here from mid-1941 to mid-1943, it must be stated that also in the Time of greatest territorial expansion of power During the Hitler Empire, Turkey "only made use of the agreed value limits for deliveries to Germany to a small extent" in the agricultural products sector. ³⁵⁰ were in agreement the German foreign trade politician it is clear that this took place in 1942, i.e. in a favorable period from Berlin's point of view The statement made in the war situation will continue to apply. Not just bad harvest results in the Türkiye, but especially the now As a result of the loss of their raw material sources in the Far East, the pre-emptive policy of Great Britain and the USA, which at the same time showed a high level of willingness to supply, as well as the naturally motivated Turkish negotiation tactics and practical trade policy had a detrimental effect on Germany. ³⁵¹

It was not possible for the governments of the relatively sovereign southeastern European states to carry out a similar balancing act between the warring parties for geographical reasons and would not have been possible, at least until the turn of the year 1942/43, in the assessment of the situation and opportunities by the Key politicians in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria at the time.

The following episode shows quite eloquently how weak Bulgaria's negotiating position was at that time: When the German government felt compelled to deliver 20 field anti-aircraft guns (flak) to the To release Turkey, the Bulgarian Prime Minister refused the transit permit because he was crossing his country through the Türkiye believed to be under military threat. It took only four weeks, until the Bulgarian Government the German one Pressure after-

348 BAP, AA 67863, BI. 426, note Stock about a meeting at Ripken with representatives of the AA, the RWiM, the RMEL and the RMBuM, July 27, 1943.

349 For more information see Kreckler, pp. 183-189. - In order to exclude the use of looted weapons, the Turkey insisted on the following: "This military equipment must be new, German-made and of the same modern quality as the German Wehrmacht uses." Ibid., p. 187.

350 BAP, AA 68764, BI. 311, file note "German-Turkish foreign trade" undated (HaPol VII 3939/42, probably at the end of 1942).

351 Ibid.; further ibid, BI. 166 ff., Ripken's statement on Record of the Hungarian envoy v. February 12, 1942, for Wiehl, February 19, 1942.

gave.³⁵² The actual motivation for the Bulgarian refusal was It has been that Bulgarian wishes to receive such weapons in return for Bulgarian deliveries of goods Berlin were disregarded. As It was almost humiliating it in Sofia, that 36 Anti-aircraft guns, the delivery of which was contractually bound to the Rheinmetall company in October 1941, were still in March 1943 on the German side were held back despite repeated warnings from the Bulgarian side. "The King of Bulgaria seems to be personally interested in this anti-aircraft gun," the Reich Foreign Minister was reported to.³⁵³ In his discussions with Hitler and Ribbentrop at the beginning of July 1943, King Boris announced more extensive wishes for weapons, with the "securing of the "Peace and order in Bulgaria and in the area occupied by it" was recognized by high authorities on both sides.³⁵⁴

In Hungary, too, the processing of trade and payment transactions with Germany encountered increasing difficulties. In contrast to Romania and Bulgaria, the clearing peaks here grew in favor of Hungary, meaning that Hungary did not receive anywhere near the equivalent value for its deliveries and services to Germany or the German Wehrmacht units located in Hungary. That is already in July 1942, the Hungarian National Bank's attitude towards resistance hardened was due to its serious concerns about the Hungarian currency, which was still growing when the Hungarian government was based in Berlin was urged to "eliminate" Jewish capital from the Hungarian economy. Because of the feared negative consequences for the Hungarian monetary economy resisted the Management of the National Bank such Measures, first with certain Success. Only with Effort let

In this context, the resignation of Prime Minister Miklos Kallay should be avoided .³⁵⁵

In Romania, too, since 1942 the National Bank increasingly countered German demands out of concern for the currency. In October 1943, when Marshal Antonescu the The bank's stance was clearly supported, he wrote German negotiators, Clodius, in a record for the Reich Foreign Minister: "The Romanian behavior is just like last year it was purely a policy of blackmail. The Romanian commitments from the previous year have by no means been fulfilled. Instead of 4 million tons of mineral oil, we will e.g in the run of year 1943 at most 3 Million tons received instead of the promised 90,000 Tons of oilseeds, only 15,000 tons have been delivered. The Romanian National Bank has also tried throughout the last year to sabotage deliveries to Germany as much as possible, despite our repeated objections."³⁵⁶

352 BAP, AA 68750, BI. 13, Telegram Beckerle to AA, Sofia December 10, 1942; *ibid*, BI. 23 ff., FS v. Weizsäcker to the Sofia Embassy, December 18, 1942; *ibid*, BI. 93, Telegram Ripken to Embassy Ankara, January 9, 1943.

353 BAP, AA 68709, BI. 17 f., Morath to the office of d. RAM, "Record of the current status of German-Bulgarian economic relations", March 29, 1943.

354 *Ibid*, BI. 19, Purr on the German Embassy Sofia, July 31, 1943.

355 BAP, AA 68756, BI. 222, Southeast Europe Company, Managing Director Heinrichsbauer, to Clodius with confidential information Report from Budapest, Vienna August 18, 1942.

356 BAP, AA 68736, BI. 346, record. Clodius for the RAM on the negotiations with Romania, October 24, 1943. - after the Romanian army at the Eastern Front 25 Divisions with all equipment

f) Switzerland

At first glance, Switzerland appears to be an island in the middle of the Axis powers' area 1941 - Completely isolated from the rest of the world in 1943 and therefore to have been dependent exclusively on the goodwill of Berlin and Rome. However, Switzerland's position was not that weak, and this was definitely reflected in its foreign trade relations low. Of course it cannot be denied that their situation in that phase of the war was considerably more difficult than before the collapse of France in the early summer of 1940.

Among other trade policy agreements concluded with Germany and Switzerland signed a special agreement on July 18, 1941, limited to the end of 1942, in which Switzerland received a loan for German relocation orders and other goods purchases until to amount of 850 million Swiss francs. This credit was then not only fully utilized, but was even exceeded by 500 **million Swiss francs through the awarding of orders.** ³⁵⁷ The German-Swiss agreements of July 1941 prompted the British government to officially announce the naval blockade on September 10, 1941 on most goods (with the exception of food and animal feed ³⁵⁸) to apply, the in the Switzerland can be transported should, from whom you but in London assumed, not without reason, that they would be in the Switzerland processed into products that would then be delivered to Great Britain's war opponents. ³⁵⁹

The USA against it delivered right generous Were at the Switzerland. Except from the profit

They were also guided by the idea that cutting Switzerland off from overseas goods trade would only drive this country further into Germany's arms. Interestingly, purchases of goods increased Switzerland from the USA not only in the second - in contrast to first - Half of 1941, ie before the start of the state of war between Germany and the USA, but even more so in 1942, at least in the first months of ³⁶⁰, as can be seen from the following statistical information .

had lost, Antonescu feared, that the intact remaining Hungarian army At the end of the war, Hungarian territorial claims to Romania would be enforced by force. He felt more and more abandoned by Hitler.

357 BAP, AA 68744, Bl. 5, Clodius, „Recording above the was standing the economic negotiations with Switzerland" for the **RAM**, May 12, 1943.

358 Hornberger, S. 25 u. 69 ff.

359 Medlicott II, S. 212. - Over the factually failed British-Swiss negotiations from July to September 1941 see just that. 209 ff. - According to Hornberger, S. 70 f., were for the Orders for the production of war material were relocated to Switzerland in addition to deliveries for Swiss domestic consumption and for other export production, coal and iron supplied from Germany.

360 Medlicott II, S. 213.

Table 123

The import of the Switzerland out of Germany, Great Britain and the USA, 1938-1942

	mill. sfr	GB	USA	percent of Total imports		
	D			D	GB	USA
1938	403	87	125	25.4	5.4	4.5
1939	438	100	133	22.4	5.3	7.1
1940	410	86	198	22.3	4.7	10.7
1941	645	14	150	32.1	0.7	7.5
1942	643	20	235	31.7	1.0	11.6

Source: BAP, AA 68818, BI. 2 f., Statistical Reich Office, import the Switzerland after countries of origin.
 - For comparison purposes, I also included information for Austria in the information for Germany in 1938 - B.P

If at the information for 1942 must also be taken into account that a part of in The goods statistically recorded this year had arrived earlier and had simply not yet crossed the customs border, so may one in the Principle probably but determine: With the from The tactic used by the USA as opposed to Great Britain became a more self-confident one Performance of the Swiss negotiators towards their German negotiating partners. Not only did Switzerland's exports to the USA remain quite high in 1941 and 1942. ³⁶¹ It was even enforced that certain batches of goods from Switzerland, which the British side is very interested in obtaining was, for transit through Germany or countries occupied by them were admitted, although German raw materials were probably also used in their production. The "compensation deal" between the Allied blockade and the German counter-blockade shows: Both belligerent sides were interested in a certain freedom of movement for Swiss trade, even though they were of course fundamentally concerned with effective economic warfare against each other. ³⁶² This web of contradictory interests offered Switzerland some scope for action not at such criteria as Size of Territory, strength of the armed forces or trade turnover is to be measured.

Also apart from the Impact the USA and of Great Britain was the Switzerland not defenseless against German pressure. As the strongest German means of pressure (apart from... Threat of military occupation, its chances of realization were extremely questionable and those after June 1940 never more was considered), the aim was to cut off Switzerland from the outside world in terms of transport and trade. But this would have acted as a boomerang. Although it was the Switzerland, also for their own needs, entirely dependent on coal and Iron deliveries from Germany depended. Conversely, however, southern German industry was largely of continuous Supply of electrical power from the Switzerland from-

361 BAP, AA 68818, BI. 20, Statistical Reichsamt, "Export of Switzerland according to destination countries".

362 Over the Course the complicated British-Swiss negotiations please refer Medlicott II, S. 213-235. - She led finally in the December 1942 to one Compensation agreement.

pending, and the railway connection through the The Swiss Alps and the easily blocked tunnels there continued to prove indispensable for cooperation between Germany and Italy. These and other means of counter-pressure that Switzerland had at its disposal also motivated the foreign and economic politicians in Berlin in the spring of 1943, when Switzerland - taking into account the turning point in the war - After the expiry of the special agreement of July 1941, the promise of a similarly large credit volume for future deliveries to the German war economy was refused and a contractless situation arose, to forego economic war measures against Switzerland.³⁶³ Although perhaps not to the usual extent, Switzerland's willingness to supply the German war economy should still be maintained as much as possible.

Unpublished at the time Information of the From the Reich Statistical Office we the The following information about some important goods that were imported from Switzerland to Germany in 1942 and 1943 despite the situation without a contract for several months. For comparison, the pay for quoted in 1938. Although quantities are given for most of them typical Swiss products in itself not very meaningful own, like that we lead she still on, because the from the development of the Value sums resulting trend is confirmed by the volume development.

Table 124

Important Types of goods the German import out of the Switzerland, 1938, 1942 and 1943

Type of goods	1000	Mill. RM				
	German 1938	1942	1943	1938	1942	1943
<i>import total</i>	2 430.0	4 207.5	2 559.0	102.6	424.4	297.7
Cheese	31.4	4.6	1.0	4.1	1.2	0.3
Iron ore	1 200.0	2 752.2	1 775.8	1.2	4.1	2.5
aluminum	36.6	44.6	17.9	3.0	6.5	2.6
Tar dye	8.7	4.8	1.8	6.8	4.0	1.6
Explosive, shooting supplies, Ignition goods	0	2.1	4.9	0	6.6	17.1
Hardware	11.1	49.5	45.5	3.9	58.1	40.8
machine tools	7.8	57.9	46.2	4.2	42.6	33.1
Electrical engineering products	3.0	27.6	36.1	1.8	16.0	23.5
Clocks	0.5	19.4	10.8	8.4	85.3	51.7
Precision mechanical and optical production.	0.1	2.3	1.7	0.4	11.5	7.3
Pharmacy Generate.	6.6	2.2	1.2	3.6	16.2	9.2

Source: BAP, AA 68818, BI. 1, Statistical Reich Office, share the main Goods on the German imports from Switzerland in 1938, 1942 and 1943.

363 BAP, AA 68744, BI. 5 ff., Clodius, "Record of the status of the economic negotiations with Switzerland" for the **RAM**, May 12, 1943; *ibid.*, BI. 54 ff., Sabath, record of a meeting with MD Wiehl regarding German-Swiss Negotiations, May 21, 1943; *ibid.*, BI. 141 ff., Clodius, "Record of the status of the economic negotiations with Switzerland" for the **RAM**, June 3, 1943.

This table clearly shows the strong increase in imports that are important for armaments, with a sharp decline in imports of the typical Swiss consumer item, cheese (but also of tar dye, which was probably due to cartel disputes that took place during the war. The "reorganization of Europe" went each other). Out of the table also clearly shows how the German import of a number of goods important for armaments from Switzerland in 1943 was declining. However, rose the import of products that can be used directly at the front, especially in the product group "explosives, shooting supplies, ignition goods", furthermore strong at, or he stayed right high, How the Declarations for the group "Hardware" identify, in the Guns and other weapons contain were. Apparently The now scarce means of payment were now primarily concentrated on this.

g) Vichy France and his overseas Possessions

When the USA entered the war, American deliveries of oil, food, motor vehicles and others Were at French North Africa not on.³⁶⁴ In Washington, but also in London It was hoped that in this way they would gain sympathy for the Allies against the Axis powers. But as long as the Although the Battle of Egypt and then Libya were not decided, the supplies proved to be beneficial for the German Afrika Korps, to the fuel and Motor vehicles as well as replacement share forwarded been be should³⁶⁵ 5, before everything however for the German War economy. According to official British calculations at the time, from January to August 1942 one Million tons of phosphates, 200 000 t low phosphorus Iron ore, 20th century 000 t Man whole and 140 000 t Oilseeds and peanuts from North Africa to the French Mediterranean ports, from there largely to Germany.³⁶⁶ The increasing tensions between Washington and Vichy, the occupation of Morocco and Algeria by the Allies and the destruction or expulsion of German and Italian troops from Libya and Tunisia brought about a brisk import of goods from French overseas territories holding Petain in the fall of 1941 The Strait from Gibraltar to Southern France is increasingly coming to a standstill. At the beginning of August 1942, a noteworthy item of 2,000 carats of industrial diamonds arrived in Marseille, half of which was then to be transported to Germany and half of which was to be used in France for German orders. This was the first delivery from the diamond mine near Dakar (West Africa), where a acting administrator appointed been was around 50 000 carats annual estimated production, which he on 100 000 carats should be made usable for the German war economy.³⁶⁷

Ruge according to had since dem armistice 1940 until for the November 1942 in total 540 French Convoys with 1 750 commercial vehicles the street from Gibraltar happened.

³⁶⁴ Medicott II, pp. 343-376 .

³⁶⁵ Ibid, S. 356,365,367.

³⁶⁶ Ibid, S. 377.

³⁶⁷ **BAK, R 7/2281**, "Achievements of the French economy for Germany", as of August 1, 1942 (from a report the Germans Ceasefire delegation for Business Paris-Wiesbaden), S. 8th.

According to the same source, it enabled cargo ship traffic from French North Africa to southern France, which had almost returned to pre-war levels by October 1940 had achieved, by November 1942 "an import of about 4 1/2 million tons by weight, of which about 3/5 phosphates and ores, plus 1.6 - 1.7 Millions of cubic meters of wine. Morocco delivered in a year about 1/2 million t, about the same How in peace." Finally, te claimed the German admiral long after the end of the war: "Except for a few Amounts, the in the free market from the Occupation force were bought, came the total import the benefit the French population."

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By Vichy France the lost trade connections to the overseas territories that remained loyal to him, unnecessary it itself in the eyes of the Occupiers more and more, the officially le existence of the Vichy government to be noted. She granted her in increasing Take orders instead of negotiating with her. Nevertheless, the fiction of French sovereignty became not completely given up. French collaborators and the many French entrepreneurs, the at their considerable Production contributions for the In this way, the German war economy benefited from the alibi that they were not henchmen of the foreign occupiers, but patriots "Budget Fran ais" to be. Even after November 1942 quite Frank rich from German and was occupied by Italian troops, became the The Armistice Commission was not dissolved, as was initially considered, but as Retained as a symbol of French sovereignty. But Hitler commented on this decision to his **military** commander in France in December 1942, saying that French sovereignty would only be recognized to the extent that it served "our purposes"

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h) Further east

After the elimination of rail transit across the territory of the USSR, all trade with the Far East was dependent solely on blockade runners.³⁷⁰ At the same time, Iran and Afghanistan were no longer viable trading partners, and the economic and financial ventures initiated by Germany in connection with the coup in Iraq did not even come to fruition as a result of the coup's failure.³⁷¹ With the Chinese government under Chiang Kai Since May 1941, there have been no diplomatic relations and not the slightest trade opportunities after Berlin Government under Wang Ching Wei had recognized in the Japanese-occupied part of China.

368 Ruge, Frederick, The Naval War 1939-1945. Third expanded ed. Stuttgart 1962, S. 122 f.

369 Jäckel, Eberhard, France in Hitler's Europe, Stuttgart 1966, p. 260 f.; Milward, The New Order, p. 139.

370 See Michaud, T., Raw materials from East Asia, The journeys of the blockade runners. In: Wehrwis senschaftliche Rundschau, born 1955.

371 BAP, AA 68761, Bl. 47 ff., note about a department meeting in the AA on August 23, 1941 for preparation of visit of Iraqi Prime Minister Gailani in Berlin. - In the became a Reich printing press the Print newer Iraqi Banknotes prepared so that immediately when the march arrives A new currency could be introduced by Axis troops in Iraq (ibid., Bl. 65 ff., note in the Ripken files).

After the French Atlantic coast had been conquered, the German side resumed overseas shipping in the fall of 1940, primarily to and from South and Central America organize began. This should concentrated mainly on overseas since the beginning of the war Ports support German cargo ships that are stranded because they available in Europe had already been requisitioned for Navy tasks or as for the transport of ore Sweden and Norway were considered indispensable if they were seaworthy at all. However, freight traffic between Latin America and the German territory with German ships actually did not take place: partly on their own initiative, partly under pressure from Britain and the USA, the South American governments prevented the German ships from leaving the country and prepared for their confiscation (e.g. T. was averted by the German side ships sold or even given away in order to obtain permission to leave for others), and which actually left German ships that left the well-watched ports of the east coast were largely lost, mostly through self-absorption when approaching British warships. On the other hand, it was possible to transfer German ships lying in ports on the west coast to Japan.³⁷² These, like the German cargo ships that were in the Far East at the outbreak of war and some that had already broken through there from Europe, were later loaded with war-important goods and set off towards Biscay, preferably in the cloudy winter months.

Of the two possible routes to the Far East and back, the blockade runners preferred the much longer one around Cape Horn without the possibility of Fuel intake compared to the route around the Cape of Good Hope with a bunker stay in French Madagascar and options for calling at ports in other Vichy-loyal West African colonial territories³⁷³, which is easily understandable until the conquest of Singapore, Malaya and the Dutch Indies by the Japanese.

The German war economy needed many raw materials from the Far East, such as oil seeds, rubber, tin, tungsten (tungsten ore) and quinine, for what she was not allowed to shy away from high costs and sacrifices. However, Japan's interest in successful passage of blockade runners, including merchant submarines, may have been even greater because it not only felt the need lack of Mercury, potash, ball bearings and certain chemicals, but especially the latest types of weapons. In April 1943 the German informed the Japanese government at their request about the extent of the 1942/43 period for the Japanese army and navy shipped goods. Of the 17,483 tons of goods shipped for both clients, 5,21 tons were in Japan and 989 tons in Japanese-occupied Singapore arrived, 1,016 baptism two sunk blockade runners lost gone and 5 930 t still on the way; another 4 337 t were on the ship transporting them, which had turned around, again in a port of German territory arrived.³⁷⁴ Except the direct ones Military supplies were located There were 13,190 tons of potash and 8,420 tons on board the blockade runners various goods such as machines, engines, ball bearings, electric locomotives, stainless steel, tubes, Wire, high pressure vessel, electrical Material, further chemicals, Colors,

372 Pommerin, Reiner, *The Third Reich and Latin America. The German policy towards South and Central America 1939-1942*, Düsseldorf 1977, pp. 198-213.

373 Medlicott II, S. 170 f.

374 BAP, AA 68725, BI. 41 f., memorandum "at Komuro hand over", April 19, 1943, O. Vf.

Medicines, paper and cardboard, as well as metal goods mainly for Manchukuo and the Japanese occupied China.³⁷⁵ As Return freight became out of dem Femen east also gold transported to Europe, which, redeemed in Germany in Swiss francs and Swedish crowns, was intended to be used to pay the accommodation costs of Japanese diplomats and orders for Japanese goods in Switzerland and Sweden. For those estimated at eight tons gold transport, the not last out of the Financial support the Philippines and Low The Germans were prepared to provide submarines.³⁷⁶

In Medicott's view, the Allies failed on this front in 1942. They valued that from 1. July 1941 to June 1942 out of Japan eleven ships had arrived in German-occupied Bay of Biscay ports, of that eight since Beginning of 1942. This Blockade breakers should 55000 to 60000 t Freight, largely rubber. In the opposite direction there should be six Ships have left European ports. From Nine ships are said to have left Biscay between September and November 1942, while three blockade runners from the Far East arrived in Bordeaux in November 1942. In considering the serious fat deficiency Germany should be in November 1942 Tankers were sent out to bring in cooking oil.³⁷⁷

In this context, it should only be mentioned briefly that Manchukuo tried to ensure its Deliveries from Oil plants Price increases to enforce, against what the German The side negotiated in a dilatory manner, in accordance with the instructions, "in any case, a termination of the economic negotiations to avoid".³⁷⁸ Man sees, which high Status Even in the precarious war situation of 1943 for the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo coalition, they had economic considerations, that is, profit calculations for the moment and for the post-war period.

5. From the Autumn 1943 until for the spring 1945

a) General

Was at the beginning of the in the following to be treated phase the turn Even though the war had already occurred long ago, it was not possible to predict exactly how long the war would last and whether the anti-Hitler coalition would last until the end. In any case, in the fall of 1943, the European continent, with the exception of southern Italy, but including the western parts, was there The USSR was still relatively firmly in the grip of the armed forces Germany, of which also the neutral ones States and Trading partner Switzerland and Sweden still before clasped were and the also the Türkiye, Spain and Portugal still had to be taken into account when shaping their policies.

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

³⁷⁶ Ibid., BI. 47 f., Note Clodius about a departmental meeting in the AA regarding Japanese foreign currency requests, June 11, 1943; *ibid.* BI. 52 u. 52R, note Clodius above a conversation with the Japanese envoy Matsushima, June 18, 1943.

³⁷⁷ Medicott II, S. 171.

³⁷⁸ BAP, AA68725, between BI. 42 u. 43, Telegram Wichl to the German Embassy Tokyo, April 22nd 1943.

However, as the situation at the front deteriorated, the import requirements for the German war economy hardly, at least less than in previous years, through the threat or use of violence against trading partners. Especially towards neutrals, it was more necessary than in previous phases of the war to the principle of mutual Benefits too regard, the growing difficulties Despite through Delivery of the German products you require and prompt Payment, including older debts, to preserve and stimulate their willingness to deliver. The opportunities for this increasingly dwindled, especially when it was no longer possible to fall back on the great economic potential of occupied France. In 1944, dictatorial interventions in the economies of satellite states were not avoided, but even so At times they remained flexible their change of front to avoid or at least delay the Italian model.

When, in September 1943, the state management mechanism of the German war economy was redesigned and essentially concentrated in the hands of Speer, whose official title from then on was "Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production", the responsibility of the Reich Economics Minister for basic questions of foreign trade policy was expressly confirmed, as was the case Competencies of the Foreign Office for the Conducting foreign trade negotiations.³⁷⁹

Given the situation, this regulation could hardly be applied in practice to the occupied countries and parts of the country, whose deliveries of goods to Germany and whose purchases of goods from Germany were subsequently recorded statistically as foreign trade, but whose production potential was largely in the Planning by the Ministry of Armaments was included.

While watching a series despite the allied governments the de facto military occupation of them countries through German Troops still End 1943 and 1944 a certain degree Sovereignty or at least pseudo-sovereignty in the designing their Foreign trade relations with Germany and third countries were granted, the fascist government newly formed under Mussolini's leadership in the parts of Italy not yet conquered by the Allies made its mere puppet role felt very clearly. From a "record concerning the financing of the Wehrmacht and the Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production in Italy", which Schnurre prepared for the Reich Foreign Minister on October 6, 1943, it emerges that not only "the costs of current German troop requirements" (monthly approx. one billion lira) from the new Mussolini administration as

"War Cost Contribution" to apply were, but also "the necessary amounts ... to carry out the Führer's mandate to Reich Minister Speer, all to secure the war economy in Italy necessary Measures hold true, to continue to enable. This concerns the purchase and removal of raw materials and supplies, the start-up and conversion of Italian companies, workers' wages, etc. The amount announced yesterday evening by the representative of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production initially amounts to 10-15 billion lire for the next 2 Months

379 BAP, AA 68754, BI. 65-67R, Schnurre's commentary on the "Führer's Decree on the concentration of the war economy" v. September 2, 1943, September 24, 1943. - Over this one Decree see. II, p. 146 ff., u. Autumn, pp. 255-275.

... The departments involved are: opinion that These amounts must be liquidated by the Italian government and the Italian banks through credit... I pointed out in these meetings that the demand for such amounts would explode Italy's financial economy in a very short time and accelerate the progress of the already existing inflation." Schnurre asked that this be taken into consideration and that Hitler make a special decision.³⁸⁰ Which was practical The outcome can be read in the minutes of the interministerial trade policy committee of the Reich government dated 12. February 1944 as Statement by Clodius like follows: "In his opinion, traffic between Italy and Germany cannot be carried out in the same way Kind of equal negotiations, but in compliance with the external form, like this even so far happened, essential only in the form of German administrative orders regulated become."³⁸¹

Considering the systematic economic Plunder Northern Italy, the in was intensified in the following months, it is unnecessary for us to further investigate German-Italian foreign trade relations.

On the 30th September 1943 State Secretary Landfried on behalf of the Reich Economics Minister the confidential "General Decree No. 76 Exp." to the heads of the audit offices and the foreign exchange offices³⁸², which means in the sense of the "Führer Decree". Due to the concentration of the war economy, foreign trade with the remaining partner countries was regulated even more tightly. It says: "Since the beginning of the war, the prices for foreign products have risen significantly more than German domestic prices... The efforts to through intergovernmental agreements To bring about a price freeze and a pegging of prices with European countries, e.g. T. did not have the hoped for success. Foreign products continued to rise in price in some contracting countries despite agreed fixed prices and were not available at the intergovernmentally agreed prices. Wanted Not Germany on important ones Imported goods had to be avoided at all and had to pay higher prices to purchase them those in the intergovernmental agreements intended. One such a development can the German economic management can no longer stand by..." Apparently the Reich Economics Minister did not expect to be able to persuade the governments of the supplying countries to reduce the price demands through an agreement. In doing so, he certainly also took into account the fact that concessions of little use to governments if producers and traders were subsequently unwilling to do so Goods too the degraded one prices to sell to German customers. Out of For this reason, the minister announced that he would set country-by-country price surcharges for goods to be exported from Germany, the transfer of which would be monitored by the auditing bodies for the benefit of the Reich finances. In this way, additional foreign currency was to be generated with which the increase in import prices could be compensated. To exclude, that German exporters out of goodwill towards old business

380 BAP, AA 68723, BI. 214 ff., Schnurre, "Record concerning the financing of the Wehrmacht and the Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production in Italy" for the RAM, October 6, 1943.

381 BAK, R 7/3648, HPA protocol v. February 12, 1944.

382 BAK, R 7/4544, "General Decree No. 76 Exp." of the RWiM (StS Landfried) to the heads of the examination offices and the foreign exchange offices, September 30, 1943.

Because partners abroad did not raise prices, perhaps with a view to sales opportunities after the war, or because cartels invoked their maximum price clauses, the exporters had this In any case, the specified amounts, regardless of the price actually achieved when selling abroad, may therefore be below reduction in their profits to an account set up at the Deutsche Golddiskontbank "additional proceeds from exports". The new regulation applied from January 1st. November 1943 for exports to Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Portugal, Romania, Switzerland, Serbia, Spain, Turkey and Hungary. Remarkably, that Sweden was not mentioned in the decree.

This decree also shows that German foreign trade ran into increasing payment difficulties in the fall of 1943. Only towards countries subject to an absolute German occupation regime were subjected to, clearing settlements could be carried out without restraint. These same countries then also had to the According to the internal official German "control calculation of the clearing level" dated January 27, 1945, the lion's share of the in the November 1944 nearly 20 billion Reichsmark reaching German clearing debt, the of course not only out of trading balances, but to a much greater extent from numerous further posts of the Balance of payments resulted.³⁸³

To countries that were considered allies and to which at the time certain remnants of economic and monetary policy Sovereignty had to remain in order she further willing to collaborate to receive, tried hard itself the German government representatives, good will to

to demonstrate a partial payoff of German debt. As already considered in ¹⁹⁴², offered one capitalists this Countries, approximately Hungary, Romania and the Slovakia, the "Buyback" in German hands located (for the Part previously French and Belgian scher) capital shares in local companies as well as the acquisition of minority interests German stock corporations.³⁸⁵ Also became companies, e.g Wisely in Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia, who regularly purchased German industrial goods, probably even after the end of the war, it was suggested that already during War total Purchase contracts for the post war period to complete, for the upcoming Clearing requirement of the country concerned should be credited to Germany as an advance payment.³⁸⁶

383 **BAK, R 7/3636**, "Control calculation of the clearing stand" v. January 27, 1945. - That's almost the same amount "Protocol above the 3. regular meeting of the Board of Directors the German settlement fund in 1944 on November 30, 1944 in the building of the Reichshauptbank Berlin" (**BAK, R 7/3638**).

384 **BAK, R 7/3636**, Schultze-Schlutius note on the German clearing debt as of July 7, 1942.

385 BAP, AA 68752, BI. 7 ff., Hungarian Embassy Berlin to AA, April 21, 1943; **BAK, R 7/3019**, trust!. Report Blessing, "The Romanian Currency Situation", p. 6, December 20, 1943; BAP, AA 68745, esp. BI. 9R, „Recording about the Results the in Pressburg the Time from the 25th January to February 2, 1944 German-Slovak government committee meetings".

386 **BAK, R 7/3019**, Blessing (as in note 385), S. 5; BAP, AA 68691, BI. 295, "Confidential Protocol about the Eighth Joint meeting of the German and Bulgarian Government Committee in Sophia in the Time from the 26th October to 18. December 1943"; BAP, AA 68819/2, BI. 33, "Protocol of the Eighth Joint Meeting of the German and Slovak Government Committees in Vienna and Pressburg from April 27th to 16th. June 1944".

How little Trust the foreign ones Trading partners still put in the clearing process and in German treasury bonds and similar papers was discussed at the meeting of the Trade Policy Committee the Reich government on November 5th 1943 clearly, where you can see the "recently emerging demand in almost all countries for partial payment of our salaries in gold or Foreign exchange" noted.³⁸⁷ In in this context be also the announcement von Wiehl in the HPA meeting on the 18th January 1944 mentioned, "that at all trade policy negotiations in the future to be considered Circles of the German private sector so turned on "It should be ensured that any existing relationship with a powerful bank in the economy of the state with which the negotiations are to be conducted is exploited in the interest of improving the outcome of the negotiations."³⁸⁸ Wiehl speculated probably on the fact that the foreign ones Banks German company bosses rather than the Reich government trust credit would be inclined to admit. Incidentally, Wiehl was not the only one to hold such ideas. "Practitioners" are officially "involved" in foreign trade policy and in the administrative regulation of foreign trade, that is, not just how for a long time now, the Heads of business associations behind the backdrops and In the spring of 1944, leading representatives saw that some of them could sometimes have a definite influence on state decisions at the negotiating table of the bilateral government committees the economy and key foreign trade politicians including the Reich Minister of Economics also with regard to the post-war period as necessary.³⁸⁹

That one from the autumn of 1943 at very was keen to be a trading partner Not to alienate neutral states is also shown by the discussion that was taking place between various Reich authorities at the time about the possible creation of a "Red List". The impetus came at the beginning of October or something earlier the German ambassador in Madrid, Hans Heinrich Dieckhoff, who was motivated by "the completely negative attitude of the Spanish government towards our ideas and the absolute necessity of "German countermeasures" against the ever closer cooperation between Spain and the Allies.³⁹⁰ Finally it was agreed to renounce such a threat of boycott and declaration of disrepute in general (particularly towards Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey). and she only towards Spain, however in moderate Form, by putting only companies "that have a particularly hostile attitude towards us (whether politically, commercially or in propaganda activities)" on a "red list". sat.³⁹¹

In the internal discussions by German foreign trade politicians So came expressed a certain degree of real assessment of the opportunities that remained for German wartime foreign trade. In a recording made in early 1944 in the Reich Ministry of Economics specifically about the Trade with Southeastern Europe was made, find each other the Sentences: „The previous Experiences have shown, that man opposite the allies or. the country

387 BAK, R 7/3648, HPA protocol v. November 5, 1943.

388 Ibid, HPA protocol v. January 18, 1944.

389 Detailed in addition: Autumn, S. 350-365 .

390 BAP, AA 68971n, BI. 1 ff., recording Purr for the R.A.M, October 8, 1943.

391 BAK, R 7/3648, HPA protocol v. November 12, 1943; affirmed in the HPA protocol v. February 17, 1944, *ibid*.

"In our military sphere of influence, the use of pressure instead of deliveries of goods could not achieve the same or at least sufficient results... There are relatively narrow limits ^{to} the simple use of pressure and force in the field of foreign trade." reinforced propaganda for one "European Economic Community". German leadership, including that in Funk's lecture to the Southeast European Society in Vienna on March 10, 1944 - not to first time - defended thesis: The Southeast Europeans should contribute to saving European culture from the Bolshevik onslaught by agreeing to clear the clearing balances finance. ³⁹³ In the ruling circles of southeastern Europe the fear of the advancing Red Army undoubtedly great, but pointed Funks The se no way out of their economic problems. It was also in the spring of 1944 in In the ruling circles, especially in Hungary and Romania, there is a growing existential desire to turn away from Hitler and towards the Western powers, and in this way their country before destruction and Soviet occupation to preserve, what they no longer expected from fighting on the side of Hitler's Germany.

The jump failed or only took place immediately when the Red Army arrived. At this moment at the latest, all foreign trade between these countries and Germany, which had recently been based more on looting and transporting away the last reserves of goods and e.g. T also production and means of transport had run out. At the same time, the southeastern European countries lost their function as a transit route to and from more distant countries.

A other Summary is for those countries and occupied territories to pull, with which the traffic until in the Not in the spring of 1945 cut off by Allied troops became. This will be shown by the regional analysis that we are now also undertaking for the phase from autumn 1943 to May 1945 want.

b) Spain and Portugal

The development of war events was too far gone advanced, as that neutral and even formerly friendly states are still affected by the Threats of German reprisals, even of a military nature, were to be intimidated. Those stationed at the Pyrenees passes since 1942, only after the "Gisela" plan was replaced in June 1943 (originally "Ilona"), the German troops that were largely withdrawn as a result of the "Nuremberg" plan and were urgently needed on the Eastern Front, ^{would} hardly have been able to do anything against an Allied invasion of Spain, but were able to do so the ongoing power struggles within the Francoist leadership as some support for the particularly German-friendly, anti-Western forces, which gradually lost influence. During of the year 1943 had that, after all

392 Handle after Southeastern Europe, Doc. 121, S. 237.

393 BAK, R 63/239, Bl. 5a, (with many corrections) speech disposition for a lecture by Reich Economics Minister Funk to the Southeast European Society in Vienna on March 10, 1944; see. the excerpts are reproduced in: Grip on Southeast Europe, Doc. 127, p. 243 ff.

394 Quiet!, S. 132 ff. u. 220.

already resulted in Spain continuing to export into German territory and German weapons for its tungsten deliveries in payment took, even though it was impossible that this could have made up for the technical deficit in his army.

You probably can't expect either be careful, that both that Franco- as that too Salazar's regime was decidedly anti-communist and was still willing to support Hitler's Germany against the Soviet Union, not just because of possible reprisals, although they took into account the internal contradictions in the anti-Hitler coalition. "It remains open and needed thus another investigation, whether the USA and Great Britain did not attack its Soviet partner indirectly by tolerating Iberian raw material imports to Germany whose front the Dimensions the German troops stood, " ³⁹⁵ Such trains of thought cannot be seen as completely unreasonable even at the turn of the year 1943/44, when the German Wehrmacht was still fighting deep in Soviet territory. However, such speculations increasingly lost ground due to the events of the war.

Finally in May 1944 were both Portugal and Spain after negotiations with the USA and Great Britain at most still ready, the Tungsten export from those mines that were owned by German capital into German territory. He decided with resignation HPA in mid-May 1944 that the agreement had now been signed about the repayment of the claims arising from German aid to Franco during the civil war against legitimate government of the Spanish Republic results must be brought about more quickly. ³⁹⁶

The Allied landing in Normandy and the liberation of France A few weeks later, the news of the German occupation simply brought an end to German trade with the Iberian Peninsula, which had already almost come to a standstill. If in an internal official German statistical compilation ³⁹⁷ the import from Spain in the period January to September 1944 with 107.7 **Mill. RM** in contrast to 206.5 **mill. RM** in the same period 1943 is stated, so reflects this Halving the value is far from the reality, but rather the recording, which is greatly delayed due to the circumstances. This becomes very clear when you look at the import value from September 1943 (7.0 **Mill. RM**) with the twice as high (14.0 **million RM**) in September 1944 compared to when no traffic with Spain was possible anymore.

c) Northern Europe

On August 31st 1943 received the representative of the German Reich in Denmark, Werner Best, from the Reich Foreign Minister the following instruction: "Based on a decision of the leader carry She as authorized representative of Rich also while of military

³⁹⁵ Ibid, S. 223.

³⁹⁶ BAK, R 7/3648, HPA protocol v. May 16, 1944.

³⁹⁷ BAK, R 7/3639, "Der German foreign trade with important countries", appendix to an elaboration (not mentioned). O. D., apparently: 4. Quarter 1944) on "German foreign trade under the influence of military and political developments. The results for August and September".

State of emergency political responsibility in Denmark. This means in particular that it is your responsibility alone to form a new central authority to replace the previous Danish government and to give it the political instructions and relations to regulate the royal family, to manage the press and radio and to regulate the economy regulate". In had military concerns Best Agreement with dem German military commander to bring about.³⁹⁸ With it was the in the April 1940 created fiction one in

The occupation of Denmark by German troops, which took place on a "friendly agreement", was finally abandoned. Nevertheless, the German leadership considered it opportune to organize the military exploitation of Denmark rationally, in contrast to the ruthless plundering of most of the occupied countries. At the end of April 1944, the HPA took note "about the pleasing development of Danish food deliveries the kingdom and the decision of the leader, according to which Denmark to be supplied with all the goods that are necessary to maintain the productive capacity of the Danish economy."³⁹⁹

About the completely different situation in Finland bears witness to that At the same meeting, Ambassador Schnurre announced that, for special reasons, the contractually agreed deliveries of grain and sugar to Finland will not be carried out for the time being there would be no advance deliveries of goods and would require additional Finnish delivery requests not taken into account for the time being. They are against that responsible economic departments requested to carry out other contractually agreed deliveries to Finland within the deadline and everyone Endangering our war-important salaries out of Finland to avoid."⁴⁰⁰ Es The German leadership now only cared about getting as much nickel⁴⁰¹ and other raw materials like possible to get Finland out and to deliver goods that could be used immediately at the front, although it was clearly taken into account that Finland's armistice with the Soviet Union and the change of front of the previous ally could no longer be avoided. Both took place in September 1944.

Since autumn 1943 that was also the case Import on a military basis particularly important goods from Sweden are more difficult. On the one hand, this naturally resulted from the war situation becoming increasingly unfavorable for Germany, the Allied threats of reprisals against Sweden and the resulting and increasing Pressure from the Swedish labor movement forced efforts by Swedish business circles to improve their relations with the USA and Great Britain, especially with a view to the post-war period.⁴⁰² On the other hand, however, there was a reduction in the Swedish willingness to deliver simply economic reasons. On the latter was entered here first.

398 BAP, AA 68712, BI. 222, telegram v. Ribbentrop Best, August 31, 1943.

399 **BAK, R 7/3648**, HPA protocol v. April 25, 1944.

400 Ibid.

401 Hunter, S. 234, concluded (after he itself with different statistical information about Finnish deliveries of nickel ore and nickel mat has), that thereby the German consumption in 1943 about 73 percent and the one from January to October 1944 was over 87 percent covered.

402 **BAK, R 7/3363**, Telegram Walter (Chairman of the German government committee) and Thom sen (German ambassador in Stockholm) to AA, Stockholm 12/14/1943.

Although it was certainly recognized in German government circles that the willingness to deliver Sweden's Fulfillment of his purchase wishes was a prerequisite ⁴⁰³, and although corresponding instructions were repeatedly issued from the highest authorities, towards the end of 1943 and even more so in 1944, the German economy proved less and less capable of achieving the desired exports, especially of coal, coke and iron, to Sweden. ⁴⁰⁴ The attempt, in the absence of some others If German weapons were available for sale, the Swedish ones were negotiator, not least because of the experiences lack of interest in German arms deliveries that were not made in accordance with the contract in previous years. ⁴⁰⁵ By the The German side became less and less able to supply coal in sufficient quantities very affecting Swedish economic life; because Sweden had with us the Time supply warehouse created ⁴⁰⁶ and other Measures prepared to be able to cope in the event of a blockade until the end of the war was obviously approaching. ⁴⁰⁷ ago everything got it Swedish side one more argument into the Hand, which is why the coal-dependent transport of Swedish bulk goods (iron ore, etc.) to Germany cannot function in the usual way. Because of the growing Swedish reluctance to clear and credit the unbalanced exchange of goods held the HPA considers it essential in the first months of the year 1944 for 20-25 **mill. RM** Gold after Sweden too create to the Swedish delivery readiness for some Time to stimulate. ⁴⁰⁸ appeasement caused not more much. In the last

“War Trade Agreement” from the 10. January 1944 had to the German Page far-reaching promise financial benefits: “Apart from the fact that new clearing credits were no longer granted, all old loans amounting to 81 million skr. had to be repaid in 1944, by far the largest part of it (70 million skr.) even in 1944 first half of the year.” ⁴⁰⁹ Wittmann supplements this communication elsewhere with the summary taken from Erik Boheman, Cabinet Secretary of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, “that Swedish policy brought an end to German-Swedish trade can, without that Sweden any requirements at Germany had, while the Switzerland with high Loan arrears completed” (in Height of 950 **mill. sfr.**). ⁴¹⁰

So right it is, towards the end of 1943 and during the In 1944, there were political reasons for the waning of Swedish interest in lively trade relations with Germany the main meaning to assign, so may the mentioned economic Green-

403 Z B. *ibid.*, “Note re: Meeting with Mr Presidents Kehl”, November 4, 1943; *ibid.*, radio to Speer, February 15, 1944.

404 BAK, R 7/3648, HPA protocol v. December 23, 1943.

405 *Ibid.*, HPA protocol v. December 3, 1943.

406 See. in addition Olsson, p. 269 ff.

407 See note 321 u. 322.

408 BAK, R 7/3648, HPA protocol v. December 3, 1943.

409 Wittmann, S. 358.

410 *Ibid.*, p. 391, citing Boheman, Erik, Pavakt, Vol. 2, Stockholm (1964), p. 272. - Regarding the G. Hägglöf, the leading Swedish foreign trade politician during the war years, took a completely opposite view of the Swedish restrictions. a sharply critical point of view, as he in the fifties years the Swedish war trade policy in the Second World War summarized: Hägglöf, Gunnar, *Svensk krigshandelspolitik under andra världskriget*, Stockholm (1958), S. 282.

de cannot be underestimated. Would have the commercial calculation is still not the same played a major role, it would be difficult to explain why Sweden still has significant supplies of utmost importance for the German war economy executed and sharp for it Attacks and threats of ropes of the states of the anti-Hitler coalition took the in the June 1944 their culmination point reached (from the USA and Great Britain mainly because of its ball bearing supplies, from the USSR because of its iron ore deliveries to Germany). ⁴¹¹ These protests resonated strongly with the Swedish public, and the Stockholm government feared that strikes would break out in this context. The iron ore problem, which was so important for the German war economy, seems to especially after the loss of the North African and soon also the Spanish and French sources of supply - from was of immense importance, domestic policy for Sweden been less explosive than the ball bearing problem, although the ball bearings supplied from Sweden, even after the Allied air raids on Schweinfurt, quantitatively (apart from a few special types) only covered a small percentage of German requirements. ⁴¹² However, the protests against the ball bearing deliveries came primarily from the USA. There was a threat of confiscation of Swedish capital assets and ships as well as a boycott of Swedish products in the post-war period. That is why the bourgeoisie, the government and also the workers of Sweden were more impressed by the American protests than by the Soviet ones.

However, Berlin still had leverage. The German Wehrmacht was still able to use the so-called Gothenburg traffic as the to paralyze the only existing transport connection for freight and passengers between Sweden and overseas. The Swedish government had this situation in their negotiations with the Allies repeatedly successfully game brought to to obtain their de facto consent to continue deliveries of war-important goods to Germany. Of course it was hanging Realization of the from the USA and In principle, Great Britain also agreed to the link granted in 1944 between Gothenburg traffic and war-important exports to Germany from the further Development the war situation. As in the third Quarter of 1944 Sweden was still sealed off from the Western Allies by the countries of Norway and Denmark, which were occupied by German troops, but Finland and the Soviet Baltic Sea coast were mostly sealed off from them When German troops were released, Swedish-German trade relations began, in the context of which almost 2 million tons of iron ore were delivered to Germany from January to May 1944 ⁴¹³, practically to a standstill. In the September 1944 were on the Swedish side the ball bearing deliveries to Germany (but this was due to the delivery of ball bearing steel and ball bearing machines was compensated ⁴¹⁴), the transit of Wehrmacht goods to Norway fully

411 **BAK, R 7/3271**, wire report from the German Embassy in Stockholm to the AA, May 13, 1944; *ibid*, recording Schnurre o. D.; **BAK, R 7/3273**, German Embassy Stockholm, Thomsen, to AA, June 13, 1944; **BAK, R 7/3648**, HPA protocol v. June 27, 1944.

412 Wittmann, p. 248 f.; in detail: Fritz, Martin, Swedish Ball-Bearings and the German War Economy. In: *The Scandinavian Economic History Review XXIII* (1975), pp. 15-34.

413 **BAK, R 7/3273**, Bl. 103, note Ludwig(?), July 18, 1944.

414 Wittmann, P. 375 ff.

blocked, the delivery of ships built in Swedish shipyards for German clients is refused, Swedish ships are prohibited from calling at German ports and any foreign ships are prohibited from sailing Swedish territorial waters in the Banned in the Gulf of Bothnia and the Baltic Sea, which also affects the Saßnitz Trelleborg ferry service related.⁴¹⁵ Over Ports the Swedish West Coast took place in the Practice occasional transports into the German sphere of influence⁴¹⁶, as well as up to May 7, 1945, twelve Swedish ships were able to enter and five leave in Gothenburg traffic without extending the contractual basis⁴¹⁷.

The German side decided not to take countermeasures against the Swedish restrictions in order not to risk the Swedish government refusing any delivery of iron ore.⁴¹⁸ How such goods are transported should be, remained open. Also as the for In mid-December 1944, negotiations on German-Swedish trade in 1945 were planned by the Swedish government "in view of the unclear situation" were canceled, it was agreed in the HPA on December 16, 1944, after the 1st. January 1945 to refrain from using reprisals against the Gothenburg traffic in the hope that Sweden would get permission from the Allies to continue exchanging goods with Germany wants to get and could.⁴¹⁹ The one that was supposedly actually undertaken The attempt finally failed in mid-January 1945.⁴²⁰

Finally, let us look at the volume development of German iron ore imports from Sweden in the last years before the war and during the war.

Table 125

Germany Iron ore import out of Sweden, 1935-1944 (in 1000 t Fe content)

Year	Quantity	Year	Quantity
1935	3 305	1940	5 339
1936	4949	1941	5 027

415 **BAK, R 7/3271**, recording (author name unclear) for the RAM, September 23, 1944; *ibid.*, wire report from the German Embassy in Stockholm, September 23, 1944, with the wording of a "record" the Swedish Foreign Minister; *ibid.*, note September 25, 1944 with a statement on the question posed by the AA "Continuation or breaking off of economic relations with Sweden?"

416 There were conflicting reports and opinions about the extension of the ban to the Swedish west coast. Possibly It was the intention of Swedish government and perhaps also business circles to create some confusion about this in order to benefit the strong Pressure the Allies, themselves clearly on their Page deliver, to avoid. (Wittmann, p. 383 f.). On the other hand, they hindered Swedish state railways due to hesitant carriage provision the hectic efforts of German authorities and entrepreneurs to "divert" the loading of cargo into the remaining German sphere of influence from the eastern to the western ports of Sweden; *ibid.*, p. 387.

417 Wittmann, S. 339.

418 **BAK, R 7/3648**, HPA protocol v. September 14, 1944.

419 *Ibid.*, HPA protocol v. December 16, 1944.

420 **BAK, R 10111/148**, Bl. 2, notice out of dem planning office, O. Vf. O. D

Table 125 (Continuation)

Year	Crowd	Year	Crowd
1937	5 450	1942	4 205
1938	5 395	1943	5 568
1939	6226	1944	2 628

Source: Fritz, Martin, German Steel and Swedish Ore 1939-1945, Gothenburg 1974, S. 34, Tab. 13, and S. 51, Tab. 25.

The quantities delivered during the war roughly corresponded to those of the pre-war years; the Swedish share of German imports grew with the loss of other sources of supply. Even in the phase of large-scale conquests, particular evidence emerged the low in phosphorus Ore types of Sweden as irreplaceable for the German war industry, not least under dem point of view Economic efficiency calculation the German steelworks that would otherwise have needed more coal.

d) Southeastern Europe and Türkiye

As already executed, could the Türkiye after its contract expires England from May 1939, which had granted the latter the purchasing monopoly for the entire Turkish chrome ore production until mid-January 1943, again - like in the pre-war period - become the most important source of chrome ore for German armaments. Already on October 9, 1941 Turkish government promised, for the Time from 15. January to to the 31st December 1943 a quantity of 90 000 t and for the time from the 1st January to December 31, 1944, the same quantity should be released again for export to Germany, but on the condition that counter-deliveries of various goods, including weapons, are made from Germany in accordance with the contract, i.e. also on time. arrive in Turkey.⁴²¹ Since the Germans Deliveries were more or less considerably delayed due to the higher-than-expected increase in domestic demand in 1943. By November 6, 1943, Ankara only gradually issued export licenses for 30,500 t of chrome ore⁴²², ie for a third of the planned annual amount. On top of that, he succeeded The German side did not allow the ores to be transported away the Turkey should be organized sufficiently continuously, although Armaments Minister Speer was of the opinion that ore transports from Turkey should have priority even over military transports.⁴²³ There was a lack of shipping space, but even more so there was insufficient capacity the railway connections through the southeastern European countries as well as the according to Turkish arguments by the 1940 The German delivery stop caused a shortage of locomotives and wagons the Turkish State Railways⁴²⁴ as an obstacle.

421 BAP, AA68765, BI. 131 ff., v. Süsskind-Schwendi at RMRuK, 15.11.1943.

422 Ibid.

423 Ibid, BI. 178, record Ripken for Wiehl, 14.11.1943.

424 Ibid, BI. 190 u. 190R, telegram Ripken at AA, Ankara November 23, 1943.

But it probably happened in 1943, which then happened in 1944. The main reason for the decline in German-Turkish trade was obviously: unlike Sweden, Turkey was not included in German territory; As a result, it was able to shape its foreign and foreign trade policy much more according to its own interests. After the development at the German-Soviet front in 1941 started the temporary flirtations with Hitler's Germany, in fact, a juggling act between this and the anti-Hitler coalition, which had deprived people of motivation, in the spring of 1944 the inclination towards the Western powers fully and finally took hold in the ruling circles of Turkey.

On October 22, 1943, a new agreement was concluded in which the Turkish government agreed to grant licenses for 45,000 tons of chrome ore (so nothing new) and the German government provision of the transportation of the chrome ore, the necessary locomotives and wagons.⁴²⁵ The German negotiator, Ministerial Council Mr. v. Süsskind-Schwendi, pointed in his report though on it to that the Turkish side. The agreement encourages them to continue their previous practice: "The government agencies are very slow in their orders and choose things that require long delivery times. Since we can only enjoy Turkish products when they... German goods are delivered, this means that we these goods only at the end of the year 1944 or even 1945 be received. The German delivery times are namely often 18-22 months."⁴²⁶ On the German side, an attempt was made to bring about the much desired Turkish chrome ore deliveries through an aircraft deal for three **million RM**. But: "The English tried to counteract the deal and gave the Turks large Sunderland contracts. and Douglas aircraft were offered at the peace price, ie about 1/3 of the German price".⁴²⁷ The request from the German ambassador in Ankara, Franz v. Papen, to Berlin as to whether the price of the German aircraft could be reduced was received there answered negatively.⁴²⁸

At the 20. April 1944 made man itself in the trade policy Committee still hopes, The Turkish government will resist the Allied demand that deliveries to Germany be restricted as much as possible - namely on for warfare unimportant goods such as raisins, figs and tobacco - to limit. At least that was how a conversation between the Turkish foreign minister and the German ambassador was supposed to be understood. It was even hoped that negotiations about deliveries of chrome ore for 1945 could begin, and so they did to their stimulation agricultural machines, for Part of the East Economic Staff - In other words, goods that were stolen during the withdrawal from the Soviet Union were made available.⁴²⁹

But as early as April 25, 1944, the HPA had to state that Türkiye is "under pressure from the enemy after certain Resistance" the chrome ore export on April 21st 1944 "surprising"

425 BAP, AA 68965, Bl. 1, note v. Süsskind-Schwendi above his Trip after Ankara (Bl. 1 ff.), November 8, 1943.

426 Ibid, Bl. 3.

427 Ibid, Bl. 4.

428 Ibid.

429 BAK, R 7/3648, HPA protocol v. April 20, 1944.

completely blocked. They want the breach of contract. However, the German government did not take this as an opportunity to break off economic relations.⁴³⁰ Actually reached the German side in this way a new contract conclusion the Türkiye for twelve months, the extended to Turkish products that were less important to the war effort, such as cotton and oilseeds. In this context By the beginning of August 1944, the German side had products worth 30 **Mill. RM** completed for delivery to Turkey.

However, on August 2, 1944, the Turkish government broke off diplomatic and economic relations with Germany. There this expressly was only directed against the German Reich itself, Berlin from now on wanted to try to conduct indirect compensation transactions with Turkey through the puppet governments of Slovakia and Croatia in order to get some copper in this way.⁴³¹ The internal statistical information that goods were imported to Germany from Turkey in August 1944 for 12.5 **million RM** and in September 1944 for 15.4 **million RM** is **merely in view of the military situation on the Balkan Peninsula at the time** to be seen as a very late recording of earlier imports. For comparison: For September of the much more favorable year 1943, the same source shows a much lower import value (9.5 **million RM**).⁴³²

In the previous section it was already pointed out that in 1943 the Romanian rulers made various accusations against Hitler's Germany as a result of Romania's heavy human and material losses on the Eastern Front raised. Berlin responded to this above all with the warning, which was completely in keeping with reality, that Romania was dependent, for better or for worse, on its German allies in the fight against the advancing Soviet army and therefore had to make all Romanian resources available to this purpose. Concessions approximately in the form of consideration Romania's financial difficulties were therefore kept within narrow limits. In terms of trade policy, a communication from the German negotiator Clodius testified of this attitude: "Up my demand As early as September 1943, that is, immediately after Italy's so-called armistice, the Romanian government declared its willingness to continue to supply the mineral oil that had previously been delivered to Italy in full for German account. Since Romania received 100% compensation for this mineral oil from Italy, the delivery to Germany, which is exclusively at the expense of a further increase in the clearing peak, represents a significant economic sacrifice for Romania. In addition, the Romanian petroleum industry is at a disadvantage in that the prices paid by Italy were significantly higher than the German prices. The Romanian government therefore only has the compelling military and political reasons that I asserted to the Marshal (Antonescu - BP). September for this to move was able, the delivery of earlier Italy gone oil for German

430 Ibid., HPA protocol v. April 25, 1944. - How Ambassador V. Papen reported, was The Turkish side mobilized all available transport space in order to arrive on the evening of April 21, 1944 To allow 218 wagonloads of chrome to cross the border. (Krecker, p. 189).

431 BAK, R 7/3011, note about the department and department head meeting the main dept. III on August 8, 1944.

432 How Note 397.

to agree to the bill." ⁴³³ In the spring of 1944, Clodius then suggested that Romania should actually be at the expense of the occupied Northern Italy a "compensation" to grant that should consist in "that Romania has the opportunity to acquire 350 million lire against payment in the German-Romanian clearing (i.e. in triangular traffic). Romania can use this amount for purchases in Italy only under our control and with our prior consent on a case-by-case basis." ⁴³⁴

At the same time, Romania was once again faced with a price increase for its mineral oil deliveries Nazi Germany in this War phase, yes especially strong was instructed. This price increase made 30 percent and was valid from November 1, 1943 at. ⁴³⁵ Mit We know from 1. March 1944 He found it too Wish of the Romanian side Mineral oil freight on the Danube at 32 percent to increase, approval. ⁴³⁶ The arguments about the prices for Romanian mineral oil deliveries to Germany, which were due to the so-called oil pact of January 1st. October 1940 in a stable relationship to the prices for German arms deliveries to Romania continued until August 1944. At this point, Clodius shared with the Romanian Minister of Armaments and Economy, General Dobre, the key figures for the war by the end of 1943 price increases occurred.

Table 126

Price indicators for the Exchange Romanian gasoline against German armament equipment, 1939-1943

Valid with effect from the	Key figures for the prices to be paid by Germany for petrol 60 octane	Key figures for Romania prices paid for Armament device
1. September 1939	100	100
6. March 1940	135	135
1. April 1941	147	176
1. June 1941	167	200
1. May 1942	225	
1. November 1943	287	254

Source: **BAK, R 7/2275**, Clodius at Dobre, August 11, 1944.

The same announcement announced a 220 percent price increase for weapons that were not supplied in exchange for oil. But two weeks later it was After the Antonescu regime was overthrown, Romania was no longer part of the fascist bloc.

⁴³³ BAP, AA 68752, BI. 50, telegram Clodius at the AA for Sweep!, Vienna March 3, 1944.

⁴³⁴ Ibid.

⁴³⁵ BAP, AA 68971/16a, BI. 125, minutes about delivery Romanian Petroleum products to Germany v. February 9, 1944, signed by Clodius and Petala.

⁴³⁶ Ibid., BI. 90R, "Confidential Protocol about the result the 14th joint Conference of German and Romanian government committee" v. February 9, 1944, signed by Clodius u. Razmerita.

Also in German-Bulgarian They had trade Prices since the start of the war in 1939 experienced a sharp increase. In June 1944 the index of German Export prices to 250 and the the Bulgarian even rose to 312, although in Berlin a further increase to 340-350 was considered likely. In contrast to the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Foreign Office and the Reich Ministry of Food took the view that "these price differences should not play a role under the current conditions." Bulgaria only had to undertake the obligation to finance in advance."⁴³⁷ Given the war situation, Bulgaria was not allowed to pay for its deliveries expect more.

Hungary's importance for the German war economy increased as the German area of control shrank. At the turn of the year 1943/44, investments and expansion work had progressed to such an extent that it was expected that Hungary from **May** 1944 onwards almost a third of Germany's Total requirement for manganese would cover can⁴³⁸, which meant a doubling of previous Hungarian deliveries. Negotiations concluded in March 1944 also resulted in an increase in bauxite exports to Germany of 950 000 Tons Years 1943 to 1.3 Mill. t in Years 1944 to the result, as well as the Hungarian commitment to fully fulfill the purchase requests for plywood panels for German fighter aircraft construction, as well as the extensive willingness of the Hungarian Ministry of Finance to financing military Relocation orders out of Germany after Hungary

u. a.⁴³⁹

On March 19, 1944, Hungary was occupied by German troops. Ministerial Director Schlotterer explained this on: 4. April 1944 its senior employees Reich Ministry of Economics, "that Hungary is not to be viewed as an occupied territory in the sense of France, Italy or Denmark. Rather, the Hungarian government is recognized as a contractual partner and bearer of sovereignty. The position of the envoy of the German Empire in Hungary is very strong. Clearing balance discussions etc. have to take a back seat from the outset step, there it only and alone the Switching on the Hungarian potential for the purposes of the war economy and the Hungarian Finance Minister, if necessary, has the obligation to finance it has."⁴⁴⁰

What the exploitation of Hungary's industrial potential concerned, so represented a confidant of the Southeast European Society in Budapest in August 1944 However, the view is that the rationalization measures taken in Hungarian industry under German control had no effect.⁴⁴¹ In contrast, the The financial plundering of Hungary is now making rapid progress, particularly due to a new financing agreement, which was concluded at the beginning of July 1944 in the Reich Ministry of Economics like follows referenced became: „Hungary pays all Wehrmacht expenditure and all Wehrmacht-like expenses one War Fund. The entire Order relocation becomes out of one Pengö special

437 BAK, R 7/3011, note on the Department and department head meeting the Main dept. III on June 27, 1944.

438 BAP, AA 68752, BI. 38, telegram Clodius at AA for the R.A.M, Vienna February 23, 1944.

439 Ibid, BI. 60 u. 60R, telegram Clodius at AA for the R.A.M, Vienna March 20, 1944.

440 BAK, R 7/3011, note on the Department and department head meeting the Main dept. III on April 4, 1944.

441 BAK, R 63/129, BI. 23 f., O. Vf., Budapest August 23, 1944.

account financed, that the Hungarian government unlimited provides. The normal movement of goods continues via clearing (so-called German-Hungarian foreign exchange compensation). Clearing also receives unlimited advances." ⁴⁴² In the meantime, the new one formed by Arrow Cross members Hungarian government itself also full and quite the Berlin's policy of exterminating the Jewish population, which also mobilized considerable financial resources for war needs. The message contained in the above-mentioned report that Hungary's financial benefits should be "paid for from Jewish assets" ⁴⁴³. However, it is unlikely to realistically reflect the extent of the wealth of Hungarian Jews and, on the other hand, the extent of Hungary's financial plunder.

Since Hungary, in contrast to the other countries in Southeastern Europe, was only completely broken out of the sphere of control of German imperialism in the spring of 1945, the Statistics of the German imports of goods from there have experienced a certain upswing since mid-1944, which was forced by the clearance operations ⁴⁴⁴, which in most of Hungary was not as hasty and disorganized as in other countries.

e) Switzerland

When, under pressure from the Allies, Switzerland was no longer willing to deliver goods and services and in particular to pre-finance them to the extent previously usual, as a result since the 16th January 1943 A situation without a contract arose and economic war measures were taken against them in Berlin Switzerland had been considered by Hitler at the beginning of March In 1943 it was decided that the procedure should be followed against Switzerland should not be taken to extremes, but should keep the possibility of giving in open, even if this takes into account the German wishes regarding the awarding of new arms contracts "must take a step back". ⁴⁴⁵ After a more emphatic and more precise directive from Hitler, the situation without a contract was regulated by a partial settlement on June 23, 1943 replaced been. ⁴⁴⁶ Hitler's first on this for the "Tank program" and the

The instructions to Speer and Ribbentrop, an important milestone in the "remote control program", remained in the Reasons taken during the guideline for the rest of the war the German Trade policy opposite the Switzerland, and that government in Bern found is always ready, on the basis of no longer long-term, but rather shorter-term government agreements, subject to the fulfillment of the corresponding Swiss requirements counterclaims, the to maintain trade, transport and financial relationships that were so important for the German war economy. What latter concerned, so went it before everything around the Gold arbitrage. Here

⁴⁴² BAK, R 7/3011, note on the Department and department head meeting the main dept. III on July 4, 1944.

⁴⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁴ See note 397.

⁴⁴⁵ BAP, AA 68743, BI. 235, recording Wiehl for the R.A.M, March 11, 1943.

⁴⁴⁶ BAP, AA 68744, BI. 252 ff., recording Clodius for the R.A.M, June 27, 1943.

was "the Reichsbank on the help of Switzerland... too furthermore absolutely instructed", as the HPA stated at the end of 1943.⁴⁴⁷ In this regard it was the Switzerland is literally of unique importance. At the During the conquest of other countries and during the "Final Solution to the Jewish Question," large amounts of gold fell into the control of the German rulers. Most of them However, neutral trading partners were afraid to accept this dubious gold as payment for goods deliveries and other services because they feared it one Reimburse those who were robbed on the same day to have to. But they were happy to accept Swiss francs. And the Swiss National Bank repeatedly found itself willing to exchange "German" gold for francs or other renowned currencies. It is estimated that during the course of the war it purchased "German" gold for 1.6 billion Swiss francs, for 529 million Swiss francs alone Years 1943.⁴⁴⁸

German-Swiss negotiations led to a new agreement, which was only limited to the months of October to December 1943. The German side had already had to come to terms with the fact that Switzerland since January 1st July 1943 that actual war material and, from August 1, 1943, all war-important goods were subjected to a "restrictive quota". This meant that the country wanted to export to Germany independently so restrict how it the with Consideration for her relationship to the Allies considered necessary. For the agreement of 1. In October 1943, according to Hornberger, the payment quotas of the Swiss exports Germany basically at 45 percent and for War material on 36 percent of Value from Years limited to 1942.⁴⁴⁹ The agreement was laid down in the **HPA** However, this means that only "actual military equipment" would be restricted to 80 percent of the value of 1942, while "civil supplies", including aluminum and tools, would be allowed to make up an average of 100 percent of the previously valid "value limits".⁴⁵⁰

While the German side from August to November 1943 due to increased domestic needs a part the the Iron deliveries promised to Switzerland remained late, stiffened in the now negotiations that take place almost constantly the Swiss Attitude. Solved in Berlin the disputes out of. Joined the Chief of special staff Trade war and economic combat measures in the **OKW**, Admiral Otto Groos, advocated putting Switzerland under blockade pressure to submit and check whether the leader's decision (Avoiding demolition) is still fully valid," the Foreign Office (Wiehl) demanded that the backlogs in deliveries be made up and that obligations towards Switzerland be fulfilled in the future. Speer strangely accepted The attitude was that "if necessary, he could forego the arms deliveries and, if necessary, even forego the electricity deliveries". The decisive factor was ultimately the decision from the Reichsbank (Reichsbank Director Reinel) supported the argument of the Reich Ministry of Economics (ministerial director Carl-Gisbert Schult ze-Schlutius): „If we from this now the Conclusion of a break-off of the negotiations If you wanted to move, you would do so under all circumstances the movement of capital ceases come,

447 **BAK, R 7/3648**, HPA protocol v. December 3, 1943.

448 Bourgeois, Daniel, Les relations économiques Germano-Suisses 1939-1945. In: Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale, 1981, pp. 57 and 61.

449 Hornberger, S. 94 f.

450 **BAK, R 7/3648**, HPA protocol v. October 13, 1943.

d. H. we would then also for military and others non-trade policy Matters no longer receive sfrs; Our gold would therefore become worthless for all purposes that interest us." ⁴⁵¹ Also at the renewed ones Conflicts in German Government circles in March and June 1944 asked whether there would be less favorable conditions in economic relations with the Switzerland accept or this cancel should, gave the role this country as "Gold Turntable" the rash. ⁴⁵²

Despite strong allied pressure, uncertainty of the German services, radical reduction in German mineral oil supply, uncertainty of German alumina deliveries (from France) for aluminum production as well as the unsafe transport situation in particular To the west, the Swiss government found itself ready to sign a new economic agreement with Germany on June 29, 1944, which would last until December 31, 1944 should apply. She merely introduced a clause, the provided for a review of mutual performance after three months. ⁴⁵³ During this time, 67 modern, war-important companies were relocated from Italy to Germany ⁴⁵⁴, at least for Part of this took place on the rail transit route across Swiss territory that is still available. ⁴⁵⁵

When the Western Allied armies approached Switzerland's western border in September 1944, Switzerland invoked the review clause. Now all departments in Berlin were in agreement in dem Wish it because of the "for interests that are essential to us - Gold and foreign exchange transactions of the Reichsbank, transit traffic, electricity deliveries, illegal purchases -" not to cancel the Economic relations with the to let Switzerland come. ⁴⁵⁶ Im As a result of the joint review negotiations that ended on September 29, 1944, ⁴⁵⁷ the Swiss government imposed an export ban on ball and roller bearings, weapons, aircraft, detonators, telephone and telegraph sets, and radio sets with effect from October 1, 1944 (with the exception of finished receivers for civilian use use), any components of the listed items, Explosives and ammunition. ⁴⁵⁸ The export ban was supposed to apply to all countries, but it affected actually only a warring side: All of these products were until then - despite increasing cuts - Substantial quantities were delivered to Germany, its allies and other areas of German control.

So explains it yourself too, that the for the period from January to September 1944 reported values of German imports from Switzerland (163.1 **million RM**) by only 33 Percent below those of the same period in 1943 (242.6 **million RM**) . How hard they are trying on the German side was, Switzerland possible few instigation to give, their

451 Ibid, HPA protocol v. January 7, 1944.

452 Ibid, HPA protocols v. March 20, 1944 u. June 5, 1944.

453 Ibid, HPA protocol v. August 17, 1944.

454 Ibid, HPA protocol v. August 23, 1944.

455 Hornberger, S. 122, speaks from "Spoils of War" in the South-north traffic.

456 BAK, R 7/3648, HPA protocol v. September 14, 1944.

457 BAK, R 7/3011, note on the departmental and department head meeting the Main dept. III on October 3, 1944.

458 BAK, R7/3364, Purr (Chairman of the German Delegation) at Hotz (Chairman of the Swiss delegation), Bern September 29, 1944.

Willingness to maintain their supplies to reduce, that is, to stimulate them, the pressure of Giving in as little as possible to the allies is the result of this reported values of German exports to Switzerland. These were above the import values in both periods and from January to September 1944 (216.4 million RM) only 14 percent below those of the corresponding period in 1943 (252.8 million RM). ⁴⁵⁹ However, it should be taken into account that the German side also had every reason to demonstrate good will because of its clearing debt to Switzerland. Of the neutral countries was the Central Switzerland 1944 namely the one with by far the highest clearing requirements Germany (658.5 **mill. RM**). ⁴⁶⁰ Until End of November 1944 increased this further to 680.6 **million RM**. ⁴⁶¹

Nevertheless, in the months of November and December 1944, the Swiss government contented itself with restricting the volume of transit traffic between Germany and Italy, while electricity deliveries in particular continued became. ⁴⁶²

After on 10. February 1945 German-Swiss negotiations above the Renewal of previous economic agreement after opinion the German one delegation for the had led to a "satisfactory conclusion" ⁴⁶³, although on High-level business delegations from the USA, Great Britain and France were expected in Bern in the next few days (they arrived on February 11th and 13th) ⁴⁶⁴, hit it the The German side is even harder than the Swiss side On February 16, 1945, the Federal Council decided to freeze German assets in Switzerland. ⁴⁶⁵ In doing so, he complied with an Allied demand that had also been made in British newspapers.

The trade between Germany and Switzerland, however, had already been largely undermined in practice as a result of the desolate traffic conditions within Germany and also as a result of the breakdown of the administrative apparatus. ⁴⁶⁶

So one has to say that Switzerland - in difference to Sweden - until the end, even after the aforementioned decision of 16. February 1945 ⁴⁶⁷, at the economic relations with Germany. She used this as an argument to the Allies - how already in the earlier years of the war - next to the neutrality requirement the worry about the Avoiding mass unemployment. It is clear that the Allies were also reluctant to impose sanctions in the last months of the war - similar to that on the part of German government the previous years - out of the special role of the Switzerland as international Financial center that should be preserved for the post-war period wanted. Expressly with this justification

⁴⁵⁹ How Note 397.

⁴⁶⁰ **BAK, R 7/2277**, Bl. 2, "Status at the German clearing fund Special and clearing accounts on July 15, 1944".

⁴⁶¹ **BAK, R 7/3636**, "Control calculation of clearing stands November 1944", January 27, 1945.

⁴⁶² **BAK, R 7/3282**, "Monthly report Switzerland November 1944" O. Vf. O. D

⁴⁶³ *Ibid*, **MR Storck (RWiM)**. General Director king in Zurich, Hamburg April 20, 1945.

⁴⁶⁴ BAP, AA 68816, Bl. 9 ff., German Embassy Bern at AA, February 20, 1945; Hornberger, S. 117 ff.

⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid* (BAP), enclosed excerpts out of Swiss Newspapers.

⁴⁶⁶ **BAK, R 7/3282**, note via a wire message the Germans Embassy in Bern v. 27.3. 1945.

⁴⁶⁷ With the date of February 28, 1945 it was still a actually more irrelevant *Modus vivendi* agreed. (Hornberger, p. 121).

contradicted the "Observer" in February 1945 to the British public. The demand that Switzerland should abandon banking secrecy so that the assets brought there by Nazi criminals could be uncovered.⁴⁶⁸

f) Further east

Literally until Finally, desperate efforts were made to war-important movement of goods between the shrinking one territories of German and Japanese imperialism. In January 1944, when three German blockade runners had been sunk on their way home, Hitler rejected the prospect of sending steamers again as hopeless the Far East to set march. He like Dönitz, on the other hand, also had great expectations of the newly designed submarine transporter Type XX, but its full operational readiness could not be expected before October 1945. In the meantime we should move on the until now types of already used Commercial V-Boats try to to break the British-American blockade.

After the unconditional surrender of the Nazi Wehrmacht signed in Berlin-Karlshorst on the night of May 8th to 9th, 1945, four ran German merchant submarines attack British naval bases: The U 532, which was on its way to Europe with a load from 110 tons of tin (in the Kiel), 8 t tungsten, 8 t rubber, 4 t molybdenum, approx. 0.5 t of quinine and 100 kg of crystals and selenium, the U 861 traveling in the same direction with 52.5 t of tungsten, 55.5 tons Tin, 36 t rubber and 140 lbs. Iodine crystals on board, on course for Japan U 874, loaded with 50 tons Mercury, 30 tons optical glass in blocks and zinc, as well as in the direction of the Far East U 875 at 30 t Mercury, 30 t lead and 30 t optical glass.⁴⁶⁹ Apparently, even after the loss of the ports on the French Atlantic coast, Dönitz continued the almost hopeless attempts to break the blockade of the sea routes between Europe and the Far East in order to transport at least relatively small quantities of material that was particularly urgently needed economically during the war.

With the military collapse, German foreign trade, which had shrunk to minimal remnants since the fall of 1944, came to a complete standstill.

468 **BAP, AA** 68816, BI. 12, German Embassy Bern to AA, February 20, 1945, enclosed newspaper clipping.

469 Medlicott II, S. 452.

Chapter VI

Economic preparations the end of the war and post-war planning

From Karl Heinz Roth

In July/August 1943, the German war machine finally went on the strategic defensive.¹ Through the vibrations in core areas his military-strategic power were also the previous economic and monetary policy “peace planning” of the Nazi imperialism onto highest endangered. The in this regard secret stipulations of the economic and fiscal policy imperial departments, the imperial and business groups as well the Large companies from the July August 1940 appeared together your radicalized updates from the June July 1941 and Summer 1942 final² obsolete. Everything in seemed to everything in the Autumn 1943 one basic Revision and Adjustment the previous Planning for the post war period at the so irrevocable become military-strategic Defensive constellation of the Fascist rule is obvious.

Actually can for the Time away Autumn 1943 striking Cross-relationships to the strategic-political upheavals until to surrender at the 8th. May 1945 proven will too if itself the Post-war planning at growing Profiling in the Width and Depth always more clear from the one dramatic walking Framework conditions disconnected.

1. The first stage the Post-war planning from the late summer 1943 to July 1944

a) Initiatives to modification the “Peace Planning”

How in everyone Periods of crisis of war sat since dem Summer 1943 one flood authorized and unauthorized memoranda above the question, like everyone adversity to Despite still a victorious End and one European reconstruction perspective under German dominance to to back up would be. Serious Younger wrote in the Order his mentors, of Hamburger wholesale merchant Alfred C. Toepfer, the in Paris as captain the Wehrmacht defense a “Toepfer Office” pursued black market transactions to procure strategic raw materials, a Pamphlet, in dem he in the him own diction the "European

1 Please refer DZW, Vol. 3, S. 517 ff., 591 ff.

2 See Nestler, Ludwig, approaches to Modification of the War goal planning and occupation policy Hitler's Germany (Autumn 1942 until spring 1943). In: bulletin of working group “Second World War”, 1978, No. 3-4, S. 3-30.

Peace" as "Harvest" of previous legitimate "War of Unification" implored: If man the opponent quite for the "bigger have "rich". wool, then could the only "with his Consent _ happen." ³ Also the Defense colleague Theodore Oberlander raised his voice again and warned before the out of dem east threatening Driven, if the previous short- term looting and Colonial methods not through one long term Exploitation planning "with more appropriate human treatment" replaced would. ⁴ imperial Finance Minister Schwerin v. Krosigk mixed itself in the "Eastern Planning" a and held it for too short-sighted, out fear before eventual "Post-war claims the Eastern peoples" the given the Stability _ of Soviet systems overdue become political Distinction between _ "Bolshevism" and "Russia" further to thwart. ⁵ These and other advances should despite their sometimes far-reaching alliances cannot be overestimated become. They remained a waste, as long as the tactical corrections that now began were to be taken into account practical handling with the west- and Eastern European collaborators as well as the "Eastern Workers" ab- sees. From the eloquent and practice-determining Planning centers became she with reference to the fundamental economic policy problems the Post-war planning as unpleasant Interferences rejected.

Suggestions of Foreigners official

From others Quality were the initiatives, the the Foreigners Government office started. Already early April 1943 was a internal "Europe Committee" founded been, the Ribbentrop 's specifications according to the Claim one "Supremacy of Greater German Empire" at the "Reorganization Europe" before everything With which Bulwark function opposite the growing

"Bolshevik Danger" justify and on this Way the around itself gripping Uncertainty the Collaborators and Exploiting "neutrals". should. ⁶ Accordingly were until for the June suggestions received, the under other as compensation for the the contractual partners furthermore refused military and foreign policy sovereignty economic-political Concessions suggested. A "European "economic congress" should meet permanently, conventions to secure the "European-African metropolitan area" complete, a Preference system for the intra-European Exchange of goods say goodbye, the "European central clearing" in the Direction one expand the European monetary union and to one long term Production planning transfer. ⁷

Under dem Impression the in the meantime suffered strategically reported setbacks itself from the middle August other top officials Word. Rudolf Rahn demanded in one Memorandum, now urgent gained time up to overcoming the Defensive constellation

3 Younger, Serious, The Peace. As Private printing after dem War ed. v. Alfred Toepfer, Stuttgart 1965, pp. 11, 29, 31.

4 Oberlander, Theodore, alliance or Exploitation? Memorandum from the June 1943. Excerpts in: World domination in the visor, S. 353 ff.; Doc. No. 146

5 BAK, R 2/24243, Bl. 114 f., Schwerin v. Krosigk at Ribbentrop, December 9, 1943.

6 Disposal and Guidelines Joachim from Ribbentrops above the founding one Europe Committee v. April 5, 1943. In: anatomy the Aggression, Doc. No. 38 f., S. 182 ff.

7 P.A AA, NL Renthe Fink, Vol. 11, Envoy Hans happy wine, Basic ideas one Plans for the new Europe, garnish for the Write Happy wine Rintelen, June 7, 1943.

the in Soon expected collapse the Anti-Hitler coalition by means of one to secure political and propagandistic initiatives it allows "to weaken the opponents' will to fight." Resistance movements within "to undermine" and "the trust of the followers one European "order" again. ⁸ Carl Clodius, the deputy head the trade policy department, specified these considerations a day later dem Notice on the Need, the in the meantime far thrived European planning Western Allies "with positive German plans for the economic reorganization Europe after the war" to oppose. ⁹ Independence Europe" require a narrow "economic merger of the European peoples", in particular the Decoupling _ the agricultural Product prices from the world market, the retention a directed one Foreign trade while simultaneously dismantling the Customs borders as well the relaxation of foreign exchange controls through free movement of the internal currency and multilateral clearing transactions.

This Considerations formulated the Special envoys Cecil from Renthe Fink in the following- _ weeks further out of. ¹⁰ He hit the founding one "European Confederation of States" before the now the state sovereignty at least the into the Eye caught west- and northern European Signatory states provided because only still through this could those "Forces, but those who fear Bolshevism threatened by Germany "feel" dissuaded become, „after the with the Bolsheviks allies Anglo-Saxons to squint." ¹¹ Economic policy handle he in the essential the Considerations from Clodius on. The Planning bundle became dem Foreign Minister at the 9. September, a Day after the announcement of Italian allies ceasefire agreement, handed over. The those involved agreed _ itself on it, the proclamation of project so long to postpone, until itself the had stabilized the precarious military and alliance political constellation. However, that didn't happen anymore.

Interventions out of dem Environment of Central European business day and the IG Colors

Not so fast gave itself one other power group beaten, the out of one core area of big capital acted out, however as a result of Regroupings of the Nazi economic system at the crossing for the "Total War" her so far in the Frame the "Peace planning" claimed Special position partially lost had. Since dem Autumn 1941 was the from Tilo von Wilmowsky and dem IG Farben "Foreign Minister" Max Ilgner directed Central European Business Day (MWT) from the Reich Industry Group (RGI) and the since February 1940 in Order the economic policy top authorities operating Southeast European company (SOEG) in the Tongs taken been.

⁸ recording of envoys 1. Class Rahn v. August 19, 1943. In: ADAP, series E, Vol. VI, Doc. No. 235, SEE 413 ff.

⁹ P.A AA, NL Renthe Fink, Vol. 11, recording No. 87 of M.D Clodius, August 20, 1943.

¹⁰ The Memorandum located itself with the preliminary designs and associated Correspondences in: P.A AA, *ibid*.

¹¹ *Ibid*, AT Renthe Fink for R.A.M. re: the idea one European federation of states, September 9, 1943.

As a result of a complicated Interplay of power rivalry and - with military economy bottlenecks legitimized - Change of course in the Direction colonialist Exploitation methods so also in Southeastern Europe¹² had the RGI "the size saw". the MWT placed¹³ and until for the Early summer In 1942, both economically and theoretically equally influential team Ilgner-Reithinger¹⁴ tamed. As "Primus inter pares" became Ilgner in the corset one newly founded Southeast Committee the RGI fitted and so gradually to the Change of course used,¹⁵ and Reithinger had to the Planning skills of Economic Committee of MWT to the economic planning committee of the SOEG hand over. However offered him his function as Director the Economic

Department the IG Colors optimal Replacement options. Until for the fiasco of forced course of plunder in the spring 1944 gave so the commercial or. Foreign trade department of the Reich Industry Group alliance with the top economic and monetary policy departments the volume at. She demoted the complementary Industrial representatives of the respective southeast countries to staffages of the own industrial committees, which always more massive in the Negotiations of the bilateral government committees intervened.

However, the spokesmen of the MWT strategy did not just put on a good face for evil Game, in which she now for your part got involved as best they could and up this Way the recycling _ and Market interests of their Large companies maintained. She reorganized much more below the level the radicalized economic policy Guidelines and Power constellations and their association structures.¹⁶ The German Institute, headed by Ernst Wagemann, was particularly important to them for Economic Research (DIW). Help, that now one Row from subsidiary institutes founded.¹⁷ In this one Context swung Richard Riedl, the Nestor the economic imperialist Central Europe concept, in the Connection at its extensive Memorandum above "The Russian Ask" from the March 1943¹⁸ and shortly before his- his Death (9. March 1944) to Transcript one programmatic legacy for post-war planning.

12 Scratch at Heinrichsbauer, June 4, 1942. Printed in: Handle after Southeastern Europe, Doc. No. 83, S. 182.

13 BAK, R 63/170, Bl. 37, recording Coach, Employees of Foreign Trade Office the Foreign organization the NSDAP, January 26, 1942.

14 Max Ilgner was Board member and Pres. of Southeast Committee the IG Colors; at the same time he directed as Vice President of MWT also the Industry Advisory Board this association. Anthony Reithinger was additionally about his MWT functions (advisory board member and business Chairman of the Economics committee) Director the Economic Department the IG Colors. BAK, R 63/253, Bl. 123 ff., AT Heinrichsbauer for Schirach, March 24, 1942.

15 BAP, German Bank, P 6137, P 6138, P 6143, P 6144, P 6145, P 10886. This from the Research

16 so far neglected fact, the to one corresponding Overestimation the Meaning the SOEG led, can here not closer shown become.

And that is under the Direction of MWT board member and DJW special representative v. Hassell.

17 See BAK, R 11/111; Asendorf, Manfred, Ulrich from Hassell's conception of Europe and the Central European Business Day. In: Yearbook of Institute for German Story Tel Aviv, VII (1978), S. 387–419, here S. 415 ff.

BAK, R 43 11/683 b, Richard Riedl, The Russian Ask. Thoughts to reshaping Eastern Europe,

18 Vienna, March 1943. See. also II, S. 427 f.; additionally Eichholtz, Dietrich, "Paths to de-Bolshevization and Disappointment of "Eastern Room". In: JfW 1970/1, S. 13–44.

Had Riedl already in his the "De-Bolshevization" and "national Decomposition of the Eastern Room" dedicated Alternative study for the "General plan East" the SS emphasizes, that the economic ones resources the around the Caucasus-Baku region expanded Ukraine, the Crimea and of Baltics only then in the "European large economic area" integrated could be achieved if the nationalities affected were granted certain sovereign rights and the politics the "ethnic disentanglement" accordingly moderate,¹⁹ so was it him too in the elaboration above the "Away to Europe" around the taming too more barbaric

"lust for domination" in favor of more economical Interests to do.²⁰ He wrote introductory, it must Germany suffice, "flag bearer" not Mister Europe to become", because only to this In this way, the "federal" and "comrades in fate". Germans for the creation one on the merger freer Nations justified European "Greater Area" won become. To this one Purpose hit Riedl a multi-page Alliance treaty before, around the basic requirements and Trust guarantees one "European " Economic alliance". This should Framework conditions for a two-sided system intra-European preferential agreements are created, the agreement on customs and trade issues, production control, traffic control, energy industry cooperation and socio-political cooperation included. A "European "economic council" or "Presidential Committee" should above her observance and Further development guard as well the foreign economic concerns perceive.

This one from the confrontation with dem first global economic post-war plan Keynes²¹ won and on the "European large area" projected Organizational model equipped Riedl so with fundamental economic policy Target projections from: departure from the monetary policy controlled economic cycle automation, Avoidance one Demobilization crisis through the return for the primate the civil Goods production at at the same time Demand stimulation the pent up purchasing power, and in the Connection to it the "Achieving" seven "securities" in the process of reconstruction (freedom from crises, full employment and social Security guarantees for the Working class, Elimination the Price scissors between industry and Agriculture, consumer, transport and Trade securities and "Security and freedom of national and cultural development all European peoples, large and small").

These conceptual borrowings became explosive in the social and economic policy debates after the war the Western Allies however first through this, that Riedl also with respect to their

19 This was the Main reason for the angry ones Rejection through the Russia Research Institute of RSHA. See. BAK, R 58/237, Wannsee Institute, opinion to Memorandum "The Russian question" from Riedl, July 1943.

20 BAP, German Bank, P 339, Bl. 19-61, Richard Riedl, „Away to Europe". Thoughts above a Economic alliance European states, Vienna 1944; the following Quotes after *ibid.* The study was until now twice excerpts published: World domination in the visor, Doc. No. 153, S. 373 ff.; European strategies of German capital 1900–1945, Ed. Reinhard Opitz, Cologne 1977, Doc. No. 150, S. 990 ff. (new edition. 1994); every time incorrect dated.

21 See. to creation and impact history of the in the April 1943 as White paper the English government published "Clearing Union" plan Moggridge, Donald (ed.), The Collected writing ings of John Maynard Keynes, vol. XXV: Activities 1940-1944: Shaping the Post-war World: The Clearing Union, London/Basingstoke 1980.

instrumental Furnishing in all openness on the paths from Keynes walked and she just for the continental European Large capacity option straightened out. One "European Bank" should the out of dem Europe-wide Exchange from Were and Services emerging Requirements _ and Obligations ongoing compensate for that with it related Credit operations transact and additionally on the basis one significant own business capital Reconstruction loans grant or. convey („European Clearinghouse and Creditanstalt"). ²² Your Seat should she "out of Found political beat" analogous the Bank for international settlements (BIS) in one of the capitals of the alliance states Directorate should of the Governments the Member States appointed become and the Presidential Committee of Economic Council one Supervisory board function perceive. And himself in matters Capital resources let Keynes to greet. The Central Bank one every The alliance state should pay an amount in national currency that corresponds to the average foreign trade volume of the country last three years before the war corresponded. Then you should first the Exchange relations of the Currencies are determined among each other and then with a new bank money European Bank, dem "European guilders", in relation set become. ²³ On this Way could _ all floating Loans through the in the circulation located goods and Values be covered and in the club with the additional facilities of the "Europabank" the balance of payments adjustment from his crisis-stimulating Effects to free. Also the problem of excess purchasing power and the "floating currency" should here Find a "European" solution . ²⁴

Apparently stayed this on the European Survival perspective of German imperialism resized bond Riedls with Keynes first in the Secret registers of the narrower hidden in the MWT environment. Still served the Memorandum in the Not subsequent time few as a quarry and as internal instrument of communication. ²⁵ In the August September In 1944, the planning office's "European Circle" even discussed it an excerpt Publication, then circulated it as background paper in the "working group for Foreign trade issues ". ²⁶ Ilgner, Reithinger and the Austrian Industrialist Philipp von Schoeller tried about it out, that since approximately August/September 1943 Emerge conceived Riedl's legacy in the ongoing economic policy Practice to translate. As the German debts in settlement transactions with foreign countries exceeded the 20 billion mark in the autumn of 1943 and seriously endangered the trade policy cooperation of the satellite countries began, intervened Reithinger against a Suggestion of Reichsbank Vice President Kurt Long, itself the problem through one combination from accounts concealment and more unique Bond from the Neck to create. ²⁷ He wrote, the material for conflict let yourself only through this defuse, that man the domestic economic crises the

²² BAP, German Bank, P 339, Bl. 42 ff.

²³ Ibid, Bl: 46 ff.

²⁴ Ibid, Bl. 61 ff.

²⁵ See. the recording of conductor the Economic Department the Germans Bank, Ernst Wilhelm Schmidt, v. December 11, 1944 the European memorandum Riedls, BAP, Deutsche Bank, P 10885, Bl. 371-386.

²⁶ BAK, R 3/1941, Bl. 8th f. (Meeting of "European Circle" at the August 29, 1944).

²⁷ BAP, German Reichsbank, No. 6449, Bl. 72 ff., Vice President Kurt Long, Suggestions for one Reorganization of the German-European payment settlement, August 1943.

I take "partner countries" seriously, meet them with a "bouquet" of German asset reserves and ask them English-American model in frame of one "Southeastern Europe Conference" into a long-term clarification process include.²⁸ Rudolf was right to suspect Eicke, the Director the Economic Department the Reichsbank, in this Suggestions _ to founding of a "European Investment Trust", for whose Foundation however the required currency were missing, while he the holding one "Balkan Conference" because of the to expected insulation Germany rejected.²⁹

End November 1943 became Reithinger anew in the Order Ilgners at the Reichsbank imagine , and that is this time at Vice President Emil Puhl.³⁰ There Germany in the contrast to the Allies only above comparatively low Capital reserves have, would have to this so economical How possible to "Opening up the European economic power for the German armor" used will, wrote he in one six-sided Memorandum. For this reason be it highest Time, a "planned European foreign trade" in to bring gear, trust and cooperation the European partner countries to win back and she again "production " and willing to deliver" to make. This but be only possible at recognition of their political _ sovereignty and more appropriate Respect of their material Interests. Before everything would have to the Economic partner the Germans Certainty have,,im framework of a European Cooperation also in the Peace not worse placed to become." To the starting point one Trust offensive should the Cleanup the German Clearing debts in Southeastern Europe made will, there this Countries because of due to their undeveloped credit apparatus suffered from inflationary repercussions. The German balance must unreservedly accepted and a bunch from Measures (Advance sales of goods German post-war deliveries, Vouchers on Partial deliveries from agricultural Device, bonds on the Base a standardized one Part of German share capital, On Bill longer term German loans) to one "Disposition fund" put together become, around all Balances to cover and the Payment settlement for the next harvest to to back up. Under these conditions would then have to on one "representative" Viennese conference the Principles of future "European settlement" be determined.

Also this Start-up became of the Economic Department the Reichsbank torn apart .³¹ At latest now should the around her long term Southeast Europe perspective anxious- den MWT exponents the cynicism the Directors of financial- and monetary power center the Nazi dictatorship consciously become be. She played the itself in the bankruptcy reflecting the clearing balances of the "European economic area" down by them the Debt in a ranking scale divided, the Trade parities only still in the Doing business with the "neutrals" respected them collaborating elites of the southeast against it

28 Ibid, BI. 77 ff., Dr. Reithinger, Remarks to the Suggestions for one Reorganization of the German-European settlement, September 21, 1943 (Copy).

29 BAK, R 28/98, BI. 48 ff. (here BI. 56 ff.), Economic Department of the Germans Reichsbank, Dr. Eicke, above the plans to Solution of clearing problems, November 15, 1943.

30 Ibid, BI. 59 ff., Expose, garnish for the Write Reithingers at Puhl, November 30, 1943.

31 Ibid, BI. 66 ff., Economic Department of Germans Reichsbank, Dr. Eicke, To the transcript of Dr. Reithinger on the clearing problem, December 6, 1943.

the Resistance movements revealed and last At the end How in the occupied areas _ a fully unified and noiseless Resource transfer through the ultima ratio one military occupation put.³²

secure were the Reichsbank directors not the only ones, the in the first phase the strategic defensive the from the remaining economic Power groups always stronger isolated _ MWT initiative blocked. With your Counter-expertise documented she but as the first one well thought out Radicalization the Options from 1940/41, by she just as like two Years before the Reich group Industry the Southeast European "Development enclave" now also monetary policy in favor of one limitless and with to plunder justified by the constraints of the war economy.

End Started in March 1944 Max Ilgner a last Attempt. He sent Puhl the first draft for one elaboration above the "Increase of European armament and military economic potential" and invited him to one Meeting of the "working group" that has just been constituted for foreign trade issues" a, on the be memorandum discussed become would.³³ It acted itself in the first Part around one concretized variant the last Reithinger memorial . The there developed Immediate measures to Consolidation the were clearing debts around complements the proposal, in the interest "the organic Intensification and Development _ the economics" Southeastern Europe already now with comprehensive and accordingly to begin balance- active project planning measures for large-scale industrial and infrastructural projects . In the second Part reproduced Ilgner then in general Twists the Target catalog of the Riedl European Memorandum, without however the idea giver or the explosive ones, from Keynes borrowed Instruments at the names to to name.

The economics department of the Reichsbank also fell on this work here and left their client Puhl know, "that Mister Dr. Ilgner in the last Time always same suggestions only in something more modified shape submits, the in the Rule from Mr Dr. Reithinger, dem Director the Economic Department the IG Colors, worked out are."³⁴ There Reithinger However, the secret "Reichsbank material" not for Disposal stand, demonize he out of ignorance the Debt problem. From the in the meantime on 26 **billion** _ RM accrued clearing debts (16 billion at the Deutsche Verrechnungskasse and lo billions of others in Imperial titles created Foreign obligations) no longer apply the largest Part on the occupied areas. For the bilateral regulated economic traffic be only approximately three until four billion RM Deficits from concern, where in the case the

"Neutrals" political and not Balance problems the trade made more difficult and in relation on southeastern Europe itself only also Romania large stocks against the Block German access by it advance the German clearing debts. On the other hand, "everyone else would

32 See. to politics of Reichsbank in the occupied areas Oertel, Manfred, Over the German Reichsbank in the Second World War, phil. Diss., Rostock 1979, especially p. 56 ff., 145 ff. See also chap. VIII in the preliminary vol.

33 BAP, German Reichsbank, No. 6449, BI. 132, Ilgner at Puhl, March 25, 1944; BI. 133 ff., liar, Suggestions _ to increase European armaments and defense economic potential; First draft (copy), March 25, 1944.

34 Ibid., BI. 128 f., Economic Department of the German Reichsbank, Dr. E. (= Eicke), record by. April 19, 1944.

Southeast countries from us today already so largely exploited, ... that one essential reproduction the German import practical not possible is."

In the Plain text was called this: self for the Maintenance from commercial partnership facades opposite the Southeast European Satellite regime held the Reichsbank leeway _ neither for possible still for necessary. The working group for foreign trade issues at the 27. April 1944 above Ilgners intervention debated, responded against it obviously more diplomatic.³⁵ He framed Ilgner and Reithinger even multiple a, by he she in the narrower one Circle, the policy committee, and Ilgner alone in the Monetary Committee co-opted.

The "Working group Erwin from Beckerath"

On her Way got into trouble also another significant voice in the concert the previous "Peace planning" into the Fall behind. Since the Unleashing of war had one group from university finance and economics scientists to the Reich Minister of Economics in which function as "General Plenipotentiary for the war economy" appraised cared for and yourself included with pronounced Call Cassandra against the Price- and financial policy the Blitzkrieg era highlighted.³⁶ There their "criticism" however rather on a timely "deepening" than one Withdrawal the Armament efforts directed been was, was she Beginning 1940 as new "Class IV" („Exploration the Folkish Business") in the Frame the Academy for German Right (ADR) institutionalized been and had with one comprehensive Advice _ the food, price, currency and trade policy problem packages the War economy began.³⁷ On this ways had up to at the turn of the war around 50 Top scholars the German financial and Economics in temporarily eleven working groups appraised to the most serious economic policy problems - before everything to increase of fictional purchasing power volume, to dramatic deterioration the Balance of payments and to increasing Undermining of rationing and price freeze systems expressed.³⁸

Since June 1943 were the Committees the "Class IV" however "shut down". The Plural the Participants were successful now directly in the general departments of respective top authorities and led otherwise together with the Ladders the economic departments from Major banks and Large companies the dialog above the Fundamental problems the post-war economy in one astonishing open Journal discourse further.³⁹

³⁵ Please refer below the corresponding Sections.

³⁶ BAK, R 7/4236.

³⁷ BAK, R 61/100, Bl. 16 ff.; German monetary policy (Writings the academy for German Right, group economics, H. 4), Berlin 1941; The Competition as Medium economic cher performance increase and Performance reading (ibid., H. 6), Ed. Gunter Schmölders, Berlin 1942.

³⁸ And that is u. a. in the following Working groups: Foreign trade (Line Andrew Pre- döhl), Financial economics (Heinz Müller), Money and credit (Hero Moeller) with subgroup Reason-sentence questions (Hero Moeller), Pricing policy (Gunter Schmölders), Economics (Erwin v. Beckerath).

³⁹ And that is primarily in the Magazines Bank archive (or. since April 1, 1943 banking industry), financial

Against it was the originally as "Central Committee" for all Committees the Class IV The proposed "Working Group on Economics" was deemed "not important to the war effort" as early as March 1943. suspended been - however not without the discreet Notice at their leader Erwin from Beckerath, that a continuation of the Event as one Art Privatissimum _ absolutely he wishes be.⁴⁰ The The main cause was undoubtedly in that precisely this policy committee, from dem the others Committees constantly with Special tasks had provided become should, a long time ago at the contradictory opinions his main Participant failed was. On the meetings in the November 1940 and May 1941 was initially starting from the recently published "Fundamentals of National Economy" by Walter Eucken⁴¹ above „Goals and Methods the German one economic management" debated been. This resulted in extremely contradictory positions.⁴² One gathered around Hans Peter minority had on the Basis of a cycle-analytical control model for one "directed National economy" voted, whose full employment oriented dynamics through a after corresponding social priorities aligned State interventionism secured _ become should. Against it had under the guide Euckens and Constantin von Dietzes profiled a strong majority position that harshly rejected these ideas rejected their theoretical analogies to current war economic practice as a premature adaptation one "anomalous" Special constellation in Ask presented and opposite everyone variants the "collectivist forced economy" the Ideal type one completely competition-driven "Transportation economy" worked out.

Significant was before everything the second phase of discourse, as itself the Regulation theorist in the connection the formation of regional subcommittees had withdrawn and the Propagandists the "Transportation economy" in one Freiburg or. Cologne-Bonn Working group under itself remained were. Because this moulted itself so by no means approximately to adversaries _ the "Economic management" per se, although she too now at the evaluative premise held on, that the economic entities only at more complete competition optimal household or. Production plans to create were able, the then retrospectively above the respective ones Markets anonymous each other Voted would. Much more came she given the worldwide advance the most different "non-market" Planning systems - and especially the war economy - to the view that the desired alternative situation probably no longer by itself will set. He must rather through one fundamental reversal the until now known Methods the Economic steering around 180 Degree fought for and thereafter always again onto new secured become. No longer, if directed become should, was standing in this second Discussion phase to disposition, but the Ask of "How". Task the Economic governance the Future should it be, for

archive, yearbooks for economics and statistics, and world economic archive. About that now also Brackmann, Michael, On total war to the economic miracle. The history the West German currency reform 1948, Essen 1993, p. 36 ff.

40 ACDP, 1-256, A 017, Correspondences between v. Beckerath u. Adolf Lamp, March 1943.

41 Eucken, Walter, The Foundations of National Economy, Jena 1940. The work went through three editions until 1943 alone.

42 The minutes of the two meetings were considered lost for a long time. They are but can be viewed in NL Lampes. See the following ACDP, 1-256, A 027.

the economic process the Framework conditions one so to say automatic price equalization in free Interplay from Offer and demand to produce.

By she the "free Entrepreneurial initiative" in the Ideal condition of "perfect competition" as the allegedly most efficient of all conceivable economic systems, claimed the Economists group around Walter Eucken, Constantine from Dietze and Franz Böhm for the Economic theory does not less than that Exclusive disposition over the instruments of one state economic policy of "liberalism-as-if". This is how the controversy arose the "Working group for "economics" and hers informal _ successor between 1940 and 1944 those quite on the Post-war perspective directed ordo-liberal system theory of modern German-speaking economics,⁴³ which later in the Federal Republic under the parole "Social market economy" in one largely _ unchanged Majority against that now as "democratic socialism" model of the "controlled economy" prevailed.

As the freshly baked Ordo-liberals in the Spring 1943 theirs Pact with dem latest defector Heinrich from Stackelberg sealed, the so also as Main maxim all plans for the Transition stage from the war to Peace economy the tendency to "self-cancellation" administrative Measures proclaimed,⁴⁴ had the on the recommendation of the Reich Ministry of Economics under its director Erwin von Beckerath's "working group" continues to meet informally again Drive started. This was not only on the fact attributed, that the with theoretical standard works and sharp-tongued polemics against the pragmatist the "controlled economy" waiting _ spokesman of primacy the "free Entrepreneurial initiative" in the meantime clearly trending _ the formation of opinion in business journalism. Much more they had Members of the remaining Freiburg "rump committee" the working group after a fruitless one Fight between theirs Secretary Adolf lamp and Walter Eucken above the development of a basic program for economic policy enforcement "Transportation economy" agreed, itself on the problems at the crossing from the war to Peace economy as concrete action-oriented scenario to restrict.⁴⁵

She were with it one in the meantime far spread Need met, and because of her known front position against all Types of "economic dirigisme" were considered the Association one For a while as respectable address for one coordination corresponding _ longer term Planning. Albert Pietzsch for example, the Director the Reichswirt

43 For that were next to the Discussion minutes since Autumn 1941 (ACDP, 1-256, A 027 and K 037/1). everything the following Publications authoritative, the in the environment of the AG for economics and the AG for Pricing policy developed: The Competition as a means, Ed. Gunter Schmolders;

Stackelberg, Heinrich v., Basics the theoretical economics, Stuttgart/Berlin 1943; Eucken, Walter, The temporal steering of economic process and the Construction the economic systems, in: Yearbooks for National economy and statistics 159 (1944), S. 161-221.

44 Stackelberg, Heinrich v., Theory and Systematics of Economic Governance, Lecture at the conference of working group Erwin from Beckerath at the March 21/22, 1943, printed as Doc. No. 7 in: The path to the social market economy. Presentations, minutes, reports from the Erwin working group from Beckerath 1943-1947, Edit v. Christine Blumenberg lamp, Stuttgart 1986, S. 116 ff.

45 ACDP, 1-256, A 017, lamp at Beckerath, October 17, 1941; Bauer/Dietze/Eucken/Lampe/Preiser: Systematics the economic policy Tasks, Freiburg i. Br. October 30, 1941.

chamber of commerce, showed itself ready, the by him protected Department for central Economic observation at the Reich Chamber of Commerce to be included in an appropriate discussion group.⁴⁶ Similar positive responded also Otto Christian Fischer, the Director the Reich group banks, as well as the managing directors acting on his behalf of the German Institute for Banking science and banking, Leo thresher, the in the August/September 1943 temporarily a close cooperation with the Freiburg group of scholars Eye held⁴⁷; more _ "first names" out of the Reichsbank, the IG Colors and the Germans Bank became in August/September 1943 by Secretary Adolf lamp traded. It would have not much missing, and one small group of scholars would have already in the Autumn 1943 a huge Planning association for Post-war tasks in corridor brought, How this the Reichsgruppe Industrie only then a Year later in the literally last moment succeed should.

The fact that this didn't happen was due not least to an individual coincidence. The financial scientist Adolf Lampe was the secretary and driving force behind the remaining Freiburg group.⁴⁸ Although a classic "deflationist" and still a controversial theorist in 1938 pure private capitalist wrote "military economics" emerged, became probably the most prominent lobbyist pronounced commercial capitalist Interests within of academic economics since 1941/42 Group of Ordoliberals counted. lamp had himself but, How the so concrete expectant Post-war debate quickly showed, an independent one profile preserved, the he at the same time uncompromising for the Core piece the through coordinated him Planning debates expanded.

Lamps concept was the partners one possible larger merger however, because of the rigorous hardness of transitional economy catalog of measures a mandrel in the eye. When lamp Pietzsch presumptuously discussed the economic transition problems after End of war on pure monetary Away solve to want, could he at him only meet with little understanding, because Director the Reich Chamber of Commerce decreed thanks the department for central Economic observation about a highly developed problem awareness regarding the Connections between the Armament-related disproportionality economic Main departments and the increasing goods side Under- accounting the nominal mass purchasing power.⁴⁹ And anyway a representative of Bank capital of the stature Otto Christian Fischer's was few inclined, the Art and Way, in the Lamp all important questions one by him War aim memorandum submitted in Freiburg October 1943 escaped, go through to let. lamp didn't deny only Fischer's thesis that economic structural changes that have now become irreversible in post-war planning in The invoice to place be, rather claimed additionally, that the mass unemployment feared by Fischer exclusively through one Monetary-fiscal policy package of measures consisting of wage cuts and drastic wage and income tax increases as well as with it coupled Forced savings mechanisms prevented become could.⁵⁰

46 ACDP, 1-256, A 017, Correspondence Lamp-Pietzsch September 19, 1942 - April 6, 1943.

47 Ibid, Correspondence Lamps with Drescher and Otto Christian Fisherman August 3, 1943-January 25, 1944.

48 For the following BAK, R 7/4236, Bl. 351 ff.; R 61/60, Bl. 74 ff.; R 61/100, Bl. 40 f.

49 ACDP, 1-256, A 017, Pietzsch at Lamp, January 20, 1943.

50 Ibid, opinion Lamps to Attachment of Briefs from Otto Christian Fisherman v. October 21, 1943, Re: Questions the Business after dem wars. The Memorandum Fischer's missing in the files.

Before one like that rigorous Austerity program pulled itself all important Officials _ quickly again back, especially itself the also in discretion and Personnel issues Extraordinarily light-hearted lamp He was hardly aware of the explosive nature of the project the composition of the highest possible "practitioner circle". Post-war planning group alone too determine themselves presumptuous. So The "Freiburgers" remained after one absolutely promising exploratory phase that has begun with your post-war economic Projections largely alone. The but had to Consequence, that itself the Choir of the newly minted Ordo Liberals right at his first explosive dress rehearsal an uncompromisingly neoliberal model of deregulation.

This Model ⁵¹ went from one war-related economic Loss of substance out of, the the German Business in total approximately on the Value added level before begin the Four-year plan period (October 1936) throw back would. This one Facts of the case should be through an uncompromising "courage to be poor" and through a return as soon as possible to the "transport economy" bill carried become. From this negation everyone as well always justified transitional solutions the monetary, fiscal and wage policy consequences derived possible short term after the end of the war in force should occur: labeling all circulating Banknotes or Issue one new Monetary currency at least in Relationship four to one, appropriate devaluation of entire on the Banks deposited book money with subsequent Determination the New amounts as Compulsory capital bond, immediate state Budget balancing and simultaneous Tax reform with maximum tax progression in the Area the small and middle Income, as well as load not least Lowering the Nominal wages(!) at least on the level before October 1936.

Despite this extreme course of restrictions, the demobilized soldiers and armaments workers should not approximately over a longer period of time under Held weapons or otherwise publicly employed become, because the now suddenly forced "wage elasticity" to one rapid adaptation the Labor markets lead and low-paid, full-time employment everything in labor intensive Consumer goods sector to Consequence have would. Around this to ensure, spoke itself the majority the Participant for the Elimination of frozen collective wage system the Nazi dictatorship out of, around a exclusively operational Wage formation process at lowest level in corridor to bring. Additionally wanted she the formally that is again to be approved, in this Ask however fully lawless Trade unions as a second safety valve Low wage policy the exclusively Employee income to to impose disputed unemployment insurance. Under the protection of such rigorous labor policy restrictions should then the Entrepreneur the Construction the "Transportation economy" in the hand take. With it she the Follow the monetarist Rosskur, in particular the foreseeable-foreseeable high interest rate regime, included not too very pressed, wanted to the Freiburg Scholars to them in the Frame one generous Tax reform the Tax burden in kind largely take it off your shoulders.

With this one ludicrous Plan, on the itself looming catastrophe the German war economy one the economic substance completely ruining monetary deregulation to graft on, contrasted a couple more or fewer stubborn championed

51 The main adopted guiding principles, Partial report and Protocols are in the edition Christ- no Blumenberg's lamp, The Away in the Social market economy, contain.

Mitigation attempts. Gerhard Albrecht, a social politician who had been involved since October 1943 ,⁵² held it in the contrast to his colleagues for inopportune, the despite the relevant declarations of intent in the "Law on "Order of National Work" from 1934 never carried out Abolition of the inter-company collective wage system at the very moment of the ceasefire Wanting to implement action.⁵³ Walter Eucken hit one For a while - but by no means continuously - one Division the Post-war planning in transitional and Reconstruction phase before, where he in the first phase the war economy Steering instruments (price freeze, rationing system, forced foreign exchange economy). knowledge wanted, around the catastrophic social Follow one abrupt jump in the "Transportation economy" to avoid.⁵⁴

But only few have so far and so in time from him demarcated How Günter Schmolders, the dem always more self-aggrandizing acting Secretary the working group already in the March 1943 accused had, with his "Courage to Poverty" one " impossible slogan" in circulation brought and with his "radical proposals" any reference to problem the social Rankings and to the psychological Effects of having lost the upcoming transition period. That's why I can't see the lamp anymore, which "Chaos the Despair" be Attempt provoke could, „Victim through hardship and Shortage through misery ... overcome" to want.⁵⁵ Despite Alles this Relativization remains to note that the advocates of Ordoliberalism under the Lamps directed an extremely reactionary, anti-worker and, not least, illusionary first economic policy Community action notified had.

b) The "Europe" concept of planning office in the Reich Ministry for armor and war production

The law of the action was initially at one group of Industrial and economic policy functionaries, the it so under dem Pressure the military and foreign policy setbacks for the apparatus of Spears Ministry pushed forward. What she in the two months between Hitler's concentration decree of September 2nd and the Speer-Funk decree above the Distribution of tasks in the War economy from the 29. October

1943 in the Reorganization process to introduce had,⁵⁶ was considerably. Her Standard bearer was Hans Kehrl, most recently manager the Main Department II and permanent Representative of the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs at the Central planning. Kehrl alternated with his entire staff to spear above and built next to dem Commodity Office the through Göring decree of 4. September

52 **BAK, R61** /66 (biographical-scientific Data Gerhard Albrecht); ACDP, 1-256, A 017 (correspondence lamp - Albrecht).

53 See. the labor market and wage policy memoranda Lamps and Gerhard Albrechts for the Association. Printed in: Blumenberg lamp, The way in the social Market economy.

54 Walter Eucken, Attachment for the protocol the 2. Freiburg meeting from the 24. -July 26, 1943, Elimination of the excess purchasing power in the transition economy, *ibid*, Doc. No. 13 S. 182 ff.

55 ACDP, 1-256, A 017, Schmolders at Lamp, March 11, 1943.

56 See. in addition Vol. II, S. 146 ff.

ber created and since dem 16. September for the entire German ruling bloc responsible planning office.⁵⁷

The Arguments for this Revirement appeared everyone mandatory for those involved. The strategic defense is facing a long-term war of attrition set the agenda, they emphasized. That's why it is Time of "improvising around" irrevocably over. Plan-moderate would have to so the fallow economic Reserves of Reichs to Increasing the war economy potential was mobilized and through the Inclusion the supposedly still largely unused resources of his outer sphere of power - especially the one industrialized countries - expanded become. There are no structurally changing interventions more to avoid: Extensive Shutdown of the consumer goods industry at the same time use of their Locations for the through the air war necessary become Decentralization the defense companies, „Implementation" of their workforce and the employees in trade and Crafts in the arms manufacturing, Order relocation the consumer goods, semi-finished products and last also Weapons production into the occupied and neutral ones Abroad, however also rigorous "clearing out" of manufacturing potential in "uncertain" areas that have become How in the Donets Ukraine region and in Northern Italy.

With the group around Kehrl had itself one dynamic Manager layer developed, in the the boyish Directness hers procedure and with theirs Believe at the unlimited and society-shaping potential of technical-scientific innovation specific characteristics had. She practiced at the same time size power of fascination on the scientifically _ qualified high and middle officials the leading Large corporations the founding generation new "continental European" mammoth arms companies as well as the intellectuals of the planning staff and economic scientists research centers. In the so-called the from Kehrl represented the initiative to technocratic _ Overcoming improvisation were exponents Alles this sedimentation and domestic economic structural changes to find: serious Healing courage Vits and Max H. Schmid the synthetic textile industry, Wilhelm Voß as the main representative of the privatized "Weapon Blocks" the Reich works Hermann Goering, Ludger Westrick from the Vereinigte Aluminumwerke AG, as well as Otto Neubaur and August Rohdewald from the Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft (RKG) as dem Main financier this New startups. With Karl Rasche from the Dresden Bank as well as his former Viennese employees Hans Fish buck and Walter Rafelsberger was Kehrl since the period the economic "Incorporations" closely tied together. Karl Blessing worked him in its Characteristic as Chairman of the board the in the March 1941 out of the Baptism upscale Continental oil AG to.

Also at the Statisticians and Economists could Kehrl on first Addresses To fall back on. Rolf Wagenühr, head of the DIW's industrial department, established the statistical data framework and the strategic concept one production network. Ferdinand Green from the Department for central Economic observation the RWK controlled regional bran

57 The crucial passage of decree from the September 16, 1943 was: ",3. The Planning Office has ... for the whole War economy production and Distribution planning to set up, where the demand planning for the entire German sphere of power the basis form should. Here is the A- and export to take into account." Decree of GB Arm u. RMRuK above the Tasks of Planning Office v. September 16, 1943. In: News, No. 30 v. October 20, 1943, S. 323.

chenanalyses and one methodology to economic Overall accounting at. Erich Weiter, the propagandist one small-scale dismantled mass production for the "European market",⁵⁸ reflected as consciously used advocate diaboli the Vulnerabilities of now _ realizing planning thinking. With Bernard Benning (**RKG**) won Kehrl a the most prominent Director the Economic Departments the Major banks. Add The close colleagues came primarily from the special departments of the Reich Ministry of Economics the personal Speaker Arnold Köster, dem Kehrl the coordination the the most explosive special functions of the planning office, as well as the Reich representative for cellulose and paper and Manager the East fiber GmbH, Friedrich cathedral, the for the General speakers advanced for special tasks.

Preparatory work for a "Planning staff Europe"

Such exponents, the at the decisive points your outstanding expertise with more unconditional System loyalty to whitewash ready were, were Kehrl welcome. They made it easier for him to come along your own "peace planning" Thought figures of the Years 1940 to 1942 ⁵⁹ against the increasing constriction of the Possible actions of Nazi imperialism to run. For Kehrl and his equal stayed the War a Medium to Establishment of "Empire" as technical-scientific Innovation Center for a from economic "large area" dominated by him . In the interplay of production dismantling and market expansion should the German National economy the highest "Refining profits" and wage income for itself claim, at the same time but also their subordinate neighbors the ongoing outflow more modern Manufacturing process outside the strategic innovation area at itself tie.

It is precisely this perspective that should now be under the primacy of one "Continental European" arms mobilization can be reactivated. The planners needed this about four Months until they get together on communicated the essential aspects and your Partial functions final against each other demarcated had. The them at the strongest the nails burning Focus of discussion outline Köster, as he at the 3. September 1943 a proposal to Mobilization of the European economic reserves" presented. ⁶⁰ Given the constant declining performance the Foreign workers be it more efficient, whose Worker in the respective home countries utilize, if at the same time the there Production facilities through the transfer from German Know how modernized would. In the case of doubt must the mutual partnership _ with each Medium forced become. On the side the German Entrepreneur be- en it Fears of "Competition in Peace", with their partners possible trade policy barriers, the it out of dem Away to clear apply. A "Special report Europe" of planning office could Impulses in addition give, by it appropriate Capacity documents procure and a small group highly qualified Manager as "trustees" draw on.

58 **BAK, R 61/66, BI. 206 ff.** (biographical data Erich Weiter); Erich Weiter, The path of German industry, Frankfurt a. **M.** 1943.

59 For example BAP, **RWM**, No. 9827, BI. 91 ff., Changes the Business in and after dem war ge. speech Kehrls at the advisory board meeting the IHK Berlin on March 27, 1941; Kehrl, Hans, raw materials in common use. In: The German economy 11 (1942), No. 29, p. 1048-1050.

60 **BAK, R 3/1941, BI. 188 ff.**

After spear on the "Leader's meeting" at the 11th/12th September 1943 green Light for one appropriate "European production planning" receive had, ⁶¹ wrote Köster one day later a more precise one thoughtful elaboration. ⁶² Due to one now four years of losing battle for a crisis-free economic area Germany has it Authorization _ to guide Europe acquired. With it be it but so far rather bad as handled correctly. Instead of the occupied Countries "in the senses one European economic order". "lead", have it she "managed", "more or fewer planned exploited" and on the part

"more hostile "popular strata" a always larger Hate on itself pulled. Opposite the "friends" and neutral states lead it is against how a "doubtful one " debtor " on, the against "degrading securities" only a minimum the to use the resources there instead of "uniting the European states into an... armaments-economic fighting community." This type of economic negotiations is unthinkable in one Quasi-state of peace to continue, and far more sensible, after the backup one loyal and make sacrifices Cooperation at one European Overall planning also "on the non-German concerns Consideration" to take. In the Frame of In order to implement this alternative concept, a higher-level economic policy management body should be created, known as the "European Planning Staff", as the superior authority for the planning office all relevant imperial departments must be. By this Planning staff too non-German Experts | if you draw on it, you will receive it access on the armaments capacities their countries and could itself additionally transnational Private initiatives usable make. He should get an extensive economic archive, state clerk win , with France as the first focus of "Country Planning Groups" form and under Recourse on appropriate Initiatives the Germans academy or. of conductor of the Advertising Council the Germans Business Heinrich Hunk ⁶³ one extensive propaganda campaign for the European economicStart "combat community".

Out of the files can not reconstruct, When and with which Modifications this conception adopted been is. But probably find itself extensive supporting documents for how the other activities at the same time expansion of the Questions in terms of content respect and under more explicit Inclusion the Post-war perspective gradually structured. There were debates about the most qualified economics providers, at those Benning in the Order Kösters the chaff from Wheat son-

derte and the first four Surcharges at the German Institute for economic research, the Institute for World economy in **Kiel**, the Economic Department the IG Colors and the Central European Economic Day and the associated economics departments the Major banks and the Electrical industry distributed. ⁶⁴ On the first, from

61 FB, September 11/12, 1943, Point 14.

62 BAK, R 3/1941, BI. 182 ff.

63 Hunk started also in the September one new "Europe" campaign, on whose „ten Points" itself the Planning Office in the Follow-up time always again related: Hunk, Heinrich, The Key questions of economic policy fight in the Present. In: The German National economy 12 (1943), No. 27 (3. September issue), S. 833-836.

64 BAP, RMRuK, No. 41, BI. 15, Benning, Re: Research centers and expert personalities on dem areas the European economic planning, November 10, 1943.

car driver in the April 1943 start-up started to one "European planning iron". resorted to. In addition to the differentiation of district supply balances and variety problems, it also included already specified questions regarding the expected post-war capacities. ⁶⁵ Kehrls Commissioners wanted to the Managing directors of "Planning staff Europe" with five working groups underline: foreign business, raw material development, industrial capacity utilization, Currency- and clearing questions, Business propaganda. ⁶⁶ At the 6. December 1943 lock Sweep those first planning phase away and switched by Circular first the Reich representatives Reich positions in "large-scale planning" a. Under the Directed by his general speaker Dorn be for Implementation of the dem Planning office transferred Tasks additionally for the immediate German Dominion too the "Allies" and "Neutrals" in the European planning included been. In should in this context now the Reich representatives those goods and business groups , at those itself through Shifts in the production and Trading volume savings and Rationalization effects achieve let. She should appropriate Needs examinations _initiate and for competent in every control area clerk insert . In the remaining must the "Plan more planned penetration of us accessible economic area ... in the view on the Inclusion from economic areas outside ours immediate sphere of power secret remain." ⁶⁷

While the so in corridor coming Initiatives of Planning office not only to further increase in the contributed to domestic arms production, but also the Disintegration tendencies of economic apparatus clearly to slow down began, were her "European" effects only short term effective. That is became anyway approximately 40 percent the German textile and Clothing production Western Europe relocated, and it achieved an astonishing stabilization Arms production in the "Protectorate". But the hoped-for longer-term ones Effects stayed out of, because it since dem spring 1944 increasingly at the required energy and transport capacities for one effective There was a lack of distribution of production within the entire German sphere of influence and there was also a chronic shortage of foreign currency despite everything refined Replacement operations are not from the world created.

The short term effect the "Europe" initiative leaves itself at the soonest through this explain, that spear parallel to the just starting activities his planner to great propagandistic hug of probably main economic collaborators the Germans reached out. Jean Bichelonne ⁶⁸ was since April 1942 French minister for industrial production in the second Government Laval and had itself since journalistic How always economically and politically again offered to the occupiers. ⁶⁹ This applied he as Spiritus rector that one flow

65 BAK, R 3/1791, Bl. 185 ff.

66 BAK, R 3/1941, Bl. 178 ff., Köster, Ideas to European economic design, October 19, 1943.

67 BAK, R 3/1975, Bl. 2 f., Secret letter Kehrls at the Reich representative the imperial offices, Re: large-scale planning, December 6, 1943.

68 See. the biographical Data in: Arch. Nat., AJ 40, No. 540, dossier I; Rousso, Henry, La collaboration, Paris 1987, S. 40 ff.

69 Bichelonne, (Jean), French Economic policy in the Frame of new Europe. In: The German sche National economy 11 (1942), No. 36, S. 1391-1394; telegram veil out of Paris at the AA v. July 14, 1943 above Meeting with minister Bichelonne above Work assignment questions. Printed as Doc. No. 149 in ADAP, series E, Vol. VI, S. 251 f.

ment within of French patronage, the since dem fiasco from the May June 1940 on implemented comprehensive economic planning, in order to recover as quickly as possible economic potential as more worthy partner in the for long term stable considered German _ supremacy to introduce. Under more authoritative participation Bichelonne had since then the "Planism" as Part the "Revolution national" Vichy France Indent held. The "Comites d'Organization" (CO) and the Central office to distribution the Industrial Products (Office central de Repartition des Produits industriels - OCPRI) from August/September 1940 had a economic policy planning, control and Distribution system popped out of the ground,⁷⁰ that the steering areas and imperial associations of Kehrl largely _ anticipated ⁷¹ and since two Men's served: For the a the Skimming operations the Economics Department of military commander in France, for the change but that too internal claim to power the "Planifiers" committed to large-scale industrial concentration and rationalization interests French economy.

With dem Main exponents this ambiguous strategy one economic Collaboration _ with the Germans met spear and the Experts | of planning office at the 17th/18th September 1943 together in Berlin. She ran Bichelonne opposite open Doors a. ⁷² The Vichy Minister for industrial production was ready, accordingly the expanded Responsibility Speers on dem Area the raw materials and the production practical the entire French industrial capacity to provide what an agreement about similar _ Procedures and Responsibilities in the occupied Area and in Southern France included. Also the operational work and Production structures should largely each other approximated become. To coordination should a "Board to tighten Steering the European arms production" created become, where spear and Bichelonne

"with France the Beginning make" wanted to. In the countermove explained itself spear ready, all of them French companies, „the for our programs work, a Protection against the worker withdrawals in the Frame of the Sauckel program to grant." Otherwise, Speer and Bichelonne defeat together your respective staffs the result of the negotiations with the "Thoughts the common Work" and of the fight "for a better one Europe".

Thus were planning and economic policy Practice in terms of "European production" since dem Autumn 1943 in more striking more conceptual and more temporal Accordance. This allowed it dem Ministry of Armaments actually, until the crisis broke out The spring /summer of 1944 had significant shifting effects to achieve and the Exploitation the industrial production capacities of the German sphere of influence to a peak bring, also if itself this not more stabilizing impacted. Basically succeeded in this, because the renewed while the Order relocations in the respective countries enclave

70 Rouso, Henri, *L'Organisation industriel de Vichy (Perspectives et recherches)*. In: *revue d'histoire de Yes deuxieme guerre mondiale* 29 (1979), no. 113, p. 27--44; Margairaz, Michel, *Germany, Vichy and the economic Collaboration*. In: *Hirschfeld, Gerhard/Marsh, Patrick (Ed.)*, p. 109-129.

71 That's the verdict the Economic Department the IG Colors already in May 1942: BAP, IG Farben, No. A 3658, *The new Industry- and Work organization France*, May 28, 1942.

72 recording Purr from the September 22, 1943, Re: Visit of French Production Minister Bichelonne at Reich Minister Spear; ADAP, series E, Vol. VI, Doc. No. 338, p. 573-575.

ven of productive Survival created that company workforce Deportations protected and alongside the company management the Capacity guarantee Wins brought.

Without Doubt must the Initial success the "Europe planning" before dem background one else threatening destructive Resource transfers seen become.⁷³ Nonetheless enough this _ Facts of the case not alone, to the active Pivot the defense industrial capital groups in one situation to explain, in the the majority the European entrepreneurs and Industrial associations independent from the respective status hers country given the irrevocable become Turn of war a long time ago to passive resistance passed over was and on Post-war social pacts with the in the underground reactivated Trade union movements headed towards. Apparently was standing the alliance between Spear, Kehrl and Bichelonne for far more, namely for one serious conceptual Accordance, the stemmed from anti-cyclical "planning thinking" that had been widespread across Europe since the 1930s, with strikes and revolts of the working class as unproductive disruptions to the economic process and as a result was extremely anti-communist in both domestic and foreign policy.⁷⁴

These currents were in Young talent management of all major European companies anchored and saw in the Autumn 1943 in the offer Speers and Kehrls one last alliance opportunity, the itself to Hope on one common Post-war design Europe extended. In France, Fran was one of them ois Lehideux (Usines Renault), who together with the Germans the control above the World automobile market aimed at, but also Georges Painvin (Ugine), Raoul de Vitry (Pechiney) and Jules Aubrun (Schneider-Creusot). In the protectorate Bohemia and Moravia provided Jan Bata still in 1943/44 be Training system available to the German armaments authorities for foreman courses, as well as the outstanding weapon developments of the Skoda works thanks to the relatively narrow German leadership layer of reprivatized Group alone not explained become. Similar applies for the leading Defense companies in the Netherlands, Belgium and Norway, but also in Sweden and the Switzerland. In the Area the Cellulose- and Synthetic fiber production became Europe-wide steering and Development Agreement closed, with the cooperation between Vereinigte Glanzstoff-Fabriken AG and Algemeene Kunstzijde Unie NV as exemplary was valid.⁷⁵ A Special case presented finally the Bedaux Group. represent, one in Amsterdam resident Holding company to recycling one ar-

73 So expressly *Frankenstein, Roger, The German Labor surveys in France and the cooperation of French companies with the occupying power, 1940-1944. In: Second World War and social Change. Axis powers and occupied Countries*, Ed. Wacław Długoborski, Göttingen 1981, S. 211-223, here S. 219 f.

74 Brun, Gerard, *Technocrats et Technocracy in France, 1918-1945*, Paris 1985. This development was but also through a strengthen wing the Labor movement supports; see. Roth, Charles Heinz, *The Social policy of "European "large area" in the Field of tension from occupation and Collaboration _ (1938-1945). In: occupation and Collaboration*, S. 461-565.

75 N/A, RG 260, OMGUS FINAD 2/195/1-3 (Role the Germans Bank at the interweaving between VGF and AKU), FINAD 2/195/4 (Ernst H. Vits), ED Dec Br. 17/245-1/14 (Ralph H. Goldner, Final report on the Investigation of the Algemeene Kunstzijde Unie NV amber, and United Glanzstoff-Fabriken AG, Wuppertal, August 1, 1946).

scientific procedure to Performance increase,⁷⁶ the itself in the transmission the German "wage-organizing Measures" on the Western European Defense industry a- switched.⁷⁷ Charles Bedaux, the a him closer German Entrepreneur colleague rightly so "for a honest German friend or, perhaps better said, for a most notably fanatic Fighter of the Bolshevism" held and accordingly touted, represented⁷⁸ s one whole generation from big business efficiency fanatics.

Files out of the former German Enemy Asset Management make it additionally possible, the inner structure of defense industrial composite to decipher, the so through the "Europe" initiative of planning office a last Development boost received. In the contrast to the English and before everything US American Keynesians, the in the Frame of sovereign "economic warfare" of their Countries effective against the German Investments proceeded and included also a unexplained inner War against the own High finance led,⁷⁹ had the German Enemy Asset Management the theirs access out of- set Corporate branches of western abroad with kid gloves touched. so In many cases was this status quo Of course first after violent Disputes _ with regional NSDAP instances fought for and How for example in the case Adam Opel AG/General Motors first after one Power spell Göring's End October 1942 fixed wrote been.s¹ At the Germans Hollerith machinery GmbH (Dehomag), one IBM Daughter, became he against it successful against always more intense expectant " Attempts at Germanization" defended, although this company the whole data collection technology at the time and -processing dominated.s² Fully smoothly went it against it at the

76 To International Bedaux NV Amsterdam see BAK, NL Gerhard A Westrick/1045; additionally Christy, Jim, *The Price of Power. A Biography of Charles Eugene Bedaux*, Toronto, Garden City, NY 1984.

77 Arch. Nat., AJ 40, No. 846, final report of the Main department work at military commander in France (1944), Bl. 46 f.

78 BAK, NL Gerhard A Westrick/172, Westtrick at Halvor Sudeck, March 2, 1942.

79 Borkin, Joseph/Welsh, Charles A., *Germany's master Plan. The story of Industrial Offensive*, new York 1943; Martin, James Stewart, *Alles Honorable Men*, Boston 1950; DuBois, Josiah E Jr., *The Devil 's Chemists. 24 Conspirators of the International Colors Cartel who manufacture it was*, Boston 1952; Gordon, David L./Dangerfield, Royden, *The Hidden Weapon. The story of Economic warfare*, New York 1976; Borkin, Joseph, *The unholy alliance the IG Colors. One interest community in the third party Rich*, Frankfurt/New York 1981; Taylor, Graham D., *The Axis Replacement _ Program: Economic Warfare and the Chemical Industry in Latin America, 1942-44*. In: *Diplomacy History* 8th (1984), No. 2, pp. 145-164.

80 However only she: financial assets the European Jews in the annexed areas and in Eastern Europe was subject to special regulations and was largely confiscated. BAK, R 87/9165 (John) Krohn, preliminary activity report of the Reich Commissioner for treatment hostile _ assets, 1.2.1940-15.4.1945, v. May 4, 1945; BAK, N 1430/13, *The Administration enemy assets in the second World War*. report of Dr. Johannes Krohn, State Secretary a. D., Reich Commissioner for the Treatment of Enemy Property (von 1941 to 1945), Heiligenkirchen 1949.

81 BAK, R 87/6336, Bl. 48 ff.; Kugler, Anita, *The Treatment of hostile assets in German- country and the "Self-responsibility" of the defense industry*. Shown using the example of Adam Opel AG from 1941 until Beginning 1943. In: 1999, 3 (1988), H.2, S. 46-78.

82 In this one case was also Sweep! in contrast to his other customs because of of extremes Secure-

C Lorenz AG or. the default Electricity Society AG, the German daughters of the ITT Group, to, the while of war for the most dangerous European Rivals of the Siemens Group rose and from the previous Chairman of the Board Gerhard A Westrick "managed" became.⁸³

Many this Administrator "supervised" at the same time those non-German Subsidiaries _ of their parent houses, the in the entourage the military Operations under came under German occupation. Another step towards consolidation European level was straight in the Gang, than that initiative of planning office. There were European _ Holding companies founded, the so also for the Subsidiaries in the "friends" and the "neutral" countries responsible were and the "continental European " New startups the Germans from 1941/42, in particular the Continental oil AG,⁸⁴ were strikingly similar. Gerhard A. Westrick, for example, praised his work for this purpose with approval of ITT boss Sosthenes Behn in Year 1943 constituted European Electric standard Management company mbH always again as optimal Instrument for increasing the performance of the German war economy across Europe.⁸⁵ It was similar the Development at Opel/General Motors Dehomag and especially with those US branches, the How Ford, the International general Electric Corp. and the New York Financial houses or. Investment trusts your European Headquarters in Vichy France retained.⁸⁶ Her silence collaboration with the Germans was until for the moment _ the Liberation brilliant,⁸⁷ and they pushed along their Europe-wide branches Association with the "continental European" New startups the raw material and Substitute material sectors the trend for the "European" Production network. Included involved she in _ service the German war machine also to everyone those outrages, the the leading German Large companies after 1945 by the investigators and military courts right were charged .⁸⁸

Thus stood behind the from Kehrl under war economy sign reactivated slogan of the "continental European metropolitan economy" tangible capital interests of the present, the itself at the same time with clear up economic policy Options for the post-war

the security risk for nationalization, but was unable to do so to enforce. See BAK, R 87/ 6248, Sweep! at Krohn, December 4, 1942.

83 BAK, NL Westrick/1242, 1243.

84 See. to structure and Development 1941 until for the End of war the Duration BAK, R 176. The account nentale oil AG became first 1965 liquidated, her Story in the transitional and Post-war period is still unexplored. Please refer I, S. 235 ff.; II, S. 477 ff.

85 BAK, NL Westrick/1067, Agenda the Supervisory board meeting the European Electric standard Management company mbH at the 10.7.1944.

86 Arch. Nat., AJ 40/610, Dossiers 1-14.

87 For example, the German Embassy in Paris maintained its main account until liberation the Parisian branch the Chase National Bank. See. For this and generally to role the US wholesale banks in Vichy France: FDRL, Henry Morgenthau diaries, Book No. 804, Morgenthau to Saxon, December 20, 1944.

88 Next to of their participation at the exploitation from forced laborers and the "De-Jewification the European schen Business" did she itself before everything through the "Loot capture" in the occupied Eastern areas .

time connected. She do it at all first understandable, Why a group about 250 arms managers and Economic experts it still in the Autumn 1943 for possible held, the German supremacy above Europe through one above the Production committees and Rings as well the Business groups outgoing coordination of economic potential to stabilize and return to the strategic offensive. They were used for post-war planning responsible Special facilities at several Place in the Planning office equipment installed.

Distribution of functions the Post-war issues in the Planning Office

Manager: Hans Kehr}

Representative: Hans

Fischböck

Management group: Potter, school

- Scientific Advice center: Carl (until June 1944), Bosch, Langelütke, Bielinski, Hartman

Special tasks: General speaker Cathedral

- Construction the Large-scale planning/special investigations: Humbert
- Mission the Science: Prof. Lohmann
- Europe circle: Köster, Hoffmann, Ermisch (Blessings, Vits)

Main Department I Fundamental questions: Fromm, Huppert, Marquardt

- presentation Reporting: Benning

Main Department II Cross-cutting questions: Bosch

- Special tasks: Weher

Main Department III Overall planning: Baudisch, from Trotha

Main Department IV Technical Planning: **sweep**, from Engelberg

- Iron- and Metal management: Müller-Zimmermann
- Iron- and metal processing: Fabric rain
- Fuel Planning: Seriously Rudolf Fisherman
- Chemical planning: Kolb
- Clothing/Consumer Goods: Fudickar

Main Department v Plan statistics: Wagenführer, Bickert, sneezing, Fey, Mahnke

Source: BAK, R 3/108, Bl.34-37; Kehrl, S. 498 ff.

The Planning office is as the first initiator that great wave of mobilization in empirical economics to watch, the so in temporal Dislocations and with sometimes contradictory Questions above the Research landscape rolled away. For the from that Textile industrialists Hans Croon protected Research center for general and textile market economy of Münster residents economics professor Alfred Müller-Armack and its employees meant this, for example, that they come from one another quickly the following clients often to the same problem areas Data first above rationing options,

then about war economic mobilization reserves and finally about sales opportunities the post war period demanded became.⁸⁹ They were delivered all. The institute directors from the beat one Müller-Armack, Wagemann, Predöhl or House manager served with your staff after- and next to each other everyone since dem Autumn 1943 in corridor brought Variants of war economics potential development and Post-war planning.

The "Europe Circle"

It was created at the end of 1943 at the Planning Office a large industrial advisory board, the "European circle" (also "European wreath").

After a Series of preliminary considerations the event of "Kehrl Evenings" became the "European wreaths" at the 16. December 1943 through one speech of Head of the planning office opened.⁹⁰ Sweep! fetched far out of and recapitulated the previous Highlights and setbacks that have affected the "peace planning" since the "birth the European idea" 1940 and dem "European crusade 1941" run through would have. He lifted out, that the temporary Believe the Europeans at the German victory since dem Winter 1941/42 again in Fade understood be. In the meantime must Germany, apart from the unhindered outflow of resources from the occupied territories ("infinite clearing"), which alone bear the burden of war, and in the European Outside-, commercial and Economic policy be again Sterility returned. It is unacceptable that the Wehrmacht's support for the European ones regime would be recorded as debt, since These are "not German, but European Debts" act. Out of the Understanding, that the "Total War" not only for Germany, rather for all European States apply, must the principle of "infinite clearing" now generally enforced become. On normal governmental ways be it of course not more possible, the Exploitation of entire European armament and economic potential to advance. It would have to now other ways gone become. The Planning office decree from September 16th as well as the negotiations with Bichelonne be first landmarks to overcoming the "Lack of ideas from ours Page."

In this Direction apply it now to march on, drove Sweep! continued. Through Foreign minority investments in Reich companies must increase the willingness to support Germany's defense industry and supplemented by accompanying foreign trade initiatives become. There this but through foreign policy considerations narrowed and the official propagandistic Possibilities worn be, be more private ways to hit, around in the small Circle Relationships from Industry to Industry as well as

„from Economist to economist" to tie and "gradually greater becoming" the Requirements _ for the Establishment of one "European Economic Council" to accomplish. Through the

⁸⁹ See. the correspondence of the "Special Group N" of the Foreign Main Department with the research center for general and textile Market economy 1943/44 as well as the Lineups above the from submitted to her Memorandums in: BA/MA, RW 19/458, 459, 479; as an example for a typical one Memorandum _ in the interest of "European Production plan": BA/MA, RW 19 Attachment 1/1405, Research center for general and textile market economy, Investigations to Market research. The capacity reserves the Dutch Industry, April-August 1944.

⁹⁰ BAK, R 3/1941, Bl. 173 ff., For European wreath at the December 16, 1943.

Influence more credible Private entrepreneur on both pages must it succeed, the Government committee negotiations to loosen up, the price-, Purchasing power and clearing problems mostly and the "Orthodoxy of the Reichsbank" to overcome. In the service this initiative should all available Data materials collected, Country representative ordered, Country planning groups furnished and through "personal Advertising from Man to Mann" important foreign exponents for the European "Economic Community" can be mobilized.

Finally was also at the width transfer from technical Know how "to elevation of the European performance levels" and at the founding one Clearinghouse for such commercial transactions thought, „the otherwise not for the Trains come." By he the German war of aggression reinterpreted as a defensive war, justified Kehrl on the one hand the immediate transition to one towards ultra-aggressive economic policies of the entire European sphere of influence, Association this but on the other hand with one collaboration and Integration offer at one small minority out of dem foreign Big capital. The behind it existing production planning for the post war period let he in his Founding speech still un-

imagines.

For the recruitment the large industrial founding group of "European Circle" needed them from Sweep! with it commissioned Organizers Charles Blessings and Arnold Köster more as one Month. The first "Letter of engagement" went in the second January half 1944 _ 15 entrepreneurs out, whereby the "editing" of one or several countries were allocated. Others followed by the end of March, the Hamburg tobacco industrialist Philipp F. Reemtsma was the last, the formally written became and agreed, ongoing above the economic conditions in Bulgaria, Greece and the Türkiye too to report.⁹¹

The list of tasks was extremely extensive. The employees from big business were asked to unused productive Reserves and industrial Identify capacities to make, above the general economic policy as well as the specific to report on the trade- political situation, taking into account the relevant activities of the Allies , and suggestions for the Know-how transfer and to general activation the to carry out "European community work", to initiate concrete individual transactions and through references To improve "economic warfare" in the areas of trouble in the war economy . For some, this huge catalog went too far. Ludger Westrick, for example, wanted his cooperation on the original oral Commitment limited know, in To open your ears abroad .⁹² Others such as Reemtsma activated theirs closely-

91 In total gave it until End March 1944 the following "Country representative" of "European Circle": Her- man J. Abs (Netherlands, Switzerland), Karl Blessing (Romania), Richard Eugene Dörr (Norway), Ernst Rudolf Fisherman (Slovakia), Theodore Mom (France), Karl Rasche (Sweden, Hungary), Philipp F Reemtsma (Bulgaria, Greece, Türkiye), August Rohdewald (Bulgaria, Romanian en), Max H. Smith (Finland, Sweden), Otto Steinbrinck (Belgium), Hugo Stinnes (Denmark, Sweden), Alfred C Potter (France, Portugal, Spain), Serious H. Vits (Netherlands) Wil- Helm Voß (Romania, Serbia), Ludger Westrick (France, Hungary), Leonhard Wolzt (Switzerland). Until June came added: Richard Karoli from the board the Germans revision and Trust AG (Switzerland), Charles Lindemann from the North Germans Lloyd or. the company Melchers & Co. (Switzerland) and the Director the Orient Department of Reemtsma Konzerns Wenkel as Representative Philip F Reemtsmas .

92 BAK, R 3/1941, Bl. 135, AT Westricks above one Meeting with Blessings at the March 8, 1944.

sten Employees, and again others began with one extensive personal reporting.

Approximately 20 such big business Situation analysis are verifiable, but only one Handful _ is receive. She are consistently through the catastrophic setbacks embossed, the the German Economic policy in of their European sphere of power between March and July 1944 suffered before then also the military-political Position of power always more collapsed. Accordingly desperate was the Search after one rest from room for maneuver, and ever more this disappeared, the more more advised Kehrls large industrial State representative to hardest Violent measures opposite the Satellites at at the same time increasing willingness to make concessions in the Handling with the neutral countries. End March 1944 concluded Wilhelm Voss for example after one detailed Romania report: Only one "central", the military supplementary "economic warfare" be still in the Location, against the slogan to do something, "that it Yes as well good were, approximately the Grain in the Danube closed pour, as to Germany to deliver." ⁹³ One and a half months later had itself the Location like that pointedly that August Rohdewald recommended, "all goods that could be used for us quickly- as quickly as possible to capture and to transport away, there Romania because of the permanent deterioration his Supply situation in Brevity not more ready for delivery be should." ⁹⁴

Quite other tones hit against it Hugo Stinnes at, one of Scandinavia experts of Europe circle. In view of the growing pressure from Anglo-Americans on Sweden fell him to Maintenance the Trade relations nothing other than one the best possible preparation for the new contract negotiations coming up at the end of the year, as well as until there "the impeccable fulfillment ours Contractual obligations". ⁹⁵ Later advised he from that, on the "Black lists" the Western Allies "with one same Measure" to answer , and Köster offered comprehensive Customs union plans, with those man despite of War should "step out" immediately. In these votes showed itself clearly, How dramatically the Requirements for the Sweeper European strategy until for the Summer 1944 worsened. How should one at the Key sectors oriented Overall concept still grab and any propaganda effects unfold, if practical economic warfare on the one hand Economies the Satellite countries just as to plunder started How the occupied territories, and if on the other hand the from the Allies under Pressure set neutrals Countries _ always more complex courted became?

Out of the protocols of "European Circle" occurs this itself always stronger exacerbating dilemma out. In the Connection at a more informal meeting cycle met he in March 1944 twice (at the 1. and 15.), thereafter at each end of the month once in the Donut Hotel Esplanade mostly under the Line Blessings. ⁹⁶ Next to one Part the country representative the Business were out of dem Planning Office Arnold Köster, Frederick Cathedral (note taker), Reinhold Krause and sometimes also Eric Further represent, while out of dem

⁹³ Ibid, Bl. 94 ff., Wilhelm Voss, report above the Position in Romania (Quote Bl. 105).

⁹⁴ Ibid, Bl. 75, Köster at Sweep!, May 10, 1944 (with Content presentation one Romania report v. Rohde forest).

⁹⁵ Ibid, Bl. 40, Stinnes at Köster, May 27, 1944.

⁹⁶ BAK, R 3/1941. In the file are Endorsements or. Protocols above the Monthly meetings at the 15.3., 25.4., 30.5., 27.6. u. August 29, 1944 contain.

Head of department of the Ministry of Armaments, especially the Rationalization Commissioner Walter _ Rafelsberger and the Reich Commissioner for the Pricing as well as Kehrl deputy Hans Fischböck took part. The commitment of the Discussants were different. As pronounced activists did itself before everything the Entrepreneur Theodore Mom and Alfred C. Toepfer because of their additional military Features out,⁹⁷ while Blessing below multiple assistance through Hermann J. Section from the Germans Bank the conceptual _ Frame defined and the "technocratic" Entrepreneurial environment of planning office essentially the Country reporting remained limited.

The whole Pursue started as one Art "Board of Economic Warfare". In the first phase negotiated the European circle about covered Operations for procurement of strategic raw materials, above Black market sales from gold and currency in the Southeast European countries to support the Economic negotiations and the German Payment debts as well above Special activities to extraction more collaborative partner out of dem economic establishment the Nordic and Southeast European Countries. This was followed in May by a second period in which the topics discussed so far are becoming increasingly clear the Economic collapse in Southeastern Europe and through the Anglo-Saxon Pressure on the neutral ones States overshadowed became. Horrified became the increasing effectiveness the US- American embargolists against Companies and Individuals („proclaimed lists") to note taken, where Potter the output from Counterlists proposed, while Para she in one "Reference list for the Post war period" converted knowledge wanted.⁹⁸ Ultimately sat down itself also on the Discussion level the in the To report already proposed dichotomous _ Change of course through: "Commissioner" policy opposite the bankrupt Southeast European satellites, and in the blatant contrast in addition one Practice the Kid gloves in dealing with the economic elites of Portugal, Sweden, the Switzerland, Spain and of Turkey.

In the third work phase, the itself in the June July connected this Techniques more economical warfare through the late insight superimposed, that man the Thought leaders of the planning office is now also increasingly involved realization of theirs longer-term economic collaboration concepts to hand go must. Wilhelm Voss had before already one List of Southeast European industrialists willing to collaborate submitted. Ludger Westrick reported on be Advertise with the managers of the European aluminum industry, and **Max H. Schmid** presented appropriate efforts around the Swedish Manufacturer from Pulp and synthetic fibers in Outlook. Also otherwise was the June meeting through the Striving to restore the increasingly torn threads between economic realpolitik and post-war planning to link together. Sweep! implored once more the need to set up small specialist committees made up of German and foreign entrepreneurs entitlement to an economic one Monopoly position distance to take and yourself in this one Framework without reservation Ask the Post-war design place. Straight

97 The Textile industrialists Theodore Mom directed as major the reserve the Textile department at the military military commander in France and worked as a German "accompanying officer" for Bichelonne, Toepfer operation in the Frame the Wehrmacht defense from Paris the "unconventional" procurement from Alloy metals from Portugal and Spain.

98 **BAK, R 3/1941, Bl. 32 f.**

because the state leadership does not in be able to in this respect one General line should be given the German participants itself before with reference to the Post-war goals arrange and

"to this Ask the on the part of Planning Office already ongoing Investigations above a continental European one "Large area planning". ⁹⁹ Blessings added this vote with dem Note that extensive Anglo-American post-war plans not about it to deceive that "the Development since dem End of first world war the complete one inability of these Countries to guide or Redesign of the World economy proven" have. ¹⁰⁰ **With** this argumentation let itself her Propaganda effect on the Elites the "Neutrals" light out of the fishing lift, around the "Thoughts one Reorganization the Business continental Europe under German Guide" again attractive to make. This optimistic assessment lock itself Kehrl at and recommended the Writing an exposé supported by appropriate numerical materials and diagrams. Be there additionally to emphasize that the "New regulations the European "Economy" by no means

„under dem one-sided export printing Germany stand" become.

c) The foreign economic Post-war program

The argument Kehrls and Bennings, war and Peace could only still through massive increase the Introduce at more simultaneous throttling the Exports to be won was by Beginning at controversial. But the Planning Office had first the Notebook of action in the hand. The Reich Ministry of Economics seemed in the Autumn 1943 personnel and largely functional exploited. The Business groups got into trouble always more in the So-called the

“planned economy” steering instruments, through the the system the Main committees and rings increasingly overbuilt was, and himself the statistical department of the Reich group Industry had to get in the Industry reporting and the Employee reports of the planning office.

However formed itself until for the New Year 1943/44 clear countercurrents, which away February March 1944 on a common foreign economic denominator notified _ and first in the Autumn in context the general economic disintegration process again a To some extent moved apart. What she until held together there, was that after one The common interest in one that arose in the first orientation phase Blockade of itself in the "total war economy" looming socio-economic structural change and the associated power shifts. In addition, they wanted and had to also the Counterforces economic policy for the “final victory” contribute and this one in turn on the post-war project. For that discovered she the Foreign trade as adequate Counterweight . centers of Those were the events Reich Ministry of Economics, the Reich Trade Group and the Reich Industry Group.

In the concentration decree from the September 2nd 1943 were dem Reich Ministry of Economics as compensation for the transfer of all production-related control instruments to the Ministry of Armaments the Responsibilities for fundamental economic policy Questions,

⁹⁹ Ibid, Bl. 15 f., Sweep! on the meeting of Europe circle at the June 27, 1944.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, Bl. 17.

for the control the Consumer Goods Supply and for the coordination the Foreign trade assured been. It took until for the End of year, until this Features in the Entourage of one personnel Revirements at the Great accepted and gradually new were coordinated with each other . The surcharge received the Reichsgruppe Handel, its leader and general manager - Franz Hayler and Otto Ohlendorf - at the 16. November 1943 for the State Secretary or. for the boss the new Policy Department (Main Department II) appointed were, and in tighter poll with it a exponent the foreign economic Interests the Reich group Industry, Franz Kirchfeld, the in the January to the top in 1944 the Foreign trade department (Main Department III) stepped. Add came Reorganization measures in the Reich group industry itself. She tightened hers Foreign Trade Department and equipped it as a foreign trade department with significantly expanded competencies.

On the Search after new, the Survival perspective against the armor and After initial hesitation on their part, the leadership of the Reich Industry Group took advantage of the options for action secured by planned economic control logic and sent them a month and a half later with dem Ferrostaal Director Franz Kirchfeld, dem Textile industrialists Hans Croon and Karl Albrecht, the previous general manager the Precision engineering business group and Optics, three Men into the Run,¹⁰¹ the above the required Experience and hardness for the by no means frictionless pact the now firmly in the Reich Ministry of Economics anchored Reich group trade had. First after itself highlighted had, that itself first out of the distress of interaction from economic policy Fundamental competence and more radicalized foreign economic Practice one Virtue make let, and that secondly , the alliance between trade and industry proved to be sustainable despite all the friction, came it temporarily to one common Front position against the always more radical structural effects the Spear Kehrlschen Armament steamroller and in the Connection with it to an unstable status quo with regard to the longer term Post-war perspectives. This development sat but first away Spring 1944 a. She is in the most Representations unjustified on the entire stage since the Revirements from the Autumn 1943 been projected back.

The founding of "Working group for foreign trade issues"

The News out of dem Southeast Committee the RGI and the remaining country committees showed _ that itself the Trade relations before everything with the Southeast European Satellites worsened from month to month. A wide variety of suggestions for remediation of the mutual Blockages were submitted and discarded one after the other.¹⁰² It was also always more urgent, the monetary policy Post-war debates the Western Allies one well-founded criticism to oppose and the own "European" Monetary policy to check. Opposite these changed requirements he appeared previous foreign trade apparatus - Reich office for foreign trade, foreign exchange offices, examination centers, bilateral re-

101 BAK, R 121/230-232 (Carl Albrecht); R 6/2135 (Hans croon); R 7/37 u. 3004; R 91/1016; BAP, German Bank, P 10882 (French Kirchfeld).

102 For example BAK, R 12 1/230, Daily report Albrecht from the January 19, 1944, Meeting with Hans Croon.

government committees - exactly like his previous coordination instrument, the trade policy Committee, far too frozen, than that he fast, unconventional and would be flexible can react .

Consequently came Karl Albrecht ¹⁰³, new head of the foreign trade department of the Reich Industry Group (VI), in constant dialogue with dem RGI special representative for Foreign trade issues Hans Croon and with Frederick from Poil, dem new Chief Executive Officer of Reich group trade, on the idea of one of the Economy alone controlled foreign trade steering instrument to found, that me the by Franz Kirchfeld Main Department III of the Reich Ministry of Economics was supposed to serve as an executive authority. From Poil signaled in the Course of February 1944 the fundamental standby Haylers, Ohlendorfs and Kirchfelds to one such Step, and End February put the two Reich group representatives in poll with Kirchfeld the Founder group together. For the provisional determination of "structure, Area of work and working procedures" came it after negotiations between Albrecht, Croon, from Poil and dem Viennese Industrialists Philip by Schoeller at the March 13, 1944. ¹⁰⁴

Ten days later became the working group for Foreign trade issues in the Boardroom of the Germans Industrial bank founded. ¹⁰⁵ Appeared were next to the Initiators the permanent members, on the itself the both imperial groups agreed had: Karl Blessing, Hans Boden from the AEG, Max Ilgner and Philip from Schoeller as Representative the Industry and Otto Braun (Transdanubia Ein- und Exporthandelsgesellschaft mbH), Karl Lindemann, Edgar Michael from the company CB Michael and Carl von Schroeder (Staudt & Co.) as representatives of the trade. Hans became president Croon elected, Carl by Schroeder became deputy, and the Managing directors shared itself from Poil, Albert and Anton Reithinger from the Economic Department the IG Colors.

The core of committee formed thus Large industrialists and merchant capitalists, the especially in the southeast business were committed and wholesale in the occupied territories. ¹⁰⁶ Commercial transport experts were significantly underrepresented in the founding phase with the neutrals countries, but also global commercial interests were relative weak represent (Lindemann and Michael). The Overlaps with dem Europe circle Kehrls limited itself on the Multifunctional Blessings and Lindemann, were later she through the Join in some Expert out of dem Large bank spectrum (para and Rohdewald) and the economics Institutes (Andrew Predöhl, Emil Woermann) a little more dense. A longer-term supporting program was initially launched not adopted, probably because some Participant the whole thing initially only as a species Lobby event understood knowledge wanted to and in the Collaborate from Export industry and trade were looking for opportunities "in a real trench war

103 Charles Albrecht, born at the August 4, 1902 in Rathenow, was from 1924 until 1934 Authorized signatory and departmental director in the company Emil bush AG in Rathenow. From 1934 until to his appointment for the RGI Ab- Head of Division for Foreign Trade he seemed like Chief Executive Officer the precision engineering business group and Optics.

104 BAK, R 121/230, AT Albrecht, Re: working group for foreign trade, March 13, 1944.

105 For the following BAK, R 11/104a; R 121/230; R 13 XV/68.

106 To the later personnel Extensions and subcommittees see. the Graph.

the Bureaucracies entrenched problems". Foreign trade "up their mostly surprisingly simple ones Basics attributed." ¹⁰⁷ That this Expectation trough, showed however already those directly on it following events.

The working group for Foreign trade issues

President: Hans Croon (away October 1944: Charles Blessing)

Deputy: Carl von Schroeder

Managing Director: Frederick from

Poil deputy: **Charles** Albert

Circle of Managing Directors: from Poil, Albrecht, Gunter

Keizer, Kirchfeld, Anthony Reithinger,

Willy Lück (from September 1944)

Constant Members:

RGI representative: Charles Blessings, Hans Floor, Max Ilgner,

Philipp von Schoeller

RGH representative: Otto Brown, Charles Lindemann, Edgar

Michael, Carl von Schroeder

Subcommittees/working groups:

- More nutritionally efficient Foreign Trade Committee: Michael, from Poil (reviewer: Woermann, Hahn)
- Manufacturing assurance for the Export: Floor, Albert
- Policy Committee: Ilgner, Reithinger, from Schoeller
- Price statistics: Reithinger, Albrecht, George Leipersberger
- Monetary Committee: Blessing, Braun, Ilgner, von Schoeller (reviewer: Section, Rohdewald; Secretary: Gunter Keiser)
- Committee to Assessment the global economic Development at important groups of goods (away End September 1944):
 - Agrarian Main products Grain, Meat, fat (from Poil, Michael)
 - Cotton (Carl Albrecht, Long)
 - Non-ferrous metals (Wilhelm Avienny)
 - Chemical fibers (illegal, Reithinger)
 - Iron and steel (Jacob W. Reichert)
 - skins, fats, tannins (Carl from Schroeder, from Poil)
 - wood (Hasslacher, Heske)
 - Potash (steel, Albert)
 - rubber (illegal, Charles Ehrhardt, Reithinger)
 - Money (J. regular)
 - mineral oil (Blessings, Frederick cathedral)

107 **BAK, R 12 1/231**, AT Albrecht for Good v. April 27, 1944 with an excerpt a letter from the State Secretary a. D. Ernst Trendelenburg at Croon v. April 14, 1944.

- Sulfur pyrites and sulfur (kissel)
- Nitrogen (illegal, Reithinger, poo bird)
- Tobacco (Söhring, Raabe)
- Wool (Alfred Müller-Armack)
- Pulps (brought)
- Sugar (Carl Büchting, Ahlfeld)

Source: BAK, R 7/2121, 2128, 2129, 2135; R 121/230-233; BAP, German Bank, P 339.

After he towards the end of the constituent Meeting of three working groups Backup production for export (Boden, Albrecht), for price statistics (Albrecht, Reithinger and Georg Leipersberger of the Siemens-Schuckertwerke AG) and Clearing questions (Blessing, Ilgner, Braun) had founded, went the Working group in the Reichsbank building for a reception at the Reich Minister of Economics and President of the Germans Reichsbank.¹⁰⁸ At this Opportunity sat Wireless some Accents that first Months later from Hayler and Ohlendorf _ copied become should. In the National Socialist Economic policy be it now private property, free property, has become urgent Entrepreneurial initiative and Performance competition against the itself in the steering systems always more broad making "Pensioner of quotas " to defend, led Wireless out of. Additionally must man after areas seek, in which the dismantling of war-related regulations could be practiced in advance, and for this be that Foreign trade at the most suitable. Here they would have to "Practitioner" does now on the Front, around as "Export authorized representatives", Special connoisseur or Top managers the Examination bodies from the new to founding advisory boards out of more flexible to make, the right one The atmosphere for the always more difficult becoming negotiations to create and with your "really good ones" Friends) in the Abroad ... on the hunt or at the Play golf or in clubs the main _ Things to treat."¹⁰⁹ Funks hopes were so pinned up. He let no doubt to it, that he of the entrepreneurs like that something like a Secret recipe expected that the Bracketing of combat against the threatening socio-economic Structural change in Inside with one foreign economic initiative to rescue the Power bases of Nazi imperialism.

The day after, Croon, Kirchfeld and Albrecht reported one Meeting the managing director the Business groups at the Reich Industry Group the founding meeting.¹¹⁰ Included made she clear, that she the Aspirations Funks shared and energetic to act willing were. Now was additionally from one fourth Working group the Speech, which _ with the "Treatment the economic layout the Future" should concern - a first Notice on additional activities in the innermost Circle the RGI.¹¹¹ Hans Croon demand-

108 Foreign trade needs active Cooperation. In: German General Newspaper, No. 85 v. March 26, 1944.

109 BAK, R 13 XV/68, AT Frederick Wilhelm from Raumers above the Managing Director's meeting RGI at the March 24, 1944 (Report Croons about the speech Funks).

110 BAK, R 12 I/230, AT Albrecht about the Meeting the Business group managing director at the RGI at the March 24, 1944; BAK, R 13 XV/68, AT Raumers v. March 24, 1944 (from here the following quotes).

111 As itself the working group for Foreign trade issues constituted, lock Ludwig Erhard straight his Memorandum above the War financing and Debt consolidation away, with the the acti-

to the management of the business groups, itself now with everyone Power turn on and her Right to exist under Proof to place, especially the Reich Ministry of Economics guaranteed have, the "Disavowal from men the Business, the itself for to highlight such purposes to avoid at all costs. Franz Kirchfeld implored in turn the necessity, dem battered Reich Ministry of Economics on the Legs to help and itself with combined forces at the enormous address foreign trade problems. The effort is definitely worth it, as recent events have shown. At the youngest Economic negotiations with the Switzerland be it for example straight still once succeeded, the Transit- and "Gold Turntable" at the pole to maintain their "production power". to exploit and that "already in Table box finished foreign exchange law" to impede. At the Croatia case have he himself clarified, that it not more tackle, „from so one ridiculous Predatory state so much being" to make. The Time, in the Croatia and the other small countries of the southeast to the Germans for their "Fighting for Europe ... on everyone Contract negotiation right away Beginning" the "clearing tips below the nose" held, be now over. The problem Clearing tip" must "as well as for the Past as also for future finally in the background step", because it as exclusive homemade Consequence of inflation the trading partner should be viewed. Wireless have yourself this point of view to own made and recently in Vienna gave a speech with dem Result, "That's it Balkan states, this company with more limited Liability', the Shock into the bones _ driven be." ¹¹² The question is against that the Backup the Production for the export a "tacky topic" the but on every case addressed become must.

As Third in the Bunds seconded Karl Albrecht Kirchfeld with Report on the current contract negotiations with Denmark, Hungary and France. Included would result itself before towards everything the new French partners Possibilities, but also constraints on initiative. She felt itself on the one hand through the Overreach of communism from North Africa on the mainland threatened and could now lighter for the German work and interested in social constitution become. On the other hand, they always got it wrong stronger under the influence the Western Allies post-war debates, while she thought that from German Page "even nothing in this regard happen ... Be it urgent necessary, here one other the atmosphere to and to maintain more concrete discussions on such topics with suitable industrialists from abroad ." ¹¹³

All in all, the management of the Reichsgruppe Industrie was determined to work together with the Foreign Trade Department of Reich Ministry of Economics and theirs commercial capitalist partners a economic policy instrument to create, that compared to the foreign trade course the satellite radically tightened, the neutral countries with Concessions overwhelmed and the economic elites Western Europe with Collaboration offers courted. She was with it under reversed sign to one Conception

vities the so-called steel circle began; but also Fritz Laukisch, the Director the news outlet the **RGI**, busy itself since March 1944 with dem Post-war needs at Agricultural machines . See **BAK**, **R** 12 1/26.

112 Meant is Funk, Walther, The Countries of the Southeast and the European Economic Community. Speech, held before the Southeast European Society in Vienna on March 10, 1944, Vienna 1944.

113 **BAK**, **R** 13 XV/68, AT Raumers v. March 24, 1944.

reached, the the economic policy Practice of Sweeper Europe circle in the essential . Interestingly learned Albrecht, together with von Poil der most energetic and at the best informed activist of working group, first Beginning August 1944 from its existence, and felt through Blessings downright betrayed.¹¹⁴

One Export offensive as more real background the Foreign trade plans

The Attempt, through one private entrepreneurial initiative of all things the trade policy bottlenecks with the Post-war perspective connect, had a solid real background. So How the "Europe Circle" Kehrls up the economic Willingness to collaborate the European and international defense companies could, so also disposed the protagonists one German Foreign trade offensive above a Pledge: Which since dem Autumn 1943 clearly increasing Foreign trade activities the entire Business .

How representative handed down Files in Connection with the relevant investigation reports of Western Allies show,¹¹ rose⁵the "informal" Export volume the leading Large companies since Autumn 1943 explosively. Over the Desks from the electrical industry business group, for example, received permit applications within just a few weeks for the Started of Siemens Group in a international Syndicate for vacuum discharge devices, around the Reserve lands of the Swiss market leader pumpless rectifiers supply to can; Telefunken wanted a 100 Build a kilowatt medium wave transmitter in Sweden; and the Bremer Atlas works AG offered the Swedish Navy underwater sonar devices; all of these applications were approved . Just as approved became the large-scale distribution from post-war orders to the Subsidiaries the German Electrical industry in everyone neutrals countries, the now expanded and converted were to the Market position at pickups, quartz and utility lamps, rocker and Gas pressure switches as well tubes and electromedical device expand. Meanwhile mobilized the IG Farben Group entire domestic and foreign "peseta funds" and cemented since the autumn 1943 the Iberian Peninsula his dominant position in the Pharmaceutical, paint and explosives industries.¹¹⁶

So had of all things with those large companies, the on strongest in the "planned economy" "scientific" Arms mobilization clamped were, one huge reactivation of foreign trade activities, and they now worked together with the wholesale companies as Pacemaker for the crossing the entire Business to one

114 **BAK, R** 12 1/232, Albrecht, activities of the planning office the area of foreign trade, daily report from the RGI department VI v. August 2, 1944.

115 See. for the following **BAK, R** 13 V/241-257 (Foreign trade activities the Economic group electrical industry since 1943); FDRL, Harley Martin Kilgore papers, Box No. 114, Study of the FEA Drafting Committee on the Treatment of the Allied Activities Relating to German Assets, Economic Activities and Industrial Personnel Outside Germany from the Standpoint of International Security (TIDC Project 25, coordinated by Enemy Branch, Foreign Economic Administration), August 6, 1945.

116 BAP, IG Farben, No. A 2393 (transactions for the IG Farben subsidiaries FNCE, Flix/Inquiresa and Martin SA since autumn 1943).

“wild ones Post-war planning”. What out of today view not only unscrupulous and cynical, rather also confused and contradictory works, became from the back then Economic actors obviously complementary understood. they wanted on the one hand “Fortress Europe” is so efficient and so long How only possible defend, on the other hand clung she itself through the anticipated one Export offensive in the Economic structures the neutrals Countries so firmly that the future victors will agree to a European post-war policy without significant German ones participation only around the Price more radical more structural Interventions also in the remained neutral countries in the location were. Out of this view complemented each other the economic post-war planning of “European Circle” and of “Working group for foreign trade issues” despite the significant Frictions between its leading actors absolutely. For the realization of both There were variants it enough foreign partners who to Collaboration _ were ready because they were one European Post-war perspective without the Economic potential the Germans not introduce could.

First if you itself this logic the economics “Basic” visualizes the suddenly rapid foreign economic activities of the two imperial groups your real economic policy references understandable, especially her inner Right to exist through the armaments economics Changes threatened was. Now could you itself on one new terrain useful make, by she it of their into the neutral ones Clientele pushing abroad savings, the foreign exchange, imperial and opposite examination centers continue with haggle for exemptions for “industrial delay” using flimsy alibis to must. Her Task duration consequently first once in this, the to clear away the home-made administrative barriers that slowed down “free” economic expansion into neutral foreign countries and for Treating it as carefully as possible is important for survival become partner to worry while she itself often in the same breath for the expansion of the exploitation and plunder regime the previous Southeast European ones Satellite regime pronounced.

The activities of the “working group for Foreign trade issues” and the Foreign Trade Department the Reich group Industry

With it was for the working group the acute Framework for action specified. His most important task saw he first in this, trade-offs from the ongoing Armaments manufacturing in favor of Export interests to enforce, because to validation of expanding informal free Capital movements was now the accurate observance the in the bilateral contracts specified official Delivery obligations - and thus the prevention from “Clearing peaks” - opposite the neutrals countries from biggest Meaning. The for that used The committee took part in the negotiations just one day after the working group was formed Sweep! on.¹¹⁷ The head of the planning office was general for collaboration and to concessions to those countries ready because of her own exports for the German armaments industry was important. However, he strictly refused to impose a general level of urgency for export purposes on a certain part of German production to admit. On this one position insisted he until for the June, because despite the press

¹¹⁷ BAK, R 121/230, AT Albrecht over one Meeting with Kirchfeld and Floor, March 25, 1944.

sions of working group was from the Reich Ministry of Economics first "no one Mr. Kehrl grown", and the held further at his Opinion firmly, "Man must so much How only possible introduce and so little How possible carry out." ¹¹⁸

Finally came at the 19. June the Draft one agreement between Kehrl and Kirchfeld conditions, the the Export planning though largely from the specifications of the through the planning office to be determined Import planning dependent made, dem Reich Ministry of Economics but finally a separate quota for "normal" and "Compensation transactions" were granted as well as additionally Kirchfelds Authority to give instructions opposite the Implementing bodies of Foreign trade (Imperial and examination centers) affirmed. ¹¹⁹ That was it the Hurdling not yet finished. There were renegotiations, because Spear single Passages disapproved, and first Beginning August 1944 was the Decree under Roof and subject. ¹²⁰ Now could the since April constituted Company advisory boards at the for the export economic ranking and Foreign exchange problems responsible Examination bodies in action step

- the second most important Task in the practice-related Target Catalog of working group was with that too completed. ¹²¹

Switched in parallel the working group is involved in the ongoing bilateral economic negotiations a. There he but How the "Europe Circle" only monthly to full sessions met _ and the from the Reich group trade taken over Preparatory work often too wish left over let, laid itself the Director the RGI foreign trade department in the June 1944 a own "Foreign Trade Council" to, the with the industry representatives of Working group identical was, the Chairman the RGI state committees as expert included and so more and more as "Kitchen Cabinet" of working group acted. ¹²² Included came it to an astonishing division of labor with dem Europe circle of Planning Office for Southeastern Europe. While this before everything in Romania intervention, looked at the Croatia working group and Hungary as his special Intervention area. He operation the Appointment of Hans floor as "General Plenipotentiary for the Business" in the Rod Veesenmayers, the one before Location for that ensured, that the "Clearing question ... in Future in none Way more your influence on the Amount of Hungarian deliveries" exercised. ¹²³

Vice versa undertook Albert everything, What to correct fulfillment the contracts with the neutrals countries necessary was, and launched away April May in the Environment of working group

118 BAK, R 13 VI/45, note Hauser's above one Meeting with Kirchfeld, April 19, 1944.

119 P.A AA, R 106500, planning office, agreement above Cooperation between imperial economy ministry and planning office, June 19, 1944.

120 BAK, R 12 1/232, Albert at v. Poil, Re: Backup the production for the Export, 19.7. 1944; Albrecht, Daily report the Department VI the RGI v. July 27, 1944; Daily report the Department VI v. August 22, 1944.

121 See. the ongoing reporting Albrecht about it in: BAK, R 121/230-232.

122 **BAK**, R 121/231, Albert at Ilgner, Re: Education one Foreign Trade Council at the Reich group Industry, June 24, 1944. Actually became the Chairman the RGI state committees to the important tigsten consultants Albrecht, the so to Horror Eminence of working group rise. It were this Ernst Hanauer (AEG), Franz Hasslacher (Brother Hasslacher & Co., Creditanstalt Bankverein Vienna), Hans Lenze (Mannesmann export GmbH), Hans Reuters (Demag AG), Wilhelm Voss (AG before. Skodawerke) and Hermann Waibel (IG Colors).

123 Ibid, Circular Albrecht, Department VI the RGI, Re: Hungary, June 9, 1944.

one Row from Good Will Tours in the neutrals European Countries, around to brightening of the itself contributing more and more to the negotiating climate that is developing to the detriment of German interests . He explored the terrain more and more frequently own fist and used the working group as legitimizing background for the Construction one German business lobby, which at the same time carefully out of the previous symbiosis with the Nazi foreign propaganda swerved out. The German foreign chambers of commerce were used as bases for German Investment interests and as economic policy Sources of information especially regarding the Post-war preparations Host countries reactivated. Presidential members the German group the International Chamber of Commerce took up listening posts and delivered _ the first Analyzes and materials for the Complex the western allies Post-war planning . With the results of her research, Albrecht went into the post-war economy from July 1944 planning committees peddle and demoted the working group increasingly _ to one facade the foreign economic Operations the Reich group Industry by he this with one Information monopoly with reference to of the in Abroad the post-war discourse. In cooperation with Ludwig Erhard, dem Director of in the Spring 1943 Institute for Industrial Research founded and financed by the Reichsgruppe Industrie , intensified Albert the periodic publication "Confidential information for the German Chambers of Commerce Abroad" or "Information on Foreign Trade", ¹²⁴ in those News about the current Economic development and the Post- war discussions the Neutrals and Western Allies gradually one dominant took a position . This made itself Albrecht always more the skepticism of Economists Gunnar Myrdal to own, the the in the February 1944 founded Swedish Government Committee for Questions the Post-war economy led to a severe post-war recession the USA predicted and in Expectation of rush decay the Anti-Hitler coalition the suppression the Nazi dictatorship before one to great "optimism for peace" warned. ¹²⁵

The leading figures in the working group initially attached importance to solid coordination the to expected foreign economic Post-war reality with their own design ideas. Standing there the Clearing- and currency debates, the more one reflected transitional constellation, in the center the Debates. Over We are their course not informed in detail, because the protocols of the on the founding event following three meetings from the 27. April, 27. May and 15. June 1944 lost are. Also the work results of "Clearing- and Monetary Committee" as well as of "Principles Committee" himself are only incomplete documented, the Lines of argument of their memorandums can only indirectly some comments and statements can be reconstructed.

124 BAK, R 12 I/232, AT Albrecht above one Meeting with Erhard, Director of Institute for industrial research, above one tight Cooperation between the Department VI and dem Institute in Nuremberg at the July 8/9, 1944.

125 Gunnar Myrdal, Vaming for Fredsoptimism, Stockholm 1944; first German Output: warning before peace optimism, Zurich/New York 1945. Albrecht was during one Sweden trip on the Book attentive made been and worried one Translation. The first Passages ver- sent he at the July 26, 1944 at Ilgner, before had he at the 22.7. also Ohlendorf on Myrdal attention Sam made. See. BAK, R 12 I/232, Albert at Ohlendorf, Albert at Ilgner, July 26, 1944.

The debate started on the monthly meeting on April 27th with one dispute over the first Draft version the Reithinger/Ilgner memorandum to "Increase of European _ armament and military economic potential" from the 25. March 1944.¹²⁶ After that she became apparently with dem vote postponed, that memorandum in the Clearing- and Monetary Committee to bring in, the itself in the meantime also constituted had and under the Directed by Blessings or. Gunter Keizers, des conductor the Statistical Department the Private business group banking industry, additionally Appraise from Section and August Rohdewald caught up.¹²⁷ At the center of the dispute stood once more the offsetting debts to the Southeast European countries countries, where the known protagonists one soft course out of the MWT-IG Farben warehouse anew with dem Vote for one more or fewer violent ones Debt cancellation collided.

In the meantime acted it itself but only still around a sandbox game, the Albert anyway-well together with Erhard, Keizer and Reithinger to continue thought.¹²⁸ Because the national economies the Southeast European Countries broke in the July August finally together, and with it superfluous itself more Discussions. Sense left behind she at most in some of the speeches that Funk gave in June/July, such as his Königsberger speech, which was extremely hyped up for propaganda purposes speech from the 7. July 1944, the as counterpart to the at the 1. July in Bretton Woods held Monetary Conference the Allies thought was.¹²⁹ In this one in the essential _ from the Economic Department of Reichsbank wrote¹³⁰ There were omissions a single one constructive economic fragments of thought, namely the vague suggestion one possible Bond to Consolidation the German Clearing debts. Tellingly was it exclusively this tiny relic the Suggestions for modifications MWT-IG-farben group in the debates of "Working group for foreign trade issues", the out of dem rhetorical mixture from immobilism, Know-it-all attitude and caves propaganda phrases stood out and accordingly registered became.¹³¹ Such

126 See. above the Section "Interventions ...".

127 **BAK, R 7/3636**, Undated note out of the Main Department Foreign trade (III Gr. I) of RWM about the working group's "blessing committee". for Foreign trade issues.

128 **BAK, R 121/232**, AT Albrecht above one Meeting with Erhard at the July 8/9, 1944.

129 **BAK, R 7/2005**, Walther Funk, economic order against monetary mechanism, speech in Königsberg/Pr. at the July 7, 1944. Printed in: *The German National economy* 13 (1944), No. 21, S. 601-609. Wireless held the speech out of Occasion of 400 years old existence the university Königsberg. To Before- and postprocessing see. **BAK, R 11/2121**; **BAP**, German Reichsbank, No. 7023.

130 **BAP**, German Reichsbank, No. 7023, Bl. 239-270, Economic Department the imperial Bank, Draft one speech for Mr Reich Minister of Economics ... - The Draft agrees with the essential Passages of final speech text agree. Autumn has the Status the At- language overestimated. She brought only still the behind the compromise efforts makeshift ver- stuck helplessness of working group for Foreign trade issues and the Economic Department the Reichsbank for the Expression; Autumn, S. 305 ff.

131 For example published the magazine "Banking" two anonymous opinions, in those she this one Suggestion on the one hand highlighted, on the other hand but the allies _Currency plans as a right Step to Solution of dilemmas from Balance of payments equilibrium and regardless more tangible global economic Postwar expansion defended: economic or monetary order tion? In: *Banking industry* 1944, No. 14, S. 274-276; One Balance bond to ablation the Clearing debts? *ibid*, S. 276-277.

Marginalia were able to but not about it to deceive that the Nazi imperialism the monetary and post-war economic policy planning the Allies had nothing left to oppose.

d) First Policy documents the Reich group Industry

The ones so far examined approaches economic policy Instances for Post-war planning stood out through a clear practical relevance out of. In the circles of Big capital and high finance became but also Voices loud, the itself for one from practical Intervention requirements independent Preparation on the End of war pronounced, around itself in an independently developed planning variant to become clear about the ultimate common denominator of their often divergent strategic interests. Just like the big companies back then at the Preparation more strategic Investments the most different Decision options to clarify used to, like that laid itself now the Reich group Industry a autonomous Planning area to, the with the Work of "European Circle" and of The "Working Group for Foreign Trade Issues" was only loosely linked and the economic policy issues were examined exclusively from the perspective of private sector autonomy illuminated. As result was one independent problem-solving variant aimed at, the at the "Day "X" independent from the respective political, military and territorial conditions of peace agreement out of the Drawer pulled become could. She should then as basis for the respectively concrete Action orientations and the with it associated interventions serve the official departments.

The requirement after an independent developed instruments for Clarification of the upcoming socio-economic Structural breaks at the crossing from the War for the Post-war became for the first time in the May 1943 in more veiled shape articulated, as the Board of Trustees the scarce seven Months before founded "Supporting community the German Industry" for first time met.¹³² Rudolf steel, the CEO of the Salzdettfurth Group and deputy Director the Reich group Industry,¹³³ requested next to the Support

132 For the following N/A, RG 260, FINAD 2/215/1. The founding the "Supporting community the German industry" worked out an initiative of the Siemens Group and took place on November 18, 1942 in the Intention, „the German Business in the Danger of decline to assist." President became Hermann from Siemens, to Vice Presidents became from the out of dem entire industrial spectrum delegates founding members Hermann Schmitz (IG Colors), Albert Vogeller (United steel mills) and Wilhelm Pliers (Director the RGI and General Director the Mannesmann tube works) chosen. As Treasurer worked Dr. Achenbach, the Managing Director of Board of Trustees the Adolf Hitler donation the commercial Business.

133 Rudolf Steel, born at the April 20, 1884 in Barmen, was first How Wilhelm Pliers director in the Demag Group. 1929 became he for the General Director the Mansfeld AG for mining and Hut operation appointed, away May 1935 worked he additionally as Managing Director of Salzdettfurth Group. He became 1930 in the board of Reich Association the Germans Industry co-opted. In the May 1933 stepped he the NSDAP at. 1940 became he for the deputy Director and Member of Closer Advisory Board the Reich group Industry appointed. He died 1946. See. Eckert, S. 243-277, here S. 265 f.; Radandt, Hans, war crimes corporation Mansfeld, S. 61 ff., 185 ff.

from six others operational and economics projects the Creation of one of the "Institute for" supported by the Reichsgruppe Industrie Industrial research" because the "economic Questions later again would play a bigger role" and it therefore appears advisable Looking ahead, "there is a certain possibility Influence and **participation** _ to to back up." ¹³⁴ Be vote became correct understood, and the board of trustees, in dem all industrial Backers of later intellectual post-war planner network the Reich group Industry represent were, approved dem first in Nuremberg domiciled and later after Bayreuth relocated Institute a Three-year budget from respectively 150 000 Reichsmark . ¹³⁵ As in the October 1944 given the now acute become Project expansion "using from today free scientific Capacities" the Authorization additional extraordinary Medium out of dem 20 million fund the Support community When it came up, the Rumpf Board of Trustees readily agreed increase in the funds for the Institute for Industrial Research on 180 000 Reichsmark in the Fiscal year 1944/45 to, although the Distribution key for promoting technical and economic sciences

Projects a long time ago blown up was. ¹³⁶

Personnel backgrounds

However, for the successful development of a basic post-war planning variant not only the financial Medium for the Construction one corresponding institutional framework crucial. It had to itself also the in addition empowered Experts | offer and selected become. Here had the Great the Reich group Industry already some Time before the Application for notable personnel policy decisions made, the background to them and Motivations still in the Year 1977 occasion of the 80th birthday of former leader of RGI Institute in one remarkable Double play from Public Relations and historical hagiography veiled been are. ¹³⁷ There she til today research above the German economic Post-war planning determine, is at this Point one something more detailed reconstruction the historical Facts unavoidable.

¹³⁴ N/A, RG 260, FINAD 2/215/1, report above the 1. meeting of Board of Trustees the Supporting community the German industry on May 20, 1943 in Berlin.

¹³⁵ N/A, RG 260, FINAD 2/215/1, approved Applications in 1. ordinary fiscal year. Attachment 1 to the report above the Task the Support community the Germans Industry, first expanded fiscal year from the 11/18/1942-3/31. 1944; Appendix 3, Support approved for the period from April 1, 1944 to March 31, 1945.

¹³⁶ Ibid, transcript of the debate occasionally the Meeting of some members of the board of trustees the Support community the German industry at the October 25, 1944 in the Reich Industry Group.

¹³⁷ See. Erhard, Ludwig, War financing and debt consolidation. Facsimile print the memorandum v. 1943/44 with Preliminary remarks v. Erhard, Ludwig/Eschenburg, Theodor/Schmölders, Günter , Frankfurt a. M. 1977; Autumn, Ludolf, Overcoming crises and Economic reorganization. Ludwig Erhards participation at the Post-war planning at the End of Second World War. In: VfZ 25 (1977), S. 305-340.

Ludwig Erhard was one iridescent figure with one exciting intellectual Biography.¹³⁸ The 1897 in a Fürther Merchant family born into it had in December 1925 at dem Frankfurter sociologists Franz Oppenheimer with one study above "Beings and Content of unit of value" doctorate and was 1928 in the from Wilhelm Vershofen directed Institute for Economic observation the German Finished goods in Nuremberg occurred, the with was associated with the Nuremberg Commercial College. The institute initially primarily represented market interests the Porcelain- and household appliance industry, advanced but after Erhard's entry also represented market research for the textile and pharmaceutical sectors as well the Cigarette industry.¹³⁹ With this gradual rounding off to an instrument of entire consumer goods spectrum contrasted however the size Depression, the this sector of the economy since 1929 with special force met.

In addition, witnessing the social catastrophe of his own class led to Erhard to one Reflection on the currents critical of imperialism radius of the former academic teacher.¹⁴⁰ In one unpublished remained treatise above "Overcoming the economic crisis economic policy influences"¹⁴¹ Erhard calculated with a Poverty generating Capital accumulation away, the not social

"Wealth, but at best again "Capital" create, with of their hunt after "Pension" the balance between generation and consumption block and any approach to more economical profitability destroy. For this reason must the Country intervene to the economy in conscious Act against her short-sighted profit interests again on the Legs to help. While this conceptual change from Underconsumption theorist for the Trailer _ one countercyclical managed demand mobilization Erhard did not neglect to suggest solutions the Neoclassic from the Blow one Wilhelm Röpke to scourge, but also in extreme Sharpness against the Economic program the Harzburger front from the leather to pull, whose Main exponents Hjalmar shaft he "flat Ignorance" and the "Emergency punishment of Thought... too purposes political Career" accused.¹⁴²

1933 had to the in the meantime 36 year old Vershofen employees his academic plans to bury. In the Institute went it against it steep upwards. Erhard became in the Management added and Co-editor the Institute magazine "The market the finished goods", the now until 1939 as "The German finished goods" company name.¹⁴³

138 From the extensive biographical literature will suffice only two Posts historical-scientific scientific Claims: Mill, Dieter, Ludwig Erhard. One Biography, Berlin 1965; Laytenberger, Volkhard, Ludwig Erhard. The National economist as a politician, Göttingen/Zurich 1986.

139 Bergler, Georg, The Development consumption research in Germany and the society for Consumer research until Years 1945, Kallmütz/Upper Palatinate n.d.; Id., history the University for economic and social sciences in Nuremberg 1919-1961, Vol. II, Nuremberg 1969; Shepherd, Eric, The Institute time in Nuremberg. In: Ludwig Erhard. Posts to his political Biography. Ed. Gerhard Schröder, Alfred Müller-Arnack, Charles Hohmann, John Large u. Rüdiger Altman, Berlin 1971, S. 603-613.

140 Fritz Sternberg, a more famous Marxist, which around a further development the Rosa Luxemburg's underconsumption theory was until 1923 been Oppenheimer's assistant.

141 The following Quotes after Laitenberger, S. 21 ff.

142 Quoted after Mill, S. 25 f.

143 Away 1939 appeared she under dem title "Market and Consumption".

But that the arms build-up policy at the latest the approaching one since the four-year plan period "market organization" at the same time economically paralyzed, could dem savvy Cost structures and sales ratios cannot remain hidden from analysts . He However, he did not react to this by distancing himself accordingly, probably because that was what he supported . Institute in contrast to the business clientele began to prosper extraordinarily, but went to the extreme Over-identification with the projection that is now starting the pointed inner economic disparities one ultra-aggressive Expansion policy. He discovered the primacy of the nation, the price policy and market organization based on superior "moral law" to "Achievement national Goals" legitimated to use be and ultimately all economic activity one corresponding intermediary function reduce.¹⁴⁴ Also the Confinement of effective consumption in the Double corset of rationing and Price control appeared because of superior national Objectives justified thereby caused Mechanism of purchasing power extraction should just go through an "increase in performance" and a well-considered one politics the "Rankings " mitigated become. And still 1942 paid homage Erhard the itself allegedly looming _ "Order of European market" in the entourage the "Expansion the economic _ rooms", because the currently taking place "Overcoming the old rooms" through

"Necessities higher type" conditional be.¹⁴⁵

In the January 1939 was Joseph Bürckel, the Reich Commissioner for the Reunification of Austria with dem Germans Rich, occasionful one Viennese Event of Institute over the since Sales problems changed drastically after the "Annexation". the "Ostmark" economy on Erhard attentive. He appointed him first to the special advisor for Questions the Consumer goods industry, then he continued Erhard and with him the Nuremberg Institute for evaluation of entire rationalization and incorporation process.¹⁴⁶ This cooperation was repeated in the summer of 1940, when Bürckel became boss the civil administration of Lorraine advanced. Erhard advised him first personal in Questions the Re- invigoration the consumer goods industry and procured then a Permanent contract to Supervision the ongoing reorganization and Germanization of the the entire Iothringian economy , which he continued to do after his separation from the Nuremberg Institute and during his work for the Reich Industry Group retained.¹⁴⁷ As But he appeared to be an indispensable expert also regarding the economic incorporation of "new German Eastern Room",

144 Erhard, Ludwig, Influence the Pricing and Fixed price on the quality and the quantity of Offer and of demand. In: Market economy and Economics. One Commitment from the Circles the Nuremberg School for the 60. Birthdays from Wilhelm Vershofen. Ed. Georg Bergler, Ludwig Erhard, Berlin 1939, S. 47-100 , here S. 56 f., 79 f., 83 f.

145 Erhard, Ludwig, market regulation, in: The guide of company. Festschrift for the 60. birthday of Wilhelm Kalveram. Ed. Charles Theisinger, Berlin/Vienna 1942, S. 274-282, here S. 281 f.

146 So far identified: Institute for Economic observation of the German finished goods, Eastern market reports, Vol. I: consumer goods, March 1940; Vol. II: iron and metalworking Industry, March 1940; Vol. IV: glass and ceramics, March 1940; Vol. V: Leather industry the Ostmark, March 1940.

147 See. Institute for Economic observation the German finished goods, Lorraine, Main report Part One: market analysis, July August 1940; Part II: People and economy, July August 1940. Besides could _ until now approximately a dozen Special reports to Lorraine identified become; see. BAK, R 13 XV/123.

where he and the Institute itself with your population economics justified renovation and "productivization" suggestions particularly stood out.¹⁴⁸ So was Erhard until Spring _ 1942 restless strives, the "Necessities higher type" the adequate economic reproduction possibilities To provide, and that Institute for Economic observation the German one Finished goods walked itself under his leadership to one important and secretive instrument of the economic annexation planning. After heated arguments in the Line of Institute and in the Board of Trustees the "Company for Shortly thereafter, he had to resign from all of his Nuremberg functions .

Such spectacular intellectual Fractions they had two others business analysts who the leadership the Reich group Industry in the from Rudolf steel directed "Little ones Circle" the first planning phase co-opt should, not to have, but also she were valid the initiates as first class professionals. Gunter Keizer acted in one economic policy area of tension, whose masterminds have been in the interplay of confidential since the turn of 1942/43 Discourse and professional public debate had begun, yourself in one from the expansion and "reorganization policy" hers sector separated Discussion niche with the future post-war problems to deal with. The supporting frame of this Banks and bankers debate formed the German Institute for Banking science and Banking, the Economic departments of the Major banks, the from Keizer headed statistical department of the Economic group Private banking and that too from him responsible co-edited trade magazine "Banking", the 1943 out one fusion the Periodicals "The Bank" and "Bank archive" emerged.

In strict Separation from the immobilism of the Reichsbank developed here an independent one milieu the Post-war orientation. Robert doctor from the Department of Economics Donut Trading Company reflected the post-war problems of the Anglo-Americans.¹⁴⁹ Serious Wilhelm Schmidt, the Director the Economic Department of the Germans Bank, delivered whose Board members constantly orientation aids, where him, for example the hopes of conductor the Reich group Banks Otto Christian Fischer up one significantly different from that "free Business" worn Post-war perspective with of consideration confronted, that itself on this Way the primate from full employment and more accordingly Investment mobilization hardly realized let.¹⁵⁰ Leo Drescher, the Head of the banking institution, pointed on the need there, at the upcoming Considerations the teachings out of the demobilization and Transition period of First World War to take heed

148 BA/MA, RW 19 Attachment 1/1304, Institute for Economic observation the German finished goods, The Business of new German eastern room, Preliminary report: Market- and operating structure, July 1941 ; Final report above the economic, especially industrial structure and above the Market- and Be- driving conditions under Addition of determined numerical material, April 1943. See. also the Correspondence above the Preliminary report from the July 1941 in: P.A AA, R 112961.

149 doctor, Robert, The backgrounds the Anglo-American Currency controversy. In: banking , 1944, no. 5, S. 85-88; This. Foreign concerns about financing of industrial investment needs, *ibid*, No. 13, pp. 252-254.

150 BAP, German Bank, No. P 10882, Bl. 641 ff., EWS(= Ernst Wilhelm Schmidt), comments to the Memorandum „The reconstruction the peace economy“, January 7, 1944; Bl. 640, Cover letter Schmidt's at Oswald Rösler, January 10, 1944.

gene.¹⁵¹ As economic representative the Dresden Bank worked Kurt Hunsha does 1942 the Controversies on the itself the in the working groups the Academy for German Right gathered University lecturer until now around the Problem from War financing and subsequent Debt consolidation delivered had.¹⁵²

In this one marginal ones and for the Year 1943 unique concert profiled itself the 41-year-old Keizer as a powerful word Generalist. Like Erhard had he first the aggressive expansion policy his Industry argumentative and planning accompanied.¹⁵³ In the course of of In 1942 he had independent contributions to domestic economic context of national economic Potential, maximum affordable Armament expenditure and the itself resulting therefrom Consolidation problem contributed.¹⁵⁴ In the Time from the June until August 1943 he then drew in one Article series opposite the specialist public an interim assessment of the previous internal to the bank post-war debate, the in of their Farsightedness and self-will far exceeded the spectrum of arguments developed in the process.¹⁵⁵ The starting point his reflections formed the Warning, that man the War absolutely also still after dem War lose could, because through the Elimination the "willingness to sacrifice" of the population economic problems in the Comparison to War economy potentiated even further. Anyway be the through your stormy Phase progression embossed social and political confused after dem first World War a warning sign, dem through extensive state compensation initiatives must be prevented.

But most critically became it Keizer according to only as soon as the Transition constellation into one permanent peace order would turn over. Because of the Experiences that are international

functional the Overcoming the Depression collected from 1929 to 1932 been be, must in the interest of survival of economic system from irreversible which has become the priority full employment and crisis-free growth can be assumed. The state intervention is that Key to Troubleshooting. First, allow she it, the to compensate for private investment fluctuations and for this required credit creation

151 BAP, Deutsche Bank, No. P 10907, Bl. 88 ff., (Leo) Drescher, The solution to post-war problems Reason of the German experiences dem first World War, April 16, 1943. Brackmann's assumption, it was about that an elaboration of the Economic Department of the Germans Bank traded, is to correct. See. Brackmann, S. 152.

152 Hunscha, Kurt, Loan financing in war and the problem of liquefaction, in: Bank-Archiv 42 (1942), No. 21, pp. 405-409; This., Technology and limits of national debt, *ibid.*, no. 22, pp. 431-435; Id., By the "provisional" to "final" war financing, *ibid.*, No. 6, pp. 115-117.

153 See the relevant essays and comments by Keiser in the vintages 1940-1942 of the "Bank Archive" published by him.

154 Keizer, Günter, National Income and War Financing. In: Bank Archive 42 (1943), No. 4, p. 76-80; *Ibid.*, The problem of calculating national income, *ibid.*, No. 9, p. 171-173; This., The ablation the excess purchasing power, *ibid.*, no. 14, pp. 273-275.

155 See the following Keizer, Günter, The Mortgage of War. Considerations on the post-war economy I. In: Banking, 1943, No. 5, pp. 93-96; Id., the elimination of the excess of money. Considerations for Post-war economy II, *ibid.*, No. 7, S. 145-148; Id., planning the Plans. Reflections on the post-war economy III, *ibid.*, No. 8, p. 165-167; Id., Securing full employment. Reflections on the post-war economy IV, *ibid.*, no. 10, pp. 207-211.

the higher tax revenues from the recovery to erase. Be stabilized the countercyclical growth but secondly first through an equal weight Harmonization of production and consumer goods sector in shape more durable Consumer goods (motor vehicles, electrical household appliances and homes) to generate long-term mass income. There it however will be very difficult, the opposing European ones Market limitations and Income structures to overcome, be third a additional State budget with a secured productive Income cycle from 25 until 30 percent the entire value creation required. First Because of this state physical capital budget become the economic cycle finally functional because it is central through wealth investments controlled mass production, Consumption control and income redistribution crisis investment cycle of private capital finally solidify and up Reduce easily solvable "top problems".

What Keizer here presented, was one behind expressions of loyalty the Nazi dictatorship hidden _ presentation the Doctrines the Neo-Keynesians the Oxford School, the to this time the Light the World spotted. Keizer became because also not tired, against the Prophecies of doom neoliberals Frederick from Hayek, Wilhelm Röpke and Gustav Cassel from leather to pull. Her "Collectivism" verdict he rejected and emphasized that the celebrities Neoliberals the international one efforts for a fair one world order with of their Claim, full employment strategies destroyed the Democracy, a Disservice proven. He saw the "Danger" pull up, "that the selfish Interests of USA entrepreneurship in conjunction with the scientific romanticism of Röpke's style once again tipped the scales give, if it applies, what was destroyed economic structure ours World ... again to build up ." ¹⁵⁶

Those were astonishing statements in the leading specialist organ German Big banks were published. Any influences on the spectrum that was establishing itself at the same time the German post-war planning let themselves then not prove. Also about the "European" rescue attempts of the MWT-IG Farben group and the civil opposition differentiated she itself through your Appeal on a from the real references largely abstract economic theoretical style, although Keizer to same time which is essentially from the Riedl school-sponsored clearing and Currency Committee of the "Working Group for foreign trade issues" worked on.

Straight this property made the Keiser's suggestions but now for the management board the Reich group Industry attractive, because it Yes a first non-binding Simulation game strived for, consciously beyond its current economic policy course was. steel and the RGI General Manager Charles Good knew nevertheless, whom she there yours Post-war thought leaders Erhard at the Page put, even if she itself above the long- term Effects first by no means in the clear up were. It originated a work context, the not only to synthesis all economic Post-war planning should contribute , but lasted until the end of the 1950s. Keizer has Erhard in all stages his Postwar career as Chief planner accompanies ¹⁵⁷ and in the Interaction with

156 Keiser, Günter, full employment and "Collectivism". In: banking industry, 1944, No. 9, pp. 167-171, quote p. 171.

157 See. BAK, Duration Z 32 (Special position Money and Credit); b 102 (Keizer as Director the sub-abbey

the remaining theorists the Post-war planning the public always denounced Keynesian background from "social market economy" and "Economic Miracle" designed.

The Third in the Bunds was Ferdinand Green. This one Economists went the agile Erhard's adaptability as well as Keiser's programmatic charisma. Albert Pietzsch had him after his appointment for the Presidents the Reich Chamber of Commerce At the end of 1935 the Line one "Department for central economic observation" instructed.^{eat}

Green had in the War Time, his in the confrontation with the huge Depression developed quantitative Circulation analysis to be theoretically refined and developed which always more dramatic Faults of economic potential through the war economy cycle to apply.¹⁵⁹ There it included no direct tangible Data above the development of the State budget, the growing gap between money and goods side as well as the growing- de imbalance between Production equipment and consumer goods sector more gave, founded he his Analyzes on the calculation the net income, around from here out of one To get hold of an analogue variable for the actual development of the national product. This Proceedings was the competing Methods of Statistical Reich Office and Of the german Institute for Economic research clearly superior, but straight because of its meaningfulness increasingly undesirable. Dem in one largely disempowered Partial structure of "economic self-government" hibernating Grünig had no other choice, as itself with his quantitative Research approach increasingly the Ask to apply, How itself the the catastrophe those heading towards Development on the post-war perspective.

In that respect was Green Exactly the supplementary systematist, the the Reich Industry Group for the Consolidation hers simulation game with Help the central economic Basic data needed. Co-optation into the "Small Circle" Stahls remained however on Expert fees limited. In contrast to Erhard, who was also there personally the salary of an RGI department head became, and to that in the banking context firmly anchored Keizer Grünig was therefore forced to in the interest the Job security at the same time at to serve all other institutions that deal with Post-war planning employed. But also Green waved one Postwar career. As Head of department of Germans Institute for economic research was he in the fifties years with it busy, the West German Post-war recovery ongoing to balance.¹⁶⁰

Young I A - Economic policy Fundamental questions and Marshall Plan - in the Federal Ministry of Economics).

158 See. the archival legacy this Department in: BAK, R 11/2171-2174 .

159 BAK, R 11/2173, Derivation the private income and the Meeting needs out of dem Value the entire generation as well as dem Increase in national debt 1936–1943, Economic Balance of Germany 1938-1943 (Graphics); R 11/2174, industrial statistics of the Central Economic Observation Department 1943.

160 Please refer approximately: Grünig, Ferdinand, Quantitative Considerations to Economic situation in West German country. In: quarterly magazines to economic research, Ed. German Institute for economic research, Jg. 1952 ff.

Planning drafts and Policy debates

If Rudolf steel on the first Board of Trustees meeting the Support community the German industry spoke of the need to protect the post-war interests of the economy by establishing its own in a timely manner Securing research facilities then reflected he included before everything the vehemently Debates above War financing and Debt consolidation, whose extreme positions equally endangered industrial interests . As the main exponent the Otto Donner was an "optimist". initially claimed the financing of state Armament needs be fully easily, while the Limits of the National debt ultimately only through the to Disposal standing economic potential under Deduction of absolute subsistence level the Population set be, and also her short term Cancellation after End of war prepare no problems, because the people have itself different from the private Credit and creditor relationship Yes per se self-inflicted . ¹⁶¹ In contrast, Robert, who teaches at the Vienna University of World Trade Nöll from the He took as most famous representative the "pessimists" one immediate stabilization of state budget required, where so also the Property owner out of Justice _ those opposite, the only above her Worker had, used become and all in the prices for Armaments hidden depreciation and Provision amounts at the treasury dissipate would have to. ¹⁶²

Out of the view more industrial Interests clashed here Devil and Beelzebub each other, because

in one case she was entire economic potential for Armament purposes demanded while in the other on all preparatory measures for a self-financed post-war recovery waive should. Accordingly searched the Reich group Industry based on expertly supported counterarguments. Has been preserved an elaboration of the economist Serious Walb vom March: March 1943 "about the Ask the Depreciation _ and Financing war." ¹⁶³ The Cologne Ordinary pulled against Nöll from the Took from leather and accused him of relapse "in the Time of class struggle", but could whose Argument, the Provision amounts the Defense contractors be just as fictional income How the on the Savings banks and Banks deposited, not realizable purchasing power the small saver, ultimately not to invalidate. With propaganda pamphlets was big capital however since dem crossing for the "Total War" and to strategic Not defensive more served. It required economic theory substantiated Supports of legitimacy. Here should so Erhards Institute for Industrial research one first assistance offer, and in fact his memorandum on "War Financing and Debt Consolidation" became the starting point the Planning work of "Steel circle".

161 Thunder, Otto, The Boundaries the National debt. In: Global economics archive 56 (1942 II), S. 183-226. A Year later argued he far more cautious, without itself however from the legitimation approach from 1942 to distance: Thunder, Otto, form of government and National debt. In: banking industry, 1943, No. 1, S. 1-5.

162 Nöll v. d. He took, Robert, Depreciation in the wars - one economic Impossibility. In: The German National economy 10 (1941), No. 34, S. 1379-1380; This., To discussion around the depreciation in the wars, *ibid*, 11 (1942), No. 5, S. 175-182.

163 BAK, R 11/2171, Bl. 359-384.

In the extensive memorandum, the Erhard in the March 1944 presented, were thunder and Nöll from the He took the single authors, on the he itself namely related.¹⁶⁴ In the first part (p. 1 - 56) summarized Erhard the fundamental Characteristics and the German techniques the War financing. Included act it itself around the real Transfer of purchasing power amounts' of national income, the in the Arms consumption destroyed would. The German method presented he included a exceedingly positive Transcript out of. There she invisible go ahead, be one astonishing far-reaching Lowering the real available income he follows, without that those affected consciously to become. Economically be it irrelevant, When and to what extent a such Process of becoming conscious about it insert, How largely from the private households purchasing power not spent and from the Defense contractors not covered purchasing power in shape from wages and profits generated become. However, be Corresponding value adjustments to the income lost to consumers and producers are essential requirements for every How also always kind reconstruction perspective after the war.

With this astonishing affirmative Factual description contrasted the second, the problem The main part dedicated to debt consolidation, which is in the first third of the Dealing with the "illusory solutions" diagnosed by Erhard previous consolidation debate dedicated was (BI. 57 - 138). All included so far developed Variants, namely debt cancellation, asset levy, neoliberal deregulation and dosed inflation, declined Erhard off, because they in different extent the Target, namely the as possible smooth and at the same time socially acceptable reorganization and Effectiveness of the post-war economic potential. Donner's proposal for a short-term and blanket declaration of incapacity for everyone He found war debts captivating, but unrealistic. Around to record the debt volume and to legalize, be one longer Time required and also dangerous he with its socially leveling injustices and psychological unreasonableness, the survival perspective of the system. Also the option , a Part the national debt through limited Price increases to remove, Erhard was able to ultimately nothing to win, because it be already now Inflation trends in got going, and for this reason would itself the until now so successful marginalization the Black markets because of the sinking Price discipline after End of war only then keep up leave if up to definitive debt consolidation on Price stop and Rationing system rigorous held become. But that too neoliberal Hope on the Automatism of high interest rates and Low price policy found at Erhard no Grace. Without the working group Beckerath lamp direct to lecture, attested he her, that everyone Try that Crossing from the war to Peace economy with pure private sector Methods solve too want, even more extreme as at the time of huge Depression the continued existence the Social formation put at risk.

As main opponent identified Erhard however the Protagonists one Delivery of Capital assets the different types. She formed that is no closed ones front, and it is advisable strictly between the pure financial To engage and those to under-

164 Erhard, Ludwig, Director of Institute for Industrial research Berlin-Nuremberg, war financing and debt consolidation, March 1944, BI. 60, 170 ff. In the following quoted after one copy that in the library the HSG located.

divorce, which the problem with aspirations a fundamental social reform or even a “revolution of the social order”. The Fronde of the financial theorists it should be countered that any mobilization of Tangible assets, for example with the help of mortgage cover goes beyond the skimming off of current investment income, the socio-economic foundations of power one every new beginning would be undermined. Far more complicated on the other hand, is the confrontation with the social politicians, because Nöll from the He took have Right with his Claim, that also the hidden company reserves and the open designated operational renewal or. Goods procurement credit on the goods side uncovered and thus fictitious be.¹⁶⁵ However must the Viennese _ Scholars then also the Proof compete, Why small Savings are economically more important than the option of repair and renewal investments in the transition to Peace economy. One Radical solution but that experiment entire layers, be one method preferable, the the reparation question individually out-differentiate. Because everything, What the socialization in the names more social Justice can also be achieved through the state. The state must face the believers be prepared to “acknowledge guilt” to them clean Pour wine and your formal Claim on Material goods in convert it into a “nominal claim”. At the same time, the conditions would be created for priority replacement of destroyed real property, while the skimmed off purchasing power only slightly to interest and to amortize be. The was Erhards indirect Answer at those currents within the bourgeois opposition, the itself for one nationalization the key industries.

From him obviously particularly important argumentative defense of all claims the tangible assets Erhard then developed his plan for action for one “real Solution” of consolidation problem (BI. 139 - 259). Be there so to proceed, that the raw war economy Proceedings the preliminary Absorption of purchasing power through a sensible and socially acceptable final burden sharing will be replaced. Around a “break through” the Dams to prevent, must the Country in the role of sole debtor Hatch and all Real claims at the National product in nominal Convert capital claims. Financially, this is a double step required, namely the conversion of hoarded banknote money one state “debt sum”, which means the Note circulation from approximately 35 billion on the estimated Post-war optimum from about two to four billions of Reichsmarks could be reduced, and at the same time the equally rigorous Determination of entire at the Savings banks and Banks created book money. To it must itself one gapless Registration of entire fictional Connect purchasing power volume. In the next Step be then the excess purchasing power through the Issue of state Debt instruments to determine, and that is different classified depending on the Origin _ of the creditor's claim. On this Way got stuck at first the savings banks and banks _ the line of fire of theirs Believers, because these are not now more in the Location, with reference to the market economy character the fictitious assets their “disappointed hopes” against the Credit institutions to judge.

At all be significant anti-capitalist “resentment” to expect. If man however at the Decommissioning action first the entire liquid Corporate funds miter-

165 Ibid, BI. 170 f.

grasp, lose also she her attack surface, and at the same time be this also one first Chance to the while of war opposite the Defense industry particularly disadvantaged structural loser from the manufactured goods industry and trade by for example whose accrued Business renewal credit first again Approved would. All in everything just be still the Country in the Location, the Economic constitution to rescue and one the economic Reconstruction perspective appropriate Ranking the Compensation benefits to enforce.

In the last Section his expert opinion handle Erhard far above the specified financial and economic Frame out and designed a comprehensive Action program (BI. 211 ff.). Included separated he three Stages, viz Demobilization, Consolidation and Reconstruction. The Demobilization phase should still complete after the war economy method can be financed and the last still existing use up economic reserves in order to the sectoral disproportions of the previous era to eliminate the returning soldiers Cost of the Forced laborers in the reorganized Production structure to infiltrate and the first steps to revival of trade _ to initiate. As soon as again an acceptable social product was in sight, should the financial

economic Consolidation in attack taken become, where, How Erhard at elsewhere noticed,¹⁶⁶ one Karl Albrecht's ongoing investigation foreign trade aspects accordingly illuminate become.

The subsequent Reconstruction phase saw Erhard at the most critical, because the Entrepreneur now would have to get started without how yet in the Demobilization period over to have sufficient resources. That is would give them the state everything through the preferred release of their before confiscated Operating credit unique under the poor grab. But last At the end be she now on itself alone instructed, because only if a more self-supporting upswing _ without constant State intervention in corridor come, could she one autonomously designed Post-war perspective to claim. This but would them only succeed, when they have all the resources the consumer goods industry concentrated because this was the only way to have an immediate gripping and self-reproducing Mobilization of purchasing power Demand secured be. Erhard referred included direct on his works out of the Time before 1933. Now would have that Business the unique and probably also last Chance, her wrong Answer on to correct the crisis of 1929 to 1932 and yourself before one renewed "paternalism". the Country to protect. The Era, in the the Private capital itself with his short-term self-interests have been content can, belong irrevocably the past. It must itself with the Reich group Industry as "organized top" to one bring together a "closed phalanx of purposeful action"¹⁶⁷ And thereby from the fruitless debates around the "economic order" keep away, above the the Development a long time ago gone away . The bid the Be one hour to joint action empowered free people Economy that finally comes to a synthesis with the higher-level economic policy regulatory functions of the state. Only if the economy meets this demand in a fateful way Hour just" become, then have she "the probation passed".¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, BI. 207.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, BI. 252.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, BI. 264 b.

Green was the first, the itself to this one extraordinary treatise expressed. He wrote at 2. May 1944 at Steel, ¹⁶⁹ he hold it for in principle correct, if itself Erhard with his suggestions to Debt consolidation quite on the priority economic to be restored Performance concentrated have. It be but unacceptable, the National debt in total to freeze and to extreme low pay interest "Requirements second degrees" to downgrade because this would create a dangerous gap in the definitive elimination of purchasing power. Him seemed it makes more sense that Creditor claims through one dosed Price increase and one additional Property levy at End of war partially "for the Disappear _ to bring around then the remaining rest in a three percent interest and to two percent to extinguishing "national savings" to transform - a Suggestion, the Grünig had already worked it out in his circular theory study from 1933 and Stahl copied it attached. Besides that held Green the from Erhard underlying Estimated figures of the national income for insufficient. A State budget in Height of only 20 billion Reichsmarks unthinkable. Become him but not in realistically comparable ways Sizes calculated in advance, then hang the entire Consolidation program in the Air.

Green has this first opinion in one End June submitted Memorandum above "Preparatory Work for the economic demobilization and for the Order the peace economy" detailed underpinned and added. New was a Section above the foreign economic aspects of the economic balance sheet to be drawn up, and additionally pointed out the author on the urgent procurement and standardization the required _ statistical Documents there. ¹⁷⁰

With this one Alternative suggestion laid Green undoubtedly crucial weaknesses of the Erhard Memorandum just, and first on the basis his economic accounting model was consolidated the Overall framework for a systematization of the Planning work of "Steel circle". The special qualities the elaboration became he however not just. By he itself from all until now discussed variants from Debt consolidation and post-war planning including the discourse of the Freiburg neoliberals , the civil opposition and the ideologues of the "economic order" in the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs demarcated, had Erhard the way of Reichsgruppe Industrie became an independent one variant at all first released. Be Suggestion, the Business in toto out the financial economics Entanglements of war to solve and the entire to impose follow-up costs on the state as joint and several debtors, was crucial for the Survival perspective of the total capital.

Three days later, Stahl, Erhard and Grünig met to discuss the Erhard memorial and the more Proceed at the preparatory Work for the Conversion on peace economy Conditions. ¹⁷¹ Regarding the first point, steel seems included in the huge entire the opinion Grünigs agreed, however at the same time

¹⁶⁹ BAK, R 11/2171, Bl. 389 ff., Green at Steel, May 2, 1944.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, Bl. 452 ff., Ferdinand Grünig, Preparatory Work for the economic demobil making and for the Order the peace economy, 1. Draft, June 29, 1944; Bl. 437, Green to Pietzsch, June 29, 1944.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., Bl. 386-388, AN Grünigs about the Meeting Erhards u. Grünigs at steel on 5.5. 1944.

to have blocked a fundamental discussion and initially only to have an alternative to Erhard's financial economics consolidation proposals interested been to be. The discussants agreed itself on one Money- and Property levy in Height from 20 percent of all Monetary and material assets transferred into debt instruments of the Reich and the amount of debt 200 billion Reichsmark reduce should. As additional measure were called she A price increase of around 50 percent was a good thing, because it added another third of the national debt in Elimination, like that that from the now on 500 billions in extrapolated debt in total only still 200 billion Reichsmark remained.

Through these modifications in remained in the financial sector Erhards overall strategic concept that is ultimately untouched, it should but also additional steps be undertaken to Individual questions clarify and it long term with Help the economic accounting approach by Grunig to substantiate. Erhard himself was "asked to revise his report and prepare an excerpt for readers in a hurry." Additionally should Keizer together with dem clerk the Reich group Banks one investigation about the Composition of the contribute to the creation of huge financial assets the Creditor claims the Industry at the Country particularly work out. Finally became Green with one analysis the Investment capacities the individual economic sectors as a basis for assessing their material post-war possibilities. Included should he "Economic group around Economic group in oral negotiation around the corresponding Information" ask, ¹⁷² while at the same time Erhards Institute for Industrial research was intended to work through representative industrial balance sheets in order to question "on his part

... of their Solution a little closer to bring". The next Meeting should begin take place in June .

We knowledge not, if and When Keizer the Results the him from the precursor of The special investigation assigned to Stahl's "Small Working Group" has been submitted. Even if this has happened should be, then the expertise was on in each case through a fundamental statement to Erhard memorial overshadowed, the Keizer under cooperation of Otto Pfleiderer, who has now moved to his statistical department obviously still in May 1944 presented. In the contrast to Grünig, the ultimately the entire Approach Erhards around 180 Degree in favor of his own economic accounting model applied _ knowledge wanted, went Keizer also from the "Elimination of surplus money after _ War" as one Key problem out of, whose fundamental Solution first the Away to a new beginning for the overall economy. ¹⁷³ Erhard now wants to shut down all of the money capital assets that accrued during the war, as well as those from the pre-war period originating liquidity Usage restrictions subdue. The result is that almost the entire monetary side of the economy is regulated centrally by the state must, and this would in turn, there now once the Money above a special natural mobility, force no less drastic management measures as at the rationing of consumer goods needs.

172 Ibid, BI. 388. The the following Quote ibid.

173 BAK, R 7/2316, Gunter Keiser, The Elimination of surplus money after dem wars, O. D., 18 BI.

For no the both Management variants would but after dem War still the psychological requirements must be present. Rather, the willingness would the wide one masses to Discipline and further abstinence from consumption largely omitted. Therefore must after one Solution wanted become, „the not only the material, rather also the psychological one circumstances the Post war period" correspond. ¹⁷⁴ Violent Coercive interventions would have to on a Minimum size limited become. Asked be a more thoughtful economic-political middle way between more total liberalization and more rigorous management, the "the problem elastic through a whole system from Measures as well as financial-, monetary and interest rate policy How goods economics Nature so to speak from everyone pages tackles."

Thereupon presented Keizer one updated and in a lot refined variant his post-war reflections out of the previous year. To the starting point his He made alternative suggestions the Consideration, that of the total amount of excess money capital formation only the "unstable", short term created Part dangerous become could, because he after an immediate good realization. Especially this one But proportion will be overestimated . Consider this them merely as a result of prolonged Consumption periods and consumption waivers, then could she economic policy like that manipulated become, that you as dynamic element a pronounced "Active for the Post war period" represent. ¹⁷⁵ Without on one risky credit expansion to have to fall back the floating purchasing power used become, „pure on the basis of urgent private consumption and investment wishes" one Full employment policy to initiate, instead of on artificial ones Job creation measures To fall back on to must.

Ultimately went it Keizer so therefore, in the contrast to Erhard, the the demand-stimulating recovery first after one radicals, quite on the private sector retention of power oriented fracture with the war economy Mortgages start wanted , the in the pre-war and war years accumulated Consumption congestion directly as Lever for a full employment oriented Reconstruction cycle to to use. However had to too in this one Model the Purchasing power demands on a Dimension pruned back become, the that significantly reduced Consumer goods volume the post war period corresponded.

Around this without size Frictions to guarantee, hit Keizer in the second Main section his counter-assessment a whole Bundle of measures before. ¹⁷⁶ Included should financial and monetary economics Operations the Action focus form.

Combined man all this Operations with one decided Low interest rate policy and reduced man additionally the free Note circulation through a parity exchange into new banknotes, then were Keizer according to further interventions against the then _ existing Volume of money unnecessary. It could much more under the Precondition, that the management measures and the Price freeze until for the Crackdown the financial- and monetary economic Manipulations retained and first in the most urgent Consumer goods sector relaxed would, to Demand mobilization used become. Included was due the quick one Intensification the Consumer goods production the Priority, and that is under conscious _ Waiver on Expansion investments in the first Reconstruction phase. The main business

174 Ibid, Bl. 2.

175 Ibid, Bl. 3.

176 Ibid, Bl. 5 ff.

important was included on the generation more durable Consumer goods to place, around the still vagabonds _ Purchasing power potential analogous for the Volkswagen savings system in real convert savings capital . Everything in everything floated Keizer a elastic system before, the abrupt

"violent measures" largely avoided and "the provided Task at the same time from all sides in Attack' took. ¹⁷⁷ It be then possible, the Purchasing power surplus "in a quite tolerable one Period to be removed and thus the Overall economy again normal work and development conditions to back up."

On Keizers Opposing vote followed also end May another memorandum that, like Erhard already in his Policy memorandum announced had, the foreign economic aspects of the consolidation problem in their fundamental context . Her author was Karl Albrecht, the Director the Department Foreign trade of the Reich Industry Group and strong man of the "Working Group for Foreign Trade Issues". He emphasized introductory, above the Foreign trade the post war period let itself because of their special Vicinity on "political and border demarcation issues" only fundamental Assumptions _ make. ¹⁷⁸ This however be significant enough. First must in the Result the war economy Structural shifts at everyone directly or indirectly belligerents countries from enormously enlarged Production capacities went out become, why the Full employment question in Connection to a short-term transitional economy cover of repair and pent-up demand as most urgent agenda item become acute. In this one Connection must Secondly the Export perspective seen become. full employment be only at longer term Export expansion to to back up, and for this reason Thirdly, the additionally necessary public ones would have to be taken into account demand instruments Vote with the overall economic one balance requirements to one significant Part also benefit investments in the production resources sector.

There but probably all economies one Synthesis of As we move towards full employment policy and export expansion, "the question of competitiveness automatically arises in the foreground of interest", drove Albert continued. In the remaining was Albert in this _ first period of reflection still of that convinced, that the "Education from Large spaces through summary national Economics and itself more complementary economic structure" as dominant Structural moment consist stay and in this respect the "Finding the possible _ Economic relations between the so to educational "large spaces" one represents a subordinate task.

With this one memoranda and Opinions won the "Small Circle" Rudolf steel gradually takes shape, and with Exception Steels everyone had Participant made substantial contributions to the post-war simulation game in the arcane area of the Reich Industrial Group. The overall direction became included despite the partially massive **criticism** at his Policy memorandum Erhard slammed, whose Institute for Industrial research so for the rose to become the undisputed coordination center. Since then, the advanced ones have been under Erhard's supervision Work templates and Concept papers composed. Special working groups constituted itself in the Frame of institute, around the there accumulated and processed information the

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, B1. 18. The the following Quote *ibid*.

¹⁷⁸ BAK, R 121/231, AN Albrechts, Ret. Post-war questions of foreign trade, May 23, 1944. The following Quote *ibid*.

to evaluate the Reich Industry Group and bring it into the debates. Speakers and department heads the Donut Headquarters and yours regional relocation centers itself to the Planning wanted to participate, became away now from the RGI leadership at Erhards Institute referred and from there out of financed. To them belonged Paul Binder, the Director the department Money- and Financial economics (VI), den Erhard in the May 1944 accordingly above its coordination function taught,¹⁷⁹ but also the head of the RGI news agency Fritz Laukisch, the since March 1944 in the Frame of Albrechtian foreign trade project at a Special examination above the capacities of Agricultural machinery construction worked and in return the post-war needs the German and Southeast European small agricultural and medium-sized companies at multi-purpose and household appliances extrapolated.¹⁸⁰

However, one complex of problems was initially excluded from the extensive range of topics covered by the "Stahl Circle" because it was... could not be separated from the current power-political constellations: workers' and social policy. Your inclusion in the Tasks of Expert panel would have not only its competencies overwhelmed, but rather the informal one that initially abstracts from all decision-making constellations Planning framework blown up. **With** this one Minefield the Post-war perspective concerned itself the Leadership group the Reich Industry Group in the first phase the strategic defensive therefore exclusively within that one committees, in the the ongoing socio- political activities involved were.

In the Course of April 1944 dawned it some employees the RGI leadership, How big the gap between dem more or fewer passive updated socio-political Course and the in the meantime in the macroeconomic Area present strategic Post-war options had become. The frightened French fellow industrialists could you at the planned Discussion rounds already for this reason not with one complete developed Concept _ confront because man himself above no clarity with reference to the socio-political post-war perspectives more have, wrote Albert at the 26. April at Good.¹⁸¹ Also in other core areas the Workers' and social policy, the "duty of care of the managers" disappeared increasingly to one Margin size. This Self-perception become from the majority entrepreneurs divided, presented the Narrower Advisory Board the Reich group Industry at the 10th of May in the Connection at a Overview presentation from Wilhelm Meinberg, dem Director of the Social Security Committee the Reich group, firmly.¹⁸² But that seemed so much more unpleasant than just now now many Entrepreneur "given the far-reaching Liquidity" the Companies "their social Heart on Cost the Taxpayer" discovered,¹⁸³ without however thereby having a dominant influence to regain employment relationships.

From this Insight then gave rise to the conceptual approach for a fundamental change of course. The Entrepreneurial "follower leadership" should be back with all Power in the moved to the foreground be, and tongs announced, he wool from now on with the Out of-

179 Erhard at Binder, May 1944, quote after Laitenberger, S. 36.

180 BAK, R 12 U26, Fritz Laukisch at Frederick Olk, March 25, 1944.

181 BAK, R 12 U250.

182 BAK, R 12 U225, report above the meeting of Engen advisory board the Reich group Industry on May 10, 1944, AT Lohmanns v. June 8, 1944.

183 Ibid, Final post Zangens.

shot chairman all worker and socio-political involved Committees to regular meetings meet. The May meeting of Engen advisory board the Reichsgruppe Industrie was the birth hour of the of Pliers directed working group for Socio- economic Post-war issues, their coordination Lohmann took over.

2 The second Planning stage from the August 1944 until Turn of the year 1944/45

A whole bunch military-political setbacks marked in the July August 1944 the end the first strategic defensive phase of Nazi imperialism.¹⁸⁴ Correspondingly The repercussions were serious all variants of post-war economic policy planning , the itself until for the July 1944 profiled had. The on a political Concepts of power change civil opposition groups went in terror the Gestapo and of People's Court under. As Jean Bichelonne at the Page Petains after Sigmaringen fled, was this a Menetekel for the Post-war strategy of planning office and his European arms collaborators alike. Under the targeted pressure of the Allied economic warfare began the neutrals Countries, her official Deliveries of strategic raw materials and goods to set, and always more so far "friendly" suppliers closed itself dem embargo at.¹⁸⁵

But The export-oriented post-war preparations were also no longer in good shape. As the Participant the world currency and Financial conference in Bretton Woods at the When they parted on July 22, 1944, they not only had each other programmatically a new world order fixed, but also two Resolutions adopted, the the Reichsbank directors and the German Foreign investors equally to accomplish made. The Bank for International Settlements should because of its gold and foreign exchange collaboration with the Reichsbank after dem War liquidated become (Resolution V), and in one further resolution (VI) it was said that the United Nations would identify all activities and excretion or. refund from hostile foreign values support.¹⁸⁶ In addition, the signatory states should lobby the neutral European countries for this insert , that she the transfer from stolen and from Enemy assets prevented.

On the basis this decisions became in the August 1944 under leadership of US Treasury a interministerial Committee founded, the under dem code word "Safehaven" extensive studies on international economic collaboration as well the German Capital- and Wealth exodus in the neutrals Countries carried out and with Help the US missions in Berne, Istanbul, Lisbon, Madrid and Stockholm as well as in the capitals the liberated Countries and Latin America one effective Initiated counter-campaign .¹⁸⁷ Up In this way, the previous "Proclaimed Lists" received a far greater efficient

184 For the following ADAP, series E, Vol. VIII, S. 244 ff.; DZW, Vol. 6, p. 25 ff., 82 ff., 105 ff., 370 ff.

185 For the following u. a. Medlicott, vol. II, S. 454 ff.

186 Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1-22, 1944, vol. I, Washington 1948, P. 862 f., 939 f.

187 FRUS, diplomacy Papers 1944, vol. II, Washington 1967, p. 213 ff.; supplementary the explosive Part-

enter Basis of operation.¹ ss The had to Consequence, that now diplomatic and “unofficial” missions from Nazi Germany and the allied countries in the metropolises of the European “neutrals” the handles literally into the gave hands. Just as How the collaborating armaments industrialists fell victim to this European partners the preventative German Export offensive under massive Pressure, especially the relevant Proclamations from Bretton Woods in the February 1945 on the conference from Yalta again to that effect It was specified that the entire German foreign assets are for reparations purposes should be confiscated.

Thus were located itself the German Post-war planning in Alles your variants and “wild” Fields of action away August 1944 in one extremely precarious Location. The Power of the military-political events, the “European armaments and production planning” on a last Redoubt pushed back. And the experienced employees of the finance minister Henry Morgenthau, the Foreign Economic administration and the Anti-Trust Department of US Department of Justice led under vocation on the Resolutions from Bretton Woods one precise Counterplanning against the German Wealth exodus a, although they had only noticed its “wild” automaticity and the long-term associated with it Projects obviously remained hidden until the end of the war.^{1s 9} Under consideration – this dramatic worsened Framework conditions had to itself now this German post-war planning stop the second and final phase of the strategic defense.

The “Europe Circle” of planning office started on his Monthly meeting in the July, first from economic policy Field of intervention Southeastern Europe Farewell to take, What the armaments office at the Example Greece to dem Suggestion caused, the German troops

tradition the “Safehaven” files the US Embassy in Bern: N/A, RG 84, Foreign Service Post of the State Department, US Embassy Bern, 850.3/SH - Q (Safehaven Projects); Gordon/Dangerfield, S. 164 ff.; Durrer, S. 131 ff., 184 ff.

188 She have been since the beginning 1944 reinforced by the US missions been used to on the neutral ones Countries Pressure to exercise, see. FRUS, 1944 II, S. 154 ff.

189 The fact that the lack of information was enormous is shown by the propaganda effort, with the one before the end of the war vague and unchecked Intelligence reports out of subordinate areas the German _ Post-war planning hyped became. In the core the allies propaganda was standing the Report one agents of Deuxieme Bureau above one Strasbourg Industrial conference v. August 10, 1944. It acted itself included apparently around a Compilation from Shards of information out of several Be- speeches from middle managers with representatives the connection point France the organizational sation the commercial Business, the actually more often ins “Red A house” in Strasbourg to invite the cared for. The most names the Participant were acoustically verbally horned and can not be verified. The intelligence material itself, that in the bulletin of the state Department, in the Publications Morgenthau, the Kilgore Subcommittee meetings and later by some GDR historians always again quoted and unchecked in the rank one key document raised _ became, could in the meantime found become: FDRL, Henry Morgenthau Diaries, Book No. 806, SHAEF, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence Report No. EW-PA 128, November 7, 1944. The first careful Source criticism delivered for the at that time GDR research Eichholtz, Dietrich, The Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production and the Strasbourg meeting from August 10th 1944 (notes to open Questions). In: Bulletin of working group “Second World War”, 1975, No. 3/4, pp. 5-21.

pen out of economically unimportant become Regions in strategic Collection lines to withdraw .¹⁹⁰ The last until now documentable Monthly meeting found at the August 29th at the Line from Charles Blessing takes place.¹⁹¹ First lectured the country representative. Particularly lively became the political-military upheavals in Bulgaria and Romania _ discussed, where the Petroleum capacities Blessings according to until last exploited been were, while Potter above the first "successful" defeated general strike the French _ Resistance and the omitted timely Removal economically more important Stocks out of the region Paris reported. Charles Lindemann in turn was full of praise above the Switzerland, whose Elites itself of their long term Dependency from the German coal probably consciously stayed, while vice versa Germany everything company must, to serve as a vital façade for the "international German financial interests operating through the Swiss market ". Economic contract not to endanger.

To one insightful controversy came it against End the Meeting. Eric Further informed the participants about the project, the Europe Plan Richard Riedls from February 1944 to publish, around based this "Legacy one Europeans" finally "The European countries that Picture of a common one economic area". show, "unfortunately in the previous years was missing."¹⁹² Wireless have under the Condition agreed, that the "currency part" that he disapproved of only published in the appendix become. Against it raised Lindemann sharpest Protest. Riedls Conception be quite on the Southeast European Countries switched off been and straight in this respect through the youngest events outdated. Now could it only still therefore go, the neutrals Countries, in particular Sweden and Switzerland , to address, and you opposite would be that publication a tactical one political mistake.

The Fight had a aftermath, because Karl Lindemann sat down not only with Wireless in connection, but also informed Albrecht, with dem he now tight in the "working group for foreign trade issues" about the incident. Albrecht was dismayed. He saw not only his Reservations opposite dem in all post-war projects present blessing confirmed, but sensed the Origin one broad coalition, the the itself the secretly forming post-war political leadership claim Reichsgruppe Industrie acutely endangered.

The more Sequence the events lies still partially in the dark, because neither let the protocols of the subsequent meetings of the European circle, which is demonstrably still at the

26. September and met on October 31, 1944,¹⁹³ locate, still exists one full transcript above the from Albert targeted Pronunciation between Blessings, Ilgner, Croon and Lindemann, the between dem 14. and 21. September 1944 on dem country estate Ilgners

190 BAK, R 311941, BI. 11, note out of dem Armament Office for Kehrl, July 31, 1944. The note Related _ on a Report, the Blessings dem "Esplanade Circle" at the 25.7. above the Hyperinflation in Greece reimbursed had. The protocol the meeting is lost.

191 Ibid, BI. 3 ff., protocol No. 7 the Monthly meeting at the August 29, 1944.

192 Ibid, BI. 8th; the following Quotes BI. 9 f. To Riedl s. under Section 1: "Interventions ...".

193 BAP, Deutsche Bank, P 10883, appointment sheet for the week of. October 30th - November 4th, 1944. This schedule for the Board members the Germans Bank according to took Section at the 31.10. at one

„Meeting of circle from Mr president Kehrl" in the hotel Esplanade part.

took place.¹⁹⁴ In any case, the Riedl memorandum was not published, with which the planning office of all people now wanted to adorn itself, on the one hand, to expose its European armaments collaborators his last attempts to operational-strategic Turn of war to swear in and on the other hand the so far unrestricted claimed German monopoly claim on one "European production planning" tactical to weaken. Additionally _ Riedl's economic policy legacy has been circulating since November 1944 in a slightly revised version for participants in the "Working Group on Foreign Trade Issues" as Background material.¹⁹⁵

a) The Relocation of heavyweightlarge industrial foreign trade economic policy and foreign trade-related Post-war planning

From the Capital export to Capital flight

What Lindemann End August 1944 on the meeting of "European Circle" occasion his Switzerland report and the debate around the publication the Riedlschen European memorandum expressed, corresponded a long time ago more common Economic practice. Since dem Summer intensified many company management again her Capital- and Wealth transfers into the Abroad and chose always more pronounced the neutrals Countries as vanishing point. Included dominated _ the classic export-oriented economic sectors the Happen by no means more alone. Them kicked now Capital groups to Page, the itself first in the Course from upgrade and had consolidated war production. For example, the Daimler-Benz group sold now his most modern Aircraft engines in the Switzerland and after Spain.¹⁹⁶ He concluded license agreements for the reproduction of its heavy trucks. Additionally equipped he important Sponsor companies like for example the Hispano-Suiza group with dem necessary know-how the Iberian and Ibero- American Post-war markets for those Lines of development to to back up, the "already since dem Civil war is well known there due to the decisive air force deployment of the 'Legion Condor'" were.¹⁹⁷ The Export wholesale tried, the worsened transport conditions ments through new Transit techniques and Air freight procedures to balance.¹⁹⁸ Also secondary Pursue laid itself so Foreign missions and straw fins to and relocated her most developmental Projects in the neutral countries.¹⁹⁹

194 **BAK, R 12 1/233**, Albrecht to Reithinger, re. Introduction new work, September 23, 1944. See. also the following section.

195 See. BAP, German Bank, P 339.

196 archive the Daimler Benz AG (DBAG archive), reel 4/41.

197 DBAG archive, reel 6/56, Wilhelm reel and Fritz Nallinger at Emilio Kiechle, September 11, 1943.

The activities culminated in the Autumn 1944, see. *ibid.*

198 **BAK, R 91/1623** (Gau Chamber of Commerce Hamburg and hamburger export company).

199 **BAK, R 7** app. MCC/26 (Content report to the files of Industrial Department of RWM above the camouflage _ German foreign investments); **BAK, R 9 1/1720** (Courier Post the German Embassy Madrid for German company branches).

To same Time sold the Electrical industry even 50 "Würzburg" devices with 150 sentences Reserve tubes after Sweden in the Frame one bilateral!!n Compensation business for Cutting edge technology.²⁰⁰ Otherwise switched also the Electrical company on long-term export strategies around. The Foreign Department the Siemens & Halske AG pulled since dem Autumn 1944 all Register, around itself the Surcharge for a Carrier frequency system to Modernization of the Spanish Railways to to back up, because with it long-term Follow-up orders tied together

were.²⁰¹ She lock but also consulting contracts for the construction of one Copper refining plant in Asturias away and relocated the production of electric arc steel furnaces to Sweden.²⁰² The AEG Group, which is "Expansion program" in Spain so far right dilatory had treated, operation so with Power the modernization his branch plant in Tarrasca, around itself

a dominant post-war position in the construction of generators, railway engines and ship's auxiliary machinery to to back up.²⁰³ With this one Goods and capital transactions went the structure more strategic Stock supplies in the free ports the neutrals Countries together, because only to this Wise could the for the delivery difficulties expected in the first post-war period out of Germany bridged become.

There but the Countermaneuvers the Allies away Autumn 1944 always more effective became and the Collaborators the Germans just as frightened How the since the Executions the conspirator on July 20th the public turned completely against Nazi Germany Opinion ,²⁰⁴ became at the together operated improvement the hedging and New camouflage measures ways walked. As the Swiss Bankers and Bankers Association November 1944 the account activities the German depositors officially up the average volume of the previous year froze, was this before everything for which has been international for a long time operating German Large companies a heavier blow, because she because of of indexing of their previous Shell companies on the "Proclaimed Lists" only still above few intact Accounts had. So was for example the IG Farben Group after the detar-tion of Fallenegger Bank & Cie. and his other traditional Swiss bank details the willingness of the Schweizerische Kreditanstalt (SKA) **to cooperate** reliant, at the he 1943 precautionary a Credit account opened had.²⁰⁵ The SKA credit acquired now strategic importance for the Operations the IG Colors. His Upper limit (1.5 millions sFr.) became Per form around a Quarter shortened, by 0.4 million sfr. on a "Credit cover account" transmitted became. On this was wise the Post- war risk the SKA secured as well as the Loan volume accordingly dem Decision of the banking association formally reduced, and still the central financial administration of the IG was able to Colors further above the previous Loan amount feature.

²⁰⁰ BA/MA, RW 19/449, Sweden report of clerk (field economics office?) 3/III b (O. D.).

²⁰¹ Documented in: BAK, R 9 I/1720.

²⁰² BAK, R 13 V/243.

²⁰³ Ibid, Managing directors Economic group Electrical industry at Foreign exchange office Berlin, Re: Application the AEG on Leaving Ptas. 2 000,000 from the funds of the AEG Madrid for expansion the Factory halls in Tarrasca.

²⁰⁴ BAC; R 7/3004, BI. 103 ff., Edward Schmitz at Kirchfeld, November 13, 1944; BAK, R 9 I/397 (Effectiveness the Black lists).

²⁰⁵ BAP, IG Colors, No. A 2497, BI. 3 ff. Hereafter also the The following.

Siemens' Argentinian business partners also acted similarly imaginatively by : the for the Argentinian Armament program particularly important Subsidiary _ **SEMA SAT** against one appropriate Buyback guarantee for the post war period nationalized . ²⁰⁶ The Management of the Osram Group tried against it, the upcoming ones "Coercive measures" the Chilean Government against his Factory in Santiago through this to escape, that it again to its traditional "non-German Shareholder" remembered and offered the branch of International General Electric Corp. for sale . ²⁰⁷ The ways were diverse and devoured, the the foreign departments the German _ Pursue together with your foreign partners walked, around dem Onslaught the "Morgenthau Boys" to withstand.

The more and more strategically oriented "wild" foreign trade post-war preparations the Large companies became increasingly through tendencies to **capital** _ and Flight of assets superimposed. In the August 1944 put itself US-American Reindeer _ and French economic collaborators one explosive Project the Reichsbank, des SD and the Parisian branch the Bank the Germans aviation to Disposal. In Monaco became the Bank house J. Charles & Co. as Limited partnership with one Tribe-capital from 100 millions ffrs. founded, around one "Platform to create, on the after Completion of war conversations with the current enemy states, in particular with the USA, about the Recording from Economic relations could take place." ²⁰⁸ In the Turkey went the German Bank branches to conduct large-scale gold sales above and equipped one growing Number of Asset refugees with international currencies out of. ²⁰⁹ Against it became appropriate Gold shops in Sweden predominantly in addition used, around German investors to give yourself the opportunity to immerse yourself in first class Swedish Securities to buy.

Particularly height Commissions achieved some German Private banks finally because she together with Portuguese and Spanish straw men in the Switzerland convertible Foreign exchange against gold and other Precious metals exchanged and this then by Air freight in Portugal or Argentina deposited.

Until to official Registration away February 1945 distributed itself however the largest current of German Wealth exodus on approximately 10 000 Numbered accounts at the Swiss banks , whose volume from allies Specialists on a total of 250 millions dollar Bank deposits and gold or. Precious metals estimated became while after Declarations one representative of the Reich office for Foreign trade since 1940 currency and other mobile financial assets in height from two billion sFr. in the Switzerland spent been were. ²¹⁰ Also without Knows-

²⁰⁶ N/A, RG 260 ED Dec Br. 17/241-3/25, Siemens report, BI. 181.

²⁰⁷ Against it protested the Foreign organization the NSDAP and the AA, for what reason the Osram board in the November 1944 at Kirchfeld around Support sought; see. BAK, R 7/3004, BI. 33 ff.

²⁰⁸ BAK, R 2/5530, BI. 13 f., note out of dem RMdF above one Meeting with Dr. Krengel, Bank of the Germans Aviation, at the August 19, 1944 above the Bank house J. Charles & Co.

²⁰⁹ See. for the following FDRL, Harley Martin Kilgore papers, box No. 114, Economic Activities and Industrial Personnel outside Germany, S. 13 f., appendix S. 31 ff.

²¹⁰ N/A, RG 84, post Files Embassy Bern, 850.3/SH - Q, Caffery, Paris, at Secretary State department, Re: safe haven, August 13, 1945.

nis the overarching Orientation tendencies could the Specialists the allies rods out the analysis this Capital and asset movements draw the compelling conclusion that, firstly, foreign trade Aspects that economic post-war planning the Germans _ to dominate began, and that included Secondly the neutrals European Countries from August/September 1944 had become the decisive reference points. Until then had itself but the economic Interconnections before everything with the Switzerland, Sweden, Portugal, Spain and Argentina has already become so condensed that the first away January February 1945 correct gripping "Safehaven" operations ²¹¹ to late came and himself far-reaching- de Legislative Decrees undermined became. ²¹²

This amazing Success the German Capital flight presented itself however not on by itself. The him constituent economic policy Framework conditions had to rather based on Exactly more thoughtful priorities hard fought for become. At first Job was standing the more _ shortcut the expanding black Currency- and Capital markets with the formal Economic contractual relationships. All German Business leader and association officials, the above appropriate Foreign connections had, dedicated itself this task until for the New Year 1944/45 with devotion. ²¹³ To the for that undertaken more and more frequently Travel so intensive How possible to design, grew her before Location acting correspondents and Representative in always more important Tasks into it. The persistence, with the For example, he was Vice President of the Reichsbank Emil Puhl for the maintaining the "Gold Turntable" Switzerland started, were without the permanent engagement the Reichsbank representative at the Bank for International Payment settlement unthinkable been. ²¹⁴ Fritz von Napolski, the managing director of the German Chamber of Commerce in Switzerland, arranged for Albert Interview appointments with leading Swiss Industrialists and advised him at his considerations, the Reich group Industry through the "Licensing" their statistical Survey methods in one permanent Connection with the Swiss business associations to bring. ²¹⁵

In Sweden advanced against it G. Riedberg to undisputed Horror Eminence the Reich group Industry. He worked Albrecht, the u. a. in the September 1944 the Germans _ Chamber of Commerce in Stockholm lectured, ²¹⁶ as Contact person and lobbyist to. Je more

211 She became first now effective, because the Western Allies so in the ongoing commercial negotiations lungs Promises of benefits of the Capture and Determination of the German Foreign assets dependent made.

212 The was before everything in Argentina the Case. See. FDRL, Kilgore papers, S. 36 f. (How Note 209).

213 BAK, R 12 1/10, circular the Dept. VI of RGI v. February 28, 1945, re. Foreign trade relations the Switzerland; BAP, Deutsche Bank, No. P 31, Bl. 64 ff., minutes the Meeting of the working committee the Germans Bank at the November 2, 1944.

214 BAP, Deutsche Reichsbank, No. 6741; NA, RG 260, FINAD 2/146/8, 11/15/1, 11/402/2; Trepp, p. 129 ff.

215 BAK, R 121/233. Most important Swiss Correspondence partner Albrecht was Heinrich Hornberger , director of suburbs of Swiss commercial and Industrial Association in Zurich.

216 Charles Albrecht, The Meaning the German Foreign Trade Chambers for the Care between-state Economic relations, speech on September 29, 1944 of the ten year old existence of the Germans Chamber of Commerce Stockholm. Excerpts printed under dem Title: Albrecht, Karl, Some Future questions the Foreign trade. In: steel and iron 64 (1944), No. 46/47,

the Germans' collaborators in the neutral countries came under pressure and the more difficult it for German Corporate and Association management was provided with substantial information above the current developments and the Post-war perspectives the main _ future trading partner to get closer, the more more important became these contact people . So How Albert itself always more often with Napolski and Riedberg voted, so the foreign and national economies got into trouble Department of German bank increasingly among the Influence the reporting hers Stockholmer correspondents George Conrad von der Goltz.²¹⁷

In the Focus this activities moved more and more the Make an effort, through personal che Contacts, informal negotiations and clever public Appear the Room for maneuver for the illegal capital and Wealth transfers so long and so large as possible to hold, assuming the Allies Interventions through appropriate Post- war agreements to undermine and the current and future economic conditions for the Economic relations to clarify. There itself included the United States together your conceptual contradictions always more clear as determining factor the global economic and more and more also the intra-European post-war order loomed, you remembered from late autumn In 1944, additionally to some institutions , the in the past ones years because of of primacy of "large-scale thinking" become obsolete was. Before everything the German-American Business Association experienced a true renaissance. He became now downright courted. Albert forgave in the October at the Association orders for procurement of Information about the trends and Frictions of North American post-war planning.²¹⁸ And the management of the Zeiss Group was also renewed at the beginning December 1944 in one letter at the Managing Director of the German-American Business Association old Feelings of loyalty at future again so important economic ties after successfully protecting its Ibero-American investment interests from unwanted attacks. Undoubtedly, Paul Henrichs wrote to HE Müncks, would the American "with of their predominantly economic Attitude ... very soon to Understanding come ... , that a economically lying there Europe for her of enormous economic Damage be would and vice versa a healthy Europe significant for the prosperity America with contribute can, that a healthy Europe but is unthinkable without a economically healthy Germany."²¹⁹

reorganization of "Working group for foreign trade issues"

Since dem late summer 1944 stood also the "Working group for foreign trade issues" increasingly under dem Influence this Reallocations in the foreign economic Catalog of actions of the Pursue and Business associations. Similar like the "European Circle" reflected he

S. 759-760. See. also the subsequent extenuation this (incorrectly on November 1944 dated) speech at Albrecht, Karl, *The Human behind dem Wonder*, S. 15 f.

217 BAP, German Bank, P 10883, P 10884 u. P 10885, various Correspondence

218 BAK, R 121/233, Daily reports the Department VI v. October 12, 1944 u. December 2, 1944.

219 Paul Henrichs, Managing Director from Carl Zeiss Jena, at H. E Müncks, Managing Director of German-American business association, December 2, 1944. Quote after anatomy of war, Doc. No. 264, p. 467.

but first the latest Disasters in the Trade relations. On the full meeting on 8th. August gave it still hot discussions above the Price stabilization in bilateral clearing transactions, and the for and Contrary one Sending German "experts" to the centers of the Hyperinflation was discussed. On the following first September meeting (September 14th) stated the Participant against it only still, the youngest political-military events would have "the previous mistake and Export planning fully above the "thrown in piles ". All energy should now on it be concentrated, "Economic exploitation of still existing room in favor of Germany to force."²²⁰

From there followed center September one short intermediate period, in the for the last time was attempted in the area of tension between the private sector and central authority economic policy comprehensive supporting program for the to formulate post-war plans. At the 21. September 1944 received Ilgner from Secretary of State Hayler a corresponding order, one Conception to reorganization of working group to suggest.²²¹

Already one week later presented he the Full meeting of the working group policy paper, by recommended, the previous committee work to one comprehensive statistical-organizational inventory the World economy to expand and the included results obtained with an analysis of the international monetary and economic problems to confront.²²² In the Frame The trend investigations should have fifteen working groups in addition to the reactivated committees for processing the currency and Food economics issues the capacity, Production and Consumption ratios in relation on the main Raw- and Basic materials study as well the latest overseas Industrialization processes investigate.

With the Ilgner wanted to work on the second problem-oriented focus on the other hand, instruct the policy committee. On In this way, from October 1944 onwards, the working group was supposed to address all of the core problems of the Post-war economy out of more international perspective topic : The Currency discussion including the war debt issues, the international raw materials policy, the perspective the Industry in the international post-war trade, the Cartel discussion as well the Reconstruction- and Full employment problems. It acted is a serious attempt to address the strategic deficits of the working group 's first planning phase through a empirical and at the same time problem-oriented supporting program to overcome, included all significant global economic developments of the recent times to be taken into account and at the same time Lindemann's request for an updated update the Riedl memorandum to fulfill. The Ilgner's suggestion was from the working group on 28. September approved unanimously. The Management received the order, „with the for the editing the individual areas intended persons out of Practice and Science Connection to record." The first Partial results out of dem Raw- and Basic material area should already until to next meeting present.²²³

²²⁰ So Schlotterer on the meeting of working group at the September 14, 1944, BAK, R 121/232, Daily report from Department VI the RGI v. September 15, 1944.

²²¹ BAP, German Bank, No. P 339, Bl. 2, AT for Section above a Call Polis, September 21, 1944.

²²² BAP, German Bank, No. P 339, Bl. 7-11, Ilgner design, Attachment to Summary the Results the meeting of working group for Foreign trade issues at the September 28, 1944.

²²³ Ibid, Bl. 6, protocol the meeting of working group at the September 28, 1944.

However had the agreement not once three weeks long Duration. The Attempt the leading capital groups, the working group for the cross-interests Planning center for her far advanced informal foreign economic expand post-war preparations, pushed Beginning October on a unexpected Obstacle. Since center August worked in the Main Department II of Reich Ministry of Economics a more ambitious Economist _ called Willy Luck, the as economic policy Speaker Ohlendorf about one conscience Influence decreed and the comprehensive Construction one Economics Department planned. This Man urged so in the Circle of Managing Directors of "Working group for foreign trade issues" and made itself attached, the required Planning documents to look after and the ongoing Project work to coordinate.²²⁴ With it were the Switches to one far-reaching Functional change placed. The working group should his _ role as Pressure Group and "self-governing" Coordination instrument the Business give up and de facto to one Advisory Board the economic policy guide restructured become.

It was clear, that Hayler and Ohlendorf behind Luck stood, and that Albrecht, the the trio since August in the in the meantime far plugged in Post-war ideas the Reich group Industry inaugurated had,²²⁵ itself a Piece far miscalculated had. At the 10. October informed _ itself Albert and Lindemann above this for she unpleasant ones Development and agreed that Lindemann the him because of of failure from Hans Croon submitted Chair only take over should, if How until now "the Managing directors of working group first _ line through Albrecht" successes.²²⁶ This Appointment let itself however on the management meeting, the at the following Day took place, not push through. Luck was not to shake off , Yes he should above the him granted Competency framework out "on every Topic in the individual" Influence take may. Thus was standing, How Albert noted that Decision at, „if the working group future exclusively a ministerial or a self-governing body becomes." ²²⁷ Actually mediated the finally negotiated result between this one both extremes. The working group, whose Line so also blessing took over, acted on the one hand further as Coordinating body foreign trade Business interests opposite the Foreign Trade Department of imperial economy ministry; on the other hand had to be itself future with one representatives Hayler's and Ohlendorf arrange, the not only a sovereign and economic policy Leadership demands represented, rather also insight in all important agenda had.

With it had the working group out of the view the private sector post-war interests him straight through the RGI-Ilgner agreement awarded central Control function again lost. Under dem immediate Impression this Changes agreed Albrecht at the 11. October with dem deputy Director the Reich group Industry, Rudolf Steel, one crucial Forcing the first since recently above the non-binding

224 BAK, R 7/2121, Bl. 49 f., Work report of Report IUI Dr. Luck from center August until Mid-October 1944.

225 Ibid., p. 12f., 16a, 19ff.

226 BAK, R 12 U233, Albrecht, Daily report the Department VI v. October 10, 1944, 3. Meeting with Lin demmann.

227 Ibid, Albrecht, Daily report the Department VI v. October 11, 1944.

The Reich Group's post-war preparations, which were carried out at expert level.²²⁸ Took for that the Company representative and Association officials on the meeting on October 19th the extensive dismantling of the Ilgner program from 28. September without contradiction.²²⁹ First should the currency discussion from the argument with the agreement from Bretton Woods Distance take. Through this lost she the her intended Explosiveness and played in the Frame of working group practical no role more. Secondly became the analysis the Effects of industrialization push in the overseas one countries on post-war world trade postponed. Also the other negotiating points of Policy Committee became dropped. Only out of dem package the Trend analysis stayed a Point unscathed: The Investigation the "global economic development the most important raw materials." But also at the Award this fifteen Subprojects became emphasizes, that she to _ a global economic situation diagnosis and a development forecast from an entrepreneurial perspective to restrict had, while "economic policy Conclusions from the German point of view out of" the "Reserved for economic management" be.

Despite this impairment The working group retained its radius of investigation however one certain Meaning. The Results the so starting Raw- and Basic materials surveys were, if she accordingly bundled became, for macroeconomically oriented post-war considerations absolutely valuable. Also the Task, the different Constellations of interests the economic Power groups constantly to balance, stayed under the Direction Blessings at least a Piece far receive. Not to underestimate was thirdly, the Mediation function of working group to Hayler and Ohlendorf. The new Men of the Reich Ministry of Economics had itself through her recent action though unequivocally _ against the post-war economics Claim to sole responsibility the Large companies were demarcated, but remained at the same time tactical allies and secured post-war planning the private sector official away.

After this new revision, the "Working Group for foreign trade issues " since dem 19. October the so in attack taken Raw- and Basic material analyses. The aim was to produce overview reports that were as concise and concise as possible without any scientific Apparatus. On the meeting at the 30. November 1944 became the members of the working group the first drafts above the global economic Development in the mineral oil sector the Iron and steel production the production of natural and synthetic rubber as well as from Skinning, skins and tannins to discussion submitted .²³⁰ center December they said goodbye Final version of the both memoranda the Perspectives the Iron- and Steel industry as well as of petroleum sector and discussed _ the Rough drafts from Memoranda above artificial fibers, Cotton and the agricultural Key products Grain, Meat and Fats.²³¹ Beginning February 1945 became this

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ BAP, German Bank, No. P 339, Bl. 12 ff., Summary the Results the meeting of working group for Foreign trade issues at the October 19, 1944.

²³⁰ BAP, German Bank, No. P 339, Write Polis to the members of the working group v. 11/22 1944; BAK, R 12 1/233, Albrecht, Daily report the Department VI the RGI, December 4, 1944.

²³¹ BAP, German Bank, No. P 339, Bl. 72 f., Results report above the meeting of working group for foreign trade issues at the December 15, 1944.

together with one elaboration above the Sugar economy finally advise and Drafts _ above the World markets for Wool and tobacco discussed.²³² At the 1. March could the **Employees** _ Ohlendorf finally eight in of their Final version list existing memoranda that come from this from the last period of activity of the working group.²³³

The eight completed raw material memoranda of the "Working Group on Foreign Trade Issues " have with Exception the petroleum memorandum and the elaboration about skins, Skins and tannins in the Nazi archives overwintered. The previous Research has she right one-sided as Investigations interpreted, the lump sum one extreme Import dependency of the German post-war economy forecast and already now clear on the USA as the coming leading global economic power oriented had, from whose good now obviously wants the elementary prerequisites for the recovery of exports activities were dependent.²³⁴ Actually put the Reviewer of the working group until to Turn of the year 1944/45 still right confident on other Options. She considered itself after How before as leading representatives and "Speaker" of European _ economic blocs, its global economic Reintegration now to Disposition stood. Included played secure the successes from Armament integration and more anticipated Foreign trade offensive one crucial Role.

Jacob W. Reichert, the Chief Executive Officer the Economic group iron creating Industry , demanded for his Industry extensive domestic economic support measures, the Backup the "Reincorporation Lorraine" and the Resumption the Swedish iron ore shipments, around the German Iron- and Steel industry for the in view the Overcapacity secure hard competition with the USA armed to knowledge .²³⁵ And also the IG Farbenindustrie AG found ample reasons for their suggestion, the now gigantic increase in German production capacities for synthetic rubber despite the inflated Cost prices to maintain. The palette was enough from the note on the to expecting foreign exchange shortage, the Rubber imports largely impossible , until there to dem Suggestion, the Construction more competitive Bunawerke in to prevent the "smaller " neighboring countries.²³⁶

232 The had a meeting originally already at the 19.1. take place should. See. *ibid*, Poti to the members of working group, January 11, 1945, January 23, 1945, January 26, 1945.

233 BAK, R 7/2121, note above the prev. memoranda of working group, March 1, 1945: 1. rubber (Igner, Charles Ehrhardt, Editor: Reithinger), 2. Cotton (Carl Albert from the company Albert Müller, Pearse & Co. in Bremen, Editor: Long), 3. Chemical fibers (Igner, Reithinger), 4. skins, Skins and tannins (Carl v. Schroeder, v. Poll), 5. To Petroleum industry the world (blessing, Editor: Frederick cathedral), 6. To iron and Steel industry the World (Richert), 7. The Position the World sugar economy and her Development trends to beginning of year 1945 (Karl Büchting, Editor: Ahlfeld), and 8th. The World market the agricultural Main products grains - Aisch - Fat (Nutritional Foreign Trade Committee, Edgar Michael, editor : v. Polt under cooperation from Emil Woerman u. Walter Faucet).

234 Autumn, S. 370 ff.; Brackmann, S. 186 ff.

235 BAK, R 7 app MCC/272, Jacob W. Reichert, To Iron- and Steel industry the World, Berlin (December) 1944.

236 BAK, R 7/2129, Igner/Ehrhardt/Reithinger, Rubber, O. D

First in the final passages of her The authors of the memoranda turned to this Problem too, how the on a case by case basis differently weighted import dependencies , exchange rate issues and transfer problems should be solved in order to Overcapacity in the transition period to to back up and the a long time ago already anticipated foreign trade offensive to align the subsequent decade of reconstruction. In these final Considerations made itself then also one certain Perplexity wide, because that own Production capacities were closed one-sided weighted and were able to the immediate one after End of war to expected backlog demand before everything of consumer goods and food cannot even be partially satisfied. The disproportionality was compelling the world market balance. This realization led then to that more or fewer _ vague formulated insight, that the concrete requirements of foreign trade Survival ultimately depends on the outcome of the war were and the USA in this represented the greatest unknowns.

The Basic tenor the memorandums of the working group so ambiguous, and this became _ undoubtedly through the since the October negotiations agreed conceptual narrowing _ of perspective favored. The Option, the own Claims to power at least temporarily under the table closed return and reveal the last card the future leadership the global economy to set, became in this one Elaborations still not once between the lines indicated. This radical Change of course was not the Result the activity of "Working group for Foreign trade issues". He advanced first in the Agony phase of Nazi imperialism to ruling Opinion the large entrepreneurial leadership circles.

Because of his conceptual narrowness and the resulting prognostic ambivalences and his since existing since October 1944 Hermaphrodite position between more entrepreneurial Self-determination and official Advisory function was Ultimately, the "Working Group for Foreign Trade Issues" does not in the Location, contributions to one comprehensive post-war perspective. The The result was that the particularly problem-oriented economic ones Power groups with your decisive Questions increasingly by him turned away. The MWT-IG Farben Group hesitated this one Step long beyond, What especially due to the initiatives of Ilgner, Reithinger and von Schoeller, which were repeatedly thwarted surprised. Her retreat had for she Yes also by no means a Information deficit Consequence. Much more provided she the Economic Department of IG Farben Group under the Direction of Head of Secretariat Gerhard Prince, of later Director of Federal Statistical Office, with always more dense information about the upcoming global economic events Setting the course. Through this became them increasingly consciously, that the previous arrangement with the European defense companies and the Bank locations Zurich and Stockholm for economic Survive not was enough. The Music became at latest since then Summer 1944 in Washington/New York and London played, and that is not only regarding the European "neutrals". Disadvantage of German plans.

Also the Bankers and the them those working Research association saw itself with their post-war reflections increasingly less through the "Europe Circle" and the "Working Group for foreign trade issues" represent. Her exponents had itself in the contrast to that always again intervening team Ilgner-Blessing-Reithinger-v. Schoeller a long time ago on the the first steps of the Reich Industry Group and their own discussion contexts were withdrawn. They now compared their results with the Anglo-Saxon After-

war preparations. In broad agreement with the Economics Department of the IG Farben took them opposite dem meticulously reflected ²³⁷ Course the Anglo- American currency discussions, whose through Keynes set Prelude she however from Beginning at more skeptical commented had, one increasingly rejecting attitude a. The leader of the Reich Banks Group, Otto Christian Fischer, saw this Possibility in the coming World order regional Subsystems to install, largely impaired. ²³⁸ Leo Drescher, the Managing Director of the banking institution, wrote, the Americans would have in the Expert negotiations and in Bretton Woods all Try from Keynes, the debtor nations the to strengthen the future global economic order. ²³⁹ Gunter Schmölders came in one Presentation, the he in the Banking institution held, too dem Result, The Bretton Woods agreements had predominantly "a propagandistic character" and none the involved partner see "in them one real Solution the dealt with post-war problems." ²⁴⁰ So became the Bankers and your Economists increasingly clear that the on the common basis of a countercyclical full employment program hoped for starting points for a Post-war arrangement between one continued to be "run" by the Germans Continental Europe and the new World economic order increasingly questionable appeared.

The Bankers were probably the first, the itself gritting his teeth on the looming pax americana with Alles your Imponderables prepared, around itself under radical changing global economic conditions gradually in European context again to be very hungry. She were to that extent himself dem busy Albert ahead, the first in the Course the examination of Myrdal's global economic reflections and the USA reporting through Herbert Large the Inevitability and Susceptibility to crises the approaching one Post-war order perceived. ²⁴¹ In the Contrast with the exponents the MWT-IG-farben group and the Albrecht retained high finance however also On fundamental issues, it achieved a tactical cooperation status with the "Working Group for Foreign Trade Issues", but was also able to temporarily disintegrate the post-war large-business discourse not to impede. Because in September/October 1944 was it It is still by no means clear whether the post-war planning circle that is now emerging from its informal niche existence the Reich group Industry at all to one synthesis find would . Around so more intense should the "Steel Circle" then but in the decisive stage on the knowledge of MWT-IG-farben major banking complex To fall back on, that any ge-

²³⁷ See. the ongoing anonymous documentation u. Commentary in: "Banking" Jg. 1943 f., the after the publication of white paper above the Keynes plan used u. not since then demolition.

²³⁸ fisherman, Otto Christian, The World monetary plans in the Twilight. In: banking industry, 1944, No. 2, S. 25-27.

²³⁹ thresher, Leo, The currency and Financial conference from Bretton Woods. In: Yearbooks for National economics and statistics 160 (1944), S. 235-248.

²⁴⁰ BAP, German Bank, No. P 10907, Bl. 87, EWS(= Serious Wilhelm Schmidt), More international Monetary funds. Meeting in the Banking institution (Presentation Schmölders) v. August 17, 1944.

²⁴¹ BAK R 12 U233, Albrecht, note, Re: The American one Post-war problem, November 30, 1944. In this recording discussed Albert the Essay v. Large, Herbert, The American Post-war problem. In: Global economics archive 60 (1944 II), S. 132-169.

collective economic Post-war planning in the Air hung as long as she not the achieved so far Advance payments preventive with dem "Post-war picture" of future global main creditor and main producers voted. Practical These insights became important however first five minutes before Twelve, as the Business her Emergency phase graduated and itself on the occupation Germany by the Allied victorious powers set up.

b) The Post-war ideas the structural loser (trade, consumer goods industry)

But before When the time came, they came Trade and the medium-sized consumer goods industry have their say as the main exponents of the war economy losers of the "total war" .²⁴² Emphatically reported itself now the stakeholders the through the armaments economics Upheavals of "Total war" disadvantaged economic sectors to Word. The State Secretariat and the Employees the Main Department II of the Reich Ministry of Economics understood itself as her legitimate mouthpiece, and Otto Ohlendorf growth so finally _ in the role hers Prophets into it.

From the resentment to Counterconception

The starting point this since August/September 1944 clearly accentuating initiative formed the Secret knowledge of security police apparatus, whose Economic experts (office group III D of Domestic SO) about the Personal union Ohlendorf now closely with the Main Department II of the Reich Ministry of Economics were intertwined. Of their reporting according to had itself the through the further expansion of defense sector forced socioeconomic Upheavals since dem spring 1944 crisis-like pointed . The Extent of the Escape out of the Reichsmark was now like that enormously, that the now consolidating Shadow economy of barter and the Black markets no more frontal fought, rather only still regulated and supervised become could.²⁴³ This Reichsmark devaluation "from below" pointed up the monetary economic side real Limits of War financing and purchasing power extraction. With her corresponded since the relocation of orders and air warfare Armament industry erratic deepening distortions in the goods economy and traffic structure. The Implementation and decommissioning

²⁴² Not included was the Craft: whose representatives responded on the escalation their socioeconomic marginalization not with neoliberal deregulation concepts, but were looking her only partially realized corporatist Utopias above the Nazi period to save away. See. John, Peter, Chambers of crafts in the twilight. 700 years of entrepreneurial interests in Poland de the guild idyll, 1979, S. 156 ff., 161 ff.; v. Saldern, Adelheid, "Age middle class" in the "Third Rich". Remarks to one Controversy. In: Story and Company 12 (1986), pp. 235-243, here p. 240 ff.; Boyer, Christopher, Between Forced economy and Freedom of trade. Crafts in Bavaria 1945-1949, Munich 1992, p. 53 f.

²⁴³ SD report to Domestic issues v. January 20, 1944 (Greens series), v. February 24, 1944 (Yellow Series). Printed in: Messages out of dem Rich. Vol. 16, p. 6260 ff., 6367 ff.

Actions shocked with your highly centralized decision-making processes not only the middle economic policy authorities,²⁴⁴ but brought one growing "Part of German medium-sized companies for the "Succumb" and made all approaches regional traffic unbundling to waste.²⁴⁵

What the Economic politician of SD in the breastfeeding researched, put the ministerial staff Hayler's and Ohlendorf political-journalistic around, and in the aura this Ideas were also possible Wireless always more often from them the Speech concepts pre-formulate.²⁴⁶ The tendencies, that Ministry of Armaments finally for the expand production ministry, held she in contrast to, that from it by no means one the further Restriction of the consumer goods sector appropriate increase in Armaments production results, but itself only the Bureaucratization the Spear Kehrlschen Steering instruments further strengthen would.²⁴⁷ A draft speech Ohlendorf's press office added the passage for Hayler a, the "leader state" threaten finally for the "Planning State" to degenerate, Hitler but be at the time "to Leader and not to the planner become".²⁴⁸ Everywhere they saw the "forces of the massification" on dem advance, ranted against the control points, the itself more and more entrepreneurial Competencies appropriated, and Ohlendorf said one Development up to the point of "commissioner", "who ultimately takes over the operational management himself."²⁴⁹ The civilian sector the The economy has become a "whipping boy". whose costs are the type one of Ministry of Armaments petted "over-operation" widen, in dem How for example at the IG Colors only still quite few had an overview and Chemist as "Officer one capital" worked, the itself randomly still in private hands located. Still worse be it around the Development in the public Company _ ordered, the itself Per form one private sector structure put over would have. As in the enemies be also in Germany the planning on the advance. She set the Business _ dem unbridled Pressure the technical rationalization out of, around possible big effects with minimal Expense to achieve. On this Way remove itself the Economy increasing from your "national connections."

No Doubt: spear and before everything the allegedly dem "Americanism" dilapidated Kehrl were after one scarce Year the forced cooperation among the economic policy representatives of the structural losers of "total war" become intimate enemies . To this opposition came since dem late summer 1944 Alles those in addition, the in the framework of theirs post-war economic considerations went about it with the "ideas of opponent" to befriend. The Danger, at the "ideal Front". "subject to", was for

244 SO report to Domestic issues v. April 11, 1944, Business: Voices to the operational implementations (Wißmann campaign). Printed *ibid*, Vol. 16, S. 6476 ff.

245 SO report to Domestic issues from the June 26, 1944, Business, Voices to traffic unbundling; v. July 24, 1944, Business. Printed *ibid*, Vol. 17, S. 6605 ff. u. 6666 ff.

246 BAK, R 7/2002 (Speech concepts the Press office of RWM for Wireless 1944/45).

247 BAK, R 7/2133, 81.42-48, Hayler, Some points of view Suggestion of Planning Office (Ab-writing), August 11, 1944.

248 BAK, R 7/2006, Bl. 84 ff., press office, Questions and Suggestions for one speech from Secretary of State Dr. Hayler, December 29, 1944, Quote Bl. 92.

249 BAK, R 7/2024, Ohlendorf on the Work meeting of RWM above sociological Questions and Tasks at the December 1, 1944, Bl. 23. The following Quotes *ibid*, Bl. 22 ff.

Hayler, Ohlendorf, Lorch and the in the meantime as Ghostwriter the Press office added Hans Wöckener far larger as the current military setbacks.²⁵⁰ Accordingly _ intensive tried hard she itself around the initiation one Countercampaign. Included they tried to gloss over the catastrophic results of the collapsed occupation rule²⁵¹, and condemned the Southeast Europe policy the MWT-IG Farben Group because of of their distorting structure consequences on the "German "Architecture".²⁵²

In this journalistic-propagandistic orientation, trends emerged for the first time one general **criticism** at the monopoly capitalist Regulatory mechanisms to appear, the above the criticism at Kehl's "Planned Economy" went out. Articulated However, they were only in the innermost arcane area of the inland SO. At a meeting of the RSHA/Amt III, which on the 31st October took place in 1944 Ohlendorf From the Nazi dictatorship be in the drawn to war, without before the Opportunity had to have, the Military and the To reshape the economy according to National Socialist principles.²⁵³ Instead, an "evolution " used, the, how the events of 20th of July shown would have failed be. But now have a "revolution" in the Wehrmacht began, and the Reich Ministry of Economics work in the meantime with all Power about it the Business to transmitted.

How Ohlendorf still in the face the agony out of "Negative the "Positive" to produce thought, became a Month later clearly, as the Main Department II of The Reich Ministry of Economics together with the Inland SO and some representatives from economics, trade and medium-sized industry held a sociologist meeting organized.²⁵⁴ The "People" must, so Ohlendorf in his Closing address,²⁵⁵ again from dem him through the "assembly line" forced "mass existence" freed become. Big companies are back up their "family ties" and that Restoration more manageable production and Distribution structures of small and medium-sized enterprises be a desirable Goal. Accordingly wanted he the Technology on the development smaller Aggregates new aligned knowledge, around the economics people again "to a real serving member in his "nationalistic goals". It is therefore urgent that further design of the War economic and financial policy nothing more to allow, What the tendencies to "massification" reinforce, and immediately after

250 BAK, R 7/2006, BI. 1 ff., press office, documents to the lecture by State Secretary Hayler in Feldafing, suggested Title: The economic policy Responsibility of the state in the Practice _ of sixth War year, January 18, 1945.

251 BAK, R 7/2025, The Development of German Foreign trade. garnish to one Write Lorchs to Ohlendorf, August 2, 1944; BAK, R 7/2010, BI. 7 f., press office, German achievements for Europe, October 23, 1944; BAK, R 7/2002, BI. 37 ff., Lorch, „Responsibility for Europe", Draft speech for radio on the Weimar meeting Of the german foreign academics institute, January 1945.

252 BAK, R 7/2024, Closing speech Ohlendorf on the Sociology event of RWM on December 1, 1944, BI. 33.

253 BAK, R 58/990, BI. 198 ff., Shorthand the speech Ohlendorf at the 31.10.1944.

254 From this "Work meeting of Reich Ministry of Economics above sociological Questions and Tasks", which took place on December 1st, 1944, there is a complete protocol with a part of the presentations given and the contributions to the discussion: BAK, R 7/2024.

255 Ibid, BI. 20 ff. The following Quotes ibid.

dem war must "the entire Alignment ours Production around 180 Degree "turned" .

They were particularly revealing at this Opportunity in free Reflections presented in the speech Ohlendorfs over the Post-war planning big capital. ²⁵⁶ If you ask industrialists about this, you can "on average hear that it is important to get out of the box within Europe Focus of the internal area the economic position the Production distribution etc. to set." She strived thereafter, „that here A unified economic area with, if possible, its own currency and without customs barriers is emerging . It is unbelievable, "in which strong Dimensions, without that the Country on legal Ways any Knowledge of that receive has, the German Industry" with Belgium, France , the Switzerland, „Yes with England and America Peace policy might and here understandings brought about above the location, about the Production, above the Prices, about the distribution , above the rooms, in To whom the individual quotas to award are the Business have yourself quite "in Direction on your own Operation" fixed and let included all political and social aspects except Consideration. Would itself this Conception push through, then would each other within a few generations the social ones differences blur between the peoples , and that is continuing as himself in the Soviet Union. The to expecting Post-war prosperity would "also folkish dangerous become". It be unacceptable, „such pure industrial Questions for the starting point one European economic design" close . For this reason come it now on it at, „that we so much material in the hand have, ... to prevent, that this economic conventions approximately on Europe would be turned inside out."

On the one hand, these statements explain the intention of Main Department II of the Reich Ministry of Economics "Working group for Foreign trade issues" in October reins created had; for the change make she clearly, that itself the structural Losers of the economic policy of "total war" on the way to independent post-war planning were, the the survival interests of your own bourgeois-factional

Base in extreme neoliberal Figures of thought articulated and at the same time with dem "national" program of extermination and reorganization of **RSHA** linked. However, they made a distinction strictly between strategy and Tactics. The main enemy, against the it here and now in the alliance with the itself on the Postwar preparatory Large companies to proceed was, was the armament technocratic "Planned economy". The Problem the on her Way not less "performance-inhibiting" "large corporate formation". the social-sanitary rehabilitation of the "people" also depends on them threatened to be severed from economic foundations, should against it for now "still not cut become." ²⁵⁷ The question that Ohlendorf at his first Pronunciation with Albert on August 10, 1944 raised had, namely like it possible were, the Mass production the USA one European Method of production to oppose, the this not simply copied, ²⁵⁸ had he thus at the 1. December 1944 basically _ answered, the itself from it necessary resulting Dissent with the Reichsgruppe Industrie but up to defeat of the main enemy "planned economy".

²⁵⁶ Ibid, Closing speech Ohlendorf, Bl. 32 ff. The following Quotes ibid.

²⁵⁷ BAK, R 7/2006, Bl. 84 ff., press office, Questions and Suggestions for one speech from Secretary of State Dr. Hayler, December 29, 1944 (quote Bl. 93)

²⁵⁸ BAK, R 12 1/232, AT Albrecht above one Meeting with Ohlendorf in the RWM at the August 10, 1944.

approaches to one medium-sized Post-war planning

Nevertheless had Hayler and Ohlendorf but also already The first steps were taken to defend this line of confrontation in the post-war era, which had been put aside for tactical reasons to arm. Had she itself in the first phase the strategic defensive only the journalistic-propagandistic resentment and the fundamental requirement for one Devoted to an “alternative” economic order as a war goal, they too stopped in August 1944 the first Foundations for a forward-looking one economic planning. center August became Willy Luck, the previous Director of the institute for Economic research the Reich fair city Leipzig, as head of department for economic policy Fundamental questions (11/1) in that of Ohlendorf Main Department II of the Reich Ministry of Economics set. Luck raised for his Department the Claim, an overview about the economic Whole to win, by on the one hand Economics and business practice a new Relationship to each other would find and on the other hand through special methods of empirical economic observation the current and expected distortions the Economic governance would be documented.²⁵⁹ With it was the claim registered, for the “Lück Department” has directive authority to demand the other former policy departments of the entire ministry that are grouped together in Department II, but also in the ongoing decision-making processes Foreign trade and credit departments Neighboring main departments involved to become. Dem first three-month report the Department according to belonged in addition in the back then logic science policy practice the establishment of a central economic research archive, a central library, a central recording and control center for economic research Work, one contact network with the relevant top institutes as well as the one by hand Treatment economic policy Questions in the Order Ohlendorf.²⁶⁰

For the realization this veritable functional description, the after back then size orders Jobs from at least 100 scientific employees and **employees** – covered, stood Lück to Time the Drafting of the report however next to some assistants only two Graduate economists available; the number of scientific people working on him Forces increased to a maximum of five by January 1945.²⁶¹ The real job opportunities were so exceedingly modest and limited themselves moreover, about a half Year. Internal discharge gave it only in this respect, as some Experts | out of that in special section V summarized keynote speeches from the pre-Ohlendorf era and in the October out of a special project “Corporate investigations”. energetic acting industrial department emerged.

With this one sobering Facts must however the far-reaching Cooperation agreements faced become, the Luck until for the New Year 1944/45 under Roof and Academic subject

259 BAK, R 7/2131, Bl. 20, Lück an Ohlendorf, Re: task of Economic observation, September 14, 1944.

260 BAK, R 7/2121, Bl. 49 ff., Work report of Report 11/1 Dr. Luck from center August until center October 1944.

261 It were this the Graduate economists Hane, Pichmann, Dr. Wolfes, the assessor Dr. White and the only as Half-time worker busy Graduate economist Hunter. Ibid, Bl. 107 ff., Hane, work report presentation 11/1 Dr. Luck, January 9, 1945.

brought. It was about about it the construction of “scientific papers” that the first itself opportunity offered in the Main Department II incorporated become should and in this respect the “special report Lück” as a kind placeholder for identify the desired huge economics department. At the beginning of December the remains of the from Otto thunder directed military economics Research center at the Four-year plan authority accepted.²⁶² Ferdinand Grünig, the methodical Impulse generator from Planning Office and Reich group Industry equally, wanted with his entire Department for central economic observation at the Reich Chamber of Commerce in the Reich Ministry of Economics indent, came but not more in addition.²⁶³ Many at once departmental and Heads of department at the largely exploited Reich Statistical Office have been striving since November under the wings Ohlendorfs, and the mutual efforts resulted At the beginning of 1945 Preliminary contracts about the common Building one statistical central office as well as the already in the first one Activity report requested central Economic Research Archives.²⁶⁴

Mental basis all of these preliminary agreements and the with it associated hunt after vagabond economic policy information carriers²⁶⁵ was the common front position against the planning office, the itself since now one Year in the him own Robustness largely appropriated the economic institutional complex and the not usable Leftovers hers left to fate. The endeavor, it's the now all- powerful “Scientific Advice Center” and the “Information Office Group” to pay back was still until Exodus from Berlin, the in the February 1945 cast his shadows ahead, predominant.²⁶⁶ It was a remarkable Alliance, the there in the last months of the war between the private sector and those qualified in economics losers of “Total war” conditions came.

Ohlendorf rejected the hunger for power based on data acquisition science and Lück finally in the Role of preparers, the nearly exclusively from the Change on one size Future lived. In certain Way represented she the last line-up of those sovereign “ragpicker”, the the leftovers the empirical economic research landscape searching for post-war planning decision-making skills . They didn't have to put in much effort, as the institute directors and experts did gifts itself at them out of own drive the Doorknobs in the Hand. After the Requirement of planning office covered was and itself also the “Steel Circle” always stronger on the cooperation from RGI officials limited had, could only still the with dem Domestic SO in personal union interwoven special resorts of the Reich Ministry of Economics enforce OK positions and front-line leave, state funds procure, have certain research projects declared “important to the war effort” and security police protection against misunderstandings on the part the NSDAP base grant. It acted itself first of all around

262 Ibid, Bl. 107 ff., Work report v. January 9, 1945.

263 Ibid, Bl. 71 ff., note Pichmanns above one Meeting with Green at the November 9, 1944; R 7/2131, Green at Ohlendorf, November 14, 1944.

264 BAK, R 7/2119 u. R 7/2121, various Doc.

265 For example the Archives some more dissolved Business newspapers or one collection from U.N-company commemorative publications, the shaft created and in the library the Reichsbank deposited has- te. Documented in: BAK, R 7/2121, Bl. 28, 47, 133 f.

266 See. ibid, Bl. 138, Hartman at Luck, February 7, 1945.

banal institutional survival reflexes, for example when serious Wagemann, the President of German Institute for Economic research, Ohlendorf for the strengthen Man its management committee made,²⁶⁷ or if Charles C Thalheim, the director of World Economic Institute the Business school Leipzig, with one entire list from suggestions „for the Transmission more important to the war effort Research tasks" in the last yourself gap in the market pushed in.²⁶⁸

Everything in everything is it dem never to Economic Department mature "Report Lück" only succeeded in minimal approaches basic demands of Hayler and Ohlendorf on a fascist-neoliberal one Post-war design with Help a wide to underpin the economic policy data collection and purpose-built research program . The attempt to make medium-sized business interests politically viable that out of the in the Autumn 1944 still existing leftovers the empirical-statistical economic research a ministerial Information center timbered and for the Basic stock one central economic management department was expanded, no longer came to unfolding. It stayed in which Claim, a comprehensive synthesis of Economic theory and Economic practice to pre-exercise, around directly after End of war one U-turn the entire Economic policy around 180 Degree initiate to can. That is recorded them Employees Ohlendorf also amazing Successes. As most important more practical The outpost has been open since the beginning of October the "Working Group for Foreign Trade Issues" became a ministerial advisory body resized. The export-oriented economy recognized _ this one status quo, however pulled itself the Reich group Industry as a representative more economical overall interests back and built the so far rather embryonic developed our own Planning focus so energetically. But also now the post-war planners were looking the industry tactical arrangement with Hayler, Ohlendorf and Lück, especially the contacts and correspondence in November 1944 were decisive.²⁶⁹

In total prevailed willingness at the pages to Cooperation, because itself both Political party-en regarding the Transitional constellation to Post-war economy above essential conceptual _ Commonalities in the Clear up were: The possible rush Dismantling the "Planned economy" after end of war, the at least partial Respect neoliberal-middle-class survival interests in the Transition phase, and the consolidation of the National debt above all on Cost the without assets Small saver. This mutual The representatives of medium-sized business post-war interests did not see any agreement of their long term Reservations as sufficient. She found itself ready, the Post-war preparations by big capital help her political and security police instruments of power against any Interventions on the part the Nazi leadership to secure.²⁷⁰

267 BAK, R 7/2126.

268 BAK, R 7/2131, Karl C. Thalheim, Proposals for the transfer of research tasks important to the war effort to the World Economics Institute of the Leipzig Commercial University, October 31, 1944.

269 Documented in: BAK, R 7/2121 u. 2131.

270 There were definitely approaches to such interventions, for example one from the Party Chancellery the NSDAP and the Reich Chancellery together initiated campaign to distance from managers with Anglo-American relations from the management positions of the commercial economy. she got in the Interaction from RWK and Main Department II of RWM bent. See. BAP, RWM, No. 9020.

Over the role one Junior partners are the representatives the structural loser of "Total war" in the Bourgeoisie but never got out. Her Post-war orientations condensed itself despite some more empirical approaches not from the Counter concept to politically capable of acting Planning. Here in was them the at the next related - if also politically different - neoliberal deregulation program of the Beckerath-Lampe working group house high superior. The comparatively far developed They were neither able to openly attack the post-war options of their main competitors in the Ministry of Armaments nor to respond in a timely manner Neutralize with the help of viable counter-models. Your temporary interventions in the large business committees (working group for Foreign trade issues") only at short notice one Disintegration and became very quickly through the activation the from the Reich group Industry exclusive operated Planning approaches overcompensate. On the great consensus of the actors in the emergency phase, which took place in January /February 1945 forged became, around the economic substance before the Destructions in the Final phase of war to rescue, performed she just as few a Contribution How to the one from Planning Office parallel about this in Area the Consumer goods economy advanced domestic economic advances that led to the complete ruin of the German economy Potential should be prevented. In this respect they are Economic-political-"national" visions of Ohlendorf the previous Not research only partially misunderstood, but also considerably overestimated been.²⁷¹ The from Ohlendorf dreamed of "revolution" in the economy stayed no chance. The SS group leader and Ministerial Director was ultimately only a subordinate figure who influences large-scale industrial post-war planning without any promise of substance In return, the medium-sized businesses ' survival interests were protected in one hopeless late beginning initiative in the concert the economic After-war preparations brought in.

c) The "Steel Circle" the Reich group Industry

Consolidation of planning association

On 1. August 1944 turned itself steel at nine celebrities members of Engen advisory board of the Reich Industry Group or the Board of Trustees of the Supporting community of German industry.²⁷² Er shared them with, the Director of the Reich group "close ones" Institute for industrial research Frame "certainly more strictly confidential Preparatory work individual problems of later peace reconstruction" one Memorandum above the consolidation of the War debts composed, the "in one quite small circles "had been discussed in advance". The working group had approved the analytical focus part, however against those developed from it "consistent, but very drastic" Suggestions for the later ones Debt consolidation significant Concerns reported. Thereupon be Keizer, the already before "Bank archive" above this Problem expressed would have, to one Correspondence "caused"

271 See autumn, S. 276 ff., 320 ff., 445 ff.

272 **BAK, R** 11/2171, BI. 385, Circular Steels at Heinrich Dinkelbach u. a., Re: Debt consolidation, August 1, 1944.

been. In him would "other, from psychological points of view dictated Attempts at solutions of difficult problem" shown. Well wanted to Pliers and steel the Both suggestions initially "in a small "committee of experts" for advice, before they would be passed on to official bodies, if "this happens at all at the present time opportune" appear. He load for this reason to one confidential Pronunciation with the previous one employees a, the End August/beginning September take place could. As Attachment sent steel one short version of Erhard report and the opinion Keizers; on Request stood but also the detailed one version Erhards to Disposal.

We know nothing about the Sequence and the Results of meeting, but it is certain that the "Committee of Experts" after discussing the Erhard Keizer controversy not again fell apart, rather similar How before the "Europe Circle" and the "Working group for foreign trade issues" at least once monthly to full sessions met and additionally Subcommittees formed.²⁷³ How the in the Archive holdings of Salzdetfurth Group handed down Remaining files show steel, stayed he about it out in the Contrast to the others planning committees not only until End of war active, but even tried until Autumn 1945 about continuity his Work.²⁷⁴ Dominated became the "Committee of Experts" of top managers of large corporations in the production resources sector and the Major banks. As constant members took next to steel and Pliers Heinrich Dinkelbach (United Steelworks), Max Ebbecke (Electric Licht- und Kraftanlagen AG), Friedrich Flick (Frederick Flick KG), Carl Goetz (Dresden Bank), Fritz Jessen (Siemens Group), Alfred Olscher (Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft), Philipp F. Reemtsma (HF and Ph.F. Reemtsma KG), Oswald Roesler (German Bank) and Hermann Schmitz (IG colors). the full sessions part. The Meeting minutes could until now not localized become because the files of Institute for Industrial research and the Estates the Main actors - with the exception of the Salzdetfurth holdings - are not accessible or have been destroyed. From the surrounding materials can However, it can be concluded that this committee underwent exactly the opposite development as the "European Circle" and the "Working group for foreign trade issues". It became all the more more active, ever closer the End of war moved, and it went it from the discussion the fundamental Transformation problems always more to the economic policy Questions of the day the approaching Emergency phase over.

Also the "Small Circle" the Expert reviewer and became experts expanded. Erhard's Institute for Industrial research was possible to assert itself as the "clearing house" of the "Stahl Circle". All internal How external Aspirants on cooperation became first in the expanding Planning context built-in, after she itself with Erhard discussed and whose Place received had.²⁷⁵ Keizer and Albert were in Course of July finally co-opted. As another RGI employees followed until October the Head of department Paul binder (IV, tax, banking, Credit- and financing issues), Victor Metzner (III, Market regulation and Business Administration) and Bernhard Skrodzki (II, Internal Economy and Transport). This expands

²⁷³ See. Brackmann, S. 169 f.

²⁷⁴ BAP, Salzdetfurth AG, No. 15 f., 25, 29, 159 f., 173, 176. See. also the Final section this chapter. as well as Cape. VII in the prev. Vol.

²⁷⁵ See, for example, BAK, R 121/233, Albrecht to Erhard, September 25, 1944; Albrecht Thalheim, 9.10. 1944.

third core group of the “Small Circle”. additionally within the Reich group set up department -specific working groups for post-war issues or associated itself with existing ones facilities, around the subcommittees of to provide ongoing assistance to the expert committee . They were either carried directly by the Institute for Industrial Research , so for example the working group Albrecht, the the European country studies took over,²⁷⁶ or maintained relaxed working relationships, according to Metzner's working group for Business Administration and Market regulation as well as the from Bickert directed Statistical Department (VIII), the materials to industry reporting, to Foreign trade statistics and to forecast of workforce potential brought in. The Contact with dem after How before external permanent social economy led by Lohmann The planning circle, on the other hand, was mediated directly by the top of the Reich Industry Group, and it was not until December that the key problem of the group came to the fore Post-war wage regulations become a direct part of the planning “Steel circle”. On the part the Donut Headquarters was away August 1944 Albrecht for the coordination of the Working groups and subcommittees are responsible.²⁷⁷ He looked after additionally in ongoing poll with Erhard and Metzner the contacts with external economic institutions and individual researchers.

The “Steel Circle”

Small circle:

Director: Rudolf steel

Coordination: Ludwig Erhard/Institute for industrial research, Charles Albert (Albrecht, Binder, Erhard, Grünig, Keiser, Metzner, Skrodzki, Steel)

Committee of Experts:

Director: Wilhelm pliers, Rudolf steel

Coordination: Charles Good (Dinkelbach, Ebbecke, Aick, Goetz, Good, Fritz Jessen, Olscher, Reemtsma, Rösler, Schmitz, Steel, pliers)

RGI working groups for Post-war planning:

- Foreign trade (Albrecht/Institut for industrial research)
- Business Administration and Market regulation (Metzner)
- Domestic economy and Business groups (Skrodzki, Good)
- Money- and Financial economics (Binder)
- Industry reporting/employment (Bickert, Grünig)
- Social economy and Wage regulations (pliers, Lohmann, Mansfeld)

External Employees:

(Coordination: Albrecht, Erhard, Metzner)

- Hans from the Cover, Agricultural Department of Germans Institute for Economic research
- Edgar Michael, More nutritionally efficient Foreign Trade Committee

276 BAK, R 121/233, Albrecht, Daily report the Department VI v. November 18, 1944; Albert at Erhard, Re: Cooperation with ours Department VI, December 22, 1944.

277 Albert received Beginning August from steel the Order, one Overall concept for the further development winding the Planning to work out, the however not to find was. See. BAK, R 12 1/232, note Albrecht for Good above one Meeting with Steel, Re: Special work the Department VI, August 3, 1944.

- **Charles** Eugene Mössner, Economic and Statistical Department the Community group of German mortgage banks
- **Charles** C Thalheim, World Economic Institute the Business college Leipzig
- Walter putting chamber, Director the Reich office for Spatial planning
- Individual researcher: Hero Moeller, Heinrich Rittershausen

Source: **BAK**, R 7/2131; R 11/2171; R 121/24, 221,232,233; R 131/665; N/A, T-73, Roll 193; **PER**, FO 935/138.

The economic projects financed by the funding association alongside the Institute for Industrial Research were activated on a case-by-case basis: for example, the Leipzig World Economic Institute Karl C. Thalheims, which contributed Albrecht's expertise on the post-war economy of Switzerland and Italy to the country studies;²⁷⁸ the agricultural department of the German Institute for Economic Research, which oversees the entire practice of previous food rationing was developed and controlled had;²⁷⁹ the Housing construction expert from the community group of mortgage banks, Karl Eugen Mössner; the food trade committee of the "working group for foreign trade issues"; the head the Reich Office for Spatial Planning, Walter Puttkammer, and other individual researchers who, like Hero Moeller and Heinrich Rittershausen, had made a name for themselves in the previous scholarly dispute at the Academy of German Law about the limits and post-war consequences of war financing.²⁸⁰

At the 10. August informed Albert as emissary Steels for the first time Ohlendorf in generally held Turns about the projects of the Reichsgruppe Industrie.²⁸¹ On it A period of scanning followed, initially at the end of September during the disputes around the "Working Group for Foreign Trade Issues" led to a mutual delimitation of terrain. It was only the meetings in November that Now Stahl himself arranged with Ohlendorf with the involvement of Erhard,²⁸² provided final political security through the policy department of the Reich Ministry of Economics and the Inland SO. The fact that this happened was due not least to Erhard's biographical and conceptual profile. The former economic annexation expert not only came from the tradition and environment of the medium-sized industrial losers, but was also ready and willing, their survival interests so far How possible in the big business post-war

²⁷⁸ **BAK**, R 121/232, Albert at Erhard, September 25, 1944.

²⁷⁹ Please refer v. d. Cover, Hans, The Work of Agricultural Department in the DIW 1929 until 1945. In: German Institute for Economic research (Institute for economic research), The German Institute for Economic research (Institute for economic research) 1925-1945 in the Memory earlier Employees, Berlin 1966, S. 33 ff.

²⁸⁰ **BAK**, R 7/2131, expose Erhards v. November 14, 1944; see. e.g also Moeller, hero, Boundaries of government credit. In the: Financial archive 10 (1945), S. 490-517; Rittershausen, Heinrich, The Future the public Fault. In: Yearbooks for political economy and statistics 158 (1943), p. 22-38.

²⁸¹ **BAK**, R 121/232, AT Albrecht above one Meeting with Ohlendorf in the Reich Ministry of Economics on August 10, 1944; see also **BAK**, R 7/2121, Bl. 12, AN Lücks about a meeting with Albert at the August 18, 1944.

²⁸² **BAK**, R 7/2131, steel at Ohlendorf, November 14, 1944, with expose Erhards as Garnish; R 7/2120, Bl. 7, AN Lücks v. November 20, 1944; Autumn, S. 390 f.

scenario to introduce. Additionally made Erhard with one specially for Ohlendorf written purposes Planning exposition from 14th November In 1944 a right one extensive bow Before _ from him some months before so lively ironized ideologemes of the "Economic order".²⁸³ The Requirements for were a coexistence so in the critical Transition phase of the RGI planning for concrete decision-making. As then in January 1945 the Emergency phase started, played the neoliberal-fascist Axioms Haylers and Ohlendorf ultimately no role more.

extension and synthesis for the Survival program

So tedious and time consuming How the final Consolidation of The planning association also involved the synthesis of the existing policy papers and partial work into an overall plan. Anyway became one to some extent coherent Interim balance sheet first at the 14th November from Erhard tried and Ohlendorf presented without but beforehand from the small circle been advised to be.²⁸⁴ Erhard wrote in his expose introductory, the now to be bundled partial results the so far "in the narrower Circle" guided post-war debate any "Interest politics" far away; theirs Summary should rather the responsible _ beyond the ongoing Daily problems "at least mentally on the coming _ Tasks" prepare. Around this Tasks in of their entire complexity capture simultaneously _ in detailed How division of labor each other to be voted on Individual questions break it down to be able to, he distributed them up four Focus: monetary and Monetary policy, trade policy, problems of the domestic German economy, and fundamental questions of economic policy. Under this one Rubrics listed he then the already present Work on and linked them with the ongoing or projected Additional studies that in the essential in the Environment of the institute for Industrial research and the Foreign Trade Department the Reichsgruppe Industrie were located.

Also if man taken into account, that this Interim balance sheet apparently under extreme time pressure on paper was brought, you sting unsystematically and in some cases more associative character in the eye. Her was missing the despite all long-windedness determined Access the Erhard's first fundamental memorandum. It was also noticeable that the Author decisive and partly far advanced contributions such as those by Grünig and Keizer just as unmentioned let How the Subprojects some Head of department the Reich group Industry, the for a long time Albrecht and Binders engagement had connected. The expose awakens still today the Impression, as have Erhard be Institute for Industrial research above Years out with Project orders take care of want, the relative not binding to one Overall project summarized were. Because of This probably happened to Erhard again as it happened on the occasion the presentation of his Policy memorandum. He undoubtedly provoked considerable contradiction , because the unmentioned remained Employees and Partial studies were in the meantime by _ Plan probably established. Besides that stood the Planning in the contrast to previous approach visible under Time pressure. The finally result were for this reason not

283 BAK, R 7/2131, Erhard expose v. November 14, 1944.

284 BAK, R 7/2131, steel at Ohlendorf, November 14, 1944, with dem expose Erhards as Garnish. The the following quotes from the expose ibid.

more Supplementary suggestions or critical statements, but a more concise overall plan, the the Conceptual debates definitely ended, Erhards Industrial Institute in the overarching Frame integrated and moreover for the first time from the Great the Reich group Industry itself was responsible.

Nearly Exactly a Month later sent steel the final, six pages comprehensive "Program for dealing with post-war economic problems from the standpoint of industry" at Ohlendorf.²⁸⁵ In the Cover letter emphasized he, only a "the further deepening in details" antecedent program be in the Location, a overview above the entire Question to give. Because only on this one Away could "at the abundance the problems, the both the Goods- as also the money side and last At the end also the economic policy objective touch, clarity about it won become, with which methods she in the which expert bodies have to be addressed individually cooperation be used must and in which Series the Tasks to edit are." From special Meaning is in the Program outline aside from that the distinction of transition stage and Peace Economy". The Reich Industry Group hope itself also for that Ohlendorf A- understanding and request around the authorization to Continue working on this basis or to Counter suggestions. Dem program paper, the short thereafter also dem Ministry of Armaments forwarded became and whose decisions to Conversion on consumption-oriented production programs from the February 1945 probably significant influenced,²⁸⁶ were also the first Partial results out of the since End October ongoing surveys Skrodzki's at attached to the economic groups.

The Ductus of so following program framework was clear and simply. On one brief preliminary remark, the additionally to the in the Cover letter included Justifications the confrontation with the concerns the remaining economic sectors and the conscious Incorporation of fundamental economic policy issues was justified, followed by contrast for the expose Erhards a systematically more structured Catalog of topics. As the core of the The question was: to planning money and economic interventions in this "transitional stage" and the subsequent "Peace Economy" defined, where the two each other following Periods of Transformation process sharp separated from each other were and in itself respectively strictly separated after Goods- and money side were treated . In the Demobilization phase should the remaining Production opportunities are given priority the restoration of transport systems, ensuring food supply makeshift procurement from Living room, one first Repair the factory facilities, the Conversion greater Parts the war on Consumer goods production and the Revival _ of Foreign trade to Backup the Raw material imports concentrated become. To

285 BAP, FS, Movie 3568, Reich group Industry, program for the editing economic post-war problems from the position the Industry, garnish for the Write Steels at Ohlendorf, December 13, 1944. Please refer also Cape. VII in the prev. Tape.

286 The complete version (including the cover letter steel Ohlendorf) is located in a bundle of files, in dem otherwise only processes out of the last period of activity of Ministry of Armaments from the March April 1945 as well as the first Interrogations Speers through the FIAT contain are (like note 285; filmed there). See. also the first partial publication of the Document in anatomy of war, Doc. No. 266, S. 468-470.

monetary policy Flanking was first only the binding the excess Purchase- power intended, additionally should the continuation of Salary- and Price stops as well as the Ms. ge one Recording from Foreign loans clarified become.

Against it was with reference to the peace economy "Planning on long View" the fundamental one economic Objective in the foreground moved: Dismantling the "state- chen management" and Replacement through a new balance between private initiative ve and state economic management, fundamental poll between state and Zi- vil need, but also between Means of production- and consumer goods sector, as well as Principles the "Market Regulations", the "Labor deployment policy" and the "Spatial planning for the Reconstruction ". Once clarified, the core problems of the The goods side must be addressed, whereby sharp between planning and Implementation phase differentiated became. The On- position one economic Balance sheet and the from it to be derived Priority plans had itself finally as crystallization point for the structuring the on the demobilization following Reconstruction period enforced. From her out of defined itself now the Through- leadership priorities, namely rationalization of entire production apparatus, living new construction and reconstruction the destroyed cities, reactivation the foreign trade, Intensification of agricultural sector and reorganization of commercial. With her interlocked were extensive monetary policy Measures, the in this respect still further as until now intended hen in the Reconstruction period delayed become should. First now should the state debts finally consolidated, the State budget new orderly and balanced, one definitely _ "Salary- and price order" enacted, the Credit regulated and probably also a currency reform ("currency regulation") into the Eye caught become.

On this Overall program followed a more extensive Work schedule. Because of his ar- contribute poll and the complexity the Topic demonstrated he clearer than any other document, that itself the Reich Industry Group to mid December 1944 under nearly exclusive Recourse on the Preparatory work of "Little ones circle", of "Working group for foreign trade issues" and you own intellectual Potential in terms of the Post-war planning one undisputed leadership position secured had: ²⁸⁷

"B. work schedule

I. Material provision:

(part Usage existing Documents - part own Work)

- 1.) Reports above Conversion problems the individual Industry sectors
processor: Dr. Skrodzki
- 2.) report above the World market situation more important raw materials
Editor: Dr. Albrecht/under recycling the Work of working group Foreign trade
- 3.) Probable Labor potential for
processors: Dr. Grünig/Bickert
- 4.) report above the Nutritional
situation Michael Committee ²⁸⁸

²⁸⁷ How Note 285.

²⁸⁸ Meant is the from E Michael directed Nutritional economics Foreign Trade Committee of the working group for Foreign trade issues.

5.) Development from Methods for the Setting up one economic balance sheet editor:

Dr. Green

6.) Evaluation the Industry reporting Editor:

Bickert

II. Economic policy Basic work:

1.) Ranking of the Need groups (Public and private needs - investment and consumer needs)

Editor: Dr. Keizer/Dr. Skrodzki

2.) requirements and Requirements one Wage regulations
responsible: Dr. Mansfeld ²⁸⁹

3.) requirements and Requirements one Price schedule

Editor: Dr. Metzner/Rittershausen ²⁹⁰ /Paul binder

4.) Order the forms of distribution, -ways and -costs
responsible: Dr. Metzner/Dr. Erhard

5.) layout of the market
regulation : Dr. Metzner

6.) Debt consolidation and Financial policy
editor: Dr. Erhard/Dr. Keizer

7.) Foreign trade as Supplementary economy
Editor: Dr. Albert

8.) Currency regulation
processor: Dr. Keizer/Dr. Erhard

9.) Principles the Spatial planning
Editor: Dr. Puttkammer/Reichsstelle für Spatial planning

III. Individual goods management tasks respective special emphasis of the most necessary immediate measures in the Transition stage:

1.) Conversion problems the Industry (structured after economic sectors):

a) More likely Requirement at industrial products

b) Raw material supply

c) Work use

d) Investment capacity under special consideration the War damage

e) Rationalization options

f) Investment needs

g) Financing issues

h) Immediate measures during of the transition

: Dr. Guth/Dr. Skrodzki

289 Werner Mansfeld, since October 1942 Human Resources Director of Mansfeld Group with general manager might (Part of Salzdetfurth Group), former MD of the Reich Ministry of Labor and in the January February 1942 predecessor of later GBA, Fritz Sauckel.

290 In the Originally incorrectly meant "Riddershausen". is the Financial scientist Heinrich Rittershausen .

2.) Housing economics Tasks and plans with special consideration their effects on the industry

Editor: Dr. Mössner

3.) reconstruction the transport facilities under special consideration of Impact on the industry

Editor: Dr. Renaud ²⁹¹

4.) Measures to Assurance the nutrition and Intensification the Agriculture in the post-war period under special Consideration the consequences on the Industry editor: from the Blankets/mountain green ²⁹²

5.) reconstruction the Foreign trade

editor: Dr. Albert

6.) Economic Balance Sheet

Editor: Dr. Green."

At the reading this truly comprehensive and regarding the Systematics the Preparation for transformation, a historically unique program concept, of course arises immediately the Ask, to what extent she short before dem crossing to action-oriented Emergency phase at all still realized and as one Art Counter manual used become could, to in the Area the Economic policy the allies Post-war plans either planned to undermine or in the own fairway to to steer. Because of the difficult Source location is located itself the Research about it still in the Begin. It can probably of that went out become, that at least a Part the Individual work in Design stage remained lying and a precisely comprehensible large-scale business "General Plan 1945" was no longer adopted. Various projects were canceled at the end of February 1945 because of the acute pressure to act postponed, so for example the Diploma the Investigation above "Prerequisites and requirements of a price order", for the butchers, Rittershausen and Binder are responsible drew. ²⁹³ Some the most explosive Partial studies are lost, for example the by Keizer and Erhard taken over Project planning one Currency reform in the reconstruction period or the in the November 1944 already far advanced second large study by Erhard one oriented towards full employment and anti-cyclical economic policy Global control. Also the from Werner Mansfeld responsible Sketching _ the Post-war wage regulations missing in the files of Salzdetfurth Group, whose Human resources department he from 1943 onwards.

Nevertheless, a preliminary assessment is possible because of some work results and memoranda out of the second working period present or. still in the last War editions of the magazine "Bankwirtschaft" and others Excerpts from specialist organs of economic groups published became. At the most extensive stayed the Posts Griinigs receive . Already Beginning September lock he for the "steel circle" one Memorandum above the

²⁹¹ Speaker for Transportation in the from Skrodzki directed Department II (Inner Business and transportation) the RGI.

²⁹² Speaker for industrial expansion, Order relocation and Work use in the Department II the RGI.

²⁹³ BAK, R 121/221, Metzner at Rittershausen, February 28, 1945.

compensation of the public budget after the war away.²⁹⁴ In her emphasized he the Necessity the Budget stabilization in the Step in step with the debt settlement, his Opinion after the most serious weak point the so far projected financial post-war preparations. Outgoing from one updated economic He revised the balance sheet estimate the original approach Erhard memorial a little bit further above. He came last on a stabilized first Post-war budget with respectively 36 billion Reichsmark on the Revenue- and Expenses page. This succeeded him however only because of this that he one significant elevation the indirect Income taxation with a price increase of approximately 50 Percent wanted to combine, whereby he at the same time a psychological one particularly skillful Technology to Lowering the Real wages around average ten percent found out believed to have. On this basis developed Grünig then until November be economics balance sheet, the not only dem Planning Office of the Ministry of Armaments for the final Potential comparison the belligerents Powers served,²⁹⁵ rather also as more general Framework plan in the definitive post-war program Reich group Industry received.²⁹⁶

The second good handed down Planning focus form the from Bernard Skrodzki since End October 1944 forced Elaborations the Business groups above the acute adjustment problems the Industries.²⁹⁷ At the 31. October sent the Director the Domestic Economics Department Reichsgruppe Industrie sends a standardized questionnaire to the management the Business groups away, the Beginning December again in accordance with the now agreed principles of the economic balance survey revised and expanded became. In this became Key data to everyone essential aspects the pre-war and War developments the respective sectors raised and with prognostic information about the development of demand, employment relationships, the raw material situation, the capacity situation and the export development in the Linked to the post-war period. Additionally Information about specific problems with the changeover was provided the peace economy awaits.

At the smoothest worked in the following weeks the Information outflow from the mostly consumer goods oriented economic sectors. The Economic group The leather industry, for example, hoped essentially like after first world war a quick one Release the military Stocks and the promptly Elimination the management regulations, around the Conversion problems in freer more entrepreneurial initiative tackle and the critical period until for the Arrive newer Raw material imports bridge to **be able to**.

²⁹⁴ BAK, R 11/2171, Bl. 417-426, Ferdinand Grünig, Zur Question of balancing the public budget after the war, September 7, 1944; Bl. 416, cover letter Grünig's memorandum to Pietzsch, September 9, 1944.

²⁹⁵ BAK, R 11/2171, Bl. 33 ff., Grünig, Department for central economic observation of the RWK, Die economic Total production and the national income, November 1944.

²⁹⁶ See. also the Partial publication short before End of war: Grünig, Ferdinand, Basics an economic one Balance sheet. In: banking industry, 1945, No. 5/6, S. 49-53.

²⁹⁷ See. for the following BAK, R 7/2153, R 13 U665, R 13 XU22, R13 XIV/245. Supplementary Schumann, Wolfgang, Post-war planning the Reich group Industry in the Autumn 1944. One document tation. In: Yep 1972/III, S. 259-296.

He answered particularly quickly Managing Director the powerful economic group iron producing industry. Jakob W. Reichert delivered before his "Working Group for Foreign Trade Issues" in Order given World economic analysis one Expertise about the domestic economic Perspectives his industry away.²⁹⁸ But the Appearance willingness to cooperate trough. Instead of more precise, territorial more broken down and at the Question schema more oriented He emphasized that the information he presented was mostly rough estimates, for example about the development of employment and investment capacity during the war years for that but so much more the urgency of preventive demobilization measures before everything in the Area the workforce policy, with it the out of dem Steel workers returning from the war not yet once "revolutionary agitators" for the Victims fell.

When it came to the iron and steel industry, they had Postwar planner of the "Steel Circle" in January 1945 finally nonetheless above a sufficient overview above the war-related Capacity expansion and the rationalization effects, but regarding the Sales and price developments as well as of the for prognosis the Post-war reserves are particularly important share of the Wehrmacht production they continued to stay up rely on their own estimates. The from them hoped gapless economic Basic data didn't stay finally too therefore fragmentary because the most powerful partners only were prepared to make a limited contribution to the internal consolidation of the large-scale industrial "phalanx".

All the more so more dedicated expressed himself Binder, the Director the money and Financial Department of the Reich Industry Group, on the principles of pricing policy in the post-war period.²⁹⁹ For him was out of current How fundamental considerations the era the purely market economy Pricing irrevocable to End. The Equilibrium function of the There is no pricing mechanism more intact because in the contrast to theory the classical economics by no means only the out of the ongoing Income derived from production at the **market** as demand in appearance occurred, expressed he introductory. Additionally become yourself this phenomenon in the post war period through this aggravate, that because of the huge apartment and substance destruction only through price tax Control measures a balance between supply and demand must be achieved. That's why the pricing policy for the central instrument the production and Consumption control advance

But also Ludwig Erhard gave in one his last Elaborations out of the Time before the downfall of the Nazi dictatorship to recognize that a moderate Keynesian global control of the Post-war economy the common denominator the in the meantime nine months Debate of the "Stahl Circle" represented. The "state interventionism" be closed one irrefutable fact become and can therefore not more simply rejected or be advocated, wrote he in the January 1945.³⁰⁰ full employment and social Welfare state be

298 BAK, R 13 1/665, BI. 17-34, Reichert, To Conversion the iron creating Industry on the peace economy, November 10, 1944.

299 Binder, Paul, Tasks the Pricing policy in the Post war period. In: banking industry, 1945, No. 1, S. 3-6.

300 Erhard, Ludwig, The State budget in the economic balance sheet, ibid, No. 1, S. 1-3.

to Key data become, at those no one more come over, even if her Upgrading „to one Art new economic Principle" alone already because of the so far missing theoretical _ support seems exaggerated - one careful demarcation against Keizer. Still be on the new economic income and redistributive function of the public households nothing more to revise. The old contradiction, what itself the economy on the one hand, always "from the paternalism Through the state" to to free and on the other hand sought state intervention through its demand for a "socio-economic order". provoked have, solve itself in favor of one novel economic _ dynamics on. In the Transition period would stand Consequently sufficient economic policy instruments to available to the tremendous Discrepancies between purchasing power demand and "marketable social product" so to steer, that one "Blast the social Order" avoided become could. But also at the crossing to peaceable _ Post-war economy become the Country as above the party interests standing regulator exist stay to one permanent "ranking order" of claim to to enforce the social product . He become yourself finally for the "modern welfare state" transform, to those to him incumbent function the Income redistribution permanently to perceive and last on "those size Planning" to limit that "social harmony". "more economical Performance" optimal try to balance. I have to the welfare state but always within _ the critical Border one stable budget balancing act and every Regulation the autonomous Economic forces avoid.

With these views not that one most recently also from the main economic policy players the Western Allies favored Future panorama had itself the Thought leader of "Steel Circle" at the beginning of 1945 was surprisingly wide of the reality and the train constraints of "Total war" removed. Around so more should itself her anticipation on the Post-war economics will prove to be realistic in the long term. Because it was nothing other than anticipation that Keynesian model of regulation that the social formation of West far above the period of should dominate post-war reconstruction .

The described programmatic guidelines have been since the beginning of year In 1945, not at all more the Secret knowledge one secretive planning circle, rather became in addition to the specific information channels of the economy in the were treated as key topics in the relevant trade press . On this way arose wider post-war-oriented consensus, the itself increasingly from the political-military power structures the replaced by the Nazi dictatorship.

3. The Emergency phase since January 1945

The post-war program of the Reichsgruppe Industrie was by tacit acceptance embossed, that it after dem Diploma one Separately- or compromise peace furthermore _ a sovereign one German Central power give would, which the economic policy transition and Reconstruction plans made his own and your execution responsible . This Initial hypothesis was since End January/beginning February 1945 not to maintain more . The Fail the Battle of the Bulge, the General attack the Redden Ar-

mee and the Final declaration of the Yalta Conference rather now expect an outcome of the war that would result from the Allied occupation of Germany and the at least a temporary suspension or clipping more essential Government functions characterized be would .

This Military-strategic change of perspective had drastic consequences for post-war planning. Instead of implementing their transformation program more or less systematically, itself the German economic elites additionally for the threatening social chaos the Demobilization period with different military governments, with short-term reparations demands and with the Danger more structural Interventions on the part of the occupying forces have to deal with. The view of An unconditional surrender also finally raised the question of which of the future victorious and occupying powers would be at all to one arrangement with dem socioeconomic Survival program the German economic elites were able and willing.

a) Devotion to one from the USA dominated Post-war world economy

First calculated the Thought leader of the "Stahl Circle". the Doctrines the "Continental-European large-scale economy". They only needed to conclude those discussions, the since dem Doom the Southeast European collaboration regime in the July August 1944 began had. For example had Albert Beginning December 1944 at the leading ones heads of Southeast Committee the Reich group Industry one anonymous Memorandum sent,³⁰¹ whose author the bilateral Basis of contract of previous, since the beginning the 1930s Years initiated "Southeast Business" as an "emergency solution". The concept is an industrialization model failed, the German Foreign trade have it against it with his far above dem World market level lying prices only Difficulties brought. Himself in huge economic areas let itself apparently the "Education " economically unfounded exchange relations" cannot be avoided. The ultimately unavoidable gap between economic performance and price formation would lead to overflowing short or long to inner disruption, while the increasing Encapsulation the "large areas" from each other "necessary one Derouting the international monetary order" to have consequences. The last war editions the Business press awarded this one self-critical Change of course also public sustainable Expression.

With it was the Away free to Answer the Ask which one the future Winner- and occupying powers at all in the Position be would, a substantial one Contribution to Reintegration of the German economic potential and thus the economic leadership groups in the looming new World economic order to afford. The answer was quickly found, because also about it needed itself the Participant the German Post-war planning only still in the Result more material Investigations to communicate. Mid- October had Keizer the "remarkable and unique" Capability of economic system USA praised, next to the huge war economy Expansion too

301 BAK, R 121/233, Attachment for the Write Albrecht at Ilgner, Lenze u. Hanauer, December 1, 1944.

the Mass consumption in the "Result one energetic development the respective unused productive forces" to increase.³⁰² Two Months later was Green with one comparative economic Potential estimation followed, the the USA far before Great Britain arranged;³⁰³ the was one impressive Addition the short before from the editorial staff the "Banking" completed debate above the economic policy opposites under the Western Allies. What the Experts | explained, confirmed also the informants and Verband officials. From the Goltz, the Section regularly from Stockholm out of with provided insider knowledge, pointed Beginning February on the USA as main factor everyone economic post-war planning there.³⁰⁴ The Managing Director of German-American economic association in turn could his Correspondence partner from the Zeiss Group answer, that he yourself now huge encouragement the entire Industry delight.³⁰⁵

It was thus a Lightweight for Erhard, in the phase the agony the Nazi dictatorship those conclusions to pull, the out of the perspective the German economic elites on were at hand.³⁰⁶ act wisely, he wrote in the last output the "Banking" who is ready now itself the "Supranational influences and ties", the with the reorganization the Foreign trade accompanied would, farsighted to subdue. It be one

"Basic function of world trade, above State borders away for the Advantage all Economist-companies the Exchange real goods equivalents" to guarantee and the "interstate" then performance differences" so far How possible to level. This one principle would have to but also the future Investors to obey. Capital export be only still as temporally temporary Help for the reconstruction justified. He must dem prime the consumer goods manufacturing gung suffice and always within one certain deadline again erased become. In this one sense be the USA probably advise, if she itself on the "mental and moral basis of "commercial" reflect and on it renounced, „her Power and your Influence for the Disadvantage the self-economic Development" in the recipient countries to abuse. It was the with moral Appeals garnished Deditio of loser, the itself through his anticipate lumbar obedience Mildness and preferred Treatment through the economically most potent Victory made promised.

At the Revamping the ideological enemy images against the future outer and inner Enemies of private property as well as at Attempt to cleavage of allies warehouse in last minute were the Postwar planner the economic policy Committees and "Himself-administrative bodies" however barely involved. This Business left over she in the Ending-phase of war largely the economic policy propaganda committees and department ministers, the now after each drinking straw grabbed, around the fracture the Anti-Hitler coalition "in one time enter to let, in dem we still on the legs stand."³⁰⁷ It was

³⁰² Keiser, Günter, War finances in the fifth War year. In: banking industry, 1944, No. 19/20, pp. 375-378, here p. 376.

³⁰³ BAK, R 11/2171, Bl. 47 ff., Grünig, Economic Balance sheet for Germany, Great Britain and the United States from America. presentation before dem Advisory Board the RWK at the December 14, 1944.

³⁰⁴ BAP, German Bank, P 10884, Bl. 107-114, report No. 4/45 at Section, February 7, 1945.

³⁰⁵ Müncks at Henrichs, January 3, 1945. Quoted in: Carl Zeiss Jena. Once and Now, Berlin 1962, S. 582.

³⁰⁶ Erhard, Ludwig, Capital export and World trade. In: banking industry, 1945, No. 5/6, S. 53 ff.

³⁰⁷ BAK, R 2/24242, Schwerin v. Krosigk at Goebbels, April 6, 1945.

Reich Finance Minister Schwerin from Krosigk and not approximately a exponent of "steel circle", the the Death of US presidents Roosevelt (at the 12. April 1945) as "God's Gift" celebrated and to mobilization of political Catholicism USA in favor an anti- Soviet one Separate peace through the Vatican prompted. ³⁰⁸ Meanwhile came Albert Speer came up with the idea of sending a delegation of Czech industrialists to the US headquarters after France fly to let, with it she "there with your American connections, negotiations on the protection of Czechoslovakia from the Bolsheviks " and the Education one from the USA protected anti-communist Government got going. ³⁰⁹

The relative Restraint on the level the anti-communist and anti-Soviet propaganda meant not, that itself the Postwar planner approximately from the underlying goals and the efforts around a pro-Western "Mill Game" in last minute distant _ would have. However did you know around the illusionary character this race the Defeat and held it rather with the prophecy Gunnar Myrdals, that the Anti-Hitler coalition first after the German surrender - then but quickly and with extensive Follow - fall apart become. ³¹⁰ Also stood the Cynicism, with dem she the from the Nazi imperialism destroyed or weakened European Economies out of pure economic considerations as partner one German reconstruction written off and so on the US-American - as well as alternatively the British - Map put, behind the anti-Soviet propaganda campaign by no means back. Add comes that it straight the were economic elites, the parallel to the panicked mass exodus that was now beginning the Red Army and the popular uprisings in Southeastern Europe all somehow mobilizable economic policy Steering instruments and financial assets on quiet soles out of East- and Southeastern Europe as well as the future Soviet occupation zone withdrawn and in the future western allies Occupied areas transferred.

b) Intercompany aspects the Emergency planning

The Prelude to Escape the central authorities out of Berlin in the future Western zones didn't give randomly those Departments and business associations that itself was particularly intensively involved in the post-war debates had. The planning office and the Information Office Group of the Ministry of Armaments became already Beginning February 1945 after Blankenburg in the resin outsourced , while the Statistical control center set up in Wernigerode. ³¹¹ Far more convoluted were the Ways, the the officials of Reich Ministry of Economics three weeks _ later struck. ³¹² First sat itself End February a "Working staff Thuringia"

³⁰⁸ Ibid, Schwerin v. Krosigk at Goebbels, April 14, 1945.

³⁰⁹ Bormann to the Minister of State in Bohemia and Moravia, Karl Hermann Frank, April 23, 1945, anatomy of the war, S. 491, Doc. No. 279.

³¹⁰ Myrdal, S. 198 ff., 202 ff.

³¹¹ BAK, R 7/2121, Bl. 140 ff., note Lücks u. Hartmann's above one Meeting at Ohlendorf am February 10, 1945, Re: Scientific Department and General Archives of RWM.

³¹² See. for the following BAK, R 7/42 u. 43; R 13 XIV/7 and 11; Boelcke, The German Business 1930 -1945, S. 347 ff.

with Wireless at the Great after bath Salting off, to the out of the eastern county towns of the Mark Brandenburg, fleeing into central Germany "Working staff Care" to summarize. There however the Planning Office the problem _ the Consumer goods supply in cooperation with the relevant economic groups have long since tackled it had, hit himself the Working staff Funks on to Bavaria through, where he in the second April week on a by Franz Hayler directed "South working staff" of the Reich Ministry of Economics came across. Because in the meantime the leadership group that remained in Berlin had in Derenburg one "Message Head" educated and itself from here out of in a "Working staff North" and „South" divided up.

That I until mid-April also most Large banks were brought to Hamburg in this one weeks still once a relative intact regional financial and economic center, which for the constitution of the Flensburg "Executive Reich Government". spear and Ohlendorf as Top representatives one production and Reconstruction Ministry from greater Meaning was. As additionally a more adventurous Attempt the Reichsbank Vice President Emil Puhl, after recent successes in negotiations the Swiss • rish National Bank and the Bank for International settlements the for the French sische Zone planned "control center the Reichsbank" in Speyer with Help one from the BIS managed Gold deposits to upgrade, ³¹³ failed, advanced also the after Hamburg evaded "Reichsbank control center" to leading financial institution in the first Transition period.

Against it concentrated the Reichsgruppe Industrie and the Economic groups in their deportation movements from Berlin the central German area. Because they were given the exact course of the zone boundaries defined by the Allies in September and November 1944 as well as Berlin regulation ³¹⁴ were initially unknown, let she partly _ on future Soviet Occupation territory low and pulled itself in the Course of June together with the US Army in the American zone back. The main business

313 Puhl negotiated in the March April 1945 with the Line the Swiss National Bank (SNB) and the BIS, for a repeal of the Negotiation results to reach that shortly before him one of Lauchlin Curry directed US delegation achieved had. This succeeded him astonishing largely . U. a. bought the SNB another three tons of gold, which they themselves from the Reichsbank office in Konstanz was transported away. More one and a half Tons were taken over by the BIS, but remained in Konstanz as the declared property of the BIS until after the end of the war. After having the currency reserve gold through this one trick before dem access the Allies protected had, tried _ itself Puhl from Constancy out of with Help of BIZ in the Construction one "control center" the Reichsbank in the French Zone to turn on. He became however on Imprisoned June 1, 1945. See NA, RG 260, FINAD 2/103/15 (Letters Puhls Wireless out of the Switzerland v. March 19th, 23rd and 30th and April 6, 1945; Smith, Arthur L., Jr., Hitler's Gold. The story of the Nazi Was loot, Oxford/New York/Munich 1989, p. 72 ff.; stairs, S. 154 ff.

314 The European Advisory Commission the Allies powers said goodbye at the September 12, 1944 in London _ a zone protocol, this in the Boundaries v. December 31, 1937 one East- , Northwest and Southwest zone as well a Special area Berlin with sectors for the - first - three occupying powers provided. See. FRUS, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta 1945, Washington 1955, S. 1 18-121, 124-127. The German version contains Deuerlein, Ernst, Die Unit Germany, Vol. I, Frankfurt a. M./ Berlin 1961, pp. 314-318, 321-32.

guide, Central administration and the Statistical Department the Reich group Industry quartered _ itself until there in Gera a. ³¹⁵ The Department for Market regulation and the Foreign trade department came to Erhard's institute for Industrial research in Bayreuth under what given the corresponding Institute membership the Head of department Metzner and Albert vicinity lay. Binders Department for Money- and Credit issues related Logis in Ilmenau in Thuringia, and general director steel took the one led by Lohmann Department for Social economy in the Rosslebener Secondary headquarters of Salzdetfurth Group on. Only Bernhard Skrodzki stayed with one Rest group in Berlin, so that the intellectual Core group of

"Steel Circle" while the Emergency phase largely on a closely bounded area in Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia Upper Palatinate and Franconia concentrated was.

Some representative actors in large-scale industrial post-war planning have testified that that she itself immediately the invading western allies offered to desired partners . They behaved significantly differently than that management the Business groups that first Contact the military commanders and economic officers either until for the Surrender date delayed or at possible "uncontaminated" employees delegated, around itself the Continue working and a with "Off Limits" sign provided military post to to back up. Erhard became already at the 18/19 April, directly after dem The US Army invaded , presented themselves to the Fürth city commander, and secured a special order to restart the Fürther Industry and gave decided to recognize, that he in Things Post-war economy to higher appointed be. ³¹⁶ Albert worked since Beginning May as liaison between the Reich group Industry, the Business groups and US American economic officers. ³¹⁷ Also the under the Wings of The Salzdetfurth Group's social economic department made its first contacts in April. However held this her Employees not of that away, also still after dem invasion of the American with the destruction of the Secret files of the registry deposited in Roßleben the Reich group Industry to continue. ³¹⁸ That itself also the Statistical Department the Reich group Industry still before dem Surrender date with of their Industry reporting in the service of US high command presented, ³¹⁹ able after all of that not more to surprise. Under the supervision of the western victorious powers subsequently consolidated the emergency period in the Anglo-American troops occupied areas one fourth economic policy planning phase still ahead the surrender date began and until for the beginning of Nuremberg Major war crimes trial in the Autumn 1945 lasted.

But before it to these new partnerships came, were the actors of economic policy survival program first once the grueling Escape before the Redden army

³¹⁵ BAK, R 12 1/24, Bl. 5 ff., Business distribution plan the Reich Industry Group, allegiance v. March 16, 1945; BAK, R 13 X/66, Alfred Möllers, report at the Economic group Glass industry above the Managing Director meeting the RGI at the March 23, 1945.

³¹⁶ Laitenberger, S. 44.

³¹⁷ See. BAK, R 13 V/91; Albrecht, Karl, The Human behind dem Wonder, S. 17 f.

³¹⁸ BAK, R 121/24, Bl. 26, Lohmann at Good, May 29, 1945.

³¹⁹ Ibid, Bl. 11 ff., John Greim, report above the contact one officer of American schen headquarters with the Reich group Industry (Department statistics and economic observation danger) in Gera, May 10, 1945. Please refer anatomy of war, S. 492, Doc. No. 280.

exposed. They were through the uncertain and highly uncomfortable transport options, through chronic fatigue and not last through the immediate Witness it from Mass escapes and social demoralization considerably in of their Performance impaired. Doubt made itself broad. Steel wrote End March at Frederick Flick, you can ,Yes today only in the Electricity swim along and hope, that man one day but and that Riverbank reached..." ³²⁰ In dark moments he even pulled the moderates basic positions of his intellectual Postwar planner in Doubt and said clairvoyant, that the Imperial debt in the meantime probably compulsorily in the Relationship Ten to One reduced would have to be. ³²¹ Similar he went it also Hans fish buck, dem deputy Director of Planning Office and Reich Commissioner for Price Formation, who at the end of February received the previous one from Bernhard Benning claimed course of "European Circle" in the Ask the Debt consolidation radical revised and itself for one with one devaluation around 50 percent coupled extremes tax burden of Small saver pronounced. ³²²

The more due to the Daily events the question about the meaningfulness the previous medium term Planning work presented, the more more consistent closed itself however the economic- political Steering points to one practice-related alliance together, around the ones in RGI program from 13. December 1944 requested "Immediately- and Emergency measures in the transition stage" ³²³ still before the end of the hostilities ways to guide. Far away of the previous Controversies and rows formed since January February in the background of various "special authorizations" and "emergency programs" a secret one size Coalition, the from the Ministry of Armaments, the Reich group Industry and the leading business associations and all relevant economic policy steering bodies included.

The declared goal was to save the economic and private economic substance alike. In the next Chapter becomes shown, ³²⁴ How away End February Measures were initiated, which correspond to the macro-economically oriented emergency catalog of the "Stahl-Kreis" for repairs the Transport facilities, for Boosting agriculture and nutrition, to restart the production of consumer goods and to carry out repair work on a peaceable basis important Factory facilities corresponded.

Additionally was this method with subprojects connected, the the Individual companies, as the last "organizing cells" of the social formation, ensure survival in the demobilization and should facilitate the transformation phase. Here said the committee of experts of "Steel Circle" the volume on, ³²⁵ while the macroeconomic Around-

³²⁰ Rudolf steel at Frederick Flick, March 23, 1945. Quote after Radandt, war crimes corporation Mansfeld , p. 283.

³²¹ So steel multiple since April and last Beginning June 1945. See. BAP, Salzdetfurth Group, No. 160, Bl. 3-7, AN Stahls over one Meeting with Ernst Schoen v. Wildenegg, June 1, 1945.

³²² Hans Fischböck, Restoration of the monetary order in Germany, Supplement to Write at spear v. February 27, 1945. Referred to Piskol, S. 324 f.

³²³ BAP, FS, Movie 3568, Reich group Industry, program for the editing economic post-war problems from the position the Industry (with Write to Steels at Ohlendorf v. December 13, 1944).

³²⁴ See. Cape. VII in the prev. Vol.

³²⁵ See. BAK, R 12 U22I, BAP, Salzdetfurth Group, No. 29, 173.

steering priority from the Planning Office pushed forward became. The establishments became largely _ kept out of the fighting and their Destruction by German demolition squads prevented. ³²⁶ The Hoarding of raw and excipients as well as semi-finished products, the Kehrl still in the October 1944 as had branded it "treason", ³²⁷ acquired so the legitimizing consecrations of the struggle for survival. From a wide variety of authorities and authorities became the companies after corresponding Pressure on the part the RGI lobby "credit" and "financial aid" downright thrown back, so that the Excess liquidity the Pursue towards the end of the war the rule was and a sizeable "regular workforce" despite the shortage of coal and electricity be held together could. Also the Removal from Machinery , Systems, devices and assets out of the future Soviet sphere of influence the Traffic disaster for the Despite being processed quickly, that is independent _ of that, if the Permits the for the Operational relocations responsible instances existed or not. ³²⁸

c) The crossing the Large companies in the Postwar

Everything in everything could the Large companies on one Variety economic and monetary policy resort to help yourself for a post-war period Allied occupation to equip. The Corporate management served itself extensively, developed additionally but also highly original Personal initiatives. Included went she in many cases from Initiatives out of, the she at latest since dem Summer 1944 in the ways directed had.

came first the need for competent crisis advice and long-term advice Personnel policy. Blessings for example worked already since dem Autumn 1943 as deputy Chairman of the Supervisory Board the Daimler Benz AG and initiated a almost a year later the establishment of an "economic policy department" to coordinate the arms company's post-war preparations. ³²⁹ Ludwig Kastl, who moved from the supervisory board to the executive board in 1944, apparently also took on similar advisory functions of the MAN Group was delegated. ³³⁰ But not only experienced dignitaries and post-war planners became recruited, also energetic Young talent were asked. She became often with Management functions entrusted, without to formally belong to the boards or working committees . Ulrich Haberland was a such "shadow member" with voting rights of Before-

³²⁶ See. Cape. VII in the prev. Vol.

³²⁷ BAK, R 7/2025, abstract out of dem protocol one meeting at the RGI at the October 27, 1944 (Kehrl's presentation about the supply of raw materials), note from the press office of the Reich Ministry of Economics v. November 4, 1944.

³²⁸ See. For this the insightful ones Correspondence files of since then September 1943 at the Armament Office departmental "Commissioners for the Relocation the electrical industry", the always How- the to subsequent Permits forced became: BAK, R3/270 until 279 H. 2.

³²⁹ The Daimler-Benz book, S. 308 ff., 312 ff.

³³⁰ See. agitator, Gerhard, Entrepreneur and leading Employee between Armament deployment and political _ Cleanup. In: From Stalingrad to Currency reform. To Social history of upheaval in Germany, Ed. Martin Broszat, Klaus Dieter Henke u. Hans Woller, Munich 1990, S. 551-591 , here p. 562.

stands from Bavarian Leverkusen; he should out of optical reasons first after dem War in the board appointed become. ³³¹ Vice versa went the Management of the Krupp Group before, the one director the Commercial niches Department (Carl Eberhardt) 1943 with the Founding one

"Central Office for Company Relocations" and a year later into a "small circle" for Post-war preparations co-opted, him however not in the central decision-making bodies. ³³²

This Personnel revirements were included different far-reaching interventions in the group structure tied together. Included became before everything one Reinforcement the decision-making and Autonomy of action the Operating lines for the case aimed at, that the contacts to the central Governing bodies demolished (Degussa AG). ³³³ Sometimes became additionally the different departments of the Donut Headquarters together with the file registries distributed to the branch plants and the top management itself was transformed into a "working staff". (Salzdetfurth Group). ³³⁴ Friedrich Flick staged one Pseudo-de-nesting his group, around on the one hand allies interventions to anticipate and on the other hand which looming Zoning Germany The invoice to carry. He founded four in 1944 Holding companies for the Main divisions with Seat in Düsseldorf, related in the February 1945 an "alternative point" in Sulzbach-Rosenberg in Berlin one Residual management and let out of the future Soviet occupation zone additionally to the "Marching Orders" for the leading staff all somehow mobilizable assets and System components his empire transport away. ³³⁵

To this one structural Anticipation joined itself in many cases first steps to resumption of peace production. ³³⁶ Bayer Leverkusen and the Schering Group closed her efforts around the Development newer pharmaceuticals, in particular in the areas of hormone, anti-allergic and penicillin preparations. In the workshops of the defense companies in the mechanical engineering industry and metal processing those civil _ Department areas again expanded, the already always as a springboard to Post-war production survived had. The foundry of MAN Group for example took in the Winter 1944/45 the production from Locomotive cylinders again on, the general Mechanical engineering moved on the production from spare parts, and the on Submarine diesel engines discontinued Group engine plants started with the repair from Rail vehicles. In the Daimler-Benz Group came still before End of war significant constructive New-

331 ItZ, ZS 981, Carl herb, 1. Folder, Interrogation Krauchs v. March 11, 1947; Stokes, Raymond G., *Divide and Prosper. The Heirs of IG Farben under Allied Authority 1945-1951*, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 1988, S. 31 f.

332 BAK, Alles. Proc. 1 XIII, case X, b 1, Doc. NIK-9515, Affidavit Explanation Charles Eberhardt, July 2, 1947.

333 See. Piskol, Conceptual plans and Measures the German monopoly bourgeoisie, S. 319 f.

334 BAP, Salzdetfurth Group, No. 15, Circular Steels at the Board members and plant directors, March 14, 1945.

335 BAP, Flick Group, No. 520,558,637, 860.

336 Cf. to following Piskol, Conceptual plans and measures, p. 360 ff.; Id., about the relationship of finance capital and fascist power apparatus in the Final phase of Second World War (July 1944-May 1945). In: *Bulletin of the working group "Second World War"*, 1978, no. 1/2, pp. 5-51, here p. 28 ff.; Autumn, p. 408 f.; The Daimler-Benz book, p. 318; agitator, S. 562 f.

and further developments in passenger vehicles and universal agricultural vehicles and Diesel trucks for the Diploma.

All of these conversion measures still had to be taken At the end of the war, extensive funds were diverted become. There the Financial injections and Stockpile mobilizations but by no means the extensive reserve formation for the Transition period were allowed to diminish, developed the Corporate management imaginative Methods to Estimate from material resources and available _ Cash reserves. Already to times the Attempts to counteract this of planning office had the Hoarding from raw materials and Workpiece enormous dimensions assumed, and this made it easier now the additional Stockpiling. Alone in the Surroundings of the Essen Krupp plants were larger at the beginning of 1945 than 100 000 Tons of finished and semi-finished steels are deposited .³³⁷ Before Above all, the defense companies would be involved Transition to the post-war literally choking on their supplies if they don't carefully decentralize and store them would have.

With this one horrendous Camp formations corresponded energetic activities to Increase in liquid assets Operating resources that, as long as the pent-up inflation is the Prices still remained relatively stable more direct Gauge for the ability to act and react the Pursue stayed. For this reason shied away the management of Krupp Group none Effort, around a out of the era Gustav Croup originating package with long term To liquidate Reich bonds amounting to 200 million Reichsmarks, the claims for replacement of war property damage rigorously enforced to do and the outstanding debts in particular public Client quickly to collect.³³⁸ At Daimler Benz pointed the financial status since dem Autumn 1944 amazing Digits out of. The liquid Bank balance lay with more as

150 million Reichsmarks, well above the share capital (120.256 million Reichsmarks), while the Securities ownership on approximately 20 millions shrunk was.³³⁹ Alone for the refund from War property damage had the Stuttgart Group management until End November 1944 182.54 millions Reichsmark driven in, from those she until there only 87 million for cleanup and Repair work consumed had. The Abundance of money reached before especially in the last few months of war incredible dimensions because that General Department for Business and Finance so the losses the Eastern European "War works" and Repair shops on the Base of Target/actual comparison lump sum "after Faithful and Faith ".³⁴⁰ In total became the economy up to Surrender with 28 to 30 billion Reichsmark to Compensation from War property damage and others indirect Consequential war costs fitted.³⁴¹

Additionally to this one personnel, structural, production technology and business management advances the post-war some company management got involved in a special way the further privatization of the public technology and pro-

337 Manchester, S. 551.

338 See. the summary Depiction at Manchester, S. 547 f.

339 DBAG archive, reel 1/5, Monthly Financial report v. November 30, 1944.

340 Extensive documented in: BAK, R 3/1829.

341 BAK, B 127/11959, Joint German Finance Council, minutes of the 1st meeting of the working staff to determine the national debt on July 25, 1947 in Frankfurt a. M. (Remarks by Ministerial Director Schwandt, Bl. 6 f.).

production sector. You could at it those two big ones Waves of reprivatization continue, the 1942/43 first the Engines- and Mechanical engineering capacities the Reich works "Hermann Göring" captured ³⁴² and a year later with the almost complete handing over of the concentration camps' workforce potential to the armaments industry and its underground projects the Group of the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office largely marginalized had. ³⁴³ There as a result in Contrast with Italy a structure-defining one public sector not more existed, concentrated itself the direct with the Post-war preparations were largely linked to privatization efforts the power of disposal over such military cutting-edge technologies, from those a more essential more innovative effect on the Civilian technical post-war development expected became.

The Results this Aspirations were down to case right different. For example the experiments ended the IG Colors, join in the Development of a heavy water reactor for the German "Uranium machine" a Patent monopoly over the catalytic exchange processes at the Manufacturing of heavy Water to secure, in everyone respect with a fiasco. ³⁴⁴ It succeeded the IG managers don't the on this one Area leading Research group to turn off, because this on a new, fewer energy-consuming and of the IG Colors uncontrollable separation process evaded.

In the contrast managed to do this it dem management of the Siemens Group against End of war, the years of strife around the control the development and manufacturing capacities at the Rocket development in his favor to decide and at the same time a remarkable technological breakthrough to achieve. ³⁴⁵ Until for the late summer 1943 had the military and technician the Army Research Institute Peenemünde all attempts of AEG Group and of him secondary General speakers Hettlage to privatization of Pre- series factory for the rocket A 4 („V 2") successful repelled. Under the impression the heavy allies Bombing of the German missile capacities then in September 1943 the founding the written privately, but dem Special Committee A 4 or dem General Department for Business and Finance subordinated "Mittelwerk GmbH" a first step to Privatization takes place. At the same time, the Siemens Group was in charge Development and production the electrical components taken over because it him now succeeded was, the trajectory the rocket by means of two Vertical gyroscopic devices to stabilize. In the June July 1944 was then the final privatization the electrical engineering branch the German Missile armor enforced.

³⁴² See. Perz, S. 94 ff.; Wysocki, Gerd, Work for the War. S. 32 ff.

³⁴³ See. before everything Kaenig, S. 283 ff., 291 ff.; Karny, The SS Economic Administrative Main Office, S. 153-169 .

³⁴⁴ See. for the following bike chewing, Joachim, Ascension and crisis the German Nuclear economy 1945-1975. Repressed Alternatives in the Nuclear technology and the origin the nuclear controversy, Reinbek at Hamburg 1983, p. 34 ff.; Walker, Mark, The Uranium machine. myth and reality of the German atomic bomb, Berlin 1990, S. 148 ff., 174 ff.

³⁴⁵ See the following Siemens archive, 35-44/Lc 168, Gerald Klein, documentation on History of the Aviation Equipment Plant Hakenfelde LGW 1930-1945, Munich 1980; SAA, 35-70/la 856, K W. Fieber, On the history of German rocket armament, Klagenfurt, May 1965; Bomemann, Manfred, Secret project Middle construction. From the central Oil storage of Germans Rich to largest rocket factory in the Second World War, Bonn 1994.

Such aspects more entrepreneurial Post-war preparations are until now largely in Hidden ones remained. Are against it the Techniques of Capital flight out of Eastern Europe and the later Soviet occupation zone in the general no Taboo more. This is quite remarkable, because the Exodus concentrated itself in the general on those regions, in which the case by case Czech, Polish, soviet, Jewish or also " Enemy of the state" assets are removed from the property-protecting enemy asset management system with remarkably open private entrepreneurial participation and accordingly sequestered or confiscated been were.³⁴⁶ At your Decision making For the emergency phase, the planning staff of the corporations first had to deal with the question of ownership from the probability go out, that them Same with Same would be repaid . In principle, the company management transferred its mobilizable capital components before everything for this reason in the future western zones, because whose future economic policy administrators in matters of confiscations and reparations the lowest counter-invoices in the had bag. In addition, this was preventative Flight from economic retaliation measures is overbuilt with that anti-communist attitude , the the cold one War already before the defeat the Nazi dictatorship anticipated.

The preparation and implementation of domestic capital flight varied considerably. At the least moved itself the Pursue the public hand or. the party divisions, of which, for example, the management of Volkswagenwerk GmbH obviously did nothing at all,³⁴⁷ while the general directors of the partially re- privatized sectors of the Reich works "Hermann Göring". corresponding activities picked up.³⁴⁸ Also a part of Private company limited to purely precautionary measures or on Operations in individual focus areas. The board of The Schering Group, for example, basically decided on its traditional location in Berlin from Beginning at a arrangement with the economic officers the Redden army and judged only for the case one nationalization all Donut Major works in Braunschweig one branch as well as a Research laboratory a.³⁴⁹ Against it calculated the Management of Phrix Group with dem complete Loss the in Eastern Europe and built in East Germany productive Capacities. It caused the Directorates his Eastern European and East German Branches for the complete transfer the liquid means up the hamburger headquarters, around with of their Help the reconstruction and the Continuation the West German establishments to to back up.³⁵⁰

346 BAK, N 1430/13, John Krohn, *The Administration hostile assets in the second world war*, Heiligenkirchen 1949, BI. 66 ff.

347 Written notice from Manfred Grieger, Employees of from Hans Mommsen directed research project above the VW Group in the Nazi era, at the Author.

348 So operation for example the General Director of in the Year 1942 partially reprivatized Steyr-Daimler -Puch Group his Relocation activities significant in the Intention, Investment capacities for the post war period to to back up. See. Perz, S. 160 ff., 170 ff.

349 Hamann, Hans-Jürgen, *The Schering AG 1945 until 1949. A Pursue fights around be Survive* , Berlin 1990.

350 Pritzkolet, Kurt, Bosse banks exchanges. Men's above Money and Business, Vienna/Munich/Basel 1954, p. 14 ff.

The leadership of Siemens Group took however, similar How Flick, Daimler Benz or croup, the Transition phase with Help one broad fanned out action program in advance.³⁵¹ In the October 1944 decided the Group management the "Eviction relocation" all subsidiaries and Branches east the line Warsaw-Prague-Vienna as well as short thereafter east the Empire border. In the December sent she a emissary after Floor-holm, around itself above the future division Germany under the victorious powers Clarity too provide. The she only succeeded partially. How the Reichsgruppe Industrie und the most others Corporations held she the Elbe-Saale line for the future Western border the Soviet _ occupation zone, went in ignorance the Berlin regulation of one complete or permanent occupation Berlin through the Red army out of and took at, that the annexed Sudeten areas also furthermore Reich territory remain would. Because of this were misconceptions in the crossing for the Postwar ongoing corrections necessary, where the US Army and after surrender extensive logistic Support granted.

Around the Turn of the year 1944/45 started at Siemens the crucial Action phase. The corporate management let now important technical Documents in the Switzerland create. The foreign Subsidiaries became oral reliant, her Stocks to expand and her bills at the parent house not more to pay, with it she the We were able to survive the dry spell until the group connections were restored. Cutting-edge technology development projects and parts of the central laboratory were moved to Upper Franconia or outsourced to the Sudeten region - like that for example that "pure silicon group" Walter Schottky's in the Upper Franconian Lock Pretzfeld - and Top talent from the technical and commercial Area out of the Wehrmacht retrieved.

Also the Decision, on the base the enlisted in Stockholm News a "government in exile" to ensure the ability to act and chances of survival form, fell around the Turn of the year 1944/45. For Siemens & Halske became under the guide from Serious from Siemens one "Group leadership" with Seat in Munich fixed while for the "Group management" the Siemens-Schuckertwerke Günther Scharowsky as boss and first court in Bavaria as Destination certainly became. Add came a Siemens-Schuckert offshoot for the Rhine-Ruhr area in Mülheim an der Dysentery and a subgroup of Siemens & Halske Munich in Arnstadt, the for the four Factories in Thuringia responsible was. At the 7. February 1945 the staff in march set. The first common meeting the Group leaders found center February in Hof instead of, where she the coming tasks in coarse trains outlined. „Directly after End the hostilities was standing for the three western Occupation zones one capable of acting and decisive Leadership team to Disposal , the already in the May 1945 with the Inventory and the Collection of everyone Residual assets of house begin could, as a collecting basin for those from all over World streaming in served as a returnee ", Development and construction again built up, the repair the Factory facilities

351 See. for the following HSG, Duration Siemens Group, No. 10, From Groote, The reconstruction of house Siemens 1945-1951, O. D; No. 16, Gerd tack, „From the Heap of ash for the global company men - The House Siemens in the and after dem second World War", Speech before dem ZFE Colloquium around Munich on January 17, 1989; Berger, Heinz, causes of the Conservation and restoration the Power of AEG and Siemens Group in the Western sectors Berlin, phil. diss., Berlin 1967, S. 56 ff.; tack, Gerd, A Contribution to Story the Siemens AG, Munich 1976.

coordinated and the more or fewer largely demoralized Group members "psychological buoyancy effect" mediated. She "knew again, that it still or again a parent house gave and that the company the fight around a permanent one had not given up continued existence ." ³⁵²

One Part the Donut Major banks appears the Decision to Relocation not to have fallen so easily. ³⁵³ While Commerzbank's top management spent its entire... Headquarters in the February 1945 in one perfect camouflaged action at the The board of directors of Dresdner Bank was hesitant about moving the company back to the traditional legal location of Hamburg and the Germans Bank this Decision until in the last Weeks of war out. This was without the Acceptance one too great risk possible because everyone Bank board members since dem Autumn 1943 under dem Pressure of the air war extensive had carried out operational restructuring. The Dresdener Bank had one special branch office for Middle and East Germany in Dresden or. Wroclaw founded, in bath Nauheim one West board group with the branch supervision for West Germany formed their main accounting with one Regional management south to Würzburg relocated and the only still for Northern Germany responsible central board group on some Berliners Deposit funds outsourced. Something else was the German Bank proceeded. She had in Wiesbaden, ham castle and Erfurt although also "connection points". Board of Directors" set up to manage their branches in the case one interruption the central leadership under control too hold, but all beyond that Board functions initially continued Berlin concentrated and then off September 1944 for the General Secretariat in Meiningen one "salvage site" built up. With it were too in this one case in principle two specific banking policy Transition problems already solved: the control of far branched branch network and the maximum fluid retention the active, around also in the case from Mass withdrawals on the part the depositors remain solvent.

Thus was in the February March 1945 only still the fundamental problem of future central location open. The decision on this was made as with the industrial groups dependent made, which the occupying powers at the least the Power structures in Ask presented, ie the German Universal large banks intact let and at the earliest as monetary policy turntable for the reconstruction pull in would. The positive Determination _ on the new Main locations fell largely in favor the future British occupied zone out of. In the contrast to the managers the industrial Large corporations and economic groups was waiting the High finance with this Determination apparently so long, until them exact Information available had: until she secure knew, that the Bank of England in a milder mood was when the treasury Department Morgenthau, and until she also the Details the

352 HSG, Duration Siemens Group, No. 16, tack, From the Heap of ash for the global company, Bl. 11 f.

353 See. for the following BAP, German Bank, No. 51-53, No. 72, No. 10883; N/A, RG 260, FINAD 2/45/6, FINAD 2/46/4, FINAD 2/143/5, FINAD 2/148/16, FINAD 2/186/9, FINAD 2/194/2, FINAD 2/194/3, FINAD 11/531/9; 100 Years Commerzbank 1870-1970, Hamburg 1970, S. 76 f.; OMGUS, Investigations against the Dresden Bank, Ed. hamburger Foundation, endowment for Social history of 20. century, Nordlingen 1986, S. LXVII ff.; Horstmann, Theo, The Allies and the German schen Major banks. Banking policy after dem Second World War in West Germany, Bonn 1991, S. 42 ff.

future Zone boundaries knew. The Headquarters the Commerzbank took already in March 1945 her Task in Hamburg on and transferred all liquid Medium the East German Branches in the future Western zones. For the board the Germans Bank was at the 5. April 1945 clear, that the "salvage site" Meiningen not more in Ask came. Hamburg also became the new "salvage office". The upgrade to "Hamburg Command" followed one Week later. At the 13. April traveled Section in one Trucks of the Karstadt Group out of Berlin after Hamburg away, around together with Eric Bechtolf the Function one "Board of Representatives" to perceive. The Main mass of the liquid means in Height from seven billion Reichsmarks became to their available one new set up "Payment office Hildesheim". Similar let also the Dresden Bank the first into Eye composed new Central office Erfurt fall. She founded under Alfred Helling a "Management staff West" in Hamburg, while Hugo Zinßer in Frankfurt at the Main a "central directorate". West" built up. Also the financial assets became wider scattered as at the Commerzbank and Deutsche Bank. The main mass was on four head branches in the future western zones.

In contrast to the Large industrial companies could only the liquid ones components and the in the technical Know-how fixed Parts of their Capitals in the future Western zones create. However succeeded them also the transfer from Split of their invested capital by efforts to the relocation of the Armament capacities in underground Investments and Bunker structures for this purposes instrumentalized. The management of the Daimler-Benz Group, for example, had long and secretly defended itself against the relocation activities of the "Jägerstab" and the "Armaments Staff". set.³⁵⁴ Since the Turn of the year 1944/45 changed it the tactics and cared still until the last weeks of the war that the production lines and permanent workforce of the aircraft engine factory Genshagen and of after Dubnica in the Slovakia outsourced Ostmark aircraft engine plant in the "Goldfisch" underground mine in Obrigheim am Neckar were transported away . The Osram Group let against that "Richard 11" underground mine in Litoměřice as Relocation location for be Wirework also then still further Remove, as he in the March 1945 in shape of underground project "Dogger" in Hersbruck as well as of bunker works "Winery" in Mühldorf at the Inn alternative Escape places had found, the him because of of their Position in the future _ western occupied area now much more attractive appeared.³⁵⁵ He took on this way at one Revision the previous Relocation policy part, on the itself the Large companies the electrical industry, the above one independent relocation authority decreed, already in the November December Notified in 1944 had.³⁵⁶

354 The Daimler-Benz book, *passim*; Roth/Schmid, Daimler-Benz AG 1916-1948, p. 333 ff.; Perz, S. 170 ff.

355 See. State archive Berlin, Field office Width Street, Rep. 231, No. 500 until 508; Raim, Edith, The Dachauer Concentration camp external commandos Purchase ring and Mühldorf. Armaments buildings and Forced labor in the last War year 1944/45, Landsberg a. Lech 1992; Karny, Miroslav, „Destruction through Work " in Litoměřice. The SS command staff in the German War economy. In: 1999, 8th (1993), H. 4, pp. 37-61; Vanselow, Gerd, Hersbruck concentration camp. Largest external warehouse von Flossenbürg, o. O., 1992.

356 See. BAK, R 3/279 Notebook I; BA/MA, RW 19/197.

This episode linked the transition of the Large companies in the post-war one last Just with the mass atrocities the Nazi dictatorship. The in the Frame the Only underground relocations and bunkering projects could ensure capacity work by the Worker from Concentration camp prisoners until in the last Weeks of war ruthless exploited _ became. Thousands from them had to die, with it the Factory lines possible large shares the in the Armaments economy accumulated Investments, Production lines and devices _ above the War out saved.³⁵⁷ As then the allies Troops to the cathedrals the Extermination technology approached, started the last act the Destruction of traces. The external commandos of the concentration camps were on closed at the insistence of the industry , the Inmates from the SS on the Death marches sent. The written Testimonies were where always possible, destroyed.

357 See. Froebe, Rainer, The Work use from Concentration camp prisoners and the Perspectives the Industry, 1943-1945. In: Europe and the "Empire deployment", pp.351-383.

Chapter VII

agony and catastrophe 1945

The German Economics, always again of waves of attacks from the Air like impact flows met and at workers and raw materials slow bleeding out, was Beginning 1945 nonetheless still not paralyzed. The production from weapons and Device was standing still _ on more significant Height. Several millions of people ¹ were with clearing and repair work in the arms factories, at Transportation facilities and power plants busy and fought a stubborn, if also always again in vain Battle around the permeability the traffic arteries, around every ton of fuel and every kilowatt Energy.

At the Fronts gave it only in the west and southeast Movement. In the south the Eastern Front was Budapest end of December from the Red Army surrounded. To the same had time the German Battle of the Bulge short before Dinant (Meuse) her turning point reached; at the 8/9 January 1945, after in vain German relief attacks in the Alsace, began the Wehrmacht with theirs retreat on the Starting positions in the Vicinity the Imperial border . It was so clear, that the Final battle on German Floor short was imminent.

The Storm on the Nazi empire and his Capital city started at the 12. and 13th January 1945, as the Red army from the Border East Prussia and the Vistula until to the Carpathians to their big, on Wish the Western Allies at eight The offensive began days early. She freed Warsaw (17 .1.), Krakow and L6di (19 .1.) and occupied within further ten Almost days the whole Upper Silesian Industrial area. Beginning February was from Rybnik (Upper Silesia) to the south from Stettin nearly everywhere the Or reached, on exceeded in some places.

1. The "Emergency program". The collapse from transport and production

The Soviet was offensive a disaster for the German Business. With dem Loss _ Upper Silesia fell, after the since November 1944 always more obvious traffic- wise constriction of the Ruhr area, also the second size heavy industrial and R6-

1 Please refer Cape. II, Note 41. - The estimated Pay capture People, the in the Plural not continuously while the entire Time until End of war only at the Elimination from bomb sheath who worked. If spear after the war estimated, "that overall at the elimination of the "A million workers worked in the air raids " (IfZ, ED 99, NL Speer, Vol. 8, Vemehmg. v. May 17, 1945), so can the the Minimum number the constant with it employees to come close.

training center out of. With it was the short term collapse the German coal and energy industry unavoidable.

At the January 16th presented the Minister of Armaments Hitler "the tremendous importance the [coal]Magistrale (railway line from Opole above Litzmannstadt after Gothenhafen)" before, the through the frontal Soviet advance on Czestochowa threatened be, and summoned him, „that it excluded is, even just temporary a traffic-related one Lockdown of Upper Silesian industrial area for the remaining Rich to allow". ²

As the Upper Silesian district two weeks later in Soviet hand was, said he him open-hearted the soon End the German Warfare capability in advance. Upper Silesia, wrote like that he him at the 30. January, "was still the only as well as transport- How intact as far as funding is concerned Area, out of dem the Business of Rich Quality coal in big Scope receive could. All so in the Rich still existing Armament capacities can only still partially exploited become, there she neither with the necessary Money, dem necessary Electricity still with dem necessary gas supplied become can." ³ He mentioned before everything the deadly _ Follow for the Steel- and Ammunition production. „It is impossible, the German economic life on long view with the still existing Hard coal and with the to maintain the crude steel capacity still to be producedThe German armament will be lost after the war not from Upper Silesia more in the Be able to, even just in the the most distant ones Needs _ the front at Ammunition, weapons and tanks, the losses at the front and the to cover the needs for the new configurations. The enemy's material preponderance is afterwards too not more through the bravery ours soldiers to compensate."

At the same time went within two until three weeks more significant Armament capacities in "General Government" in the "Warthegau", in East- and West Prussia, East Brandenburg, Split _ Western Pomerania and in the eastern Half of Silesia lost or became cut off; so approximately the establishments of Focke-Wulf Group in Marienburg and poses, in Alleys and Sorau.

Further atone the Wehrmacht weapons and Device in huge amounts a. This one losses _ so one with one Beat strong reduced Arms production opposite. So hastily too new soldiers recruited and the units of "Volkssturm" set up became, so little was the production in the Location, them sufficient with weapons and ammunition to take care of. It become at people "reckless onto Outermost" everything scraped together, Göring reasoned at Hitler's briefing on January 27th, but "we do n't have the weapons." ⁴

In the lost areas stayed in the Rule size replenishment and reserve stocks Equipment of war and economic goods back, further the everywhere furnished military and civil camp and Magazines with clothing and foods, if she not before that from the own population broken up and looted been were.

2 BAP, FS, film 1734, memorandum. Speers for Hitler, January 16, 1945. -Czestochowa was founded on 17.1. of the Redden army taken.

3 BAP, FS, film 1732, memorandum. Speers f. Hitler: "On the armament situation February –March 1945", January 30, 1945. Hereafter also the The following.

4 IMG, Vol. 33, S. 105, Doc. PS-3786.

In January 1945 broke finally the time of Flows of refugees from east to West. Before the Soviet attackers fled millions Civilians panicked to Foot, with Hand-dare, out of rural areas with horse-drawn wagon treks, barely ever with the for Refugee transports rarely available, overloaded Train or on ships. The conditions on the Country-streets while the very cold Winter weeks mocked everyone Description.⁵ The Escape demanded countless victims, especially among the children. On February 19th was in the OKW the speech of that Escape and Evacuation off the Eastern areas already 8.35 million people would have captured.⁶

a) The "Emergency program"

The production in the main armament programs sank in the January significant. From the planned figures - one Art extended "Victory Program" - became only a fraction reached; at Tanks 64 Percent, for airplanes 62 percent, in shipbuilding 44 percent and at ammunition _ 64 Percent.⁷ The was not only one impact the Soviet Offensive; also the West German one Industry located itself in one desolate condition, the a report from the Upper Rhine described: „All Manufacturing Suffer under huge difficulties through Proximity to the front, relocation failures, aircraft activity and alarms, transport difficulties, coal, energy , Lack of raw materials, supplies." ^{8th}

The was the Situation, in the Hitler a "Emergency program the "finished armament production" under-wrote. idea How Draft this program from the Minister of Armaments, the already during the Autumn crisis in the Ruhr area in his report from the 11. November 1944 talked about it had, it be so "but urgent necessary, that immediately a Emergency program the armor and war production, the on the currently given Conditions arrives, set up becomes." ⁹ Man must the still available supplies, Construction services etc. on the most important, namely the completion from weapons and Device, focus. For the Example at Shutdown from Electricity and gas must clear be,,what within one such emergency program here for the armor on every case further manufactured become must."

„The therefor emergency program to be set up", that was called it at that time in Speers report for Hitler, "will be in one It will be ready in the week and then presented to you for a decision. Included have I no way the Intention, ours Overall armaments planning - the we each on width view make must - this currently negative Picture underlying to place; because with that would we [us] on many areas the initiative take The Emergency program with his reduced Deliveries should the works only be communicated, if it inevitable necessary _ is. It is so not intended, she generally to teach or she even on this height to determine. The Goal is after How before, at least the current Armament performance to to hold and carry out."

5 Please refer DZW, Vol. 6, S. 633 ff.

6 KTB d. OKW, Vol. IV, S. 1327, State Secretary discussion v. February 19, 1945. Please refer also Section 2.

7 car driver, S. 116, Tab.; ibid, S. 117, some deviating Pay.

8 BAP, FS, Movie 4640, AT Rülh Upper Rhine, February 6, 1945.

9 BAP, FS, Movie 1732, report Speers for Hitler re: „Location in the Ruhr area", November 11, 1944.

So careful yourself the minister also expressed - it happened to him but like that How often in the last part of the war, that he Hitler's approval first later, out occasion one further drastic deterioration of the Position received. On January 23, 1945, when the Red Army the Oder at Opole and Brig reached and began had, the Upper Silesian Industrial area of Northwest here to include, approved and signed Hitler the "Emergency program the final production of armaments", according to which 13 product groups "have absolute priority over everyone others To carry out armaments production" were: "1) All handguns , Hand grenades and fist cartridges, 2) anti-tank mines, 3) Pak, 4) le. FH and see FH, 5) flak, 6) 8th cm grenade launcher, 7) Armored car and assault guns, 8th) TRUCK, Traction vehicle and Tractor, 9) generators, 10) Tomister radios, 11) All High performance aircraft with main emphasis on (me) 262, (Ta) 152, as well (Fw) 190 and (Me) 109 together with Equipment, 12) Submarine- and ship repair, 13) The Leader violent actions Mistletoe, EZ 42, Jammer, Elephant." To the shipbuilding repair program also belonged - including supplies, Spare parts and ammunition - the New building the Submarines XXI (until to the 170th boat) and XXIII (until for the 70. Boat), of "Seal" (until for the 450th boat), the production of Submarine- and Torpedo accumulators and from Torpedoes.¹⁰

The Emergency program was in this shape nothing other as one classification in highest

Urgency. The Designation was new; and so fell the open contradiction to the still in December 1944 for the 1. March "Repeal" ordered in 1945 all Emergency regulations " fewer clearly into the Eye. ¹¹ However should it itself soon highlight, that Manufactures _ outside of emergency program at all no chance more had, above coal, energy, transport space, material and Workforce to feature and en masse set had to be and that also the classification of emergency program as absolute priority - later as valid alone - illusory was given of economic collapse.

For Hitler led the emergency program the protection of the Recover workers before confiscations . The since 12. January ongoing SE VI confiscation action had straight the "Total protection" abolished, even for the Flak program from the 4. November 1944. At the 31. January 1945 had Hitler against, "that all in the Emergency program employed Skilled workers with Except for those born in 1928 and younger from everyone Confiscation must be exempted if they are not fully valid before everything through Skilled workers more disused establishments replaced become can." This applies also for the "Iron creating Industry, supply industry as well as for the Companies that the Equipment for this manufacturing, optics, electrical engineering etc." ¹²

The first still to some extent manageable classification the Armaments in the emergency program became in the February more and more watered down. New Lists of Technical official

10 BAP, FS, Film 1730, RErl. Speer, January 23, 1945. Mistel = piggyback aircraft or gliding bomb on long-haul aircraft (with an explosive charge of over four tons against power plants etc.); EZ 42 = range fuze for anti-aircraft guns; Jammer = against bomber radar; Elefant = assault gun (Porsche) with 8.8 cm gun.

11 News, No. 51, January 10, 1945, Erl. **RMRuK**, December 14, 1944; in addition "Explanations" u. DfAO d. Pla-nungsamt v. 12/21 or. December 14 and 21, 1944 (ibid.). "Planning takes place Urgency" should the be a new principle; If the shortage increases, the urgency classification no longer applies. "The variety of needs that arise in a scarce economic structure cannot through emergency orders be regulated." (ibid., Explanation **RMRuK**, December 14, 1944).

12 BAP, FS, Movie 1730, here in: AT MAN Augsburg, February 2, 1945.

and des Production offices contained dozens of new ones positions or products, locked in gas protection device, harvest twine, Baby clothes, crutches and Coffins.¹³ The Supply industry was with one barely to be overlooked Production range involved; one list of precision mechanical-optical Industry, for example contained Target and Directional telescopes, gyroscopic devices, time and distance fuze, bomb aiming devices, command devices, Torpedo lead calculator, dive sights, Night visors.¹⁴ The Technical Government office ordered: „Repair and spare parts of the im Emergency program included Devices generally work before New production." ¹⁵ Since then

28. February belonged for the Emergency program also "all companies, the the Basic nutrition of the people (Bread, Meat, Milk, Fat etc.) serve." ¹⁶ spear cleared himself a, „that the emergency program first a size Width has." ¹⁷

The Sense, the the German guide originally in the Emergency program saw, based on a fatal one Illusion: Through completion and forced completion the main Weapons should the Wehrmacht in the Position offset will, that Ruhr area and to regain Upper Silesia or. again full in the German armor to include. If and How the succeed _ would, stayed open. „Afterward at the completion program", explained spear indefinite, but insightful, „comes the actual emergency program, which itself then up the still existing raw materials and semi-finished product base." ¹⁸

Quantity planning was initially not associated with the emergency program; it was yes, just "as Supplementary program started, d. H., the Main committees were obliged to determine which essential Parts any tanks already available were, in order to the rest in addition to complete." ¹⁹ Nonetheless gave the Ministry of Armaments later, End of February, target figures before, even in shape of group indices. The March numbers became but, except at light infantry weapons, nowhere reached, multiple already in the Month the Plan preparation around above the half undercut (airplanes, Tank, heavy infantry weapons, light Artillery ²⁰ On the side were valid Per format, approximately at the Main Committee Weapons, the above-dimensioned Planned figures further, the from the programs from 1944 for 1945 had been updated. ²¹

13 BAP, FS, Movie 1732, Decrees RMRuK v. 13.2. (Premier) u. February 14, 1945 (TAmt); BAK, R 3/1772,

Attachment e.g. Rs. **RMRuK**, March 13, 1945 (Crutches and Coffins).

14 Brazen. BA des VEB Pentacon Dresden, No. 431, O. D

15 How Note 13 (February 14, 1945). New production and Repairs were too this Time in the Production statistics not always from each other picked up. After car driver, S. 116, rose for example the repair rate, based on the Total the at the Troop delivered airplanes, from 18 percent in the October on 25 percent in the December 1944.

16 BAP, FS, Movie 1732, REL. **RMRuK**, February 28, 1945.

17 BAP, FS, Movie 4640, TO Rln Upper Rhine regarding discussion in Heidelberg, February 26, 1945.

18 Ibid. Please refer also car driver, S. 117 f. (with Explanations Kehrls v. spring 1945).

19 IfZ, ED 99, NL Spear, Vol. 8, Vemehmg. v. May 22, 1945 (Bl. 23).

20 BAP, RWiMin, No. 20308, Bl. 29, Erl. RMRuK (P!Amt) regarding "Guidelines to Implementation of the emergency program the armor and war production", March 1, 1945. Please refer also car driver, S. 118.

21 BAP, FS, film 1727, "Weapons Planning" for 1945/46, various documents (including budget figures v. 16.l., 1.3. and March 24, 1945).

Table 127

Planned figures of "emergency program", March, June, August 1945, and Actual numbers December 1944, January and March 1945 (index; January/February 1942 = 100)

	Actual numbers		, emergency program - Planned figures 1945			actual numbers	in percent
	Dec.44	Jan.45	March	June	Aug.	March 1945	from plan
weapons							
Light							
Infantry							
weapons	331	295	215	294	126	270	126
Heaviness							
Infantry-							
weapons	582	284	351	443	422	162	46
Lightweight							
Artillery	1,275 _	514	444	572	572	208	47
Heaviness							
Artillery	354	173	233	237	237	178	76
Heaviness Flak	530	385	373	389	389	227	61
On-board weapons	684	408	136	191	191	168*	..
Nebelwerfer	159	148	120	24	24	148*	..
Tank	598	557	715	294	126	221	31
Aircraft	224	231	280			136	49

*) Is February 1945.

Source: car driver, S. 118; S. 178 ff. - March numbers (Is) appear as very unsure, already due to failure many Communication connections.

The production instructions within the framework of this "plan" to the committees or the companies - in the present case the wood processing industry - were with the following instructions tied together: „ 1.) The Production task in the Emergency program is first for the The months March to June are to be advertised. 2.) For this production, existing inventories must primarily be processed." The companies had to ensure energy (electricity, coal, gas) and transport space for this production and apply for the release of skilled workers .²²

The handling of the planning caused a lot of irritation. On February 23, the Armaments Minister announced his opinion on the timing of the emergency program in a decree. In the "Level I" were in afterwards the Armament finishing iron and Steel in the quantities available, as well as the "counted" (!) stocks of material or equipment parts only for the emergency program and "essentially to complete the "Equipment production" should be used. If primary materials and stocks are used up, „goes the Level I in the Level II above, at the the Production plan on the remaining

22 BAK, R 3/1772, REL. RMRuK, March 13, 1945.

Material supply alone switched off must become." ²³ The March version of Emergency program was running under the Designation "preliminary final Emergency program". ²⁴ It was now everyone those involved clear, that the Emergency program "not as a minimal program, rather as a maximum program to watch" was. ²⁵ More or fewer officially existed a "Emergency program I", "which cannot be switched off under any circumstances" ²⁶, and an "emergency program II".

Already in the February could not more of that the be speech, that central Specifications and programs according to plan realized became. In some areas, approximately in Thuringia and other parts Central Germany, was a more significant Emission at certain ones Weapons, especially light ones Infantry weapons, still short Time before End of war to be recorded. In other areas against it sank the production already in the February into the Bottomless. „The coal supplies ", was called it End of month in Southwest Germany, „are to Time so bad, that hardly those power plants and the food sector provided become can [and that the emergency pro-gram only until 10 percent with Coal supplied can be." ²⁷

Everyone Involved had to the Emergency program as admission the defeat recognize. Nonetheless _ summoned responsible Director the Arms production How Head of office Sour "a new, quite big Wonder the Germans Armor": "It is in this one and the possible in the next few months, at unheard of more carefully planning one Final armament production force from one Height, the the World in astonish set becomes and the War situation one decisive _ turn to give can." ²⁸

b) Traffic chaos and coal shortage

The disruption the overall economy, the itself since the air strikes on the Transportation in October November 1944 signed off had, became with everyone Attack wave the Allied bombers and Attack pilot deeper and more comprehensive. The allies, whose Airfields now immediately behind the German Western border and in Northern Italy lay, achieved to at any time light each any Target on German Floor. After dem Fail the Battle of the Bulge switched the allies Air Force nearly three Months long with the heaviest _ Bombings of entire war systematically and repeated the Junctions and main routes of the German transportation, grabbed a hundredfold Aircraft factories and airfields said Fuel industry the rest and encountered electricity countless times

23 BAP, RWiMin, No. 20308, RMRuK "Guidelines to execution of emergency program of armaments and war production", February 23, 1945.

24 BAK, R 13 XII/prev. 508, Prot. d. meeting of Production offices d. Wigru Chemical Industry, on the 8th 3.1945, 9.3.1945.

25 Ibid.

26 BAP, FS, Movie 4640, AT R  n Upper Rhine, February 6, 1945.

27 Ibid, AT v. February 25, 1945.

28 BAK, R 3/300, Armament staff collective report, February 10, 1945. See against it ibid, February 8, 1945: "Emergency program at current one Coal transport location from iron worker Industry not to keep share fe Reductionsrequired."

factories, armaments factories and works of the Basic industry with more destructive Effect .

Already the Attacks in the fourth Quarter 1944 had catastrophic caused production slumps. To Time the Battle of the Bulge, d. H. since center December, concentrated the British and American strategic Air Forces theirs attacks on the Cologne area - Koblenz - Trier and stretched she soon in Direction Kaiserslautern and Saarbrücken . Later were the Rhine bridges in the Back the Germans a important Goal. ²⁹

Table 128

Production and inventories of the United Steelworks AG, 4. Quarter 1944 (in percent compared to the 4th quarter of 1943)

Pig iron production Crude	- 76.51
steel production Ore	- 75.51
reserves (imported ores)	- 55.18
Coke production Coal	- 55.17
reserves at the works GBAG	-51.89
coal production Coke	-36.76
supplies at the works Ore	- 34.35
reserves (German ores)	- 27.22
GBAG coal reserves	+831.32
GBAG coke stocks	+! 308.34

Source: Mierzejewski, S. 147, Tab. 7. 1. - GBAG = Gelsenkirchen mine AG; Carbon base and Major coke producer of Steelworks Group.

Beginning January 1945 was already a Low point in the Coal supply reached, the for example in the chemical Industry to Shutdowns led. „What the theoretical Allocation quotas regards, so lies the following new Classification before: A) 8{...1 ()percentage theoretical coal allocation for the areas east of Schwerin, Breslau, Reichenberg, Linz ... B) 1{...20 percent Allocation, if not more completely Failure: Hamburg, Bremen, Kiel, Kassel, Hanover, Koblenz, Saarbrücken, Stuttgart, Karlsruhe, Alsace-Lorraine, Luxembourg. C) Berlin, Wroclaw, Dresden can only with Upper Silesian Hard coal calculate. Extensive restrictions are in place expect. D) Unexplained is the Supply option in Weimar, Magdeburg and Wiesbaden. E) As Island districts apply Muenster, Düsseldorf, Cologne." ³⁰

From End January 1945 at renewed the allies strategic Air Force her massaged Attacks on Railway destinations and shipping routes northeast and southern of Ruhr area, especially the marshalling yards and large viaducts. The tactical air force , especially fighter-bombers with bombs and rocket projectiles, destroyed train stations and railway lines and rolling stock; Fighter aircraft took locomotives and Wagons under fire.

29 USSBS, Do Effects of strategy Bombing on German Transportation, S. 14 (ff.). Hereafter also the The following.

30 **BAK, R** 13 VIUvorl. 508, Prot. d. meeting of Production offices d. Wigru Chemical Industry at the January 4, 1945, January 5, 1945.

Heaviness Attacks met South German and Austrian Railway routes. On Request the Red Army strong forces bombed the Transport connections around Berlin, Cottbus and in Saxon Space. The two day one Operation Clarion (February 22nd and 23rd), executed _ with huge, but fragmented forces - 9 each 788 and 8 400 aircraft ³¹ - , directed itself against Transportation facilities in quite Germany. She should everywhere expressly the allies Air superiority demonstrate and - as well how to same Time the unprecedented _ Area bombings against residential and Cultural cities - the Morality of the German population break.

End February 1945, while in West the allies Troops in fierce battles everywhere until for the Rhine open-minded and yourself on the Preparing for the river crossing began the decisive phase the insulation of Ruhr area from the Air. The coordinated plan of allies _ Luftwaffe strategists saw before,

- in one huge Bow of Bremen up the Weser above Bielefeld to Koblenz every railway connection by destroying one particularly important bridge or to interrupt a viaduct ;
- all major train stations, Routes, signal boxes and main workshops within the barrier line with severe and continued attacks except Operation to set;
- supplementary with Low-flying aircraft always again Attack trains and alternative routes and in this way cause traffic disruptions over a wide area.

The objectives of this plan were twofold. In strategic respect the arms industry should Ruhr area from the deliveries dem the rest of Germany entirely cut off and his export there, particularly from hard coal, prevented become. Tactical seen, should after dem plan equipment and Replenishment the German Defense forces on the right of Rhine are prevented.

At the 23rd/24th March 1945, as the allies offensive above the Rhine away started, was the Ruhr region "practically completely" isolated. ³² On 16 of 18 of the bridges designated in the plan and Viaducts were a or several Sheets destroyed. More as 20 the 25 marshalling yards and huge Signal boxes at the Periphery of areas were difficult damaged, numerous smaller Railway facilities difficult met. The tactical Aviation Forces had in February and March 113 Bridges, more as 4 000 locomotives and 28 000 Wagons all species destroyed; more as 5 000 Route interruptions occurred her Account.

End March, as the allies troops east of Rhine quickly into the Inner As Germany advanced, the center of gravity shifted attacks on the German transport system in the Space Hall - Leipzig - Chemnitz. From center April at met last heavy punches the connections between Berlin and that Saxon area, the stretch in the western Czechoslovakia and the further links through Austria in the Area the - stuck in the planning stage - "Alpine Fortress" or "Imperial Fortress of Tyrol". end of April gave it for the strategic Bomber forces the Allies no worthwhile Goals more.

If the German Business, How spear stated, after depletion the Coal reserves in the armor already Beginning 1945 "before the Coal disaster on wider Base" was standing ³³ , so

31 Groehler, bombing war, S. 423.

32 How Note 29 (p. 15).

33 IfZ, ED 99, NL Spear, Vol. 8th, Vemehmg. v. May 20, 1945.

were those in power after Loss of Upper Silesia, „the me then practical the final push gave in the entire Armor" ^{3 4}, and under dem Rain of bombs the next weeks and Months bar everyone possibility of catastrophe to stop and the Armor too in the most modest way Frame to stabilize.

The Transportation options for controlled coal in the last months of war the production , more comprehensive and more thorough, as it ever previously the regulation the War economy effects had. The main Key figures for the economic collapse in February and March 1945 were accordingly the Carriage position the Reichsbahn, before everything for hard coal, the care the Energy companies and the Steel mills with coal and Coke, the Coal reserves the power plants and the Reichsbahn himself and the Steel production.

Table 129

Carriage position the Reichsbahn, July 1944 -March 1945 (in 1 000 wagons)

	wagon overall	freight dare	of it (in 10 t units) for Hard coal	for Brown coal	for Hard coal (RBD Food)
<i>1944</i>					
July	4216	3 970	1481	668	586
August	4th 123	3 941	1394	667	565
September	3rd 630	3442	1086	612	436
October	3472	3 242	883	568	252
November	3rd 180	2 976	850	542	232
December	2,679 2,571,889,508,253 _		—	—	— —
<i>1945</i>					
January	2170	1 878	691	475	282
February	1st 092	1069	319	..	208
March	465		369	..	70

Source: car driver, S. 94 Tab.; Mierzejewski, S. 191 f., Tab. A 3 and A 4; RBD Eat: USSBS, The Effects of strategy Bombing on German Transportation, S. 82, Exh. 82 (Mistake in d. Legend).

Table 130

Coal transport and Reichsbahn supplies at hard coal, July 1944 - March 1945

	Hard coal shipping via d. Dortmund- Ems Canal (lock Muenster); 1000t	Trains with Ruhr coal for southern Germany	Stocks at RB coal in RBD departments southl. d. Mains (end of each month; in days) Stuttgart Munich	
July 1944	753	..		
August	663	..	24.5	28.4
September	473	..	23.1	22.1
October	126	766	12.5	4.8
November	40	635	1.5	0.7
December	208	518	0.5	0.2
January 1945	25*	257	0.5**	0.2**
February	167*	177	1.0**	1.7**
March	25*	24		

*) Canal transport in total (Sluice Muenster). **) Incl. Brown coal.

Source: USSBS, *The Effects of Strategy Bombing on German Transportation*, S. 82, Exh. 85; S. 83, Exh. 86 u. 87. Please refer also *ibid*, S. 23 f.

Behind the Pay the statistics hidden itself chaotic Conditions. The reckless Laying _ from 45 divisions the Eastern Front, underneath a third of the Western Front, end January and February³⁵ placed additional strain on the German transport network. The Reichsbahn imposed drastic Traffic blocks. „One Performance from the situation give the The fact that in the restricted areas of 1 00 cars possibly three to five, in the unlocked ones districts approximately ten until twelve Dare placed become To Time are 60 percent more Trains switched off as End December.“³⁶ "The Reichsbahn", was called it center February, "drives to Time a Quarter of what demands becomes. There are but also the Wehrmacht transports contain. The General traffic closure becomes maintain, for the Part also the Territorial and Route traffic closures."³⁷ **At the beginning of March, the chemical** industry business group discussed the Location: „The Traffic districts Berlin, Munich, Nuremberg, Augsburg, Regensburg and Hall are stuck and immobile. Out of Berlin goes practical nothing out and nothing into it The Try, with Flash marks and Tank slips to help, are

not always completely succeeded The Tank slip have itself different good proven.

In the Halle district, for example, B. out of 59 tank notes issued, only six were honored, while they in others Reichsbahn directorates 100percent Success had How difficult the Things lay, goes from it out, that Per Week in the entire Chemistry only seven Koh-

³⁵ DZW, Vol. 6, S. 513.

³⁶ BAK, R 13 XII/prev. 508, Prot. d. meeting d. Production offices d. Wigrü Chemical Industry on 18.1.1945, 19.1.1945.

³⁷ How Note 36 (Meeting at the 15.2., Prot. v. February 16, 1945).

trains to To be available. Besides, there are three Imperial coal trains without accompanied and for Maximum certainly were practically lost along the way. Only Half a train arrived." ³⁸

In one official report out of Munich from center March was called it the Stocks at Munich Coal trade are until on low Amounts of coke and anthracite, the in this one days left to supply hospitals, hospitals, homes and garden centers become, completely exhausted." ³⁹

At the 7. March 1945 explained the Imperial unification Money officially your Bankrupt. Pleiger reported dem Minister of Armaments, the Coal industry be at the End. ⁴⁰ The He described them as coalfields the "extraordinary escalation of the Location, in particular the progressive decline of the Coal transport services", either lost (Upper Silesia), "As a result of the traffic difficulties for the general coal supply ... practically failed" (Ruhr), sealed off (Lower Silesia) or, how Lignite, "affected most severely by the increasing deterioration of the wagon structure". "Characteristic of is the overall situation the weekday one Carriage: In February/March In 1944 this was an average of 76-77,000 Units; at place of in the meaning of promised emergency program around 36 000 units is she on to Time approximately 20 000 Units fell behind. The inland water transport between the Rhine and the Main and the Oder as well as the interrupted traffic have also been disrupted Mainline - Baltic Sea and almost completely Traffic Dortmund- Ems- and Mittelland Canal. Himself Rich coal trains for most important consumers, yes even Trains with Wehrmacht trip numbers at the current developments cannot be delivered to the recipients."

Pleiger explained under the given Conditions the collapse for unavoidable : „As long as the fully intolerable Conditions in the Transportation last for, is it It is no longer possible to maintain the coal supply to the most important consumers, the comprehensive ones Burglaries the Coal supply the Defense industry to remedy and the collapse most important sectors, namely of traffic and the electricity and gasworks."

The Rhenish-Westphalian Coal syndicate held at the 28. March his last meeting off, paid his employees a Monthly wage out of and postponed itself on the Time after End of war. ⁴¹

Iron and steel production declined rapidly. beginning of January calculations were still being made the Base from 40 percent of the production from 1943 employed, the alone for the Armament final production monthly 870 000 t iron provided. ⁴² After dem failure Upper Silesia

38 How Note 36 (Meeting at the 1.3., Prot. v. March 2, 1945).

39 Quote in Boelcke, The German Business, S. 338.

40 BAP, FS, Movie 3381, report Pleiger at spear re: "Coal economy Location", March 7, 1945. Here- after also the The following.

41 Mierzejewski, S. 174. - The conditions in the Post Office- and Telecommunications were similar catastrophic. A "important to the war effort" Telegram, at the 6. March from Leipzig after Oberhausen (GH;H) given up, came before the occupation Oberhausen through the Allies (11.4.) not more at, rather met first in the October 1945 after Release of Postal traffic between the Occupation zones a (Haniel archive, 4001016n, TO GHH, October 30, 1945).

42 BAK, R 3/1842, Bl. 1, AT RMRuK/PIAmT, January 11, 1945.

reigned complete confusion about how much iron and steel still generated could become. The forecast for February - always still “production program” called - wavered from 400 000 (Spear) until 1.2 millions metric tons (RVE). „It consists clarity about it, that in large ones trains nearly only still the Ammunition manufacturing taken into account become can.”⁴³ Stayed there it until for the End. Speers Financial support in his speech in the Ruhrstab at the 7. March went already from quite unreal ideas from the Production possibilities in March out of: “Crude steel production for Garnet steel stands before the generation for all others purposes. 2/3 of the total Iron production is for ammunition intended, 1/3 for Weapons, tanks etc.”⁴⁴

Still before the allies offensive above the Rhine away lay in the Ruhr area already all on the left bank of the Rhine and the Works in the 8 km zone right of the Rhine silent.

Table 131

Iron- and Steelmaking, March 1943, March 1944, September 1944 -March 1945 (in 1 000 t)

	pig iron Rich	Ruhr area	Crude steel Rich	Ruhr area
March 1943	2456	1011	3 121	1294
March 1944	2 374	923	3 031	1197
1944				
September	1 382	808	1976	1096
October	1 147	567	1 695	768
November	846	390	1 314	495
December	625	256	1006	299
1945				
January	544	320	825	388
February	402	246	591	269
March, 1. decade	..	50	..	62
March, 2. decade	..	27	..	40

Source: BAK, R 13 1/630, Bl. 3, „Agenda to meeting of narrower Advisory Board the Northwest Group“ (Wigru ESI), March 24, 1945.

Since Beginning of year 1945 lay all huge Fuel plants and 20 percent the smaller ones including the Refineries quiet; only Pölitz produced initially with since long limited Capacity. As a “conclusion” resulted itself for the OKW, “that the army largely demotorised”, ie the Panzergrenadiers “to Foot or with wheel emotional” become would have to. Since dem 13. January fell also Pölitz out of. The production from Aviation fuel sank with it to zero. The OKW reserves supplied itself End January on maximum the half of “urgent need” one month (40 000 t). At the February 11th ordered Jodl “the ruthless one Be-

43 BAK, R 131/600, Bl. 5, written down ex. d. RVE chairman meeting, February 1, 1945, v. February 5, 1945.

44 BAK, R 13 1/592, Bl. 24, „Agenda (to) meeting tighter Advisory Board Northwest“ (Wigru Esl), March 10, 1945.

restriction of all air force missions"; may be flown only on focal points of the fight and "there, where other Medium none Success promise."⁴⁵

It looked better the special fuels. For the Me 262 was End of February - at estimated 12,000 tons monthly requirements - still for two and a half Months of fuel present ⁴⁶; he became even not fully in Claim taken, there it on machinery and Pilots was missing.

End March went the Hungarian oil region lost. At the 17th April had to the Wehrmacht Zistersdorf (Austria) and with it the last Petroleum wells clear, out of those she itself provided .

The production from weapons and Device followed on dem Away in the collapse with some Delay. In different areas, particularly at the Priority programs (light infantry weapons, high-performance aircraft, U-boats, anti-aircraft guns) were usually larger material reserves and a leader at worked on Split available. More primitive weapons and weapons without huge Material and labor costs became still in March in significant numbers completed (bazooka; Panzerschreck; Small naval ordnance). With primitive construction methods, about in the Aircraft industry (Wooden components, e.g. tail units and propellers; plastic instead of wood)), gave way man material shortages and Delivery delays out of.

Not to catch were the Burglaries in the Ammunition production. The Ammunition situation became as well as from the Steel crisis as also from the Shortage at powder and explosive certainly. The consequences on this one areas showed themselves like a highlight at the at the 25. January ordered Lineup from so-called "bicycle moving "tank hunting commandos" in the army groups center and Vistula. 600 such Commandos were formed out of eight Soldiers, one Corporal and one officer on bicycles passed and with one each gun (assault rifle) and Equipped with two bazookas were. ⁴⁷ In April Additional such troops were formed on the Western Front to form the 1st Tank Hunting Regiment. ⁴⁸ The Armor Staff decreed given of advance the Redden army from the Vistula at the Oder the immediate "formation of tank close combat squads at all armaments factories is more crucial Meaning including Store [and] in particular industrial airports, around to prevent individual tanks from breaking through interrupt and paralyze the activity." The mobility of this of officers in training Squads - in strength of about one each group - should "through Stand by from motor vehicles and bicycles" aimed for (!) become. „Equipment with rifles, machine guns and MPI, as well as ample Furnishing from Panzerfaust _ and others Close combat weapons and supplies of mines." ⁴⁹

Also Robert Ley wanted be "Free Corps Adolf Hitler" out of 10 000 "activists" from Political party
and Volkssturm, the actually in the from Allies occupied areas terror and sabotage

45 KTB of the OKW, Vol. IV/2, S. 1317 ff., notes WFSt/Qu v. 3.1., 13.1., 28.1. u. February 11, 1945 (Command ChiefWFSt).

46 Please refer sweeping), S. 428 (re: February 28, 1945).

47 DZW, Vol. 6, S. 517. Please refer also: 1945. The Year the final defeat the fascist Wehrmacht. Documents, selected u. deposited v. Gerhard ranger u. Richard Lakowski, Berlin 1975, S. 112 f., Doc. 14, Lecture notes v. GO Heinz Guderian, January 24, 1945.

48 DZW, Vol. 6, S. 560.

49 BAK, R 3/3011, Company representative from Focke-Wulfim Armor Staff at Focke-WulfCottbus and So-rau, January 26, 1945; sa BAP, FS, Movie 10759, AN RüKdo Magdeburg, March 5, 1945.

commit should, „to anti-tank units summarize, the only with bazooka, Assault rifle and Bicycle fitted are." ⁵⁰

To this Time had the Minister of Armaments a long time ago the Armament of Volkssturm, the according to Nazi propaganda, modern, even with Tanks should be equipped, due to a lack of weapons and ammunition stopped. ⁵¹ What the Bazookas concerned, so went the Lack of explosives so far,

"the the in ... duds (i.e. H. in hostile Bombs - D E.) existing Explosives are absolutely needed by the German Wehrmacht for the explosive charge in the Panzerfaust." For the air raid police However, their tasks include collecting and transporting away from duds belonged, stood no fuel to Disposal. ⁵²

The front suffered difficult under dem Shortage at Ammunition, the combat power and Willingness to resist paralyzed. Colonel General Jodl made the following The invoice on:

"Ammunition in February(:)

Nine Trains a 450 t = 4 050 t.

4 300 t daily in the east missed.

1 200 Tim West and southwest and southeast.

Replenishment 4,150 t.

IF West should 1 000 t Per Day receive." ⁵³

Therefore could with Replenishment only in Height from 75 percent of firing be calculated. end of March Jodl wrote laconically for the Western Front (Netherlands): "Lack of artillery" and Infantry ammunition. 10 until 12 cartridges Per Day Men enough ... It lacks Weapons." ⁵⁴ The Main Committee Ammunition made an overall assessment: "As long as it does the basic evils, namely the Air terror and the nearly paralyzed transportation options, not eliminated (become) and the required Raw material- and Semi-finished base not to provided _ becomes, are we simply powerless. The Cry for ammo will under the current one conditions from Month to Month greater become and must relentless to the lead to the most serious consequences." ⁵⁵

The "leader meetings" of this time convey the ghostly impression of meaninglessness and the complete blindness of the "Führer". the Reality. While Saur, the spear represented, to Example not around could, Hitler "on the serious upcoming burglaries" at the crude steel and Ammunition production attentive to make - calculated _ for March 1945 only still with 150 000 until 160 000 metric tons Crude steel opposite 3.2 million metric tons in the March 1944 ⁵⁶ - presented Hitler after How before requirements after dem "Run-up" and dem "Highest output" from weapons and ammunition and after the Development of new types of weapons.

50 BAK, NL 118/59, Goebbels diary, Entry v. March 29, 1945. Please refer also DZW, Vol. 6, p. 551 f.; p. 641 f.

51 "The Mister Reich Minister has temporary every Delivery from Weapons, ammunition and Device at the Volkssturm with more immediate Effect blocked, there first the Wehrmacht himself full be supplied must." (BAK, R 3/300, Collective report armor staff, February 10, 1945).

52 BAK, R 13 111/79, AT February 12, 1945 (Wigru Mechanical engineering?).

53 IfZ, ED 115, NL Iodine!, Vol. 3, TB Iodine!, Entry v. February 12, 1945.

54 Ibid, Entry v. March 29, 1945.

55 BAK, R 3/3027, BI. 7, HA Ammunition, "Annual performance report 1944", March 20, 1945.

56 FB, March 22, 1945, Point I. Last FB: 14. u. 26.2., 8th. u. March 22, 1945.

They were still big the regional and local differences. Production stoppages and phases most tense production solved often each other away. From the Setting and the Managerial qualities the conductive Personalities in the Operated hung in the last months of war much away. In the Rule propagated she slogans of perseverance, drove the workforce unforgiving at and improvised with biggest Energy, around continue to produce can. Her motivation was different; Fear before dem End of war and misguided sense of duty played one size Role: „Not the Load hang let and say it has even none Purpose. I Job me before, if I fail, work I under one Russian Jews and do entrenching work. And I do not want that. Many people in Germany seem the still not Got it to have. We think, if it only finally is over , then there is it's roast pork again etc. That is same stupidity as after the previous one War If the troops at everyone Fronts after weapons scream, have to the medium-German Space she delivery. Who should it then otherwise do?“⁵⁷

c) Hectic organization

The organizational machinery of the Nazi Reich was running in the first months of Still in 1945 on high Tours. But she worked, at least What the War economy concerned, increasingly _ in the Idle. On dem Paper became significant organizational Efforts made and always new Commissioners with new Powers of attorney created to the To adapt the economy to the changed circumstances and keep it functioning. All of these efforts came to nothing. In fact, the one that broke apart into individual parts reacted economic organism only still with convulsive movements and became from one quickly around yourself gripping paralysis recorded.

The central Points, around the the bureaucratic activities circled, were in dem In general , the framework defined by the emergency program regulates traffic and organisation the Restoration work before everything at the Reichsbahn systems, the Establishment of new regional ones Steering bodies the war economy and the Procurement of the necessary _ Workforce and their security before Recoveries - at the same time but also the Coping of problem the excess working population including the Refugees.

The Minister of Armaments had already appointed his “representatives for commercial transport” to the crisis organization (central traffic control center and district traffic management) in December 1944. smuggled. ⁵⁸ He appointed Fritz Rudolf, a member of the bank's board of directors, as his authorized representative at headquarters from German Aviation, a proven crisis manager. Under Rudolf worked 31 district representatives in the Reichsbahn directorates; he could respectively also regional representatives appoint. The organization was subordinate dem Planning office. She quotas the Wagon inlet in the individual economic areas, regulated that Ranking the Commercial transport and presented “Transport step plans” on. She also worked at the decrees above traffic closures and the respective “exceptions”.

57 BAP, FS, Movie 10759, Prot. d. meeting at the Rükdo Magdeburg on February 27, 1945 (quote You. Klein, ring leader torpedoes).

58 BAK, R 3/1848, Erl. GBBreast, December 5, 1944. Hereafter also the The following. Please refer also Sweep!, p. 419 ff.

Over the Collisions with dem Reich Ministry of Transport and dem Reich Ministry of Economics and whose Representatives sat itself spear finally center February away, as he, under dem pretext the Illness of Minister of Transport, from Hitler instruct let, "that ... Mister Reich Minister spear provisional the businesses the Reichsbahn leads".⁵⁹ A few days later, at the 18. February, sat Hitler a Traffic staff under the Line Speers a. The Minister of Armaments afterwards had "the entire Transport space for Wehrmacht, armament, Nutrition and Business", apart from the operational Wehrmacht transports (troops and equipment), and was for "authorized to give instructions" in this area at the Reich ministries, the Requirements and the Reich Defense Commissioners."60) spear prepared the new subordinates to him a detailed circular on "Extraordinarily hard and drastic Decisions" before.⁶¹

A of attempts, the Traffic disaster to encounter, directed he with dem Decree from the 1. March above the "Mission from workers to Damage repair in traffic systems". he an "immediate Multiplication" the forces on. „It must in the next _ four up to six weeks 700 000 up to 800 000 New workforce for this one Purpose for use come." At the transport hubs and marshalling yards would have to constant _ strength Forces for Repair work to Disposal stand. „It must for that taken care of become that this Workforce always directly after one took place attack with the Restoration work begin can. Any Loss of time - also around Hours - are allowed under none circumstances enter." Therefore would have to the people on the sensitive traffic points concentrated remain, to search for the "probably always again following attacks " immediately at Location and Job to be.⁶² In the Area the Armaments Commission XIb (Magdeburg) were alone 66 000 Forces to place "1) out of the out of cleared east and Western areas, especially in treks, 2) the freely available prisoners of war and concentration camp inmates and 3) from the permanent or [temporary] lack of energy etc. freed-up workers."⁶³

The Success this extraordinary, desperate measure is in everyone Questionable in this respect . But one certain concentration such permanent Damage columns becomes - at least regionally. Goebbels In any case, the spear still on March 3rd praised had, he be "in this one Points the right one Man at the right Place. He understand it, one enormous difficulty in of their root to grasp" ⁶⁴, made itself at the 24. March the Criticism belongs to "the party", which defends itself against "that Speer Hundreds of thousands of idle people in the west sitting around has, the on hostile Airstrikes wait should, around the traffic damage again to remedy."⁶⁵

59 FB, February 14, 1945, Point 5.

60 BAK, R 3/300, Atl. e.g. Collective report of Armor staff v. February 24, 1945, Hitler decree v. February 18, 1945;

s. a. BAK, R 13 V/162, Rs. RGI, March 5, 1945.

61 BAK, R 13 V/162, REL RMRuK, February 19, 1945.

62 BAK, R 3/1778, Erl. RMRuK re: „Mission from workers to Damage repair at traffic facilities ", March 1, 1945.

63 BAP, FS, Movie 10759, Telephone RMRuK at RüCommission XIb Magdeburg re: "Multiply" chung the Workforce for the Restoration the traffic facilities", March 8, 1945.

64 BAK, NL 118/58, Goebbels diary, Entry v. March 3, 1945.

65 BAK, NL 118/59, Goebbels diary, Entry v. March 24, 1945. Similar also Jodl: "1 1/4 millions

At the 18. March appointed the Minister of Armaments a "Commissioner General for the Restoration _ the "Reichsbahnanlage" in shape of OT task force leader Eckhard Citizens. ⁶⁶ Undoubtedly relieved he itself with it at the same time from the most insoluble all Tasks, to a time when he the End of war tangible saw close.

Since Beginning March 1945 sat the Minister, assisted before everything from Kehrl, in expectation of Collapse "in four to eight weeks" ⁶⁷ clearly new priorities. Among the transport goods moved he - next to Reichsbahn material - food at the first place, even before Money. ⁶⁸ The those involved at the orientation on a Harvest- and Nutrition program for 1945 - Speer, Kehrl, Jaw, Riecke - , the, after Kehrl, already End 1944 in attack taken was ⁶⁹ did itself after dem wars much on it benefit, „for the Nutrition ours people" ⁷⁰ taken care of to have. Her and the German business elite concern around the People was evident; but it was subtle far more one fear before the people - What particularly undisguised the domestic political Precautions of the regime showed.

The collapse of the central arms organization into regional, always less communicating with each other areas wore the Minister of Armaments through the Appointment of arms representatives Invoice. The Central power of Ministry became in the run of February and March 1945 on six Armaments representative delegated, whose Rods after dem model of from Birder directed Ruhrstab organized became. „The Armaments representative can all departments of his armaments district subordinate to Speer, including OT and Transport Corps with Instructions Mistake. He leads the transferred to him Tasks in Behavior with the responsible Reich Defense Commissioners (i.e. with the Gauleiters - EN) through." ⁷¹ In Consideration the fainting of the central ministerial Instances one created herewith _ for the still more or fewer functioning "bigger armaments economics

workers in the Ruhr area. Lay around, eat and do nothing - she must at the Train work. railroad should she rejected have." (ItZ, ED 11 5, NL Iodine!, Vol. 3, TB Iodine!, entry from March 23, 1945).

66 BAK, R 3/1778, Erl. RMRuK, March 18, 1945; s. a. BAP, RWiMin, No. 20308, Bl. 23, Rs. RMRuK

(P!Amt), April 3, 1945, after citizens' orders "Unrestricted priority over all others measures, including the Geilenberg measures", had.

67 IMG, Vol. 42, S. 421, Doc. Speer-23, Memorandum Speers f. Hitler re: "Economic situation March - April 1945 and conclusions", March 15, 1945.

68 Mierzejewski, S. 1 75 (quote Speer guidelines v. March 14, 1945). For Beginning March are differing Instructions _ Speers handed down. In the OKW noted man at the 6. March: „It became the following Urgency levels for Railway transport set: 1) Weir night transports (Operations and replenishment), 2) Money, 3) Nutrition, 4) Emergency program from RuK, 5) refugees (practical so no refugee trains more)." (KTB of OKW, Vol. IV/2, S. 1 150). In his speech in the Ruhrstab at the 7th March called the minister "Troop transport at first Job. It followed the Nutrition and Food clearance. Only then did arms transports follow. This order is also crucial for the Resilience the Population, the carefully support financially is." Become this Sequence adhered to, then, however, says Speer's "personal Opinion", "No more room for Refugee transports available." (BAK, R 13 1/592, Bl. 24, "Agenda (for) meeting tighter North West Advisory Board " (Wigru Esl), March 10, 1945).

69 Sweep!, S. 421 ff.

70 Ibid, S. 421.

71 Decree RMRuK, February 8, 1945; quote after Daily report RGI v. February 17, 1945 (Anatomy of the war, S. 486 f., Doc. 274). Hereafter also the The following.

connected rooms" organs with all powers, "Strong economic self- help" to organize and for the fulfillment of emergency program through "increased balancing the Production requirements" (workers, Traffic, means of communication, Money, Energy, water) between the supervised lower authorities, namely the armaments commissions .

Table 132

Armaments representative of Reich Ministry for armor and war production, was standing center March 1945

district	Expansion range	Surname	Seat	appointment date
Rhine- Ruhr	2 Rü.- commissioner.	Albert Vögler (United Steelworks)	Essen- Kettwig	December 6, 1944
Berlin- Brandenburg		Albert spear	Berlin	Beginning February
southwest (Saar area, Rhine- Hesse, Bathe, Württemberg)	4Rü.- commissioner.	Heinrich Kelchner (Röchling Group) GWiB Westmark	Pagan!- berg (formerly Metz; Ulm)	Beginning February
Oder- Moldova ; later: southeast	5 Rü.- commissioner, protector, Hungary, Slovakia	Hans Malzacher (mountain hut group)	Prague	February 14, 1945
		Deputy: Franz Leitner (Böhler Group)	Salzburg	
northwest	1 Rü.- commissioner, Denmark	Otto Wolff	Hamburg	March 12, 1945
South (Bavaria, "Bavarian. Ostmark", Tyrol) center (Thuringia, Saxony, Hanover, Braunschweig)	2 Rü.- commissioner.	(MAR Hapag etc.) Pres. Come back deputy GWiB George Seebauer	Munich	March 13, 1945
		Head of office RMRuK President GWK unoccupied		

Source: News, No. 55, March 15, 1945, "Deployment of arms representatives"; "Formation of armaments districts Southwest, Southeast and Northwest": BAP, RWiM, No. 20308, Bl. 24, Erl. RMRuK, 12. and March 13, 1945.

"I have", so was called it in one later Decree Speers, „in the agreement with dem Director the party chancellery for separate Districts that for a somewhat self-sufficient Economics suitable and with one strengthen Industrial capacity Mistake are, Armaments representative used. Goal is the achievement one possible decentralized guide the armor and War production ." ⁷² • The armaments plenipotentiary represented the Headquarters in his district in "closest working connection" with the middle instance, in first line with the chairmen the Armaments commissions. Be work staff, „the in the Number that is small, but in his Performance terrific _ be must", should out of, „the best Personalities his district or suitable employees the central authority" consist. In the work staffs were the Coal working areas and Iron, Energy, armor, other war production, labor use, Building etc. represented. Further worked the traffic officer in the Rods with. The Armaments authorized representative became Main [district] representative the Committees and Rings assigned. She were at the same time for the case of "emergency" empowered, itself "in the Preparation and release from eviction and Paralysis measures decisive to turn on." ⁷³

2. Social chaos

a) refugees

With the Soviet offensive in the January put itself Flows of refugees in Movement, those within recently reached enormous proportions and continued until the end of the war one the biggest and most complicated problems for the regime's domestic and economic policy. Already in the second January half pulled treks with three until four millions Evacuees from East and West Prussia, dem eastern Silesia and that "Warthegau" westwards. ⁷⁴ In the rule were the Evacuations - in the official Usage of language became the Terms Escape and refugees possible avoided - from the authorities, Wehrmacht and Party departments head over heels Head under Punishment ordered. But the Expression the Forced evacuation hits not the whole Truth; because the size majority the affected Population _ was through reports and rumors about the Behavior of the Soviet troops and through the anti-Soviet atrocity propaganda, the straight in the last months of war a new Climax reached, on Outermost unsettled and scared and sat the eviction orders barely any Resistance in contrast to.

So gifts millions from people house, court and belongings on and moved itself - many times to Foot - at greater winterier cold and under catastrophic conditions on the same time from the Wehrmacht used retreat or supply routes towards West. The mortality on the treks and marches was large, particularly under the children and infants. The Wehrmacht units went by your Withdraw with Confiscation of horses and vehicles evident with extreme ruthlessness towards

⁷² BAP, RWiMin, No. 20308, Bl. 34, REL RMRuK re: „Mission from Armaments Commissioner", February 27, 1945. Hereafter also the following.

⁷³ How Note 71 (Anatomy of war, S. 487).

⁷⁴ See DZW, Vol. 6, p. 633 ff.

the fleeing People before; it had to Commands enacted become, after those "civilian Vehicles _ everyone type" of the Wehrmacht only exceptionally confiscated were allowed to be used if they were "for." indispensable combat purposes... (use with the Drawbar to the east!)" were intended.⁷⁵

Figures about refugee flows are only available as very rough approximations. She took in dem growing chaos the last months of the war, the longer, the more more the character of estimates.

Table 133

'Numerical information above refugees and out of air-endangered areas evacuees, January - March 1945

28. Januar	3.5	(only East)	Source: KTB/OKW, Vol. IV, S. 1324 KTB/OKW, Vol. IV, S. 1327 KTB/OKW, Vol. IV, S. 1147 "Leadership notice" (Reich leadership d. NSDAP?) Sts. Stuckart/Mdl (Goebbels diary)
y	million		
19. February	8.35 mill.	(only East)	
6. March	10 mill.		
6. March	16.5 mill.		
24. March	19 mill.		

In one internal information for Authorities and Party departments ("Leadership Note") dated 6th March 1945 became "numbers." above Repatriation from enemy-threatened areas and resettlement for reasons called "air terror": "Eviction movement in the Reich as a whole 16,500 000. Of these East 8th 350 000, West 1 421 000, through Air terror 4 884 000".⁷⁶

The able-bodied men among the refugees were - as far as could be realized - subject to more complete control more bureaucratic "Capture" and sharpest "Usage" provisions. The "Decree over Capture the fit for military service Men of civil area the cleared areas in the east" from the 3 February wore the Signatures from Keitel, Bormann and Sauckel. Recorded should be by local group leaders, residents' registration offices, police stations and food card offices the vintages 1897 until 1928. The Military District Command decided in cooperation with NSDAP district leadership and employment office "under Creation a strict standard", if one UK position to extend be or if the feeder for the WHEEL in Ask _ come (Vintage 1928); all remaining Men became dem army or. the Education in the Replacement army assigned. ⁷⁷ At the 22. February became this Decree expanded; "fast and sharp measures to Recording everyone able-bodied men". itself now on too those still to be cleared and up the air damage areas. Of the captured men - now until Born in 1929 (15 year olds!) - became first those screened out, the the Wehrmacht positions because of "Indispensable for decisive in the war Tasks in homeland",

⁷⁵ 1945. The Year the final defeat ... , S. 116, Doc. 17, command boss OKW, January 28, 1945; s. a. BAK, R 5/8, REL. RMdI, January 29, 1945; KTB of OKW, Vol. IV/2, S. 1324 f. - Hitler refused yourself, how spear reported, regularly, itself photos from the Refugee misery to watch (Spear, Memories, S. 430; S. 441).

⁷⁶ BAP, FS, film 10709.

i.e. on Location and place, complained. All The remaining able-bodied soldiers were sent after the "planned" one Backwards movements (treks) ... in the reception rooms recorded."⁷⁸

This multiplied the separation of countless families and the uncertainty about fate the affected relatives the Refugee misery. In East Prussia became for example from 2.2 millions German Population 500 000 until 600 000 Men withheld.⁷⁹

The watchword for the armaments factories was to "work until the last moment."⁸⁰; but the experiences during the stormy weeks of the Soviet offensive said, that this Recipe in the most cases unsuitable was. So far at all one normal Work to enforce was, presented it itself out of here, „that that is until for the last moment is being worked on, the fruits of this work and the whole The furnishings are completely intact get lost." ⁸¹ For the Removal in last minute were Train carriages or. fuel _ necessary, the then but not more to procure were. The workers the Armaments factories belonged so in the Rule to the last, the evacuated became.

In poses, the at the 25. January from Soviet troops locked in became, let the responsible as well as the population as also the big one Focke-Wulf factory in Sting.

"Size Stocks at Special drills and Aircraft parts has man lay calmly", was called it in one report for the SD. „The conductive Men's from Focke-Wulf have it preferred, the trucks with Private matters to loaded and to get rid of Also for the Removal the

German Familys of work has itself the Operational management not used, as well little for the Followers. From those is a Part already on the 18th and 19. in Direction Bremen (to the main plant - DE) left where they were on the 24th not in the had reported operations. It is impossible to predict how the loyalty office will attract its followers again gather together want, there all Documents in Posen circling remained lying are The Loss of work through this deficient return the Following

is not yet to be overlooked. Approximately 900 German followers, for the Part Academic subject- and special workers, become until today still not in the Work use be. Besides that has man failed to the Polish Skilled workers in the External works cottbus and Sorau to take with you. There a Part the Poland good Expertise owns, are also here valuable Forces lost."⁸²

The Escape of millions made difficult the economic situation in remaining imperial territory resounding, quite apart from the heavy ones social and psychological problems and Long-term consequences for the those affected, the she with itself brought. Already in the directive

77 BAK, R 13 V/prelim. 162, More common Erl. boss OKW/Head d. Party Chancellery/GBA, February 3, 1945.

78 KTB of OKW, Vol. IV/2, S. 1328, Zsf. d. decree v. February 22, 1945.

79 How Note 76.

80 BAK, R 3/301 I, Main plant representative of the Focke-Wulf Group in the armory staff at Otto Long, Representative f. d. eyewitness program in the armor staff, February 13, 1945. Reported became ex. the Focke Wulf works in poses, Marienburg, Alleys and Sorau. Hereafter also the The following.

81 In a completely failed operation, the Armaments Staff tried on January 26th and 27th, from the Focke-Wulf factory in poses Devices to recover; but the City was already at the 25. January from the Redden army locked in been. (BAK, R/3011, report d. Start-up representative Focke-Wulf Cottbus at 0. Long, 29.1.1945).

82 BAK, R 58/976, report SD Lüneburg at RSHA, February 10, 1945.

lines of Interior Minister took itself the list the in this situation to solving Tasks considerable From the people in Work to bring; her supply in orderly Railways to to steer; eviction family support afford to; her Horses, you cattle and her movable _ Have one economically to put to proper use; the public one Assets _ from dem personal Property to separate and ensure ... ; the industrial and agricultural paralysis good to ensure; the Registration the to accept war damage."⁸³

It originated a greater additional Requirement at consumer goods, particularly furniture and simple _ household goods, whose production itself 1943/1944 that is in one Row from positions (beds, Bowls, cups, frying pans, buckets) into consideration of the many "bombed out " people, but now no longer met the rapidly increasing demand. The Nutritional situation aggravated itself also drastic.

The effect on the workforce situation was mixed. In many places there was no longer any use for the labor "reserves" that were flooding in. "Especially through the extensive Shutdown from Operated and operating parts, through the There is a significant influx of refugees and returnees from the evacuated areas Labor reserves available become." ⁸⁴ Without Doubt relieved but the immigrants in some areas and regions the labor situation. A more detailed analysis is here around so more difficult, as the Labor authorities himself always fewer were informed , the links under the local, Gau- and central Authorities always got worse ; that was the case in March apparently every "overview of "the work situation has been lost ".⁸⁵

At least it seems Agriculture has been much better in some areas since February/March than before with workers fitted been to be - with workers, the at the farmers in need accommodated were and probably most of the time, if at all, just with some natural products rewarded became. „Through the refugee flows the Agriculture to Time with Strengths good provided can be."⁸⁶

Certain categories of workers became targeted wanted. „Out of the Upper Silesian streams of refugees are Miners intended: for the Ruhr area 5 000, for the Sudetenland 3 500, for the Styria 3 000, for Central Germany 3 000, for Waldenburg 800 It are particular Trek roads and Refreshment places determined, at those already a Sieving out the should be carried out by qualified skilled workers." ⁸⁷ The Armaments Staff called for forces for weapons production at: „Management of mechanical engineering out of dem east largely for

83 BAK, R 43 II/692, Bl. 27 Rs., REL. GB f. d. empire administration, February 9, 1945.

84 BAK, R 4I/290a, Bl. 39, Rs. GBA/Reich Inspectorate, February 9, 1945.

85 Ibid, Bl. 52, AT one Employees d. RArbMin/GBA ex. d. Position in Westphalia, (Beginning) March 1945.

86 Ibid, Bl. 57, GBA/Reich Inspectorate, March 2, 1945. -Reich Finance Minister Schwerin v. Krosigk shouted in his spicy letters at Goebbels after quick and comprehensive Conscription of the unemployed and refugees into the Wehrmacht and demanded for example: "A UK-provided farmer, the one out of dem east Refugees Farming family at itself records, can now without additional at the front go, because he has for his Operation sufficient At sight and Get workers ." (BAP, Case XI, No. 342, Doc. NG-4683, v. Krosigk Goebbels, February 27, 1945).

87 How Note 84 (Bl. 39 R u. 40).

Weapons manufacturing insert." ⁸⁸ Of course, the employment offices also had them Instruction for the "Capture the fit for military service German Men of civil area out of the cleared areas in the east". ⁸⁹

The Success the described Skilled worker actions is unsure. The military situation and the access from Wehrmacht, Political party and "Volkssturm" on everything, what a gun or a bazooka carry could, made him, ever longer, the more more obsolete. "Repatriation measures from skilled workers out of evacuation areas illusory through unrestricted Defense orders from the owner the executing Force." ⁹⁰

In total seen, was the Position the Refugees too in the remaining empire catastrophic. The Ver-

administrative authorities were not more Mister the Location. Many Reception areas refused yourself, more refugees to include; Gauleiter threatened, the boundaries of their region for To be recorded to close. ⁹¹ "The individual Gaue", wrote Goebbels, „are to 400 percent overcrowded . The Rich is so quite closely become. Consequently have we us determined,

out of dem west no longer to evacuate." ⁹²

As Hitler at the 18. March while of American advance in the Saar area and on Mainz "in contrast to the previous instructions", but apparently in accordance with his "Nero Order" issued the next day, ordered the areas west of the Rhine including Saarpfalz "immediately, behind dem main battlefield starting, from all _ residents to clear" ⁹³ , there shouted this Command not only displeasure and Resistance at his closest confidants out. Hitler lose strong at Authority, said Goebbels, because he up the eviction in the west exist, the "pure Theory" be and practical even not carried out become could. „The population goes simply not away, and there are enough means of power us in this one Space not to Disposal, around an eviction force." ⁹⁴ Also shown in the East itself now Resistance against Evacuations. And but moved until the end April always still more Columns of refugees out of dem East, dem "Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia" and out of Lower Austria westward. First at the April 29th arranged the OKW

"for the German North room" at, that only volunteers Evacuations in Ask would come and "not at all Obligation" more be exercised should. ⁹⁵

The overwhelming majority the German refugees and Displaced people came at least not first after dem War, rather - in contrast to the from the propaganda of Cold marked by war , until today virulent imaginations widest Circles the German Company - in the last months of war, before everything from January until March 1945, out of dem east into the interior Germany. Her Exodus, the itself part voluntarily, quite mostly but under with that threat of punishment and many times with more brutal Violence and destructiveness executed

⁸⁸ BAK, R 3/300, Collective report armor staff, February 14, 1945.

⁸⁹ How in Note 84 (BL 40).

⁹⁰ Ibid, BL 45, GauAA North Westphalia at GBA/Reich Inspectorate, February 23, 1945.

⁹¹ DZW, Vol. 6, S. 636.

⁹² BAK, NL 118/58, Goebbels diary, March 4, 1945.

⁹³ BAP, FS, Movie 1732, REL. Keitel with "leader's order", March 18, 1945. - Hitler were irreplaceability ten the Population different localities against the defense and destruction of their Villages reported become (Spear, Memories, S. 444 f.).

⁹⁴ BAK, NL 118/59, Goebbels diary, March 27, 1945.

⁹⁵ KTB of OKW, Vol. IV/2, S. 1591 f., command Chief OKW, April 29, 1945.

Obligation the Wehrmacht, Political party- and other Nazi organs carried out, was one the determining- the factors of economic and social collapse of the "third party". Empire".

b) „Stronger change the work situation“

After the SE-VI Action were from 1. February until 31. July 1945 out of the born in 1901 and younger 788 000 Man for the Wehrmacht to place. ⁹⁶ The command Hitler's from 3. January, that the action triggered, raised the Total protection against any withdrawal of workers, which had previously been enjoyed by, for example, the Geilenberg program and the anti-aircraft program (from November 4, 1944).

The Minister of Armaments gave Instruction, some Categories from workers "after Possibility to protect to a large extent". ⁹⁷ Internally, the minister's instructions seem much more specific and more extensive been to be. In one Circular from January 12th to the establishments of Ruhr area explained the RVE, from the SE-VI Action be Toolmaker and Fixture builder and experienced Industrial aircraft pilot as Excluding inbound travelers.

"Mostly "to be spared". over and beyond so good How all priority at the time, major armament programs (anti-aircraft guns, "high-performance aircraft", submarines, the infantry armament program including tanks and motor vehicles, ore mining, oil production, iron producers Industry and most important supply industries). „After Possibility to protect", so it was said finally, be Development and Research. ⁹⁸

The Soviet offensive offered spear the Opportunity, the Emergency program at Hitler to enforce and with it the comprehensive Protection the for that workers again to introduce. ⁹⁹ The Battle around the Workforce had given of lack of energy, the Traffic distress and the from it resulting Shutdowns always fewer something with actual Labor shortage to do, around so more but with dem aspiration the Company, her best forces that she for the post war period absolutely need would, not in last minute still to let it burn senselessly .

When Goebbels took stock after two months the SE-VI action, he had to determine that the confiscations the armor at far behind the required numbers were left behind . There were even outstanding demands from the September 1944 program, he complained; "in view of on the Credit the of the Armament handed over kv- Volkssturm men, entrenchment worker, Emergency forces etc. stands but still the difficult task before, this for the Part probably in the Mission located Men to find and them Conscription orders to send or. Substitute from the armor to demand and to obtain." ¹⁰⁰

Over the course of January came it too one essential change of workforce situation and - politics. „The strength decline the coal supply and so that the Deployment from

⁹⁶ BAK, NL 118/106, memo Goebbels for Hitler, March (not sent).

⁹⁷ BAP, FS, Movie 3642, Erl. RMRuK, January 5, 1945.

⁹⁸ BAK, R 10 111/28, Bl. 12, Rs. RVE/field office Northwest, January 12, 1945.

⁹⁹ Please refer Section 1.

¹⁰⁰ How Note 96.

energy as a result of enemy offensive in the east Airstrikes and the The traffic difficulties caused by them led to a major change in the work situation." ¹⁰¹

In the November urged the Labor authorities still expressly on it, no "embarrassment" to allow. „It is not at the Time, Forces precautionary to hoard or through Claim more legal Possibilities on Ice to place. With Shortening the working hours, granting from more or fewer forced vacation, payment of compensation for losses, Embarrassing activities and similar is no War to win, but only with dem strongest and fast Mission all forces at the right Job. In particular, no leave of absence for part-time women or women is permitted women with family." ¹⁰²

Actually but paved the way itself that one change already at. The District employment office Westphalia-South provided for example in the the same quoted Circular a entire Catalog from "Bridging" measures at absences from work from shorter and from longer Length of time together, the himself the "Execution from forestry work" performed.

Out of the Business heard man to the same Time already considerably sharper tones. The Gau Chamber of Commerce Schleswig-Holstein demanded a "through." the current "The situation necessitates a change in the mentality regarding labor deployment policy"; the increasing number the "through the unfortunate Development the transport conditions" and the coal and Raw material situation released Workforce must busy become. Necessary was a "switching of workforce management". In the companies that were important for the war economy of civil sector give it "still always Possibilities to productive Occupation". As long as the "shrinkage process" in the arms industry stop, must man

"far-reaching reallocations in the Approach the workers and also in the general development of labor requirements" into the Eye see. ¹⁰³

On the 15th December 1944 made itself the Reich group Industry in one Write to the GBA to Speaker such requirements after one "necessary Change of course". She added them the Suggestion added, "If necessary Leaves of absence out of the immediate Armaments production ... at the civil Sector" to pronounce. A Month later received the RGI a negative one Answer. ¹⁰⁴

In the meantime felt but also the regional Labor authorities always stronger the "Stalls in the Work effort": "The Possible uses for Women out of dem Circles of those required to report shrank in the heavy industrial districts ... together ... Out of the stagnation in the entire Work use results itself inevitably also one such in the Continuation _ the Tk measures (Tk = Total war - D E.)." At the same time became also the

101 How Note 84; largely literal. takeover out of dem Decree from the January 28, 1945 (see Note 106).

102 BAK, R 41/290a, BI. 7 ff., Rs. GauAA Westphalia-South AÄ, November 21, 1944. Hereafter also the following .

103 BAK, R 121/339, Pres. GWiK Lübeck at d. Pres. d. GauAA Rendsburg, November 22, 1944.

104 Ibid, RGI at GBA, December 15, 1944, regarding "Avoiding a release of workers as a result of the undersupply of the defense industry with raw materials due to temporary leave of absence in companies in the civil sector that are important to the war effort"; GBA to RGI, January 15, 1945: "A change in the work situation can be reported, for example. Not yet spoken."

increasing redundancies more feminine workers, the "Working time extensions" and "temporary exemptions" silently as given accepted.¹⁰⁵

At the 28. January 1945 signed Bormann, Speer and Sauckel a "Remission above the planned one Mission the Workforce in the event of production stoppages".¹⁰⁶ He wore the "Secret" note was officially the Reich Defense Commissioners Chairman the Armaments commissions and the Presidents the District employment offices directed, circulated but understandably also in industry.¹⁰⁷ The decree initially stated in dry words the catastrophic conditions in the country the energy and transport economy, which requires "a complete or extensive Shutdown of companies and operational parts". had consequences. That was not really one news for the those affected, had but one significant psychological Meaning, because the reality here probably for the first Just in one Announcement from more official and highest more authoritative Job clear into words caught became.¹⁰⁸

The decree was quite from the apprehension dictated, the workers could in dem Mixed up of collapse, while Lack of work and unemployment increases, of control through the regime slip away. The in this detailed listed Measures, for which Business, Labor authorities and Party offices equally responsible were made, everyone had the meaning, the freed up workforce on in no case dem firm grip the establishments and Authorities to dismissed.

In still energy supplied and in few energy consuming Production areas should "the "most efficient forces" if necessary in three and four Shifts or extended shifts can be combined "for the greatest possible use of performance". This was already widely gray ones Theory, as well How the Financial support, „the available high quality Skilled workers out of the border areas across districts in the intact Armament capacities of the Central German room to implement". And so filled the biggest Part of decree a colorful one All sorts of things of "exemplary" specifications for replacement and Emergency jobs:

- repair at production facilities,
- Restoration from traffic facilities, Repair from locomotives and damaged wagon,
- Be- and unloading of wagons and ships,
- Help for the Country- and Forestry,
- overhaul from Machines, measures the Rationalization,
- operational air defense measures,
- Elimination of bomb damage all type, also at Apartments,
- position construction,
- makeshift home construction,
- collection from Scrap metal, metals and Wood in destroyed houses,
- logging, extraction from Generator wood and charcoal, Setting up charcoal kilns,
- and finally "closed Training in the Germans "Volkssturm".

105 BAK,R41/290a,BL.16R,GauAA Westphalia-South DanGBA, January 15, 1945.

106 Ibid, BL. 22 ff. Hereafter also the The following.

107 In relation on the Reich group Industry and one Row from Group representatives documented in BAK, R 121/339.

108 In the Follow-up time were literal Acquisitions out of dem Decree text at Authorities usual.

Should be outside the company workers possible in groups and, so far it is around Germans acted, „preferably in the ways the temporary transfer" used become. Dem increased interest the Company, itself from few productive workers to separate and before everything the leftovers the proven Maintaining core workforce contributed the Determination _ about the “Tk women” bill: “Female workers becoming available,” the on The reason for the mandatory reporting regulations was implemented, especially housewives, can use theirs agreement on available at any time from her Work without continued payment be granted a leave of absence from pay .”

Sauckel rode one of his hobby horses on his own initiative when he reported to his authorities at the beginning of February recommended, “in the treatment the Housemaid and compulsory year questions (can) something more generous procedure become. Basically should good Housemaids again as such used become, however only in Familys, in those it really necessary is.” ¹⁰⁹

The Decree from the 28. January granted the lower Authorities more leeway and laid the focus the "Labor deployment" policy on the steering the Workforce at Location and Job. „The strength central steering of work effort must ... restricted become.” ¹¹⁰

But the war no longer allowed us to get used to any reality because it had a high impact on it tempo changed and the German Business always deeper fell into catastrophe. From Beginning February until the end March gave it though not a comprehensive one Land offensive the Allies. But everywhere pushed she itself in hard Battle always closer at the central areas of inner Germany. It was the one Time the Flows of refugees that the authorities found increasingly helpless to deal with. At the same time was the narrow space between the Rhine and the Oder the Scene the heaviest and most persistent air raids of the war.

One Consequence of decree and the Decentralization of the Labor control was the, that now all local and district Place - Business, Wehrmacht, authorities and Political party - direct in the Battle intervened for workers. This Battle did not decrease in intensity, although constant many Hundreds of thousands out of the described Found for shorter or longer _ Time “released” were, millions refugees arrived and man generally “ in terms of numbers nearly from one unemployment”. Male workers were given to the companies particularly at Production stoppages after air strikes "from everyone possible places snatched away ... (e.g. b. also from the Volkssturm)". ¹¹¹ Wehrmacht and Political party ordered Schanz- and Fastening work huge extent. A central Force requirements from 100,000 men for "expansion and expansion of airfields ... for fast-flying aircraft" reported central positions “as crucial to the war and urgent”. ¹¹² Were constantly size amounts of workers the repair and Restoration the Transport facilities and resources busy. In Rhenish-Westphalia industrial area was soon the entire “work deployment” situation is marked by rectifying and eliminating extensive ones operating and Traffic damage through lasting air strikes”. ¹¹³

109 As note 84 (Bl. 40R).

110 As note 84 (Bl. 39R).

111 BAK, R 13 XII/508, Prot. d. meeting d. Production offices the Fagru Chemical Industry at the 18.1., v. January 19, 1945.

112 As note 84 (Bl. 40).

113 BAK, R 41/290a, Bl. 44, GauAA North Westphalia at GBA/Reich Inspectorate, February 21, 1945.

The establishments in turn reported the due to air damage released Workers are not more and acted at the Elimination the Damage out of "corporate egoism" d. H., they looked for it after Possibility to avoid, strength Outside to give away. „Strong impaired _ becomes the Capture and steering more surplus Workforce also through the committees , rings and Shock troops of the Armament organization by them free Internal workforce under shutdown of labor deployment management." ¹¹⁴ The regional labor authorities were also closed this Time already helpless: "Hidden unemployment seems to some extent To the extent that it has already occurred, but it will not reported by the companies. Through self-importance the organs of the Armament industry remain the Labor deployment management Force movements hidden, in the she regulating intervention should." ¹¹⁵ In one Decree of the Ministry of Armaments in Mitte March was called es: "Due to the temporary lack of coal and Electricity and as a result other Manufacturing difficulties as well as through the Repatriation of workers the evacuated Ostgauen". currently a "relaxation in the Work deployment situation in particular regarding auxiliary work" occurred. ¹¹⁶

In the Reich Chamber of Commerce were middle February on the Base of the decree of January 28th far-reaching concepts "Conversion from machine work to Handwork" designed , the expressly one massive Lowering from production and productivity in took purchase. The Suggestions the chamber were unmistakable with dem View on the the approaching end of the war wrote:

- "Most intense Training from workers for rational Handwork",
- "Conversion on temporally longer, material-saving methods",
- "Reflow the workers in the offices ... in household, schools and universities",
- "Feeding of workers in ... social care tasks",
- "Extraction or. recovery everyone reachable materials", approximately "out of aircraft-damaged workshops and houses",
- „Granting better Possibilities to leisure recreation the forces", approximately Possibilities , „her Gardens fine to order",
- "Expansion of repairs" (craft).

Two Core requirements dived here on, the, How we see become, to same Time in the centre the Attention the Reich group Industry stood. It acted itself around the "basic conservation one German regular team" for the establishments and about that Repel from forced laborers: „At the levy from workers out of the economy are basically first to be released 1) concentration camp prisoners, Jews and prisoners of war, 2) Foreigners". ¹¹⁷

The last from the employment offices reported Pay above the in the Business new used _ Workforce showed a rugged one downward trend, although also the straight refugees who arrived and reported for work, as well as evacuated foreign civilian workers and Prisoners of war recorded been be would have to.

114 Ibid, Bl. 45, GauAA North Westphalia at GBA/Reich Inspectorate, February 23, 1945.

115 Ibid, Bl. 47, GauAA North Westphalia at GBA/Reich Inspectorate, February 24, 1945.

116 BAK, R 3/1778, REL. RMRuK, March 15, 1945.

117 BAK, R 12 1/339, Draft RWiK/Prof. Frederick re: "Conversion the establishments on the changed working situation", February 13, 1945.

Table 134

„Report about that of the economy new to Disposal provided workforce", 1944, January - February 1945 (in 1000)

	Total	of these: Deutsche	Ausländer	Kriegsgefangene
Monatsdurch- cut 1944	241	139	86	16
Januar 1945	89	47	33	10
Februar 1945	64	30	25	9

Source: BAK, R 41/284, Bl. 172. - inconsistency (January 1945) through rounding.

c) misery the German workers

The Thumbscrews of "Total war" were the German employees already in 1943 and 1944 created been. A difficult to overviewing scrub from She had regulations unlimited power of disposal of capital, the labor authorities, the Police, the party, the DAF and the Wehrmacht subjected. Outgoing of the "Order No. 13 to Backup the Order in the "operated" from the 1. November 1943 had itself their employment relationships significant worsened.¹¹⁸ The company management ("Operations managers") were also able to Followers "permanently or temporarily (one) others _ workplace occupy (dislocation, delegation)", provided that this "to fulfillment cannot be postponed Tasks from special state policy Meaning ... "was commanded".¹¹⁹ This provision was Beginning 1944 officially so far designed, that workers at Job losses after air raids could also be "implemented" in other companies, "as a rule in the ways the Commitment to service for limited Time". You were valid then "as from their previous operation temporarily on leave."¹²⁰

The general 60-hour week, which has long been common practice in large parts of the industry and in huge areas the armor on 72 Hours expanded, was in the August 1944 also legal fixed been.¹²¹ For from of their Family separated living workers and

118 RArbBl. 1943 I P. 543. In the Focus the AO of GBA stood a in more detail Catalog from Punish (warnings, Fines until to Height one weekly earnings, Show at the Employment exchange, at foreigners at the Police) at violations "against the Order (work discipline) or Si- safety of company" (§ 2).

119 RArbBl. 1943 I S. 544, "AO to regulation the working conditions at otherwise Mission of the followers", II I.1943.

120 RArbBl. 1944 I S. 66, GBA "Decree above Measures of Labor law and work effort so- How above special Assistance services at Air raid alert and "aircraft damage", 25. II 944 (§ 19). See also Werner, p. 349.

121 RGBI. 1944 I p. 191, VO above the sixty-hour week, August 31, 1944. The validity of the 48 hour working week became formal not repealed; twelve hours were as Overtime defined and paid (§ 1). Please refer also Werner, S. 335 ff.

Employee gave it since dem 1. January 1944 only still all six Months one family trip home, for Single only once in the Year.^{1 2 2} The defense officer the establishments been subordinate since dem 30. June not more the Wehrmacht, rather dem SD.¹²³

In the Autumn 1944 became the Guidelines to "Fuse of order in the companies" expanded, significantly tightened and standardized.¹²⁴ The violation of the "duties" of the followers - unfounded Absence, "strolling", unauthorized distance of residence and workplace - became now uniform throughout the empire under public law threat of punishment placed. The punishments - Jail, fines in more limited Height, Administrative fines, withholding of food allowances, Sick pay deduction, rework, etc. - were partly of the police and Authorities, partly enforced by company management.

Hermann Röchling stepped in the January 1945 at the Minister of Armaments with dem Suggestion approach, a "martial criminal law for the to create the entire war economy. In his draft for a such Penal Code presented he the „Financial support" on, „all in the armor standing people under soldierly Laws to place and How at the Military dem superiors the criminal law to transmitted." It have itself in the west shown- so Röchling - , „that the current powers the Operations manager under the current one circumstances are too low."¹²⁵

The Year 1945 wore the War after Germany into it. Since dem breakthrough the Red Army until at the Or saw millions "before the naked question of existence placed", How it in one the last SO reports was called. „The whole People is without Difference from one more oppressive every day become Worries Fulfills. With the Evacuees and refugees out of dem East is the Horror of the war in all cities and villages of the empire that had become narrow. The Airstrikes have the to some extent normal been Life course in one extent shattered, that it for every becomes noticeable. The Population suffers badly from this Bomb terror. The Connection between the People is largely tore off. Tens of thousands of men the Front are still without news today, whether their relatives, their wives and Children, still at the Life are and where she itself condition Hundreds of thousands from Women remain without News from your men and sons, the somewhere outside stand, they are constant from dem Thoughts Fulfills, that she not more under the living could be ."¹²⁶

In one Point is this report to be corrected, of course. The differences between the one near the front rooms and the areas of central Germany as well those between the metropolitan ones metropolitan areas and the rural Regions were absolutely not disappeared , rather showed itself undoubtedly more blatant as ever previously. secure had also in the rural population so good How every Family War victims - Dead, Wounded, refugees - to

122 BAP, IG Colors, Zefi, No. 269, "work" and social law Review", January 1944.

123 BAK, R 58/797, Erl. Chief OKW, June 30, 1944.

124 RArbBl. 1944 I, S. 359, „Second arrangement to Backup the Order in "the companies" v. September 23, 1944; Werner, S. 354 f.; BAK, R 13 V/160, Rs. RGI, October 3, 1944. Hereafter also the The following .

125 BAK, R 131/600, Bl. 9, written down ex. d. RVE chairman meeting v. January 19, 1945.

126 Messages out of dem Rich, S. 6734 f., report (SD) out of files the Managing Director Reichsre-yaw Donitz from End March 1945. Please refer in more detail DZW, Vol. 6, S. 616 ff.

complain and lived in the Danger, the father, husband or son in the last minute to Wehrmacht _ moved in to see or on the front to lose. But the urban-industrial population was still in quite other Dimensions affected: through the destruction of their Apartments and Jobs out of the Air, through the Death in A hail of bombs, through the daily and nightly Fear before new attacks, through Gas- and Power failure and, not last, through the drastic deterioration the Nutritional and Supply situation.

The Defense workers and her Familys had the heaviest Come on. In those operated , the still without Stalls and failures produced, took the length of working day and the number of Special shifts often still closed, regardless of the lack of sleep in the Nights of bombing and malnutrition. Countless working-class families lived separately, be it because of the evacuation from Women and children out of the bomb-prone cities, be because of it the Detachment the Men on entrenchment work ("mole action"), in Alternative companies or to Various special operations Art. The internal Practice the Entrepreneurs want to get rid of inconvenient workers who are unpopular with them by sending them to such assignments or even from the UK position to Wehrmacht released 12 7, worked to this Undoubtedly particularly strong at this time disciplining. A Hoesch workers reported after the war over the rule that the factory railway had no lights in the dark because of the danger of aviators had to be driven: "Refused itself a Train driver because of the with it associated danger, in the dark drive, like that threatened to be punished." ¹²⁸

At the 26. January 1945 was the Vacation block, the already 1944 various pronounced _ been was, renewed. ¹²⁹ Dem was standing the reversed Practice from Hundreds from Operated in contrast to - her Number growth daily-, workers because of loss of production in "Vacation" to send them if they don't have them just profitable could borrow. Of unemployment was officially allowed not spoken become, but actually acted it itself around nothing other.

"Everyone feels that the total war is collapsing under the blows of the enemy air force goes. For Hundreds of thousands who in the last few months brought into the work process been are, is in the Operated and offices no Place more. Always more factories, in which the Allegiances knowledge, that her Task for the armor vital is, must _ celebrate. The Walking around around every Worker becomes replaced through one quickly around gripping Unemployment." ¹³⁰

Legally was it the entrepreneurs until End of war required, your Employees in "war-related Loss of work" 16 days 100 percent for a long time of their gross wages, thereafter 60 percent (single) or 80 percent (Married people) to their loss of earnings pay. At "Cleanup" and Restoration work to Elimination from "Aircraft damage" was she to "Payment of full wages" obligated. The Pursue in turn could special state ones "Payment assistance" apply for. But the establishments found it obvious cheaper and more comfortable, at because of Close to the front standing production - the concerned

127 Please refer e.g. brass. B.A of VEB Pharmaceutical Plant Dresden (formerly from Heyden), I, No. 38, various documents (end of December 1944).

128 Hoesch archive, No. 968, report Thomas Kulczak, in "Anniversaries tell" (recorded 1955-1960).

129 **BAK, R 13 V/162**, Rs. Wigru Electrical industry (quote GBA-AO v. January 26, 1945).

130 How Note 126 (p. 6736).

already during of March the predominantly Number the huge establishments of Ruhr area - all unemployed able-bodied forces, including those for the Emergency program deferred, "the military district commands to eventual Confiscation prestigious to make"; Only important skilled workers should be excluded. "All other possible male powers, also in turn the loud Emergency program deferred, are dem Volkssturm to provide. Approximately then remaining and not Required staff must be offered to the employment office." ¹³¹

The Traffic disaster had already of more often to Delivery difficulties at foods guided; but first in the February March 1945, after dem Loss the German eastern territories, sat the crisis in the Nutritional situation for the German Population a. At the March 5 occurred a sharp cut the Food rations in effect. Retroactively 5. February _ became the Ration cards the 72. and 73. Allocation period from together eight to nine weeks extended. „For this reason found for the Week from the 2. (Easter Monday - D E.) until April 8th 1945 no allocation instead of, so that the 74. supply period first at the 9. April 1945 began and only three weeks included." ¹³² For this last period but were for the Example in surrounded Ruhr area even no more cards issued. After the Announcement in "Völkisch Observer" from the 28. March should it in the 74. Allocation period as Daily ration 243 grams Bread for Adult, d. H. approximately four Slices, 143 grams for Children, 36 grams (14 grams) Meat, 18 grams Fat, 11 grams Nutrients, 18 grams Sugar, nine grams Cheese and Quark give. ¹³³ In one letter out of Berlin from 3. April was called it: „Most have already since past Week no Piece Bread and should continue to starve until _ next Monday; then apply first the new Cards. One only Ration card (instead of bread menu, Meat menu etc. - EN) have she published, there may you nothing on it buy, only after call; one Number card, there becomes no Man learn from it." ' ' ¹³⁴

Table 135

Food supply the German Population 1945 (in calories; daily)

allocation period	Hard worker is supposed to be		Hard worker should be		Long- time workers should be		normal need is supposed to be	
71. period (8.1. - 4.2.)	4500	3424	3 600	2 723	3 000	2416	2400	2 021
72. period (5.2. - 4.3.)		3 150		2480		2 215		1 828

131 BAK, R 13 1/592, Bl. 25 f., „Agenda (to) meeting tighter Advisory Board Northwest" (Wigru EsI), March 10, 1945; Bl. 2 f., „Agenda (to) meeting tighter Advisory Board Northwest", April 9, 1945 (pay- lung).

132 Schmitz, Hubert, *The Management the food and Consumer goods 1939-1950. Shown _ at the Example the City Eat 1956*, S. 40.

133 *The liberation Berlin. One Documentation*. Ed. and deposited v. Klaus Scheel, Berlin 1985 (2. ed.), S. 67, Doc. 17 (Tabel).

134 *Ibid*, S. 73, Doc. 22, letter v. Elizabeth Fiegler, April 3, 1945.

Table 135 (Continuation)

Allotment period	Heavy worker Should should	Heavy worker is should	Long worker Is is	normal needer Should Is
73. period (5.3. - 8.4.)	3 023	2366	2088	1 701
74. period (April 9th - April 29th)	2482	2 085	1551	1551 *

*) Average Calorie count 1412 with regional Different.

Source: DZW, Vol. 6, S. 619.

"For the first time in this war," he said reported the SD, „might the Nutritional issue is sensitive noticeable. The Population becomes with dem, What she has, not more Fed up. potatoes and bread are sufficient not more out of. The Big city women have now already Effort, the Eat for the children to procure." ¹³⁵

The NSDAP saw one famine in advance and gave Dietary Guidelines out of here, the "for the Folk nutrition important novel Food" recommended: Rapeseed cake and rapeseed meal, chestnut flour, acorn coffee, sugar and fodder beet, serradella, clover and alfalfa, wild plants, to "Improvement of protein layer" even frogs and snails, further **Jaw-** _ and Spruce needle decoction against Vitamin deficiency. ¹³⁶

The attitude the Workforce was widely from apathy and dull Fatalism, of fear and from dem despair will certainly, with your Familys to survive. "Rebellion was also in the last months of Nazi regime life-threatening." ¹³⁷ Although the Population from hopelessness and Despair controlled was, was insubordination rare, and the Work, so far existing, was if possible on time did. Of course: „The Doubt at the sense of further fight eaten away the Readiness for action". ¹³⁸

A widespread Means, not of Resistance, though the Defense the physical and mental Overwhelm were the sick notes, „the in the last months of war at the German men frequently ten percent the male German workforce reached and exceeded." ¹³⁹ It gave cases How the the Freitaler Steel industry (Flick Group), where "25 percent of the total male followers" reported sick in April were. ¹⁴⁰

135 How Note 126 (p. 6735). Literally consistent, but with questionable Date (January) as Ohlendorf's memorandum quote in DZW, Vol. 6, S. 618; s. a. *ibid*, S. 618 ff.

136 Kuby, Eric, The End of horror. Documents of doom, January until May 1945, coin chen 1961, S. 93 ff. (94), Guideline of Reich Office f. Public Health the NSDAP, April 5, 1945; s. a. DZW, Vol. 6, S. 619.

137 Werner, S. 354.

138 How Note 126 (6734).

139 Werner, S. 353 f.

140 BAP, Flick Group, No. 1048, Bl. 33, AT Health House FSI for You. Fucks, April 30, 1945, re: Report Fickerts v. April 28, 1945. The Company doctor held dem Director before, it act itself "around one

To investigate would be one whole Row from Attempt and tricks, with those workers tried to avoid the obligation to do certain work and to be drafted into the Wehrmacht, approximately the "Pretense from Diseases as Medium to liberation from the military and Compulsory work service".¹⁴¹ For a year now, Gestapo offices had been carrying out checks in close cooperation with the companies' counterintelligence officers and with official and company doctors systematically cases of illness under the German workers, but also among the foreigners and prisoners of war. research the Police control center Katowice and the stapost office Bremen resulted dozens of cases, where in particular Those subject to military service inflammation, open wounds, Colon- and Eye problems and Fever with Help from Petrol, Quinine, graphite powder, milk injections, hellebore etc. taught, other Illnesses simulated had. "It could be repeated Field post letters stopped in which front-line soldiers through her relatives hellebore with one Instructions for use was sent The from the Stapo (control) offices Katowice and Bremen edited cases prove, in which high Dimensions the Impact power the Wehrmacht and the Defense industry through the pretense from Diseases endangered is."

In the confused the last weeks and often under Exploitation the Air raid alerts occurred increasingly Thefts, particularly Food thefts. But doubtless were it is not uncommon for grocers to who faked a theft own frauds and embezzlement to cover up.¹⁴²

d) Foreign forced laborers

While of year 1944 had the Position the foreign workers itself worsened, their work performance yourself, however "strongly increased overall".¹⁴³ The "decree machine" of the work and security authorities of regimes had "on full speed, but in the Idle' worked.¹⁴⁴ On the 25th. March 1944 was the Eastern workers wages to the Polish workers attached

Ask the discipline and the attitude Of their followers; for that is not alone the Be- trainee doctor, rather also the Operations manager and the company chairman responsible." (Ibid.).

141 BAK, R 58/1058, Bl. 15 f., report d. Police control center Katowice, September 1944.

142 Bigger spontaneous Actions, before everything Looting from Food storage and -shops, put nearly always first then a, if the NS and Gestapo greats fled were, the Repressive apparatus itself dissolved had or paralyzed was. Over one Exception reported Goebbels at the 8th. April: „In Berlin Rahnsdorf have for the first times since beginning of war smaller Popular casseroles took place." 200 men and women have two bakery shops looted- in the end that one week, in the the Ration reduction itself at the most sensitive impacted. Goebbels caused, that two those involved were beheaded (BAK, NL 118/60, Goebbels-TB, 8. and April 9, 1945). Similar about that incident (three executions) s. The liberation Berlin 1945, S. 105, Doc. 60, Memoir report from Walter Zimmerman (February 14, 1974).

143 Herbert, foreign workers, S. 294.

144 Ibid, P. 269. Given the detailed analysis by Herbert should at this Job only some _ Highlights on Late phase and Final crisis of forced labor system thrown become. See also Cape. III.

equaled been.¹⁴⁵ This "Equality" had in first line bureaucratic, not last financial technical reasons¹⁴⁶; „one better position the Eastern workers has man first in second line in the Eye had".¹⁴⁷ For the larger Part the Eastern workers - the lower paid, the younger and the Women - was the new regulation even with loss of earnings connected.¹⁴⁸

Unequal more important, Yes was literally vital the Ask the nutrition, in first and foremost again the Eastern workers. It accumulated in the Summer and autumn inputs the economy, in those constantly the accusation repeated, "that according to unanimous opinion the Eastern worker by far the best and cheapest foreign labor represents what we have and that it quite incomprehensible is, that the Catering the mostly as incompetent or even lazy determined remaining Foreigner significant more plentiful and higher quality is."¹⁴⁹

... that straight she (the Eastern workers - D E.) as the better and with it for us more valuable workers nutritionally worse placed are as the remaining foreign worker."¹⁵⁰

The since End June 1944 decreed "Reich allowance" for Eastern workers and Soviet prisoners of war¹⁵¹ had Minister of Food Herbert Jaw, a protagonist the imperialist- fascist Objectives in the east and the racist Discrimination the there living peoples, "bound to performance, whereby personal commitment and attitude are also taken into account".¹⁵² Together with the DAF he had decreed: „It are three Performance levels to differentiate: 1.) above 100 percent the German Performance, II.) 90-100 percent the German one Performance, III.) under 90 percent the German Performance. The group II receives in the future the new Meal kit without every restriction, while the group III the previous one Meal kit under retention the Bread shortening receives under Zubilli

145 RGBl. 1944 I S. 68, „Regulation above the Conditions of use the Eastern workers" (Goering/Himmler /Lammers), March 25, 1944. Dem text the VO after should for the Eastern workers "the same salary- and Salary conditions How for other foreign workforce" apply. Actually but had she, instead of How until now the "Eastern Workers' Tax" now the "Social equalization levy" from 15 percent to pay, How the Polish and the Workforce out of the Baltic States (see. II, S. 217 ff.). Allowances (for Familys and Children) gave it not; however had to Steer and Social- insurance contributions full removed become. More Restrictions (regarding holiday surcharges, Employment Law and Osh, separation compensation) contained the Implementation Regulation dated March 26, 1944 (RGBl. 1944 I 70).

146 Finance Minister Schwerin v. Krosigk presented it after dem War as be Merit represent, that in the Early- year 1944 finally "accordingly my Suggestion the Eastern workers in terms of wages and income tax- moderate the German(! - D E.) workers equal became." (BAP, case XI, No. 199, Bl. 12, minutes v. September 29, 1948, hearing Schwerin v. Krosigk).

147 BAK, R 13 V/161, Rs. RGI, August 10, 1944.

148 Please refer e.g BAK, R 12 1/229, Rs. RGI, August 4, 1944 u. a. Doc.

149 Ibid, GWK East Hanover at RWiK, August 5, 1944.

150 Ibid, District specialist association. Iron- u. Metallind. in theGWK Franconia at RGI, October 30, 1944.

151 Please refer Cape. III, Section 2. To the further negotiations in the July August 1944 s. Herbert, foreign worker, S. 267, the but the Connection with the "Reich allowance" not manufactures.

152 BAK, R 13 V/160, Rs. RGI, 4.10.1944 (refers to on RE-decree RMEL v. 26.7. and 9/22 and to Rs. DAF/Amt f. Work use v. 11.8.1944). Hereafter that too The following.

gung the increased Sugar ration and the Jam- and amount of curd, against it under discontinuation _ the Cheese ration. Out of the here made Savings at Meat (50 G), Fat (88.75g) and Cheese (31.25 g) Per week the Allowances for special Services the group I provided. To take into account is further, that the Award winners the the latter group including the them administered Rewards never more at foods receive may as the German Warehouse worker (i.e. H. camp caterer workers - D E.) the same Group. Further is insufficient Services of the Grant recipient (heavy, Difficult- and long-time workers - DE) also taking into account the mentioned three-tier system a reduction the Allowances until to half possible she can use find for the Pre-miation the Performance level L At this Opportunity is expressly emphasized that also for him Case, that Reserves for the Rewards not more to Disposal stand, there Possibly. one Performance level III not more exists, no additional requests may be made to the nutrition offices."

The decision about the Classification lay in the **arbitrariness** the operational management, „after
Suggestion of master, of (DAF) company chairman and of camp leader".

The official negotiations with dem Russian defector general Andrei Vlasov in November/December 1944 forced the German Page in addition, particular discrimination against the to repeal Eastern workers. From one fundamental improvement of the Diet was evident not the speech.¹⁵³

In the March 1945 met therefore the Ration reduction the Eastern workers at the lower End the Meal scale particularly difficult. Already at the 1. February became arranged, that from the 72. Allotment Period at, so away 5. February, all allowance and Additional cards for foreign Workers were lost.¹⁵⁴ Air raids apparently occurred in the last months of the war frequently before, that foreign workers for days no Eat got. "Already on different days they received Foreigner in our company because of this "Difficulty not having any food at all or not being able to eat it until late in the afternoon ." ¹⁵⁵ The SD whined above the Shortage at occupation for Foreigner: "Hundreds of thousands of foreigners who who gave us valuable help become unnecessary blackheads." ¹⁵⁶

Already Beginning February reported the German industrialists, represent through RGI and

153 Herbert, foreign workers, S. 268. Vlasov has the nutritional problem, if also possibly only later, brought forward; That is Göring's promise to him Beginning of February 1945, „that also he itself immediately for one equality the Eastern workers in relation on Salary, Catering _ and general Treatment with the remaining foreign workers insert become." Man have, so Göring's late insight, „out of ignorance capital Mistake" in the politics opposite the Soviet Union made (BAP, FS, Movie 713, AT SS Main Office/Russian Control center ex. "Conversation with Reichsmarschall Göring", February 4, 1945).

154 Hoesch archive, G 7 c 1, Trade Inspectorate Dortmund at Hoesch warehouse management, February 1, 1945.

155 Ibid, Hoesch house announcements, March 19, 1945 (regarding Dortmunder Wire rope works GmbH/Hoesch Group).

156 How Note 126 (p. 6736). - Tens of thousands forced laborers disposed of itself the Defense companies through this, that them to Fastening work and even for the Volkssturm releases. BASF had for example "for the Part since months and weeks already approximately 4 000 Mostly foreign _ Workforce for the ski jumps switched off" (BAP, case VI, Movie 420, ADB 68, BI. 82 ff., Document NI-2831, Protocol d. Management postal meeting, Ludwigshafen, February 20, 1945).

Reich Chamber of Commerce, at the Authorities one of their heaviest Care for at: How you could use the foreign ones workforce, as before especially the concentration camp prisoners and prisoners of war in time Get rid of? At the 8th. February formulated the RGI in one secret Meeting document this problem in all Sharpness: „1) The establishments must the Right receive, e.g. that concentration camp imprisonment, Jews and prisoners of war at the responsible Departments (Stalag, Gestapo, employment office). 2) The establishments should the right have, foreigners, the them not more for the production need, dem employment exchange return. So far closed here Warehouse dem employment exchange to provided become, has this the entire camp to take over and can the there accommodated Foreigner for public put in work ." ¹⁵⁷ The Reich Chamber of Commerce expressed itself in apparently more coordinated In a very similar way: "When it comes to the transfer of workers from the economy, the first thing to do is fundamentally to be released 1) concentration camp prisoners, Jews and prisoners of war, 2) Foreigners, so far those mentioned not to Maintenance the production are indispensable." ¹⁵⁸

RGI Managing Director Lohmann negotiated at the 14. February at the GBA as most urgent about even this Topic: "To 1) authorization the companies, the concentration camp prisoners, Jews and prisoners of war at the responsible Place return. Timm [GBA] affirmed this Necessity ." ¹⁵⁹ The fundamental aspirations of the Industry, everyone Foreigner getting rid of was also met with regulatory understanding; but the regime was able to help many millions of people at the best will not "with treks send back". ¹⁶⁰ "To 2) authorization of companies, foreigners, which they don't for the need production, the employment office return . Here Timm points out that there are around 7 million foreign workers throughout the Reich available are. Calculate man the Familys, in particular the Ukrainians etc., added, amounts the Number more as 8th Millions. Alone in Berlin condition itself 6-700 000 Foreigner. Try, foreign Workforce in bigger Number from Berlin at other Gaue have to give a negative Result brought about. The Reichsbahn can no wagon for him transport to make available; other Means of transport can also not be used. The foreign Workforce with trek at the current weather on the country road to send, is unfortunate, especially for Accommodation and catering Intermediate stations taken care of become must. If the not flap, exist the Danger of looting. The danger be greater, as the foreign Workforce here to leave. Anyway be intended , approximately 150 000 Foreigner for position construction, clean-up work, Get out of coal and iron parts out of destroyed houses and the like. to start. If man Foreigner in larger Scopes dem employment exchange for use in public Working on available, it is important the Foreigner in your previous camp already because of Ensuring of Accommodation and Catering to leave and closed to use." ¹⁶¹

157 BAK, R 12 1/339, "Conversion the establishments on the changed working situation", February 8, 1945 (probably template f. d. Discuss d. "Steel circle" on 8.2.).

158 Ibid, „Draft! Conversion the establishments on the changed working situation", February 13, 1945, O. V. (file Fr/M, d. i. RWiK/Prof. A. Friedrich).

159 Ibid, AT Lohmann/RGI above meetings at the GBA (Tim u. Steinmann), February 14, 1945.

160 Economics archive the Potash industry (formerly Staßfurt, now BAP), A II, Sat, Ia, AV, No. 104, template Lohmann/RGI f. Seating at the February 8, 1945.

161 How Note 159.

In the Ruhr area spoke at the 7. and 8th. March the Minister of Armaments with the sharpen of Ruhr staff above the "in the Cases one threatening enemy invasion" acute problems. In Berlin, says Speer, be already "decided been, that Dutch, Hungary, Czechs, Slovaks, Norwegian, Danes, so far she dispensable are, in her home territory deported become." The industrialists demanded that prisoners of war and civilian foreigners be transported away one production "because of the near the front" not more possible be; man must If necessary, obtain a corresponding "order" from the local party offices or from the Reich Defense Commissioner/Gauleiter. "Unreliable foreigners are possible to be transported away in advance. Notification to local Representation of the Stapo control center".¹⁶²

Given one such procedure the RGI, the Reich Chamber of Commerce and the corporations can the since the Nuremberg industrial processes so frequently strained Claim, the work for German Defense contractors have the forced laborers, especially those Jews and concentration camp prisoners, before dem worst preserved, not maintained become. It had to the one mentioned Institutions and Industrialists clear be, that the "Return" in particular of concentration camp prisoners, Jews and "unreliable foreigners" to the SS and Gestapo under the then circumstances one was tantamount to a death sentence.¹⁶³

After Herbert shared itself the foreign Workforce of Ruhr area already since Summer 1944 in three Groups: The one, largest, lived further in the camp and went more or fewer regularly of their Work after. „The second group was bombed out been and waited in the ruins the Cities on the Liberator, while the third group the Ruhr area left and tried to survive in the agricultural regions of the surrounding area until the end of the war." ¹⁶⁴ At called elsewhere it more cautious about the dating: "That's how it began in the industrial metropolitan areas Germany successively since dem Autumn 1944 one of not the authorities more to overviewing Emigration Thousands from foreigners _ in the surrounding agricultural areas."¹⁶⁵

Probably is this Date for the Reich average always still to early scheduled. In the last Weeks of war Of course becomes the last described Development very accelerated been be, not last through this, that the Pursue more or less inhibited strives were, their forced laborers - living Proofs of their Participation at the Nazi barbarism - get rid of.

It is questionable whether under the Thousands of foreigners who out of dem chaos the Cities fled _ and in rural areas seeped in, very many Eastern European Poland and particularly Eastern workers - were. For this always contained such an escape another one fatal risk. The hysteria the Nazi departments and terrorist organs, the since Year and Day with Foreigner unrest and -riots counted, reached first now your Climax.

Anyway sat a weeks, maybe disappearance for months Help and Solidarity _ from Germans ahead. This gave it, and that is one of the most interesting, on few-

162 BAK, R 13 1/592, Bl. 24 ff., „Agenda (to) meeting tighter Advisory Board Northwest" (Wigru Esl), March 10, 1945.

163 For this latest Barbara Hopman u. a., Forced labor at Daimler Benz, Stuttgart 1994, S. 79 f.

164 Herbert, foreign workers, S. 339.

165 Ibid, S. 325.

sten brightened and probably also very complicated problems of behavior the German population. After all, it was about the same time in which the mentioned hysteria and xenophobia wider Population circles captured.

In the from male workers so strong exposed Agriculture becomes the additional Worker one out of his Operation and camp escaped foreign Workers appreciated been be, the itself at latest at the Fiscal order Extremely useful in 1945 make could. Here How everywhere played the Outlook on the End of war one very big role and thus the effort for the approaching crew by the enemy one backing, a good Certificate of character to provide.

The But Nazi organs had all Hands full with it the Persecution of those too People to do, who are unselfish in danger went, free from more opportunistic Calculation and reinsurance intentions. „The People's Court is constantly changing cases too deal with, in those prisoners of war or foreign civilian workers Escape assistance accomplished has been ." ¹⁶⁶ Here acted it itself often undoubtedly around real acts of resistance.

A Month before End of war seem the Terrorist authorities and the Spy apparatus no longer Mister the Position been to be: „The cases undignified, defeatist, anti-state and treasonable behavior by Germans People's comrades, like that too in an official capacity, against foreign civilian workers and prisoners of war are increasing every day like this, that one reportable Capture at all not more possible is." ¹⁶⁷

Preventive Measures against feared revolts, larger Riots and Riots the foreign one workers, Ahead the Eastern workers, have been since Fiscal year 1943 a more and more expansive field of activity for the armed and Terror organs of the regime. They were already the center of attention the "Walküre" plans Wehrmacht, whose conspirators of 20. July as camouflage served, and became later regional and operational in other forms (Keywords "Gneisenau", "Shill" "York" etc.) continued. ¹⁶⁸

Himmler urged in his Basic regulation from the 25. September 1944 ¹⁶⁹, as the Allies _ at the German Boundaries stood, „under everyone circumstances (on) the Ensuring the Order and discipline under the foreign peoples workers, prevention from Acts of sabotage , prevention of the formation of resistance groups and rebellious associations etc." Operated and Authorities became most careful Observation, spying and Report also the "least perceptions" at Defense Officer and Police, reinforcements the company baton guards (works security, factory guards), the Defensive activity and the propaganda under the forced laborers required. „Under under no circumstances may any requirements accepted or may the least Flexibility should be shown."

166 BAK, R 22/951, Reich Justice Min. at Supreme Attorney at the VGH, January 4, 1945. It be, so was called it in dem quote Write, "hardest Punish" against helper and refugees necessary.

167 DZW, Vol. 6, S. 616 (quote report SO guidance section Munich, „The current Position in the foreign sector", April 7, 1945).

168 Sources out of dem Munich Space in BAP, FS, film 10784 u. 10785. Please refer also Herbert, foreign workers, p. 322 f.

169 IMG, Vol. 35, S. 52 ff., Doc. D-226, „Arrangement to Backup the discipline and Performance the foreign workers", September 25, 1944. Hereafter also the following.

In the Final phase of war cost the growing persecution hysteria Thousands from foreign ones workers the Life and culminated in the Murder sprees of March and April 1945, for the the **RSHA** and, from him expressly covered, the local Place the Gestapo, the Sipo and of SD and the Detective immediate Responsibility carried.¹⁷⁰ From essential, triggering Effect was apparently the command Kaltenbrunner from the 6. February 1945 at all police departments, intended as orientation in the increasingly chaotic situation in the bombed-out areas cities, in the traffic and Communications.¹⁷¹ "In Alignment on BdS and inspector (the Sipo and of SD - D E.) have Head of department in own Responsibility and Responsibility to decide Over Special treatments from Eastern workers at death-worthy crimes (to be interpreted broadly) are decided by the head of the department. With other foreigners and Imperial Germans with BdS, Inspector or. HSSPF vote Expect from everyone Departments highest Commitment, responsibility, strong grab, no Hesitation. Every defeatism in your own rows ruthless with sharpest Measures eradicate."

e) „Social Immediate emergency program"

Forced labor uprisings were one Danger, the one believed by armed ones equipment and terror prevent to can. Still far more threatening appeared the responsible persons in economics and politics the Shadow from 1918: the Possibility, that revolution and Civil war could hit the capitalist order at its roots. Coping with the so-called Demobilization crisis formed since Autumn 1944, in one acute phase then since February 1945 one always heavier, itself always more in the foreground-pushing component the survival and Post-war planning the ruling Circles of regime , in the first place line of leading business circles.¹⁷²

Out of the Experience from 1918/19 signaled as one the first of the Austrian old politicians and Nazi supporter Richard Riedl, a from the German Big capital more valued economic expert, the threatening Danger. In his Beginning 1944, short before his Death, written memorandum "Away to Europe. Thoughts above a Economic alliance European States (W. E St.)" pointed he on the most urgent Task one Anti-revolution strategy there: "He 's okay War to End, like that demanded the from the front in the Hometown those returning Dimensions of the soldiers Work, merit, Incorporation in the economic Life the Hometown. It is this the Least, What she after theirs sacrificial walk through the hell of war expect can and What them guaranteed become must, if man not again experience want, What us after dem first World War with experienced horror."¹⁷³

The iron business group creating industry under their World War experience General Manager Jacob Wilhelm Reichert was it, the a additional clear signal sat.

170 Detailed Herbert, foreign workers, S. 314 ff., S. 327 ff., S. 336 ff.; further DZW, Vol. 6, S. 643 f.

171 BAC, R 58/243, Bl. 370, Telephone „at all BdS, IDS, KdS u. Stapo (control) offices"; „applies also sense-

according to f. Detective u. CdS", February 6, 1945. Hereafter also the The following. Not mentioned at Herbert, Foreign workers.

172 For the Overall problem the Post-war planning s. Cape. VI.

173 European strategies of German capital. Ed. v. Reinhard Opitz, Cologne 1977 (new edition. 1994), p. 1001 (there wrong dating).

From the Managing directors the Reich group Industry End October 1944 to one detailed statement on the foreseeable "conversion to the peace economy" was called upon to cut Reichert the problem the Demobilization and the return flow of the workers from the front at. 1918/19, so warned he, "flowed many Tens of thousands from ironworkers into hers Hometown back, war-weary and Mostly through revolutionary Hetzer whipped up. She found out lack of Peace missions first most of time no useful work." ¹⁷⁴ The current World War become, so wrote Reichert cautious, without collapse end up; anyway would be similar problems get over: „For the out of dem Felde's returning followers must follow forces be taken care of. is urgent the Caring for food, clothing and Apartment the workforce. The requires namely with regard to the Accommodation enormous size Measures ... Under consideration the longer as 1918 lasting demobilization should the levy the foreign and female workforce accordingly regulated become. One immediate complete Dismissal Alles the on the duration not to employing forces must so be avoided." ¹⁷⁵

Apparently achieved the RGI similar Elaborations also out of others business groups. The Reich Group, which has been planning post-war for the entire industry for a long time busy was ¹⁷⁶, took over the leadership also in this Ask. Your deputy Head, Rudolf Stahl, Chairman of the Board the Salzdetfurth AG, took at latest in the November 1944 tight Connection with dem "strengthen Man" in the Reich Ministry of Economics, Ministerial Director and SS group leader Otto Ohlendorf, on. ¹⁷⁷ In one expose from the December 1944 for a Program, the "a overview above the entire Ms. provision" the "Post-war problems from the position the Industry" give should, formulated _ the RGI apart from economic policy tasks Post-war period "Immediate and emergency measures in the Transitional stage with dem Goal the conservation the human substance and the prevention for a ordered economic process'. It must taken care of become for

- „1. Repair the traffic facilities,
2. Assurance the Nutrition,
3. Makeshift ones procurement of most necessary living space,
4. Urgent repair work on peacetime terms important factory facilities, especially in the production of raw materials,
5. As soon as possible Conversion of a significant part the war on Consumer goods production.
6. As soon as possible revival the A- and export (raw material procurement)" ¹⁷⁸

174 Schumann, Wolfgang, Post-war planning the Reich group Industry in the Autumn 1944. In: JfW, 1972, T III, S. 273, Doc. 2, elaboration Reicherts „To Conversion the iron creating industry _ the peace economy", November 10, 1944.

175 Ibid, S. 274 f.

176 Please refer Cape. VI; Autumn, S. 383 ff.; DZW, Vol. 6, S. 191 ff.

177 Remarkable is the clear orientation the RGI on the Reich Ministry of Economics, its continued existence after End of war more likely seemed than that of the already in erosion located Ministry of Armaments.

178 BAP, FS, Movie 3568, steel at Ohlendorf, December 13, 1944, with "Program for the editing host-

Practical Meaning received this program in the last months of war; though not in dem hoped senses, that the German Rich in one ordered Transition to Peace "his Economic disruptions self-eliminated" ¹⁷⁹, but in meaning one - how to it in the Managing directors the RGI called - "Social emergency program" ¹⁸⁰ Given the increasing Unemployment, the misery of refugees and the impending famine.

At the 8th. February 1945 met Steels "Smaller Committee of Experts", also called steel circle , and discussed the location that is from the Soviet offensive, the entry into force of the armaments "emergency program" and the decree of Bormann, Speer and Sauckel of January 28th resulted. In the Template the Managing directors the RGI for this session became "Loyalty um Loyalty" opposite the workers warned - one grotesque formulation given of the workers' years of being at the mercy of capital and of the company and outside the company Terror. ¹⁸¹ The detailed, internal Orientation, the Result the Meeting _ was, was valid henceforth as Guideline for the Labor policy the Industry. She contained the already mentioned demand for dem "Right", the Concentration camp prisoners, Jews and prisoners of war at "to give back" to the Gestapo, Stalag and employment office. ¹⁸² as the "supreme principle". man, so informed steel Secretary of State Franz Hayler above the Meeting, "The moral and political duty of the... Entrepreneurs Eyes, their core following like this long How any possible in Work and Salary to hold. At one any further tightening _ the Position must under everyone circumstances avoided become, that the workforce, the in war her Best and Last given away has, on the Street comes. Much more must _ the establishments as important 'Order cells' in the State structure also at temporarily diminished _ employment opportunities are maintained, around an uprooting of the to prevent working people and also jobs for the soldiers who return later to keep it open." ¹⁸³

Man forgot not, at the same time all Expenses, the out of the fulfillment of principle "Loyalty um Loyalty", this "moral and state political Duty the entrepreneur", would arise , dem Country in The invoice to place, before everything the Continued payment of wages at Loss of work and the Wage compensation at Short-time work. Actually worked the immediately granted by the state "Payment assistance to Backup the necessary for war Performance" on the Base, that the Pursue guaranteed by the Reich Loans in Claim take could, the later in „conditional refundable" Loans or in a "lost capital subsidy" transformed should be . ¹⁸⁴

more businesslike Post-war problems from the position the Industry" (Program not contain by _ Document excerpt in anatomy of war, S. 468 ff., Doc. 266).

179 How Note 174 (p. 274).

180 How Note 160.

181 Ibid.

182 BAK, R 12 U339, RGI (secret), "Conversion the establishments on the changed Working situation", February 8, 1945.

183 anatomy of war, S. 483, Doc. 272, steel at Hayler, February 9, 1945.

184 As note 160, "Principles of payment assistance to secure those necessary for the war Performance ", (14.?)2.1945.

Steel provided few days later his own company with guidelines in which the Wording "Loyalty to Loyalty" appeared: „The establishments must in this serious time, the us through the flows of refugees dem East also dem Food area will still face serious problems, prove themselves as solid organizational blocks and according to the principle ‚Loyalty for loyalty‘ act." ¹⁸⁵ Here was also strictly confidential from the hope that Speech, with the Authorities soon to one binding solution the Ask to come, whether and in which one Scope at deficient Employment opportunity through Relaxation or change the until now valid Provisions relieve the burden on companies from dispensable foreign ones workers, those obliged to serve Women etc. take place can." ¹⁸⁶

3. The "Conservation the Substance"

The events since Mid-1944 had gradually the Illusions of Minister of Armaments and his confidants out of the Armament organization his Ministry reduced, the until up there the Production successes and on the in the Armor Staff culminating Concentration of power in the War economy founded were. The Disasters of summer at everyone Fronts impressed the minister and the German economic elite in first line and directly through the increasing destruction of the basis of production from the air. Since October/November 1944 lost the Ruhr area, traffic wise tied off, his Significance as a leading German company Armaments Center, and about the German Business broke the coal disaster in. Against End of 1944 was the Battle of the Bulge failed. Four weeks later went Upper Silesia lost. The rest the War economy broke in the weeks later under the strongest air bombardment of the war.

This Signals the approaching defeat could not overlook become and led too late, cautious Attempt, the herostratic politics the political and the To undermine the military leadership and the economy by means of certain corrections to the armaments course on the immediate post war period to prepare.

a) Change of heart before the catastrophe

In the winter 1944/45, in Approaches already formerly ¹⁸⁷, sat in the Great of Ministry of Armaments, with Speer and Kehrl, such a rethinking. Reports and Minister's memorandums, the he Hitler forwarded, languages one always clearer Language. It was the speech

¹⁸⁵ anatomy of war, S. 484, Doc. 273, Rs. steel at the Board members u. Directors the Salzdetfurth AG, February 14, 1945. One Week later, at the 20.2., went a Circular the RGI with the same Formulations at all "industrial operations manager" (BAK, R 121/339, Rs. RGI, „To the industrial operations manager", February 20, 1945).

¹⁸⁶ Ibid (Anatomy of war).

¹⁸⁷ Sweep!, S. 408 ff., reported, he have for the first Just at the 21. August 1944 "Plain text with Spear" gere- det and "very fast perfect Accordance" with him about it achieved, „that we nothing do and nothing allow should, What the Live on ours people and ours Industry as

that it would be impossible to continue waging war in the foreseeable future and that it was necessary to the economic continued life of to think about the German people after the war .

In the already mentioned Memorandum from the 30. January 1945¹⁸⁸ hit spear to the first

Just

a such volume at. While he in dem memorandum from the 11. November 1944 above the "The situation in the Ruhr area" had called for the "battle for the Ruhr" to be taken up, the "final end of the war" in view of the "long-term unsustainable" closure of the industrial district but passed victoriously" and would be won¹⁸⁹, led he now, after the loss of Upper Silesia, the "material preponderance of the enemy" which has never been openly mentioned and mostly denied crucial in Meeting that "afterwards no longer comes from bravery of our soldiers".

Hitler responded, spear according to, with the threat, like that something could he don't let him offer you anything.¹⁹⁰ In the following weeks, the minister called on Hitler much less often and had Saur attend the armaments discussions with him. "I, on the other hand," he wrote, "connected myself as closely as possible with the employees of the industry, to discuss with them urgent supply problems and the transition to the post-war economy."¹⁹¹

Impressive encounters of this kind with those responsible for the German economy often took place back then; Speer only reported later sparingly about it. With the The minister seems to be working on their behalf Ruhr industrialists, especially Vögler and Rohland, began for the first time in the spring and more intensively in the summer of 1944.¹⁹² acted in September he in accordance with them, as he the "fight against the crazy idea of the burned people Earth".¹⁹³ From this time onwards he understood the "conservation of the substance" as most important national "duty". Rohland described it Change in Speer's behavior so: „First the growing clarity about an unfavorable outcome War and the attitude of the colonels leadership caused Speer to abandon his previously strictly adhered line of limiting himself to purely economic problems."¹⁹⁴

The people's livelihood was damaged beyond the enemy's influence." (p. 411). Here as well as in October (see p. 412 f.) it was about the problem "Conservation of Substance" in view of the on the Allied armies advancing across German borders and Hitler's "scorched earth" strategy one fanatical party and military clique, not yet around cautious changes in the war economy.

188 BAP, FS, Film 1732, "On the armament situation February-March 1945", January 30, 1945. Preparatory already the memorandum from January 16, 1945 (BAP, FS, film 1734; s. Section 1) u. the fifth (last) hydrogenation memorial from January 19, 1945 (Birkenfeld, fuel, p. 260 ff.). Furthermore, Speer's armaments report v. January 27, 1945 (Bleyer, The Secret report (JfW, 1969, part II); Janssen, p. 325 ff.); see Janssen, p. 301 f.

189 BAP, FS, Movie 1732,,location at "Ruhrgebiet", 11.11.1944.

190 Spear, Memories, S. 432.

191 Ibid, S. 440.

192 IMG, Vol. 41, S. 493, Doc. spear-42, hearing raw land, May 20, 1946.

193 Ibid, S. 489 ff. Please refer Cape. I

194 Ibid, S. 494.

In November 1944, when the Ruhrstab was reconstituted under Vögler's leadership, Speer clearly announced his attitude towards these questions to all the Ruhr industrialists gathered there. The consequence of this speech was that even the "Frightened minds found the courage to act in accordance with Speer's views."¹⁹⁵

With birds the minister had at the end of November - probably on this occasion - a discussion in which he urgently asked when it would finally be "finished".¹⁹⁶ Speer indicated that Hitler a major military strike, the "last attempt" an offensive, prepare. As he said, Vögler hoped that The offensive would take place in the east; Hitler couldn't do "craziness commit to denuding the East in order to West the To want to outplay opponents." Otherwise remained he stubborn: "But he is Are you sure that it has to end after that? We lose too much substance. How should a structure be possible? if the Destructions in the industry too continue like this for a few months?"

During the Soviet January offensive, Speer, according to his own report, was preoccupied with the fearful thought that "the people (could) rise up in anger and disappointment against their former leaders and kill them."¹⁹⁷ The fear of the people, of a revolutionary criminal court about those guilty of war, and also from the revenge of the Allies and the attacked and abused peoples undoubtedly did at that time their effect. It was probably always behind the intentions of the actors involved, the "basics of life" of the population to be reasonably secured and to take precautions even after the end of the war.

Since December 1944 Speer, Kehr! and bake such supply problems. In the period that followed, the Ministry of Armaments seemed to be splitting between Kehr! and Speer there was a kind of division of labor in which Speer was responsible for the "maintenance of the substance", while Kehr! was responsible for supply issues as the most important area of responsibility. Kehr! prepared the work in coordination with Backe and Riecke the measures and that worked Arrangements that on the one hand, the makeshift nutrition of the urban population, especially in the Ruhr area and Berlin, and on the other hand to create certain conditions for the spring cultivation and the 1945 harvest.¹⁹⁸

The precautions in this area had to go hand in hand with Speer's measures to restore transport connections and provide transport space and coordinated with the supply of coal and electricity to the companies. They extended to the provision of nitrogen and other fertilizers, of agricultural machinery and its spare parts, of agricultural equipment and tools, of seeds and finally of harvest twine.¹⁹⁹

Speer had on December 6, 1944 in a report handed over to Hitler together with Backe above the Nitrogen supply on it referred, that the Loss of production at the

195 Ibid, S. 491.

196 Spear, Memories, S. 423. Hereafter also the The following.

197 Ibid, S. 429. spear visited at that time (January 21, 1945) Lower Silesia and came probably directly in contact with the plight of refugees.

198 In more detail Sweep!, S. 419 ff. Further Janssen, S. 292; BAP, FS, Movie 3568, Interrogations of Speer, May 1945. See also section 1.

199 Please refer Sweep!, S. 421 f.

nitrogen production in large nitrogen plants in the fertilizer year 1944/45 (June to **May**) and thus the fertilizer nitrogen allocation would be halved compared to the previous year (26 percent compared to 1938/39). This would “seriously jeopardize” the yields of grain, root crops, oil crops and vegetables.²⁰⁰ Hitler made no decision - which would otherwise have had to fall to the detriment of powder and explosives production. But in the first quarter of 1945, Kehrl wanted “increasingly” nitrogen from the Wehrmacht contingent for agriculture “saved” have.²⁰¹

At a chemistry meeting on January 16, 1945 in the Ministry of Armaments, those present (Kehrl, Krauch) stated that the for the rockets and that Walter submarines important T-substance (oxygen carrier) not sufficient for the needs of 1945/46. Kehrl ended the discussion about capacities and investments with the comment that, “if there are any additional opportunities in the construction sector, these will probably be from Minister Speer for the development of nitrogen production would be used because this absolutely has priority.”²⁰²

At the beginning of March, the Armaments Minister instructed Krauch and Geilenberg “that the nitrogen plants should be built before the hydrogenation plants.”²⁰³

Even if it was carried out under careful camouflage, the new orientation towards the basic needs of nutrition and daily life was increasingly clear. However, its impact should by no means be overestimated. If the economy had not already been in agony, this course would have been more successful, but it would probably have faced the bitter resistance of the circles around Hitler and that OKW hardly enforce let. As things stood, the measures described or intended could at best provide ephemeral relief in one or another acute local or regional emergency.

The military events and the rapid economic drove decline spear and his followers to be more consistent steps. The seventy year old Friedrich Lüschen, leading mens manager and a the Supports the German armaments organization, laid At the beginning of February, Speer, referring to Hitler's own words in “Mein Kampf”, described the “rebellion” against Nazi tyranny: “If a nation is led towards ruin through the means of government power, then the rebellion of every member is one “For such a people it is not just a right but a duty.” The minister then entertained thoughts of assassination for a short time - According to his own account, an idea that was quickly dropped and a rather ridiculous episode.²⁰⁴

On February 27th he discussed “in a small circle” at Landsberg Castle, the seat of the Ruhr Staff. fundamental Questions the “Conservation the Substance” and the Nutrition the population

200 BAK, R 3/1530, Speer/Backe, “Report on the nitrogen supply situation”, December 6, 1944; see the RMRuK decrees v. February 28, 1945 (on the emergency program) and v. March 2, 1945, the middle instance of the Ministry committed itself to “supplying all manufacturing plants and repair companies working for agriculture with coal, energy, transport space and workers as a matter of priority.” (Both decrees in BAP, FS, Film 1732).

201 Kehrl, S. 423.

202 BAP, FS, Movie 3386, written down v. January 18, 1945.

203 IfZ, ED 99, NL Spear, Vol. 8th, Vemehmg. Speers v. May 20, 1945.

204 Spear, Memories, S. 436 (quote out of “My Battle”, Issue 1935, S. 104).

tion.²⁰⁵ Two weeks later, he called his “employees from industry” together in Bernau and assured them, as he later wrote, “that I would personally and personally support the companies even if the military situation continued to deteriorate under no circumstances should it be destroyed.”²⁰⁶

At that time originated the Memorandum from the 15. March 1945 with dem title “Economic situation March -April 1945 and conclusions”, in the Speer declared the war lost and further destruction clearly criminal designated.²⁰⁷ The According to matter, it contained one sharp opposition to the cold-blooded and ruthless extermination strategy of the clique in the “Führerbunker”:

“The enemy air force continued to focus on the traffic facilities. This means that economic transport is possible decreased significantly.

When the front was moved to the Rhine, productive brown coal areas and large brown coal power plants were lost. The immediate artillery Impact on the Ruhr area and those caused by the Increased near the front Hunting activity during the day and at have night This resulted in further break-ins in the Ruhr area. ...

Since the loss of Upper Silesia, the empire's economic collapse has accelerated. Due to the decisive restrictions in the supply of coal, this process has accelerated catastrophically.

It is therefore in 4-8 weeks with dem final collapse of the German economy Certainty can be expected.

Then there is neither an arms output guaranteed, nor the Reichsbahn and shipping in the Position be, the transports assigned to them - maybe with the exception of that operational transport - to carry out.

After this one collapse can the War also military not continued become.

The people have in this War has fulfilled its duty and completed its task circumstances carried out that were far more difficult than ever before in a war.

It is determined not his Fail to attribute if the War lost goes.

We in the leadership has the obligation to the people in the difficult hours that it should expect to help.

We sobered up - regardless of our fate - to present the question of how this can also happen in the future.

If the Opponent wants to destroy the people and their livelihood, then should he this Carry out the work yourself. We must do everything we can to preserve a basis for life for the people, even if perhaps in the most primitive forms, until the very end.

In all areas must Measures seized become, about this point of view to enforce. Through clear Instructions can local disaster can be prevented. None may the Take the position that the fate of the German people is also tied to his personal fate.

It must be fixed become that the most distinguished Duty of leadership these weeks must be to help the people wherever possible.

The following must be done for the area of German production and transport for which I am responsible :

205 How Note 192 (p. 491).

206 Spear, Memories, S. 442 f.

207 The following according to IMG, Vol. 41, S. 420 ff., Doc. Speer-23. Some corrections based on the copy in BAK, R 3/1536; there also those mentioned below Investments.

1. It must be ensured that if the fight continues is brought into the Reich territory, no one is entitled to destroy industrial plants, coal mines, electricity plants and other supply systems as well as transport systems, inland waterways, etc.

While previously businesses were paralyzed for one to two months by removing irreplaceable individual parts in order to be able to be made usable again in the short term after the reconquest, this position must now also take effect when reconquest does not appear possible.

The industrial plants and the basic industries are just as much a part of the vitality of the German people as agriculture. Nobody would even think of using a toxic substance to make German fields barren for years to come. It is just as impossible for the miner and the industrial worker of our Page to make a living.

2 Large-scale preparations have been made for the demolition of bridge structures belonging to the Reichsbahn or road construction.

Of course, it is necessary to blow up the bridge structures over the major rivers as long as the enemy's further advance can still be prevented. - But it **cannot** possibly be the purpose of warfare the be home, to destroy so many bridges that... the limited one In the post-war years it took years to build this transport network rebuild....

It must through a sharp order be ensured, that both those Wehrmacht as also the Party, including the Volkssturm, do not have the right to arbitrarily destroy bridges in their own country....

With one If the bridges were blown up to the extent planned, the transport systems would be destroyed more sustainably than the air raids of recent years were able to do.

Her destruction means the elimination everyone further possibility of life of German people.

3 The distribution all warehouse clothing and other items of use, insofar as they can be used by the civilian population, must be prepared immediately and carried out on cue. The stocks are still large. Inadequacies that arise due to transport difficulties must be accepted become.

Further is the command to give, also for the Warehouse the Wehrmacht including the Nutrition warehouses

- one such Distribution campaign prepare, the through keyword triggered becomes.

One Distribution of civilian and Wehrmacht stocks can the people something to help, about the difficult times that await have to get over it.

4 It is at the current Position of course, that the Backup the German Nutrition - also for the more distant future - must be at the forefront of all efforts.

It is therefore already ordered that both in traffic also in all other areas for necessary nutritional measures are carried out become.

The devastation of this war in German cities is comparable only to that of the Thirty Years' War. - Whether the events that follow a defeat also have a decline similar to that of the time the population to Consequence will have is not foreseeable. The The people will have to endure the most severe burdens will, however, bring about a hard selection and thus preserve a good core of this unique people for the distant future.

We have no right to cause destruction on our own initiative at this stage of the war to undertake measures that could affect the lives of the people.

If the opponents were this people who fought with unique bravery has, destroy If they want to, this historical shame should fall exclusively to them.

We have an obligation to the people all Possibilities to let him in "We could secure a new structure in the more distant future."

A number of appendices were attached to the memorandum, including the RVK (Pleiger) report on the coal situation from March 7,²⁰⁸ and the drafts for two "Führer" decrees: one who the destruction of transport facilities and bridges and the sinking of cargo ships, and another that prohibited the destruction of industrial facilities and took responsibility for "paralysis". the industry exclusively transferred to the Minister of Armaments. On the In addition to the spokesmen of industry, the position of armaments minister was now occupied by a not insignificant part of the military and political leadership, although, as it turned out, this was uncertain and subject to great fluctuations.

The document showed **courage**, and despite all tactical preparations and precautions, Speer took a great risk by handing it over to Hitler on March 19th.²⁰⁹ Typical was the weak reaction of Goebbels, whom Speer had previously tried to get into line with his line. Goebbels noted Speer's (and Ley's) "extremely alarming" reports that the opinion is correct, "the spear regarding the maintaining the basis of life of the German people",²¹⁰ but immediately added that he, Speer, was too strong under dem Impression whose stand, What he in west seen have, and that he the Position

"out of the Perspective of the pure economist and "Technician". He does not have "the necessary distance", the "statesmanlike attitude" that one must maintain in the "highs" and "depths" of war; "it is precisely in the depths that it is important to have a cool attitude "To keep your nerve and not lose your nerve."

spear could itself on the Effect the Memorandum no huge hopes make. At the 18. On March 1, Hitler issued a decree requiring the aforementioned immediate forced evacuation entire population west of the Rheins ordered²¹¹, and He said farewell to Speer in the early hours of the 19th, without having read the memorandum himself, with a dark threat he at the same time the complete bankruptcy of his worldview and politics admitted: "If the war will be lost also the people lost be. It is not necessary to take into account the foundations that the German people need for their most primitive survival. On the contrary is it better even this to destroy things. Because the people have proven to be the weaker, and the stronger Eastern people belong exclusively the Future. What's left after this fight is just... the inferior, for the good have fallen!"²¹²

208 Please refer Section 1.

209 Detailed Spear, Memories, S. 442 ff.

210 BAK, NL 118/58, Goebbels-TB, entry from March 15, 1945; sat Entry v. March 14, 1945 (respectively March 14 and 13, 1945). Hereafter also the following.

211 Please refer Section 2.

212 Spear, Memories, p. 446. - The tradition is not overall free of ambiguities, and it is possible that the content of the memorandum, which As a precaution, Speer Hitler had been using his liaison officer v. since March 15th. Below let it be "presented". wanted (ibid., p. 443), dem "Leader" to this Way on the 18th It was already known in March this but still wavered, how he should proceed with spear. Hitler's quoted oral statement and his quick response ("Nero command") allows one such an interpretation. With another memorandum, the Speer had drawn up on March 18th and described the defense strategy between the Rhine and the Rhine in a strangely brisk tone Or for "the battle of the next eight weeks" (BAK, R 3/1537; see a. Janssen, p. 311), he undoubtedly pursued tactical purposes.

b) The "Nero command"

On the same day, Hitler ordered the total destruction of German land: "The fight for the existence of our people forces us to use all means possible, even within the territory of the Reich weaken our enemy's fighting power and hinder his further advance. I therefore command:

- 1) All military, transport, communication, industrial and supply facilities as well as material assets within the Reich's territory that the enemy could somehow immediately use to continue his fight or in can be used in the foreseeable future, are to destroy.
- 2) Responsible for the Implementation of this destruction are the military Command authorities for all military objects including traffic and communications facilities, the Gauleiter and Reich Defense Commissioners for all industrial and supply facilities as well as other material assets; the Gauleiters and Reich Defense Commissioners are in the process of carrying it out their task by the troops to provide the necessary assistance.
- 3) This order must be communicated to all troop commanders as quickly as possible; conflicting instructions are invalid."²¹³

The Armaments Ministry and its armaments management organization were not included in this decree ("Nero Order"). The military and the Gauleiter were given a free hand and full authority for the "scorched earth" policy on German soil. The order disavowed the armaments minister and removed him from power even. There spear but has now spread to significant parts could support the ruling class and his position ultimately corresponded to the interests of the broader population expect the conflict to be about destruction or maintaining violent forms assumed. Their outcome was by no means already decided.

There are almost no written sources for the following events.²¹⁴ They were later described by those involved²¹⁵; However, these representations can only be considered to have limited source value due to numerous inaccuracies and different information become. What they all have in common is that they emphasize the prominent role of the armaments minister because also for them decisive Twelve days must be sufficiently documented .

213 **IMG**, Vol. 41, S. 430 f., Doc. Spear-25; also at Speer, *Memories*, S. 583 note 10; Janssen, S. 311 f.

214 Speer has e.g own notes above his meetings re: the defense of the Destruction orders were understandably destroyed (Speer, *Memories*, p. 449).

215 The Nuremberg trial files contain statements about the events, particularly from Walter Rohland and Oberstlt. Manfred v. Poser (**IMG**, Vol. 41, Documents from Speer's defense) and Speer's detailed interrogation from 19 to 21. June 1946 (**IMG**, Vol. 16, p. 475 ff.). Rohland's undated documents can also be found in BAK, R 3/1661, BI. 20 ff. Speer in detail in his memories (p. 446 ff.). A summary presentation based on the Nuremberg and other documents in Janssen, p. 310 ff.

Compilation from events between dem 19. and 30. March 1945

19. March 1945

Speer's negotiations with Mayor West, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, near Bad Nauheim remained unsuccessful. Employees of the Commander-in-Chief's staff show a greater understanding of the policy of "preservation of substance".

Accompanied by Hermann Röchling, the chairman of the RVE, Speer went to the staff of the Southwest Armaments Commissioner, Heinrich Kelchner, in Heidelberg, then at night to Army Group G in the Palatinate. The boss of Army Group, Colonel General of the Waffen-SS Paul Hausser, declares himself in favor of Speer's conception.

20. March 1945

Speer finds in Gauleiter Willi Stöhr (Saar-Palatinate) a allies.

Field Marshal Walter Model, head of Army Group B, which is supposed to defend the Ruhr area, has Help was promised at the beginning of March. In at his headquarters the "completely surprised" Speer the "Nero Order" is transmitted.²¹⁶ The order has an effect on Model. Speer immediately travels back to Berlin.

21. March 1945

Hans Malzacher, Armaments Representative Southeast, is called to Berlin and instructed.

Afternoon hands over spear a copy his Memorandum from the 15. March in the Reichs office Colonel General Heinz Guderian, Chief of the Army General Staff. Keitel refuses to accept it. Hitler briefly dispatches the minister.

22. March 1945

The Armaments Minister confers with leading representatives of the coal industry (Pleiger, Otto Steinbrinck, Martin Sogemeier), with Guderian and army generals (Wolfgang Thoma le, Gundelach, Ivo-Thilo v. Trotha) and with Grand Admiral Dönitz.

23. March 1945

"Armaments meeting" under Speer in the ministry (allegedly with the Heads of office and department heads, the members of armor staff, with Ladders the Main committees and -rings etc.); afterward Head of office meeting.

24. March 1945

Speers' meetings with Willy Messerschmitt, Albert Ganzenmüller (Reich Transport Ministry), Gerhard Klopfer (Party Chancellery), Dietrich Stahl (Head of the Main Committee **on Munition**), Xaver Dorsch, Eckhard Bürger (OT; Transport Staff), Admiral Backenköhler (High Command of the Kriegsmarine) and Goebbels.

In the evening the minister travels at Rohland's urgent request - the Allied offensive across the Rhine began on the 23rd/24th. March began - to West Germany, where negotiations with the Gauleiters were deadlocked. Accompanying him from the ministry is State Secretary Günter Schulze-Fielitz, who is sent on special assignments to the southeast and south.

216 IMG, Vol. 41, P. 524 f., Doc. Speer-47, answers (to questions from the defense attorney) from Manfred v. Poser, June 14, 1946; Speer, Memories, p. 442.

25. March 1945

Still in Speer arrives in the Ruhrstab that night. „Meeting the situation. Decision: Try by all means to carry out the Führer's order only pro forma, otherwise leave it to paralysis. Not to release any explosives from the mines." ²¹⁷ The Armaments Minister promises to provide 50 submachine guns for reliable miners, "to secure the power plants and other important industrial facilities against the Gauleiter's destruction squads." ²¹⁸

On the following difficult meeting with the Gauleiters of the industrial area (Friedrich **Karl** Florian/Düsseldorf, Albert Hoffmann/Dortmund, Fritz Schlessmann/Essen, Alfred Meyer/Münster) Those present, apart from Florian, finally agree with the minister that the eviction orders from Hitler and Bormann can no longer be enforced, that production takes precedence over destruction right up to the end and that, above all, the power plants can only be paralyzed. They agree to postpone the extensive destruction already planned.

The evening and night meetings at Model (together with Vögler) and in Kesselring's staff end with the result that the military the Nero command in the want to carry out a militarily hopeless situation while protecting the industrial area and economically important facilities as much as possible. Model declared that planned destruction was taking place that's why impossible, because the 4,000 needed for this Tons of explosives were missing. ²¹⁹ He says to to maintain close contact with Rohland and his staff in the next few days and weeks.

26. March 1945

In Heidelberg advises spear with Kelchner (and Röchling?) above Possibilities, the To prevent the destruction plans of the Baden Gauleiter Robert Wagner.

Again negotiations with Hausser because of without a fight handing over from Heidelberg.

27. March 1945

After being dealt with by Speer, Gauleiter Otto Hellmuth (Würzburg) refrains from destroying the Schweinfurt ball bearing industry.

The Minister of Armaments moves in the evening back to Berlin, where the The situation deteriorated greatly due to the dismissal of Guderian and the appointment of Kammler over Speer's head to be responsible for development and production of all new aircraft and through stricter destruction decrees. ²²⁰

28. March 1945

Hitler has now received a report from Bormann Speer's meetings in West Germany received. "The Leader" like that When Goebbels describes Hitler's constitution, "is very displeased with the last statements spear made him. spear has away from its industrialists

217 **BAK, R 3/1661**, Bl. 20 f., raw land, "Transcript above the events from the 15.3. until April 15, 1945".

218 Speer, *Memories*, S. 452.

219 How Note 216 (v. poser, S. 525).

220 See "Implementation Regulations (Intelligence Annexes)" of the Chief of the Intelligence Troops for the Nero Order, March 27, 1945; partial reproduction in Speer, *Memoirs*, p. 584, note 6; similar provisions followed on March 29, 1945 of the head of transport (IMG, vol. 41, p. 431 ff., Doc. Speer-26: "The aim is to create a traffic desert in the abandoned area."

let it influence... The Führer intends to have Speer come to him in the course of the afternoon and present him to present a very serious alternative. Either must he adhere to the principles the current insert warfare, or the leader wants on his **Give up** work ...on an employee who fails in the critical phase. The Führer becomes extremely forceful towards Speer. I don't think Speer will have an easy time with him in the next few days becomes. Above all, the leader wants the talking heads von Speer, which has a decidedly defeatist character.... What is true, however, is that the Führer among all circumstances ensure wants Speer to do it hands from the industry that influences it. He can no longer be a pawn of the economic circles around him be The Führer is already talking about one eventual After followership Speers through Saur, which in my opinion is extremely significant is. This means that the situation for Speer has become very critical. In any case, I will draw his attention to it." ²²¹

The only sources available are the description of the conversations between Hitler and the Armaments Minister on March 28th and the night of March 29th to 30th (Good Friday). Speers ²²² and an entry in Goebbels' diary reflects Hitler's view of what happened.

The scenes in Hitler's bunker are like a smear piece in which the long-time... loyal servant and friend of the tyrant rebelled against his last heroic impulses. Hitler's intention is to immediately send Speer on "sick leave" with the strange argument: "For domestic and foreign policy reasons, I can't rely on you renounce." Since Speer is stubborn refuses to act in the most critical situation To have the office taken out of his hands, Hitler finally accedes to the demand back, the Minister should at least explain that the War not be lost. After undignified horse-trading over this formulation, he released him with 24 hours to think about it.

29./30. March 1945

Speer describes Hitler as seeing him around midnight visits him again, as insecure, "almost a little afraid". He unexpectedly succeeds in convincing him with a false declaration of loyalty ("My leader, I stand behind you unconditionally!") to dupe Hitler signs a new one, from spear drafted decree ²²³, the itself formally refers to the Nerobe incorrectly, but in reality it refers to the destruction of industrial facilities and utility companies restrictive "also through "sustainable paralysis". and in any case allowed to postpone it in favor of production "until the last possible moment". However, the key point of the decree, which largely makes the Nero order a waste of time, is the exclusive commissioning of the Minister of Armaments with the implementation of the paralysis and destruction measures.

In the secret implementing regulations Speers ²²⁴, the he sent it the same day, without she Hitler to submit, become all previous Decrees and Instructions of Rū-

221 BAK, NL 118/59, Goebbels TB, Entry v. March 28, 1945.

222 Spear, Memories, S. 457 ff. Hereafter that too The following.

223 From the March 30, 1945; IMG, Vol. 41, p. 433 f., Doc. Speer-28. Also spear, Memories, p. 585 note 10.

224 IMG, Vol. 41, S. 435 ff., Doc. spear-29, March 30, 1945.

Ministry of Education “with regard to the paralysis of all types of industrial plants and utilities (electricity, gas, water, food industry). Businesses of all kinds, etc.)” for as before valid explained. The Gauleiter will be on pure Auxiliary functions for the Armaments departments pushed away. Powers and responsibility for The destruction and paralysis lie solely with the armaments departments (chairmen of the armaments commissions or sub-commissions) and with the "operation managers".

“Speer visited the Führer twice,” noted Goebbels, who met Hitler on March 30th from his point of view, “to discuss with him the implementation of an emergency armament program. There was a very dramatic debate about Speer's political stance. The Führer made serious accusations against Speer that he was allowing himself to be harnessed too much to the economy and that he represented tendencies that could not be reconciled with the National Socialist view of war. speer there because also small at; at least though he achieves from the leader that the The last decree of the Führer regarding the destruction of our economic foundations in the areas occupied by the Anglo-Americans is toned down to the point that paralysis is also permitted if it leads to the desired goal, and that neither destruction nor paralysis of industry and armaments facilities is permitted when armaments production is continued - albeit under great danger - can still be continued.” Hitler complained about Speer's lukewarm attitude to questions about armaments and was "very annoyed that he this work in the main thing himself make must Be a speer not the strong personality ity ... Surrender him as well as at energy How also at Improvisational art." ²²⁵

However, an analysis of the events described must not focus on the person of the Minister of Armaments and his integrative activity restrict. The aspirations to "Preservation of the substance" was carried out by a considerable number of those involved - respectively back in her circle - in a similar way to how Speer defended himself against Nero's order and its effects.

They were different also workers and employees who - with or without political motivation, with or without contact with the management - opposed the destruction of their workplaces and made preparations to defend them. This remains a field for investigations, the also refers to the fall of 1944 and, in the East, must extend to the period since mid-January 1945.

At Speer's side were initially the top officials of his ministry, among the heads of office at least Kehrl, Hupfauer, Hettlage and Schulze-Fielitz, and also predominantly the leading figures in his armaments organization (arms commissioners, chairmen of the armaments commissions, main committee and main ring leaders, etc.). The most active opponents of the “scorched earth” policy on German soil were understandably industry itself. The center of the fight against Nero's orders was the Ruhrstab under Vögler and Rohland. It was created here not only that strategy in its basic features, according to which the Minister of Armaments proceeded. Vögler, Rohland and their employees also negotiated themselves constantly with the military commanders and staffs and with the Gauleiters. On March 30th, as Hitler his new Decree signed, took she for the first time with the generals

about a handover of the Ruhr area without a fight. At the same time Hitler issued a decree and Implementing regulations "spread like leaflets".²²⁶ people was therefore ready in the Ruhrstab to fight for the "preservation of the "Substance" to also include broader sections of the population and the workforce.

Among the local politicians and also among the Gauleiters, the number of those who more or less resolutely supported the position of Speer and the industry was not small .

A greater, more acute danger than the small group of fanatic Gauleiters posed by the military, who blindly obediently carried out orders "from above". like "military aspects" were used to representing arrogantly. A support of the armaments minister in those days and weeks a small group of army officers, especially Chief of General Staff Guderian, who was of course "on leave" at the end of March.²²⁷ Speer mentioned as willing to cooperate particularly Colonel General Gotthardt Henry, IF the Army Group

"Vistula", and Panzer General Thomale. Im Westen supported him, Hausser; Model, on the other hand, wavered and evaded any clear decision. An unpredictable opponent of Speer's strategy remained "the **OKW, which was completely lost in its radical stance.**"²²⁸

The significance of the actions against Nero's order went far beyond that the the Speer's intervention with Hitler. The question is, if the Works Speers and the other opponents of the command in the country - the emphatic argument and propaganda for the "preservation of the Substance" - under the circumstances of the time, it was no more important than the minister's success in the Führerbunker. The actual role of the Nero Command should not be overstated will, as well little but also that of those who de facto revoked it Orders of March 30th and the first week of April. Hitler's will was no longer there in those weeks omnipresent, his Commands were no longer unchallenged. The effect of Nero's order would be In the end, it was largely paralyzed in every case, if not by the more or less widespread resistance of those affected, then by the "chaotic command relationships"²²⁹ , who now ruled.

Table 136

negotiations of Ruhr staff in the Ruhr basin the Enclosure through the Allies (1. April 1945) until the end of hostilities (April 17, 1945) based on notes by Walter Rohland

-
30. /31.3. First contact with AOK 5 regarding possible handover. Colonel General Harpe suggests a meeting with Model. On the evening of the 31st there was a meeting with Gauleiter Hoffmann. An approach to handover there too. Dr. Vögler supports my suggestions. Result of further discussion with AOK 5 and Army Group b.
- 1./2.4. Meeting as planned. Colonel General Harpe shares my opinion. Field marshal model must be mine first admit that you are right. However, it can become a corresponding one Can't make a decision.

²²⁶ As note 217 (BI. 21).

²²⁷ "We had frequent and close contact with each other." (Guderian into the. hearing at the May 10, 1946; IMG, Vol. 41, p. 513, Doc. Speer-44).

²²⁸ IMG, Vol. 41, S. 494, Doc. spear-42, hearing raw land, May 20, 1946.

²²⁹ Spear, Memories, p. 464.

Table 136 (Continuation)

-
- 8.4. Again advance birder - raw land at Field Marshal Model. In this context, the latter takes Contact with General von Lüttwitz also for handover is. Based on new instructions [from Hitler and Speer], new negotiations were held with Army Group B in order to avoid unnecessary bridge blowing. To these meetings gave there During the night, Field Marshal Model issued an order stating that bridges carrying supply lines (cables, electricity, water, gas) must not be blown up.
 - 9.4. Due to an objection from General von Alvern takes place in this respect restriction, than before for the not to be blown up Bridge approval must be obtained from Field Marshal Model.
 - 10.4. Another meeting with the boss Staff [Army Group B], General Wagener. Ing. Flat is over Dr. Vögler set out on the march the Bridges to be released at the Army group to ensure. For six Ruhr bridges the blast is canceled.
 - 12.4. Meeting at general from Lüttwitz [re: Handing over] in positive senses.
 - 13.4. Another meeting with General von Lüttwitz, who suggests speaking to Field Marshal Model again despite the new, completely incomprehensible Führer order, according to which surrenders are no longer an option and should be punished accordingly. On the same day again with Army Group B. After a lengthy discussion with the Chief of Staff, General Wagener, the last attempt was to hand over the cauldron and thereby save valuable blood, avoid further insane destruction and a proper to ensure handover, be finally abandoned .
 - 14.4. Short final discussion with General von Lüttwitz, who now no longer has the option sees.
-

Source: How Note 217.

c) Industrialists Starting positionsJü,r the post war period

What usable fixed assets did German industry have at the end of the war? Should the war economy happen are taken into account under this question, it must be the case Industrial investment funds (gross fixed assets) are compared with the sum of depreciation and war damage.

The investment power the The German economy, which at its peak in 1939 was well above the level of 1928, maintained the level of the last pre-war years during the first four years of the war .

Table 137

Economic fixed investments, 1928, 1932-1944 (in billion RM)

1928	13.7
1932	4.2
1933	5.1
1934	8.2

Tabelle 137 (Fortsetzung)

1935	10,3
1936	11,4
1937	12,9
1938	15,3
1939	17,3
1940	15,3
1941	15,0
1942	15,2
1943	13*
1944	9*

Source: Statistical Handbook of Germany 1928-1944, Munich 1949, p. 604 (until 1934); Petzi na, p. 183, tab. 17 (1935-1942). *) My estimation.

She concentrated in War, ever longer, the more on the Industry, at the expense of housing, transport, agriculture and forestry, public administration (excluding military power).²³⁰ Industrial fixed investment rose on a absolute and relative levels not previously reached: twice that of a "normal" economic year

- around 1928 or 1937 - and more than twelve times as much as in the crisis year of 1932. You also sank in 1944 barely below the level of 1938 and were still around a third above the pre-crisis peak of 1928.

Table 138

Industrial fixed investments, 1928, 1932-1944 _

	Mill.RM (not adjusted for prices)	index (1928 = 100)	Share of economic fixed investment (Percent)
1928	2 615	100	19,1
1932	439	17	10.4
1933	557	21	11.0
1934	1 060	41	13.0
1935	1636	63	15.9
1936	2 159	83	18.9
1937	2 843	109	22.0
1938	3 691	141	24,1
1939	4432	169	25.8
1940	4867	186	31.8
1941	5 261	201	35,1
1942	5 571	213	36.7

230 Please refer also II, S. 381 ff.

Table 138 (Continuation)

	Mill.RM (not adjusted for prices)	index (1928 = 100)	Share of economic fixed investment (Percent)
1943	4 913	188	approx.40
1944	3 509	134	approx.40

Source: Statistical Handbook of Germany, p. 605 (until 1939); Kregel, Rolf, The long-term development of gross capital investments in West German industry from 1924 to 1955/56. In: Quarterly Issues on Economic Research, 2/1957, p. 170 ff.; Kupky, Helmut, The long-term development of gross fixed assets investments the Central German Industry from 1924 until 1955. In: Ibid, S. 398 ff. (for 1940-1944). - To interpolation the Pay from Kregel and Kupky s. II, S. 381.

The direction of this unique Investment boost was clearly. It were the branches of the defense industry, who used the investment fund more and more one-sidedly and exclusively. From equipment investments (machinery investments) for the In 1943, 30 percent of industry went into final armaments production and 54 percent into the basic industries. Both received 89 percent of the construction investments. An “improved” list from the planning office is available for machine investments.²³¹

Table 139
machine investments, 1943 (in mill. RM)

<i>In total</i>	5 028
of that:	
Industry	3 895
Energy industry	79
Traffic	502
Crafts	35
Agriculture	433
forestry	1
Trade, banks,	
insurance, tourism	30
Administration	53
Housekeeping	?
<i>Industry in total</i>	3 895
of that:	
Armament final production	1 174
Basic materials	2 191
Rest production	328
construction industry, Building materials	131

²³¹ **BAK, R** 3/1960, BI. 175, lineup v. September 15, 1944; *ibid*, BI. 165, lineup ex. d. Construction investments v. July 23, 1944; *sa* II, pp. 376 and 380, tab. 95 and 99; Weyres v. Levetzow, p. 115 f.

Table 139 (Continuation)

<i>Armament final production in total</i>	1 174
of that:	
engines	181
ammunition	176
tank	119
weapons	118
Eye cells	73
Electrotechnical military equipment	57
Eyepiece equipment	51
Motor vehicles	42
Miscellaneous Military night device	35
Ships	27
Underwater weapons	6
powder and explosive	6
Precision mechanics and optical	
Equipment of war	5
Not more divisible rest	278
<i>Basic industry as a whole</i>	2 191
of that:	
Mining	1 384
iron and steel	243
Metal industry	3
Petroleum industry	243
chemical industry	298
woodworking Industry	9
Stones and Earth	11
<i>Rest production in total</i>	328
including:	
Foundry industry	60
Material refinement	42
food industry	40
mechanical engineering	39
semi-finished metal products, Metal-, iron ,	
Steel- and Sheet metal goods	35
sugar industry	25
Electrical engineering products	23
Vehicle industry	15

Source: **BAK, R** 3/1960, Bl. 175, "Machine investments 1943, structured according to the production of the overall expenditure plan the German economy. Greater German Reich without a protectorate (approximate values). Improved result", September 15, 1944.

As exceptionally strong as industrial assets grew and modernized, growth and modernization were disproportionate. The disproportions between Defense industry and more civil production were still blatant, as it the outline the

above table recognize. So were the listed above branches of the The majority of “other manufacturing” are branches of the armaments industry or predominantly work for the armed forces. On the other hand, a dozen other branches of primarily civilian character contributed a total of just 21 million RM, including the clothing, leather and shoe industries, printing, paper goods, ceramics and glass industries, brewing and spirits industries. Seriously disadvantaged were too branches of the Capital goods industries How the construction industry and such areas of machine, Vehicle- and shipbuilding for civil purposes and for consumer goods industries produced. In The production apparatus became outdated in these branches and areas.

During the war, the hypertrophy of the production resources industries prevailed over the consumer goods industries, which was the result of the accelerated armaments industry in the second half the thirties Years had used. That was back then the share of means of production industries the total industrial fixed investments, whose standard rate was previously below 70 percent had lain, from 75 percent (1935) on 81 Percent (1939) climbed.²³² after It is estimated that it increased to 87 percent during the war.

Table 140

Portion the Industrial departments at the industrial one fixed investments, 1936- 1944

	production		including:		Consumption	
	medium-		investment		goods-	
	industries		goods-		industries	
	(mill. RM)		industries		(mill. RM)	
		percent		percent		percent
1936	1650	76	440	20	464	21
1937	2 279	80	611	21	534	19
1938	3002	81	757	21	633	17
1939	3 671	83	911	21	722	16
1940	4 105	84	1 031	21	715	15
1941	4509	86	1 158	22	702	13
1942	4830	87	1 341	24	690	12
1943	4254	87	1 255	26	614	12
1944	3056	87	936	27	424	12

Source: Kregel, The long term Development, S. 170; Kupky, S. 398.

Wartime investment policy led to rapid and momentous changes in the capital structure. In those industries, the already on anyway were most heavily monopolized, the concentration of capital increased disproportionately. This process was significantly intensified and accelerated by an extraordinarily powerful wave of rationalization in the armaments industry.

²³³ The connection of investments and rationalization

²³² Statistical Manual from Germany 1928-1944, Munich 1949, S. 605.

²³³ Please refer II, S. 293 ff.

This led to significant advances in engineering, technology and organization Production. The most modern, thoroughly rationalized companies were mostly considered Branches of the Leading corporations newly built operations for tanks, airplanes, guns, etc., the only produced large series of one and the same type. The above-mentioned progress was concentrated in a highly one-sided manner, especially among the large arms companies and profiteers.

The different production developments in the individual industrial sectors and branches provide some information about the real effects of investment policy and rationalization and the economic disproportions that arose during the war. Of course, the figures are for 1944 other factors should also be taken into account for example, the decline in mining.

Table 141

Volume index the industrial production, 1939 and 1944 (1936 = 100; price adjusted)

	1939	1944
<i>Mining and Basic industries</i>	121.1	137.5
including:		
Mining	125.2	119.0
Iron- and Steel-, non-ferrous metal		
and Foundry industry	114.7	138.7
Chemical and Fuel industry	136.6	172.9
<i>capital goods and Construction industry</i>	137.5	165.0
including:		
Machinery-, Steel- and vehicle construction		
(including Airplane- m/d shipbuilding)	184.7	243.1
Electrical industry	173.0	171.3
Precision mechanical and optical Industry	126.4	191.4
Construction industry	73.5	28.3
<i>Consumer goods industries</i>		
including:		
Textile industry	98.7	74.1
Paper industry and Printing industry	112.6	82.4
nutritional and luxury food industry	136.0	104.0
<i>Total Industry</i>	126.2	129.1

Source: Gleitze, Bruno, East Germans Business, Berlin 1956, S. 169.

In 1944, the rapid growth of industrial capacities relevant to armaments led to a decline. The War now destroyed also in Germany more, as was built. The total amount of industrial investment was relatively high still high level, but fell compared to 1943 around almost 30 Percent. The Allied air raids reduced now the industrial substance seriously, and a growing portion the Investments - in shape as well as from capital goods as well as from Construction capacity - served the How-

the restoration of destroyed industrial and transport facilities or was for the used for above and below ground relocation.

Around August 18, 1944, the Armaments Minister suggested to the Führer that all industrial investments be suspended. Hitler, in line with his wishes, ordered "that the expansion of all industry, unless it is completed in the short term, be stopped for nine months" and that "The equipment necessary for the expansion of industry in the broadest sense (including agriculture) may initially fail."²³⁴ capacities and workforce of Mechanical engineering should be like this for the immediate armor cleared become. He was determined, said Speer in a speech to the Armaments Staff, "this cruel work..., the plunder - if we should put it so sharply - to carry out mechanical engineering radically; We have to risk broken pieces here... and perhaps have to accept one or two serious breakdowns that will be ironed out later can be."²³⁵

In the last year of the war, the balance of fixed assets changed dramatically into the negative. The height War damage plays an important role in this context. War damage industrial assets were primarily caused by air bombardments, furthermore since late autumn 1944 and especially in the last phase of the war - since January 1945 - through direct combat operations in Germany, and finally through destructive measures by German troops and departments.

The overall extent of war damage to industry is difficult to determine. But it will in the general - already under dem impression of Destruction of countless urban neighborhoods and entire cities from the air - greatly overestimated. The massed and targeted attacks by Allied air forces did not lead until spring/summer 1943 to a serious impairment industrial capacities. It was not until 1944 that continued large-scale attacks caused increasing destruction Measure the systems of entire industrial sectors. Besides that As a rule, the damage to buildings was not only more noticeable, but also much more serious than the damage to the mechanical ones Investments inside the buildings; a fact that the USSBS researchers also came across again and again.

According to Kregel's estimates for the western zones, the amount of damage resulting from the air raids was: 1943 to two percent, 1944 to ten percent and from January until April 1945 to 7.5 percent of gross industrial fixed assets from the respective previous year. Theoretically, this results in a decline in gross industrial assets of 23 percent compared to 1939; In practice, however, the current value of the destroyed or damaged systems must be calculated, ie the new value reduced by the usual depreciation rates. The estimated damage to fixed assets based on fair value was 17 percent.²³⁶

234 FB, August 18-20, 1944, Point 2.

235 BAP, FS, Movie 1740, speech v. August 21, 1944.

236 Kregel, Rolf, fixed assets, production and industrial employment in the Federal Republic from 1924 to 1956, Berlin 1958, p. 76 and passim.

Table 142

Gross and net fixed investments in West German industry, 1933-1945 (in million DM; prices as of today from 1950)

	Gross fixed capital formation	minus: depreciati on	War damage	Disman tling	Rest: net fixed capital formation
1933	619	1472			- 853
1934	1143	1504			- 361
1935	1 819	1533			+286
1936	2,366 _	1575			+792*
1937	3 113	1641			+1472
1938	3 967	1 732			+2 235
1939	4,729 _	1 857			+2 872
1940	5 261	2000			+3 255
1941	5 537	2175			+3 361*
1942	5 869	2 355			+3 514
1943	5079	2 534	876		+1669
1944	3 541	2587	4 515		-3 561
1945	778	2008	3,290 _	767	-5 287

*) difference as a result from On- and rounding.

Source: Kregel, fixed assets, p. 105. - The gross investment figures correspond to those in the previous tables due to the different currency basis do not match.

For the time since January 1944 Kregel stated: "From 1944, when the... Effect of the air attacks multiplied, In all areas of industry, the gross fixed assets of West German industry shrank so much that in the balance of investments on the one hand and war damage on the other hand, in the last sixteen months of the Second World War the gross fixed assets West German industry increased by 1 every month on average during this period v. H. reduced became, at first fewer, later significant more." ²³⁷

On average over the period examined, the Industry, even if not in all parts of "Greater Germany", so but in the later field of East zone like the the Western zones were affected to approximately the same extent.

There are no reliable estimates of the damage during the fighting on German soil. In comparison to destruction of bridges, Roads and other traffic facilities and damage to residential structures in towns and villages through shelling, house-to-house fighting and explosions, the damage to industrial facilities is likely to have been less. The final battles of the last weeks of the war made the eastern areas of Germany particularly hard - especially Berlin and the Mark Brandenburg - affected. ²³⁸

²³⁷ Ibid, S. 13 f.

²³⁸ See Barthel, Horst, The economic initial conditions of the GDR. On economic development development in the territory of the GDR 1945-1949/50, Berlin 1979, p. 42 f.

For the territory of British-American occupied territory Abelshauser festival, that “the real industrial capital stock ... in the years 1936 to 1945 grew by 20.6 percent despite the bombings and - in the last years of the war - a lack of investment. "On the other hand, the increase in capacity without war damage would have been *ceteris paribus* 38 Percent of base assets amount.”²³⁹ According to the Statistics from Kregel provide more detailed values.

Table 143

Gross and net fixed assets of West German industry, 1933-1945 (in billion DM; prices as of today from 1950)

	Gross fixed assets	Net fixed assets
1933	51.11	25.82
1934	50.58	25.21
1935	50.58	25.18
1936	51.18	25.72
1937	52.42	26.85
1938	54.46	28.70
1939	57.29	31.25
1940	60.61	34.32
1941	64.33	37.63
1942	68.48	41.06
1943	71.66	43.66
1944	69.72	42.72
May 1, 1945*	61.80	37.20

*) Estimate of the Germans Institute for Economic research.

Source: Kregel, Capital assets, S. 16; S. 23; S. 94; p. 96.

Puts man the estimate for the 1. May 1945 in proportion to the stand from 1936 and 1939, like this is obtained from gross fixed assets Incremental rates of 20.75 or 7.87 percent, i.e. i.e., the The level of gross fixed assets at the end of the war was around almost 21 percent over dem state of 1936 and still almost eight percent above that of 1939.

From the statistics of gross fixed assets it is possible to - compared to net investment wealth statistics - more informative values with regard to the real production capacity, since "industrial plants generally emit goods to an approximately equal extent throughout their entire (average) technical lifespan."²⁴⁰ The calculations based on net fixed assets, i.e. on the basis of the current value of the plants, result in contrast significant higher Percentages (44.6 or. 19 Percent),

²³⁹ Abelshauser, Werner, Economy in West Germany 1945 to 1948. Reconstruction and growth conditions in the American and British Zone, Stuttgart 1975, S. 118. - From „omission investments" can in relation on the Industry only for 1944/45 the be speech .

²⁴⁰ Ibid, S. 114 f.

because this reflects the high average level of newness of industrial assets as a result of the significant investments made during the war years. Similar values certainly apply to the area of the Soviet occupied zone.²⁴¹

The fixed assets West German industry is ultimately also for the approximate low point after the Great Depression (January 1, 1935) and for the peak during the war (1. January 1944) compared to May 1, 1945 been.

Table 144

Gross and net fixed assets the West German Industry, 1. January 1935, 1. January 1944, 1. May 1945 (in billion DM; prices as of 1950)

	Gross fixed assets	Net fixed assets
1. January 1935	50.4	25.0
1. January 1944	72.7	44.5
1. May 1945	61.8	37.2

Source: Kregel, Capital assets, S. 16; S. 23.

So has the Scope of the Investments in the Industry the Bomb and other war damage was far outweighed. At the end of the war, Germany actually had a stronger industrial potential than at the beginning of the war. The consequences of the investment boom were also reflected in the age composition and the "quality level" the industrial investment funds, which reached their "most favorable constellation" at the end of the war had.²⁴² However, this potential was limited by the hypertrophy of the primary industries that were important to the war effort the synthetic production, and the Armaments industry in in the narrower sense as well as through capital reductions in many branches of the consumer goods industry structurally deformed. The collapse of the infrastructure, especially the transport system, would also paralyze it for a long time.

The history of German industry in the first post-war years is already different Theme. In this context, new economic facts must be analyzed (conversion to a peacetime economy, dismantling and reparations, underinvestment, unbundling, effects of zone separation and the division of Germany). But above all, play included basic political Changes one Role, the one diametrically

241 Whether for the areas east of the Oder and Neisse, for Austria and for It is unclear whether the values in Polish territories annexed from 1939 to 1945 are to be expected to differ more strongly. Certainly rose the Investment rate in 1943 and 1944 in these areas faster than in the rest of the empire; for the years 1940 and 1941 probably applies rather the Reverse. With Security too high is seized The following general statement about the war damage in the GDR: "In sum, however, the war damage exceeded the increase in capacity" (Handbook for Economic History, Vol. 2, Berlin 1981, S. 1047); also the statement that in the industry "a total of about 40 "Percent of existing capacities have been destroyed" (Barthel, p. 44) is incorrect.

242 Abelshauser, S. 124 ff.; S. 129. Under "Grade of quality". the The ratio of net to gross investment assets is understood.

opposites Course in the Soviet Union and in the western occupation zones .

The investigated facts of the German war economy pressed nonetheless left its mark on post-war history. They strip the West German “economic miracle” of the “free market economy” of all miraculous appearances. "Anyone who believes in the 'economic miracle'," as Kregel stated as early as 1958, albeit cautiously, "is diminished in his 'proof' of the Federal Republic's pre-war productive capacity only about the war-related capacity losses and does not take into account the capacity growth that occurred at the same time."²⁴³

However, behind the sober numbers there was a frightening reality. The accumulated wealth of industrial assets that had survived war and bombing and now served as an invaluable foundation for the Federal Republic's economic rise had been paid for dearly, paid for from the actual ones losers of the war. German workers, foreigners, prisoners of war and concentration camp inmates had created those values, under a regime of exploitation and lawlessness, cruel suffering and tens of thousands of hunger and death; They had the population of occupied territories with their impoverishment paid for. Yes, the German population also paid according to that May 1945 for as she months and Years experienced severe shortages and ultimately lost nine tenths of their financial savings due to the currency reform, while their industrial assets were lost at full or greater value the DM opening balances are used became.

The same facts of the war situation were also at work in the territory of the later GDR. The view held by various people that the war investments reduced the industrial gap in this area compared to western Germany may apply to certain areas, such as mechanical and vehicle construction, where the catch-up generally began in the last years before the war. But the lack of basic industries, especially hard coal mining, ferrous metallurgy and the cement industry, also made up for this branches of the chemical industry became even more important after the end of the war. In terms of industrial investments, which were carried out in this part of Germany during the war years, in contrast to the West, apparently to one larger percentage around pure arms investments,

d. H. around such Facilities that immediately and lld exclusively for the Wehrmacht produced and became the largest after the end of the war part of fell victim to dismantling or as Reparations payments for the USSR dismantled became.

243 Kregel, Capital assets, S. 15.

Chapter VIII

The War financing

From Manfred Oertel

The German rearmament created numerous prerequisites for a rapid changeover the economy on the to ensure war, including also in the field of currency and finance. "Germany had thereby in not to improvise any new methods of economic management and financing in the first months of the war... Probably one the biggest advantages compared to 1914 is in it too see, that 1939 dem German Empire a tightly centralized Tax and financial system was available." ¹

The financing of war encompasses "at the same time a monetary and a goods economic problem. The problem of goods procurement for the national economy is the following question: How does the state procure the goods necessary for waging war? As a problem of state finance, the parallel monetary question is: How does the state pay for the goods necessary for warfare?" ² Warfare requires "a whole system of economic policy measures to control production, investment and consumption. The Main task just exists in that the War finance policy with the All of these measures are brought into line." ³

The Nazi regime guaranteed through its tax policy, through unrestricted borrowing and state money creation as well as through ruthless exploitation of external sources on the one hand, and through price policy, draconian rationing and quotas as well as various other coercive measures on the other in all phases of the war such a "harmony", like this that the Those involved got their money's worth - the Armament companies "plundering the state treasury" (Lenin) as did the Wehrmacht, which was supplied with weapons, military equipment, consumer goods, etc. without serious financial difficulties .

The War financing as a component of systems the War economy includes

- the editions of State for the Armed Forces and other editions of the State in interest or in context with warfare;
- the application the in addition required Funds through the Country, the Sources for this

Lapp, Klaus, The financing the World Wars 1914/18 and 1939/45 in Germany, Nuremberg 1957, S. 79.

2 Lanter, Max, The Financing of War. Sources, methods and solutions from the Middle Ages to the end of the Second World War 1939 to 1945, Lucerne 1950, p. 17.

3 Lanter, p. 68.

expenses that Methods of Procurement including of their Results and Effects that partly only became visible after the war. ⁴

1. War expenses of State

As Germany's war expenditure as part of war financing 1939 to 1945 are to be evaluated:

1) the Wehrmacht budget in the Reich budget. The Wehrmacht budget includes direct expenditure for the Wehrmacht. They include personnel expenses and material expenses of a wide variety of types, i.e. expenses for salaries, food, clothing, accommodation, weapons and equipment as well as for a wide variety of military and other expenses supplies, those from the The Wehrmacht was used and used up - **Ammunition** , fuel and lubricants, animal feed, etc. If used against payment, services provided for military purposes must also be included.

2) expenses for family support and survivors' benefits. These expenses were mostly reported as civil expenses. The nature of the matter dictates that it be counted as military expenditure; Ultimately, they represented the necessary supplement to the salary.

3) Furthermore, all other expenditure of the state - both from the Reich budget and from the budgets of the states and municipalities -, which are in the interest of or in connection with the warfare was carried out, as War expenses to regard. In Based on the definition of "war production" ⁵, this applies to all financial state expenditure that was not clearly and exclusively intended for civilian purposes and corresponded to the normal peacetime needs in the civilian sector as War expenses in a broader sense to be considered: state investments for primarily or exclusively military-related infrastructure, for state armaments companies; expenditure to ensure the functionality of the economy during war, protective structures for the state, the economy and the population; direct government support or equity participation in private defense companies; Expenses for the development and expansion of non-productive areas important to the war effort (administrative apparatus and hospitals) as well as costs that were borne by the state due to the war-related rationalization in the economy and administration.

Furthermore, the compensation figures for bombs made during the war and other war damage must be taken into account. The cost of financing itself - Interest payments for those borrowed to finance the war Loans of the Empire - make up a significant amount.

⁴ Expenditure in the rearmament period before the war and post-war expenditure However, they are not part of war financing.

⁵ Please refer II, S. 327.

a) The Expenses page of Imperial budget

The bulk of Germany's war expenditure was met from the Reich treasury; In this respect, the war expenses are to be attributed to the Reich budget, even if the financial burden is not small to the states and municipalities carry goods. The Total scope of this The type of expenditure is difficult to determine exactly.

After 1939, no information was provided about the imperial budget of the German Reich published by the Reich government. Reliable, if sometimes incomplete, post-war publications on the amount of income, expenditure and most important items in the imperial budget are based on administrative documents found at Reich authorities and in their archives, which occasionally did not come without estimates. The information contained in the "Statistical Handbook of Germany 1928-1944" ⁶ are generally acceptable, even if individual items are quantified slightly differently in the literature based on more recent research and as a result of different structuring.

During the course of the war, the Reich's expenditure increased to several times the pre-war expenditure. Exact overviews that really included all relevant items were not possible, even during the war be set up. Sources of error were unavoidable in the pursuit of secrecy as well as the fact that due to the insufficient level of revenue from taxes and customs duties, the financial resources missing to cover costs are virtually per se The stroke of a pen was obtained through credit, although no precise records were kept of either the provision of funds or the demands made during the war years. In the Practice of household management was during the war everyone Planning neglected. ⁷

Table 145
expenditure of Imperial budget after accounting years, 1939/1940-1944/1945 (in billion RM)

Financial year (April-March)	Total expenses	including: Wehrmacht	in percent
1939/40	52.1	32.3	62.00
1940/41	78.0	58.1	74.49
1941/42	101.9	75.6	74.19
1942/43	128.6	96.9	75.35
1943/44	153.0	117.9	77.06
1944/45	171.3	128.4	74.96

Source: Statistical Handbook of Germany 1928-1944, S. 555. After: Currency and economy in Germany 1876-1975, Frankfurt a. M. 1976, p. 400, those apply Figures 1944/45 until the end of the war.

⁶ Statistical Handbook of Germany 1928-1944. Published by the State Council of the American Occupation area, Munich 1949.

⁷ The formal basis for budget management was provided, among other things, by Göring's regulation to simplify the budget Housekeeping in Rich and countries in the accounting year 1941 from the February 12, 1941 (RGBl. II, p. 37): "Securing the resources necessary for the defense of the Reich is the absolute priority priority above all remaining public Expenses." (§1). See also regulation above the

Table 146

editions of Imperial budget after war years, August 26, 1939 - May 8, 1945 (in **billion RM**)

	Total expenses	including: Wehrmacht (excluding family support)	in percent
8/26/39-31. 8.39	1.33	0.92	69.17
1.9.39 -31. 8.40	57.63	38.04	66.01
1.9.40 -31. 8.41	81.47	55.89	68.60
1.9.41 -31. 8.42	102.36	72.31	70.64
1.9.42 -31. 8.43	125.85	86.19	68.49
1.9.43 -31. 8.44	149.39	99.44	66.56
1.9.44 - 12/31/44	49.99	31.53	63.07
1.1.45 - 8th. 5.45	47.70	30.60	64.15
8/26/39 - 8th. 5.45	615.72	414.92	67.39

Source: **BAK, R** 2/21781, "Net overview of cash receipts and expenses from the start of the war (August 26, 1939) to the end of December 1944", January 11, 1945. Issues for 1.1.45-8.5.45 according to Boelcke, Willi A., *The Costs of Hitler's War*, Paderborn 1985, p. 98.

The expenses for loan repayment are not taken into account in the tables. Their classification is extremely problematic; On the one hand, the information about the height is very different, on the other hand, they have numbers given the ongoing New debt only fictional character. According to Boelcke, "that presented itself German war financing mainly as the implementation of huge mountains of debt." ⁸ The payments for family maintenance still have to be included in the Wehrmacht's expenditure; in the According to the Reich budget system, they were part of civil expenditure. ⁹

b) expenditure the Wehrmacht

The expenditure of the Wehrmacht as ongoing and one-off expenditure of the regular budget and as Expenditures of the extraordinary (war) budget affect in several individual plans, household parts, numerous chapters and many individual titles material expenses,

Household management in the Reich in the financial year 1941 from March 26, 1941 (RGBl. II, S. 85): "Until the Reich budget plan for the financial year 1941 has been completed, the funds to maintain the Imperial administration or to Fulfillment of the Tasks and legal obligations of "The Reich's necessary expenses must be paid." (§ 1).

⁸ Boelcke, Willi A., *The Costs of Hitler's War*. War financing and financial war legacy in Germany 1933-1948, Paderborn 1985, p. 98.

⁹ Schwerin by Krosigk, Lutz count, How was World War II financed? In: Balance sheet of the Second World War, Oldenburg 1953, p. 322, gives one Total of 24 billion RM for Family maintenance payments until February 28, 1945. Andexel, Ruth, imperialism - state finances, Armament, war, Berlin 1968, S. 112, comes to a total RM24.9 billion. After Federau, Fritz, *The Second World War*. Its financing in Germany, Tübingen 1962, p. 59, payments for family maintenance amounted to RM27.53 billion (see Table 149).

personnel expenses and administrative expenses. It However, they are not yet budget documents the Wehrmacht known those more than a fragmentary one look into the spending structure and the Wehrmacht's budget bureaucracy could be won over.

Out of one secret Write of OKW at the Reich Minister the Finance from the January 11, 1943 on the Reich budget plan 1942¹⁰ are as follows "binding "target numbers". Budget plans of OKW and the Wehrmacht parts visible: ongoing and one-off expenses from the regular budget totaling 1.6 billion RM; Expenses of the extraordinary budget for the army 49.0 billion RM, for the Navy 9.5 billion. RM, for the air force 25.17 billion RM; for 1942 a total of 85.27 billion RM.¹¹

As of the end of November 1944, expenditure for the Wehrmacht during the war totaled around 376.57 billion **RM**.¹²

Furthermore, archive documents only show that the command authorities, staffs and departments carried out budget planning work every year until the end of the war, but probably never submitted them and were combined into an overall plan.¹³

The material expenses for armament and equipment, for tanks, artillery, aircraft, ships, for motor vehicles, for ammunition (including explosives, mines, rocket projectiles, etc.) as well as for the countless different consumption and supplies, Fuels and lubricants etc. undoubtedly made up the majority of the mass use of materials and technology the Wehrmacht expenditure.¹⁴ Illustrative are Declarations above the individual costs

10 **BAK, R 2/21778**, Write of Bosses of **OKW** at the Reich Minister the finance, re: Reich budget plan 1942, January 11, 1943. The Writing included that Annual financial statements of **OKW** to the Reich Minister of Finance.

11 Continuing expenses of regular budget the pre-war period ongoing maintenance of the Wehrmacht. Procurement, construction work, etc. caused one-off expenses. They fell with the war ongoing expenses formally eliminated; Issues of this kind were (such as almost all Wehrmacht expenditure during the war) was carried out in the extraordinary budget. Expenses remained from the regular budget During the war, as one-off editions, it was only a follow-up to some projects from earlier years.

12 **BAK, R 2/21781**, letter RMdF (Department I to Department V), "Preparatory work for the peace agreement", December 16, 1944. After one Instruction from the September 16, 1940 became within of RMdF re:

"Preparatory work for the peace agreements" monthly the expenses for the Wehrmacht and the expenses of civil administrations the war budget recorded since the beginning of the war. The total expenditure for the upgrade was around RM 62 billion. The original intentions of this "preparatory work" may have faded into the background as the war progressed.

13 The Catholic field bishop left behind both the "economic plan of the Wehrmacht High Command for the financial year 1943 (war budget)" as well as the one for 1944, but without any Number entries. (**BA/MA, RH 15/278**). Also from the "economic plan of High Command of the Wehrmacht for the financial year 1945 (war budget)" only unfilled forms can be found. (**BA/MA, RW 6/v. 35**). Are noteworthy still some Individual titles regarding their content: Title 39: Spiritual care of the Troop by supplying field newspapers and home newspapers; Title 42: Graves care: a) Costs for the creation of honorary cemeteries, subsidies to communities for honorary groves and design of the gravesites of soldiers buried in community cemeteries; b) Costs for the care and maintenance of graves located in cemeteries not owned by the Reich.

14 See. Geyer, Michael, German Armament policy 1860-1980, Frankfurt a. M. 1984, S. 13.

one of many aircraft types. Airplane production In terms of value, it made up around 40 percent of the total armament.

Table 147
Prices from airframes, 1941 (in RM)

	Me 109E	Ju88A	Hey 111 H	Ju 87 b	Yu 52
Price ever cell	58 800	245 200	203 900	100 300	125 000
Price with Engines)	85 970	306950	265 650	131 175	163 000
Built until 1945 (pcs.)	35000	15 000	7000	57000	

Source: Groehler, air war, S. 495 f. All Prices without Armament and other Equipment.

According to Speer, the construction of the “Atlantic Wall” alone consumed 13.3 million cubic meters Concrete worth **RM3.7 billion**.¹⁵

The then Reich Finance Minister later commented on the waste with regard to Wehrmacht expenditure: “The lack of any control gave expenditure a significant boost. Because even if they Price review bodies the Wehrmacht worked effectively and the budget officers of the old school, especially in the army and navy, tried to keep their thumbs on the bag, still broke through again and again the consciousness, out to be able to operate all dams to their full potential. The same effect could have been achieved with significantly smaller amounts of money.”¹⁶

A considerable part of the expenditure for the Wehrmacht was made up of personnel expenditure (salary, food, accommodation and other soldier support purposes). The general basis for this, in conjunction with the Reich Salary Regulations and other legal provisions, was the “Law on Salaries, Food, Accommodation, Clothing and Medical Care for Members of the Wehrmacht during Special Operations (Operations Wehrmacht Fees Act)” of August 28, 1939 (RGBl. I, p. 1531). According to this law, all members of the Wehrmacht received military pay, which was divided into three Rates on the I., Paid in advance on the 11th and 21st of the month.

Table 148
military pay for the Wehrmacht members at “special Use in RM)

Pay group	Recipient	Monthly amount
1	Commander in Chief one Wehrmacht part	300
2	colonels general, admirals general, generals, Admirals	240
3	lieutenant general, Vice admirals	210
4	major generals, Rear Admirals	180
5	Top, Captains to lake	150

¹⁵ Spear, Memories, S. 363.

¹⁶ Schwerin v. Krosigk, Lutz Graf, Supplement in: Hitler, Germany and the powers. Edited by Manfred Funke, Düsseldorf 1976, p. 315.

Table 148 (Continuation)

Salary group	recipient	monthly amount
6	lieutenant colonels, Frigate captains	120
7	majors, Lieutenant Commanders	108
8	captains, Lieutenant Captain	96
9	first lieutenants	81
10	lieutenants	72
11	staff sergeant major, staff sergeant, Senior sergeant and equals	60
12	sergeants, Senior Ensigns	54
13	sergeants, ensigns, Chief Mate	45
14	non-commissioned officers, Mates	42
15	corporals, corporals, privates, sailors, Aviator (after 2 years active Service)	36
16	senior riflemen, Protect, sailors, Aviator (so far not military pay group 15)	30

Source: Deployment Christmas Fee Act (so).

With the payment of Military pay fell for the conscripts the "wages" gone, the for soldiers 0.50 RM and for privates 0.75 RM per day had.

The "peace fees" of professional soldiers (salary according to the Reich salary regulations, housing allowance u. a.) became in the home territory paid on. It became only a "compensation amount" for those at the front or in military pay paid to the unit will be deducted. The compensation amount could not be higher than the military pay that the Wehrmacht member received from the military treasury according to his rank. The compensation amount took marital status and children into account; it amounted to up to 20 percent of the peace fees. Married people with five or more children were not entitled to any compensation deducted.

The amount, if any, reduced by the compensation amount Peace pledges resulted from the 25 salary groups and the assigned tariff classes for housing benefit subsidies.¹⁷ Afterwards they received Commander in Chief the Wehrmacht parts and the Chief of **OKW 26 550 RM** annual salary. Generals the different Degrees got between 24 000 and **16 000 RM. Colonels/captains at sea received** 12 annually in grade **5 600 RM**. Majors and lieutenant colonels had an annual salary of up to 9,700 RM. For the captains were depending on the seniority level between 4 800 and 6,900 RM, for First lieutenant and lieutenant between 2 400 and 4,200 **RM** provided. The Sergeants could as Staff sergeant on 2 934 RM come. The Salary group 25 saw as lowest Amount 1 410 RM for privates, ie **117.50 RM per month.**

According to Section 7 of the EWGG became one for all ranks same front allowance granted. It was seen as "compensation for the deteriorated living conditions that members of the Wehrmacht faced during special deployment due to prolonged combat operations and enemy

17 RGBI. I 1940, S. 340.

"exposed to proximity" but "no combat or danger allowance" should be paid. This front-line allowance was calculated on a daily basis, paid out subsequently and partially offset against other allowances. It was one mark per day.

A special feature presented the "Africa allowance" represents. It was paid for a stay in Africa, not offset against other allowances and only paid out after returning from Africa or on holiday in Germany - for officers four **RM**, non-commissioned officers three **RM** and enlisted men two marks per day.¹⁸

The food and accommodation for the Wehrmacht members caused corresponding financial expenditure by the local departments, directorates, catering departments and military district administrations; According to the operational Wehrmacht catering regulations (EW Ver pfl.V.-HDV 86/1) it was a cash compensation for self-catering a daily rate of 1.20 **RM** was set. Various individual decrees specified the monetary value of the food received by the troops from the magazine stocks. It corresponded to the price level at the time.¹⁹

The Guidelines for the Compensation for accommodation (published in HVBI. A) demanded, "professional tariff rates" not to be exceeded, "Off-season prices" and also "for economic reasons, on timely payment for everyone "To attach absolute value to the amounts to be reimbursed by the Reich".²⁰

At the equipment with Uniforms or. clothing played Funds in this respect an immediate one Role, as officers even in war after § 5 EEC accordingly the Peace settlements for procurement and maintaining the uniform and certain equipment themselves. After the initial clothing was free of charge, they received a monthly clothing allowance of 30 euros. **RM**. For non-commissioned officers appointed as officers during the war and teams gave it One-off clothing allowance of 350 **RM** (Army/Air Force) or. 500,- until 700,- **RM** (Navy). However were when purchasing from clothing Imperial clothing card and Reference certificate to present.²¹ Teams drafted received unique five **RM** cleaning supplies allowance; at the through no fault of their own Loss of self-produced items Clothing and equipment aid could be granted.²² Even before the war, there were financial regulations that "indigent conscripts ... at convocations for military service for the Trip from whereabouts until for the Place of delivery paid for in advance with travel expenses if they submit a corresponding application to their municipality in a timely manner and present the production order It was said for the community then: „The Community ... pays in the However, usually not earlier than 24 hours ago the necessary Departure to the place of delivery." Furthermore: "The communities are obliged to adopt the path that appears to be the most favorable for the Reich treasury, with the best ones links for the Purpose the Trip used become can and whose use

18 Please refer Absolon, Rudolf, The army in the third Reich, Vol. V, September 1st 1939 to December 18, 1941, Boppard 1988, p. 357.

19 See Albath, Max/Kretschmer, Karl/Petzold, Compensation for special deployment of the Wehrmacht, Vol. II, Berlin 1940, p. 59 ff.

20 Ibid, S. 340 ff.

21 Ibid, S. 107 ff.

22 Ibid, S. 129.

also corresponds to traffic customs." ²³ For the rest there was it for all precise and binding regulations, implementation and implementing provisions for each conceivable individual question.

To supply the Paying offices and directorates of the Wehrmacht with The relevant regulations stipulated that the army coffers had to be connected to the Reichsbank giro system. According to their demands, they received cash in exchange for "green checks". In case of unexpected need for money places in which there was no Reichsbankanstalt, the army treasuries were able to obtain cash payments from the public finance treasury "on recognition", that is, by virtue of their authority as army treasuries. ²⁴

c) Family support

For family support of soldiers called up for military service - In official information, it is usually assigned to the civil expenditure of the Reich - significant resources were spent.

Table 149

expenditure of Rich. for family support, 1. September 1939-8. May 1945 (in billion RM)

1st year of the war	3.20
2. War year	4.27
3. War year	5.17
4. War year	4.89
5. War year	5.80
1.9.44 - 8.5.45	4.20
<i>In total:</i>	27.53

Source: Federau, S. 59.

The payment of family maintenance was based on a combination, so to speak Application of the Operational Wehrmacht Fees Act of August 28, 1939 and the Family Support Act of March 30, 1936 (RGBl. I, p. 327) or the later deployment family maintenance law (EFUG) from 26. June 1940 (RGBl. I S. 911). ²⁵ § 9 of the Operational Wehrmacht Fees Act from 1939 particular: „Those relatives the Wehrmacht, through

²³ Kretschmer, **Karl**, severance pay Convocation for the active military service, to Exercises of Leave of absence and in the event of dismissals. A collection of decrees, Berlin 1937, p. 18 f.

²⁴ Please refer Albath/Kretschmer/Petzold, S. 398.

²⁵ The various legal provisions on family support/family maintenance revealed a certain duality until June 1940. See also RGBl. I 1939, p. 1225, Ordinance supplementing and implementing the Family Support Act (Family Support Ordinance - FU-DVO -) of July 11, 1939; **RGBl. I** 1939, p. 1563, Ordinance on family support during special deployment of the Wehrmacht (Deployment Family Support Ordinance - Deployment FUV -) from September 1, 1939. Only the ordinance implementing and supplementing the Deployment Family Support Act (EFU-DV) of June 26, 1940 (RGBl. I, S. 912) abolished

1.7. 1940 one standardized Basis.

whose conscription into the armed forces means that the maintenance of their relatives or the fulfillment of their other obligations is no longer guaranteed, receive family maintenance for themselves, their families or dependents." The actual recipients were therefore those called up even if the payment of family support also to the relatives at home or took place at the place of residence. Although family support, different from the peacekeeping fees of professional soldiers are regulated under the responsibility of the Reich Minister of the Interior and are regulated by the urban and rural districts paid was, it was the creature to attribute direct war expenditure to the Wehrmacht are.

When assessing family support, "the previous living conditions and the income received by members of the Wehrmacht during peacetime were to be taken into account." The following applies: "The continuation of the household, taking into account the restrictions required by the special deployment, the preservation of the property and the Fulfillment of obligations assumed should be ensured to an acceptable extent."

After § 4 of EFUG were four fifths of the costs of family maintenance reimbursed to the city and rural districts by the Reich. The family maintenance payments were therefore not entirely borne by the Reich treasury. From reports from the mayor the City of Stralsund to the district president in Stettin shows, for example, how plentiful 50 000 city with population through the Family support payments financially was charged.

Table 150

Financial Burden the City Stralsund for family support, 1940/1941 until 1943/1944 (in RM)

accounting year	
1940/41	233 000
1941/42	216 000
1942/43	303 000
1943/44	252 000

Source: City archives Stralsund, T 1454-1458 .

The granting of family support depended on the submission of an application; Family maintenance should be granted at a maintenance rate adapted to local circumstances and not in addition lead, that dem those entitled to his There were more **resources** available for current essential living needs compared to the time before the call-up .

In the event of captivity, missingness or internment in a neutral foreign country, the Family support continues to be paid. In the event of of death during After military service, family support still had to be paid for three months, unless higher survivors' salaries took effect immediately.

With the relatively generous assessment of family support and the Payment of survivor's benefit was not least the Intention prevails, dissatisfaction under the population should be avoided as far as possible.²⁶

26 See Speer, Memories, S. 229. Please refer also I, S. 83 f.

d) More, covered and indirect War expenses

Extensive additional expenditure was made by the Reich, states and municipalities in the interests of warfare or in connection with it.

The internal one correspondence in the Reich Ministry Finance ²⁷ refers to such "expenditures by the civil administration of the Reich during the war from the extraordinary (war) budget". These were expenditures in particular for

- defense industry special tasks,
- transport economics Measures the Reich government,
- expenditure the Traffic management in the occupied Eastern areas - inland shipping, Road traffic, subsidies for special funds in the occupied eastern territories,
- Road construction demands the Wehrmacht,
- war construction program,
- fortifications,
- granting from advances at particularly important defense factories,
- Reich subsidies for the costs of the state food authorities, the food authorities and economic offices,
- relocation and franking purposes.

Individual items often amounted to several hundred million RM. Expenditures amounting to billions related to compensation and advance payments according to the War Damage Ordinance. ²⁸ At the end of 1944, these civil administrative expenses from the extraordinary budget for the period up to November 1944 were estimated at 84.45 billion RM. ²⁹

One Listing the The municipality of Stralsund has this the following additional financial burdens:

Table 151

War-related Special editions in Stralsund, 1940/1941 until 1943/1944 (in RM)

	Air protection measures	Salary of auxiliary staff	nutritional and business office	Increased police protection	Furnishin gs _one auxiliary hospital
1940/41	73500	241 000	40000	7500	
1941/42	31000	253 000	65000		
1942/43	80000	254000	90000		102 000
1943/44	60500	273 500	113 000		33000

Source: City archives Stralsund, T 1454-1458 .

²⁷ BAK, R 2/21778 and 21781. Please refer Note 12.

²⁸ RGBI. I 1940, S. 1547, War Property Damage Ordinance (KSSchVO), from the November 30, 1940.

²⁹ BAK, R 2/21781. Please refer Note 12.

2. Decent Budget revenue

The war expenditure was offset by income from the Reich budget from taxes, customs duties and “other ordinary income” only to a limited extent. The war could only be financed as Unity of regular (ordinary) income of the empire and (extraordinary) income from bonds.³⁰

The sum of around 185 billion RM in imperial revenue from taxes and customs duties during the war is generally recognized in the literature.³¹

Table 152

Imperial budget, income from taxes and ?oilen by accounting year, 1939/1940 to 1944/1945 (in billion RM)

	Steer and duties	with war contributions from the states and communities
1939/40	24.2	25.0
1940/41	27.5	28.9
1941/42	32.3	33.7
1942/43	42.7	44.3
1943/44	38.0	40.0
1944/45	37.5	40.0

Source: Statistical Manual from Germany 1928-1944, S. 555.

Table 153

imperial budget, revenue out of Steer and 7.öllen after war years, 1. September 1939 - 8th. May 1945 (in billion RM)

	Steer and duties
1.9.39- 31.8.40	24.93
1.9.40-31.8.41 _	28.72
1.9.41-31.8.42 _	33.09
9/1/42 - 8/31/43	44.63
9/1/43 - 8/31/44	33.93
1.9.44- 8.5.45	19.50
<i>Together:</i>	184.80

Source: Federau, S. 32.

30 See. RGBI. II 1930, S. 693, Imperial budget regulations.

31 Detailed Declarations above the tax income s. in the Attachment to this one Cape. (Tab. 160-164).

a) The Tax system in Germany to beginning of war

The German Reich decreed to start of war over a detailed and developed long-term tax system geared to war requirements. The German leadership was aware of the advantages³² the financing of war expenses through taxes consciously and strive to ensure this source of the war financing in possible high dimensions to exploit. In particular, the final nature of tax revenues, the later aftermath largely excluded, given the unpleasant experience of inflation as a result of war financing in 1914 - In their eyes, 1918 was a significant one advantage. Again, get it, like this also in December 1942, the Reichsbank ruled: "Taxes have the main advantage that they irretrievably drain purchasing power and have a final mean covering the costs of war; so in a sense they create clean table."³³

The tax financing but also has disadvantages. Reich Economics Minister Funk, who was also President of the Reichsbank, himself said in 1943: "You sometimes hear that the war must alone be financed by taxes. But it's not that easy in practice."³⁴ When applying the tax screw, it always had to be taken into account that the tax financing was a direct burden on the population had a direct influence on the mood of broad sections of the people, on their willingness to perform and make sacrifices.

At the start of the war in 1939, there was more of a depressed, foreboding mood among the German population than, how at the beginning of the First World War, spread readiness for war and willingness to sacrifice occurred would be. This the leadership tried to take this situation into account throughout the war, even after the Wehrmacht's initial blitzkrieg successes.

So it was said in the confidential Reichsbank case "Basic Questions of War Financing" of October 3, 1939, after the end of the Polish campaign and in view of a certain lack of clarity about the further course of the war, the "operational step of a radical control of income above the subsistence level ... would be straightened out stifle what we urgently need today: the initiative of our chemists, technicians, skilled workers, exporters, etc. These considerations do not change anything demand that the tax is the main source of war financing have to be. But they show that limits of the tax screw."³⁵ Such problems taxation was already in place. Period of rearmament and preparation for war has been taken into account. The tax system in place at the start of the war, created up to that point and further supplemented by the War Economy Ordinance, allows this recognize.

The pillars of this system. Firstly, taxes were raised income and wealth with income tax (including payroll tax) and corporate income tax as the most important sources of tax revenue of empire, the also while of war in the entourage increased A-

32 Please refer Köllner, Lutz, Armament financing. Demonic and Reality, Frankfurt a. M. 1970, S. 28 ff.

33 BAP, German Reichsbank, No. 7132, BI. 55.

34 Quoted by Krafft, H., It was always about money. One hundred and fifty years Sparkasse in Berlin, Berlin 1968, **see** 174.

35 BAP, German Reichsbank, No. 7004, BI. 206 u. S. 209.

come and Win one significant increase learned and on the after the **KWVO** from the 4. September 1939 still War surcharge raised became.

Also worth mentioning is the wealth tax, which brings in around half a billion RM annually. The Inheritance tax provided yearly plenty 100 **mill. RM**, something more the "Provision levy". Other taxes to be classified here according to the formal classification amounted to: on comparatively only small amounts, for example the levy the Supervisory board members, the Reich flight tax, traveling trade tax and fire protection tax.

The second pillar of the tax system, the taxes on capital transactions, is almost half of it Billion RM annually and none increase in the war included such Taxes such as capital transfer tax, totalizator tax and other racing betting taxes, lottery taxes, exchange tax, Document tax.

Thirdly, the Taxes on sales and transport overall increased slightly during the war, but always remained below five billion RM. The main post was the sales tax. While the Transport tax opposite the Having doubled in size before the war, the income ran out the vehicle tax (as a result of the decommissioning of private motor vehicles or their takeover by the Wehrmacht) fell to half.

Fourth, taxes on consumption and expenditure were sufficient from tobacco tax, beer tax and revenue the brandy monopoly (for this, after the **KWVO** levied a war surcharge) via sugar tax, mineral oil tax and a variety of tax types barely ten **mill. RM** brought annually. Compared to the pre-war period, increases only resulted from the data collected war surcharges.

The income from income tax (including wage tax) originally flowed to the states of the Reich too. In the Weimar Republic received the Reich Tax sovereignty for income and Property tax. The income tax law from the October 16, 1934 (**RGBl. I, S. 1005**). "for the public Financial economics on the one hand and for the burden on the German economy, on the other hand, the most significant law within the framework of the National Socialist regime tax reform". It served after more contemporary opinion also in addition, "To give a breakthrough to National Socialism's tax policy ideas without reducing tax revenue sink 36 The income tax change ^{laws} from 1938 and 1939 prepared the Income tax legislation continues to affect the Requirements of the coming War before (**RGBl. I 1938, p. 121 and I 1939, p. 297**).

The fascist Racial politics found your Precipitation in the "Failure the Kinderer moderation for children, the Jews are" and in the fundamental Classification of Jews in the highest tax group **1**.³⁷

The corporation tax covered the profits of corporations of various forms as non-natural legal entities. Since 1925, a uniform 20 percent of profits had to be paid to the Reich. In 1936 the tax rate was increased to 30 percent and in 1938 to 40 percent.

Income/payroll tax and corporate tax brought the largest tax revenues for the Reich treasury, only slightly fewer the Value added tax. The countries of Reichs received

36 Blümich, Walter, income tax law, Berlin 1943, S. 4 f.

37 Ibid, S. 5 ff.

in accordance with the respective financial equalization law a certain share of the revenue income, corporate and sales tax. After Law of 21st February 1940 (RGBl. I, S. 391) this proportion was from 1. October 1939 maximum 25 RM per resident in the relevant area Land, at least 17 RM.

The "application levy" which during the war amounted to a good quarter of a billion annually was due to measures in connection with the Dawes reparations plan. In 1924, according to the "Industrial Pollution Act" (RGBl. II, p. 257) and the "Application Act" (RGBl. II, p. 269) the "industrial and commercial entrepreneurs Companies... weight the interest rate and repayment of an amount totaling 5 billion gold marks. According to the Industrial Banking Act of 1931 (RGBl. I, p. 124), the repayment levy was only supposed to last until the accounting year levied in 1936. But punctually on June 17, 1936 (RGBl. I, p. 511) the Reich Minister of Finance was authorized to order that the contribution levy for the financial year 1937 and the had to be collected further in the following financial years. That's how they became amounts determined in accordance with the company's assets will continue to be collected.

In a similar way it was the "Reich Flight Tax" above the original one Maintained beyond purpose. In the December 1931 per Emergency regulation as one the When "measures against capital and tax evasion" were introduced, people who emigrated were supposed to pay a quarter of their taxable assets as "Reich flight tax". Originally for emigration This tax was always limited until the end of 1932 renewed again, most of time by a year. Finally in December 1942 became the period of validity "up to further extended" (RGBl. I, p. 682). The real significance of this tax regulation in the years since 1933 probably lay in this have that with Section 9 there is a legal Handling given was to confiscate the entire assets of emigrated people.

Various other tax laws from the pre-war years testify to the attempt to enact everything imaginable Possibilities to collect taxes and to increase state revenue and not to leave any tax gaps.

In July 1937, the "Law on a Tax on Persons Who Do Not Meet the Obligation" was passed be called up for two years of active service (military tax) - WehrStG -" issued (RGBl. I, S. 821). After According to this law, every male German citizen who was not drafted into the Wehrmacht was required to pay a surcharge of 50 percent on their income or wage tax for two years. In the With regard to tax groups and income levels as well as discounts Income or wage tax should be at least four percent of wages or five percent of income become. In the following years up to the age of 45, six percent of the income/wage tax amounts had to be paid (at least five per thousand of wages or six per thousand of income). The person liable for military tax had his income from the third year Tax liability still on a surcharge on the Income/wage tax or a corresponding portion of his income/wages must be paid. An exemption from military tax for low income/wages or low income tax due to child tax credit was excluded. **With** This military tax was already in practice, which became binding for all income tax/wage tax payers in September 1939 with the war surcharge.

After the "First regulation above the simplification of wage deduction" from the 1. July 1941

was from August 1941 the military tax "up to "Nothing else is collected" (RGGI. I, p. 362). The tax overview shows this for the years 1942 and 1943 even tax refunds of around two million RM.

In February 1939, as Taxes with ultimately low tax returns introduced: the sweetener tax (Sweetener law: RGGI. I, S. 111), the at most with protecting the sugar industry from this to cover competition from sweeteners was; the fire protection tax (Fire protection tax law: RGGI. I, S. 113), with which fire insurance is included a few percent of the insurance premium at the insurance companies were proven, supposedly for Promotion of fire extinguishing. With the "Law about financing national political tasks of empire, (New financial plan - NF -)" from 20. March 1939 (RGGI. I, S. 561) a "additional income tax" was finally introduced. Thanks to them, everything was increased in income compared to previous year too 30 Percent controlled away. However, it was this Additional income tax only levied for 1939.

b) The War Economy Ordinance (KWVO) from the 4. September 1939

At the beginning of the war there were no tax increases or the imposition of new taxes. Initially, only in accordance with the War Economy Ordinance of September 4, 1939 (RGGI. I, p. 1609). War surcharge on income/wage tax is levied and ordered the levying of a war surcharge on beer, tobacco, sparkling wine and brandy. In addition, the elimination of overtime, Sunday and public holiday bonuses was announced, which will apply in the future the should be paid to the state treasury. However, this determination only lasted until mid-November.³⁸ Furthermore, the states and communities had to pay a war contribution to the Reich. Finally, all prices and fees for Goods and services of all kinds according to the "principles of the war-committed national economy" be formed (§ 22 KWVO).

In detail, the War Economy Ordinance and the first implementing regulations on the war surcharge for income tax (RGGI. I, p. 1613) stipulated that with an annual income of over 2,400 RM or a monthly wage of more than 234 RM, a war surcharge of 50 percent on income tax is to be paid. The war surcharge should no longer be used as 15 percent of income amount. Together, taxes and surcharges should not account for more than 65 percent of income. 2,400 RM per year or 234 RM monthly wage (54 RM weekly wage or 9 RM daily wage) should be left to the recipient at least.

A war surcharge of 20 percent of the price was levied as a war tax on beer, as was the same on tobacco products. The war surcharge on spirits products consisted of: by the state brandy monopoly now 375,- RM per hectoliter of spirits was required as income instead of the previous RM 275. The wartime surcharge for sparkling wine was reduced to 1.00 Priced at RM per bottle.

The war contribution countries for the imperial treasury was 15 Percent of the country's share of the volume the Income-, corporate and Value added tax. The municipalities had as

38 RGGI. I 1939, S. 2254. See. also I, S. 73 ff.

War contribution to be paid to the Reich treasury: 2.5 percent of the tax assessment amounts the property tax on agricultural and forestry businesses, five percent of the Property tax assessment amounts from other properties, 7.5 percent of trade tax and ten percent of the citizens tax.

A few days after the **KWVO was announced, the Economic and Statistical Department of the German Reichsbank calculated** a total revenue of "probably not more than 5 billion RM" for the first year of the war from the war surcharges and the war contributions from the states and municipalities .³⁹ In the Reichsbank's confidential report of October 3, 1939 on "Fundamental Questions of War Financing" the conclusion was reached: "In any case, there still remains a significant hole in war financing, the as far as somehow possible must be covered by voluntary savings. Here are the difficulties largest quite generally scare the Experiences the past nen Inflation. You will therefore on the Issuance of war bonds forego and instead the Deposit on Savings accounts stronger propagate must so far also the Save failed, remains only still the money creation, and this means Inflation."⁴⁰

c) The Dividend Tax Ordinance (DAV) from the 12. June 1941

The Announcement of the "Ordinance on Limitation of profit distributions (Dividend Tax Ordinance)" of June 12, 1941 (**RGBl. I**, p. 323) were no small amount of rumors and speculation in business circles, extensive negotiations and controversies in authorities, economic and financial departments preceded the Reich government.⁴¹ The history goes back to the "Capital Investment Act" from 29. March 1934 (**RGBl. I**, p. 295) and that "Bond Stock Act" of December 4, 1934 (**RGBl. I**, p. 1222). With these laws, the state had already influenced the foreign exchange distributions of stock corporations and other corporations, and corporations that received more than six percent Dividend on her Basic/common capital poured out, to Forced to take over imperial bonds. After its three-year period of validity had expired the Bond Stock Act was extended by three years in December 1937 (**RGBl. I**, p. 1340). The bond papers were exchanged for tax vouchers. Those accumulated as "bond stocks" until 1940 However, amounts should not be paid out now, as shown could be seen in the press.

On March 12, 1941, the Reichsbank President announced a new law limiting dividends at the general meeting of Reichsbank shareholders, citing this intention. There was then unrest on the stock market. In June 1941 this was done in a secret report by the head of the security police stated, "that according to the information so far The reports received ensure the rapid publication of the Dividend Ordinance desirable held become, around further speculative Price movements a End to

39 BAP, German Reichsbank, No. 7004, BI. 122-125, "Estimate of the inputs out War taxes based on the War Economy Ordinance of September 4, 1939.

40 Ibid., BI. 212.

41 Please refer also II, S. 533 ff.

"⁴² Between the departments of Reichsbank President and Reich Economics Minister Funk and those of the Reich Minister of finances existed a remarkable back and forth at the Development of the intended law. In the end, however, it turned out that The resources that could be mobilized in this way to finance the war did not reach any significant extent. The Dividend Levy Ordinance was ultimately more about ensuring that the dividend rates did not exceed "the level desired for psychological reasons" and that they were "reduced to an optically appropriate level through the Dividend Levy Ordinance."⁴³

In the chief meeting on March 24, 1941 between Funk and Schwerin v. Krosigk opposed radio restrictions Dividend distribution to six percent; it disadvantages shareholders unjustified. The capital adjustments are also not allowed be taxed too high. The secret file note about the meeting states: "There were also distributions of seven and eight percent. H. to save tax (IG Farben)." And "overall it is not a tax problem, but an economic and political problem".⁴⁴

When Funk finally submitted the draft regulation to Göring on May 13, 1941, he wrote to the Reich minister and boss the Reich Chancellery, Lammers, with the reference to special Urgency: "Despite our best efforts on my part Unfortunately it is only after more than Three months of negotiations succeeded in obtaining the approval of the Reich Minister of Finance for the drafts. Given the importance that the Dividend Tax Ordinance has, in particular, not only economically, but above all in terms of political sentiment, it would seem to me intolerable to publish it the Regulations... to delay further. The Months of uncertainty about the content of the Dividend Tax Ordinance not only forced the economy to postpone its accounting work, but unfortunately it also created the ground for speculative machinations to spread."⁴⁵ Dated June 12th, the DAV was only published on Announced in the Reich Law Gazette on June 21, 1941. It decreed both a compulsory loan for dividends and a tax (dividend levy).

The essential content of the DAV was that, in principle, no more than six percent dividends could be distributed, unless previously a higher dividend rate was set. In these cases, however, it could not be increased above the previous level. However, only six percent or, in the cases mentioned, a maximum of eight percent should be paid out. The amount of the dividend in excess of this amount was "immediately in treasury notes of the Reich" and "to be managed in trust for the shareholders." In the event of a distribution of more than six percent A dividend tax had to be paid to the Reich. With a seven percent dividend, 30 percent was the additional payout to pay. The levy increased in stages up to 400 percent of the additional distribution with a twelve percent dividend or higher.

42 BAP, Reich Ministry of Finance, No. b 6427, BI. 253.

43 BAP, German Reichsbank, No. 6550, „On the question of legal Dividend regulation". Article by Reichsbankrat Windlinger for the civil service magazine "Die Staatsbank", July 1941.

44 BAP, Reich Ministry of Finance, No. b 6427, BI. 45 f.

45 Ibid, BI. 214.

Through capital adjustment one could Dividend levy if applicable bypassed become. From this option, which did not increase the distribution amount, but from the dividend levy The exemption was used in the majority of cases, as such a capital adjustment was only taxed with a moderate flat rate tax (maximum rate of 20 percent).

According to the Dividend Tax Ordinance in the The amounts flowing into the Reich treasury remained very modest and reached 23 **million RM in the first year (1941/42)**, after which they remained well below the ten million mark. The earnings of DAV were not higher than the revenue from sweetener and acetic acid taxes combined. The DAV was by no means a serious attempt to generate higher tax revenue to finance war by cutting war profits to achieve.

*d) Profit transfer after paragraph 22 KWVO and
Profit Transfer Ordinance (GAV)*

Also the profit transfer regulation (GAV) of March 31, 1942 (RGBl. I, p. 162) was primarily designed for visual impact; at least she brought but in three years 2 838.6 **million RM**. This profit transfer was based on Section 22 of the War Economy Ordinance of "unjustified profits in war" ahead, but which actually had no practical significance.

Initially, such a payment obligation was not provided for under the KWVO and became also until to GAV not pronounced. They were content with appeals the Company. This is what the Reich Commissioner emphasized for pricing on September 9, 1939, simply that there could be no dispute about the meaning and interpretation of the war-committed national economy for decent German people. It was only in November 1940 that he created "a stricter regulation of this general, moral obligation," which made "the programmatic and moral obligations of Section 22 of the War Economy Ordinance more immediate "were right." ⁴⁶

After that, every entrepreneur was obliged to check his prices carefully and to take advantage of every opportunity to reduce prices. The profit rates are not to be measured according to previous peacetime habits, but rather according to war economic standards. ... All savings in production must be used to reduce prices if this is at all possible. Is this in not possible under separately stored conditions or out of If general economic reasons are not desirable, then the resulting excess profit must be transferred." ⁴⁷ But the "Second Implementing Ordinance for Section IV of the War Economy Ordinance" of December 8, 1940 (RGBl. I, p. 1581) limited itself again only to general formulations. The Reich Commissioner for Price Setting simply decreed: "According to the principles of an economy committed to war, everyone contributes his pricing behavior to act with consciousness, that the War a special one for every German Responsibility opposite his people imposed and really Victim from him

⁴⁶ Fischer, Guido, LSO. Cost and Price, insights and Conclusions from the practice of the LSO account, Leipzig 1941, p. 192 ff.

⁴⁷ Ibid, S. 193.

demanded." Also according to the circular No. 138/41 saw "the relevant regulations of the Reich Commissioner for pricing stipulates that each company is responsible for ... calculating and transferring any excess profits." ⁴⁸ Self-assessment applied. ⁴⁹ The transfer of profits according to Section 22 **of the KWVO** was therefore highly questionable, and there were no significant "excess profits" in the Reich treasury flowed.

First the "Ordinance on the recording of extraordinary increases in profits during the war (profit transfer regulation - GAV)" of March 31, 1942 created a generally new basis for the taxation of war profits. Formally, the transfer of profits was not a tax, but de facto it was based on the system according to which Type of acquisition and the intention to use it, constitutes a tax. § 1 The GAV stipulated: "The amount transferred is transferred to an account (profit transfer account) which the Reich Minister decides on its use which will determine finances after the end of the war." Natural persons and partnerships had 25 Percent, corporations have to pay 30 percent of the extraordinary increase in profits, with such increase in profits being "the surplus of the commercial Income in the 1941 financial year was one and a half times higher the commercial income in the financial year 1938" was valid, if this amounted to 30,000 RM or more.

The First Ordinance on the Implementation of the Profit Transfer Ordinance (First GADV), also dated March 31, 1942 (RGBl. I, S. 162), in the these determinations were hit, but bid in § 5 the Possibility of reducing the profit transfer amount if the entrepreneur worked according to fixed prices, standard or group prices. This particularly affected the majority of defense companies. According to §14, up to half of the profit transfer amount could be retained ("leave") or - if not already removed - be returned ("handed over") if this is "for economic reasons Reasons or as a result of a special economic emergency". The part of the profit transfer amount that was not paid or was temporarily left over was treated as a loan and had to bear interest at 3 1/2 percent.

According to an analysis by the Reich Ministry of Finance on the transfer of profits as of December 31st 1942 had for 1941 in total 60 122 Pursue the Total amount from 814 972,348 **RM** to be paid. Of this, around 48.5 **million RM** were left or handed over, and approx. 111.4 **Million RM** were still in arrears (deferred or also controversial). ⁵⁰

The analysis shows that the most important arms companies have understood to largely avoid paying the full profit transfer amounts. 465 companies applied for 1941 not to have to pay profits according to § 5, of which 59 were from the upper financial district of Düsseldorf and 44 from the district of Westphalia, ie from the heavy industrial districts. ⁵¹ According to the analysis, the average transfer amounts of the companies in these districts amounted to 18,409 and 14,193 **RM respectively**. ⁵² The amount corresponding to these transfer amounts "extraordinary profit" was between

48 Ibid, S. 253.

49 Please refer *ibid*, p. 197 f.

50 BAP, Reich Ministry of Finance, No. B 6916, Bl. 56 u. 93.

51 Ibid, Bl. 56.

52 Ibid, Bl. 93.

see 75,000 and 50 000 RM. This magnitude means that medium-sized and smaller companies involved in armaments had to pay, but the most important armaments producers are not included in the average calculation.

With the Third GADV from March 1943 became this differentiation even reinforced. From the financial year 1942/43 at were still valid on the one hand stricter standards for the Little ones (already 20 000 RM or 120 percent of the annual profit was subject to tax); on the other hand, for the Great additional discounts effective (in addition to the sales share). Deliveries and services according to standard and Group prices could the share of sales Deliveries for export and transit trade can be used to reduce profit transfer).

e) More tax Measures in the wars

During the war, measures to increase taxes were only taken very hesitantly in order not to provoke unpleasant reactions from the population or those affected.

In the summer of 1941, when the failure of the blitzkrieg strategy had not yet entered popular consciousness penetrated was, but himself the upcoming tediousness of the war was already clear, was with the "Ordinance on the change of Tax laws (Tax Amendment Ordinance - StÄV)" (RGI. I, p. 510) decreed the introduction of the war surcharge on corporation tax amounting to 25 percent of corporation tax for corporations with income of more than 50,000 RM. In 1941, however, only half of this war surcharge was initially to be levied The profit transfer regulation from 31. March 1942 increased this War surcharge for corporations with more as 500,000 RM income to one and a half times. It was now 37.5 percent of corporate tax for them.

In October 1941, the Second Implementing Ordinance on the War Surcharge to the Retail Price of Beer, Tobacco Products and Sparkling Wine (RGI. I, p. 666) increased the war surcharge at Tobacco on 50 percent and at Sparkling wine around the Triple on 3,- **RM** per bottle (fruit sparkling wine 1.50 RM). At the same time, the Ordinance on the Control of Purchasing Power of 31. October 1941 (RGI. I, S. 664) beyond that Price for brandy increased further. One hectoliter of spirits should now bring the brandy monopoly revenue of 475 RM instead of the previous 375 RM (according to **KWVO**) .

The Reich government collected a one-off, very significant tax revenue in 1942. With the "Ordinance on the abolition of the building debt relief tax" of July 31, 1942 (RGI. I, S. 501) was announced on January 1st. January 1943 a tax abolished annually since 1926 approximately 800 brought in millions and as "House interest tax" was known⁵³; but it Ten times the annual amount of this tax was collected in one fell swoop. While the building debt relief tax one What was a state tax now became one from the Reich one-off compensation payment in the amount of ten times the annual tax amount required. This should Tax must be paid. The "compensation amount" had to until no later than 31. December 1942

53 See RGI. I 1926, p. 251, Law on Compensation for the Devaluation of Developed Land, v. June 1, 1926.

be paid. From 1943 was he otherwise charged with 4.5 percent interest. Loans were taken out to raise the compensation amount become.

On this Way flowed in shorter Time above eight billion RM in the Reich treasury, namely 7 987, 6 **Mill... RM** in the accounting year 1942/43 and more 146.3 **mill. RM** in the Financial year 1943/44. It is apparently, that with this action in Years 1942 An unusual financial injection was intended to financially secure the Wehrmacht's pursuit of a renewed offensive, particularly on the Eastern Front.

In general, the question of tax due dates was not insignificant. After all, the empire didn't need the money at some point, but rather as early as possible. That is why the Tax Change Ordinance required quarterly advance payments of the assessed income tax. At the end of 1941/beginning of 1942, the Reich Ministry of Finance also considered bringing forward the due dates for consumption taxes, which would lead to temporary burdens similar to a tax increase. Payment difficulties could arise for those affected, while obviously temporary payment difficulties in the Reich treasury were intended to be alleviated in this way.⁵⁴ A whole series of protests and complaints were the result.⁵⁵

Other disputes gave it 1944 about the possible abolition of individual consumption taxes in order to simplify administration.⁵⁶

f) taxation foreigner forced laborers

Also the foreign forced laborers were used to finance war through taxation .

While Polish foreign workers who worked in German agriculture According to the "Reich Tariff Regulation" of January 8, 1940, lower wages and social benefits than German workers were paid in industry according to general tariffs.⁵⁷ From July 1940 they were but with a "social equalization levy" occupied to their to depress the social situation towards German working people.⁵⁸ This tax was added as a surcharge to income/wage tax levied at 15 percent, went to the Reich budget and was therefore used directly to finance the war.

Take it off Autumn/Winter 1941 increasingly in the The "Eastern tax" was deducted from the wages of the civilian Soviet workers employed in the German armaments industry.⁵⁹ The tax table gave Eastern workers a maximum weekly wage of 17 RM. However got barely a "Eastern Workers" the in addition required Gross weekly wage from 70 RM. There

54 Please refer BAP, Reich Ministry of Finance, No. b 9252, Bl. 87, AT v. December 8, 1941.

55 Ibid, various docs

56 BAP, Reich Ministry of Finance, No. b 9253, various Doc.

57 Elsner, Lothar/Lehmann, Joachim, foreign workers under dem German Imperialism 1900 to 1945, Berlin 1988, p. 183 ff. For the following, see I, p. 96 ff.; II, p. 190 ff.; p. 217 ff.

58 RGBI. I 1940, S. 1077, regulation about the survey one Social equalization levy v. August 5, 1940.

59 RGBI. I 1942, p. 41, regulation about taxation and the employment law treatment of the workforce from the newly occupied eastern territories (StVA Ost) v. January 20, 1942.

When accommodation and food costs were deducted from the net wage and other deductions were made, many people were left with a debt at the end of the week instead of a wage.

The "Eastern tax" even caused criticism and concern in arms industry circles because it... absolute wage limit (17 RM weekly wage) as a consequence stifled any desire to perform.

The "Regulation above the Conditions of use the Eastern workers" from the 30. June 1942 (RGBl. I, p. 419) reorganized payment and taxation. The Eastern workers were now formally exempt from tax. She had "no income tax and no citizen's tax" to pay. However stayed her "Graduated wages based on performance" according to the "pay table for Eastern workers" was just as low as before. The costs for accommodation, food and other things continued to be deducted.

So that the companies did not have any special profit advantages through the use of Eastern workers, they had to an "Eastern workers levy" count the about the difference between

"Remuneration" and the wages of a German workers with comparable activity and performance corresponded. The new regulation was in Reasons of a formal nature. The transfer to the Reich treasury now had the Entrepreneurs without detour the Payment of wages to be carried out. The Eastern workers received after § 8th the regulation no Payroll. Them only the promise was made to keep the income in a bank account for them and to them at the return in the Hometown to hand over or later there to transfer, where "The saved amount ... is available to the saver or his family members in accordance with the detailed regulations of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories or the High Command of the Wehrmacht" (§ 13). The so-called "Ostarbeitersparen" allowed, in addition to the Eastern tax or the Eastern workers levy, an additional, ultimately no longer ascertainable sum would flow into the German war chest.

As a result, everyone was Taxes, duties and "savings" from the forced labor of Polish and Soviet workers in Germany specific form of tributes, the the peoples of the occupied financially imposed on countries. In The sources do not contain any summary information.

3. Extraordinary Budget revenue

Borrowing and the mere creation of money served to an even greater extent than taxes and duties Furnishing of Nazi state with the to provide the necessary funds for warfare. The Reich government had very much this second source early on the armament and war financing developed. tax vouchers, Mefo change and other means already made rearmament possible without placing too much of a burden on the Reich budget. Only a consecrated one, with upgrade and Wehrmacht orders significantly involved People knew **means** , methods and connections.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ See Andexel, p. 83 ff.; Zumpe, Lotte, economy and state in Germany 1933 to 1945, Berlin 1980, p. 293 ff.; Boelcke, The Costs of Hitler's War, p. 26 ff.

On 12. September 1939 the "Ordinance" appeared above the Determination of an addendum to the Reich budget for the financial year 1939" (RGBl. II, p. 963). In it the Reich Minister the finances are authorized "to meet one-off extraordinary expenses Spend an amount of up to 15 billion Reichsmarks by way of loans." This was the start of the debt financing of the war.

The Nazi leadership took into account the advantages and disadvantages of loan and bond financing, which had been known particularly since the First World War, and developed a fairly routine system that largely concealed the contradictions and dangers of state credit despite its enormous dimensions. Before the Publicity Largely hidden, borrowing was subsequently practiced - without a lot of administrative effort, without breaks, "on a rolling basis" and without any restrictions on the summation of debts. Everything took place behind the backs of the population in internal transactions with banks, savings banks, etc credit institutions and insurance companies. The financing of the war through national debt was, in its "quietness", a cleverly operated system of deception against the people, whose income and assets were literally squandered. With remarkable results After all, for several years it was meticulously announced in the Reich Law Gazette which issues of interest-bearing treasury bonds from the German Reich managed to be entered into the Reich Debt Register .⁶¹

The financing of the war through credit not only led to an enormous increase in the well-founded, long-term Reich debt recorded in the Reich Debt Register, but also increasingly to the growth of the "floating" debt, the short-term debt through central bank credit. This resulted in the growth of short-term, "Floating" debt in all periods of the war faster than that of established debt. Since 1942/43, central bank credit became the dominant way of raising money. Since short-term loans to cover the costs of the war were constantly - usually every two months - had to be renewed, which took place in formal repayment and new borrowing, the bookings in the Reich main treasury piled up more and more quickly as the Reich's debt increased.

Short-term borrowing by means of non-interest-bearing treasury notes, imperial bills, treasury bills or similarly named debt securities was only credit financing in form. Essentially it was the start of the printing press.

Table 154

Borrowings and -repayments of the empire, September 1, 1939-May 8, 1945 (in billion RM)

	Borrowin g	Loan repayment	Status of RM domestic debt (31.3. d. J.)
1.9.1939- 31.8.1940	62.54	31.95	50,796
September 1, 1940 - August 31, 1941	108.54	66.60	88,366
1.9.1941- 31.8.1942	171.49	116.42	141,099

⁶¹ RGBl. I, vintages 1940-1943 .

Table 154 (Continuation)

	taking out credit	Loan repayment	was standing the RM Domestic debt (31.3. d. J.)
1.9.1942- 31.8.1943	243.09	182.45	196,406
1.9.1943- 31.8.1944	365.08	281.64	274,025
1.9.1944- May 8, 1945	244.43	177.57	347,156*

*) was standing 31.12.1944.

Source: Boelcke, The Costs of Hitler's War, p. 98/100, as well as announcements the Reich debt administration (Reichsanzeiger and Prussian State Gazette).

What is remarkable are the significant interest payments on the Reich debt, which are to be seen as real costs for obtaining the means to finance the war.⁶²

Table 155

interest the Imperial debt after accounting years, 1939/1940-1944/1945 (in billion RM)

1939/40	1.9
1940/41	2.8
1941/42	4.2
1942/43	5.9
1943/44	6.6
1944/45	10.5

Source: Statistical Manual from Germany 1928-1944, S. 555.

a) The well-founded imperial debt

Middle and long-term bonds of the German Empire, the in the Reich debt book were entered played an important role for the Covering the costs of war. Became systematic the out of the war economy resulting high liquidity from banks, credit institutions, savings banks and insurance companies for the purposes of war financing. Since there were hardly any other short- and long-term investment opportunities apart from the armaments industry, the lenders were practically forced to invest their free funds in imperial securities. They were the main buyers of bonds, treasury bills and bills of the empire. Large amounts were also simply allocated to them.⁶³

The countries and communities became imposed, Imperial title to take over. They had to subscribe to 75 percent of their reserve funds as imperial bonds or treasury notes.⁶⁴

⁶² The Interest payments are usually included in other statistics approximately the same height. Opposite are the Information in Statistical Handbook of Germany 1928-1944, S. 555, above Repayment and taking on debts are incomprehensibly low.

⁶³ Federau, S. 38.

⁶⁴ Please refer for example City archives Stralsund, T 1234, various Doc.

The issuance of the Reich debt securities was largely non-public. The deposits of the Banks that Savings deposits and insurance contributions transformed without Audience Knowledge in War Financing Resources.

Previous experiences were used in the specific design of borrowing or borrowing observed. Included is apparently the public emission from 500 **mill. RM** 4 h percent raffleable treasury notes of the Deutsche Reichsbahn were important in November 1939. This issue may have been the last public tender for such a bond in the German Reich. According to the Reichsbahn's public subscription offer, it was intended to "supplement and perfect its structures and to increase its vehicle fleet, which is due to the general economic upswing and the addition of routes in the Ostmark, in Sudetengau and in the new imperial districts formed in the east.

From the Total amount (500 **mill. RM**) became 300 mill. to public Tender ge brought. 200 Mill. were already there before been bound. The consortium consisted of 48 Banks and financial institutions, from the Reichsbank to the major Berlin banks and numerous public banks Credit institutions to various private banks. The Treasury bonds were to be issued by drawing lots between 1945 and 1949 Redemption coming. The Emission was quickly realized and confirmed the A development that had become apparent since 1935 meant that the credit market increasingly only had to cover the state's financial needs.⁶⁵

Although according to the tender there is a subscription period from the 3rd to the 13th November 1939 was planned, the 300 **million RM** treasury bonds of the Reichsbahn that were publicly offered were already issued on first day Drawings in Total amount of 546.2 **million RM** , so that subscriptions closed on the evening of November 3rd pronounced had to become. The 500 in total mill. RM Treasury bills became 30 117 subscribers, including 3,368 credit institutions and 291 insurance companies. The banks took over 67.9 percent of the bond volume, private subscribers received 11.9 percent and companies received 10.5 percent of the bond amount. 91.1 percent of the artists who Treasury bonds were allocated, took over shares in the Size up to 20 000,- **RM**. Subscription shares of medium size (up to 100,000 **RM**) went primarily to companies and banks; 550 drawings over 100 Almost all of it was 000 RM to credit institutions, including 114 **Mill. RM** in 34 Posts of more than one **million RM**.

In the subscription offer, the subscribers were "given the choice of either applying for the execution of the subscribed items or their placement in a collective deposit at a securities collecting bank". 232 **million RM** were received as collective deposit subscriptions, so piecemeal, realized.⁶⁶

The knowledge gained from issuing this bond about the high level of capital liquidity, the outstanding role of the banks and the great interest in the advance subscription for the Collective custody account (non-denominated transactions) were decisive for future bond issues.

65 See. Zumpe, p. 292.

66 BAP, Deutsche Reichsbank, No. 6549, BI. 307 ff. "Statistics of the drawings on the 4th %,percentage redeemable Reich treasury notes from 1939".

Subsequently, medium and long-term government securities were no longer offered to the public. If anything, they were in the internal circulars announced by the Reichsgruppe Banken and the Central Association of the Banking and Banking Industry.

The common forms of entry in the Debt book of the German Empire arriving and with it to Debt securities belonging to well-founded debt were bonds and interest-bearing treasury bills during the war. According to the debt register entry, one was usually made every year Bond and several episodes of Treasury notes. The interest rate was until 1939/40 4 ½ percent, 1940 gave it bonds and Treasury bonds at four percent, from 1941 the bonds and treasury notes became only 3 percent ½ percent interest.

The terms of the interest-bearing treasury bonds varied, but tended to become longer and longer. Did the 1938 Treasury Notes (4 ½ percent can be drawn) and from 1940, episode I - IV (four percent) still had terms of five years, while series V in 1940 already had terms of ten years. From Episode VI/1940 onwards, a term of 20 years and more was set. In January 1945 in the circular of the private banking industry group announced 3 ½ percent treasury notes 1945 series I should be issued on the 16th. February 1967 (!) become due. This episode I from 1945 served at the same time as a replacement for the four percent Treasury notes from 1940, Series I, whose term was only five years.⁶⁷

The total amount of each episode of Treasury notes has not been disclosed in announcements. The total volume from 1939 to 1945 exceeded the 70 billion mark

The bonds of the German Reich that were issued during the war years had terms of 20 years (four percent bond in 1940) to 27 years (4½ percent bond in 1940). The 3 ½ percent bond from 1941 was for 25 years. The bonds were qualified as liquidity bonds (Li bonds), ie 50 percent of the legally required liquidity reserves Savings banks and insurance companies were allowed or had to hold Li bonds. They were suitable for Lombard use but were not admitted to the stock exchanges.⁶⁸ Otherwise, the bonds were not announced or made public; Their launch could only be found in the regular announcements of the Reich Debt Administration become. Thereafter achieved the bonds, expected from the 1. output the 4th ½ percent bond from 1939 to the 3rd ½ percent bond from 1944, a total volume of over 53 billion RM.

Next to the Increase in pension bank loan in the first years of the war of 408.8 Mill. RM (mid-1939) to 1 549.9 **million RM** was added to the bonds and treasury notes issued in 1944 ½ percent loan of 100 **million RM** in the Reich debt book for registration. In total increased itself the registered one well-founded Imperial debt from 23 642.0 **mill.** at the June 30th 1939 on 134,960.4 **mill. RM** at the 31. December 1944. The titles

67 BAP, Reich Ministry of Economics, No. 15556, circular number 1 the economic group Private banking industry/Central Association of the German Banking and Banking Industry, v. January 5, 1945.

68 Here How in the following s. Attachment: The from the Imperial debt management designated Reich Debt (leaflet).

69 See Born, Karl Erich, Money and Banks in the 19. and 20. Century, Stuttgart 1976, S. 542.

out of the pre-war period were depending on their duration or Repayment period is part of this founded debt, but were gradually paid off using the subsequent founded debt instruments.

Long-term borrowing increased rapidly from the second year of the war onwards, reaching more in 1943/44 as 33.5 billion RM. In this one Year fell along 6.3 billion RM also larger loan repayment amounts (especially treasury notes and bonds from the 1930s).

The issuance of government debt securities in non-denominated transactions corresponded to the strict rationalization sought by the Nazi leadership in all areas. It also eliminated technical barriers to loan financing. With just a few strokes of the pen instead of with "a huge amount of work and costs... that come with printing, transport, storage, Check, To count, Sort and Packaging many millions of pieces arises", the financial resources for the war were made available.⁷⁰ The simplification of the procedure also served the purpose of after determining the Reichsbank discount rate to 3 % and of Lombard rate to 4 % on 9. April 1940 the Interest rates of the Bonds and interest-bearing treasury bills away 1941 - until on one Exception - at 3 % constant held became.

"Since 1942 was interest rate stability reached."⁷¹

The first months of Quarters brought how the Reichsbank in one Analysis from February 1941 found the largest Net sales because the special cash flow after Quarterly close (not a big tax date, eh in the last month of the quarter) Of course, the biggest sales were always in January and in it first week - because the funds made available at the end of the year for special balance sheet items and for interest and similar payments were then released. "What is remarkable is the regular rhythm, which is expressed in the fact that the highest amounts are achieved in the first and third weeks, while the figures for the second week show the tax deadline on the 10th as well as the average requirement and those for the last week the final requirement sign off. Sales in the first half of the month are always higher than in the second."⁷² The loans taken out by the Reich were also due to the current sales of the Debentures in exchange with the tax revenue of the Reich a fixed, predictable one Place in the financing of imperial income and expenditure.

Accordingly, there was no overall Reason for a change in the loan taking process. Opposite here and there again expressed wishes more direct The Reichsbank was particularly opposed to placing the Reich's debt securities with the public following considerations: 1) The Imperial titles are included the Carrier of the Organized credit is accommodated more permanently than with the public (easier to implement steering measures). 2) After the experiences of First World War ... one guarantees Greater placement of Reich bonds in the public does not relieve the central bank of the burden in the long term. 3) The German saver have itself after the tarnish Experiences the inflation

70 Federau, p. 43. F. was general secretary at the time the German Girozentrale, which acts as a securities collecting bank Accommodation system of imperial debt securities one played a big role. The rationalization effects of the piecemeal He saw traffic from this practical point of view.

71 Boelcke, The Cost from Hitler's War, p. 105.

72 BAP, German Reichsbank, No. 6549, Bl. 517 f., "Confidential Reichsbank matter. "The sale of interest-bearing bonds of the Reich and money market papers", February 17, 1941.

time from bond ownership largely weaned and maintain their savings in savings accounts at banks and savings banks. This development has recently been further encouraged by non-denominated securities transactions. A change in the financing method could cause mistrust among savers, whose willingness to save must be maintained. Occasion give. With sticking to the previous emission technology There is also no reason for a different and more varied design of the Reich's missions."⁷³

The German Reich's debt denominated in foreign currencies, which was of little significance compared to domestic debt, remained without major changes during the war. As far as a contractual repayment was due, the following official note was always made: "The due to lack of foreign exchange not transferred, to a The repayment amounts transferred to a special account at the Reichsbank for the American, Swiss, Italian, Belgian, Dutch and German bond holdings were deducted from the debt capital."⁷⁴ However, since the repayment amounts were not transferred, they were ultimately not realized as repayment. Even if the When the Reich Debt Administration considered itself relieved of these amounts, the amounts were placed in the Reich's special bank account nevertheless still represent debts to foreign creditors. Individuals may have creditor for Payments within Germany via amounts of special account; because - unchanged exchange rates assumed - the The total of all items showed a decline of almost 35 million RM between 1939 and 1944.

b) The floating Imperial debt

Under the influence of the growing financial demands of the German warfare increased Taking out loans with short terms and without funding from the capital market absolutely and percent faster than all phases of the war taking out sound, medium and long-term loans. The part of the short-term debt the The total documented Reich debt was around 25 percent in June 1939. At the end of December 1944 it was more than 60 percent. This is not due to avoidable failures in war financing attributed, but rather on the fact that, despite enormous monetary capital formation and income development (including excess purchasing power), the capital basis for the consolidation of the required Loans were missing.

The capital market could do the sums that the Reich threw into the bottomless pit of war simply not bring it up. Even the subjugation of large parts of Europe and their economic and financial exploitation could not provide the resources on such a scale in the long term. The financing was therefore, from the outset, to a large extent dependent on the pure creation of money.

73 BAP, German Reichsbank, No. 7132, Bl. 86 ff., "Documents for a speech by Vice President Puhl to the district advisory board of the Reichsbank headquarters in Vienna", September 14, 1943.

74 Here after the announcement of the Reich Debt Administration in the German Reichsanzeiger and Prussian State Gazette, March 15, 1945.

Table 156

Status and annual increase in the well-founded and the pending Reich debt, 1939-1944 (in billion RM)

Date	Founded Guilt*			Pending Fault**		
	was standing	increase	increase in percent	was standing	increase	increase in percent
June 30, 1939	23.64			9.58		
March 31, 1940	28.64	5.0	21.1	22.16	12.58	131.3
March 31, 1941	46.52	17.88	62.4	41.84	19.68	88.8
March 31, 1942	69.60	23.08	49.4	71.20	29.36	70.2
March 31, 1943	90.87	21.27	30.5	105.54	34.34	48.2
March 31, 1944	118.04	27.17	29.9	155.98	50.44	47.8
December 31, 1944	134.96	16.92	14.3	212.19	56.21	36.0

*) Only on RM-denominated domestic debt.**) Incl. Tax vouchers, business assets and goods Creation credit, but without mefo change.

Source: Announcements the Imperial debt management.

The most important items of short-term debt were non-interest-bearing treasury bills - so-called V-treasures, which had to be redeemed after a few months - and change of empire.

The non-interest-bearing treasury bonds were sold with a term of three to six months, most recently up to 20 months. The interest rate was $2\frac{1}{i}$ percent at seven months and three percent at 18 Months term after which they were redeemed at face value. In December 1944, 5,351.1 **million RM** treasury notes were issued to the Reichsbank sold and 6,000.0 **million RM** treasury bonds redeemed.⁷⁵

Another main item of the floating imperial debt was the imperial changes. She became with an interest rate of $2\frac{1}{s}$ until $2\frac{3}{4}$ percent in Circulation set and were after Due 90 days.⁷⁶ Schwerin von Krosigk described the change of empire with reference to interest rates as the cheapest financing instrument. A total of 130 billion RM was put into circulation.⁷⁷

As of December 31, 1944, 102,407.4 **million RM** non-interest-bearing treasury bills and 98,226.6 **million** Reich bills of exchange were registered in the Reich Statistical Office, a total of over 200 billion RM. According to the Reichsbank statement, 61,614 **million RM** were in the Reichsbank's vaults. Until 7. March 1945 increased the Reichsbank holdings at Treasury notes and imperial changes to 70,192 million RM.⁷⁸

75 BAP, statistical Reich Office, No. 2441, BI. 57, "Preliminary determination the status of the Reich's pending debt", December 31, 1944.

76 BAP, German Reichsbank, No. 6549, BI. 497, "The ones for most important types of imperial debt prescriptions at the time", January 20, 1941.

77 Schwerin v. Krosigk, How became the Second World War funded?, S. 326.

78 German Money- and Banking in Pay 1876-1975, Frankfurt a. M. 1976, p. 36 f.

Floating debts were officially designated as “short-term loans.” expected. These were the Reichskreditkassenscheine, the occupation money put into circulation by the German Wehrmacht in almost all occupied territories. She represented a loan the Headquarters the Reichskreditkassen to the empire. Depending on the in circulation The amount of these “short-term loans” depended on the actual amount of crew money. In the Polish campaign of 1939 there were approximately 45 **Mill. RM**, which in the public Announcement of the Reich Debt Administration were not included at that time. In the status of the main administration the Reichskreditkassen became at loans or. Credit at the Rich expelled

- End 1941: 4 778.2 **mill. RM**;
- End 1942: 7 433.5 **mill. RM**;
- End 1943: 9 133.0 **mill. RM**;
- on the 30th September 1944: 9 885.0 **mill. RM**.⁷⁹

In the literature⁸⁰ only the 3.0 billion RM Reichskreditkasse notes that were not redeemed at the end of the war are mentioned referred to as a debt item or as a financial service provided from abroad. This is in serious need of correction. The Reichskreditkassenorganisation - after they put their Reich credit bank notes into circulation out of nowhere on the basis of a loan to the Reich and with them you too one own banking activity had developed - referred in their balance sheet as of 30. September 1944 at 12 326 **Million RM** assets on balances with the Reich or loans granted amounting to 9,885 **million RM**. The Reich Statistical Office listed the outstanding Reich debt as an item as of December 31, 1944 under “Loans from the main administration of the Reich Credit Funds (up to the deadline at the Reich Main Treasury booked amounts)” 9,043.9 **Mill. RM** and under “other loans” 89.0 **Mill. RM** on.⁸¹

Furthermore, they are current operating loans the Reichsbank for the empire as permanent position in the unfounded imperial debt. According to the law on the German Reichsbank from 15. June 1939 was it the "Führer and Reich Chancellor" leave that height of Business loans to determine. She mostly reached on the highest level at the end of the year; As the war continued, they also amounted to several hundred million Reichsmarks on other dates.

Treasury securities for the purpose of security deposits, tied to specific long-term investment projects, became more and more dismantled and were overall insignificant during the war. The final instruction for A project in the Wartheland worth 1.1 **million RM** would have been due in 1950.⁸²

According to your entire financial system, the tax vouchers must be added to the pending national debt be assigned. The bond stock tax vouchers were issued in 1937 than after three years During the first period of validity of the German Bond Stock Act, the bond stock amounts were not refunded but were exchanged for special tax vouchers. The Duration at this one tax vouchers took still until in the accounting year

79 Oertel, Manfred, about the German Reichsbank in Second World War, dissertation, Rostock 1979, appendix F, BI. 2.

80 For example Boelcke, The costs from Hitler's War, S. 100 ff.

81 See note 75.

82 BAP, Statistical Reich Office, No. 2441, BI. 58, Table regarding Treasury notes for the purpose of Security benefits.

1940/41 too. First then became he reduced. The Tax vouchers were the form of tax payments made in advance, which the empire now calculated for itself, but only 20 **million RM annually**.

The other tax vouchers - two different types - made the amount of at the beginning of the war around four billion RM. Overall it was 4.8 billion spent. According to the "New Financial Plan" in 1939, when paying for public contracts, especially armaments contracts, they were traded in at 40 percent of the invoice amount, half as Type I and half as Type II. The first type was interest-free after six months of tax payments to redeem; Type II paid interest at four percent annually and could be used to pay taxes after three years at 112 percent of the nominal value become.

Both Types put a from the Rich forced credit represent, the the **Rich** then in the Follow-up time at the Tax collection through Waiver on cash payment redeem had to.

In the Announcements the Imperial debt management appeared further away 1942 the "Operating plant credit" and the "goods procurement credit", which by their nature can also be assigned to the unfounded, floating imperial debt. Both posts left - Business asset credit directly and Merchandise procurement credit indirectly - on the "Ordinance on the "Directing Purchasing Power" from 30. October 1941 (RGBl. I, p. 664).

The Purchasing Power Control Ordinance stipulated the creation of "company asset credits". Entrepreneurs were asked to "create credit balances with the tax offices by paying in amounts of money intended for the purchase of wearable fixed assets of the movable business assets in the post-war period (business asset credits)". The credits were allowed to be up to half of the movable business assets gens of facilities; the Deposits should only be possible for a certain time. The investments purchased from this credit after the war should then not be taxed. However, no interest was paid on these amounts during the war. They could only be redeemed early if their holder "urgently needs the repayment amount for military reasons or as a result of a particular economic emergency."

The operating asset balances were supposed to represent company reserves, but were de facto a permanent one and interest-free loan to the Reich with the Perspective, sometime Interest too bring and at more purposeful Use later a Enjoy tax benefits. The limits on the amount and time of credit accumulation were of a psychological-tactical nature; The deposits should be made as quickly as possible and the impression that these credits are particularly attractive should be achieved. The total amount of business assets did not reach the 600 million mark.

The creation of goods procurement credits ordered in November 1941 was designed in a similar way.⁸³ These were to be "intended for the procurement of goods in the post-war period". They were allowed to account for 20 percent of the value of the finished goods, semi-finished products, Do not exceed raw materials and auxiliary materials; The deposits had to be made by January 10, 1942 at the latest. Apparently the "ultimate demand" was to be reached at the turn of the year 1941/42. be covered by the Reich treasury.

83 RGBl. I 1941, S. 739, regulation via goods procurement credit (VWBG), v. November 28, 1941.

Without interest during the war, the goods procurement credits were to become a tax-free reserve for goods purchases after the war, which was to be dissolved in eight equal annual amounts starting with the fifth year after the end of the war. The repayment of this "bond" was so until at the end of the twelfth post-war year provided in promising. Early repayments were only made on the same terms and conditions for the same reasons as for the business asset credits. In the first and actual deposit period, a little more than 160 **million RM was received**, increased by permitted later payments the Total amount still to 177 **Mill. RM**, of which 100,000 RM were apparently repaid early were (1943/44).

tax vouchers, operating system and goods procurement credits were hybrid forms between taxes and bonds/compulsory bonds and should be alongside the traditional ones Taxes and bonds also mobilize funds for war financing in other ways. In this context, the already mentioned profit transfer amounts according to the GAV from 1942 must also be mentioned; They were not formally taxes and were definitely not confiscated when they were paid. However, that was Later repayment is also not guaranteed.

Already in the period of forced rearmament Finally, a debt item arose that was uncovered by the company The Reichsbank had a negative impact on the Reich's financial situation until the end of the war in 1945: the Mefo bills. These financial bills of exchange disguised as bills of goods were used in the pre-war period more than a third of defense orders financed. They had moved to the dummy company "Metallurgische Forschungsanstalt GmbH" (Mefo), had a term of five years and the full rediscount promise of the Reichsbank. The Reich had taken over the direct guarantee for all of Mefo's liabilities and also provided its administrative staff.

Mefo bills of exchange were put into circulation in a total amount of twelve **billion RM until 1938** and eventually all ended up in the holdings of the German Reichsbank, which accepted them as assets. They were not shown as part of the imperial debt, they are theirs but to assign; because in them embodied - in the form of Reichsbank claims on the Reich - the Reich's payment obligations to the armaments suppliers from the pre-war period.

c) Sources for taking on debt

As shown, the imperial debt was suspended very different items together. In the last weeks of war Many things were no longer recorded correctly. Nevertheless, it is possible the Total of internal debt of the Rich at the The end of the war will almost certainly be estimated at 390 to 400 billion RM.⁸⁴

84 BAP, Statistical Reichsamt, No. 2441, BI. 49 ff., Statement and handwritten Chronicle (o. V.o. D.); estimates the imperial debt as of April 30, 1945 to 406.0 billion RM, of which 242.9 billion RM were short-term Fault. The imperial debt exceeded the 100 billion mark in July 1941 and the 200 billion mark in July 1941 July 1943 and the 300 billion limit in the July 1944. At partial Estimates

The Reich debt securities (both long-term and short-term) were distributed among commercial banks, savings banks, insurance companies and companies and, to a considerable extent, the Reichsbank.

Table 157

distribution the Imperial debt by 30. September 1944 (in billion RM)

I Inland:	Savings banks	85.6
	Postal Savings Bank and Postal Check Office	10.0
	Credit banks	51.8
	Cooperative banks	19.1
	Insurance	25.0
	Reichsbank and Gold discount bank	45.0
	Audience, ventures (Market)	47.1
	<i>inland in total</i>	283.6
II Abroad:	Clearing balances u. ä.	40.0
	<i>Total Imperial debt</i>	323.6

Source: **BAK, R 3/1003**, BI. 7 ff., "On the restoration of the monetary order in Germany", memorandum from Reich Price Commissioner Hans Fischböck, at the same time deputy head of the planning office, for Armaments Minister Speer, February 27, 1945; according to Herbst, p. 412.

In the last months of the war, however, major changes took place in the distribution of the Reich's debts. In particular, the share of the Reich's debt deposited with the Reichsbank increased further to.

The German Reichsbank played the central role in the system of silent war financing inside. She was the Chief commissioner at the Accommodation the Bonds and

and different levels of involvement individual Debt item come Authors to following Amounts :

- 387 billion RM (Schwerin v. Krosigk, How became the Second World War funded?, S. 326);
- 377.5 billion RM (only bonds, treasury notes and bills as new debt during the war: Federau, p. 42);
- 397 billion RM (including Mefo bill and tax vouchers: Boelcke, The costs from Hitler's War, p. 102);
- 379.8 billion RM (Andexel, S. 113);
- 388 billion RM (Zumpe, S. 413);
- 378 billion RM (Autumn, S. 415);
- 389.9 billion RM (Born, S. 543).

See also Köllner, Lutz, military and finances. On the financial history and financial sociology of military spending Germany, Munich 1982, p. 50 and p. 56 ff.

Treasury notes of the empire. The non-deductible traffic was centralized here. She provided the banks and other financial institutions Liquidity support through the purchase of the Reich's debt securities. It increasingly discounted even non-interest-bearing treasury bonds and imperial bills. your loans the Rich increased from 12.6 billion RM at the end of 1939 to 64.2 billion at the end of 1944 - including RM61.6 billion treasury bills and non-interest bearing treasury bills. On the 7th In March 1945 these loans were further at 72.72 billion RM, including RM70.19 billion in treasury bills and interest-free treasures.⁸⁵

The Reichsbank acted during the the entire duration of the war after Line, the she in their management report programmatically for 1939 had formulated: "At the outbreak of war, the German Reichsbank saw it as its natural task, not only indirectly by exploiting the possibilities inherent in the German money market constitution, but directly by using them own credit capacity to make oneself available to the Reich in financing the Reich's projects."⁸⁶

The Reichsbank covered the credit needs of the Rich too plenty 25 Percent. The Banks, savings banks and others Credit and financial institutions contributed more than 50 percent, the rest was borne by insurance and other companies.⁸⁷ The deposit holdings at the various financial institutions and the growth of money capital as a whole formed the coverage potential.⁸⁸

Since the loans to finance the Reich's expenses almost exclusively come from the banks and credit institutions recorded were, was the Savings creation by the population is of utmost importance. The savings balances accumulating at savings banks and other financial institutions formed an essential part of the growing financial capital. Mobilizing the population's savings for war financing via credit was a main concern of German war financing. The Nazi regime was able to rely on increasing amounts during the war years and made considerable efforts to promote the austerity movement. The progressive reduction in the range of goods on offer did the rest.

What they could Buy people? The Rationing began Boundaries. More valuable consumer goods were hardly available. The food supply was also up to The last period of the war was relatively secure, so the supply of textiles and most other equipment became increasingly patchy. So savings increased over the course of the war more than quadrupled.

85 German money and banking in figures 1876-1975, p. 43; Federau, p. 48, estimates "based on reliable figures" As of May 8, 1945, the Reichsbank's loans to the Reich amounted to 84 billion **RM**.

86 Administrative report the Germans Reichsbank for the Year 1939, general meeting at the 19. 4. 1940, Berlin, S. 5.

87 Federau, S. 48.

88 Boelcke, The Cost from Hitler's War, S. 103.

Table 158

The development of savings balances in Germany, 1939-1944 (in billion RM; as of the end of each year)

	Total savings deposits	including: at Savings banks	in percent
1939	29,092	21,532	74.0
1940	38,071	27,838	73.1
1941	51,922	37,750	72.7
1942	72,965	51,232	70.2
1943	96,356	66,941	69.5
1944	116,719	80,411	68.9

Source: German Money- and Banking in Pay 1876-1975, S. 18 and S. 102.

The German rulers attached great importance to the fact that everyone Free amounts of money as savings credit bank or savings bank were brought. Wireless, Schwerin von Krosigk, Goebbels and others repeatedly propagated this Save as high commitment to all Germans to achieve the "final victory" and asserted that stability of the German currency. Banks and savings banks, for their part, tried everything to collect free money. Even the smallest amounts were recorded. For this purpose, the savings banks also loaned out small steel money boxes to their savings customers, which could only be opened at the checkout counter. They were used to deposit the - mainly from children - collected Small amounts.

Given the rapidly increasing war costs and according to the Shy, that Tax financing stronger to to use, became away 1941 this Efforts reinforced. With dem "Iron savings" became a special form of compulsory savings called to life. Previously, Reichsbank Vice President Kurt Lange explained the government's arguments internally to the district leaders of the "German Labor Front": "The situation of the German currency at the end of the second year of the war and the current status of war financing inevitably require the accelerated implementation of a special monetary and financial policy measure ... It is intended to launch a new planned savings campaign on a larger scale extent into the to call life... What about the vital need for labor income is not allowed to go to the consumer goods market push, but must be made entirely available to finance the war. It must not be wasted, but rather saved. Ultimately, our armaments and war costs can only be covered by the savings of the people as a whole." The course of the war would mean a certain German victory and one great economic Expect future. „**With** everyone Reichsmark helps the saver the victory win and secures itself thereby his own savings. Besides, has he, and that The most important thing is the Führer's word that the German saver will never be disappointed." ⁸⁹

With much demagogic Expense became the parole of "Iron savings" under the

89 BAP, Deutsche Reichbank, No. 7007, BI. 367 ff., "Draft one Speech by Mr. Vice President Lange to the district mayors the DAF", October 22, 1941.

borne by the working population. According to the provisions of the "Ordinance on the Management of Purchasing Power" of October 30, 1941 and the implementing ordinance that appeared a few days later the "Iron Savings" (RGGI. I 1941, S. 664 and p. 705) should regularly "Iron savings amounts" removed become. Only "Employees German "Ethnicities that are subject to income tax" should be entitled to save.

The savings amounts transferred were exempt from income tax and other charges. They bore interest at the usual interest rates, but could only be canceled twelve months after the end of the war. The amounts should be "at the request of the employee" must be paid into an "iron savings account" by the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur had to provide proof of the deposit lead. Only once in Year took place the Entry in the "Iron Savings book", which is included one determined by the entrepreneur Credit institution was conducted. However, the saver was allowed to inquire about the amount of the balance in the meantime.

It became Fixed amounts for the "Iron Savings" determines:

with daily Wage payment:	1 RM	or	0.50 RM Per Day
at weekly Wage payment: with	6,-RM	or	3,- RM Per Week
monthly wage payment:	26,-RM	or	13,- RM Per Month.

One and a half times these amounts were provided for overtime, overtime and other bonuses. Christmas gifts and the like should be saved at half or full amount if they amounted to less than 500 RM , or, if they exceeded 500 RM , with 500,- or 250,- RM will be transferred to the "Iron Savings Account".

However, the success of this large-scale campaign obviously fell short of the expectations of its authors. Until the end of February 1942, the larger ones were there Banks, cooperatives and at the Savings banks total 174 mill. RM received. Ten to 14 Millions were suspected to be at smaller commercial credit unions, at rural cooperative banks, small joint stock banks and private bankers only smaller amounts.⁹⁰⁾

In October 1942, the "Iron Savings" was modified with a "Third Implementing Ordinance on Iron Savings" (RGGI. I, p. 611) in order to further increase the results. Other as the previous one-off donations were as economical explained; there were both lower and also higher fixed amounts than previously permitted; "Current payments from a previous employment relationship" were also eligible for savings. Finally, it was determined that that the recipient of remuneration has the obligation to transfer to an "iron savings account", even if the actual recipients "as a result of the war conditions (e.g. as an internee, prisoner of war ... or missing person) or for similar reasons in the Iron-clad savings procedures intended declaration of intent (e.g. b. Delivery... the Iron Savings Declaration). This affected, for example, members of the armed forces, to whom the "peace fees" continued to be paid if they were prisoners of war or interned in neutral territory got into trouble. These were reported missing Coverage one more time paid for three months (single one, married three months).⁹¹⁾

90 BAP, German Reichsbank, No. 7008, Bl. 274, writing at the Reich Minister of Finance, February 28, 1942.

91 Please refer Albath/Kretschmer/Petzold, S. 33 ff.

However, the results remained modest even after this renewed boost to the "Iron Savings" campaign, although normal savings deposits increased. Overall information on the results of the "Iron Savings" campaign not available. This is also the case for the entire system Capture of funds for to attribute the war. They probably were in contains information on the development of savings balances since 1941. During the currency reform In 1948 they were "Iron Savings Accounts" in the western zones and West Berlin are treated on an equal footing with other **banks** and savings deposits.⁹²

Although that Overall savings volume continued to rise since center 1942 a increased withdrawals from normal savings accounts registered.⁹³ The unforeseeable duration The war, the conspicuous austerity propaganda, the closing of savings bank branches, etc. gave rise to various rumors among the population, which encouraged such tendencies.

Two thirds of all German savings were invested in securities. As of the end of September 1944, 95 percent of these were government debt securities. Never before in the history of German savings banks had this her Means like that fixed unilaterally on government securities.⁹⁴ With the use of savings to finance the war through credit, large amounts were achieved Parts of national wealth wasted the Death on the battlefields financed.

In the western zones, where the capitalist market economy was re-formed after the German defeat, savers were left with only 6.5 percent of their savings after the currency reform of 1948 savings and hers cash; the Companies though realized their War and post-war profits complete and final. More than half of all West German stock corporations converted their shares from Reichsmarks into German Marks at a ratio of 1:1. In their opening balance sheets in the new currency, 367 stock corporations declared their share capital to be higher than before in RM.⁹⁵

Fourty Years later was called it in one current Consideration one business magazine, "Be long-term the Share as Investment basically always closed anyway recommend... Stocks securitize tangible assets, bonds only represent monetary claims, which - the unresolved horror of Germany's past - are threatened by devaluation cuts... After all, in 1948, the average consumer was caught with 40 marks and a few miserable ones Leftovers on the savings book. Friedrich Flick, however, was able to... Economic miracle start with suitable blocks of shares from the descendants later for A few billion marks were silvered."⁹⁶

92 banking lexicon, Wiesbaden 1963, Sp. 477 f.

93 BAP, German Reichsbank, No. 7009, Bl. 211 ff., file notes v. June 5, 1943 and June 12, 1943 on increased withdrawals from savings accounts.

94 Kraft, Herbert, Always went it around Money. One hundred and fifty Years Savings Bank in Berlin, Berlin 1968, S. 170.

95 German Week, Munich, v. November 11, 1953. In: Documentation the Zeit, Berlin 1954, issue 62, p. 3903 ff.

96 Behrens, Bolke, Cops, bears, Sheep. In: business week, Düsseldorf, No. 20/88, S. 53.

4. Specific Funding resources. Outer Sources of Funding

The main forms of financing - Taxes and loans - were introduced domestically through additional forms and methods - albeit in clear terms less Total scope - as well as through the use considerable external sources of financing.

Tangible results the financing of war benefitted directly and indirectly the "Winter relief organization Of the german people" and the of this organization worn "War Winter Relief Organizations" (War WHW): collections of money and material assets, which contributed to income and to redistribute material assets in such a way that the material burdens of the war could be made less noticeable among the population and also among the soldiers at the front. They were also capable of propaganda as evidence for the The functioning of the "national community" is exploited in war.

In 1939 the organization had the winter relief organization 27,397 local groups, 106,715 cells and 552,446 blocks in the empire. More than half a million collectors took part in the 1939/40 collection campaign collection box on the street and also collected small amounts. The winter relief organization then issued special-purpose vouchers to those in need to purchase or pay for textiles, coal, food, etc. The vouchers were for fixed dates Amounts: 50 Pfg., 1,-, 5,- and later, away "2. War WHW, series C", also to 10 **RM**.⁹⁷ The vouchers were given to retailers who accepted them instead of money when paying had redeemed within certain deadlines. The dealers in turn credited these amounts until they were redeemed.

summary information about the amount of WHW donations not available. The under the Direction of Reich Ministry for propaganda and popular enlightenment from the In any case, the winter relief organization "National Socialist People's Welfare" was implemented with much Propaganda effort and right attractively raised. So were the sums of money coupled with badge sales, which were very popular not only with children. The total WHW contributions during the war certainly reached several hundred million RM. If you to a part also served social purposes, so they are but in connection with the tasks of financing the war must be taken into account as financial resources that do not flow through the Reich treasury. The **WHW vouchers**, in their design as earmarked notes of value with limited use and validity, represented specific means of circulation.

a) Financing/issues at the Persecution of Jews and the Concentration camp administration

Methods of brutal robbery were also used to finance the Nazi regime and its war been applied to parts of the population, or The dictatorship's violent measures were used to improve state finances. So were the confiscation of the assets from Jews after dem November pogrom from 1938 and at all the confiscation and expropriation of assets from "enemies of the state," "pests of the people," and so on similar-

97 Flour, Manfred, The Vouchers of "Winter relief organization Of the german people" (WHW) 1939-1944. In: The Banknote collector. magazine for paper money, No. 3/1987, S. 109 ff.

Persons classified as loan are suitable to enrich the Reich budget within the framework of "other income". A sharp distinction cannot be made between domestic and foreign countries.

Legal basis formed - in addition to the provisions regarding the Reich Flight Act - some already in the first months the Hitler dictatorship issued Regulations⁹⁸ as well as the "Decree from the Führer and Reich Chancellor on the utilization of the confiscated assets of enemies of the Reich" dated May 29, 1941 (RGBl. I, p. 303).

Although the It must be pointed out at this point that the financing of Nazi crimes in concentration and extermination camps, the persecution of Jews and the mass murder of the Jewish population in the true sense did not form part of the war financing. Measures of the described type were not always about the financed by the state budget. For example, "procurement of funds for deportation the Jews" above "Home purchasing contracts" realized, after those the Jews before of their

"Deportation" had to hand over at least a quarter of their movable assets to the "Reich Association of Jews in Germany", which was subordinate to the head of the security police and the SD. According to these treaties, the Jews were granted "life imprisonment Living in the Theresienstadt retirement ghetto," as stated in a secret file note dated March 17, 1943 in the Reich Ministry of Finance was called.⁹⁹ The representatives of the Chiefs of the security police and the SD are "already there." earlier opportunity on the The possibility was pointed out of requesting the funds for the deportation of the Jews from the budget. The head of the security police did not follow this suggestion... The amounts that arise from the conclusion of the home purchasing contracts are enormous and, contrary to expectations, high."

It was with noticeable regret that the Reich Ministry of Finance stated that the assets transferred to the Reich Association of Jews could not be confiscated by the Reich. "They therefore do not become Reich assets... The Reich Minister of Finance has no influence on whether and which assets are confiscated for the benefit of the Reich. It must therefore be accepted that the head of the security police and of SD certain parts of assets of the confiscation." The result could be that "Aryan creditors of the Jews are disadvantaged ... if the assets that flow to the Reich are over-indebted."

There was special camp money in the immediate SS control area of the concentration camps. The character and classification of this means of payment in the system of the war economy and war financing were determined by the "Service Regulations for the Granting of benefits to prisoners (bonus regulation)", which was valid from May 15, 1943, can be seen with frightening clarity. It was called there: „Alone the Work used Prisoners should in the future Have the opportunity to earn a cash reward through performance. It is given as a reward in the form of bonus vouchers, which represent monetary value within the concentration camps those prisoners given, the itself through good Performance, Diligence and special

98 Especially RGBl. I 1933, p. 293, Law about the Conscription communist Veqnögens v. 26.5. 1933; just that. 479, Law on the confiscation of assets hostile to the people and the state. 14.7. 1933.

99 BAK, R 2/21778, AN RMdF "Procurement of funds for the deportation of the Jews", dated March 17, 1943. Hereafter also the following.

express interest. The extra performance is rewarded. The amount of the reward depends after dem Value the More efficient and may provisionally in the Individual cases **RM** -,50, RM 1,-, RM 2,-, **RM** 3,- or RM 4,- and in a few exceptional cases until at a maximum of **RM** 10 per week... The prisoners have the option of using their bonus vouchers to buy cigarettes, other purchases in the canteens and to visit the brothel... or to use the bonus amounts earned on theirs to have savings accounts credited."

The regulation provided for the following distribution of costs for these bonus payments: "The bodies paying the bonus (construction management, commercial enterprises and armaments companies) buy for a certain period of time in advance and at the end of each week issue the notes to the prisoners to be rewarded. The bonuses are paid through purchases from those places to which the prisoners are made available for work. For the prisoners employed in camp operations in the concentration camps themselves, the payment of the bonus certificates is made from Reich funds via Chapter 21/7 b (material expenses)". *where*

Gold, Jewelry, antiques and other valuables goods as assets to replenish the Treasury particularly in demand. According to the regulations of the compulsory foreign exchange economy, which became increasingly stricter during the years of the war, all gold and foreign currency assets had to be paid to the Reichsbank or, to the extent that they were used in the economy, they were subject to the direct control and administration of the Reichsbank. Under the obligation to deliver All values also fell in the course of the conquests were "captured" by the Wehrmacht or other organs of the Reich in other countries. The Reichsbank officials in Berlin, especially in the cash department and in the vault departments, were quite familiar with the term "loot".

Increasingly and regularly, the SS also delivered "values delivered or confiscated in the East" to the Reichsbank. In 1942, a secret agreement was concluded between the SS and the Reichsbank (Melmer Agreement), which specifically... SS loot from concentration camps and extermination camps.¹⁰⁰

After the "Melmer" deposits had been processed in the Reichsbank and then in the Prussian State Mint, the equivalent value was credited to the Reich Ministry of Finance (Special account "**Max** saint"). To lower Split became jewelry, golden ones Clocks u. etc., the prisoners taken off been were, also at the Donut Pawn shop "to best possible recycling" given $m\sqrt{2}$

100 Quoted from Pick, Albert, The camp money of the concentration and DP camp 1933-1945, Munich 1967, **p.** 49 ff.

101 BAP, Case XI, Protocol, Vol. 61, p. 5707 ff. (consultation with Reichsbank Vice President Puhl) and vol. 80, p. 7946 f. (consultation. Reichsbankrat Thoms).

102 IMG, Vol. 13, S. 666 ff.

b) To role external sources of financing

The exploitation of external sources of financing was carried out in a differentiated manner, depending on the course of the war, on the different potencies of the individual occupied and dependent countries and on Germany's war intentions towards the countries concerned. It was carried out both to cover external financial needs and to settle financial obligations within the empire, ie for war expenses both further and further narrower sense. So the means were used for Covering expenses in foreign trade, to cover the costs of purchases and to use services in the occupied territory, as far as the Wehrmacht and the occupying organs the were the cost bearers. The Some of the external financial resources flowed directly into the Reich treasury and from there to various recipients. As a result, they led to the displacement of inflationary processes - currency collapse, price increases - in the occupied countries and in dependent states.

The exhaustion outer Financial sources included:

- the direct financial plunder of the invaded and occupied countries Robbery of gold, securities and cash, through the collection of occupation costs, contributions and other financial contributions;
 - the issuance of occupation money and the setting of currency rates at the Reichsmark for Germany were beneficial;
- the strict monitoring and de facto management of the currency, credit and banking systems of the occupied countries in the German interest.

The loans forced by occupied countries and satellite states as part of clearing transactions played a major role. Finally, the Reichsbank's cooperation with the Bank for International Settlements in Basel and with the Swiss National Bank was put into the service of German war financing.

c) Requisitions and Crew costs

Requisitions were mostly only carried out in the front areas. After Establishment of occupation bodies - regardless of whether as a military or civil administration - were usually the Deliveries and Services of the economy and population of the occupied territories for the Wehrmacht, for Troops, staffs, occupation bodies and other German Positions to be compensated with money, even if under the conditions of the occupation they are below value.¹⁰³

The Plundering of occupied territories through mere robbery However, it was also continued at a higher level, as demonstrated by the example of Belgian gold is that after extortionate manipulations of the German armistice delegation for **business** in Wiesbaden from French Depots in sub-Saharan Africa on adventurous Transported to Germany via Marseille became.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ See Blumhoff, Onno, The Influence of the Germans occupation on money and Banking in the areas occupied during the Second World War, Diss., Cologne 1961, p. 49 ff.

¹⁰⁴ Oertel, Manfred, Over the German Reichsbank in the second World War, Attachment C, Documentation: The Rape of the Belgian gold; Boelcke, The Costs of Hitler's War, p. 117 f.

For the maintenance and the supply of the troops and organs the Occupation administration purchases were made directly in the occupied territories. In practice it soon became apparent that this not only for the supply in each occupied area, but also to supply other areas. Huge black market purchases in occupied France for the Wehrmacht needs of other occupying forces and front areas stand for it.¹⁰⁵

From initially mostly improvised measures developed in Quite routine in northern, western and southeastern Europe. It found its way into the planning for the attack on the USSR and was also used there - dependent from the military Course- practiced.

The largest items of foreign financial sources came from the demands for occupation costs and other "contributions" to finance the war as well as from the use of clearing credits for the German War economy developed.

The occupation costs were formally the financing of the stay of German troops as an occupying power in the countries concerned, including the financing of military construction and other investments important to the war effort. also of an infrastructural nature. In fact, the collection of occupation cost payments was not based on this purposes limited. Also further information and in The Wehrmacht's needs arising in other countries were financed from them, as was particularly evident in the use of France's payments.

Formally should the Height the Payments of the numerical strength of the Occupation troops are determined in the respective country. In reality, the strategic situation, Germany's long-term military and economic policy intentions towards the country in question, as well as its economic performance, also influenced the degree of financial burden, measured per capita of the population or as a proportion of national income, in the individual countries was different. The total amount of crew costs was 85 to 90 billion RM.¹⁰⁶

Table 159
2',payments from crew costs, 1940-1944 (in billion RM)

	1940 (2. half year)	1941	1942	1943	1944 (until September)	total in total
France	1.75	5.55	8.55	11.10	8.30	35.25
Holland	0.80	1.90	2.20	2.20	1.65	8.75
Belgium	0.35	1.30	1.50	1.60	0.95	5.70
Denmark	0.20	0.20	0.25	0.55	0.80	2.00
Italy				2.00	8.00	10.00
Rest	0.90	1.05	4.50	7.55	8.30	22.30
<i>total</i>	4.00	10.00	17.00	25.00	28.00	84.00

Source: Alexeyev, S. 267.

105 At this one Buy was exploited, that the occupation money - the Reichskreditkassenscheine - had a different exchange rate relative to the respective national currency in different countries. Please refer Alexeyev, A **M.**, The War finances the capitalist states, Moscow 1952 (soot.), S. 300 ff.; Blumhoff, S. 62.

106 See. Boelcke, The Cost from Hitler's War, S. 109; Federau, S. 32 f.

However, the payments did not flow together into a single account, for example in the Reich treasury or at the disposal of the Reich Minister of finances. Unlike the “military contributions” or other payments that were demanded by some countries and were used as political blackmail Tribute payments were, acted it itself at the Crew cost payments (or. -credits) to ensure that the occupied countries cover military-related costs. The Payments were made in favor of the occupation organs or the Wehrmacht directly. If the payments from one occupied area were used to finance military or logistical measures for other theaters of war, this was done directly under the responsibility of the Wehrmacht leadership in conjunction with each other with the Reichskreditkassen and, for example, the “Rohstoffhandels-gesellschaft mbH” (Roges), founded in December 1940, which was responsible for “the collection and utilization of loot in all occupied areas as well as the purchase, storage and resale of raw materials important to the war effort”.¹⁰⁷ Thus, large sums of the amounts accumulated in the occupation cost account in France were spent by the Wehrmacht on extensive, systematically organized (but not coordinated) black market purchases for Wehrmacht needs on the Eastern Front and in southeastern Europe.¹⁰⁸

In the affected countries were the Crew costs one the Main causes of the inflationary development. Since there was no such comprehensive regulation of the market and consumption in these countries as in the Reich, open inflation phenomena occurred in prices and in money circulation, of extreme magnitude in Greece, for example .

Not all occupied countries had to pay occupation costs in the strict sense of the word. The temporarily occupied areas of the USSR were largely front-line areas; the area around Bia, Lystok-Grodno and the Reich Commissariats in Ostland and Ukraine were legally not an “occupied territory”, but something imperially immediate Area. Her Status was that of colonies, was but according to that The course of the war is still unfinished. Also in relation to currency and finances the intended regime was not fully realized. The The Wehrmacht troops operating or stationed in the occupied Soviet areas were therefore not occupying troops. The financial costs for them were de jure direct imperial expenses. In the Reich Commissariats in Ostland and Ukraine, taxes and duties were collected directly, and corresponding shares were transferred to the Reich budget.¹⁰⁹

d) Reichskreditkasse bank notes as Crew money

The most important instrument for the financial exploitation of the occupied countries and territories was the Reich Credit Fund Organization.

107 Oertel, Over the German Reichsbank, S. 214 ff. Please refer also Cape. v.

108 Arnoult, Pierre, La France sous l'occupation, Paris 1959, S. 39: „They got us Nothing necessary for life was forcibly taken away; you bought everything from us correctly; but they paid for everything with the money they took from us before had.”

109 Oertel, Over the German Reichsbank, S. 158 ff.; Boelcke, The Costs from Hitler's War, S. 110 f.

The Reichskreditkassen were organs the Reichsbank, also “Sol databases” or Called “bank offices of the Wehrmacht” and “the rapid troops of the German Reichsbank”.¹¹⁰ 1942 existed on the various Theaters of war more than 60 Reichskreditkassen and many exchange offices affiliated with them. The board members were exclusively Reichsbank officials. The remaining staff of the Reichskreditkassen also consisted predominantly of civil servants and employees Reichsbank.¹¹¹ At the head of the Reichskreditkassen organization was an administrative board based in Berlin. As the leading executive body, the Administrative Council appointed a “main administration” consisting of senior Reichsbank officials.¹¹²

The Reichskreditkassen put special money symbols into circulation, the Reichskreditkasenscheine, which were denominated in Reichsmarks and had been available for years.¹¹³ They became legal tender in the temporarily occupied territories declared, but were not valid in the Reich territory itself. The backing of this currency was in the form of a loan the Headquarters the Reichskreditkassen at the Reich only fictitious.¹¹⁴ In reality, the Reichskreditkasse bank notes were - According to a characterization by Reichsbank director Kretzschmann - “requisitions dressed in the form of currency seem”¹¹⁵, and the German tanks and cannons were their cover.¹¹⁶

The first Reich credit funds were in 1939 in Poland built; she became later in Reich's banks converted or. from them emerged in General Government the "Emissions bank in Poland". While the Reichskreditkasenscheine were only in circulation for a short time in Denmark and Norway, they were used on a large scale in Belgium, France and the Netherlands. From Mid-May 1940 passed at times up to 30 Reichskredit

110 BAP, Deutsche Reichsbank, No. 7014, BI. 279 f., "Working at the Reichskreditkassen" (article for the Werkzeugzeitung), February 28, 1941.

111 In a list of names from 1943, 542 officials and 101 employees of the Reichsbank are listed as having been “assigned” to the Reichskreditkassen. listed (BAP, Main Administration of the Reichskreditkassen, No. 21, BI. 18 ff.).

112 Ordinance sheet for the occupied territories in Poland, no. 5 and 6 (1939); Reichsanzeiger and Prussian State Gazette, Berlin, September 28, 1939. - In the early days, the board of directors, chaired by Reichsbank Vice President Puhl, included the Reichsbank board members Kretzschmann, Lange (also a representative of the Reich Ministry of Economics) and Bayrhofer (also Representative the Reich Ministry of Finance) as well as the banker Otto Chr. Fischer von the Reichskreditgesellschaft AG (as head of Reichsgruppe banks and permanent representative of the Reichsbank President chairs the Advisory Board of the German Reichsbank). In 1940 he became ministerial director Tischbein was brought in as a representative of the Wehrmacht. In Lange's place, ministerial director Riehle later represented the Reich Ministry of Economics.

IMG, Vol. 36, P. 197 ff., Doc. EC-128, RWiM, “Report on the status of work for an economic 113 "corporate mobilization", September 30, 1934.

The regulation above Reichskreditkassen v. May 3, 1940 (RGBl. I, S. 743) sat for the loan egg-

114 a limit of 500 million RM; just two weeks later the loan was increased to three billion RM increased (Regulation to the change the regulation above Reichskreditkassen, v. May 15, 1940 (RGBl. I, S. 770).

115 Kretzschmann, Max, The Reichskreditkassen. In: German monetary policy, Berlin 1941, S. 117.

116 Alexeyev, S. 301.

cash registers in the West. The notes were also circulated as occupation money in Yugoslavia and Greece. In Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, cash registers were maintained to supply the Wehrmacht with money in the march and deployment areas.

On the occupied territory of the Soviet Union, the activities of Reichskreditkassen are large.¹¹⁷ Of the approximately 50 created there some of the coffers were transformed into the "Central Bank of the East" and others into the "Central Bank of Ukraine"; in the area of the army groups they remained in place, with the designation as "forerunners and placeholders of future regional central banks"¹¹⁸ to be. In the Reich Commissariat of Ukraine, the central bank there introduced the Karbovanets as a new currency. They existed in the other eastern areas Reichskreditkasse bank notes further, in the east country as only means of payment in the frontline areas next to the ruble currency.

e) Clearing credit

Significant resources from abroad were made available for the German war economy through clearing carried out in Berlin by the Deutsche Verrechnungsbank. This formally happened as a credit in ongoing clearing transactions, but in reality it was a case of non-payment of amounts due. The multilateral clearing system offered the possibility of importing more and more, even if Germany's balance of trade and payments remained passive, both from occupied countries (to the extent that they were connected to clearing) and from dependent states also from neutral countries. The Clearing credit concerned the foreign exchange settlement, not that Payment of the delivery companies. The exporters usually received the delivery value credited in their country's currency by the respective central bank.

Such Advance payment of Foreign trade was introduced especially from exporting countries practices that under the supervision and dictate of the German occupying forces. The countries with which more or less genuine foreign trade had to be carried out succeeded in doing so Regulation naturally not just like that. Had to stay here Circumstances are actually paid for, with deliveries of goods or with foreign currency and gold. Otherwise the export companies had to wait for payment.¹¹⁹

In the Reich Statistical Office as of 18 April 1945 a German clearing minus balance of 20 386.8 **mill. RM** registered. It resulted itself out of 21 225.7 **mill. RM** Debt to 21 Clearing partners and a credit balance from 838.9 **RM million** compared to six other billing partners, including a fictitious 474.9 **million RM** from the two long-defunct Reich Commissariats in Ostland and Ukraine.¹²⁰

117 Oertel, Manfred, On the participation of the Germans Reichsbank the fascist Aggression against the Soviet Union. In: Military History, 5/1981, p. 579 ff.

118 BAP, Head Office of the Reichskreditkassen, No. 4, BI. 218, minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors on December 2, 1942.

119 Benning, Bernhard, European Monetary Issues. In: European Economic Community, Berlin 1942, p. 168 ff. See also chap. V; also II, p. 509 ff.

120 BAP, Statistical Reich Office, No. 3552, BI. 1, „The Development the Clearing balances in the payment

The Prices and that Currency rates in Clearing traffic were in In most cases, this was dictated by the interests of Germany. The clearing balances for individual countries were "adjusted" in such a way that debt was formally kept within certain limits or largely eliminated. So became Bulgaria, where the demands the clearing cash in Berlin expressly as a means of cover for the issue of money considered were induced to purchase Reich debt securities for these demands. This relieved the clearing accounts, but the debt remained in another form. From the end of 1942 to the end of 1943 the clearing minus balance increased to Bulgaria from 108.6 only to 111.6 **mill. RM** at, the Attachment of Bulgarian demands in non-interest bearing Treasury instructions against it from 305 on 567 **mill. RM**, because "in the reporting years a balance Amounts exceeding 100 million RM were transferred to the Deutsche Reichsbank for interest-bearing investment, as in the previous year." An increase in such debt was required for the General Government from 1 676 Mill. to 2 785 **million RM** registered.¹²¹

In the literature, the clearing credits or debts were often viewed as contributions to German war financing. That's just in general Sense correctly. It is more precise to describe them as financial contributions for the German economy during the war, whereby it is understood that the entire economy was put into the service of waging war. Interstate clearing transactions said "also in 1943 in line with military economic requirements. The continued strong import of raw materials and goods for war purposes [led] once again to a sharp increase in clearing debt."¹²² The war financing became immediate then touched when, in various cases, the crew costs also exceed the clearing were settled, at least temporarily - in Norway and Serbia, for example. Also the transfer of military pay from front and occupied areas to Germany were partly carried out via clearing settlement. Clearing credit was a direct source of war financing in that it was immediate was used by the Reich for war purposes, especially for expenditure by the Wehrmacht.

For Germany, the exploitation of clearing as a financial source was essential, both for the economy committed to the war and for the Wehrmacht. If we treat them as part of the funds used for the war, it should be noted that, to the extent that the goods and services benefited the imperial treasury, these balances were already included in the Reich's budget and debt figures, and therefore not included in them can be counted again."¹²³ On the other hand they come from the crew cost payments and the Clearing debts at The sums originating from the occupied countries are by far none complete overview of the Monetary value of the forced economic benefits because enormous Deliveries and Services through requisition or as Benefit in kind in the

traffic with the individual countries", April 18, 1945. The Clearing balances for the Eastland and for reflected Ukraine internal financial relationships between domestic German and occupation authorities or -economy reflects, not the exploitative economic Relationships with Business _ the affected areas as a whole.

121 BAP, German Reichsbank, No. 6779, Bl. 416, German annual report Clearing box for 1943.

122 Ibid, Bl. 412.

123 BAP, Statistical Reich Office, No. 2441, Bl. 71, elaboration "The War financing 1943".

Front- or. rear area driven in became, the neither as clearing post or occupation costs have still been offset as a loan from the respective national central banks. The same applies to the into the Richly transported Profits of German companies in the occupied territories increased, such as the "Eastern companies" in the occupied Soviet territories.

5. To monetary policy Conception the Reichsbank

Analyzes, memoranda and reports from the Reichsbank and others Passages illustrate the pragmatic effort to solve financing and currency issues during war. They initially show great self-confidence. Later, the powerlessness of being able to do anything about the difficulties and inadequacies is admitted. Grandiose expansion programs were pushed aside by the anxious question of the Allies' monetary policy goals and how they could survive in the post-war period.

As a result of the long-term preparation for the war in the area of financial and monetary policy, at the beginning of the war in 1939, the monetary, credit and currency systems in Germany were not exposed to such stormy pressures as in July/August 1914. In addition, the German Reichsbank in 1939 on the Requirements, the with mobilization and the beginning of the war were largely prepared from a practical and organizational point of view. Funk presented on September 2, 1939 in the Meeting of the Reichsbank Directorate, that in the field of money and banking as well as on the capital market in Unlike abroad, not the The slightest alarm had arisen and the German Reichsbank therefore had no reason to take any special measures. The mobile surveillance tasks were carried out smoothly "thanks to the well-functioning apparatus of the Reichsbank." ¹²⁴

The Reichsbank memorandum "Fundamental Questions of War Financing" dated October 3, 1939 came to the more critical conclusion, "that one Devaluation of money more and more inevitable the longer the war lasts. ... The primary task of monetary policy can only be to keep money intact to the extent that it can facilitate the movement of goods; But not the idea of preserving the value of money at any price." Contrary to all public assurances They focused on the inviolable value of the Reichsmark responsible authorities of the Reich throughout the course of the war According to this guideline, it was already clear to them at the beginning of the war that "at the end of the war ... there will always be a reduction in the value of the monetary unit." ¹²⁵

When comparing with the methods of War financing in the countries of the war opponents, especially Great Britain, warm on itself in this Time the German superiority fully secure. ¹²⁶ In a letter to the economics department of the Goebbels Ministry from November 10, 1939 the Reichsbank recommended that the Newspapers more than before, to what extent the democratically governed countries and hotbeds of liberalism in England and France economic and military economics Measures of authoritarian

124 BAP, German Reichsbank, No. 7004, BI. 156 f.

125 Ibid, BI. 213 ff.

126 BAP, German Reichsbank, No. 7004-7006 .

Germany's have imitated. ... Detailed considerations in the press must inevitably lead to the conclusion that the ... German measures are obviously superior to previous practice in the enemy states."¹²⁷

As long as the fascist leadership was still luxuriating in victory, not much was done to further develop war financing and make it more effective.

In the summer of 1940, Funk examined the possibility of lowering interest rates on the capital market. However, the Economics Department of the Reichsbank only considered an extension of the term of the four percent Reich Treasury Notes and the issuance of 3 1/2 percent Reich Treasury Notes to be justifiable¹²⁸: "In this way, the Reich would achieve the absolutely desirable interest savings for its future credit needs, and the Economy would win necessary time for one gradual adaptation to a lower one Overall level. The different capital market values would again a stronger interest rate differentials and the newly issued imperial titles the special position they have in terms of interest rates preserved." Accordingly, they remained on April 9, 1940 fixed Interest rates (Reichsbank discount 3 1/2 percent; Lombard rate 4 1/2 percent) unchanged; The interest rates and terms of the bonds and imperial treasury notes were designed accordingly.

In mid-1940, questions of a future "reorganization of Europe" temporarily became more conceptual Work moved. Funk had received the order from Göring to summarize Planning for the structure of the German and European economy after - so the immediate expectation - to prepare for a victorious end to the war. After the from the Economic Department of Reichsbank worked on a confidential Reichsbank case on behalf of Funk "Problems of external monetary policy after the end of the war" (July 20, 1940)¹²⁹ The Reichsmark should become the leading currency in a German "major economic area"; Germany would receive war compensation Form of raw materials, assumption of debt and demand money; after all, the relationships of the Reichsmark to Gold will be preserved, however be greatly relaxed. Within the German currency bloc, fixed exchange rates should facilitate the expansion into a monetary and customs union.

Early December 1940 wrote Reichsbank Director Einsiedel, head of the Economic Department of the Reichsbank, in a confidential assessment, that the currency protection measures of the War Economy Ordinance had proven their worth.¹³⁰ "Nevertheless, the transition into the second year of the war requires an examination of the question of whether she also for a longer one Duration of war sufficient become The Reichsbank stand while of war only inadequate Medium to Disposal At the actual Danger source can the imperial

127 Ibid, No. 7004, BI. 295.

128 BAP, German Reichsbank. No. 6549, BI. 359 ff. "The possibility of a further interest rate cut on the capital market", report for the Reichsbank Directorate dated August 22, 1940.

129 BAP, German Reichsbank, No. 7015, BI. 49 ff.; also BI. 224 ff., "On the question of the reorganization of the German currency after the war with special consideration of the money problem", July 4, 1940.

130 BAP, Deutsche Reichsbank, No. 7006, BI. 317 ff., "On the currency situation in the second year of the war", December 9, 1940.

"The bank doesn't come close at all." The concerned before everything the Scissors between the amount of money and credit and the sinking one Consumer goods production. The report suggested an overhaul of the war economy regulation, stricter taxation and a tighter wage policy. As a result, as described, the Dividend Levy Ordinance, the war surcharge on corporation tax and the measures of the Purchasing Power Control Ordinance came out. However, there were no noticeable monetary policy effects.

At the end of the summer of 1941, detailed discussions began in the Reichsbank about what changes were necessary to secure the continuation of the war in terms of financial and monetary policy. An analysis prepared for Vice President Puhl in September 1941 stated: "The German monetary situation at the beginning of the third year of the war was characterized At first glance, there are two succinct facts: Compared to the peacetime period, 1.) the supply of consumer goods has halved, 2.) the money in circulation doubled. ... Based on all experience, the consequences of a continuation of this development can be assumed to be certain ... such a development could at the price of Victory could be accepted if necessary if the war was only expected to last a short time. However, this assumption is unlikely... Given the clarity with which these development tendencies can be overlooked, countermeasures become inevitable." ¹³¹

A further analysis "On the internal monetary situation" from October 4, 1941 for Vice President Long ¹³² came to drastic statements. The speech was from Disturbances in Economic rhythm, of asset psychosis, surreptitious trading, paralysis of the will to save and disregard for money, serious social damage and unthinkable political consequences.

As Countermeasures were in the Elaboration for Puhl considered: "1. A limitation the War expenses through reckless Lowering the Prices for military equipment, 2. reinforced skimming the mass purchasing power through appropriate increase of taxes, 3. further reduction in income through effective austerity propaganda, possibly introduction of a compulsory savings rate with a long-term commitment, 4. finally dispelling the thesis: 'Money doesn't play a role' by informing all relevant authorities about this Dangers of the current currency situation 5. increased fight against black trade in all its forms."

In the elaboration for For a long time, the massive use of all state resources was called for "that Countermeasures are taken are stronger than the decayed think." Further was called it: „Until now is still no War supplier hunger died In

At a time when all defense companies are swimming in money, it is simply ridiculous to claim that they can no longer lower their prices." With regard to taxes, it was pointed out that "the Englishmen to the dangers of inflation through gradual, but consistent tightening of the control screw with considerable success without their economy being damaged or other disadvantages occurring as a result." Two years earlier, war financing in Great Britain had been assessed quite differently. But now was called it: „Such Measures ... to refrain from means one Danger from unmissable tangible scope. If we let things continue, we will soon find that the worker refuses wage increases and instead demands more food."

131 Ibid, No. 7007, BI. 266 ff., "War financing and Currency", September 17, 1941.

132 Ibid, BI. 330 ff.

The already mentioned "Ordinance on the Control of Purchasing Power" of October 30, 1941 But that was the most the Reich government decided to do in order to regulate the currency situation more strictly. She he put also now, as in the East the "Blitzkrieg" illusions over the heap were thrown, one strength Restraint and conveying caution on how always when it was valid, that to burden their own people materially more heavily and to impose greater hardships on them.¹³³

Another problem was raised by the board of directors of the Reichskreditkassen on November 13, 1941: the Wehrmacht soldiers in occupied Russia could not buy much and transferred theirs pay increasingly by Field postal order home, like that that the in the East not activated purchasing power now in the Rich as additional purchasing power occurs, which amounts to 100 million RM per month. The military pay with which the members of the Wehrmacht actually paid their personal tribute the peoples of the The USSR was supposed to demand this, thus appearing as a demand on the Reich. This caused the Board of Directors to make the bitter remark: "We are in the process of somehow tying up free purchasing power at home... and in these considerations we must now also take into account the excess purchasing power coming from the field."¹³⁴

How in many other cases, so could also here at the Factual situation nothing be changed. The Board of Directors had to admit at its meeting on February 16, 1942: The idea of reducing military pay "Because he does not fulfill its purpose of being used for additional purchases fulfilled, is being fulfilled the frontline soldiers Not towards Russia considered portable. As a result, the funds continue to flow to the Reich..."¹³⁵

side the Reichsbank and other imperial offices were in the course of During the war, credit developments and especially the relationship between long-term and short-term loans were discussed again and again, sometimes with a comparative one View on the First World War. In April 1942,¹³⁶ the economic department of the Reichsbank noted the increasing trend in the Reich's financial needs, the Reich's borrowing and the short-term Reich debt, but at the same time countered any fears: "In comparison to the Reich's total debt since the beginning of the war comes credit to the central bank as immediate Source of funding ... no crucial Meaning to. The increased national debt one Expansion of our economic area and Increasing the performance (tax) power of the German people. Also is the national debt is still lower than, for example in England. The The Reich's annual interest burden is currently approx 4 ½ billion RM and is therefore in proportion to the Tax revenue is still moderate so far."

Regarding the currency situation, it was said: "Thanks to the comprehensive system for controlling the flow of money and goods, not only has it been possible so far the population with the vital ones goods smoothly supplies, but also the price for numerous nutritional and luxury foods as well as

133 See. I, S. 20.

134 BAP, Headquarters of the Reichskreditkassen, No. 2, BI. 234, report on the meeting of the Board of Directors on November 13, 1941.

135 Ibid, No. 3, BI. 109, report above the meeting of board of directors, February 16, 1942.

136 BAP, German Reichsbank, No. 7008, BI. 249 ff., "The location of the German war economy", April 25, 1942.

other important goods and services ... are reasonably maintained. Of course, this should not lead us to talk about monetary policy. Overlooking tensions... Our currency is effectively protected from the outside world by seamless foreign exchange management and foreign trade controls. In this respect it contains external currency situation. Time for us no serious problems."

Remarkably, that in the In the first years of the war there was hardly any contradiction between internal assessments and public ones. Announcements about war financing and Currency existed. In A number of strictly confidential analyzes did not overlook possible dangers and sources of conflict, but doubts about the fundamental correctness of this policy and its eventual success were not raised. This did not change even after the fundamental change in the East at the turn of 1942/1943, although it was recognized as essential to re-examine the financing and currency issues. "The requirements of total warfare also apply in the financial area," as a report from the Reichsbank stated. The lack of smoothness of the current financing mode must not tempt us not to touch the hot potato of increasing taxes";¹³⁷ but overall the transition to total war announced by Goebbels remained without counterpart in the financial sphere.¹³⁸

In the report cited, the question was at least asked whether, given the continued increase in excess purchasing power, "with the expected longer duration of the war, the current levy system is sufficient to avoid, if possible, harmful consequences for the war and post-war economy." Against the "in "The objections raised by the rule" were "basically demonstrated the necessity of tax increases", whereby "as most suitable and the most promising Way one increase in Wages and income tax". The authors suspected that the "political concerns previously raised against tax increases... had now been put aside". "Reich Minister Funk recently expressly emphasized at the general meeting of the Reichsbank that not everyone has yet Tax reserves have been exhausted and announced that a new tax program was being prepared." Everything remained the same.¹³⁹

Until 1944, the prevailing tendency of those responsible was to confirm to themselves that there was no better way to finance the war. Developed in January 1944 the economics department the Reichsbank a "Review on war financing in 1943".¹⁴⁰ The overall assessment of war financing continued to be positive: "In the year of the war 1943 was on the already proven method The silent financing of the war has not changed anything." It went on to say: „If it also succeeded so far, around 50 BC. H. of the imperial expenditure instead of just 13 percent. H. to cover the First World War from current income, so it holds The circulation of short-term imperial assets and the means of payment are increasing at an increasing pace certain dangers that require the constant attention of the the responsible authorities." In addition to the visible national debt grow

137 BAP, German Reichsbank, No. 7009, BI. 116 ff., „To Ask from tax increases", March 24, 1943.

138 Brackmann, Michael, From the total War to economic miracle The history the West German currency reform 1948, Essen 1993, p. 34.

139 Please refer For this detailed ibid, S. 50 ff.

140 BAP, German Reichsbank, No. 7009, BI. 438 ff.

still "a considerable invisible imperial debt the unpaid obligations of the Reich towards the bomb-damaged population".

"The War financing goes in well broken in Railways and - different as in the World War - rather silently," said the "Draft of Thought for Vice-President Lange" on the subject of "Tasks and Probability of the German Banking Industry in the War," which was written at the Reichsbank in April 1944.¹⁴¹

The Reich government no longer had enough strength and courage to take new financial, currency or tax policy measures. In seemingly desperate appeals, demagogic promises and deceptions were used to try to get the population to increase savings and persevere. This was also the case in a radio speech by the Reich Minister the Finance on 8th. April 1944, the Internally he expressed himself very differently, but here he asserted that the Leadership commitment was conscious of "fighting and averting the danger of inflation with all possible means." He tried to make one believe that the German savers act correctly and wisely in terms of war No money for spending unnecessary things at inflated prices, but to Bring savings bank. „Because once is the Talk, that Savings balance now or later taken away whoever could do it, just one thing the bad rumors the Poison kitchen of the hostile Propaganda there. On the other hand, once the war is over, it will become clear what enormous possibilities there are in converting our war and peacetime production. Has our industry in the Manufacture of weapons for the war organizational and technically miracles are achieved, it is used in the production of goods for peace - also as far as prices are concerned - perform the same miracles. Then it will be shown that the Saving was worth it and that talk of the devaluation of money was nonsense."¹⁴²

In mid-1944, another attempt was made to launch a major campaign to promote savings under the slogan "Victory Savings". On June 2, 1944, a meeting of the board of directors took place at the Reichsbank, at which the idea of a film was discussed that would illustrate the cycle of money and the goods that alleged currency security and unnecessary fears of inflation as well as the value of saving. According to this idea, the film's credits should read: "The opportunity has never been better. You hardly miss out on anything today if you save. So avoid any unnecessary expenses! Victory is certain for us, if all save! Be therefore you too are confident of victory Saver! Believe and save!"¹⁴³ This line of spreading optimism and perseverance slogans was persistently continued until the end of the war.¹⁴⁴

In the economics department During this time, however, the Reichsbank increasingly elaborated on the economic war goals and post-war plans of the states in the anti-Hitler coalition.¹⁴⁵ While for example Wireless in the July 1944 the Results the

141 Ibid, BI. 441 ff.

142 BAP, German Reichsbank, No. 1608, German commercial service, Press release from the April 8, 1944, „The Methodology of German financing the war.

143 BAP, RWiM, No. 8444/1, AT and various material "Connected to victory Save".

144 BAP, German Reichsbank, No. 7010, BI. 168 ff., "Draft of a speech of Vice President Lange on the radio, October 1944".

145 Ibid, No. 7010 and 7015.

The Bretton Woods Monetary and Financial Conference was publicly and angrily attacked,¹⁴⁶ this conference was assessed quite objectively by the Economics Department of the Reichsbank. One was dispensed with general contempt the Western agreements on the gold and dollar standards, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.¹⁴⁷

When the front lines ran into German Reich territory, the monetary and financial systems and the Payment transactions increasingly confused. The German Reichsbank published last time on the 7th February 1945 an ID card. For their internal business operations she until 7. March 1945 a put together an already incomplete ID card.¹⁴⁸

Testify above the Total expenses Germany for the War must inevitably on Estimates are based because, firstly, there is no really exact overview of all war-relevant expenditure. Second is the boundary between military or war spending and civil and post-war spending flowing, especially under the conditions of the of Germany declared and practiced "total war". The same applies to the Total war costs, which also include the pre-war expenses and the costs resulting from the war, which broadly include expenses for war damage recovery and compensation as well as ongoing survivors' benefits and war graves care.

When calculating specifically the costs of the war falls further into Weight that with the currency reforms in Germany in 1948, the old Reichsmark currency and the liabilities denominated in Reichsmarks were different were liquidated, and that two fundamentally different currencies the Job the RM currency kicked. From the 1949 established with the German states also became liabilities from the war and from the post-war period - towards other states and peoples, but also towards war victims and war victims in Germany - adopted and fulfilled to very different extents.

146 Please refer Reports in the German Daily press at the July 8/9, 1944.

147 BAP, German Reichsbank, No. 7015, Bl. 609 ff., "The results of the monetary and Financial Conference in Bretton Woods", August 9, 1944. See Chapter VI in the previous vol.

148 German Money- and Banking in Pay 1876-1975, S. 23 u. 36 f.

6. Attachment: Tables above the tax income of Germans empire, 1938/39-1943/44 (in mill. RM)

Table 160

The highest-earning Steer (including the respective war surcharges)

	Financial year:						total 1939/40 until 1943/44
	1938/39	1939/40	1940/41	1941/42	1942/43	1943/44	
Income-tax	5 352	8th 225	10726	13 121	12 875	13 384	58,330 _
<i>including:</i>							
Payroll tax	2091	2646	2979	4223	4540	5 001	19 390
corporate							
tax	2417	3,228 _	3 485	5 087	6956	6 655	25410
Sales tax	3 357	3 735	3 929	4149	4160	4177	20150
<i>total</i>	11,126 _	15 187	18 140	22 356	23 991	24216	103 890

Source: Statistical Manual from Germany 1928-1944, ed. v. State Council of the American Occupied Territory, Munich 1949. Differences in totals due to rounding.

Table 161

Selected Steer from income and Assets

	Accounting year:						Total 1939/40 until 1943/44
	1938/39	1939/40	1940/41	1941/42	1942/43	1943/44	
assets							
tax	390.6	417.2	552.8	615.7	646.0	674.2	2905.9
application							
apportionment	144.5	167.9	221.9	249.2	269.1	289.2	1 197.3
profit transfer							
guide (GAV)				316.6	1304.3	1 217.7	2 838.6
dividend							
delivery(DA V)				23.0	7.2	5.5	35.7
inheritance							
tax	104.2	117.2	123.8	153.4	130.9	130.9	656.2
military tax	16.6	9.5	6.4	2.0	- 1.1	- 1.0	15.8
escape from the							
empire	342.6	216.2	47.8	36.5	31.5	8.8	340.8
tax							
Fire protection-							
tax	1.5	21.0	21.8	22.8	25.9	26.2	117.7

Source: How Table 160.

Table 162

The taxes from the movement of assets and Traffic (Value added tax see table. 160)

	Accounting year:						Total 1939/40 until 1943/44
	1938/39	1939/40	1940/41	1941/42	1942/43	1943/44	
Steer from the assets traffic (in total)*	436.1	473.7	483.2	463.0	463.8	382.6	2 266.3
transport tax (personal nen and Goods)	342.9	376.3	442.3	531.0	618.4	737.3	2 705.3
motor vehicle vehicle tax	140.8	115.5	92.5	0.1	85.6	74.7	368.4

*) This includes: capital transfer tax (= corporate tax + securities tax + stock exchange turnover tax), real estate transfer tax a), insurance tax, totalizator tax, other racing betting taxes, Lottery taxes, bill of exchange taxes, document taxes.

Source: How Table 160.

Table 163

The with War surcharge documented Excise taxes

	Financial year:						total 1939/40 until 1943/44
	1938/39	1939/40	1940/41	1941/42	1942/43	1943/44	
Tobacco tax	1 002.6	1 240.1	1 558.1	1 633.7	1 515.8	1 340.0	7 287.7
Beer tax	413.8	642.8	638.0	682.5	660.9	637.2	3 261.4
War surcharge on Beer, tobacco							
u. sparkling wine		782.3	1 608.4	2 180.0	2 743.9	2 581.4	9 896.0
intake out of dem burned- wine monopoly*	318.9	497.8	705.9	669.6	342.0	433.0	2 648.3
Tax revenue in total	1 735.3	3 163.0	4 510.4	5 165.8	5 262.6	4 991.6	23 093.4

*) including War surcharge.

Source: How Table 160.

Table 164

Selection further Steer on consumption and Expense

	Accounting year:						Total 1939/40 until 1943/44
	1938/39	1939/40	1940/41	1941/42	1942/43	1943/44	
Sugar tax	377.6	509.2	512.7	598.2	519.6	553.4	2 693.1
Mineral oil- tax	107.2	134.4	129.7	147.6	177.2	203.9	792.8
Salt tax	59.9	77.0	85.1	95.3	131.4	118.3	507.1
ignition products tax	13.2	17.0	19,1	20.2	20.3	21.1	97.7
light source tax	15.6	19.7	20.6	23.3	24.3	20.6	108.5

Raised became also the acetic acid tax and the sweetener tax. Both brought annually less than 10 **mill. RM**, as well the Playing card tax. In the Courses of the war fell the Fat tax (last levied in 1940/1941) and the slaughter tax (last levied in 1942/1943).

Source: How Table 160.

Attachment

1. Co-authors of book

Hagen Butcher, Prof. Dr., University of Athens

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Charles Heinz Roth, Dr. med. Dr. phil., hamburger Foundation, endowment for Social history of 20. century

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3. Sources- and bibliography (including one Literature selection out of the Volumes I and II)

a) Unprinted sources

State and Municipal archives

Federal Archives Koblenz (BAK)

R2	Reich Ministry of Finance
R3	Reich Ministry for Armaments and war production Reich Ministry of
RS	Transport
R6	Reich Ministry for the occupied eastern territories Reich
R7	Ministry of Economics
R 91	Reich office for the Foreign Trade
RIOMI	Reich Association Iron Reich
RII	Chamber of Commerce Reich Industry
R 12 I	Group
R 13 I	Economic group Iron workers Industry Economic
R 13 III	Group Mechanical Engineering Economic Group
R 13 v	Electrical Industry Economic Group Precision
R 13 VI	mechanics and optics business group Chemical
R 13 XII	Industry Economic Group Leather Industry
R 13 XIII	Economic Group Clothing industry economic
R13XV	group mining Reich Ministry of Justice
R 13XX	Reich Office for Economic
R22	Development Representative for the
R25	Four Year Plan, Business Group
R26IV	Nutrition Departments of the
	Reichsbank Reich Ministry of Labor
R28	Reich Chancellery Reich Security
R41	Main Office Academy for German
R43 II	Law Southeast European Society
R58	Police departments in incorporated and occupied territories
R61	(Poland)
R63	Reich Commissioner for the Treatment of hostile assets Wednesday company
R 70Poland	Continental Oil AG
	Goerdeler, Carl
R87	Goebbels, Joseph
R 106	Krohn, Johannes
R 176	Kraut, Heinrich
NL 113	Westrick, Gerhard
NL 118	Nuremberg Trials
NL 141	Falkenhausen Trial
NL 198	Nadler, Fritz
NL200	
Alles. Proc. 1, 2, 3,	
9	
Alles. Proc. 4	
ZSg 115	

For some Source complexes become abbreviation used:

timeline the Departments of Reich Minister spear= timeline (R 3/1 735-1740)

"Leader meetings" (Hitler-Speer conferences) = FB (**R** 3/1507-1511)

headquarters Planning, Stenographic Transcripts = ZPP (R 3/1710-- 1727)

Headquarters Planning, "Results" of the meetings (Result logs)= ZPE (R 3/1689 u. 1690)

Karl Otto sour, Keywords for the Armament index (of Technical office) = sour, Keywords (**R** 3/1989)

Federal Archives/Military Archives, Freiburg (BA/MA)

RH 15 **OKW**, General Army Office

RH 19 VII Army High Command 12

RH 26-- 22 22. Infantry Division

RM 7 Naval War Command

RW 6 **OKW**, General Wehrmacht Office

RW 19 **OKW**, military economy and Armament Office

R 40 territorials Commander Southeast

Holdings of the film collection (former FS of the military archives Potsdam), in particular **OKW**, Wehrwirtschafts- und Armaments Office and subsequent institutions (see concordance)

Federal Archives, Departments Potsdam (BAP)

Reich Ministry of Economics

Reich Ministry for Armor and War production Reich Ministry of Finance

Reichsbank Statistics

Reichsamt Foreign

Office

Reichskredit-Gesellschaft headquarters the

Reichskreditkassen Deutsche Bank (F)

IG colors

Economics archive (WFA) the Potash industry, formerly VVB Kali

Staßfurt Flick Group

Salzdetfurth AG

Siemens AG, now Siemens Archive, Munich estate of Herbert von Dirksen

Nuremberg Succession Trials:

Case II Milk Process

Case V Flick process

Case IG Farben trial, Krupp

VI trial, Wilhelmstrasse

Case X trial, OKW trial

Case

XI

Case

XII

Stocks the Film collection (see Concordance), especially mixed stock economy (military economy and armaments) Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production Reich Ministry of Economics

RFSS, More personal
Staff Goebbels diary

Abbreviation:

News from the Reich Minister for armament and ammunition or for armaments and war production
(Ministerial Gazette) = News (Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production, No. 51)

Political archive of Foreign Office, Bonn Thuringian

Main State Archives, Weimar

Reich governor

City archives Stralsund

Economic archives

archive Daimler Benz

AG Archive Thyssen AG

Mining Archive, Bochum

Haniel archive

Siemens archive, Munich

35-44/Lc 168, Gerald Small, documentation to Story of Aviation equipment factory Hakenfelde
LGW 1930-1945, Munich 1980

35-70/1a 856, **K. W.** Fever, To Story the German rocket armor, Klagenfurt, May 1965

Company archive of the brazen. VEB Pentacon Dresden

company archive of the brazen. VEB Sachsenwerk Dresden

company archive of brazen. VEB Medicinal product/work

Dresden

Archives from Foundations and Institutes

archive Jü,r Christian Democratic politics (ACDP), St. Augustine
NL Lamp, Adolf

archive the hamburger Foundation, endowment Jü,r Social history (HSG)
Duration Siemens Group

archive of Institute Jü,r Contemporary history (IjZ), Munich

ED 99 NL Spear, Albert

ED 115 NL Jodl, Alfred

Zs/A-20 NL Schwerin from Krosigk, Lutz Count

ZS 565 Saur, Karl Otto

ZS 1186 Luer, Carl

ZS 1217 Messerschmitt, Willy

ZS 1230 Milk, Erhard

ZS 1432 Schmelter, Fritz

Foreign archives

Archives national, Paris (Arch. Nat.)
Af 40

Archives diplomacy, Paris (AD)
Guerre 1939-1945, Vichy Europe

Historical Archives of Crete (IAK)
Heraklion Prefecture (NI or PI)
Rethymnon Prefecture (NRe or. PRe)

archive the University of Crete,

Rethymnon Public Record Office, London

(PRO)
FO 371
FO 837
N 6292

Wojewodzkie Archiwum Paristwowe w Katowicach, Katowice
Upper Silesian Institute for Economic Research
Dresdner Bank, Katowice branch

National Archives, Washington (N/A)
Record Group No.
84 226
260

Frank/in Delano Roosevelt Library (FDRL), Hyde Park, NY
Henry Morgenthau Diaries
Harley Martin Kilgore Papers

Film concordance

concordance between the Film numbers the above mentioned

Film collections (BAP and BA/MA) and the T- and Roll numbers of the National Archives,
Washington

Film no.	T- No.	Roll no.
713	175	130
1727	73	2
1729	73	13
1730	73	30
1732	73	180
1733	73	181
1734	73	182
1737	77	4
1740	77	10
1772	77	140
1775	77	332
1780	77	347
2328	77	278
2348	84	72

3353	175	71
3365	71	23
3375	501	165
3381	73	4
3383	73	14
3384	73	15
3385	73	19
3386	73	20
3399	73	179
3568	73	193
3570	175	119
3575	175	194
3609	175	103
3642	73	105
3654	71	34
3661	175	146
3716	120	Ser.5685
3857	81	59
3956	83	6
3957	83	17
4564	77	489
4571	77	429
4605	71	105
4640	73	21
4650	73	37
4660	73	50
5273	71	94
5884	120	Ser.4646
8253	77	354
8261	77	363
8263	77	365
8322	77	430
10604	84	41
10609	84	46
10611	84	48
10612	84	49
10613	84	52
10614	84	53
10629	84	69
10630	84	70
10631	84	71
10632	84	73
10636	84	77
10638	84	80
10642	84	84
10655	84	97
10660	84	102
10709	84	155

10738	84	188
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register to Complete edition

1. Film concordance

By HelmaKaden

concordance between the Film numbers of the above mentioned Film collections (BAP and MA) and the T and Roll numbers the National Archives, Washington

Film no.	T- No.	Roll no.	Film no.	T- No.	Roll no.
376	84	8th	1788	77	445
381	81	2	1791	77	450
713	175	130	1811	77	482
1571	175	91	1818	77	545
1726	71	109	1826	77	635
1727	73	2	1828	77	659
1729	73	13	1829	77	667
1730	73	30	2297	84	25
1732	73	180	2312	77	15
1733	73	181	2313	77	16
1734	73	182	2317	77	84
1735	73	183	2324	77	167
1737	77	4	2325	77	204
1740	77	10	2328	77	278
1741	77	14	2348	84	72
1742	77	17	2353	84	195
1746	77	64	3315	77	360
1748	77	50	3345	175	57
1752	77	81	3353	175	71
1758	77	94	3361	175	93
1772	77	140	3365	71	23
1775	77	332	3368	81	600
1777	77	335	3375	501	165
1780	77	347	3381	73	4
1781	77	352	3383	73	14
1783	77	404	3384	73	15
1784	77	441	3385	73	19

Film no.	T- No.	Roll no.	Film no.	T- No.	Roll no.
3386	73	20	5465	77	178
3398	73	144	5474	120	Ser.2885
3399	73	179	5548	175	122
3567	175	39	5675	77	203
3568	73	193	5682	77	37
3570	175	119	5683	77	40
3575	175	194	5884	120	Ser.4646
3608	175	90	8253	77	354
3609	175	103	8261	77	363
3642	73	105	8263	77	365
3643	73	140	8273	77	376
3654	71	34	8274	77	377
3661	175	146	8288	77	670
3716	120	Ser.5685	8290	77	673
3854	81	42	8297	77	400
3857	81	59	8322	77	430
3956	83	6	8398	77	649
3957	83	17	8630	77	38
3961	83	74	8651	77	440
3962	83	75	10604	84	41
3964	83	80	10609	84	46
3965	83	81	10611	84	48
3966	83	94	10612	84	49
4141	175	94	10613	84	52
4184	73	22	10614	84	53
4186	73	34	10616	84	56
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4566	73	16	10630	84	70
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4640	73	21	10636	84	77
4649	73	35	10637	84	78
4650	73	37	10638	84	80
4660	73	50	10642	84	84
4667	120	Ser.4688H,ff	10649	84	91
4742	73	187	10655	84	97
4788	73	94	10660	84	102
4826	73	142	10667	84	109
5273	71	94	10699	84	142
5381	77	189	10707	84	153
5382	77	190	10709	84	155
5386	77	198	10738	84	188

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10746	84	198	10804	84	261
10749	84	201	10807	84	264
10759	84	211	10809	84	266
10763	84	216	10869	84	65
10764	84	217	10975	81	219
10765	84	218	11246	81	76
10784	84	239	13380	77	594
10785	84	242	14155	580	18
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6. Errata list

Bandl

Page/Line		Page/Line	
45/11 vu	<i>instead of:</i> of Procedure <i>correct:</i> furthermore pre-	61/1	<i>instead:</i> flr milk as flr spear <i>correct:</i> as flr spear flr Milk
50/4 vu	hens <i>instead of:</i> st4rlesten <i>correct:</i> strength	94/5 vu	<i>instead of:</i> RMBuK <i>correct:</i> RMRuK
capitalism 109/15 vu	<i>correct:</i> imperialism <i>correct:</i> from Pages	105/2 vu	<i>instead of:</i> <i>instead of:</i> from the sides
110/3	<i>instead of:</i> just <i>correct:</i> de facto	123/21 vu	<i>instead of:</i> admiral <i>right:</i> Grand Admiral (since Jan.43)
127/8	<i>instead of:</i> Military districts <i>correct:</i> military districts	124/15	: AEG Group <i>correct:</i> Siemens Group
130/9	<i>instead of:</i> can <i>correct:</i> could	43/15 vu	<i>instead of:</i> Albert Speer <i>correctly:</i> Albert spear (position represented: Albert birder)
188/3	<i>instead of:</i> gc- <i>correct:</i> huge financial	144/10	<i>instead of:</i> <i>correct:</i>
Lamertz 198/10 vu	<i>instead of:</i> Radandt	145/11 vu	<i>instead of:</i> GB Chemistry <i>right:</i> Reich Office filr Host-shaft expansion
Lammertz	<i>correct:</i> Inaccurate quote in: Ra- then	226/13	<i>instead of:</i> <i>correct:</i>
247/6	<i>instead:</i> Iron <i>correct:</i> iron-creating in- 1942 industry 1943	275/1 vu	<i>instead of:</i> 1943 <i>correct:</i> 1942
311/6 vu	<i>instead of:</i> before <i>correct:</i> from	275/3 vu	<i>instead of:</i> 1942/43 <i>correct:</i> 1941/42
317/10 vu	<i>instead of:</i> Scnebelle <i>correct:</i> Senelle	316/12 vu	<i>is missing:</i> Date: 24. 3. 1943
tape II		330/13 vu	<i>instead of:</i> Triple <i>correct:</i> Quadruple
XVII/5	<i>instead:</i> Special ring(s) <i>correct:</i> Special ring(s) <i>to cancel:</i> ("Barbarossa")	334/14 vu	<i>instead of:</i> still far higher Guess <i>correct:</i> similar height Guess <i>instead of:</i> s. S. 297f. <i>correct:</i> s. in this one Vol. - p.297f.
4/9	<i>instead of:</i> Examination committee <i>correct:</i> Examination committee	340/fab.59	percentages relate itself ever- because on the annually growth
17/4 vu	nen	373/14	<i>instead:</i> 1938-1942 – <i>correct:</i> 1938-1944 –
22/13 vu	<i>instead of:</i> Shapes <i>correct:</i> Companies	374/16 vu	<i>instead of:</i> 276.6 <i>correct:</i> 276.7
2519	<i>instead:</i> 1932 <i>correct:</i> 1942		
26/20 vu	<i>instead of:</i> satisfiable	376/11	<i>instead of:</i> appointed <i>correct:</i> called
50/16 vu	<i>correct:</i> fulfillable" <i>instead of:</i> Siemens and AEG- Group	412/10	<i>instead:</i> Otto Wolf Group <i>correct:</i> Otto Wolff Group
60/3	<i>correct:</i> Siemens Group <i>instead of:</i> discuss <i>correct:</i> discuss"	438/note. 197	<i>is missing Specification:</i> Himmler at Greifelt. 12. 6. 1942

Page/Line		Page/Line	
452/21	<i>instead of:</i> Space <i>correct:</i> robbery	140ffab.42 (ex.)	<i>instead of:</i> the and <i>correct:</i> the
481/3 vu	<i>instead of:</i> at the Jconfigen <i>correct:</i> „at the Jconfigen		<i>instead of:</i> (in t ever Day) <i>correct:</i> (Generation in yep
483/1 vu	<i>instead of:</i> 1984 <i>correct:</i> 1948	152ffab.47	Day) Pay flr 1943 <i>instead of:</i> ?? <i>correct:</i> 5925(Schkopau)2860
511/14	<i>instead of:</i> l. l. 1944 <i>correct:</i> l. 11. 1944	154/2 BCE	{H0ls) <i>instead of:</i> Ibid
515/3 vu	<i>instead of:</i> 1952 <i>correct:</i> 1942	188ffab.69	<i>correct:</i> Ibid (USSBS) Actual numbers flr Flak 3.7 and
645/13 vu	<i>instead of:</i> (in 1000) <i>correct:</i> (in 1000 Schu,8)		12.8 apply additional-gefa, Bt f.
673/9	<i>instead of:</i> 1938-1942 _ <i>correct:</i> 1938-1944 _	198/1	Singleton and twin <i>instead of:</i> Autumn 1943
677/5 vu	<i>instead of:</i> Movie 1750 <i>correct:</i> Movie 1740	280/13 B.C.E	<i>correct:</i> Summer
679/12	<i>instead of:</i> Ytw, 1959 <i>correct:</i> Ytw, 1969	332/25	1943 <i>instead:</i> save-p <i>correct:</i> save,
692/13	<i>instead of:</i> Arab politics <i>correct:</i> Agricultural policy	512/Note 16 512/Note 18 522/11	<i>instead of:</i> Vuglesang <i>correct:</i> Fuglesang digit two lines deeper set digit one Line higher set <i>instead of:</i> him
Bandffi		529/5 vu	<i>correct:</i> lamp <i>instead of:</i> Treatment G <i>correct:</i> Administration
XIII vu	<i>instead of:</i> gets <i>correct:</i> contains	628/12 vu	<i>instead of:</i> Crisis organization <i>correct:</i> crisis organization of
XIX/15	<i>instead of:</i> STAV <i>correct:</i> staV Reich		transport
46/Note 185- 188	Zijfemje one Line higher put	660/8	<i>instead of:</i> cold-blooded
48/7-8 vu	<i>instead of:</i> going <i>correct:</i> lost	668/2	<i>correctly:</i> hysterical
regulation 64/1 vu	<i>deleted:</i> emphasis. in the original		<i>instead of:</i> Implementing
75/2 vu	<i>instead of:</i> Right there <i>correct:</i> Speer, The Slave		: Speers implementation
	the State Keywords	745/6	Regulations of <i>instead of:</i> sour,
85/4 vu	<i>instead of:</i> Please refer Tab. 4 <i>correct:</i> Please refer Tab. 14		<i>correct:</i> Sour

The from the Imperial debt management designated Reichss

A. The well-founded Fault

I. On Reichsmark loud Fault (million Reichsmarks)

Debt instruments	was standing the Fault at the:	06/30/39	09/30/39
5 % bond from 1927		304.5	304.5
Promissory note loan from 1928		27.0	25.9
Bond redemption debt of Germans Reichs (16. July 1925)			
a) with Drawing Rights		2,654.9	2,654.9
b) without drawing rights		61.4	61.4
Reich debt register claims for volunteers Labor service		4.8	4.8
Reich debt register claims, registered on Reason			
a) of War Damages Compensation Act (30. March 1928)		795.6	795.6
b) the Poland Damage Ordinance (14. July 1930)		132.7	132.7
debt register claims, registered on the basis of § 65 of the law regulating agricultural obligations		50.7	55.2
Fault of Rich at the Reichsbank		172.0	172.0
Pension bank loan		408.8	808.8
4½ %y Treasury notes from 1934		90.5	90.5
4 %y bond from 1934		166.2	166.4
4 % Promissory note loan from 1935		264.1	264.1
4½ %y Treasury notes from 1935		421.4	421.4
4 %y Treasury notes from 1935		13.2	13.2
4½, %y bond from 1935		774.7	774.7
" second edition		1,010.8	1,010.8
4½, %y triggerable Treasury notes from 1935		463.0	463.0
Promissory note loan from 1936		56.7	56.7
4½, %y Treasury notes from 1936		324.4	224.5
4½, %y triggerable Treasury notes from 1936			
II. Consequence		670.3	670.3
III. Consequence		599.9	599.9
4½, %y bond from 1937		611.4	611.4
4½, %y triggerable Treasury notes from 1937			
I Consequence		700.0	700.0
II. Consequence		800.0	800.0
III. Consequence		849.9	849.9

guilt

03/31/40	03/31/41	03/31/42	03/31/43	03/31/44	12/31/44
295.3	286.2	-	-	-	-
23.8	19.6	15.1	10.5	6.9	1.8
2,572.5 60.4	2,417.3 59.5	2,260.9 58.4	2,102.4 57.9	1,942.5 57.6	1,864.0 57.1
4.7	4.7	4.6	4.6	4.5	4.5
722.9 132.7	670.7 121.0	592.7 106.0	517.2 90.7	431.5 75.7	431.2 60.4
60.1	52.3	48.6	45.4	40.2	34.7
170.8	170.8	-	-	-	-
1,199.9	1,334.9	1,549.9	1,549.9	1,549.9	1,549.9
55.5 166.4	10.5 133.2	10.5 99.7	- 66.6	- 33.0	- -
264.1 417.4 13.3 754.2 986.0 463.0	264.1 308.1 13.3 733.1 960.9 463.0	264.1 95.6 3.5 711.4 934.1 370.5	264.1 - - 688.1 905.9 277.8	264.1 - - 664.2 876.1 185.1	264.1 - - 664.2 876.0 92.5
56.7 118.7	56.7 112.9	56.7 109.0	56.7 86.9	56.7 62.9	56.7 43.3
670.3 599.9	670.3 599.9	670.3 599.9	670.3 599.8	556.0 497.6	442.1 395.7
597.5	582.6	567.3	551.9	534.9	534.9
700.0 800.0 849.9	700.0 800.0 849.9	699.9 800.0 849.9	699.7 - -	580.4 - -	580.2 - -

4%, %ige Anleihe von 1938	1.783,9	1.748,4
second edition	978,5	959,6
4 %ige Schatzanweisungen von 1938	67,5	67,5
4%, %ige auslosbare Schatzanweisungen von 1938		
Erste Folge	1.399,9	1.399,9
Zweite Folge	1.966,-0	1.966,0
Dritte Folge	1.850,0	1.850,0
Vierte Folge	1.600,0	1.600,0
4%, %ige Anleihe von 1939	1.565,7	1.854,2
zweite Ausgabe		186,9
4%, %ige Schatzanweisungen 1939		20,1
4 %ige Anleihe von 1940	Summe:	23.642,0
4%, %ige Anleihe von 1940		24.386,5
4 %ige Schatzanweisungen von 1940		
Folge I-IV		
Folge V		
Folge VI		Summe:
Folge VII		
3%, %ige Anleihe von 1941		
3%, %ige Schatzanweisungen von 1941		
Folge I		
Folge II		
Folge III		
Folge IV		
Folge V		
Folge VI		
3 %ige Schatzanweisungen von 1941 Folge VII		
3%, %ige Anleihe von 1942		
3%, %ige Schatzanweisungen 1942		
Folge I		
Folge III		
Folge IV		
3%, %ige Anleihe von 1943		
3%, %ige Schatzanweisungen von 1943		
Folge I		
Folge II		
Folge III		
3%, %iges Darlehn von 1944		
3%, %ige Anleihe von 1944		
3%, %ige Schatzanweisungen von 1944		
Folge I		
Folge II		
Folge III		
3%, %ige Schatzanweisungen von 1945		
Folge I		

1,748.4	1,710.8	1,671.6	1,630.4	1,589.5	1,544.7
974.9	974.9	957.4	932.6	908.0	883.3
67.5	60.0	52.5	45.0	37.5	30.0
1,399.9	1,399.9	1,399.9	-	-	-
1,965.9	1,965.9	1,965.9	1,963.4	-	-
1,850.0	1,850.0	1,849.9	1,847.7	-	-
1,600.0	1,600.0	1,600.0	1,599.7	-	-
3,204.0	3,139.6	3,072.3	3,002.2	2,928.8	2,852.1
322.0	420.1	807.5	785.9	762.9	743.1
31.2	42.4	47.7	50.2	2.3	3.1
-	4,177.3	4,203.2	4,203.2	4,202.1	4,201.6
1,964.0	4,085.4	4,006.3	3,923.6	3,840.5	3,758.0
750.0	2,750.0	} 7,852.0	7,843.4	7,837.5	7,835.8
28,635.5	1,000.0				
	2,000.0				
	2,100.0				
Total:	1,235.6	7,921.2	7,921.7	7,921.3	7,921.3
	3,000.0	} 15,000.0	14,999.9	14,999.9	14,999.9
	786.5				
	46,524.9				
		25.0	40.0	40.0	40.0
		42.7	41.2	39.7	38.2
Total:		2,808.0	9,254.9	9,254.9	9,254.9
		2,837.2	6,000.0	} 18,003.2	18,003.3
			5,984.0		
		69,600.8	6,000.0		
Total:			3,537.0	12,316.5	12,316.5
Total:			90,868.1	} 18,064.0	18,083.0
				100.0	100.0
				3,364.3	11,407.8
				3,409.8	6,000.0
Total:				118,044.1	6,000.0
					400.0
					589.1
Total:					134,960.4

II. On strangers Currencies loud Fault (Millions RM - after the Intermediate courses the Donut

Debt securities	status the Fault at the:	06/30/39	09/30/39
6 %y Outer bond of Germans Rich from 1930		298.1	298.1
International 5%, %y bond of Germans Rich from 1930		709.6	695.4
On Special account at the Germans Reichsbank paid in Repayment amount			36.5
German Outer bond from 1924		281.4	291.4
On Special account at the Germans Reichsbank paid in Repayment amount			54.8
total the on strangers Currencies denominated Fault (plus the O. G. "Repayment amounts")		1,289.3	1,285.1 (1,376.4)

B. Floating Fault (Millions RM)

Debt securities	status the Fault at the:	06/30/39	09/30/39
1. Payment obligations out of of the event from			
a) Non-interest bearing Treasury notes with equivalent and of changes of empire		7,486.0	9,673.5
b) interest-free Treasury notes without equivalent		45.5	35.5
2. Short term loan		286.5	5.2
3. Business loan at the Germans Reichsbank		100.0	218.7

Quotations of deadline)

03/31/40	03/31/41	03/31/42	31 . 03 . 43	03/31/44	12/31/44
298.1	298.2	298.2	298.2	298.2	298.2
687.6	674.5	667.8	661.8	652.2	645.5
-	44.6	48.8	53.3	55.4	57.9
282.3	274.5	265.5	258.8	250.8	245.6
-	72.3	80.3	87.5	90.7	94.6
1,268.2	1,247.3	1,231.6	1,218.9	1,201.3	1,189.3
-	(1,360 , 7)	(1,360.7)	(1,359 , 7)	(1,347.4)	(1,341.8)

03/31/40	03/31/41	03/31/42	03/31/43	31.03 . 44 *	12/31/44
17,690.4	36 . 089 , 6	61,106.5	94 . 724.7	144,499.8	200,628.4
29.4	23.3	17.3	· 11 , 4	5 , 5	5.5
4.6	1,923.7	5,271.0	7,906.9	9,245.3	9,132.9
315.5	180.7	450.3	873.2	411.2	767.8

total the Payment obligations	7,918.0	9,932.9
4. Treasury notes for the purposes from Security deposits	61.4	12.4
Floating Fault:	7,979.4	9,945.3
II. Amount the pending Tax vouchers		
1. Bond stock tax vouchers	108.0	108.1
2. Tax vouchers I and II (NF)	1,497.8	4,029.1
tax vouchers :	1,605.8	4,137.2
III. operating system and Merchandise procurement credit		
1. Business asset credit	-	-
2. Procurement of goods s- credit	-	-
total the Plant/ goods receipt credit	-	-
total Floating Guilt/II. and III.	9,585.2	14,082.5

Declarations after: German Reichsanzeiger and Prussian State Gazette,
No. 290 from December 11, 1939,
No. 196 from the August 22, 1940,
No. 153 from July 4th, 1941,
No. 132 from the June 9, 1942,
No. 146 from the July 1, 1944,
No. 37 from the March 15, 1945.

disagreements in the offsets arise out of the roundings.

18,039.9	38,217.3	66,845.1	103,516.2	154,161.8	210,534.6
10.6	9.7	14.6	12.3	8.6	6.6
18,050.5	38,227.0	66,859.7	103,528.5	154,170.4	210,541.2
109.2	109.8	89.1	67.4	44.5	25.8+
4,001.2	3,544.5	3,539.9	1,177.7	999.8	862.6+
4,110.4	3,614.3	3,629.0	1,245.1	1,044.3	888.4+
-	-	548.3	587.6	589.3	589.2+
-	-	161.3	177.0	176.9	176.9+
-	-	709.6	764.6	766.2	766,J+
22,160.9	41,841.3	71,198.3	105,538.2	155,980.9	212,195.7

annotation to the foreign debt:

After Repayment amounts were made on June 30, 1939 for France, England and Sweden withdrawn, which causes the registered debt again at 10 **Mill. RM** increased.

About the Repayment amounts noted the Imperial debt management in your Announcements always:

"The assets not transferred due to the lack of foreign exchange, repayment amounts transferred to a special account at the Reichsbank transferred to a special account at the Reichsbank Repayment amounts for the American, Swiss, Italian, Belgian, Dutch and German bond holdings were from Debt capital deducted..."

annotation to pending guilt:

The with+ marked Amounts are as estimated buzz published been.

